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
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THE WHARFON SCHOOL OF FINANCE AND COMMERCE, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

**I
NTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS**

SCIENTIFIC BOOK AGENCY



The World Community in Transition

Isaac Rosenberg

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SECOND EDITION

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PREFACE

While the first edition of *International Relations: The World Community in Transition* was in the final stages of preparation, new administrations entered the White House and the Kremlin. Both events, but particularly the emergence of "collective leadership" in the Soviet Union, invited speculation on changes in the foreign policies of the world's two super-powers, and each produced a considerable though still undetermined effect upon the whole international situation. While this second edition was being readied for the press the Eisenhower Administration was given a vote of confidence by the American people ; developments in Poland and Hungary revealed that the heavy hand of Stalinism had survived the downgrading of Stalin himself ; and Israeli and Anglo-French armed interventions in Egypt imperiled the general peace of the world and confronted the United Nations with an unprecedented challenge. Soviet measures in Eastern Europe gave the lie to the peace professions of the "new look" and reduced Soviet prestige throughout the "uncommitted world." The forcible measures of Britain and France weakened the unity of the major anti-Communist powers and even more than the Russian iron heel in Hungary at least momentarily aroused the apprehensions of people nearly everywhere.

As we go to press again, anxious meetings of the Security Council and the General Assembly of the UN, as well as the ominous headlines in the day's newspapers, accent the need for the serious and continued study of international relations. The present volume, like its predecessor, is intended as an introduction to that study.

The second edition holds to the same objectives as the first. The authors have kept their faith in the fundamental good sense of a presentation that deals first with the nature of the state system, involving the state itself, nationalism, sovereignty, and national power ; second, with the various tools or instruments which states have available for use in the promotion of their national interests ; third, with the controls that are present to restrain states and to make possible a tolerable international order ; fourth, with the conflicts and changes which have come since World War II and which have given us the form of the international problems that we now confront ; fifth, with the foreign policies of those states which today shape the well-being of the world ; and sixth, with the kind of international life that seems to be emerging out of the transition period in which we are living.

The requirements of a good textbook are certainly that it be solid in substance — that it present what ought to be learned — and that it have teachability — an orderly and logical progression and clarity of presentation. We have tried to achieve these qualities. We believe that a text should be expository rather than argumentative, that it should seek to be

comprehensive rather than to exploit a particularistic interpretation. To the end of comprehensiveness we have added chapters on Latin America, Africa, and the atom. We have kept our rather full discussion of the United Nations, with increased attention to the evolution of international organization, but we have put these chapters in Part 3 : The Controls of Interstate Relations. We have added substantially to the discussion of the factors of national power and of imperialism and colonialism, expanded some of the original chapters and reduced others, and, in general, "updated" the entire volume and taken account of recent contributions to the study of international relations. With regret, we have eliminated the strictly historical chapters of the first edition, but we have added to historical content at appropriate points. In these ways, and for reasons which every teacher will understand, we have reduced the length of the book by almost four hundred pages. We believe that the new compactness will better meet the needs of teacher and student as well as the general reader.

Our views on approaches to international relations are presented in some detail in "The Study of International Relations," which follows the preface. Perhaps the first question to be answered by the writer of a textbook on international relations is whether he should offer a frankly subjective presentation or a more objective one. It may well be argued that we of the Western world are so conditioned by our traditions of freedom that we are incapable of objectivity on the issues now dividing the Communist and anti-Communist worlds. While this point is well taken, there remains the question of the writer's obligation to the young men and women who are beginning their formal study of the subject. Should he pre-empt their right of judgment by his own urge to demonstrate his patriotism and his tough-mindedness, or should he write with some restraint and with confidence that facts will be as compelling to his readers as to himself? To grossly overstate the case, the choice is between brain-washing and education. Nevertheless, no lover of freedom—certainly neither of the present authors—can write of the issues in the "cold war" with detachment. Perhaps the best that he can do is seek to limit his moralizing, control his language, and give the devil his due.

A few words may further clarify our procedure. The prevailing interpretation in each chapter has remained that of the original author, but through criticism and revision most of the writing has tended to become truly joint. While we have not always agreed on interpretation or on content, each of us has reconciled himself as best he could to the other's viewpoints and "errors." We owe a great debt to each other for forbearance and charity under frequent stress and occasional provocation. Together we have sought to be vigilant against errors of fact and of judgment, which, however, seem to take little account of the best of intentions.

We have assumed that the names of the men and women who write with authority on international relations belong to the vocabulary of the subject, and we have often used these in the text itself rather than relegate them to footnotes. We have preferred to avoid Latin terms in the foot-

notes. We have given the full bibliographical reference with the first use of each title in each chapter, with the publisher listed for American titles and the city of publication for all others. With some compunction, we have kept the reading lists to books and articles in English. We have included in the appendix bibliographical suggestions that may provide additional help in locating material relating to particular areas or topics. We have omitted international relations textbooks from the reading lists ; but many of these have chapters of value as supplementary reading, and so we have included them in the appendix.

Our debts of gratitude are numerous. We are indebted to many authors, publishers, and artists, mostly American and British, for their kindness in allowing us to reprint passages, maps and charts, and cartoons. We are grateful to the *New York Times* for broad permission to quote from its columns, and to the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., New York City, holder of the copyright to articles published in *Foreign Affairs*, which we have found most useful. We have, of course, a continuing debt to those persons who assisted in preparing the first edition, particularly to those whose helpfulness extended to this second edition : Dean Dayton D. McKean, of the University of Colorado, general editor of Houghton Mifflin publications in political science ; Professor Edwin D. Dickinson of the University of Pennsylvania Law School ; Professor Frank R. Brandenburg, now of Michigan State University ; and Mary Sutherland Perkins, whose services as secretary and typist have added new meaning to those words. Our thanks for guidance and assistance in the second edition are offered to Professor Horace V. Harrison of the University of Maryland, and to Professors Arthur P. Whitaker and George A. Coddington of the University of Pennsylvania.

Finally, we wish to thank the editors, artists, and technicians of Houghton Mifflin, who, although nameless here by mandate of "the code," have given of their experience, skill, and patience to the making of this book.

NORMAN D. PALMER
HOWARD C. PERKINS

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
November 28, 1956

THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Almost two centuries ago, in a world without massive armies, tanks, planes, submarines, poison gas, and atomic weapons, Tom Paine spoke the mind of many people when he said, "These are times that try men's souls." What would he say today, were he here to see the frightful weapons of the atomic age, the deterioration of international relations, and the failure of the most powerful states to devise formulas for living together without the ever-present threat of war? He would certainly see, as does every thinking man, that thoughtful attention to the problems of international life has become mandatory for our security, welfare, and, indeed, our survival.

The crisis of our age is no temporary one. It is probable that we are living in one of the great transition periods of human history. The real international crisis of our time, says E. H. Carr, "is the final and irrevocable breakdown of the conditions which made the nineteenth-century order possible."¹ It is not only that "the foundations are shaking," as one writer describes the "world revolution" of our time, but also that new political forms and relationships are emerging. We may sum up the present crisis, and its meaning for the student of international relations, in the following comment by J. B. Condliffe :

We are living through a period of revolution and wars in which the processes of social change are quickened. New power alignments are developing. The confusion is the greater because a new aggressive philosophy of political and economic organization has emerged to challenge the fundamental postulates of the established order. It is reasonable to expect that the economic and political map of the world will register shifts in the location of industry, in political structure, and in the balance of power that will make the latter half of this century as different from the nineteenth as the latter half of the nineteenth was from the eighteenth century.²

A somewhat more specific but similar analysis of the nature of these momentous changes has been made by Thorsten V. Kalijarvi :

Contemporary international relations are going through a reorganization in which the old national state and the old state system are being slowly molded into new political forms. Colonies are gaining independence as empires are breaking up. National states are being merged into

¹ E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939*, 2nd ed. (London, 1946), pp. 236-237.

² *The Commerce of Nations* (Norton, 1950), p. 623.

great federations. National economies are being completely remolded. The nation-state is being forced to yield the complete freedom of action which it has long held under the guise of unbridled sovereign power. New forms of political control are evolving. States by voluntary means or under pressure are being gathered into regional groups and in that form promise to be great forces either for peace or for wars of even greater destruction and horror than in the past.³

As the student of international relations contemplates the world in the early years of the second half of the twentieth century, he finds cause for both hope and discouragement. He is inevitably aware of "universal unrest and perturbation," to use Adlai Stevenson's words. If he is at all perceptive, he is conscious of vast forces at work beneath the surface of events. These create what Mr. Stevenson called the "subterranean pressures..... of dire need, of hunger and disease, of awakened hope, of nationalism, of envy, of impatience to make up for lost centuries" which are "the explosive stuff of international life." In his address of acceptance of the Nobel Prize for Literature, Sir Winston Churchill said : ".....we have entered an age of storm and tragedy. The power of man has grown in every sphere except over himself. Never in the field of action have events seemed so harshly to dwarf personalities.....The fearful question confronts us : Have our problems got beyond our control?"

THE PRESENT NATURE OF THE STUDY

Although international relations has emerged from its earlier status as a poor relation of political science and history, it is still far from being a well-organized discipline. It lacks a clear-cut conceptual framework and a systematic body of applicable theory ; and it is heavily dependent upon other and for the most part better-organized disciplines. But it does have certain features which set it apart from other disciplines, and, above all, it has a particular approach to the problems with which it deals. More than twenty years ago an elder statesman in the field, Sir Alfred Zimmern, wrote :

From the academic point of view, International Relations.....is clearly not a subject in the ordinary sense of the word. It does not provide a single coherent body of teaching material.....It is not a single subject but a bundle of subjects.....Of what is this bundle composed? Of law, economics, political science, geography, and so on—but not the whole range of each of these subjects.....Thus, we are not simply dealing with a group of subjects indiscriminately thrown together but with a group of subjects *viewed from a common angle*. Viewed from that angle, one part

³ "The Persistence of Power Politics," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, CCLVII (May, 1948), 10-11.

of them is in the light, the rest remaining, as it were, in the shadow. The different subjects *converge*, so to speak, at a common point, a point from which the contemporary world of public affairs can be observed.⁴

Since these words were written, relations among states have become even more complex, and, although real progress has been made in the more systematic presentation of the subject, the distinctive characteristic of the study remains the line of approach rather than a generally accepted body of materials or of theory.

The study of international relations is still too subjective in character and content, too likely to be perverted from its real purpose by proponents of a Utopian or of a power-political approach, to mention only the extreme "schools." In its early stages, as Carr has pointed out in one of the basic works in the field, it was "markedly and frankly utopian," for "the passionate desire to prevent war determined the whole initial course and direction of the study."⁵ But the failure of the League of Nations and of the "collective security" system, observed Carr, "clearly revealed the inadequacy of pure aspiration as the basis for a science of international politics, and made it possible for the first time to embark on serious and critical analytical thought about international problems."⁶

The disillusionment of the two decades of aggression and war gave impetus to a "realistic" school of international politics ; here the emphasis was on power politics and the virtual inevitability of war. Then, after World War II a newly-born optimism swung the pendulum back toward the Utopian approach. Observers hopefully assumed that the major non-Fascist states would cooperate in peace as they had in war, and that the United Nations would provide a means for cooperation in averting threats to the peace and in building a better world. Actually, of course, these assumptions were based more on hope than on a realistic appraisal of the world scene. Overenthusiastic champions of the United Nations gave the impression that the new organization had more authority than it actually possessed and that it somehow operated above the plane of power politics and interstate conflicts. With the widening gulf between the Communist and the non-Communist worlds, and particularly with the disillusioning events in Korea after June, 1950, the pessimists again seemed to be in the ascendant. More recently, the "new look" in Soviet foreign policy, beginning with the death of Stalin in early 1953, encouraged a cautious but widespread optimism until the Middle East crisis of 1956.

"International Politics" or "International Relations"? These terms are often used almost interchangeably. Some modern students, however, particu-

⁴ Alfred Zimmern, "Introductory Report to the Discussions in 1935," in Alfred Zimmern, ed., *University Teaching of International Relations*, Report of the Eleventh Session of the International Studies Conference, Prague, 1938, under the auspices of the International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation, League of Nations (Paris, 1939), p. 9.

⁵ Carr, p. 8.

⁶ Carr, p. 9.

larly those who specialize in the study of political behavior, hold that there ought to be a distinction in usage, and that the failure on the part of writers and practitioners of international affairs and diplomacy to make a distinction has contributed to a semantic confusion in the study of international relations today. Briefly stated, these students insist that international politics should deal with the politics of the international community in a rather narrow sense, centering on diplomacy and the relations among states and other political units, whereas international relations is a term properly embracing the totality of the relations among peoples and groups in the world society, and the forces, pressures, and processes which determine the way men live and act and think. Those who subscribe to this broader and more nebulous term differ on the role of international politics in international relations ; some of them would assign it a major role, while others would subordinate it to various cultural, social, and psychological forces in the world environment.

The authors of this volume recognize that "international relations" is a broader term than "international politics," and that its study is being enriched by the wider and more versatile approach currently being pursued ; but they also believe that the new insights and techniques should be employed to understand better the "core" as well as to explore all collateral approaches. While the historian, the economist, the geographer, the sociologist, the psychologist, the anthropologist, and other specialists make their distinctive and indeed indispensable contributions, the fact remains that the working relationships of states are prescribed most of all by the enactments and engagements of governments, however much these may be predetermined by underlying conditions and forces. Moreover, the use of "international relations" to mean essentially "international politics" is by no means a deliberate effort to exclude the non-political ; rather, it is understood to mean the relations of states primarily as those relations come within the conventional purview of the departments of political science which have usually fathered "international relations."

The Content of the Study. The authors of the present volume believe that contemporary international relations is a study of "the world community in transition." According to their view, many of the basic principles and underlying factors of international relations have not changed, but the international environment has changed and it is still changing. The changes are a result of the modifications in the state system, the vast technological developments of our time, the increasingly influential role being played by non-Western societies, and the "revolution of rising expectations" which is affecting the majority of the underprivileged people of the world. Thus in the study of international relations old and new elements must be interwoven. The focus is still the nation-state system and interstate relations ; but the actions and interactions of many organizations and groups also have to be considered. As Quincy Wright has pointed out, "varied types of groups—nations, states, governments, peo-

ples, regions, alliances, confederations, international organizations, even industrial organizations, cultural organizations, religious organizations—must be dealt with in the study of international relations.”⁷

In a report published in 1947 by the Council on Foreign Relations, Grayson Kirk, on the basis of surveys and conferences dealing with the study of international relations in American colleges and universities, concluded that “five ingredients” were usually “combined according to the individual taste of the instructor” in the basic course in the subject. These ingredients were : (1) the nature and operation of the state system ; (2) factors which affect the power of a state ; (3) the international position and foreign policies of the great powers ; (4) the history of recent international relations ; and (5) the building of a more stable world order.⁸ Seven years later Vincent Baker, reporting on a survey under the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, found that “the following ingredients seem now to appear in most courses” : (1) the nature and principal forces of international politics ; (2) the political, social, and economic organization of international life ; (3) the elements of national power ; (4) the instruments available for the promotion of the national interest ; (5) the limitation and control of national power ; (6) the foreign policy of one or more major powers and occasionally of a small state ; and (7) the historical ingredient as a background for other factors and as a history of recent international events. Other trends noted by Baker were the growing concern with theory, the increased emphasis on the policy-making process, a tendency to draw more heavily upon other disciplines, and the more frequent use of case studies of various types.⁹ These trends may be reflected only indirectly and to a limited extent in basic texts for the beginning course ; but they are an indication of the direction in which experienced students of international relations are moving—or trying to move. In fact, an analysis of the components listed by Kirk and Baker will suggest again, as has been indicated already, that the trend is away from an almost exclusive preoccupation with international politics toward a broader approach to international relations.

Even if the focus is on international politics in a more conventional sense, the sheer bulk of relevant materials is staggering. United Nations documentation is so great that the UN is now the second largest publisher in the world, outproduced only by the United States Government. One commentator estimated that “it would take a person 5000 years.....to

⁷ Quincy Wright, *The Study of International Relations* (Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955), p. 6.

⁸ *The Study of International Relations in American Colleges and Universities* (Harper for Council on Foreign Relations, 1947), pp. 27-29. See also Russell H. Fifield, “The Introductory Course in International Relations,” *The American Political Science Review*, XLII (Dec., 1948), 1189-1196.

⁹ Vincent Baker, “The Introductory Course in International Relations : Trends and Problems,” *Universities and World Affairs Document No. 62*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Nov. 1, 1954.

run through the documentary mileage of the First World War." It would take much longer to read all the materials pertaining to World War II. James F. Byrnes records that during the five-week session of the Council of Foreign Ministers in the fall of 1946, when the peace treaties for Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, and Finland were being agreed upon in final form, 855,000 pages of documents were mimeographed. "The entire job required the production of twenty versions" of each of the five peace treaties, with accompanying documents, "totalling in all 44,000 volumes."¹⁰ And this was only one of the scores of important conferences held in the postwar period! These examples illustrate the impossibility of mastering the materials available. They call attention to the problem of selectivity, which has many dangers and pitfalls, and they are reminders of the far from exhaustive knowledge on which vital decisions are based.

APPROACHES AND THEMES

Since the study of international relations is not itself a well-organized discipline with a coherent and integrated body of material, it is not at all surprising that approaches to the subject vary greatly. Much depends upon the orientation, training, and interests of those who teach and write in the field. History and political science are the disciplines from which international relations has emerged, and approaches natural to these two older disciplines are still common. In introductory courses the necessary historical background—or at least as much of it as can be compressed within rigid space limitations — may be presented as a separate section or it may be woven into the textual material at various places on a basically analytical framework. In general, it may be said that in Britain, and in countries influenced directly by the British pattern of education, introductory courses in international relations are usually courses in the history of recent international affairs, whereas in the United States the analytical approach seems to be preferred. One variation or adaptation of this is the problem approach, which is common in government policy-making and is employed to a considerable extent in the university teaching of international relations in the United States.¹¹ A related approach is the use of case studies of various kinds. Neither of these is popular in European universities, where the study of international relations is still heavily theoretical, legalistic, and institutional, with emphasis on legal norms, jurisprudence, and history.

Specific Approaches. Supplementing the general approaches are a vari-

¹⁰ James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly* (Harper, 1947), pp. 150-151.

¹¹ The International Studies Group of the Brookings Institution, which was headed by Leo Pavolsky until his death in 1953, did much to promote the growing interest in the problem approach, especially through the sponsorship of several seminars, the publication of a number of problem papers, and its volumes on *Major Problems of United States Foreign Policy*.

ety of specific ones that give a distinctive flavor to almost every basic text in the field. Most texts, for instance, give special emphasis to one or more of the following :

1. *Power.* This is perhaps the most common and most currently popular type of emphasis. Power seems to be a major determinant of the policies of the leading states of the world and of international relations generally. Moreover, the concept of power has been widened markedly by research in various disciplines, while at the same time its limitations are also being more generally recognized.¹² As applied to the study of international relations, however, the chief forms are such old concepts as the balance of power, elements of national power, and the power equation in its practical application to international politics.

2. *Institutions.* The existence of the United Nations, the most comprehensive of all international organizations, and other organizations of an international or regional character has insured the continued popularity of the institutional emphasis. Doubtless too much attention is often given to a description of the structure and operation of many different kinds of organization. The emphasis thus often tends to be upon procedure rather than substance.

3. *Decision-making and the political process.* This approach is in a way a counterweight to excessive concern with the institutional aspects of international relations. It is especially popular in the United States, where increasing attention is being given to the decision-making and governmental processes. It offers a convenient formula for getting behind the surface of international phenomena in an attempt to explain them. Clearly, decisions are made at various levels and in different ways in different societies, even though the institutional structure may be rather similar. The study of the governmental process provides a broader setting for a detailed analysis of decision-making.¹³

Current Themes. Besides the general and specific approaches, works on international relations often reflect an emphasis on certain themes or viewpoints. Among these the following seem to be currently popular :

1. *The world community.* In many respects ours is already one world, and the community theme emphasizes the things that peoples and nations have in common and the ties that bind them together. It appeals particularly to those who wish to concentrate on the more positive aspects of international affairs, who favor functional and cooperative programs, and who advocate some form of world government, whether in the near or distant future, but it is by no means restricted to visionaries and Utopians.

¹² See Bertrand Russell, *Power : A New Social Analysis* (London, 1938) ; Bertrand de Jouvenel, *Du Pouvoir : Histoire Naturelle de sa Croissance* (Geneva, 1947) ; and Robert Strausz-Hupe, *Power and Community* (Praeger, 1956).

¹³ For an excellent discussion of the applicability of the decision-making approach to the study of international relations, see R. C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and B. Sapin, *Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics*, Foreign Policy Analysis Series No. 3 (Organizational Behavior Section, Princeton University, 1954). See also David B. Truman, *The Governmental Process* (Knopf, 1951).

2. *War and peace.* Much of international relations has revolved around questions of war and peace. In fact, in the atomic age, when war has become a threat to civilization to an unprecedented degree, these questions assume a new urgency. Moreover, although the borderline between war and peace has become more difficult to discern, it is only natural that many texts in international relations should give special attention to the vital issues of war and peace.

3. *Ideologies.* Ours is an ideological age to a degree unknown to history. In the twentieth century, with aggressive totalitarianisms and deep-seated conflicts between political, economic, and social systems, ideological issues have become the burning realities of international life. It is apparent that at the present time much of international relations centers on ideological issues which complicate and obstruct efforts to emphasize long-range problems and needs.

4. *The national interest.* In recent years, especially in the United States, a major school of historians and students of world affairs has emphasized the concept of national interest as a central theme for the conduct of international relations. Obviously the leaders of every nation are expected to promote the national interest, but interpretations of that interest may vary greatly, and consciously or unconsciously policy-makers may be diverted from their true objective. Here is a theme which may be useful in assessing the history and the conduct of a nation's foreign policy.

5. *Nationalism, imperialism, and colonialism.* Nationalism is certainly one of the most powerful forces in the world today, especially in non-Western countries and areas. Imperialism and colonialism in their traditional forms seem to be declining, but they survive in many parts of the world and in many minds and policies. Peoples who have been or are now victims of these "isms" know something of the tragedy they can cause. Moreover, new forms of imperialism are appearing, notably Soviet or Communist imperialism. Knowledge of these forces helps to explain many of the stresses and strains in the international relations of our time.

6. *Economic factors.* The Marxist-Leninist approach to international relations is basically an economic one—witness Marx's theory of economic determinism and Lenin's theory of imperialism—and many non-Communists are also inclined to emphasize the economic aspects of international life. Almost every problem can be analyzed from an economic point of view, even though few problems are wholly economic.

7. *National character.* This theme illustrates the possibilities of a broadly based analysis of the distinctive attributes of peoples and social groups, especially those which compose the national units of modern international society. While it is difficult and perhaps even dangerous to attempt to appraise such a nebulous thing as national character, it is a necessary task for those who are concerned with the mainsprings of thought and behavior of nation-states. In spite of the lack of precise and reliable tests and standards, useful work is being done in studying na-

tional character. Here again we encounter a theme which, if developed more adequately, will provide valuable guides for policy-makers and students of international affairs.

Theory and Philosophy. These approaches and themes can be developed only by drawing upon the contributions of many disciplines. Indeed, one of the most significant and promising trends in international relations research is the emphasis on the interdisciplinary concept. New insights into political behavior can be gained through the various behavioral sciences, especially social psychology, sociology, and anthropology. We are learning more about the causes of cooperation and of conflict between individuals and groups, and about the importance of the unconscious and the irrational in social life.¹⁴ The UNESCO studies on Tensions Affecting International Understanding, for example, are enlightening in this area. So are researches in communications theory and techniques.¹⁵ The beginning student in international relations can be expected to become familiar with the interdisciplinary approach in only a general way, but the basic text and other materials which he uses should incorporate some of the results of this kind of research. The broader approach should not become so diffuse as to obscure the central core of the study; "whereas international relations as a field of study is now conceived in such broad terms as 'all social relations that transcend national boundaries,' the focus of the introductory course may be said to be 'the political processes of international society.'"¹⁶

One of the reasons for the wide range of approaches to the study of international affairs and for the absence of an agreed-upon frame of reference is the lack of a basic theory. Many scholars of a theoretical bent of mind have made significant contributions to the formulation of such a theory, and many practitioners of diplomacy have called attention to the need for further work in this field.¹⁷ Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, for example, has declared that "an applicable body of theory" is necessary for the conduct of a more effective foreign policy. The beginning course should not be primarily a course in theory — some teachers would disagree with this view—but it should have some theoretical content, and it should challenge the student to probe for the

¹⁴ See Harold Lasswell, *Power and Personality* (Norton, 1948); Feliks Gross, *Foreign Policy Analysis* (Philosophical Library, 1954); E. F. M. Durbin, *The Politics of Democratic Socialism* (London, 1940); Gabriel A. Almond, "Anthropology, Political Behavior, and International Relations," *World Politics*, II (Jan., 1950).

¹⁵ An excellent example of the value of communications research for the illumination of the nature of significant international phenomena is Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication* (Wiley, 1953).

¹⁶ Baker, p. 7.

¹⁷ See especially Kenneth W. Thompson, "Toward a Theory of International Politics," *The American Political Science Review*, XLIX (September, 1955), 733-746. This article is a report of a weekend conference on theoretical approaches to international relations, attended by Robert Bowie, Dorothy Fosdick, William T. R. Fox, Walter Lippmann, Hans J. Morgenthau, Reinhold Niebuhr, Paul H. Nitze, Don K. Price, James B. Reston, Dean Rusk, Kenneth W. Thompson, and Arnold Wolfers.

limitations and the possibilities of some of the theories that have been advanced.

Theory is closely allied to philosophy, and in international relations a philosophy is perhaps even more important than a theory. The subject deals with important aspects of human nature and conduct, with the behavior and standards of groups, with the principles and forces underlying and motivating national and international actions, with ideological considerations, with ends and means, and with values and value judgments and hypotheses. All of these and many related considerations are of deep concern to the social philosopher. Thus a philosophy of international relations, as Feliks Gross has observed, "may be an appropriate term for this area of ideology, visions, values, principles, future plans and solutions in the area of foreign politics."¹⁸

MAJOR PROBLEMS OF OUR TIME

We should never forget—if, indeed, we could—that we are living in a time of trial and revolution, of trouble and change, of uncertainty and instability. The roots of our problems go deep into the past and into the basic behavior patterns of men and of nations. We must adjust ourselves as best we can to a situation that will continue long after the present generation has passed from the scene of human affairs. We are in fact living in the midst of many revolutions, and it is clearly impossible to isolate all of them or to agree on their relative importance. In part the present world situation is a moral crisis which threatens the foundations of Western civilization as we have known it. The challenge to that civilization comes, from within and from without.

"In the mid-twentieth century," concluded a group of distinguished American students of international affairs, "the nations of the West are confronted with three fundamental challenges to the values and institutions which characterize their distinctive way of life." The first is "the unmistakable challenge of communist imperialism," which, being "pervasive," "aggravates their other problems and makes resolution of them more difficult and urgent." The second is the challenge of what Toynbee has called the "as yet uncommitted nations" of Asia and Africa. "Many of these countries are passing through social transformations whose outcome is still uncertain—transformations largely induced by their encounter with the West over the past century or more." And the third challenge—"in some respects the most serious of all"—is that of the West's "own internal problems." Fascism, Nazism, and communism are all products of Western thought and society; so are imperialism and nationalism in their extreme forms; so are the greatest wars of modern times, including both World Wars; so are witch hunts, treason trials, and genocide on a scale unprecedented in history; and so are materialism and

¹⁸ Gross, p. 88.

the mechanistic approach to life. "Thus, it is the conjunction and mutual exacerbation of these three sets of fundamental problems which make our period of Western history one of profound crisis."¹⁹ The challenges to Western civilization from without come at a time when it has been seriously weakened from within, and when many of its fundamental tenets have been sharply challenged and even repudiated.

Although Western civilization is relatively weaker than it has been for many decades, it is still very much alive. In fact, it is even today the most vigorous of the World's civilizations. In many respects it has been the most advanced civilization the world has ever known, certainly it has been the most dynamic. Within its orbit many of the great achievements of mankind have been accomplished. Practically all of the great powers of modern times have been Western states. In spite of its grievous faults, Western civilization has made possible a higher standard of living for more people than has ever been known in all of human history. Perhaps, on the whole, its moral code has been higher—at least by its own standards—although there have been many departures from the code.

The impact of Western civilization upon all other societies has been tremendous; indeed, Arnold Toynbee, expert on civilizations past and present, believes that this impact is the greatest event of the twentieth century. In a thousand ways, tangible and intangible, the influence of the West is apparent in almost every country and area of the world. Large parts of Asia were under Western domination for many decades. Most of Africa is still under the control of European powers, and the awakening of that "dark continent" at the present time is in large part a response to as well as a reaction against the influence of the Western world. Many—perhaps most—of the present-day leaders of Asia and of Africa were educated in England, the United States, or European countries, and almost all of them have been deeply stirred by Western ideas. The influence of these ideas upon them, in fact, has generally been stronger than that of their own cultural and political heritage.

While the impact of Western civilization will continue to be great, that of other civilizations, especially those of the Orient, upon the West and upon each other will increase in intensity. "In the future," states Toynbee, "we will witness the counter-action of non-Western societies upon us." The long-run effects, he holds, will be far more significant than "the Russian counter-discharge in the form of communism."²⁰ Certainly, international relations cannot be confined to the Western world. "Our thinking about world affairs is dominated by a pre-Coper-

¹⁹ William Yandell Elliott and others, *The Political Economy of American Foreign Policy* (Holt, 1955). This is the report of a Study Group sponsored jointly by the Woodrow Wilson Foundation and the National Planning Association. The members of the group were William Y. Elliott, Chairman; Frank Altschul; Richard M. Bissell, Jr.; Courtney C. Brown; H. Van B. Cleveland; Theodore Geiger; Harry D. Gideonse, Edward S. Mason; and Don K. Price.

²⁰ "Encounters Between Civilizations," *Harper's Magazine*, CXCIV (April, 1947), 290.

nican point of view, which regards Western civilization as the center of the world. The tremendous change taking place in the world requires a revolution in our thinking comparable to that caused by the discovery that the earth is not the center of the universe."²¹

Encounters between civilizations provide the substance for much of recorded history. This is in fact the central theme of Toynbee's monumental work, *A Study of History*. At all periods, civilizations have in some degree impinged upon each other, but today the encounters are more intimate and more pervasive. This is a consequence of the "shrinking of the world," the "annihilation of distance," which has resulted from improvements in means of transportation and communication and from the general advances in technology. In this sense we live even today in one world and are all marked for a common destiny. While World War II was in progress—a vivid reminder that this is indeed one world—an English poet wrote :

Gone are the days when madness was confined
By seas or hills from spreading through Mankind :
When, though a Nero fooled upon a string,
Wisdom still reigned unruffled in Peking ;
And God in welcome smiled from Buddha's face,
Though Calvin in Geneva preached of grace.
For now our linked-up globe has shrunk so small,
One Hitler in it means mad days for all.
Through the whole World each wave of worry spreads,
And Ipoh dreads the war that Ipsden dreads.²²

Three related problems of our times may be marked for special emphasis. All relate to the growing demands of the vast majority of the people of the world, who have colored skins, who are illiterate, hungry, and exploited, and who live in underdeveloped countries, particularly in Asia.

Of all the revolutions that are now going on, perhaps the most significant and deep-seated is that which is often called the "revolution of rising expectations." "One of the reasons for the world crisis we are living through," declared former President Harry S. Truman in 1955, "is the tremendous upheaval—in social and economic terms—among the peoples of the poorer or less developed parts of the world. . . . In the last hundred years two tremendous things have happened to them. Contact with the highly developed nations has shown them that other peoples can overcome poverty and misery . . . and the spread of Western political ideas has given them an irresistible desire to be free and self-governing."²³ The efforts of the peoples and governments of underdeveloped

²¹ J. S. Roucek, George de Huszar, and associates, *Introduction to Political Science* (Crowell, 1950), p. 557.

²² Martyn Skinner, *Letters to Malaya*, I and II (London, 1941), pp. 34-35 ; quoted in Arnold Toynbee, *A Study of History*, IX (Oxford University Press, 1954), 415.

²³ Testimony before Senate Subcommittee on Revision of the United Nations Charter, April 18, 1955. Text is given in the *New York Times*, April 19, 1955.

countries to improve their economic, social, and political status are responsible for many of the strains in the world today, but these are necessary growing pains toward a more tolerable level of existence. "More fundamentally, the profound social transformation of these countries provides a moral challenge both to their own capacity and to that of the West for building a wider and more stable community among many diverse nations and cultures despite the resentments engendered by past relationships and present conflicts of interest."²⁴

The first of these related and basic problems raises delicate and explosive issues of race and color. It is an admitted but often unappreciated fact that the relations between the white and colored peoples of the world are undergoing a basic reorientation. Professor W. Friedmann believes that this reorientation "may well become the most critical international problem of the next generation."²⁵ (The two-thirds of the world's people who have colored skins are becoming more and more resentful of the white men's treatment of them.) They are now demanding their share of the good things of life. Professor Edwin D. Dickinson has offered some helpful comments on the significance of this problem and on its possible outcome :

In a world in which the white peoples have enjoyed hitherto a none too tolerant ascendancy, yet one in which the colored peoples predominate numerically and have been aroused increasingly by the stirrings of nationalism and the urge for ampler recognition, these things are of tremendous import.....The adjustments may be difficult but certain it is that the arrogance of empires must be tempered increasingly by tolerance and understanding and that influence must pass increasingly to those peoples which are successful in the cultivation of tolerance and understanding both at home and abroad.²⁶

Tolerance and understanding are not easily come by. Feelings of superiority and inferiority, of fear and hatred are still strongly manifest and greatly complicate the problem of developing a better relationship among peoples of different races and colors.

The second series of problems arise out of the life conditions of the vast majority of mankind, most of whom, as we have noted, are colored people. It is hard for the well-fed and over-fed men and women of advanced industrial countries to understand what real hunger and poverty are and what they do to the minds and hearts as well as to the bodies of men. Yet probably two-thirds of the people of the world are undernourished ; about the same number, and almost the same group, are afflicted with disease ; perhaps even more are illiterate. The United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, in its Economic

²⁴ Elliott and others, p. 1.

²⁵ *An Introduction to World Politics* (St. Martin's Press, 1951), p. 276. Used by permission of Macmillan and Company, Ltd., London, and St. Martin's Press.

²⁶ *Law and Peace* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1951), pp. 15, 16.

Survey for 1948, stated the matter succinctly : "When more than half of the world's population lives in conditions of such utter poverty, there cannot exist a sound basis for enduring peace."

Complicating the problems of poverty and hunger are the almost equally grave questions of population growth and of vast human dislocation. Population is increasing most rapidly, indeed alarmingly, in underdeveloped countries, where economic and social conditions are already desperate. In many parts of the world the production of food and other basic necessities is not keeping up with the increase in the number of mouths to feed ; and even if production is greatly increased it may still be far from adequate to provide standards of tolerable existence, not to speak of the needed margin to make possible a real improvement in living standards. In a sense, the problems of the twentieth century may be summed up in two words : food and people. In his report on the work of the United Nations for the year ending June 30, 1954, Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld called attention to the gravity of the problems created by mass poverty and population growth :

Various United Nations surveys of world and regional economic and social developments continue, year after year, to point to two trends that may, if permitted to go unchecked, be more dangerous in the long run than the conflicts that so monopolize our attention today. One of these is the fact that the population has been increasing faster than production, especially in those areas where standards of living are lowest. The other is the manner in which standards of living in those same areas are still lagging far behind those of the more economically advanced regions. It seems clear that no attack on these trends can be successful without a combination of measures of an order of magnitude far beyond what has so far been undertaken.

Since World War I, and especially since World War II, the related problem of refugees and displaced persons has assumed gigantic proportions. In 1950 the International Red Cross estimated the number of refugees at somewhere between sixty and eighty millions. In the following year the National Geographic Society set the figure at between thirty and sixty millions. "The homeless and hunted have moved, and are moving, across continents and seas because of war, political persecution, natural catastrophes and over-crowded lands," the Society reported. No sane international order can exist until these millions attain at least a minimum of security and decency in countries where they are valued members of the social order instead of unwanted parasites. Of all the grim but accurate characterizations of our age, one of the most damning is that of "the century of the homeless man."

The third major problem concerns the consequences of what is often referred to as the awakening of Asia, or the Asian revolution, or the revolt of Asia. This revolt is a many-sided one, it takes such forms as anti-imperialism, nationalism, and numerous other evidences that the peoples

of the world's most populous continent are beginning to realize more than ever before that they can improve their lot in life and are determined to do so. These people, as former Secretary of State Dean Acheson has said, feel "that they should have and should exercise in the world an influence which is proportionate to their numbers and worthy of their cultures."²⁷ Obviously a new relationship has to be worked out between the Western powers and the newly independent states of Asia, which until recently were under Western control. Obviously, too, Western students of world affairs must gain more knowledge and understanding of Asia, and must pay more attention to Asian points of view. No survey of international relations can be adequate which does not give consideration to the Asian revolution and its implications.

Much the same comments could be made about the growing importance of Africa in world affairs. The awakening of Africa is almost as significant an event as the awakening of Asia, although it seems to be lagging behind Asia in economic, social, and political development. It is also hardly comparable in terms of levels and continuity of civilization and in power potential. But Africa, like Asia, is figuring more and more prominently in world affairs, and its importance is certain to grow year by year.

The position of Latin America is much different. It is neither an "uncommitted world" nor a "dark continent." Firmly within the orbit of Western civilization, composed of already-independent states, and now on the road to industrialization, it needs, most of all, the sympathetic assistance of the wealthier and more politically mature states as well as a more sincere dedication to the principles of social and political conduct which its leaders have long professed.

CONFLICTING TRENDS

As we reflect upon the present state of the world, and as we embark on a general survey of existing condition and trends, we must keep alert for the appearance of many paradoxes and inconsistencies. Among the conflicting trends which confront and perhaps confuse the student of international relations are the following :

1. Objectivity—subjectivity. Objectivity, we have said, is important for the student of international relations. Without it, how can the great problems of the world be fairly analyzed and appraised ? Yet one society may accept without question certain goals and values which may be anything but acceptable to other societies. "The problems of international relations," observes Quincy Wright, "usually concern the divergence of the subjective truths accepted by different societies and regarded

²⁷ Address to a group of magazine and book publishers in Washington, June 29, 1951 ; Dept. of State Press Release No. 269, July 14, 1951.

by each to be objective truth."²⁸ In the Communist world objectivity is deliberately repudiated, but this is simply one of the many evidences that communism and the search for truth are incompatible. We, on the other hand, must resolve to be as objective as possible, to make allowances for our own preconditioning and prejudices, and to apply rigid standards to our analyses of international problems and phenomena, without abandoning the basic values and principles that we associate with the democratic way of life. This is indeed a big order.

2. Realism—idealism. The issue of realism versus idealism has occupied the attention of philosophers and men of affairs throughout history ; and it has a continuing application to international problems. Much of the difference of opinion on current issues of foreign policy or of national behavior centers on this dilemma. The recent debates on the national interest, for example, have raised questions on the meaning of realism and idealism and their relative roles and validity as touchstones of foreign policy. Actually, both are of great importance in national and international affairs, and the differences are perhaps of degree rather than of kind. For this reason the idealists like to talk about "the reality of idealism" and the realists like to insist that they are the true idealists. Undoubtedly, extreme devotees of either position have done a great deal of harm in the world ; realism can degenerate into *machipolitik*, and idealism into an ivory tower mentality and a blind disregard of realities.

3. Nationalism—internationalism. Here we encounter one of the most obvious dichotomies of the present day. To an increasing degree this is one world ; but it is also many worlds, and economic, social, and cultural differences, not to mention political issues, tend to obstruct the development of a real sense of world community. Nationalism is still a major factor in the contemporary international order ; moreover it is one of growing strength, at least among peoples who have recently won political independence and are now struggling to achieve economic and social emancipation, or who are still living in a dependent political status. Yet nationalism may become an even more anomalous phenomenon, and internationalism may represent the "wave of the future." Perhaps, as Leslie Lipson has contended, "modern internationalism.....is a reaction to the declining adequacy of nationalism."²⁹

4. National security—international cooperation. As long as the nation-state system is the prevailing form of political organization, the emphasis must continue to be on national security rather than on international cooperation. To be sure, these two goals are not necessarily incompatible, and the popularity of military alliances and regional associations suggests that the one goal can often be reached only by the use of means which lead to the other. But no major nation can afford to gamble its national security on the assumption that all nations will cooperate in their own self-interest ; it must keep its own guard up while at the same time it is

²⁸ Wright, p. 20.

²⁹ *The Great Issues of Politics* (Prentice-Hall, 1954), p. 351.

trying to be a cooperative member of the international community. The presence of powerful states or groups of states which seem to be willing to cooperate only on their own terms, or which seem to be emphasizing their desire for peace and international cooperation as a front for activities which threaten the peace and security of other nations not of the same mind is, of course, an additional reason for the primacy given to national security, defined as the maximum possible reliance on a state's own resources and the support of its allies.

5. Force—consent. The relative importance of force and consent in international conduct, as in national and even personal affairs, is difficult to ascertain. Even the most peace-loving state has to mix the two. Totalitarian states are expert users of the "carrot-stick" technique. Democratic states, if they adhere to their own best traditions, must seek as wide an area of agreement and of consent as possible, but they can by no means avoid the use of force or be oblivious to its use by other states. Indeed, the role of force and consent is one of the underlying themes that call for special attention, for it has never been carefully studied or even understood.³⁰

6. Cooperation—conflict. Closely related to the issues of national security versus international cooperation and of force versus consent is that of the respective roles of cooperation and conflict in international affairs. It is clear that innumerable instances of both tendencies occur daily. Examples of conflict are more newsworthy, and they do involve basic questions of war and peace and of national and human survival ; but cooperation is more common than conflict, and the opportunities for promoting it in fundamental ways are being constantly explored. As has been noted, the findings in many disciplines—as in psychology and psychiatry and other branches of the behavioral sciences—have thrown new light on the causes of cooperation and conflict in international affairs as well as in individual and group behavior.

7. Collectivism—individualism. The trend toward collectivism—one of the strongest trends of the past century—has been in keeping with the prevailing patterns of human society in most parts of the world at most periods of history. Only in the Western world in relatively modern times has the individual *qua* individual been the focus of national and international policy, and even in this area the idea has encountered many reverse tendencies. Americans, brought up on the principles of the rights of man and the importance of the individual, have difficulty in understanding other societies where the emphasis has been upon the group and upon the subordination of individuals in the mass to the interests of the favored few. They also seem to be baffled because even within their own country the state is playing an expanding role in their private lives, and in most parts of the world collectivism seems to fit in with the desires as well as with the needs of the people. The concept of the welfare state,

³⁰ For a stimulating discussion of this point see Louis J. Halle, *Civilization and Foreign Policy* (Harper, 1955), Chap. VII.

for example, which is viewed with considerable suspicion in America, has very favorable connotations in most other areas. Yet at the same time the independence movements in non-Western lands outside the Communist orbit have been profoundly influenced by Western ideas of human freedom, and leaders of these movements have repeatedly insisted that one of their chief aims is to promote human freedom and dignity. Arnold Toynbee has suggested that in attempting to appeal to peoples in non-Western societies the West should emphasize spiritual rather than material factors. "We should put our main stress on the West's respect for individual freedom. That has universal appeal."³¹ This is a mass age, however, and the individual will have difficulty in maintaining his freedom of maneuver and even his dignity under the impact of the growing collectivism.

8. Plenty—want. One of the great paradoxes of our time is the presence of human want on a colossal scale at a time when man has developed the scientific skill and the capacity to provide a tolerable standard of existence for everyone. The paradox assumes gigantic proportions when the United States is worried about overproduction of basic crops, and surplus crops are stored in bulging warehouses or even destroyed while unnumbered millions of people in many parts of the world are still subject to famine, and the majority of the world's people habitually go to bed hungry. A substantial improvement in the life conditions of the majority of the population of the world would seem to be a *sine qua non* of a peaceful world. It is already a scientific possibility, but no formula has yet been devised for dealing with the political and other problems involved.

9. Humanity—inhumanity. In many respects there has been a steady improvement in moral standards and in social responsibility. Toynbee has predicted that the twentieth century will be remembered longest because for the first time in history the welfare of the whole race became an object of international policy. Unfortunately there is another side to the picture. The twentieth century has also been an iron age, and it has witnessed brutalization of the human spirit and some of the worst examples of man's inhumanity to man. Particularly disturbing have been the prevalence of racial persecution, purges, mass murders, and a growing callousness in countries which were supposedly among the most civilized. But inhumanity knows no boundaries, and it persists as an affront to the professions of statesmen, the avowed goals of nations, and the teachings of all of the great religions.

10. The promise of an unprecedented era of human progress—the danger of mass annihilation. Man has come to a fork in the road as a consequence of recent technological developments. For the first time "power without limit" seems to be attainable, with all of its potentialities for human betterment or destruction. This is perhaps the greatest paradox

³¹ Press conference in New York, Nov. 3, 1954 ; reported in the *New York Times*, Nov. 4, 1954.

of this age of paradoxes — that inherent in the limitless possibilities of the atomic age are limitless dangers.

SIGNIFICANT CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS

We have already referred to some of the major problems and principal conflicts of trends which must be considered in a study of the international relations of the second half of the twentieth century. We shall, in addition, present five current developments of potentially great significance : the expanding role of ideologies, the evolution of bipolarity and an “in-between world,” the changing status of various states, the drift toward regionalism and multilateral diplomacy, and the harnessing of nuclear energy.

1. The role of ideologies. The term “ideology” was coined only about a century and a half ago, and only in relatively recent years have ideological factors been persistently operative in international relations. Broadly interpreted, however, they have always been present to a greater or lesser degree, and they have been especially important during periods of religious conflict. The ideological issues of this age have not been primarily religious in character, although in a measure they have been caused by the rise of powerful pseudo-religions. They have arisen because of the growing emphasis on national and individual freedom, on the one hand, and the rise of modern totalitarianisms, with their grave challenges to national and individual freedom, on the other. They have served as a cloak for sinister and subtle methods of control. Ideological universalism, which implies the existence of ideologies which seek to “convert” the world by persuasion if possible but perhaps by force if necessary, is a marked phenomenon of the present age. Herein lies a great difference between democracy and communism.

2. Bipolarity and the “in-between world.” “The central fact of today’s life,” declared President Eisenhower in October, 1955, “is the existence in the world of two great philosophies of Man and Government. They are in contest for the friendship, loyalty and support of the world’s people.” There can be no denying that a fundamental cleavage exists between the Communist and the non-Communist world. On the Communist side the strongest power is the Soviet Union ; on the non-Communist side it is the United States, with Britain, France, and a few other countries also important in a power-political sense. A considerable degree of bipolarity, therefore, does in fact exist. But many countries and areas, occupying much of non-Communist Asia and most of North Africa, inhabited by perhaps a third of the entire population of the world, comprise what is often called the “in-between world.” People in underdeveloped countries formally associated with major non-Communist powers in measures for mutual security against possible Communist aggression often share the views of the peoples of the “in-between world.” These are people

"who are of little weight in the immediate balance of power, whose politics are democratic only in a rudimentary sense, whose economies are at a relatively low level, whose use of physical power is very low, and whose productivity, outside of agriculture, is far behind modern western levels."³² They wish to remain aloof from "power blocs" and they often do not see clearly the nature or even the existence of the Soviet-Communist threat. They are too far removed from the centers of world power, too mindful of past wrongs, too unaware of the nature of modern totalitarianisms, too much absorbed with their own pressing and desperately serious problems. Many of the states of the "in-between world" are making remarkable progress in dealing with their vast problems and in promoting democratic institutions and attitudes, and they are becoming an important factor in world affairs. Thus it is incorrect to describe the world today simply in terms of the rivalry between Communist and non-Communist states, although in fact a disturbing degree of bipolarity does exist.

3. The changing status of various states. Later we shall review the evolution of the state system and the changing relations among the constituent units of the system. Here we wish to call attention only to certain major trends. "Four major facts perhaps can sum up the history of the past fifty years : the rise to world influence of the United States ; the development of Russia under Soviet Communism ; the decline of world influence of the nation-states of Western Europe ; the movement towards political self-determination and independence of peoples in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, who in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries lived under systems of colonial rule."³³ The implications of these major changes in national status will be explored in some detail in various parts of this book, and particular attention will be given to the relative position, foreign relations, and changing status of the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, the Soviet Union, Communist China, India, and re-emergent Germany and Japan.

4. Trends toward regionalism and multilateral diplomacy. We have already observed that the state system is in a period of transition and that new patterns of international relations are emerging. Most of these new patterns are still within the general framework of the state system. Examples are the strong trend toward international regionalism and the appearance of regional arrangements, such as the Organization of American States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the increasing resort to the conference system and to multilateral diplomacy, and the pervasive role of the United Nations. The net effect of these trends, strengthened by embryonic efforts to create truly supranational institutions, by the persistence of movements for government on a universal or

³² *Communism in China*, House Doc. No. 154, Part 3, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., p. 50.

³³ William Draper Carter, review of Ralph Linton, ed., *Most of the World* (Columbia University Press, 1949), in *Courier* (a publication of UNESCO), II (Sept., 1949).

regional scale, and also by the "annihilation of distance" and the amazing developments in technology, may well be to ease the way toward a fundamentally different organization of international life. We may be witnessing the passing of the age of the sovereign state ; but, if so, we are only in the beginning of a new age.

5. **The Atom.** The most disquieting features of the present international situation," states Henry L. Roberts, "are novel and unfamiliar. Certain problems seem without adequate precedent ; customary tools of analysis fail to measure them. The statesman finds it hard to play by ear because he cannot recall any appropriate tune." In Roberts' view "the most disturbing aspects of the present international crisis" are summed up in two words : "atom" and "totalitarianism,"³⁴ In some respects both the harnessing of nuclear energy and the advent of modern totalitarianisms are logical outgrowths of previous developments ; but whatever their origins, they cast ominous shadows over the world at the present time.

"The major test we face today is whether we as a nation are capable..... of adjusting and adapting ourselves to the atomic age."³⁵ The atom offers untold possibilities for human progress, but at the moment its potentialities for destruction are exercising an almost hypnotic effect on peoples everywhere. It may accelerate the alarming tendencies toward totalitarianism in modern society. Even now it seems to magnify the threat from Communist totalitarianism ; for, as Roberts has noted, "the fact that the Soviet Union possesses atomic power and is possessed by Communist totalitarianism expresses most starkly the singularly refractory and unprecedented nature of our tense relations with that regime."³⁶

PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

The student of international relations should pursue his study with a sensible appraisal of the result to be achieved. He must not assume that hard work and consecration will lead inevitably to the solution of the many problems of the international society. He cannot have the assurance of an engineer who sets for himself the task of building a bridge, draining a swamp, or clearing the rubble from a half-destroyed city ; he is not a scientist working through the laws of the physical world. Instead, he is endlessly concerned with emotions, personalities, traditions, motivations, and a host of other intangible and changing factors. At the same time he must never regard himself as a mere observer or onlooker—as one who finds the unfolding story of politics among nations "interesting" but without profit as a means to help men shape their future. He must not be discouraged by the defeatists who deprecate the study of inter-

³⁴ Henry L. Roberts, *Russia and America : Dangers and Prospects* (Harper for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1956), p. 10.

³⁵ Roberts, p. 14.

³⁶ Roberts, p. 10.

national relations because it has not yet revealed the means to prevent tensions and conflicts among nations or because it has not made it possible accurately to predict the course of events.

Why study international relations? The answer is that it reveals how men and nations tend to act in given circumstances and so tells us what conditions should be encouraged and what conditions are to be discouraged if we are to promote international harmony and well-being.³⁷ More specifically, the serious student can never overlook the importance of sovereignty ; he will not minimize its significance as an obstacle to all schemes of world government and all visions of an all-embracing world law ; he will look for it to figure in all matters relating to international legislation, disarmament, collective security, the peaceful settlement of international disputes, foreign trade, and imperialism and colonialism. He will not condemn it forthwith, for he will see that it has great virtues, that it is as yet the backbone of the international community. He will see that nationalism also must enter into all calculations—that it is sometimes good, often bad, but that it can never be ignored. He will see that all dreams of a happy world of the future that disregard sovereignty and nationalism have not the remotest chance of realization. He will see that national interests are interpreted by states alone and not by the “organized conscience of mankind,” that propaganda can poison as well as inspire, and that it can upset all expectations regarding the actions of a nation, that states can move in countless ways to implement their policies through economic, political, and cultural pressures, that national power is a *sine qua non* of survival but that it is varied and changeable in its form and measure, that the actions of nature and of forceful personalities can wreck the most painstaking calculations of wise men, that the road to world peace may not lead altogether through the field of politics, that race, history, language, and culture may devise wholly irrational but supremely effective ties, that democracy and dictatorship can be both constructive and destructive, that problems of poverty and overpopulation are not to be solved by generalized prescriptions, and that technical assistance has its limitations as well as its promise. He will see that full stomachs will not inaugurate the brotherhood of man or a worldwide rise in physical or educational standards banish conflict from the earth. He will learn that war deferred is peace, perhaps the only peace that nations will ever know. Above all, he should gain a sense of realism — a realization that the road to a better order is filled with obstacles of infinite complexity, that it can be traversed only by men who see the horizon ahead as well as the soil below.

The careful and thinking student will come to understand the sub-

³⁷ A UNESCO report of 1954 answers the same question very simply : “The case for a teaching of international relations is a part of the case for a teaching of the social sciences in general. That case rests at bottom upon an article of faith : namely, that the better the world is understood by the better people in it, the better for the world will it be.” C. A. W. Manning, *The University Teaching of Social Sciences: International Relations* (Paris, 1954), p. 84.

jectivity of his own analyses. He will observe that the diagnosis of the ills of the world is not a particularly difficult task and that most people can achieve it to their own satisfaction. He will discover that prescribing the cure is a somewhat more difficult task but by no means a baffling one. He may then be shocked by the resolute unwillingness of the patient to take the cure. There may have been nothing wrong with the prescription of the enthusiast who would bring peace through universal observance of the golden rule ; the hitch came in getting the world to follow the doctor's orders. When and if the cure finally comes it will have to be acceptable to a great many sovereign patients, most of whom have long been convinced that the impairment of their sovereignty is far more likely to be fatal than any of the grave afflictions to which they have long been accustomed. The student will learn that acceptability conditions every proposal for international action, and that it so screens every venture that the only surviving ones are those possessing the rare quality of universal self-interest.

The study of international relations is not a science with which we solve the problems of international life. At its best it is an objective and systematic approach to those problems. It holds few definite answers and promises no final solutions. The alternative to it is ignorance and blindness and probable disaster. Every man who believes that the human race has been endowed with capabilities above those of the lower animals must concede that we have an obligation to ourselves and our posterity to use our minds to escape in the future the miseries and harassments so frequent in the past. One such line of effort pertains to the conditions of the world society in which we live : we call it the study of "international relations."

"The overarching fact of our times," states Robert Strausz-Hupe, "is the struggle between freedom and tyranny. To be sure, it is also the struggle between rival world powers and groups of nation states. But were not the moral order under which mankind lives the supreme stake, then the contest would be a frivolous diversion of mankind's best energies." ³⁸ Today the perennial struggle has reached an acute stage because of the threat of Communist totalitarianism, backed by Soviet power. The Soviet threat is a real one, and freedom-loving states and peoples are faced with the gigantic task of mobilizing their resources on many fronts to meet it. But it is not the only problem which confronts mankind, and exclusive absorption with this particular threat could be as dangerous as efforts to ignore it. This observation brings us back once more to the need for a proper perspective in the study of international relations. John J. McCloy has emphasized the realities of the situation in these telling words :

We should guard against the tendency to attribute all political and economic developments in this unsettled world to Soviet devilry and

³⁸ Strausz-Hupe, p. 126.

cunning.....Soviet power looms large, but it is not the only key to an understanding of world developments. It has often been pointed out, and quite rightly, that if the Soviet Union were to disappear or have a complete and convincing change of heart with respect to world domination, we should still have to face and solve many problems which we now consider to be aspects of the Soviet threat. Large segments of the world's population would still be struggling for better living standards, economic security, and viable institutions. Hyper-nationalism, authoritarianism and other dangers to free institutions would persist. Indeed, it is partly because these and other issues exist in the world today that Communism has large opportunities for initiative.³⁹

Students of international relations must always strive for objectivity, balance, and perspective. They must carry on their work in the face of obstacles of prejudice, ignorance, emotionalism, and vested interest—often including their own. Since the world is their laboratory, and since a healthy combination of realism and idealism must underlie their approach to the subject, they must beware of “simple” solutions to complex problems, and they must also shun the thesis of the “inevitability” of war, the “wave of the future” approach, and all such encouragements to disaster. They must look with understanding on the world as it is, and at the same time keep their eyes on the world as it should be ; but they must never mistake the ideal for the actual, or conclude that what “must” be will in fact occur.

They must reconcile themselves to the fact that many of the problems of international relations are unsolvable under present conditions. “The plain fact is that we are living in a very complicated and dangerous world. There are few if any easy, just and completely satisfying solutions to the great problems that face us today.”⁴⁰ Not all of these problems, however, constitute major threats to peace and security, and those which are unsolvable and dangerous may take on a different complexion and decline in importance with the passage of time, even if they are never really “solved.” Basic agreement may never be reached between the Communist and the non-Communist worlds, but this does not mean that war is therefore inevitable, or that this particular fissure in the international community must exist indefinitely. The problem of war may never be solved, but there is hope that it can be kept under control and that total war in the atomic age, with all of its frightful consequences, can be avoided. For many issues it may be impossible to devise a genuine solution, for they may be so complicated and have so many ramifications that they may baffle the most experienced and far-sighted statesmen. The only possible course in some instances may be to keep the problems under control as much as possible, to do everything that can be done within the range of practicable alternatives to deal with them, and to worry along with them as circumstances permit. “The limits of foreign policy,” to use the title of

³⁹ Foreword to Roberts, pp. xi-xii.

⁴⁰ Editorial in the *New York Times*, Nov. 22, 1949.

a book by a former member of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, are often narrower than most people realize. Another former high official in the State Department explained the limits in this way :

Justice Holmes used to remark that there are some statements to which the only answer is, 'Well, I'll be damned.' There are also, in this world, some situations posing policy problems where any answer that can conceivably be advanced can be conclusively demonstrated to be wrong. There are occasions when it is quite simple to make out a strong case against a particular line of action, and all that can be said in its favor is that an even stronger case can be made against any other course. That is life in this imperfect world. It will do no good to be hysterical or morose about it.⁴¹

This homely philosophy is badly needed as a guide to the study of international relations. It helps to explain why, to paraphrase the famous statement of Oxenstierna, the world is governed with so little wisdom, and why the policy-makers and practicing diplomats often seem so much less brilliant than writers and speechmakers without responsibility for conducting the world's affairs.

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Part One

THE PATTERN OF INTERNATIONAL LIFE

The State System and.....1 Its Corollaries

“World community” is something of a poet’s term. It raises visions of a neighborhood that reaches to the ends of the earth, of all peoples united in peace and good will, of a brotherhood of man. It is the stuff that dreams are made of.

But in another sense the world community is a historic reality. It is made up of all people everywhere—most of whom live in “sovereign” states that must “co-exist” on the same planet. Through sheer necessity these states have relations with each other—relations to promote their well-being and security. These relations and the universal pattern of their conduct put the stamp of a community on the collectivity of some ninety sovereign states and their dependent areas. Moreover, some of these states are bound together by ties of economic interdependence, others by the memories of a common past, and still others by geography, language, race, religion, or political institutions. Added to these bonds are those of a vast array of international organizations, of which the most important are the United Nations and its specialized agencies and regional organizations such as the Organization of American States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In this very real sense there is a world community, and, as we shall see, it is clearly in transition. As its basis is the state, or rather the state system, it is here that the study of the world community and of international relations must begin.

THE STATE SYSTEM

What is variously called the state system, the Western state system, the nation-state system, and the national state system may be described rather simply : It is the pattern of political life in which people are separately organized into sovereign states that must manage to get along together. The heart of the "problem" of the state system lies in the conflict between the theory of legal omnipotence and the fact of unavoidable concession and accommodation. To defend its sovereignty, its national honor, and its material interests, each state organizes its coercive resources : it builds up its "national power." When peaceful persuasion is inadequate it may use more forcible means, even to employing all of its strength in total war. Conflicts of interest often do lead to war, and it is natural that they should do so when each state is legally free to set its own course, or when in fact it is able to do so regardless of legal theory.

For more than three centuries the state system has provided the pattern of international life. It is the dominant pattern today. It is necessary, therefore, to discuss the nature of the state, the differences among states, the classifications of states in power-political terms, the historical evolution of the state system, and some important characteristics of the system.

Corollaries of the System. Certain features of the state system are inseparable from it, not adjuncts of it ; without them the system could not have come into being. We might call them *corollaries*. The first is the doctrine of nationalism, the second is the concept of sovereignty, and the third is the principle of national power. Nationalism is that psychological or spiritual quality which, although it may involve some earthy considerations, unites the people of a state and gives them the will to champion what they regard as their national interests. Sovereignty is the legal theory that gives the state unique and virtually unlimited authority in all domestic concerns and in its relations with other states. National power is the might of a state ; it provides the implements for getting done the things that the state wills to be done. It is a complex of many elements, both tangible and intangible.

The State. The term "state" is an imprecise one. According to one definition it is "any body of people occupying a definite territory and politically organized under one government." The essential components of a state, as this definition suggests, are people, land, and a government.

The terms "state," "government," and "nation" differ in meaning. A government is "the established form of political administration" of a state. A "nation" may be a "body of inhabitants of a country united under a single independent government," and in this sense the word is virtually synonymous with "state." But a "nation" may also be "any aggregation of people having like institutions and customs and a sense of social homogeneity and mutual interest." Thus several nations may be present in one state, or a nation may extend beyond the borders of a single state.

The state is a legal entity, and the term "state" is essentially a legal one. Strictly speaking, "nation" is a sociocultural term, and it may be used without implications of legal or political integrity. In general, writers commonly use "state," "nation," and "country" interchangeably to avoid the excessive use of one word—not because the three words mean exactly the same thing.

Differences among States. Vast differences exist among states in population, size, resources, culture, economies, government, military power, and almost every other conceivable respect. According to international law, however, all states are equal and sovereign. The United Nations, for example, as Article 2 of the Charter proclaims, "is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members." But in actuality there are many inequalities and many degrees of dependence among states.

Differences in population and area are particularly striking. The combined population of all other nations in the Western Hemisphere is only slightly greater than that of the United States, and—taking the less populous states—the combined population of more than half of the nations of the earth is scarcely equal to that of the Soviet Union. Some thirty states, more than one-third of the total number, have fewer people each than New York City; this list includes such important states as Australia, Chile, New Zealand, Sweden, and Switzerland. On the other hand, more than one-third of all the people in the world live in India and China. Size presents the same contrasts. Aside from tiny units which hardly deserve the designation of states—such as Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, and San Marino—Luxembourg is smaller than Rhode Island, and Lebanon is smaller than Connecticut. At the other extreme, covering more than a million square miles each, are India, Australia, the United States, Brazil, Canada, China, and the U.S.S.R., in rising order of size. Russia alone, with approximately eight million square miles, covers one-sixth of the land area of the world; and the British Empire and Commonwealth occupy nearly one-fourth of the earth's surface.

Contrasts among states in other respects are also great. In national wealth and material resources the differences are truly startling. United Nations statisticians have estimated that the nineteen richest countries, with 16 per cent of the world's population, have 66 per cent of the world's income, while the fifteen poorest countries have more than half the world's population and less than one-tenth of its income. If we may take national budgets as the measure of wealth, we note that some states expend less than one-half cent for every one hundred dollars spent by the United States. The budget of the City of New York is larger than that of most of the states of the world. The national income of India, with more than 360,000,000 people, is smaller than that of Britain with about 50,000,000 people. In some states the resources are largely agricultural, in others mineral, and in others technological or commercial; in a few they are balanced. Cultures show the same lack of uniformity, with marked

differences in history, tradition, religion, language, ethical codes, social patterns, and economic and political ideologies. Belgium, Iceland, Indonesia, Liberia, and Saudi Arabia hardly seem to belong to the same world. They differ not in cultures alone but also in economics and political institutions, to say nothing of geography, population, ethnic affiliations, and natural resources. Some states have a high degree of racial, cultural, and religious homogeneity ; others have very little.

One state may have a government headed by a parliament, a cabinet, and a queen, while another may have a parliament without a king or queen but with a president. Some may have a president with a congress, some a president, an army, and no congress, others a pyramidal soviet form, and still others a plural executive or some other arrangement. More important than form, some governments are high-handed and dictatorial, others just and democratic ; some are dictatorial and honest, others democratic and corrupt. Governments are variously monarchies or republics, federal or unitary in form, but these terms imply nothing about representative institutions and the rights of individuals. Some states, like the United States, have a written constitution that is brief and general ; some, like Mexico and India, have one that is long and definitive ; some, like Great Britain, have no written constitution at all in the usual meaning of the term.

Power Classification of States. For the student of international relations the most common and perhaps the most useful way of classifying states is in terms of national power. Although the power position of a state is the result of many variables and intangibles, certain yardsticks can be employed. At best, however, these are an unsatisfactory basis for classification. It is particularly difficult to avoid assessing the power of a state in terms of its past position or its power potential. Sweden was once a major power but clearly is not one now ; India seems to possess the human and natural resources and the qualities of mind and spirit to become a major power, but she has not yet attained that status. The rating of states in terms of national power does not, of course, imply any superiority or inferiority in levels of culture or in over-all contributions to civilization.

The most conventional classification of states, speaking in power-political terms, is that of "great powers" or "major powers" and "small powers" or "lesser powers." We shall have many occasions to use this terminology, but it will be necessary to speak also of "world powers," "super-powers," "middle powers," and powers of uncertain status. Writers use the term "world powers" in two different senses ; (1) to refer to those countries which have worldwide possessions and commitments—such as France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the United States, and possibly Belgium and Portugal ; and (2) to refer to those countries which have both worldwide possessions and commitments and extra ordinary military power. Here, perhaps, the United States would best qualify ; possibly Britain, too, may still be called a world power. The term "super-powers" is one which has come into rather general use in the postwar period,

when two or at most three giants have possessed really impressive power.

The term "great power" or "major power" is sanctified by long historical usage and is still meaningful today. We may describe a great power as a state which has broad but not necessarily global interests and commitments, and the capacity as well as the willingness to meet its commitments. At present it is sometimes held that the great powers are those states which have permanent seats on the Security Council of the United Nations, namely Nationalist China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States ; but this is merely a pragmatic test and by no means a conclusive one. Perhaps France and China should be classified as "middle powers." This category is a particularly useful one, for certainly some states which are not great powers exercise far more influence in international relations than the majority of the small countries. They may exercise local or regional superiority and have an effective power-in-being that is substantial. India, for example, may clearly be regarded as a middle power ; the same title may be bestowed, with less certainty, upon Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Italy, Mexico, and perhaps also on Spain and Turkey. Conceivably Yugoslavia should be classed as a middle power, since it has a sizable area and population, an important geographical position, and a strong and relatively independent government.

Small powers, in the words of Martin Wight, "are Powers with the means of defending only limited interests, and of most of them it is true that they possess only limited interests."¹ This is a large and rather nondescript category, embracing all the states of the world except the great and middle powers and those temporarily of uncertain status. Wight may be wrong in asserting that most small powers "possess only limited interests," although he is correct in a technical sense. Some small powers, indeed, have shown a universality of interests and a breadth of vision beyond those of most great powers.

The classification of "powers of uncertain status" is reserved for only two states—Germany and Japan. Germany remains divided. The major victor nations in World War II have been unable to agree on the terms for a peace treaty for her. Part of the former German national territory has been incorporated into Poland, and in the former zones of occupation two allegedly independent states have come into existence. In April, 1952, after more than six and a half years of military occupation, the peace treaty for Japan went into effect, and that country was readmitted into the family of nations. But these steps were bitterly opposed by the Soviet-dominated world, in whose eyes an independent Japan does not exist. In the recent past both Germany and Japan have been great powers, and both still have vast power potentials.

¹ *Power Politics* (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1946), p. 11.

THE STATE SYSTEM SINCE WESTPHALIA


Scholars commonly designate 1648, the date of the Treaty of Westphalia, as the time when the state system began to take on its modern form. States had existed before Westphalia, and they had conducted relations with each other, but they had done so on quite a different basis. The ancient world had known a succession of sprawling dynastic empires and tiny city-states, and it had known the vast Roman Empire, which had encompassed the civilized Western world. But it had never known a national state or a system of independent states resting upon something akin to the theory of sovereignty. Notable changes had come by the eve of Westphalia: England, France, and Spain had arrived as national states, and others were well on the way; the Roman Church had failed in its long effort to assert and make good its universality; the Holy Roman Empire was doomed in both fact and theory; and Machiavelli, Bodin, Grotius, Luther, Calvin, and a host of other theorists had together provided defense and justification for the independent secular state.

The Peace of Westphalia. With the Thirty Years War and the Peace of Westphalia a notable landmark was reached in the history of the nation-state system. The war resulted from the Protestant-Catholic schism begun by the Protestant Reformation and promoted by the Catholic Counter-Reformation. In addition to its religious aspects, the war involved dynastic rivalries of the Hapsburgs and the Bourbons as well as certain issues among German princes. The struggle established no dominant religious group, but it did result in a mutual toleration which has lasted, more or less, until the present time. In spite of enormous destruction, the wrecking of the universal Church, and the fragmentation of Europe into well-defined nation-states, the resulting Peace of Westphalia (1648) paved the way for a semblance of European stability.

The settlement at Westphalia may be said to have formalized the nation-state system through its recognition that the Empire no longer commanded the allegiance of its parts and that the pope could not everywhere maintain his authority, even in spiritual matters. Henceforth German princes were to rule as they saw fit, and they were to be free to choose Calvinism, Lutheranism, or Roman Catholicism. Holland and Switzerland were recognized as independent republics. The enlargement of Brandenburg began an expansion that produced the Kingdom of Prussia and, eventually, the German Empire. France and Sweden also were given additional territory. One historian has summarized the results of the Peace of Westphalia as follows: "By 1648 the state system was fully established in Europe. The Empire was an empty shell. The claim of the pope to temporal sovereignty in Europe was, as an effective force, a thing of the past."² Henceforth the states of Europe were "on their own."

As of 1648 the roll of European states read something like this: Eng-

² Warren O. Ault, *Europe in Modern Times* (Heath, 1946), p. 110.



THE SYSTEM AND COROLLARIES

European States after the Peace of Westphalia, 1648

land, France, Spain, and Sweden were the great powers. England had not been a party to the Thirty Years War and was largely unaffected by it ; France was about to enter a period of continental dominance ; Spain was beginning a long period of decline ; Sweden, in control of the Baltic area, was only momentarily a first-rate military power. Russia had not yet emerged as a strong state. Poland, large and populous, was too poorly governed to count for much in international politics. Italy, a conglomeration of petty states, was only a geographical expression. The Ottoman Empire, important for strategic rather than military reasons, had exhausted its expansive force and was soon to decay. Germany, nominally unified as part of the Holy Roman Empire, was actually disunited, although some of the larger states—Brandenburg, Bavaria, and Saxony—wielded considerable influence. The emperor was also ruler of the Hapsburg dominions, but he never succeeded in making a nation of them. The most important of these were Austria, Spain, and the Spanish Netherlands. The independent small powers were Denmark (which then included Norway), Holland, Portugal, and Switzerland.

While it is true that the state system that came into being at Westphalia still remains unchanged in its basic pattern—which is simply the concurrent existence of many “sovereign” states in one world—it is also true that the passing of time has brought many developments which have affected the system. These include the rise of representative government, the Industrial Revolution, population changes, the growth of international law, the evolution of diplomatic method, the increase in the economic interdependence of states, the setting up of procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes, and many others. These will be discussed elsewhere. Here, to bring our account of the state system down to World War I, we shall briefly note the course of balance of power politics and the appearance of new states.

Westphalia to Utrecht. The international relations of the years between the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 and the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 were dominated by the ambition of Louis XIV (1643-1715) to establish French hegemony on the continent of Europe and by the rivalries of Great Britain, France, Holland, and Spain for colonial supremacy in the Western Hemisphere. Britain provided the chief link between the two areas of conflict, for she joined with continental states to preserve the balance of power in Europe and so reduce the capacity of France for fighting on the seas and overseas.

Louis XIV possessed a magnificent army and a consuming urge to use it. He was remarkably successful in extending his power and his domains ; but at length a coalition of powers, headed by Britain and Austria, stopped him in the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1713). France suffered heavy losses by the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) ; while she managed to keep a Bourbon on the throne of Spain she was forced to pledge that France and Spain would never be united. She lost Nova Scotia to Britain. Austria was given Naples, Sardinia, Milan, and the Spanish Netherlands ;

and Britain won Gibraltar and Minorca from Spain, as well as certain trading rights. The Treaty of Utrecht also gave further impetus to the unification of Prussia, which later became the pivot of the European balance, and the agreement made it clear that Sweden, Russia, and Poland could no longer resolve issues in the East without involving the West. In fact, it is not too much to say that after Utrecht no European state could act without reckoning with the others.

Utrecht to Vienna. The balance of power set up at Utrecht was often imperiled during the next hundred years, but it was not destroyed. No state was able to establish permanent hegemony over Europe. By 1733 France had recovered enough to fight the War of the Polish Succession, by which she forced the Hapsburgs to cede to her the Duchy of Lorraine. After five years of peace she undertook to partition Austria, only to be thwarted by the courage of Maria Theresa in the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748). The primacy of France and Austria, which permitted or forced them to clash whenever a continental issue arose, was disturbed by the development within Prussia of a powerful military machine. Fearing Frederick the Great (1740-1786) and his fine army, France quickly reversed her strategy and concluded an alliance with Austria.

Russia, likewise becoming alarmed by Frederick, also joined the coalition against Prussia, whereupon, seeing in these alliances an increase in France strength, England quickly jumped on the scales to counterbalance the combination against Prussia. In 1756 the Seven Years War was begun when Frederick invaded Saxony. Only the defection of Russia gave him victory, as he was considerably outnumbered by the forces arrayed against him. His ally, Britain, won a clearer victory in North America, virtually eliminating France from the New World.

The defeat of Austria, France, and Spain in the Seven Years War, together with the exhaustion of Prussia, left no state powerful enough to dominate Europe: the balance of power had been restored. The next threat was precipitated by the French Revolution, an internal convulsion brought on by the fact that the demands of the rising bourgeoisie had been left unanswered by a reactionary monarchy. When the revolutionists sought to carry the new gospel of liberalism to the rest of Europe, they touched off a conflagration that was to last for twenty-three years. The war was several years old when the "Little Corporal" strode upon the scene, asserted his mastery of France, and set out upon the conquest of Europe. At the pinnacle of his power Napoleon held the continent under tribute, and Russia was his ally. For a time Britain fought alone. Then, as "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity" deteriorated into aggressive French nationalism, vigorous rival nationalisms sprang up under the heel of Napoleon's conquering armies. British naval supremacy, "General Winter" in Russia, and the combined might of Britain, Russia, Prussia, Austria, and Sweden finally brought about the defeat of the Corsican adventurer and the end of the most formidable of all French attempts to conquer Europe.

Since the period from Westphalia to the rise of Napoleon had been regarded as one of relative peace and stability, it is not surprising that the representatives of the nations meeting at Vienna in 1814-1815 sought to re-establish the old system. They decreed that eight states should be accorded diplomatic recognition as first-rate powers : Great Britain, Russia, Austria, Prussia, France, Sweden, Portugal, and Spain—the last three as a gesture to tradition. The deliberations were dominated by four states—Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia. At the opening of the Congress France had held the position of a vanquished nation, but through the sheer brilliance of Talleyrand's diplomacy she emerged as a major power with considerable influence in continental Europe. To protect the continent against new ventures in French imperialism the Congress erected a *cordon sanitaire* between France and her neighbors ; and to restore the balance of the state system it invoked the principles of compensation and "legitimacy," usually ascribed to Prince Metternich of Austria.

Between Utrecht and Vienna one old European state had passed from the scene and a new state had appeared in the Western Hemisphere : Poland had been divided and absorbed by Prussia, Russia, and Austria, and the United States had been born of the American Revolution. England, Prussia, Russia, Austria, and France remained as major powers, while Spain, Holland, Portugal, and Sweden had definitely become lesser powers.

Vienna to the Present. The years between 1815 and 1914, sometimes referred to as the period of the *Pax Britannica*, were disturbed only twice by major conflicts in which the status of great powers was involved. In the first of these, the Crimean War (1854-1856), the Russian threat to dominate Constantinople and the Straits was blocked by Britain and France. The second, the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871), did not immediately disturb the over-all balance of power in the European system, but it did mark the displacement of France by a unified Germany as the leading power on the continent.

The rise of Germany was due to Prince Otto von Bismarck (1815-1898), who welded the states of the German Confederation into the German Empire through a policy of "blood and iron." The Empire was proclaimed on January 18, 1871, at Versailles. Operating somewhat differently, Count Camillo di Cavour (1810-1861) performed the same services for the new state of Italy, which was proclaimed in early 1861, with Victor Emmanuel of Sardinia-Piedmont as king. Thus the decline in the power of France and Austria, plus the shrewd diplomacy of Bismarck and Cavour, led to the addition of two new major states to the European system.

In the Balkans, the decline in Turkish strength permitted realization of the dreams of independence among Slavs in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Greece, Montenegro, Rumania, Serbia, Bulgaria, and, finally, Albania became the sovereignties which were to make nationalism in the Balkans a constant threat to the peace of Europe and to the conflicting designs of the great powers.

Overseas, a group of new states joined the United States of America in the Western Hemisphere. The removal of Ferdinand VII from the throne of Spain by Napoleon furnished the occasion for the assumption of sovereign power by some of Spain's American colonies, a course eventually followed by all the rest. Brazil declared her independence of Portugal in 1822, with the son of the Portuguese king as emperor ; the monarchy remained until 1889, when a republican form of government was established. During these years the United States of America was growing steadily. By the sixties she had population and resources sufficient to wage one of the most colossal wars of the century. Certainly an important power by the end of the Civil War, she was recognized as one of the major world powers after the Spanish-American War in 1898.

In the Far East, Japan emerged from feudalism in 1867-1868 with the overthrow of the shogun. Copying the techniques of the Western world, she was able to parry the imperialistic thrusts of the European powers and to build a strong nation-state. As a result of her victory over China in 1894-1895, her alliance with Great Britain in 1902, and particularly her defeat of Russia in 1904-1905, she was admitted to equality with the major powers.

By the outbreak of war in 1914, then, there were eight major powers, all but two located on the continent of Europe. Their power interests were varied. Germany, Austria, and Italy had combined in the Triple Alliance (1882), born of German desire to maintain the status quo of 1871, Austrian fear of Russia, and Italian displeasure with French imperialistic policy in northern Africa. Italian designs on Austrian sovereignty over parts of unredeemed Italy, however, made her susceptible to counter-offers and at best an unreliable member of the combination. Great Britain, France, and Russia had teamed together in the Triple Entente (1907), a product of French desire for both revenge and security against Germany, English fear of a rapidly growing industrial Germany, and Russian designs in the Balkans. The United States, untested in world combat, was a potential counterweight to any undue tipping of the scales by an unfriendly continental combine. Consequently Britain worked to find an opening in the wall of isolationism of the United States in world affairs. She had achieved limited success by 1900 ; but she had won greater success with Japan by 1902, when she concluded the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, aimed at the maintenance of stability in the Far East. Thereafter Japan carefully watched the moves of the great powers. Willing to expand in any direction, but sensing the greatest potentialities in Manchuria, she adjusted her policies to those of warring European states to achieve regional gains in the Far East. She gave little thought to the balance of power in Europe.

Since World War I the "European" state system has become worldwide. Europe is still its center in a qualified sense, but none of the three most powerful states of today is a wholly European power. Instead of six or eight great powers with continental or regional interests, there are now two or three super-powers with universal interests. It may be argued that

these changes have effected a fundamental alteration in the nature of the state system itself ; but it seems more accurate to say that there has been little change in its basic design, which is the co-existence of a large number of states, including some of pre-eminent military power, all subject to the drive of their special interests and emotions, all subscribing to the theory of sovereignty, and all impelled to develop national power as the instrument of their national policies. Such is the state system, and since nations tend to coincide with states, it is the nation-state or national state system.

NATIONALISM

"For students of international politics, an understanding of nationalism is as indispensable as the possession of a master key to a person seeking to enter all the rooms in a building. Indeed, the *total* behavior of the state system in our day may largely be explained in terms of *national* hopes, *national* fears, *national* ambitions, and *national* conflicts." ³ If nationalism is unmentioned in any serious discussion of international problems, it is because its significance is assumed. As Carlton J. H. Hayes said : "So much is nationalism a commonplace in the modes of thought and action of the civilized populations of the contemporary world that most men take nationalism for granted. Without serious reflection they imagine it to be the most natural thing in the universe and assume that it must always have existed." ⁴

The leaders of every state regard the national interests, as interpreted by themselves alone, as paramount, and loyalty to the state as superior to every other earthly obligation. Sometimes, in fact, nationalism takes precedence over moral and religious beliefs, as was the case in Nazi Germany ; or it may become fused with such beliefs, as seems to be true in Israel and Pakistan today. It has become a kind of secular religion alongside other religious faiths, but in our day it has sometimes actually replaced supernatural religion. Arnold Toynbee has characterized it as "the real if unavowed religion of 'post-modern' Western society." In its most virulent form it has commanded virtually the total allegiance of men, and some of the most inhuman acts of this age have been wrapped in the mystical and religious trappings of nationalism.

The Meaning of Terms. Among the terms that we need to clarify before we can undertake an intelligent discussion of the evolution and importance of nationalism are *nation*, *nation-state*, *nationality*, *national self-determination*, *patriotism*, and *chauvinism*. The related concept of *sovereignty* will be examined at some length later in the chapter. Other chapters will deal with imperialism, which has often been closely associated with nationalism,

³ Walter R. Sharp and Grayson Kirk, *Contemporary International Politics* (Rinehart, 1944), p. 93.

⁴ Carlton J. H. Hayes, *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism* (R. R. Smith, 1931), p. 289. Used by permission of The Macmillan Company.

and with economic nationalism, one of the most important and pervasive aspects of the whole subject.

The word *nation* has had many meanings, some with no relation to the state system. In modern times the word *nation* has been used in several senses, on the basis of different theories and interpretations.⁵ One of the most satisfactory definitions was advanced by Ernest Barker nearly thirty years ago :

A nation is a body of men, inhabiting a definite territory, who normally are drawn from different races, but possess a common stock of thoughts and feelings acquired and transmitted during the course of a common history ; who on the whole and in the main, though more in the past than in the present, include in that common stock a common religious belief ; who generally and as a rule use a common language as the vehicle of their thoughts and feelings ; and who, besides common thoughts and feelings, also cherish a common will, and accordingly form, or tend to form, a separate State for the expression and realization of that will.⁶

In his famous lecture at the Sorbonne in 1882, "*Qu'est-ce qu'une nation ?*," Ernest Renan emphasized the intangible ties which bind people together into a nation. "What constitutes a nation," he said, "is not speaking ✓ the same tongue or belonging to the same ethnic group, but having accomplished great things in common in the past and the wish to accomplish them in the future."

A nation is not necessarily the human and physical incarnation of a state. In fact, even in a modern sense we may conceive of a state's being composed of several nations, although perhaps the term *nationalities* should be used in this connection. Indeed, we often speak of the multinational state. But in modern parlance the terms *nation* and *state* are used almost interchangeably, and the major political units which exist today may appropriately be called *nation-states*. As Hans Morgenthau suggests, "the nation needs a state. 'One nation—one state' is thus the political postulate of nationalism, the nation state is its ideal."⁷

Nationality, one of the main sources of nationalism, may imply either national character and the spirit of belonging to a nation or a group of people possessed of such a spirit. The latter connotation is very common today. Thus the sociologist Louis Wirth defines a nationality as "a people who, because of the belief in their common descent and their mission in the world, by virtue of their common cultural heritage and historical career aspire to sovereignty over a territory or seek to maintain or enlarge

⁵ See Louis L. Snyder, *The Meaning of Nationalism* (Rutgers University Press, 1954), Chapter II, "The Concept of the Nation" (pp. 14-55). See also Pierre Renouvin, "The Contribution of France to the Study of International Relations," in *Contemporary Political Science : A Survey of Methods, Research and Teaching*, Publication No. 426 of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (1950).

⁶ *National Character and the Factors in Its Formation* (London, 1927), p. 17.

⁷ Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 2nd ed. (Knopf, 1954), p. 148.

their political or cultural influence in the face of opposition.”⁸ Frederick Hertz defines it as “a community formed by the will to be a nation.”⁹ It is “nothing material or mechanical,” observes Arnold J. Toynbee, “but a subjective psychological feeling in a living people.”¹⁰

National self-determination means “the right of individuals to determine the sovereign state to which they would belong and the form of government under which they would live.”¹¹ It is the principle by which nationalities justify their efforts to acquire “nationhood” in the form of “statehood” ; within states, exalted and strengthened by sovereignty, they hope to find a new prestige and a new security. This right was strongly championed by Woodrow Wilson, and it has inspired many movements, successful and unsuccessful, for national independence.

Patriotism is a familiar concept, commonly defined as love of country. From the historical point of view it is not necessarily associated with the nation-state. The addresses of Pericles to the Athenians, of Hannibal to the Carthaginians, of Cicero to the Romans are among the greatest examples of patriotic oratory. Today, however, patriotism, like nationalism, is associated almost exclusively with loyalty to the nation-state. It is capable of inspiring some of the finest of human sentiments, but it can become as intense and as narrow as that which prevailed among the city-states of ancient Greece—and infinitely more dangerous.¹² In its exaggerated form it is known as *chauvinism*.

The Concept of Nationalism. The foremost modern students of nationalism, including Carlton J. H. Hayes and Hans Kohn, admit that no satisfactory single definition is possible. Perhaps the most revealing clue to its nature is Hayes’s statement that nationalism consists of “a modern emotional fusion and exaggeration of two very old phenomena—nationality and patriotism.”¹³ Or, as Hans Kohn puts it, “nationalism is first and foremost a state of mind, an act of consciousness.”¹⁴ In the twentieth century, as he observed in a subsequent work, nationalism became “the common form of political life all over the earth,” but “everywhere nationalism differs in character according to the specific historic conditions and the peculiar social structure of each country” and because of the “stress

⁸ Louis Wirth, “Types of Nationalism,” *American Journal of Sociology*, XLI (May, 1936), 723.

⁹ *Nationality in History and Politics*, 3rd ed. (London, 1951), p. 12.

¹⁰ *Nationality and War* (London, 1915), p. 13.

¹¹ Hayes, p. 10.

¹² H. G. Wells wrote that among the Greek city-states patriotism “took an intense and narrow form.....The narrow geographical limits of these Greek states added to the intensity of their feeling. A man’s love for his country was reinforced by his love for his native town, his religion, and his home ; for these were all one.....But in the main, patriotism in the Greek home was a personal passion of an inspiring and dangerous intensity. Like rejected love, it was apt to turn into something very like hatred.” *The Outline of History* (Macmillan, 1921), p. 260. Used by permission of The Macmillan Company.

¹³ Carlton J. H. Hayes, *Essays on Nationalism* (Macmillan, 1926), p. 6.

¹⁴ Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism* (Macmillan, 1944), p. 10. Used by permission of The Macmillan Company.

upon national sovereignty and cultural distinctiveness" has become "a deeply divisive force." When it "spread to Eastern Europe and later to Asia.....nationalism tended toward the closed society, in which the individual counted for less than the strength and authority of the national whole."¹⁵

Although he points out that "nationalism cannot be defined adequately in simple terms," Professor Louis L. Snyder advances the following statement as "least objectionable" :

.....nationalism, a product of political, economic, social, and intellectual factors at a certain stage in history, is a condition of mind, feeling, or sentiment of a group of people living in a well-defined geographical area, speaking a common language, possessing a literature in which the aspirations of the nation have been expressed, attached to common traditions and common customs, venerating its own heroes, and, in some cases, having a common religion.¹⁶

"Nationalism," says Snyder, "is neither wholly logical nor rational. Its roots lie in the illogical, irrational, and fantastic world of the unconscious." It is "in part a psychological response to grave threats of insecurity." Since it "is not an innate instinct, but rather a socially conditioned, synthetic sentiment," it can hardly be understood without reference to the findings of psychology and psychoanalysis.¹⁷ Here we have clear evidence of the importance of studying international relations from the points of view of all the behavioral sciences.¹⁸

Types or Stages of Nationalism. Although nationalism cannot be accurately defined, it does have divers forms which can be analyzed in different ways. One approach is to attempt to classify its types and stages. It has been described as "good" and "bad," constructive and destructive, material and spiritual, conscious and subconscious (or unconscious). Hans Kohn has drawn a most useful distinction between (1) nationalism in the Western world and (2) nationalism outside the Western world. This distinction calls attention to the very different forms which nationalism has assumed, and it helps to explain "the process of cultural influence and resistance in non-European areas."¹⁹ Nationalism may also be studied on a country-by-country basis. But the most common and perhaps still

¹⁵ *Prophets and Peoples: Studies in Nineteenth Century Nationalism* (Macmillan, 1946), p. 4. Used by permission of The Macmillan Company. See also Hans Kohn, *Nationalism: Its Meaning and History* (Van Nostrand, 1955); Boyd C. Shafer, *Nationalism: Myth and Reality* (Harcourt, Brace, 1955); and Snyder, *The Meaning of Nationalism*.

¹⁶ Snyder, pp. 196-197.

¹⁷ Snyder, pp. 89-110.

¹⁸ An outstanding recent study which applies new techniques in the behavioral sciences to the analysis of nationalism is Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality* (Wiley, 1953).

¹⁹ Snyder, p. 121. See also pp. 118-120 for a summary of "the Kohn dichotomy" in outline form.

most valuable approach is the chronological. This is followed in a number of rewarding studies by historians and students of international relations.²⁰

More than a quarter-century ago Hayes first developed five principal successive types or stages of nationalism, which he labeled humanitarian, Jacobin, traditional, liberal, and integral. The first four types originated in the eighteenth century, their respective heydays being the eighteenth century, the period of the French Revolution and Napoleon, the early nineteenth century, and the mid-nineteenth century. Integral nationalism, primarily a growth of the twentieth century, has characterized the policies of totalitarian states, although some of its chief exponents were not conscious supporters of totalitarianism, and more than traces of it can be found in the policies of supposedly democratic states.

A somewhat similar classification of the stages in the development of nationalism—though one which suggests an earlier development of the concept—is presented in Quincy Wright's monumental work *A Study of War*.²¹ Wright discussed in succession medieval, monarchical, revolutionary, liberal, and totalitarian nationalism. Perhaps he did not give sufficient attention to cultural or humanitarian nationalism; and neither Hayes nor Wright singled out economic nationalism as one of the major types, although both were well aware of its importance, especially in connection with their fifth stage. Hayes, in fact, devoted a long chapter to "Economic Factors in Nationalism."

Professor Snyder discerned four stages in the chronology of nationalism. These he labeled integrative nationalism (1815-1871), disruptive nationalism (1871-1890), aggressive nationalism (1900-1945), and contemporary nationalism (since 1945). During the first stage nationalism was a unifying force, and found concrete expression in the unification of Italy and of Germany; during the second, subject nationalities of Austria-Hungary and other multinational states clamored for independence; during the third, "nationalism became virtually identical with aggressive imperialism," and the "collision of opposing national interests" led to two World Wars; during the early years of the contemporary stage "political nationalism asserted itself in the form of widespread revolts against European masters," and communism "in its Stalinist form took on the trappings of nationalism in the Soviet Union."²²

²⁰ The most complete analysis of the origins of nationalism is Kohn's *The Idea of Nationalism*. Among the best summaries of the historical evolution of nationalism are Hayes, *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism*; Shafer, *Nationalism: Myth and Reality*; and Kohn, *Nationalism: Its Meaning and History*.

²¹ Quincy Wright, *A Study of War*, 2 vols. (University of Chicago Press, 1942). See the section on "Evolution of Nationalism" in the chapter entitled "Nationalism and War" (II, 1004-1009).

²² Snyder, pp. 116-117. Snyder summarizes many classifications of nationalism by scholars in various disciplines. See Chapter V, "Classification of Nationalism" (pp. 112-132). For additional classifications see Max Sylvius Handman, "The Sentiment of Nationalism," *Political Science Quarterly*, XXXVI, No. 1 (1921), 107-114; Harry Elmer Barnes, *The History of Western Civilization*, 2 vols. (Harcourt, Brace, 1935), II, 453-456; Louis Wirth, "Types of Nationalism," already cited; and George Orwell, *England Your England and Other Essays* (London, 1953), pp. 55-62.

Nationalism During the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Era.

While the roots of nationalism go far into the past, modern nationalism is a development of the past two centuries and is indissolubly associated with the nation-state system. "Modern nationalism," in the opinion of Hans Kohn, "originated in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in northwestern Europe and its American settlements. It became a general European movement in the nineteenth century."²³ It is possible, of course, to find evidences of national feeling in the period when various nations were taking form; certainly the English, French, and Dutch were often motivated by real sentiments of nationality before 1500. As Quincy Wright indicates, this early "nationalism" was monarchical, for the concept of the nation as the body of citizens had little meaning. It was the French Revolution which, almost for the first time, introduced the concept of popular democracy resting on the will of the people and on the rights of man and of the citizen.

The revolutions of the late eighteenth century—the Industrial, the American, and the French—were the seed-beds of most of the forms of nationalism of modern times. In fact—and changing the figure of speech—one might say that in the fires of these three great revolutions the modern world was forged. The period of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars was particularly fruitful for the evolution of nationalism. This force became so strong that it could not be curbed; in a sense it turned against its creators, for it diverted the Revolution into channels which were not charted, and it stimulated a reaction in other peoples of Europe against their French conquerors.

What was the character of the nationalism that emerged from the French Revolution? In some respects it was revolutionary and democratic. To it Professor Hayes applied the term "Jacobin"; but, as he admits, it was democratic in only a limited and functional way. Inevitably, Jacobin nationalism became more and more militaristic, and a creed that was democratic in origin provided an opportunity for the dictatorship of Napoleon, who though himself not a nationalist, had raised the banner of nationalism and under it had led the armies of France over much of Europe, extinguishing the liberties of many other peoples in the course of his triumphal progress. Eventually he fell victim to his insatiable ambition and to the very force of nationalism "which his wars aroused abroad and which he did not understand."²⁴

The nationalism which Napoleon evoked among his enemies was chiefly what Hayes has called "traditional nationalism." It was aristocratic, evolutionary, and conservative—the very antithesis of Jacobin nationalism. It sought to preserve rather than to destroy or change. But precisely because it regarded Jacobin nationalism with aversion, even with horror, it became itself as bellicose and violent as the Jacobin variety.

The victory of traditional nationalism at Waterloo appeared to be con-

²³ *Prophets and Peoples*, p. 3.

²⁴ Kohn, *Nationalism: Its Meaning and History*, p. 27.

solidated by the events that followed in many parts of Europe. In France, for example, Louis XVIII and then Charles X, apostles of legitimacy, succeeded to the throne ; and Tsar Alexander of Russia, who emerged in 1815 as "the great hope of traditional nationalism," championed a Holy Alliance which, under the benign aura of traditionalism and Christianity, seemed to promise a better world for peoples and nations. But Alexander soon repented of his nationalistic sympathies and became a strong supporter of the reactionary Prince Metternich, the dominant figure in Europe from 1815 to 1848.

The Liberal Nationalism of the Nineteenth Century. The nineteenth century was the great age of nationalism, both in theory and in practice. More and more accepted as almost the natural order of things, nationalism developed a more popular base and won important victories. In Europe its greatest practical achievements were the unification of Germany and of Italy. Other European states, such as Greece and Belgium, won nationhood as a result of nationalistic uprisings, and agitation elsewhere, notably in Poland, Ireland, and the Austro-Hungarian Empire demonstrated the intensity of national feelings. Nationalism, until then almost exclusively a European phenomenon, spread to other continents. The Spanish and Portuguese colonies in the New World won their independence, while in Asia the stirrings of national consciousness presaged the upheaval that is now revolutionizing the largest of the continents. In Japan, nationalism was becoming a powerful force by the turn of the century ; it was one of the Western products which the Japanese adopted in order to build a state powerful enough to resist Western imperialism.

The nationalism of the greater part of the nineteenth century was linked with most of the other great movements and tendencies of that period ; democracy, romanticism, industrialism, imperialism, and especially liberalism. Indeed, the predominant type of nationalism in the years from 1815 to about 1880 was liberal nationalism. It was based solidly on the support of the middle classes, whose power was growing with expanding industrialism. Reflecting the new democratic spirit astir in most countries, it championed individual and national freedom. This kind of nationalism, like so many of its exponents, was high-minded and pacifist ; yet in a Europe still controlled by reactionaries these goals could not be achieved by peaceful means. Liberal nationalism failed in that "it could not realize its ideal of basing the state system of Europe on the principle of nationality without sacrificing its ideal of pacifism.....So fighting became the practical means of transforming cultural into political nationalism."²⁵

As the nineteenth century waned, so too did liberal nationalism. The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries brought growing rivalries among the great powers — rivalries for trade, for industrial, military, and naval supremacy, for allies, and for colonies in the great imperialist scramble. More and more the state assumed functions previously outside

²⁵ Carlton J. H. Hayes, "Nationalism," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* (Macmillan, 1937), XI, 245. Used by permission of The Macmillan Company.

its scope. The reasons for this portentous development were at least two : in the first place, there was a growing demand for the protection of the economic and social interests of the individual ; and, second, the state began to require more from its people as the price of maintaining its prestige and status in the face of pressures from within and rivalries from without. In the twentieth century its activities in some instances extended to the all-encompassing operations of monolithic totalitarianism.

World War I and Nationalism. Nationalism was one of the underlying causes of the First World War, as Sidney B. Fay and other students of its origins demonstrated. It was, in fact, both a cause and a product of the war. This point was clearly brought home by Professor Hayes :

Nationalism paved the way of statesmen and prepared the mind of peoples for the World War.....Its immediate cause was the murderous activity of a secret nationalistic society of Jugoslavs. Its fighting was done by "nations in arms," whose morale was sustained by nationalist propaganda.....Its most obvious immediate result was the triumph of the principle of national self-determination in central and eastern Europe. The last of the non-national empires on the continent were shattered---the Austrian, the Russian and the Ottoman---and from their ruins were constructed new or enlarged national states.....The World War not only issued from nationalism but led to a more intense nationalism. In Europe the newest national states almost instantly passed from liberal pronouncements to illiberal conduct and speedily vied with older national states in establishing nationalist tariffs, armies, schools and other agencies of propaganda and in discriminating socially if not legally against dissident minorities.²⁶

Totalitarian Nationalism. In the years following World War I the facade of internationalism, built across the world stage by the League of Nations and by such agreements as the Locarno and Kellogg pacts, proved to be frail indeed. Fascism gained power in Italy only three years after Versailles, in Germany and Japan in the early thirties, and in Spain in 1936. In fascism the world witnessed the first lush flowering of modern totalitarianism, bringing a form of nationalism more powerful, more encompassing, more brutal, and more dangerous than any previous variety. Eventually World War II was largely brought on by totalitarian nationalism, and it is by no means certain that the Fascist threat has been forever eliminated. Moreover, another form of totalitarianism, the Communist totalitarianism of the Soviet Union and her satellites, and now of Communist China as well, has become more firmly entrenched, more restless, and more aggressive.

To speak of communism as a form of totalitarian nationalism may seem to be a contradiction in terms, since communism, unlike fascism, is presumably an international and not a national gospel. In practice, however, communism, or, to be more accurate, the political forms which profess to be communistic, have become increasingly nationalistic. The Soviet

²⁶ Hayes, "Nationalism," p. 247.

rulers have posed as champions of nationalism in Asia and as enemies of colonialism and imperialism, and they have had considerable success in identifying communism with nationalistic aspirations. Native Communist leaders have captured nationalist movements, or they have made profitable use of them ; they have scored notable successes in Indo-China, Indonesia, Korea, and, above all, China. The Chinese Communists succeeded in taking over the nationalist revolution that had been under way ever since it had overthrown the Manchu dynasty in 1911-1912. In spite of their close associations with the Soviet Union, the Chinese Communists still pose as national leaders who favor independence from foreign exploitation and domination.

During World War II, when German armies were occupying the western part of Russia, the Russian people were exhorted to rise up in defense of "Mother Russia"—not of communism or world revolution. Soviet rulers have constantly harped on the danger of "foreign encirclement." In the postwar years the Soviet government has encouraged the nationalism of Russia's many nationalities, permitting their cultural, political, and economic institutions to be "national" in form as long as they are "proletarian" in spirit and substance. In the satellite states of Eastern Europe it has encouraged dissident nationalist groups even while extinguishing the liberties and independence of those countries. Operating behind a front of native Communists and puppet regimes, or through the Cominform and peace appeals, its leaders have used pressures and promises, blandishments and brutality to serve the interests of their own totalitarian nationalism at the expense of other peoples and states.

When Tito was denounced by the Cominform for his heresies, and when he assumed a position of open defiance of the Kremlin, a startling phenomenon appeared : a Communist state which was apparently more nationalist than Communist. Since his open break with the rest of the Communist world, Tito has relied primarily on Yugoslav nationalism, but in part also on increasing assistance from non-Communist states. If Titoism occurs elsewhere, if nationalistic tendencies grow stronger within the Communist sphere—in other words, if communism goes national, to use Professor Carleton's words—a new equation will enter international politics.²⁷

Integral Nationalism. The kind of nationalism which has been begotten by the totalitarian states seems to be so phenomenal and so all-pervasive that some authorities believe that it is fundamentally different from anything known before and that it represents the characteristic form of nationalism of the twentieth century. Hans Morgenthau has insisted that there is a basic difference between the nationalism of the nineteenth century and the "nationalistic universalism" of today :

To call by the same name what inspired the oppressed and competing nationalities of the nineteenth century and what drives the superpowers of

²⁷ See William G. Carleton, "Is Communism Going National?", *The Virginia Quarterly Review*, XXV (Summer, 1949), 321-334.

the mid-twentieth century into deadly combat, is to obscure the fundamental change which separates our age from the preceding one. The nationalism of today, which is really a nationalistic universalism, has only one thing in common with the nationalism of the nineteenth century, that is, the nation as the ultimate point of reference for political loyalties and actions. Here, however, the similarity ends. For the nationalism of the nineteenth century the nation is the ultimate goal of political action, the end point of the political development beyond which there are other nationalisms with similar and equally justifiable goals. For the nationalistic universalism of the mid-twentieth century the nation is but the starting point of a universal mission whose ultimate goal reaches to the confines of the political world. While nationalism wants one nation in a state and nothing else, the nationalistic universalism of our age claims for one nation and one state the right to impose its own valuations and standards of action upon all the other nations.²⁸

Morgenthau presents an interesting thesis, but why should nationalism connote exclusively the totalitarian type? It could be argued that Morgenthau's "nationalistic universalism" is not nationalism at all but a peculiar interpretation of the foreign-policy objectives of the super-powers. Unique though it is, totalitarian nationalism has stemmed from the age of nationalism and of the nation-state system.²⁹

Totalitarian nationalism is the extreme and perhaps logical end-product of what Hayes and others, borrowing from Charles Maurras, have called "integral nationalism," the characteristic form of the twentieth century. Maurras himself once described integral nationalism as "the exclusive pursuit of national policies, the absolute maintenance of national integrity, and the steady increase of national power—for a nation declines when it loses military might."³⁰ The movement which Maurras inaugurated, the *Action Francaise*, was the spearhead of developing integral nationalism in France. Based on a peculiar combination of Bonapartism, royalism, provincialism, and Catholicism (although it was eventually condemned by the Vatican), the *Action Francaise* crusaded against the Treaty of Versailles as an insult to France, praised Mussolini (who was really an enemy of France), supported Franco and an authoritarian Spain, and finally championed the Vichy regime. Maurras was anti-democratic, anti-Semitic, and anti-English, but also fiercely anti-German. "France - and France alone" was his cry when his country lay prostrate in the midst of

²⁸ Morgenthau, p. 313.

²⁹ What Sharp and Kirk wrote in 1940 about Fascist nationalism can be applied to totalitarian nationalism in general: "Today, with the democratic countries definitely on the defensive against the menace of fascist aggression, a superficial view of the situation might easily lead to the assumption that fascist nationalism has little or nothing in common with the national state of mind now prevalent under democracy. But a more thorough examination of the factors that have produced fascism, considered along with the historic connection between democracy and the principle of nationality, suggests that the seeds of fascist internationalism are inherent in a state system which has made of national sovereignty a political fetish." Sharp and Kirk, p. 143.

³⁰ Quoted in Hayes, *Historical Evolution*, p. 165.

disaster. After the war he was condemned for treason by a French court and sentenced to life imprisonment. His name still exerts a spell over those in France and elsewhere who make "the politics of hate" the most fanatical religion of modern times.³¹

Instruments and Symbols of Nationalism. We have already referred to many of the techniques of nationalism and to the bases of its appeal. Among the most powerful instruments for its propagation are the schools, the press, and the radio. In a totalitarian state these instruments are deliberately used to serve the state; education, law, and journalism are permitted no other function. Freedom of thought and of the press and justice under law, as these terms are conceived in the Western world, have no meaning in modern dictatorships. Even in the free world, moreover, nationalistic propaganda, is still widespread. The controls are more indirect, arising more out of the folkways and mores of the various societies than out of the pressures from governments, but they are nevertheless powerful. Most Americans, for example, would be surprised at the amount of nationalistic propaganda to be found in present-day textbooks in use in all schools, from the primary grades to the most advanced levels. But "when honest efforts are made to secure objectivity in history textbook writing, they meet with stiff resistance from powerful interest groups in most national communities. Under the guise of patriotism, such groups exert pressure upon ministries of education, school boards, and teachers in order to prevent a balanced treatment of the nation's relations with other countries."³² In one American community the selection of textbooks in the public schools has been subjected to the approval of the Americanism Committee of the local American Legion Post ! Texts have been criticized as "un-American" because they gave too favorable treatment to unicameralism, social security, and, of course, the United Nations. A number of columnists and commentators have charged that UNESCO has become an organization for propagating ideas of world government which, if carried out, would strip the United States of her sovereignty. In some instances, as in Los Angeles, this campaign has generated local pressures to prevent instruction in the public schools on the work of UNESCO.

Nationalism is propagated by the use of symbols and "social myths." Among the commonly used symbols have been patriotic slogans and songs, flags, uniforms, shrines and monuments, public spectacles, pageantry, and ritualism. Such symbols may serve very worthy ends—certainly love of country and belief in it are among the finest of human sentiments. But these same symbols may and do serve dangerous masters when they are used to deceive and to enslave, to instill hatred of other peoples and a

³¹ See a brilliant essay on "Charles Maurras : The Politics of Hate," written by D. W. Brogan in 1944 and reprinted in his *French Personalities and Problems* (Knopf, 1947), pp. 117-128. Another excellent essay in the same volume (pp. 99-116) deals with "Maurice Barres : The Progress of a Nationalist."

³² Sharp and Kirk, p. 121.



Justus in *The Minneapolis Star*

"Whistling Past the Graveyard."

false sense of the nation's "glory" and "destiny." "Integral nationalism has surpassed all its predecessors in rites and ceremonies, in mysticism and devotion, and likewise in intolerance."³³ This has been especially true of totalitarian nationalism. Probably never before, whether in ancient Rome or in modern Hollywood, have symbols, ritualism, and "social myths" been used so skilfully or with such tremendous effect as in Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, Communist Russia, and, apparently, Communist China. These states have demonstrated that the ugly face of despotism can be "glorified" by the cosmetics of nationalism.

The Dangers of Nationalism. In its origins modern nationalism was associated with democracy and liberty, and for some time it was believed that the relationship was more than a historical one. Now we know that nationalism, far from always promoting democracy and liberty, often places these blessings in jeopardy; that it has proved on occasion to be wholly compatible with autocracy and totalitarianism; that it tends, unless carefully watched, to restrict the area of human freedom, not to enlarge it. In a sense we should perhaps be grateful that nationalism and liberty are

³³ Hayes, *Historical Evolution*, p. 299.

not necessarily coterminous ; for the former may well be an ephemeral phenomenon in history, whereas we hope that the latter will long endure.

Because nationalism tends to degenerate into ever more intolerant forms and because it has been a major cause of war, it is generally condemned as an evil force. In the final chapter of his *Essays on Nationalism*, entitled "Nationalism : Curse or Blessing," Hayes distinguishes between nationalism as a historical fact and nationalism as a belief. As a belief, he asserts, nationalism has been "a curse and nothing but a curse." Rabin-dranath Tagore, the Indian poet and philosopher, held that nationalism was a great menace because it called for a "strenuous effort after strength and efficiency" and thereby "drains man's energy from his higher nature, where he is self-sacrificing and creative."²⁴ Victor Gollancz wrote : "Of all the evils I hate, I think I hate nationalism most."²⁵ Arnold Toynbee's ten-volume work *A Study of History* contains many references to crimes committed in the name of the nation-state and of nationalism during the last three or four hundred years. Professor Shafer closes his careful study of nationalism with a fervent attack on the whole concept and with a plea for the brotherhood of man. Many students of nationalism have commented on its apparent tendency to exclusiveness and its incompatibility with international cooperation. Thus Vladimir Solovyev, a Russian philosopher of the nineteenth century, wrote about nationalism : "In its extreme form it destroys a nation, for it makes it the enemy of mankind."²⁶

Contrary to the hopes of many optimists, the twentieth century has become an age of virulent nationalism. Proponents of world government and all strong internationalists like to think that the tide of nationalism is ebbing, but the evidence to the contrary is overwhelming. It is to be found in the new and sensitive nationalisms of Asia, both in the new nations that have come into being since the war and in the strong native nationalistic movements in other parts of Asia ; in the difficulties which the Western world is experiencing in developing cooperative programs of economic recovery and defense ; in the political effectiveness of charges in the Chamber of Deputies that France is being dictated to by the United States and Britain, in declarations before the House of Commons that Britain is supinely following a war-minded United States, in accusations on the floor of the American Congress that the foreign policy of the United States is being made in Whitehall and Downing Street ; in the use of the United Nations as a forum for nationalistic propaganda ; and in manifold restrictions on trade and the exchange of currencies and in other examples of economic nationalism. To be sure, not all contemporary trends are unwholesome or alarming, for there are also encouraging signs of a slow but steady growth of internationalism. The conclusion seems unavoidable,

²⁴ Quoted in A. Appadorai, "Political Science in India," *Contemporary Political Science*, UNESCO Publication No. 426, p. 43.

²⁵ *My Dear Timothy* (Simon and Schuster, 1953), p. 292.

²⁶ From one of a series of articles on "The National Question in Russia," written about 1880 ; quoted in Kohn, *Prophets and People*, p. 205.

however, that nationalism is still very much with us and may even be increasing in intensity. Here is a great problem of our age.

SOVEREIGNTY

The concept of sovereignty, like the doctrine of nationalism, is indissolubly associated with the nation-state system. It is, said Professor McIlwain, the "central formula under which we try to rationalize the complicated facts of our modern political life."³⁷ Some understanding of it is essential to the purposeful study of international relations.

The Meaning of Sovereignty. As interpreted by earlier writers-- Bodin, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau--and by modern political scientists - Jellinek, Duguit, Kelsen, and Laski--sovereignty has assumed many different guises. Moreover, it has frequently changed its content, its laws, and even its functions during the modern period.³⁸ It has been invoked to justify absolute rule, and it has given rise to the concept of "popular sovereignty." It has often been regarded as a major stumbling block to hopes and plans for supranational organization and cooperation, the rock on which so many hopes for peace have foundered.

"Few political conceptions," observed Professor McIlwain, "have been the subject of so much discussion amongst us in the last hundred years."³⁹ "No word in political science," declared Professor Coker, "is used with a greater variety of meanings."⁴⁰ Because of this semantic confusion and because of the difficulties in fitting the concept of sovereignty into the evolving pattern of interstate relations, some political scientists contend that the concept is obsolete, or even dangerous, and that it should be discarded altogether.

The father of the modern theory of sovereignty was the sixteenth-century French political thinker, Jean Bodin (1530-1596). His *De la République*, published in Paris in 1576, contained the first systematic presentation of this theory. Sovereignty, wrote Bodin, is "the supreme power over citizens and subjects, unrestrained by law." Thus sovereignty was identified from the outset with royal absolutism; and the sovereign monarch, whose power was absolute and unlimited, restrained by no human authority whatsoever, was equipped to resist the universalist claims of the papacy and the Empire on the one hand and the decentralizing, almost anarchic tendencies of feudalism on the other. Writing less than half a century later, Hugo Grotius, who believed that states should be

³⁷ C. H. McIlwain, *Constitutionalism and the Changing World* (Cambridge University Press, 1939), p. 47. This volume contains three stimulating essays, "Sovereignty," "A Fragment on Sovereignty," and "Whig Sovereignty and Real Sovereignty."

³⁸ Wright, II, 898-899.

³⁹ McIlwain, p. 47.

⁴⁰ Francis Coker, "Sovereignty," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, XIV, 268. Used by permission of The Macmillan Company.

subject to the law of the international community, nevertheless gave a similar definition of the term in his famous work *De Jure Belli ac Pacis* : Sovereignty is "that power whose acts.....may not be made void by the acts of any other human will."

Recent political theorists have, in general, given similar definitions of this much-debated concept. Here are three examples from distinguished authorities : Oppenheim : "Sovereignty is supreme authority, an authority which is independent of any other earthly authority." Willoughby : "Sovereignty is the supreme will of the state." Kelsen : "In its original and only specific meaning, sovereignty means supreme authority."

One might add, in the interests of narrowing the definition and at the risk of incurring the wrath of those political philosophers who hold that the state is not sovereign or even that sovereignty does not apply to the state at all, that sovereignty is the supreme authority, and particularly the ultimate coercive power, which the state possesses, and which other institutions do not. Various writers on political theory have also insisted that every legally-recognized state is by definition sovereign, that otherwise it could not be called a state. This is not to overlook the fact that some states by virtue of their power, size, location, and so on, obviously have greater influence and greater freedom of action than others. It is simply a reminder that just as every state is legally equal to any other, so it is legally sovereign.⁴¹ Most writers on international law do not believe that sovereignty is incompatible with the existence of a body of definite regulations which civilized states generally accept and which are supported by recognized sanctions. We shall return to the limitations on sovereignty in the chapter on international law.

The Source of Sovereignty. The source of sovereignty in a state is often difficult, if not impossible, to locate in any meaningful way. The problem was a relatively easy one to solve in an absolute state, where sovereignty resided in the "Sovereign Monarch," as Bodin believed ; but it became an increasingly baffling one with the evolution of nonmonarchical forms of government, especially those of a federal type. If, as Bodin insisted, sovereignty was absolute and indivisible, it certainly had to reside in some specific place or person in the governmental structure.

Frequently attempts are made to locate the seat of sovereignty by dis-

⁴¹ This interpretation, like nearly every approach to questions of sovereignty, will be challenged by many political scientists. The following statement by Robert Strausz-Hupé and Stefan Possony indicates that they are in sharp disagreement : "It must be recognized that there are degrees of sovereignty and self-determination. A fully sovereign nation is one which has sufficient power to be master of its decisions. In the past, there were many nations who were sovereign in the true sense of the word. Today, there are probably only two or three, but certainly not more than five or seven." *International Relations* (McGraw-Hill, 1950), p. 709. Small nations in particular, according to these writers, lack sovereignty. But while small states may be subject to more practical restrictions on their freedom of action, they do not thereby lose their sovereignty. Sovereignty is the supreme authority which all states, large or small, possess. See Alfred Verdross-Drossberg, "The Study of International Law in German-Speaking Countries," in *Contemporary Political Science*, UNESCO Publication No. 426, pp. 601-603.

tinguishing between legal sovereignty and popular sovereignty, but even efforts to identify the legal sovereign are not too successful. It is often claimed, for example, that in England sovereignty rests with "the King in Parliament"—presumably meaning the House of Commons ; but this statement is subject to all kinds of qualifications. Even in the modern versions of absolute states, the totalitarian states, the location of sovereignty is not easy to determine. Where, for instance, does sovereignty reside in the Soviet Union? In the Communist Party? In the Presidium? In "the toiling majority," as Soviet dialecticians hold? In "the multi-national Soviet people," as Vyshinsky declared?⁴²

There is little point under present conditions in attempting to locate the exact source of sovereignty in a state. As Sabine and Shephard pointed out, "all these attempts to fix sovereignty in a particular element of the state.....are futile.....Hence the attempt to find a tangible sovereign is nothing but an attempt to force modern political institutions into a mold of thought which applied to an altogether different state of facts."⁴³

Can Sovereignty Be Divided or Limited? Clearly sovereignty, in its meaning of absolute, unlimited, and indivisible authority, is incompatible with international law, perhaps with any law. The implications of this interpretation, not only for the future of international law but also for the hopes for peace and the prospects of more effective international cooperation, are obvious. According to the champions of sovereignty, argued Jacques Maritain, "the sovereign State—each individual sovereign State—is by right *above* the community of nations and possessed of absolute independence with regard to this community." Therefore "no international law binding the States can be consistently conceived. Furthermore, this absolute independence is inalienable (*unrenounceable*), because by virtue of its nature the state is a monadic entity which cannot cease to be sovereign without ceasing to be a state. As a result, no day can dawn—as long as the States behave consistently with their so-called Sovereignty—on which they could possibly give up their supreme independence in order to enter a larger political body, or a world society."⁴⁴ Hans Morgenthau holds that "the conception of a divisible sovereignty is contrary to logic and politically unfeasible.....a significant symptom of the discrepancy

⁴² For a good summary of Soviet views on the source of sovereignty in the Soviet state, see Julian Towster, *Political Power in the U.S.S.R.*, 1917-1947 (Oxford University Press, 1948), pp. 46-69. Dr. I. H. Quereshi, former Minister of Education of Pakistan, has advanced an interesting thesis about the source of sovereignty in an Islamic state: "Progress and Islamic ideals can be reconciled in a threefold definition of sovereignty in an Islamic state: (1) the legal sovereign shall be the Muslim law ; its definition shall be in the hands of the legislature ; (2) the political sovereign shall be the people who will elect and dismiss their governments ; (3) the real sovereign will be basically the principles of Islam, brought into the public forum and discussed at length." "Sovereignty in the Islamic State," an address at the All-Pakistan Political Science Conference, Peshawar, April 10, 1951, in I. H. Quereshi, *Pakistan : An Islamic Democracy* (Lahore, n.d.), pp. 26-27.

⁴³ Hugo Krabbe, *The Modern Idea of the State* (Appleton, 1927), p. xxvii.

⁴⁴ Jacques Maritain, *Man and the State* (University of Chicago Press, 1951), pp. 50-51.

between the actual and pretended relations existing between international law and international politics in the modern state system.”⁴⁵ He is one of the school of political scientists that holds that sovereignty is indivisible, that limitations on sovereignty or the surrender of part of a state’s sovereignty in the interests of international cooperation are both theoretically untenable and practically impossible.

From the theoretical and historical point of view those who insist that sovereignty is by its very nature indivisible, that it is incompatible with international law, and that any other interpretation would involve an acceptance of the eating-one’s-cake-and-having-it-too attitude, are absolutely correct. Either a new interpretation must be evolved or the whole concept must be scrapped ; for unless the concept of sovereignty under law and of limitations on sovereignty can be established and put into practice, there is little hope for a peaceful international society. Clyde Eagleton, an eminent American authority on international law, has taken a sane and realistic view of this difficult problem :

Sovereignty cannot be an absolute term. It is just as foolish to say that sovereignty must be surrendered or eliminated as to say that it must be absolute and unrestrained.....The problem is not one of asking whether we should throw off a thing called sovereignty ; it is rather one of asking with regard to what matters would we gain by having an international control, and in which matters would we gain more by reserving control to ourselves ?⁴⁶

One might argue that states often enter into bilateral or multilateral commitments which in effect limit their sovereignty, or that proposals such as the United Nations plan for the international control of atomic energy and the Schuman Plan in its original form involve some real surrender of sovereignty. But obviously neither of these plans is a real test case : the former has never been implemented, and the European Coal and Steel Community, as it now functions, is less independent of the member states than M. Schuman first proposed. In the present interdependent world no state, however powerful, can attempt to shape its future without giving due heed to outside pressures and commitments ; and most states are bound to other states by many formal as well as informal ties. Few persons would insist that states that participate in various kinds of international agreements thereby lose their status as sovereign states, whatever may happen to the theoretical fullness of their sovereignty.

Some students of political science and international law have attempted to distinguish between internal sovereignty, which is absolute and indivisible, and external sovereignty, which is subject to limitations. Indeed, both Bodin and the English political theorist John Austin (1790-1859) were primarily concerned with the internal aspects of sovereignty. In his study *Mandates under the League of Nations* Quincy Wright declared : “From the point of view of Municipal law, sovereignty is a unity incapable

⁴⁵ Morgenthau, p. 303.

⁴⁶ *The Forces That Shape Our Future* (New York University Press, 1945), p. 174.

of division or limitation, from the point of view of international law it is susceptible to analysis, division and limitation.....External sovereignty or status exists insofar as a state can change, by unilateral action, the jural relations with other states, and must be distinguished from internal sovereignty or independence."⁴⁷ Wright also distinguishes between "partial" and "full" sovereignty, and between "political" and "legal" sovereignty. Elsewhere he suggests that the three aspects of national sovereignty that "are in most need of limitation" are "the power of self-judgment in international controversies, the power to prepare and use armed force in international relations, and the power to impose arbitrary barriers to international trade."⁴⁸

In his *Recent Theories of Sovereignty* H. E. Cohen points out that "international law finds room for the concepts of joint sovereignty, divided sovereignty, and the sovereignty of international corporations."⁴⁹ And it also finds room for the principle of sovereignty under law.⁵⁰ A clear example of this is the text of Article 14 of the Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States, prepared by the International Law Commission of the United Nations. This article reads: "Every State has the duty to conduct its relations with other States in accordance with international law and with the principle that the sovereignty of each State is subject to the supremacy of international law." Perhaps, as one of the leading students of sovereignty, Hans Kelsen, insists, the writers of this article might have been wise if they had avoided the use of the term "sovereignty" in this connection, especially since they did not define it "in a way compatible with international law"⁵¹; but here again we see a conscious attempt to assert the principle of sovereignty under law, in external as well as in internal affairs.

The idea of accepting, or even encouraging, limitations on sovereignty has been expressed so frequently, sometimes in surprising quarters, that it has become commonplace today. Taken at their face value, these statements suggest that the leaders and peoples of virtually all non-Communist states may be prepared to surrender part of their sovereignty for certain common ends. But such statements can hardly be taken at their own value, for actions say more authoritatively than words that no major voluntary surrender of sovereignty has yet been made.

⁴⁷ University of Chicago Press, 1930, pp. 289, 291.

⁴⁸ "Fundamental Problems of International Organization," *International Conciliation*, No. 369 (April, 1941), pp. 469-472.

⁴⁹ H. E. Cohen, *Recent Theories of Sovereignty* (University of Chicago Press, 1937), p. 85.

⁵⁰ Perhaps Bodin may be resting more peacefully than this statement suggests. For, as C. H. McIlwain pointed out in his significant essay on "Whig Sovereignty and Real Sovereignty," Bodin distinguished clearly between absolute power and arbitrary power and between fundamental law and ordinary law. Professor McIlwain wrote: "Bodin's conception of a republic and of the sovereign authority in it can only be understood in light of this fundamental distinction between constituent law and ordinary legislation." McIlwain, p. 73.

⁵¹ "The Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States," *The American Journal of International Law*, XLIV (April, 1950), 276.

Those who advocate world government or effective federation on a regional basis are the talking champions of the pooling of sovereignty and the creation of supranational agencies with real powers ; but there are grounds for serious doubt whether they always mean what they say. Many of the people who enthusiastically endorse world government in public opinion polls begin to hedge and qualify their stand when it comes even to preliminary steps to implement their declared position. Either they do not know the consequences of the movements they advocate or they are in favor of the surrender of some sovereignty by *other* states and peoples but not by their own. Leaders of federal union movements often try to get around the barrier of sovereignty, not by knocking it down or by hurdling it but by denying that it really exists. For example, a small volume published in 1950, bearing the bold title *The New Federalist*, consisting of papers by Clarence Streit, Owen J. Roberts, and John F. Schmidt, with an introduction by John Foster Dulles, presents the intriguing thesis that since the "Union of the Free" which they propose must be "the act of the citizens" of all the nations concerned it would not involve "actual sovereignty" at all.

Soviet Views on Sovereignty. Spokesmen of the Soviet Union strongly object to the idea of any limitation on sovereignty. Confronted, according to their doctrine, with the perpetual threat of capitalist encirclement, Soviet leaders are sensitive to any such attempts, real or imaginary. Nothing arouses their wrath quite so much as a suspicion that their absolute sovereignty is being threatened. This view is unquestionably one of the main reasons for their insistence on the principle of great-power unanimity in the Security Council of the United Nations, and for their refusal even to consider any limitations on the right of "veto."

Thus E. A. Korovin, authority on the Soviet view of international law, declares : "No really democratic state will agree to limitations on its sovereignty other than those which are voluntary, reciprocal, fair and freely consented to. It will have nothing to do with limitations on its sovereignty that are unilateral and imposed from without."⁵² This position seems reasonable enough, and indeed almost platitudinous ; but the Soviet Union's constant insistence on her unlimited sovereignty conveys the impression that she is really determined to avoid all limitations, even when "voluntary,

⁵² Quoted in Kazimierz Szczesba and Alexander von Schelting, "International Relations in Soviet Sociological and Legal Doctrine," in *Contemporary Political Science*, UNESCO Publication No. 426, p. 555. "Soviet Jurisprudence recognizes the idea of limitations on sovereignty even though it is seldom put into practice. In his report to the XIIth Party Congress (1923) J. Stalin, speaking of the Union of Soviet Republics in a common federation, stated that 'any union implies some restriction of the previous rights of those who join together.' Addressing the League of Nations Council, on January 23, 1936, the Soviet delegate declared : 'Only a state free from any international commitments enjoys absolute sovereignty and the right to do whatever it pleases. . . .' On February 10, 1946, at a session of the UN Security Council, M. Vyshinsky, chief of the Soviet delegation, answered in the affirmative on being asked whether the United Nations statute 'restricted the sovereignty of sovereign states.'" *Ibid.*

reciprocal," etc. Thus her attitude is a major obstacle to all efforts toward effective international cooperation in areas where some concessions in sovereignty are necessary.

The reasons for Soviet emphasis on the sovereignty of the state have been well summarized as follows :

So long as the U.S.S.R. is compelled to remain an island encircled by capitalism, any restriction on Soviet sovereignty must needs entail concessions of a more or less serious character to the political and economic principles opposed to her own and to the social groups guided thereby..... Under these circumstances, any restriction of sovereignty.....would delay the advent of socialist revolutions and reduce the number of the Soviet's potential allies.⁵³

The Soviet state.....regards sovereignty, not as a manifestation of unrestricted arbitrary power, but as the principle of self-determination in domestic and foreign affairs.....The principle of sovereignty serves as a legal barrier defending nations from imperialist encroachment, from military and economic aggression.⁵⁴

Interpretations of this kind are the stock in trade of Soviet experts on international law. They are expressed in the authoritative Soviet manual, edited by Andrei Vyshinsky, *The Law of the Soviet State*, and they are repeatedly declaimed before the organs and agencies of the United Nations. It is important to bear in mind that the concept of unlimited sovereignty is inseparable from the Soviet theory of international law—a theory which, "if logically pursued in practice, would make the application of the generally accepted rules of international law between her and other States to a large degree impossible."⁵⁵

Should the Concept of Sovereignty Be Discarded? Any analysis of the concept of sovereignty is bound to be a study in contradictions. Sovereignty, in its literal sense, means supreme authority, yet it must be limited under present conditions. It is absolute and indivisible, yet it must be qualified and divided. It is incompatible with international law, yet it must be reconciled with international law. It is historically associated with a period of absolutism, yet it is still regarded as an essential characteristic of a nation-state—perhaps *the* essential characteristic—in a period of many different patterns of government. It is a fairly rigid and

⁵³ Szczerba and Von Schelting, p. 554.

⁵⁴ E. A. Korovin, quoted in "Anglo-Soviet Debate on Sovereignty," *Current Readings on International Relations* No. 4 (Addison-Wesley Press, 1948), pp. 4, 7.

⁵⁵ L. B. Schapiro, "The Soviet Concept of International Law," in G. W. Keeton and Georg Schwarzenberger, eds., *The Year Book of World Affairs*, 1948 (London, 1948), p. 309. For summaries of Soviet authorities on the concept of sovereignty see the above and Szczerba and von Schelting. See also T. A. Taracouzio, *The Soviet Union and International Law* (Macmillan, 1935), pp. 26-47, and E. A. Korovin, "The Contribution of the USSR to International Law," *Soviet Press Translations*, III, No. 21 (Dec. 1, 1948), pp. 655-664. Korovin, Pashukanis, and other Soviet authorities on international law have fallen out of favor, and Pashukanis, at least, appears to have been purged, but their views on sovereignty reflect the official party line on this subject.

inflexible theory, yet it must be applied to an evolving pattern of inter-state relations.

Faced with these contradictions, many political theorists have reached the conclusion that the term "sovereignty," and perhaps the doctrine as well, should be abandoned. In *A Grammar of Politics* Harold J. Laski wrote : ".....it would be of lasting benefit to political science if the whole concept of sovereignty were surrendered."⁵⁶ Jacques Maritain concluded a challenging interpretation of sovereignty with the flat assertion : "The two concepts of Sovereignty and Absolutism have been forged together on the same anvil. They must be scrapped together."⁵⁷ John Scholte Nollen is equally positive : "The first piece of old lumber that must be discarded in this new day is the obsolete idea of 'sovereignty'."⁵⁸ Carl J. Friedrich argues that "both 'state' and 'sovereignty' " in current usage "are symbols of totalitarian government" and are "fraught with implications that are incompatible not only with democracy but with the essence of Christianity."⁵⁹

Confronted by this imposing array of accusers, one might conclude that the wisest and simplest solution would be to banish the offending term. Yet "sovereignty," for all its vagueness and variety of definitions, describes a cardinal feature of the nation-state system for which there is no remotely acceptable synonym. Some students of politics will continue to speak of it, with or without a careful definition of the particular ways in which they use the term. At the end of his careful study of recent theories of sovereignty, H. F. Cohen comes to the conclusion that "the theory of sovereignty will persist as a term defining power or the status of that power, or as a term defining a legal order, or the status of parts within that order or the totality of that order." Even if the word "sovereignty" disappears with changes in terminology, Cohen believes that "the substance of sovereignty will remain so long as the problems of social control divide men into rulers and ruled, into leaders and led."⁶⁰ Perhaps he should have revised the last part of his prediction to read : "so long as the nation-state system remains the prevailing pattern of international society." Those who view sovereignty with suspicion may find some consolation in E. H. Carr's timely reminder that the concept of sovereignty "is likely to become in the future even more blurred and indistinct than it is at present.....It was never more than a convenient label."⁶¹

⁵⁶ (Yale University Press, 1925), pp. 44-45

⁵⁷ Maritain, p. 53.

⁵⁸ "Sovereignty?" in Stuart Gerry Brown, ed., *Internationalism and Democracy* (Syracuse University Press, 1949), p. 48

⁵⁹ *The New Belief in the Common Man* (Little, Brown, 1942), p. 79. See also Georges Scelle, *Manuel élémentaire de droit international public* (Paris, 1943), pp. 73 ff.

⁶⁰ Cohen, pp. 147, 148.

⁶¹ *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939*, 2nd ed. (London, 1946), p. 230.

GREAT DESTRUCTIVE-CONSTRUCTIVE FORCES

We have attempted an analysis of the nature and evolution of the nation-state system and of two of its corollaries—nationalism and sovereignty. We have noted that nationalism is the moving spiritual or emotional force of the state and that sovereignty is the legal theory which sustains the state and the state system. Both have been invoked to strengthen the authority of absolute monarchs, and both have tended to encourage rather than retard the totalitarian movements of our own day. They have led to wars and to international anarchy; they are perhaps the most formidable barriers to international peace and the building of a true world community.

On the other hand, the doctrines of nationalism and sovereignty have given strength and cohesion to the prevailing pattern of international society. They have been flexible doctrines, evolving through the years as conditions have changed and giving rise to many schools of interpreters. They have been used in the interests of democracy and liberalism, as well as in those of absolutism and totalitarianism. Actually they are neither moral nor immoral doctrines. There is nothing inherently evil about them. They are not vast cosmic forces moving inexorably to encompass the doom of mankind. D. W. Brogan called nationalism "this great destructive, constructive force," and the same label could be attached to sovereignty. If uncontrolled or misused, both can lead to tyranny and war; but if directed to constructive purposes they can evoke some of the finest of human sentiments for the service of worthy ends. They are vital parts of the machinery that men have created to regulate their relations; and they reflect rather than constitute the really basic problems in international affairs.

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National Power: Land and.....2

Its Resources

Like nationalism and sovereignty, national power is a vital and inseparable feature of the state system. Power of some kind is the means by which states implement their policies, domestic as well as foreign. This does not mean that they always seek to achieve their ends in foreign policy by military force, nor does it imply that they must always be ready with the maximum of their military potential. They may be able to achieve their objectives through diplomatic or economic pressures, but they must be ever mindful of the possibility of eventual recourse to arms. If independence can be preserved and foreign policy goals attained without a vast military establishment, then a great war machine would be unnecessary, costly, and very likely provocative. On the other hand, for a state to take too little power into a controversy with another state might be disastrous. To know the need is a mark of high statesmanship.

Our discussion here will center on three aspects of national power. First, we shall answer the question why states are so much concerned with power, why the cultivation of national power is a corollary of the nation-state system. Second, we shall consider the various forms of national power. Third, we shall point out the elements or components of national power, indicating why some states are strong and others weak. The first two of these we shall discuss only briefly, reserving most of our attention for an analysis of power itself.

THE COROLLARY OF NATIONAL POWER

To say that states possess power is to say what everybody knows and what many people deplore. Yet power is an essential element of politics ; “the struggle for power,” says Morgenthau, “is universal in time and space

and is an undeniable fact of experience.”¹ Some writers insist that “power politics” is a redundancy—that there is no politics without power, but the term does serve in common usage to distinguish between international politics and domestic politics. To the struggle for power states are inexorably driven simply because they wish to survive. But even war and military and territorial aggrandizement are often means to the end of security ; as E. H. Carr declared a dozen years ago, World War I had a defensive or preventive character in the minds of all the principal combatants. Reinhold Niebuhr believes that there is “no possibility of drawing a sharp line between the will-to-live and the will-to-power.”² The duty of preserving national security which the state system imposes on individual states requires those states to possess power. Of course power may be mobilized beyond the peaceful requirements of states, and it may be abused and misused, but the wrongful use of power does not in itself destroy the right of states to possess power ; in fact, the evil use of power by some states is the best reason why other states must have power.

Viewed historically, the fact of state power antedated the formulation of the theory of sovereignty. What Bodin and other political philosophers did was to recognize a *fait accompli* and offer ethical justification for what had already happened. Once states had assumed the obligation of promoting the welfare of their peoples and, of course, of their rulers, they rejected all external controls and endeavored to marshal whatever strength was felt to be necessary to implement policies designed to serve the state, or, at least, the dominant group within the state. But sovereignty did more than underwrite the past and the present ; its affirmation of the omnipotence of the state amounted to a clear declaration of the right and duty of states to be strong enough to maintain themselves. It served notice that thenceforth states would be weak at their own peril : a sovereignty that disallowed the means of its own preservation would be no sovereignty at all. Not only had national power become legally correct ; the conditions of international life made it mandatory. Predatory forces outside the state posed a constant threat, and what is perhaps more important, interests within the state—king, nobles, the clergy, or the rising commercial classes—demanded policies tailored to their own taste and profit and often were able to commit the power of the state to the execution of those policies. National power is too effective to lie around unused ; there is seldom a dearth of those who would use it, perhaps in good causes, perhaps in bad.

The authority of the state differs from every other earthly authority in that it alone has no theoretical limit. All other organizations of people—industrial corporations, labor unions, churches, fraternal orders, patriotic societies, professional bodies, and the like—have sanctions of their own, often very effective ones. But only the state—not the government, by any means—knows no limits to its rights of coercion. In this respect the state is *sui generis*—in a class by itself. All other organizations of men

¹ Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 2nd ed. (Knopf, 1954), p. 30.

² *Moral Man and Immoral Society* (Scribner, 1933), p. 42.

may come up against legal barriers built and manned by the state. That the state should set the limits of power exercised by internal groups follows logically from the fact that the state itself creates, validates, and sustains the legal framework into which they must fit. "State power," says one authority, "towers above the power exercised by smaller pluralistic groupings in that it controls the system of law which is set up and perpetuated by state organs."³ It might be added that the security function of the state may require that its power also tower above the power of those states that would assail it. And, as Bertrand Russell remarks, "nothing but lack of military force limits the power of one State over another."⁴

The legal justification of a state's power is to be found in the concept of sovereignty ; the ethical defense is to be sought in the responsibility imposed on the state for seeing to the security of its people and their interests. The nature of power, its propensity to rush into and occupy every nook and crevice, is to be explained partly by the diligence of states in striving to enhance their security—power being the best assurance of security in the present nation-state system—and partly by a natural impulse to power. In his interesting study of power, Russell says that "every man would like to be God, if it were possible ; some few find it difficult to admit the impossibility."⁵ Whether, among states, the urge to power is to be attributed primarily to political realism or to a simple impulse to power, apart from security needs, hardly seems debatable—the pattern of international life points the way to the grave for the impotent.

There is, however, another side to the picture. A distinguished English student of international relations, G. Lowes Dickinson, pointed out both the "absurdity" and the supposed inescapability of the reliance of every state on power. In answer to the question "Why must the State be strong?" he found that the usual answer is "to defend itself from attack." He then commented in these words :

This looks sound enough. But meantime people in every other country are reasoning in precisely the same way. So that the doctrine, looked at all round, amounts to this : "The only way to keep the peace is for every State at the same time to be stronger than every other." The maxim thus becomes a flat absurdity as soon as every nation adopts it. But every nation does adopt it ; with the result that you get an endless competition in armaments, and increasing strain, mental, moral, and physical, and finally, and in consequence of that strain, a breakdown into war. This is the plain truth of the matter.⁶

³ Herman Heller, "Political Power," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* (Macmillan, 1937, XII, 301. Used by permission of The Macmillan Company.

⁴ Bertrand Russell, *Power* (Norton, 1938), p. 180.

⁵ Russell, p. 11.

⁶ Reprinted by permission of Dodd, Mead & Company and Allen & Unwin, Ltd., from *The Choice Before Us* by G. Lowes Dickinson (copyright 1919), pp. 90-92.

FORMS OF NATIONAL POWER

"Power" has wormed its way into the vocabulary of the Western world. One can easily imagine the frustration which the disappearance of the term would impose upon the automobile salesman, the athletic coach, the movie barker, the evangelist, and the military analyst. While its use in these and other instances is related to its use in international politics, "power" in a political context means "the power of man over the minds and actions of other men," to take Hans Morgenthau's definition.⁷ Georg Schwarzenberger defines it as the "capacity to impose one's will on others by reliance on effective sanctions in case of non-compliance."⁸ He distinguishes it from both influence and force by regarding it as containing a threat not present in influence and yet stopping short of the actual use of force. This distinction is uncommon if not unique ; most authorities use the word to cover the whole range of pressures on thought and conduct, from those without the shadow of a threat to those involving total war. It is consistent with this use to speak of the power of an example, the power of public opinion, and the power of the sword. It is in this inclusive sense that we shall use the word.

As E. H. Carr pointed out, "in its essence, power is an indivisible whole," and, while it must be somehow divided to permit an intelligible discussion, all theoretical divisions must be made with the realization that "it is difficult in practice to imagine a country for any length of time possessing one kind of power in isolation from the others."⁹ Thus a state having the industrial establishment to sustain great military power is likely to be in a position to make effective use of devices of economic coercion, and military and economic power give strength to moral suasion, even when there is no suggestion of their use. Since military power is the ultimate and most violent kind of force that may be invoked, its use naturally implies the use of whatever lesser weapons may be helpfully employed ; it is axiomatic that war brings an effort to paralyze the enemy's economy, weaken his morale, and turn third states against him. The absence of war, on the other hand, does not mean the absence of all coercion. Even friendly states try to induce each other to pursue certain policies, just as friendly individuals do, and they may use the milder forms of economic pressure without disrupting their good relations.

For purposes of analysis national power may be divided in a number of ways, all of them more or less arbitrary. Carr divided it into three categories : military power, economic power, and power over opinion ; this classification would seem to omit certain forms of political warfare, such as terrorism and assassination. The paramount importance of military power lies in the fact that it is the end-argument, the last word, the final

⁷ Morgenthau, p. 93.

⁸ *Power Politics* (Praeger, 1951), p. 14.

⁹ E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, 2nd ed. (London, 1946), p. 108.

court of appeal. "Every act of the state, in its power aspect, is directed to war, not as a desirable weapon but as a weapon which it may require in the last resort to use," said Carr.¹⁰ Thus national power is in the final analysis military power, but military power is a complex of many elements, as we shall soon observe. Economic power is inseparable from military power, for it is one of its basic components ; to say that under conditions of modern warfare economic power is military power is only a slight exaggeration. But economic power is not limited to its part in the building of a military machine. Control of markets, raw materials, credits, and transportation is another form. Power over opinion—now usually spoken of as propaganda, though perhaps not quite the same thing—encompasses the building of national morale at home, psychological warfare abroad, and the fight for moral leadership everywhere. It too is inseparable from other forms of national power, for it is always used to stimulate domestic production, fighting spirit, and the willingness to sacrifice ; and it is used abroad to recruit allies and weaken the enemy. Carr wrote that it is "not less essential for political purposes than military and economic power."¹¹ Closely related to it is political warfare.

Diplomacy also may be regarded as a form of national power, although some writers prefer to list it as an element. It may be argued that diplomacy provides only a channel for intercourse among state—that its effectiveness depends upon a state's military, economic, and propaganda resources ; but this contention seems hardly valid. Often the wit and wisdom of a Talleyrand or a Franklin may give a state an influence unwarranted by all other factors. When this happens, diplomacy is certainly both a source and a form of national power.

So that we may better understand the nature of national power, we shall devote the remainder of the present chapter and all of the following one to an examination of its elements or ingredients, with particular attention to those factors which make for the ultimate form of power—that is, military power. Then in the five succeeding chapters we shall describe the ways in which the various forms of power are used as instruments of national policy, with one chapter each on diplomacy, propaganda and political warfare, economic power, imperialism and colonialism, and military power or war.

THE ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER

To the totality of a state's effectiveness in world politics we apply the term "power." All states possess power, but very different amounts and kinds of power. We must therefore approach an analysis of power with the realization that we are dealing with a complex subject. Everyone can see that battleships and armies make for power, and most people can

¹⁰ Carr, p. 109.

¹¹ Carr, p. 132.

readily understand that cotton and rubber do the same. Power becomes less tangible, however, when we speak of it in terms of geography, technology, and morale. Nevertheless, these are highly important elements of national power. All elements, moreover, are interrelated ; for instance, oil without engineers is almost valueless, and so is radio without ideas. The interdependence of all the elements is so complete that actually power is indivisible. Furthermore, the separate elements of national power defy statistical calculation, and even if we could assign a figure to each one the grand total of these values would still fail to give us a correct appraisal of national power. Professor William Ebenstein explained this by nothing that important qualitative factors are involved :

In the field of international relations, the central problem of the strength of a nation is essentially a problem of qualitative judgment and measurement, as national power is more than the sum total of population, raw materials and quantitative factors. The "alliance potential" of a nation, its civic devotion, the flexibility of its institutions, its technical "know-how," its capacity to endure privations—these are but a few qualitative elements that determine the total strength of a nation.¹²

We shall here forego any attempt to measure national power. Instead we shall simply discuss its elements so that we may better understand the great differentials in power that partially explain the differing roles which states play in world politics. Although writers are in general agreement on these so-called elements, they organize their presentation in various ways. We shall divide power into seven component elements. Two of these—those relating to land and its resources—we shall discuss in the present chapter. The remaining five, which relate to people, their ways of doing things, and their ways of thinking, we shall examine in the following chapter.

GEOGRAPHY

When historians in the remote future look back on the group of centuries through which we are now passing, and see them foreshortened, as we to-day see the Egyptian dynasties, it may well be that they will describe the last 400 years as the Columbian epoch, and will say that it ended soon after the year 1900.....From the present time forth, in the post-Columbian age, we shall again have to deal with a closed political system, and none the less that it will be one of world-wide scope. Every explosion of social forces, instead of being dissipated in a surrounding circuit of unknown space and barbaric chaos, will be sharply re-echoed from the far side of the globe, and weak elements in the political and economic organism of the world will be shattered in consequence. There is

¹² "Toward International Collaboration in Political Science : A Reprt on the UNESCO Project, 'Methods in Political Science'," *American Political Science Review*, XLII (Dec., 1948), 1183—1184.

a vast difference of effect in the fall of a shell into an earthwork and its fall amid the closed spaces and rigid structures of a great building or ship. Probably some half-consciousness of this fact is at last diverting much of the attention of statesmen in all parts of the world from territorial expansion to the struggle for relative efficiency.¹³

With these words Halford J. Mackinder began the famous paper "The Geographical Pivot of History," which he read at a meeting of the Royal Geographic Society in London on January 25, 1904. More than fifty years later these words take on the aura of prophecy. They serve to call attention to the great developments in geography which are bound to affect the course of the world's history.

The importance of geography to a study of international relations has long been recognized. History has often been characterized as geography in motion. Napoleon once said that "the foreign policy of a country is determined by its geography." This may be an exaggeration, but there can be no question that geographical factors have had a decisive effect upon civilizations and upon national development. The "shrinking" of the world with modern means of transportation and communication has increased interdependence among peoples and has brought them into closer contact in a variety of ways. A basic knowledge of political, economic, and human geography, as well as of physical geography, is essential to an understanding of the present-day world.

In this section, after a brief comment on maps and map projections, we shall refer to the geographic factors of size, location, climate, shape, topography, and boundaries. We shall also consider the significance of geographic factors in the air age, and we shall also discuss geopolitics, which is the application of geography in a particular way.

Maps and Map Projections. Maps are indispensable tools for the study of international relations, and a knowledge of different types of map projections and the uses and limitations of each type can be of great value. Most of us were brought up in a Mercator world ; that is to say, we were taught to think of the world as it looks on maps using the Mercator projection. On this familiar projection meridians of longitude and parallels of latitude are shown as straight lines crossing each other at right angles. This type of projection is still the best map for surface navigation, for by it a compass course between any two points can be shown by a straight line. But it does not show the relative size of different parts of the world, and the distortions become greater the farther one moves away from the Equator. For this reason Greenland on a Mercator map looks even larger than South America, although actually it is only about one-tenth as large. The United States seems to be isolated from all countries outside the Western Hemisphere by great oceans and by the distant Arctic regions. This is an increasingly unfortunate misconception. For a long time

¹³ Halford J. Mackinder, "The Geographical Pivot of History," *The Geographical Journal*, XXIII (April, 1904), 421, 422.

the oceans have been as much highways as barriers, and in the air age the Arctic regions have become the shortest avenue between the United States and many places in Europe, the Soviet Union, and Asia. ~

For the air age different map projections are needed.

The map which shows us the actual relationships of the earth's areas from any given point is one with a rather frightening name. It is called an 'Azimuthal Equidistant' projection. In simple language, that merely means a map which is centered on a definite spot on the globe, and on which the distance to any or all other points on the globe can be accurately measured. On this map, the straight line connecting the center of the map with any other point on the globe is really a 'great circle,' which is the shortest distance between those two points.¹⁴

The most common map of this type is one on which the North Pole is the center.

Many other types of map projections have been developed to meet particular needs. Equal-area maps are useful for comparing areas or the distribution of, say, population or raw materials and natural resources. For studying hemispheres the orthographic projection is usually satisfactory. The Royal Geographic Society, the National Geographic Society, and other professional associations of geographers have acquired great ingenuity in adapting the basic types of map projections to special purposes. We should remember that no map is wholly satisfactory, and that the purpose for which a map is to be used may determine to a large degree the proper type of projection.¹⁵

Size. The land area of a state is in itself an element of power, small or great. Its mere size implies little about its capacity to sustain a large population, as witness the Sahara Desert on the one hand and Belgium or Japan on the other. Whether it can be too small to exert effective power depends upon a host of other factors, as, for instance, location, fertility, rainfall, the temper of its people, the nature of its technology, and the quality of its leadership. Thus Japan was not too small to defeat Russia in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. Russia's immensity was a handicap, for it impeded the concentration of her armies and supplies in distant Siberia. For the same reasons it was an initial disadvantage for her when Hitler attacked in June, 1941. On the other hand, size operated to her advantage in enabling her to turn back Napoleon's invasion in 1812 and in the eventual defeat of Germany in World War II. Her size permitted long retreat, complicated the enemy's supply problem, and precluded

¹⁴ *Maps—and How to Understand Them*, 2nd ed. (Consolidated Vultee Aircraft, 1943), pp. 11-12.

¹⁵ See Richard Edes Harrison and Robert Strausz-Hupé, "Maps, Strategy, and World Politics," in *The Smithsonian Institution Report for 1943* (Government Printing Office, 1944), pp. 253-258; and two publications by the National Geographic Society: Wellman Chamberlin, *The Round Earth on Flat Paper: Map Projections Used by Cartographers*, and Gilbert Grosvenor, *Map Services of the National Geographic Society*.

effective occupation. She was able to trade space for time, just as China had done in her wars with Japan. Although size certainly affects the conduct of both defensive and offensive warfare, the extent of that effect is obviously related to other factors, such as efficiency of transportation, the disposition of troops, the weather, and the foresight of diplomatic and military leaders. Short of war, great size may in itself be an asset, for the difficulties of occupation may discourage invasion. Here, size as a factor is related to population, military installations, transportation routes, and so on. Also, short of war, it may be a liability, for it adds to the difficulty of achieving national unity, effective administration, and cultural integration.

Location. Perhaps more important than size is location. This does much to fix a particular type of economy upon an area and people. Thus lumbering, hunting and trapping, grazing, crop culture, mining, commerce, and manufacturing are, in part, the results of location. In turn, the economy does much to determine the culture, as mining gives rise to mining towns, and commerce and manufacturing to cities. Location in the sense of spatial relationship to other land bodies and to other states also profoundly affects a state's culture and economy and both its military power and its economic power. It helps to fix its economy, partly by affecting its climate but also by fixing its relationship to trade routes, population centers, and fishing waters, and possibly by adding greatly to the financial burden of defense or, indeed, of contemplated offensive action. Location tends to make a state a land power or a sea power, with attendant over-all advantages, depending upon whether it accepts the thinking of Mackinder or that of Alfred T. Mahan, one the great theorist of geographical determinism and the other of naval power.¹⁶ England's insularity gave her partial exemption from the continental struggles of medieval Europe and contributed to her early leadership in constitutional government, literature, and industry. North America became French and English, and Central and South America became Spanish and Portuguese, partly because those continents lie generally westward of the colonizing powers. Hawaii became American partly because of its location, and certain other areas have become British for the same reason, always in combination with other factors.

Location also figures in the diplomacy and strategy of war. Because of its location, plus other factors, a state may find its land a battleground or a generally respected buffer area. The strategic assets of Finland, Norway, and Denmark, for instance, brought war to those peace-loving countries in 1939-1940. The Low Countries are another case in point. Except for the jealousies of Germany, France, and England, they would probably have long since been swallowed by Germany or France. On the other hand, just

¹⁶ Mackinder's theories are discussed later in this chapter. His most important work was *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, published in 1919. Mahan wrote several books on the history of naval warfare and the theories of naval power. Perhaps the most significant was his *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660—1783*, published in 1890.

as they may in part owe their continued existence to their location, their very position has at times brought invasion when the neighboring great powers went to war. The realization that France and Great Britain would spring to their defense in case of German aggression added immensely to their power ; but the fact that they needed to accommodate themselves to the leadership of France and Britain detracted from it. Somewhat the same relationship exists between Canada and the United States, except that the geographical position of Canada—location again—permits far greater freedom of action. In such relationships, the stronger state also both gains and loses in power.

Climate. Location is one of the determinants of climate, as it makes a land mass equatorial, polar, or something between ; but of course altitude, rainfall, and winds also help to determine climate. In turn, climate is one of the determinants of culture and of economy, along with natural resources, political organization, and religion. Climate has a direct effect on the health and energy of a people. It is not a coincidence that almost all of the major powers have occupied territories in the temperate zones. Continuous extremes of heat and cold are alike unfavorable for energy, productive capacity, and national strength. Excessive heat is enervating, even though the people who live in tropical and semi-tropical areas do not require much protection from the weather and may have natural sources of food close at hand. Excessive cold forces human beings to burn too much of their energy in resisting its effects. Generally speaking, temperatures around 68 to 70 degrees Fahrenheit with considerable seasonal variation appear to be best for energetic and healthful living. Excessive aridity or rainfall is a handicap to effective human existence. Some sections of the earth's surface are virtually uninhabitable, or are inhabited by only a few persons per square mile, because they are deserts or because they are covered with dense tropical forests, which thrive on abundant rainfall. Examples are the Sahara Desert region, covering an area about as large as the United States, and the Amazon Basin. In large parts of South and Southeast Asia the rhythm of life is determined to a large extent by the monsoons. If the summer monsoon brings enough rain, but not too much, the people of India, for example, will fare relatively well ; but if too much or too little rain comes, thousands suffer and many die. Part of the success of India's First Five Year plan was admittedly due to good monsoons.

Shape and Topography. The shape of a state's area may add to or detract from its vulnerability to attack ; it may make for long or short coast lines or boundaries, good ports or no ports, ease or difficulty of access to centers of population and trade, and efficiency or inefficiency in administration and military operations. Closely related to configuration is topography, for rivers may provide ports and access where configuration would otherwise deny them. Good rivers may afford transportation throughout a state ; and, on the other hand, as international boundary lines they may invite commercial problems with another state. Topog-

raphy has given good ports to Europe but almost none to Africa. The fall of rivers may be adequate for the production of enormous energy, and rivers and lakes may provide the means for extensive irrigation. Mountains may bar invaders, but perhaps trade as well. They may foster national unity, but they may also prevent it. They may cut a land off from the travel path of the world, as in Burma, or they may make of it a meeting ground for travelers of all nations, as in Switzerland. As a prime determinant of climate and rainfall, topography has an obvious and important bearing on economy and culture. Together with land size, location, and configuration, it provides the geographical setting of the national state, and, like the others, is a significant element of power, military and economic.¹⁷

The following observations about the Soviet Union may serve to illustrate the significance of topographic factors :

(1) While the U.S.S.R. has the longest frontiers of any nation in the world, these frontiers do not offer easy access to the seas or, with some exceptions, to contiguous lands. She has four seacoasts, widely separated : on the Baltic, on the Black Sea, on the Pacific Ocean, and on the Arctic Ocean. None of these seacoasts provides free or easy access to the great ocean highways of the world, although her occupation of Southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles after World War II gave her a protected outlet to the North Pacific area. The land frontiers in the west offer excellent protection in the Karelian Isthmus, the Pripet Marshes, and the Carpathian Mountains, and the gaps between make contact with Europe relatively easy. Elsewhere the borders of Russia run through some of the most remote and inaccessible desert and mountain areas in the world.

(2) Much of the area of the U.S.S.R. is tundra, forest, or desert, made more forbidding by vast distances and harsh climate.

(3) The great European Plain extends in a broadening path through European Russia and beyond the Urals into Soviet Asia. Parts of the plains and steppes of Russia are ideally suited to large-scale agriculture. The Ukraine is one of the finest wheat-producing regions in the world. The Urals are not a major barrier, contrary to a common assumption, and the broad lands of Siberia are being developed at a rapid rate. The Fifth Five Year Plan gives special attention to the development of Soviet Asia.

(4) The river systems of European Russia are great highways of transportation and commerce, having an importance for greater than the river systems of the United States or other countries which have relatively well developed railroad networks and highways. The Dniester, the Dnieper, and the Don flow into the Black Sea. The Volga, on which many important cities—Rzhev, Gorki, Kazan, Kuibyshev, Stalingrad—are located, ends in the great landlocked Caspian Sea. Siberia has four of the largest

¹⁷ A detailed analysis of the influence of geography on the power status of all major states is presented in Harold and Margaret Sprout, eds., *Foundations of National Power* (Princeton University Press, 1945). A revised edition was published by D. Van Nostrand in 1951.

rivers in the world, but three of them—the Ob, the Yenisei, and the Lena—pass through bleak, barren, and thinly-settled tundra areas to empty into the Arctic Ocean, and the fourth—the Amur—which forms the boundary between U.S.S.R. and Manchuria for hundreds of miles, veers northward at Khabarovsk and empties into the Sea of Okhotsk near the northern tip of Sakhalin.

Boundaries. Boundaries may be either natural or artificial ; that is, they may be determined by such natural features as mountains, rivers, and coastlines, or by strictly nonphysical considerations. Most boundaries between states are sharply delineated, although they have often been changed ; but there are still some undefined frontiers. The uncertain and in many cases conflicting claims to the polar regions may be an increasing source of friction as these regions assume importance in the jet-plane age. The Soviet Union claims all land between her own northern territories and the North Pole, and no fewer than nine states claim territory in the Antarctic region. If uranium or other valuable minerals should be discovered in quantity there, rivalry in the Antarctic would become intense.

Problems and disputes arising from boundaries seem to be always with us. Consider the tension and friction that now exist with regard to the frontiers between North and South Korea, North and South Viet Nam, India and Pakistan in the Kashmir area, Israel and some of the Arab states, Turkey and the Soviet Union, East and West Germany, Nicaragua and Honduras. The boundaries drawn in the post-World War I treaties were based largely on ethnic considerations, although in some instances historical or strategic concepts were given precedence. Thus the "historic frontiers" of Bohemia determined the easternmost boundaries of Czechoslovakia, even though this meant placing thousands of people of Germanic stock in the "Sudetenland" of the new Slavic state ; and Poland, which was resurrected after more than a century of death, was given a corridor to the Baltic, even though this corridor separated Germany proper from East Germany and was itself inhabited almost entirely by Germans. After World War II the major boundary problem—one involving the borders of Germany—was never settled, and the boundaries defined in the peace treaties emphasized political and strategic more than ethnic factors. By Russian pressure the boundaries of Poland were pushed westward, and some 8,000,000 Germans were forced out of the areas occupied by the new Poland. In several instances, as in Korea, Viet Nam, Kashmir, and Israel, boundaries were determined by the cease-fire lines fixed by truce agreements. These may prove to be anything but permanent dividing lines, and they are potent sources of conflict. Ethnic considerations were important in the division and eventual disposition of the disputed area of Trieste.

The "Science" of Geopolitics. It was left to Nazi Germany to make the most of geographic influences on world politics. In doing so the Germans developed what they regarded as the science of geopolitics. "Geopolitics, to take a convenient definition, is the science of the relationship between space and politics which attempts to put geographical knowledge at the

service of political leaders. It is more than political geography, which is descriptive. It springs from national aspirations, searches out facts and principles which can serve national ends."¹⁸


The beginnings of the "science" are lost in the past, but there is an obvious indebtedness to Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), the father of modern geography. A century later Friedrich Ratzel (1844-1904) formulated a general theory of the influence of geographic factors on states, which he compared to organisms that must grow or die. Rudolf Kjellén (1864-1922), admittedly a disciple of Ratzel, accepted some of his master's theories, modified others, added some of his own, and then gave the name "geopolitics" to what he had. To him the state was an organism and as such more than a legal entity ; it must grow and expand as geography and nature permitted and invited. The rules of growth constituted the new science, and although it involved biological and social sciences it was essentially a mass of theories based on geographic determinism. Kjellén's *The Great Powers* became the acknowledged bible of German geopoliticians.¹⁹

The two most notable geopoliticians have both been geographers, one a Scot, Sir Halford Mackinder (1869-1947), and the other a German, Karl Haushofer (1869-1946). Mackinder first publicized his theories in "The Geographical Pivot of History," which has already been mentioned. While the Versailles Peace Conference was sitting, he published his *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, in which he declared that a new world order must be based upon an understanding of geography and its influences. He contended that the so-called "Heartland," bounded by the Volga River, the Arctic Ocean, the Yangtze River, and the Himalaya Mountains, dominated the world geographically and could do so politically ; its position was invulnerable because world politics was in the long run a struggle between continental and oceanic peoples, and the "Heartland" was safe from sea power. His famous dictum runs this way : "Who rules eastern Europe commands the Heartland. Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island [Eurasia-Africa]. Who rules the World-Island commands the world." Thus, he added, Germany and Russia together could dominate the world ; fortunately, they had been divided in World War I, but they might not always be so.

Mackinder's geopolitical theories seem to have been tailor-made for Dr. Karl Haushofer, geographer, geologist, historian, Far Eastern traveler, and major general in World War I. After his war service Haushofer worked secretly with other former members of the German General Staff on a series of geographic studies designed to contribute to German success in another war effort. Through a former student, Rudolf Hess, he became acquainted with Adolf Hitler, and on Hitler's coming to power he induced

¹⁸ William H. Hessler, "A Geopolitics for Americans," *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, LXX (March, 1944), 246.

¹⁹ Thorsten V. Kalijarvi and associates, *Modern World Politics*, 3rd. ed. (Crowell 1953), p. 292.



Courtesy of Ginn and Company

Mackinder's Ideas of 1904

Nearly forty years later Mackinder revised his ideas of 1904. Although reaffirming his faith in the Heartland theory, he substituted a fulcrum of power for the pivot area. This fulcrum or axis extended from the Missouri River in the United States to the Yenisei in the U.S.S.R.

him to subsidize an Institute of Geopolitics in Munich. The Institute built up a vast storehouse of information on the geography and resources of the states that Germany was eventually to attack. Haushofer became an important advisor to Hitler, but he fell from grace when he advised against the invasion of Russia in 1941. Following Mackinder's "Heartland" theory, he argued for a German-Russian-Japanese bloc, and predicted that German armies would fail if they sought to swallow the vast lands of Russia. Haushofer was sent to the Dachau concentration camp in 1944; released at the end of the war in 1945, he returned to Munich a bitter old man, and, together with his wife, committed suicide less than a year later.

The geopolitics developed by Haushofer and his associates may be presented as a series of five major concepts :²⁰

- (1) For military reasons, a state should be economically self-sufficient.
- (2) Germany is a dynamic state with a mission to rejuvenate the world, and her master race, through world domination, will bring peace and a higher civilization. Germany, thus commissioned, is entitled to living room (*Lebensraum*); and weaker states, colonial empires, and large

²⁰ Based upon a summary of Haushofer's concepts by Derwent Whittlesey in "Haushofer: Geopolitician," in E. M. Earle, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy* (Princeton University Press, 1943), pp. 398—406. See also Andreas Dorpalen, *The World of General Haushofer* (Farrar and Rinehart, 1942).

land-monopolizing states must give way. States accepting Germany's leadership will gain new morality and health ; other states will resist Germany's destiny with futility and disaster.

- (3) All areas German by language, race, and economic interest must be brought under German rule. The United States might for a time head a Pan-America, Japan a Pan-Asia, but Germany would rule Europe and Africa and, eventually, the world.
- (4) By dominating the world's greatest island—Afro-Eurasia, Germany will occupy an impregnable economic and military position ; from this base she could eventually dominate the world. Sea power would be circumvented by land marches.
- (5) Boundaries are temporary things, subject to change in Germany's interest, and very useful in starting wars.

Geopolitics is regarded by some writers as a pseudo-science. Certainly in the minds of some of its proponents it became a fantastic thing, combining geographic determinism with economics, anthropology, racism, psychology, romanticism, and mysticism.

The "Heartland" theory was criticized and revised by Nicholas J. Spykman, late Professor of International Relations at Yale University and a leading American geopolitician. He held that Mackinder had exaggerated the potentialities of the Heartland and underestimated those of the Inner Crescent, which he renamed the Rimland and defined as the "intermediate region.....between the heartland and the marginal seas..... a vast buffer zone of conflict between sea power and land power." He declared that Mackinder's dictum was false, and should be replaced by the following : "Who controls the Rimland rules Eurasia ; who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world."²¹ Robert Strausz-Hupé also criticized many aspects of Mackinder's doctrines in his *Geopolitics : The Struggle for Space and Power*,²² but in a later work he declared : "Sir Halford Mackinder's concept of the 'heartland' is today, no less than when it was first presented in 1904, the fundamental axiom of world politics."²³ The power of geopolitics in Nazi Germany was immense ; its significance in the ultimate science of human relationships is as yet controversial.

Current Applications of Geopolitics. In 1943 Mackinder was asked to prepare an article for the American journal *Foreign Affairs*, assessing the validity of his "Heartland" concept in the light of the revolutionary changes in the world political situation and in warfare during the forty years that had elapsed since he first enunciated the principle. His answer was given in an article entitled, "The Round World and the Winning of the Peace." The Heartland idea, he contended, was "more valid and useful today than it was either 20 or 40 years ago" ; it still provided "a sufficient physical basis for strategic thinking." The advent of the air age had not changed

²¹ Nicholas J. Spykman, *The Geography of the Peace*, edited by Helen R. Nicholl (Harcourt, Brace, 1944), pp. 41-43.

²² Putnam, 1942.

²³ Robert Strausz-Hupé, *The Balance of Tomorrow* (Putnam, 1945), p. 262.

the fundamental bases of strategy. He gave more specific attention to those parts of the world which he had originally included in the "Outer or Insular Crescent." He believed that the control of Eastern Europe and the Heartland still offered a single power a chance for world domination, but he viewed the problem of winning the peace as one of finding a balance between the power constellations of the Heartland and of the North Atlantic Basin. He also gave particular attention to "the mantle of vacancies," the tropical forest lands of South America and Africa, and the monsoon lands of India and China.²⁴

Geopolitical analysis, as Mackinder believed, can throw much light upon some of the major problems and attitudes to be found in present-day international relations. To cite two examples only, it helps to explain the importance of the Middle East to the rest of the world and the basis for the concern of the United States in the power situation in Eurasia. The Middle East is important for historical, cultural, and religious reasons, but it is one of the crossroads of the world today because of its geographic and strategic location and because of its wealth in oil. Situated at the junction of three continents it occupies a key position in the Inner Crescent or Rimland, and is a potential zone of rivalry and conflict between the power controlling the Heartland and the insular or "offshore" powers. If the Soviet Union controlled this vital area, the entire world balance of power would be upset. With respect to American interest in Eurasia, Spykman wrote more than a decade ago that "the situation at this time..... makes it clear that the safety and independence of this country can be preserved only by a foreign policy that will make it impossible for the Eurasian land mass to harbor an overwhelmingly dominant power in Europe and the Far East."²⁵

NATURAL RESOURCES

The study of natural resources involves some definitions, a series of classifications, and, in the mind at least, a distribution map. We must note the sources of energy and their relation to industrial strength, and, in these premises, observe the position of the United States in particular. We must appraise the well-being of states in terms of food supply and the national power of states in terms of their total assets in natural resources.

Natural Resources and Raw Materials. We must first make it clear that natural resources and raw materials are not the same thing. Waterfall and fertility of soil are natural resources, but they are obviously not

²⁴ See Mackinder, "The Round World and the Winning of the Peace," *Foreign Affairs*, XXI (July, 1943). See also W. Gordon East, "How Strong is the Heartland?," *Foreign Affairs*, XXVIII (Oct., 1950), and Charles Kruszewski, "The Pivot of History," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXII (April, 1954).

²⁵ Spykman, pp. 58-60.

raw materials. Natural resources may be defined as gifts of nature of established utility ; they would include, for example, most minerals, flora and fauna, and, as mentioned, waterfall and fertility of soil. Some of these, like minerals and forests, are commonly both natural resources and raw materials. On the other hand, some raw materials must themselves be produced, as rubber, hides, and cotton. When these are domesticated products, they should not be regarded as natural resources. With some validity they could even be discussed under technology.

"Resource" implies asset, and what constitutes an asset varies from time to time and place to place. Unknown coal deposits are not an asset, but only potentially so ; oil and natural gas and a thousand other things are not assets in a primitive society, just as cottonseed was no asset a hundred years ago in the United States. Even today sea water in itself has little inherent value, but we hear of scientific probings that may result in its becoming a useful source of certain minerals and of unlimited quantities of pure water. Raw materials, too, possess only potential rather than actual utility. Sometimes the conversion of raw materials into finished products is long, complicated, and costly, as in the production of radium from pitchblende, or in the famous two-billion-dollar job of making the first atom bomb. The point is that even when states have raw materials they must add labor, technology, and capital to convert potential utility into actual utility.

The gifts of nature not only may fail to be natural resources at a given time or place but even may be grave liabilities. Forests may have to be destroyed and animal life obliterated, clay or granite or coal may impede agriculture, and oil or salt may complicate the problem of water supply. Furthermore, even when their usefulness has been fully established, natural resources may perform a positive disservice for a state, for natural wealth may invite aggression, as historians can testify with many examples.

The Use of Statistics. Attempts to find significance in statistics on raw materials will have to be conditioned by the realization that some figures give production whereas others purport to indicate total resources. Even production figures fail to tell the whole story, for states with scarcities have opportunities to build up their stockpiles during the less restricted exchange of peace time, and states with large production may also have large consumption. Furthermore, other factors may enter to alter the significance of certain figures. Water power, for instance, may permit substantial economies in the use of coal and oil, and an extensive system of internal waterways may do the same thing. The unrecorded production of home gardens may decrease calculated shortages in foodstuffs, or it may increase the exportable surplus beyond expectations. The efficiency of men and machines, the length of transportation routes, deterioration, industrial accidents, and many other factors may intervene to lessen the significance of statistics. Technological changes may force states to revise their power analyses, as witness the far greater reliance on oil in World War II than in World War I. Another example would be the building of

a plant in Texas so that, for the first time, Bolivian tin could be smelted in the United States. Synthetics may reduce or remove the reliance on what were regarded as essential raw materials, as in the cases of synthetic rubber, industrial alcohol, nylon, rayon, leather substitutes, various plastics, and, if we take the G.I.'s seriously, many foodstuffs, particularly meat. The development of new alloys and new pharmaceutical products, the re-use of oils and fats, and the conquest of mountains of old rubber and tin cans—all contributed during World War II to stretching stockpiles and limited imports of "essential" raw materials, and, incidentally, demonstrated the interdependence of raw materials and technology as elements of national power.

The Classification of Raw Materials. Raw materials may be divided into three groups : minerals, vegetable products, and animal products. Minerals, in turn, may be subdivided into various groups, as chemists and mineralogists would do, but the analysis would serve no useful purpose here. Some minerals have general and well-known usefulness ; others have such highly specialized usefulness that we must take the word of metallurgists on their importance.

The second group of raw materials, vegetable products, includes most foodstuffs, cotton, rubber, flax, some oils, wood pulp, sisal, hemp, some fertilizers, barks, roots, all kinds of wood, certain dyestuffs, kapok, bamboo, seeds, charcoal, nuts, and the ingredients of many chemicals, drugs, and paint and varnish products. Unlike his position in respect to minerals, man is not altogether dependent upon the original bounty of nature for his vegetable products. Although many of them are peculiar to certain climates and soils, some of them can be produced in areas to which they are not indigenous.

The third group, animal products, includes some foodstuffs—as meat, milk, and eggs—wool, hides, silk, tallow, some oils, furs, feathers, ivory, the ingredients of certain drug products, and much else. Within limits, man can also expand and diversify his resources in animal products.

The Distribution of Minerals. The development of mechanized warfare has meant that only states with substantial industry—both qualitative and quantitative—may be great military powers. Since minerals are the sinews of industry, it is evident that a wealth of mineral resources is a necessary condition of impressive military strength. Studies of international relations in recent years have given much attention to minerals as a factor in national power.²⁶ While statistics are abundant, they must

²⁶ For political aspects of minerals and other raw materials, see Brooks Emeny, *The Strategy of Raw Materials* (Macmillan, 1934) ; C. K. Leith, J. W. Furness, and Cleona Lewis, *World Minerals and World Peace* (The Brookings Institution, 1934) ; Eugene Staley, *Raw Materials in Peace and War* (Council on Foreign Relations, 1937) ; and George A. Lincoln and associates, *The Economics of National Security*, 2nd ed. (Prentice-Hall, 1954). For mineral resources, see United States Bureau of Mines, *Minerals Yearbook* (Government Printing Office, issued annually) ; and William Van Royen and Oliver Bowles, *The Mineral Resources of the World* (Prentice-Hall, 1952), being Volume II of *Atlas of the World's Resources* ; and *Report of the President's Materials Policy Commission* (Government Printing Office, 1952).

TABLE I

United States Self-Sufficiency and Percentage of World Production of Important Minerals

Mineral	U.S. self-sufficiency (%)	% of world production
Aluminum ore	43	14
Antimony	24	3
Asbestos	8	4
Cement	104	33
Chromium ore	.5-	.5-
Coal:		
Anthracite	113	31
Bituminous and lignate	98	26
Copper	70	31
Fluorspar	69	33
Graphite	37	4
Iron ore	95	40
Lead	69	26
Manganese ore	9	3
Mercury	25	9
Nickel	1	1
Petroleum	94	54
Phosphate rock	115	47
Platinum group	12	4
Potash	104	28
Sulfur	139	91
Tin	.5-	.5-
Tungsten	58	?
Zinc	74	30

The data on antimony, graphite, and tin do not include the production of the U.S.S.R. United States mineral production in 1949 was 14% under 1948, which set an all-time high ; 1949 was the second best year to that date. The above table is a composite of parts of two tables printed in *Minerals Yearbook* : 1949, prepared by the United States Bureau of Mines (Government Printing Office, 1951), pp. 10, 26. These tables have not been continued in later issues of the *Yearbook*.

be used with some caution. Figures on the U.S.S.R., for instance, are both fragmentary and unreliable. For another thing, ore production and reserves indicate nothing about a country's technology ; all the ore may be shipped abroad. Also, the possession of vast mineral resources does not imply that these are always available ; thus the extensive holdings of the British and French empires may be kept from the mills of Britain and France by transportation difficulties, by local unrest, or by enemy action. Finally, essential civilian demands may affect the proportion of mineral output that can be allocated to military goods. Nevertheless, great importance must be attached to statistics on both mineral production and mineral reserves.

Statistics on mineral resources reveal the advantageous position of the Soviet Union and the United States, thus partially explaining the military

pre-eminence of those states. In an interesting table on the resources of various countries in 27 important minerals, Alan M. Bateman shows that the Soviet Union has adequate or surplus quantities of 13 and the United States of 15. Although the British Empire holds this position in 22 and the French Empire in 11, Great Britain herself qualifies in only 2 and France in 4. Only three other countries have adequate resources in as many as 10 minerals : Canada, South Africa, and Mexico. The Soviet Union is almost wholly lacking in 6 of these minerals (diamonds, molybdenum, nickel, tin, tungsten, and vanadium), and the United States in 3 (diamonds, nickel, and tin). The British Isles have none or almost none of 20, France of 22, China of 19, Germany of 14, Italy of 17, and Japan of 15. Apart from those of which she has none or almost none, the Soviet Union has a serious deficiency in 8 minerals and the United States in 5.²⁷

While the unfavorable mineral position of Germany, Italy, and Japan may be used to explain why they went to war a few years ago, it may have more validity in explaining why they lost the war. Germany had an exportable surplus of no important mineral and adequate supplies of only coal and potash, and she partially or completely relied on imports for every other basic mineral. Italy had an exportable surplus of only sulphur and mercury, adequate supplies of bauxite (aluminum ore), lead, and zinc, and a total lack of many other minerals, including the basic ones of coal, iron, and oil. Japan exported phosphates ; she had adequate supplies of copper, graphite, and non-cooking coal ; she was partially or totally dependent in everything else.²⁸

This brief survey illustrates the patent fact that no country in the world today is close to self-sufficiency in essential raw materials, and that all states are therefore heavily dependent on foreign sources of supply. This dependence, which varies greatly from state to state, raises vital questions concerning the accessibility of these materials, control of the sea lanes or other routes from the sources of supply, exchange and balance of payments problems, relations between states needing the materials and states possessing them, trade restrictions and other barriers to international commerce, and significant security and policy issues. Some countries are heavily dependent on finding foreign markets for one or a few basic products, and their entire economies and political systems are affected by the world price and demand. Unfortunately, world price and demand may fluctuate in an unpredictable fashion, thus creating serious problems for the countries whose economies are at the mercy of conditions beyond their control.

Oil is the chief export of Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait, Iraq, Venezuela, and several other countries, tin of Malaya and Bolivia, coffee of Brazil

²⁷ Alan M. Bateman, *Economic Mineral Deposits* (Wiley, 1942), p. 369.

²⁸ These lists have been taken from Walter Sharp and Grayson Kirk, *Contemporary International Politics* (Rinehart, 1944), pp. 66-69. They cite the following sources : Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Raw Materials and Colonies* (1936) ; Brooks Emeny, *The Strategy of Raw Materials*, and E. D. Durand, *American Industry and Commerce* (Ginn, 1930).

TABLE II

*Estimated Reserves of Nine Major Minerals in 1948, by Countries,
in Percentage of World Tonnages*

Country	Coal except lignite	Petro- leum	Iron	Man- ganese	Copper	Bauxite	Lead	Zinc	Tin
North America :									
Canada	1	1	7		7		10	11	
Mexico		1					1	1	
United States	47	36	34	1	20	2	18	28	
Other North America	1		8	1		20	2		
South America :									
Republics		13	9	4	28	2	9	10	8
Other South America			1			7			
Europe :									
France			5			3			
Germany	7		1	1			6	4	
U.S.S.R. (entire)	24	6	11	58	10	2	6	8	3
United Kingdom	4		5						1
Other Europe	2	1	4	2	2	13	6	11	
Africa :									
Belgian					10			3	8
British Commonwealth	5		4	10	20	12	6	3	2
French			1	4		10			
Other Africa				1		1			
Asia :									
China	7		1	3	1	9	1	1	23
India	2		7	13		15			
Japan							1	2	
Other Asia (except U.S.S.R.)		42	2	2	1	2	2	1	54
Oceania :									
Australia					1	2	32	17	1
World Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100


From *Minerals Yearbook* : 1949, prepared by the United States Bureau of Mines (Government Printing Office, 1951), p. 28. The *Yearbook* indicates the source of much of this data.

and Colombia, rice of Burma and Thailand, jute and cotton of Pakistan, rubber of Indonesia, and tea of Ceylon. Nearly every state is dependent in some degree on the export of raw materials. This is true even of the United States, especially in the cases of wheat, cotton, and tobacco.

Whereas producing countries are dependent upon markets abroad, importing countries are concerned with problems of procurement and supply, and with devising means of cushioning the shock to their economies if supplies are shut off or even seriously curtailed because of depletion, bad diplomatic relations, or a general international crisis. The United States, which is far less dependent on imports of raw materials

STRATEGIC RESOURCES

(ALL DATA AS PERCENT OF WORLD TOTALS)



1954 Data


Foreign Operations Administration

than many other countries, is concerned with problems of this sort, and devotes a great deal of time, energy, and money to stockpiling and to developing substitute products and alternative sources of supply. Countries for whom foreign trade and imports of raw materials and foodstuffs are matters of life and death, such as Britain and Japan, must make every effort to assure themselves of an adequate flow of imports under any and all circumstances.

Major Sources of Industrial Strength. Modern industry is based upon coal, iron ore and steel, and petroleum. Coal and oil are the chief sources of energy, and iron and steel are vital to the transportation and construction industries and to a machine-using and tool-using economy. The great powers of today are those nations which are relatively well off in these essentials and have the advanced technological base which possession of them makes possible.

The quantity, quality, and relative accessibility of coal, iron ore, and oil have made the United States the industrial giant of modern times. By far the greatest producer and consumer of oil, she imports substantial quantities from Venezuela and lesser amounts from the Middle East ; and she exports some oil to Europe and the Far East. She is holder of the largest known reserves of coal in the world, and also is the largest consumer. She has the capacity to produce well over 100,000,000 tons of steel a year, although the figures for steel production have varied considerably in recent years.

The Soviet Union has some of the world's largest oil reserves, and is already obtaining large amounts of petroleum from the Baku fields, the Ural Mountains, and elsewhere in the vast reaches of the U.S.S.R., as well as from Rumania. And the Middle East, with probably the greatest oil reserves in the world, lies next door. Coal and iron ore also are abundant in the Urals and in other mines of the Soviet Union. In 1954 the estimated steel production of the U.S.S.R. was approximately half that of the United States, although in the previous year it had been only a little more than



President's Materials Policy Commission Report

one-third. The main problems facing the Soviet Union in exploiting her resources effectively are those of distance, transportation, and the general level of the technology.

Britain got the jump on other nations in industrial development, and for a century was indisputably the greatest industrial power. She still possesses great industrial strength, by virtue of "know-how," large supplies of coal and iron ore, her position as banker and center of the sterling area, her overseas connections, and the skills of her people. She produces less than 20,000,000 tons of steel a year. Most of her oil comes from the Middle East, where British companies have substantial interests.

No other country approximates the strength of the Big Three, although the countries associated in the European Coal and Steel Community together produce more than twice as much steel as Britain. Moreover, Western Germany is making amazing industrial progress and is already a formidable power; and Japan still has a strong technological base, which can give her great strength again if she can solve the problems of finding markets for her products and assuring herself of supplies of raw materials and foodstuffs.

Hydroelectric power is of major importance in some industrial states, such as Japan and the United States, and in many underdeveloped countries, such as India, where vast multipurpose river-valley development schemes are being brought into operation. It is of potential significance in many parts of Africa. Natural gas is extensively used in areas where it is available in quantity, not too far from cities and industrial concentrations. Manpower is still a chief source of energy in most parts of the world, although in the highly developed countries it is overshadowed by the energy-producing machines of man's creation.

Now that man has learned to harness the power of the atom, this new source of energy will become increasingly important. Already experiments have demonstrated that it has vast possibilities, and in time it may completely overshadow all other sources of energy, even coal and oil. Inherent in the atom are almost limitless sources of power, and these sources will never be in danger of depletion, as are coal, oil, and natural gas. The implications of the utilization of atomic energy can hardly be grasped; this is a development which may revolutionize not only the economies of nations but even the character of human life on this planet.²⁹

Uranium and plutonium (derived from uranium) are now the chief sources of atomic energy. Minerals containing substantial amounts of uranium are available in many parts of the world, and further exploration may unearth limitless quantities. At present the main supplies of pitchblende, from which most uranium is now derived, come from Canada and the Belgian Congo. Uranium-bearing carnotite has been found in several of the western states of the United States. Other significant known deposits of uranium-bearing minerals are located in several countries of Europe, in the northern regions of European Russia, in Soviet Asia where

²⁹ This is further discussed in Chapter 24.

it borders on Iran and Afghanistan, in China, Japan, Australia, and in the Union of South Africa. Monazite sands containing thorium, another important source of atomic energy, can be obtained in several parts of the world. The largest deposits of suitable quality are in India and Brazil.

In time an even greater source of energy may be captured and may supplement atomic or fuel power. This is solar energy. The science editor of the *New York Times* recently speculated as follows on this subject :

On a single day the land areas of the temperate and tropical zones are flooded with more energy from the sun than the human race has utilized in the form of fuel, falling water and muscle since it came out of the trees over a million years ago. The whole amount of coal, petroleum and natural gas left in the earth is the energy equivalent of only 100 days of sunshine. In fact there is more energy in the small fraction of radiation received from the sun than in all the uranium in the world.³⁰


Large-scale utilization of solar energy is not yet a practical possibility, but its potentialities stagger the imagination.

“Heartlands of Heavy Industry.” At the present time there are only three great “heartlands of heavy industry,” although there are several other centers of growing industrial strength which may become of real significance within a relatively short time.³¹ The key questions are adequate sources of essential materials, financial strength, and a satisfactory political situation. One great “heartland” comprises the northern and northeastern sections of the United States, roughly from Chicago through the industrial centers of New England, and includes the great industries of Ohio, Pennsylvania, and New York. Another is Western Europe. Perhaps this could more properly be divided industrially into two heartlands, one covering England and the other covering the industrial complex in Western Germany, the Benelux countries, and eastern France. The continental heartland utilizes the iron ore of Lorraine and the Rhineland area, the coal of the Ruhr, Belgium and the Saar, and the steel plants of the Ruhr, Lorraine, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Saar. A third major complex, also divided into several centers, is in the Soviet Union. Before World War II the main industrial centers in Russia were in the Ukraine and the Urals. Since the war much of the industrial strength of the Ukraine has been restored, and the Ural Mountain region has remained a major center as well ; but other industrial concentrations now exist in the vicinity of Moscow, Gorki, and other cities of European Russia, and at several places in Soviet Asia.

Potentially another great heartland of industry is in the Far East ; it combines the technological capacity and skill of the Japanese with the raw materials, including coal and iron ore, and the developing industries of north China and Manchuria. The development of this heartland,

³⁰ Waldemar Kaempffert, “Science in Review,” *New York Times*, Nov. 6, 1955, p. E9.

³¹ Strausz-Hupé, Chapter 11.



Two Worlds - Communist and Non-Communist Spheres Compared

however, is now being retarded by political difficulties. The second most significant heartland in Asia, outside Soviet Russia, is in eastern India, where coal and iron ore and apparently some petroleum as well are available. The Tata Iron and Steel Works, located at Jamshedpur, one hundred miles west of Calcutta, are the largest of their kind in Asia.

The Position of the United States. Economically the United States seems to be in a dominating and almost impregnable position. With only about six per cent of the population and seven per cent of the land area of the globe, she has nearly fifty per cent of the entire world's productive capacity. With the possible exception of the Soviet Union, she is more nearly self-sufficient in vital minerals and raw materials than any other country. With respect to the three most vital current sources of industrial strength, coal, iron ore, and petroleum, she is in a particularly enviable position. She has ample supplies of coal within her borders for the foreseeable future. She is by far the greatest consumer as well as the greatest producer of oil ; largely to husband domestic sources she imports about fifteen per cent of her total consumption. Most of this comes from nearby Venezuela, along sea lanes which can easily be protected in the event of war. She imports about the same percentage of the iron ore to satisfy the American industrial machine. Much of this comes from Labrador and from Venezuela and elsewhere in South America. Although the great Mesabi range is not inexhaustible, the sources of supply within the Western Hemisphere could be greatly expanded if necessary. The United States produces more than a third of the total world output of steel each year.

There is, however, another side to this picture. The United States is in reality far from self-sufficient in the vital materials of modern industry. She is wholly deficient in such essentials as chromite, tin, industrial diamonds, and quartz crystals. She has to rely on foreign sources for virtually all of her nickel and mica. She is hardly better off with respect to mercury, manganese, and platinum. She now has to import substantial quantities of several vital minerals which she once possessed in sufficient supply : copper, zinc, and lead.

Manganese and chromite, materials that are essential for steel production and for certain other processes in which no substitutes are satisfactory, illustrate some of the problems of America's raw materials policy. The chief source of these minerals is the Soviet Union ; but in view of Soviet restrictions and the political difficulties involved, the United States has to look elsewhere for them. At present India is the chief supplier of manganese, followed by the Gold Coast and the Union of South Africa. Most chromite comes from Turkey, with additional amounts from Southern Rhodesia and New Caledonia.

In attempting to avert any serious emergency that might arise from a shortage of "critical and strategic materials" the United States Government has given much attention to stockpiling and to the development of domestic sources of those essential materials that are in short supply and

of substitute and synthetic products. An exhaustive study of this whole problem has been conducted by the President's Materials Policy Commission. Its report, made in 1952, is a detailed analysis of the position of the United States in the raw materials field, with extensive recommendations of measures which should be taken to ensure supplies adequate for any emergency.³²

Something like seventy materials are now classed as "critical and strategic." Of these materials "over forty are not produced in the United States in sufficient quantities to mention ; of those produced in this country in any significant amounts, only eight are available to meet one-half of..... peace-time requirements. Thirteen are not available in the entire Western Hemisphere !"³³

Foodstuffs and Agricultural Products. Foodstuffs are, of course, a vital element in a nation's strength. Most Americans are only vaguely conscious of this, for they suffer more from over-eating than from under-eating. The United States and Russia are fully self-sufficient, France is nearly so, Germany and Great Britain—especially Britain—normally require substantial imports, and Italy and Japan, which have lower standards of living, are almost self-sufficient. Western Europe as a whole is dependent upon imports for about half of its food.

In most parts of the world food is a major problem, one closely related to effective utilization of human resources. Malnourished people cannot produce as much as well-fed ones, and they are potent sources of dissatisfaction and unrest. Dr. Raymond W. Miller has said : "Hunger is the most important factor in the world today. The real challenge of the twentieth century is the race between men and starvation."³⁴ And it is by no means certain that the race is being won. Rapid population growth, natural disasters, increasing pressure on arable land, civil wars and political instability, international tensions and suspicions, ignorance and superstition, corrupt or incapable leadership, and a thousand and one natural and man-made causes greatly hamper all efforts to win the grim race.

Most of the underdeveloped countries have to import large amounts of food even to sustain their people at low standards of living. Some of them have made remarkable progress in food production. India, for example, is virtually self-sufficient, a tremendous achievement indeed ; but she has achieved it at a level which provides only about 1700 calories a day for her people, a standard which is generally regarded as inadequate to maintain health, vigor, and decency of life, and she is still too much at the mercy of great natural disasters such as floods and the failure of the monsoons to bring needed rains.

³² See Report of the President's Materials Policy Commission, *Resources for Freedom*, Vol. I (Government Printing Office, 1952).

³³ Norman J. Padelford and George A. Lincoln, *International Politics : Foundations of International Relations* (Macmillan, 1954), pp. 33-34.

³⁴ Quoted in *Together We Are Strong*, Dept. of State Pub. 4614, Commercial Policy Series 144 (Government Printing Office, 1952), p. 33.

Basic foodstuffs such as rice, wheat, and corn are essential for national as well as for individual survival and for economic as well as for moral and physical development. Three other agricultural products—cotton, wool, and rubber—are hardly less essential in terms of national power than coal, iron ore, and petroleum ; they play a major role in the economies of many states and areas and in international relations in general. All have innumerable industrial uses, and all have been subjects of various international agreements.

The United States, generally speaking, is not heavily dependent on foreign trade, but some of her basic producers are, as for instance, the cotton-growers of the South. Exports of cotton are even more important for countries like Egypt and Pakistan, which have to rely on them to provide the foreign exchange with which to buy a great variety of essentials. American wool-growers need a foreign market, but the producers of certain other countries, such as Australia, are even more dependent on outside markets.

The economies of Malaya and Indonesia, countries which occupy critically important areas in the non-Communist world, would collapse if foreign markets for their rubber and tin were not available. The peoples of these lands are painfully conscious of their dependence on world market conditions, and they have already experienced the serious effects of great fluctuations in the world price of raw rubber and of exclusion from normal markets, as well as the heady effects of abnormally high prices resulting from the Korean War boom. They are concerned about the rapid development of substitutes for rubber and of the production of synthetic rubber, especially in the United States, their chief market. The United States, however, is likewise mindful of the consequences of the shutting off of the natural rubber of Malaya and Indonesia because of internal upheavals and difficulties (which the two areas are experiencing to an alarming degree) or because of an international crisis, perhaps even another global war. The United States has not forgotten the critical situation which arose when the Japanese occupied the rubber-producing regions of Southeast Asia during World War II. Thus her concern with insuring supplies of natural rubber or for developing an adequate capacity for producing synthetic rubber or acceptable substitutes conflicts with her desire to encourage the expansion of international trade and to help the underdeveloped countries to find markets for their products and strengthen their economies.

Relation to National Power. The possession of rich natural resources does not make a state prosperous, but it is essential to great national power. Advantageous geography, fertile soil, or mineral deposits can contribute to economic power, for they can create dependence by other states. By producing the wealth which permits investments, by stimulating a huge merchant marine, by supplying essential goods, or by affording a remunerative market, a state may gain economic power, and its capacity to do so is vastly enhanced by if not entirely dependent upon natural

resources of one kind or another. Thus an important element of military power is also an element of economic power—additional evidence of the inseparability of the two.

Two observations remain to be made in our discussion of raw materials. One is that financial interests in the more powerful states often control important sources of raw materials in underdeveloped areas, thus adding further to the resources of the leading states. This is true with oil, iron ore, copper, lead, zinc, tin, and rubber. The second observation is that colonial possessions do not provide the vast supplies of raw materials which one might too readily assume. In only eight minerals—including none of the basic three of coal, iron ore, and oil—did the total prewar colonial production amount to as much as ten per cent of the world's output.³⁶

The study of natural resources and raw materials discloses that even the greatest of the great powers fall far short of economic sufficiency, but that at the same time there is an astounding concentration of the basic raw materials in the hands of a few states. These few states, therefore, have vast superiority in this important element of national power.

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³⁶ Sharp and Kirk, pp. 65-66.

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National Power: People and.....3

Their Genius

We have spoken of geography and natural resources under the heading of "Land and Its Resources." To complete our view of national power we must now examine the people who inhabit the land, their numbers and kinds, and the traditions, mental processes, and moral concepts that together make up that "peculiar character or inherent nature" that is known as genius. It must be understood, of course, that the genius of a people is not a thing apart from the physical setting in which the people live. Whether we speak of technology, ideologies, morale, or leadership—and we shall here regard these as the components of genius—the compelling influence of geographic factors and of the generosity or parsimony of nature is always present. Furthermore, each of the seven elements into which we divide national power has an interrelationship with every other one, and in some instances that interrelationship all but effects an identification.

POPULATION

People are the most important things in the world—at least as far as people are concerned. And there are many of them. The present population of the world is estimated at around 2,700,000,000, and it is growing by just about 100,000 a day. Are there any limits to this human growth as it relates to the space and resources available on this planet? Obviously this question poses problems of human survival and of man's future. Here however, we shall discuss population as an element of national power by considering the advantages and disadvantages of numbers, the quality and character of a nation's population, the tremendous increase in population in recent decades, the present distribution of the world's peoples, trends

in population growth and the significance of these trends, and the problem of population and food supply.

Advantages and Disadvantages of Numbers. Everyone admits that in warfare numbers have usually been decisive in the past. But even long ago some men were stronger than others, were better fed, carried larger or sharper stones, were more in love with fighting, or got up earlier in the morning. Nevertheless, we seem to believe that there existed a rough equality among men, or at least between equal-sized groups of men and that even in the early nineteenth century "God was on the side of the biggest battalions." Since then, warfare has changed ; today it is conducted with all the genius that science can muster, and states may have to employ all their material and human resources to achieve military effectiveness. The result is that military potential is no longer arrived at by counting right arms but through calculations involving geography, natural resources and raw materials, population, the state of technology, the driving power of ideologies, morale, and the quality of leadership. Even then, because of intangibles, the results are subject to revision on the battlefield.

A casual glance at the power status of some populous states today might support the observation that population has nothing to do with power. One would see that the two states with the greatest population, China and India, are inferior in military power to the United States and Russia and perhaps even to a second-rate power like France today. But he would also find that no state with a small population is even a third-rate power. The answer is that a populous state may or may not make the most of its population but only a populous state can provide the equipment and manpower for a first-rate military establishment.

Three times within fifty years, once with Russia and twice with China, Japan proved that a smaller population supported by modern weapons, factories, and good leadership can defeat a much greater population poorly equipped and badly led. In turn, the Americans defeated Japan though outnumbered in the fighting area. Facts of this kind may suggest that military potential is only industrial potential, and so some people believe. To say this, however, is immediately to bring population into the equation, for, given the same technology, many people can make more guns than a few people. In other words, with something like equality in other respects a large population can defeat a small population and a large army can defeat a small army. Persons who decry the importance of population apparently fail to contemplate the possibility of something resembling equality in the other elements of national power. As Professor Frank W. Notestein pointed out, "the rapid spread of modern technology will bring power to populations now comparatively impotent," and he cited the experience of Russia in this respect.¹

A large population can usually provide more soldiers and more workers, and it also may possess certain other advantages. It may permit a greater

¹ "Population and Power in Postwar Europe," *Foreign Affairs*, XXII (April, 1944), 389.

selectivity and thus a better army, with no superiority in troop numbers. A consciousness of numbers may heighten morale. A populous state, through underground activities or passive resistance, may better resist absorption or occupation. Population is also an element of national power if it leads a state to build up its economic and military strength in order to seek additional territory to accommodate what it regards as surplus population. A large population may also possess disadvantages—perhaps less unity, greater susceptibility to varied propaganda, and more mouths to consume too little food.

It is readily demonstrable that population trends influence state policies, but it is not always clear how closely they are related to national power. States may tax bachelors, as Fascist Italy did, and pay bounties for offspring, as both Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany did. France has a record of encouraging large families that dates back nearly a century. Other states, feeling crowded or soon to be crowded, have subsidized emigration and tried to lure their people to colonies. England, Italy, and Japan have done this. The United States and Canada have severely restricted immigration. Some states endeavor to prevent birth control ; others permit the distribution of birth control information. The teachings of some religions enjoin certain means of family limitation.

Now, what are the power implications of all this? They are uncertain at best. Professor Quincy Wright concludes that "today the character of the influence of a particular population change is so dependent on other factors that it is impossible to predict from a study of population phenomena alone what international policies or occurrences to expect."²

Quality and Character of Population. The total number of people in a state is clearly a factor of major importance ; so too are the quality and character of the population. These involve such considerations as age and sex distribution ; trends in birth rates ; standards of living, health, and literacy ; productive capacity and skills ; customs and beliefs ; moral and religious codes and standards ; and vigor and morale. They also involve the relative proportions of people living in rural and urban areas, changing patterns of life and thought, sectional and regional differences and characteristics, racial and minority group composition, class or caste structure, and degree of social mobility. In short, it is important to know not only how many people live in a state but what kind of people they are, what they are doing, and what they are striving to become. Some information can be gained through quantitative studies, at least in countries where fairly reliable statistics are available ; but the kind of sophisticated analysis that is called for raises many questions about intangibles, and above all it leads into the nebulous but vital area of national character.

Age distribution is greatly affected by the stage of economic development, as we shall see presently. A mature industrial society will have a relatively large number of older people, whereas a society in the early

² "Population Trends and International Relations," in Hans W. Weigert and Vilhelmur Stefansson, eds., *Compass of the World* (Macmillan, 1944), pp. 427-428.

stage of industrial development will have a relatively large number of young people. For military and economic purposes it is important to have large numbers of people within the ages of maximum physical and productive effectiveness, say between 18 and 45. In the United States the increasing number of older people is having a great effect on the entire structure of American life and thought, whereas in China and India and other underdeveloped countries the profitable use of the rising number of younger people in an economy characterized by far greater unfilled needs than capabilities is a particularly urgent problem.

The vigor, energy, and productive capacity of a people are definitely related to their standards of living, their health, their levels of education, and their economic incentives. These factors account for the vast differences between the majority of the people in underdeveloped countries, whose energies are sapped by inadequate nourishment, poor health, (including various kinds of wasting diseases and chronic maladies), illiteracy, and lack of economic opportunity, and people in the more highly developed countries. Doubtless there are also other factors of importance, such as climate, the character of a people, and social and religious values and attitudes. Figures of life expectancy are particularly revealing. In many of the more developed countries, such as New Zealand, Australia, the Scandinavian countries, and the United States, the normal life expectancy is now between 65 and 70 years, with women living somewhat longer than men. On the reverse side of the shield are the underdeveloped areas, where life expectancy figures may be below 35 years and infant mortality is particularly high (along with maternal deaths in childbirth). Indians, for example, are proud—and justly so—that within the past decade the life expectancy in India has been raised from 27 to 32 years ; but this is still a shockingly low figure, and suggests the magnitude of the problems remaining.

The racial character of a population is also of great importance. Migrations of peoples throughout the centuries have produced a vast intermingling and miscegenation. In spite of all the nonsense about pure and superior races, there is probably no such thing as a pure race at the present time ; but the degree of racial intermixture varies greatly. A few countries, such as Japan, are still relatively homogeneous ; but most are multiracial and many multilingual. A study of the racial composition of a national group throws much light upon national character and behavior, and provides clues for the analysis of national power. The United States has often been called a melting-pot, but parts of the country are inhabited largely by peoples of a single or a few racial groups, and there has not yet been a high degree of "melting" between white and black Americans. In the Union of South Africa a sharp distinction is drawn among the black Africans who constitute the great majority of the total population, the "coloreds"—people of Indian origin and others with colored skins who are not classed as black Africans—and the small minority of white people, who are mostly of Dutch (Boer) or English stock,

Allied with the question of racial composition is that of minority groups. This is a major consideration in states with many such groups. It has often been a source of international friction and controversy. India has complained about the treatment of peoples of Indian origin in the Union of South Africa, and this matter has often been brought before the General Assembly and other organs and agencies of the United Nations. There is much speculation and division of opinion regarding the treatment of the many minority groups in the U.S.S.R. The Soviet leaders insist that these groups are treated on the basis of complete equality, a claim that has made a distinct and favorable impression upon the peoples of Asia and Africa, who are sensitive to anything smacking of racial inequality.

The Revolution in Population Growth. During the past one hundred and fifty years, largely owing to the Industrial Revolution and its impact all over the world, increases in population have been so rapid that they may accurately be described as revolutionary. Most demographic experts believe that because of famines, epidemics, and wars the population of the world showed relatively little growth for some centuries before 1650 A.D. The population in 1650 is estimated at 550,000,000 ; today it is just about five times that figure. From 1650 to about 1800 the slow but continuous expansion of scientific knowledge led to a gradual increase to perhaps 900,000,000. Since then the "revolution" has occurred : in a century and a half the world increase has amounted to 200 per cent. During this period the population of Europe, not including Russia, has expanded more than fourfold. Now the rate of increase in this center of the Industrial Revolution is declining, and great increases are occurring in many under-developed areas of Asia and Latin America.

The increase of the past hundred and fifty years is obviously a fact of vast political and human significance ; indeed, it is one of the most basic and most explosive facts of history. The reasons for this phenomenal increase are clear. They are associated with the industrial and technological revolution of modern times, which has brought about great changes in political, economic, and social organization and in the thinking of mankind. The new technology has made possible an immense increase in the food supply, and, along with improvements in medical knowledge and in popular education, it has produced a marked decline in death rates, a rise in birth rates, and a lengthening of the span of life.

Present Distribution of Population. A map showing present-day population distribution reveals a few areas of dense population and many large regions with relatively few inhabitants. The most thickly populated areas are : China, in the southeast around Canton, along the Yangtze Valley and well into the interior, and in northeastern China ; India, particularly in the valleys of the Ganges and the lower Brahmaputra ; Japan ; Java ; Egypt along the Nile River ; Western Europe, especially in northern Italy, Germany, Belgium, Holland, and England ; and the eastern part of the United States, roughly from lower Connecticut to Washington, D.C. There are numerous empty areas of almost continental proportions ; north-

ern Siberia, inner Asia, the interior of the Arabian Peninsula, the interior of Borneo, western New Guinea, most of Australia, the Sahara Desert, southwest Africa, the great Amazon River region, Patagonia, the American southwest, and most of Canada and Alaska, not to mention Antarctica, Greenland, or the northern part of the Scandinavian Peninsula. Well over one-half of all the people in the world live in Asia ; nearly one-half live in four countries of Asia—China, India, Japan, and Indonesia—on eight per cent of the world's land area. About one-third of the world's people live in China and India together ; one out of every five persons is a Chinese, and one in every seven is an Indian. At least two-thirds of all people have colored skins. Although a demographic map of the world shows huge areas with very scanty populations, it by no means follows that there is much room left for human settlement. Because of climate, terrain, or aridity, most of the still sparsely populated areas are not suited to large populations.

Trends in Population Growth. The general picture can be briefly sketched. In the nations of the West which have led the world in industrial and technological progress, prewar figures showed that the population increase was slowing down, as in the United States, or that it had come to a full stop, as in Great Britain, France, and possibly Germany. It is still too early to tell whether the postwar "baby boom" will effect only a brief interruption of the earlier trend or will decisively alter that trend. In Italy and Spain the population is still growing at a fairly rapid rate. Statistics on Latin America are surprising. One authority says that "the population of the entire region to the south of the United States is growing faster than that of any other major region in the world," and he asserts that the increase there between 1920 and 1940 was about 41 per cent as compared with about 25 per cent in the United States.³ In Eastern and Southeastern Europe, and in the U.S.S.R.—areas largely inhabited by Slavic peoples—the trend of population growth is still upward ; and in most of Asia all estimates indicate phenomenal increases. Despite Latin America, the center of population is shifting ever eastward.

Hardly more than a decade ago demographic experts were predicting a relatively modest increase in population, and in some instances, as in England and France, they were predicting actual decreases. To be specific in a few cases, it was estimated that by 1970 the United States would have some 170 million people ; Great Britain between 38 and 42 millions ; France between 35 and 40 millions ; the Soviet Union perhaps 250 millions, about as many as would be living in all the rest of Europe ; and India and China each more than 600 millions.⁴ It is already clear that these estimates were for the most part too low. What Russell Lord has called "an

³ Kingsley Davis, "Latin America's Multiplying Peoples," *Foreign Affairs*, XXV (July, 1947), 645.

⁴ See Frank W. Notestein and associates, *The Future Population of Europe and the Soviet Union* (Geneva, 1944), and Robert Strausz-Hupe, *The Balance of Tomorrow* (Putnam, 1945), Chapter 3.

explosive upsurge of births" has occurred in the postwar years in many parts of the world, including the United States and even France, and this trend promises to continue for some time. If present rates of increase persist, the population of the world will double in the next seventy years. Some demographers, in fact, arrive at the most fantastic figures by a projection of present trends. Professor Kingsley Davis mentions a figure of 21 billion people by the year 2240, and Professor Dudley L. Stamp suggests that there might be 1,226 billions by the year 2250. Even the far more modest projections of most demographers are startling enough.

One of the most extensive and most careful studies of this whole problem was made by experts in the Department of Social Affairs of the United Nations. They predicted that the world's population might be around four billions in 1985. As would be expected, they found that the greatest increases are occurring in the underdeveloped areas, which can least afford such a rapid growth. The peak area of rapid population growth is now in Latin America ; the UN study indicated that by the year 2000 the population of Latin America will be more than 373 millions.⁵ Well over two billions of the four billions expected in 1985 will be Asians. If present trends continue, the population of the United States by 1975 will be in the neighborhood of 225 millions ; but most projections now suggest a figure of around 190 millions. Even this is well above expert estimates made as late as the mid-1940's. If, as predicted, the Soviet Union has at least 250 million people by 1970, she will have some 40 million more than the estimated combined populations of England, France, Germany, and Italy. Trends of this kind will obviously have a profound effect on the world distribution of power and upon the course of international relations.

It should be remembered, of course, that all these figures are at best scientific guesses, and that population trends are based on three assumptions which may not be valid—namely, that future trends of birth and death rates will be an orderly continuation of past trends, that there will be no international migration on a scale large enough to affect the predictions, and that there will be no major war.

We may expect, then, that population growth will be less in the West than in Asia, which already has over one-half of the inhabitants of the globe and may soon reach two-thirds. In the "cold war," if it continues, the United States, Great Britain, and France will be at an increasing disadvantage, demographically speaking. There will be more and more people with darker skins, and fewer and fewer, relatively if not absolutely, with lighter skins.

Significance of Population Trends. Population growth appears to be related to the stages of economic development.⁶ In the first stage, that of an

⁵ See *The Determinants and Consequences of Population Trends*. U. N. Doc. 1953. XII. 3.

⁶ In analyzing these three stages and their implications, a study of population pyramids would be helpful. See, for instance, Notestein and associates, *The Future Population of Europe and the Soviet Union*.

essentially agricultural society, both birth and death rates are high, the people are young, and the number is usually expanding rapidly. Most of the peoples of Asia and, in fact, most of the underdeveloped areas of the world belong to this classification. In the second stage, that of countries in an early phase of industrial development, birth rates are still high but death rates are decreasing : invariably the population is a young and rapidly increasing one. The Soviet Union is now in this stage, and presumably will continue to be for some time to come. The third stage, that of the industrially mature nations, is characterized by low birth rates as well as low death rates. Hence there is a larger percentage of older people, and the population may be stationary, declining, or at best growing very slowly and beginning to level off. "The list of countries facing the likelihood of future population decline," says Dudley Kirk, "is a roster of the nations that have led the world in material progress."⁷

Certain power implications of these trends seem to be established. For one thing, a declining birth rate often acts to depress a state's morale and a rising one to improve it. Growing populations usually seem to have more spirit and vitality than static or declining ones. With more certainty we can say that countries of rapidly-rising population have a larger proportion of young people—hence a greater economic and military potential. A rising birth rate, however, may also mean too many mouths, a lowered standard of living, a reduction in personal efficiency, and a consequent decrease in national power. A constant or declining birth rate will probably mean the growth of the non-producing consumer class, for old people will become a larger proportion of the population.

Population and Food Supply. We have already listed food and people as perhaps the greatest "problems" of the twentieth century. A United Nations report on world standards of living, released in 1952, stated : "While one-third of the world is maintaining increasingly higher standards of living, two-thirds of the world are living under conditions which are getting worse." The Food and Agriculture Organization calculates that, whereas food production has increased by some nine per cent since the end of World War II, population has increased by twelve per cent. Fortunately, the picture is beginning to look a little brighter ; but the stark fact remains that two-thirds of the people of the globe do not now get enough to eat and every month there are three million more mouths to fill than the month before.

This rather grim situation has evoked dire predictions from a group of social thinkers who might be termed Neo-Malthusians. They predict that unless and until men stop wasting natural resources and, in addition, place drastic checks on their "happy-go-lucky procreation," they are doomed to an endless cycle of wars and to pestilence, disease, and famine, as Malthus warned more than a hundred and fifty years ago. This was

⁷ "Population Changes in the Post-War World," *American Sociological Review*, IX (Feb., 1944), 30. The theory of cycles and of decline in the industrial state is challenged by Joseph S. Davis in "Fifty Million More Americans," *Foreign Affairs*, XXVIII (April, 1950), 412-426.

the theme of a widely-read book by William Vogt, *Road to Survival*, published in 1948. A somewhat more moderate but still alarming view has been expressed by Fairfield Osborn in *Our Plundered Planet* (1948) and *The Limits of the Earth* (1953). The main conclusion of these works is that all prospects for vast increases in the production of food are utterly inadequate to meet the needs of a rapidly expanding population. "The infinitely tragic fact," writes Osborn, "is that starvation is at present the only controlling factor to constantly increasing human numbers in a vast portion of the world." But he does not believe "that this must always be so."⁸ He thinks that it may be easier to keep population in check by means of birth control than to increase production to keep pace with an uncontrolled growth in population.

Thus far birth control has never been practiced on a large scale, and there are formidable reasons—of religion, ignorance, human nature, economics, and politics—for this. Even in the relatively few countries which have publicly endorsed and publicized methods of birth control, such as Japan and India, very little actual control has been apparent. The real incentives to voluntary limitation of the size of families seem to come from increasing industrialization and a growing desire for a better standard of living. This has been the experience in almost all of the industrially mature countries, and doubtless the pattern will be repeated elsewhere, as other countries enter more fully into the industrial age.

FAO studies have suggested that it should be possible for the production of food and other basic necessities to keep well apace of the growth of population and thereby to make higher standards of living for more people. In a study entitled *The Geography of Hunger*, Josué de Castro, former chairman of the Executive Council of FAO, contended that the answer lay not in the elimination of "surplus people" but in an "economy of abundance." Remarkable progress has been made in discovering new sources of food as well as of energy, and there is no reason to believe that there are not even more promising sources still untapped. The Neo-Malthusian prophecies of gloom may prove to be amply justified, but man's ingenuity in response to desperate human needs may yet prevail :

.....the world is still both a prodigious storehouse and a prodigious mechanism of production. The ingenuity and energy of man can turn up resources at present unknown and man can, if he will, go on reaping an abundant harvest from the chemistry of sun, earth, and water.....And finally, there are the possibilities of science's reaching beyond present known resources and changing the whole concept of what constitutes a resource. Science is not satisfied that animals, grains, vegetables, fruit, and fish are the only things man can eat.....The world faces, as it always has, an endless struggle to feed itself, today and tomorrow.....But there is no reason for energetic and ingenious men to despair.⁹

⁸ *The Limits of the Earth* (Little, Brown, 1953), pp. 214-215.

⁹ "Malthusian Mischief," *Fortune*, XLV (May, 1952), 210, 211. The *Fortune* article refers to an interesting paper by Dr. Edgar Taschdjian in the August, 1951, issue of the

TECHNOLOGY

Young Americans, of all people, know the importance of technology in their lives. Alarm clocks get them up in the morning, or try to ; toasters, juicers, grills, percolators, and other contrivances provide their breakfasts ; automobiles, buses, bicycles, and roller skates take them to school ; laboratories, workshops, typewriters, adding machines, and audio and visual equipment contribute to their education ; and radios, television sets, record players, and movies offer them daily entertainment. In earning their spending money and in their lovemaking they employ both machinery and techniques, depending on opportunity, sex, and strategy.

From the time that the first man sharpened a stick or wielded a rock to crack a clam shell or a skull, technology has played a part in the lives of people. The first advances were slow, and it was by accident that man learned to make fire, build steps, fashion weapons, and snare his game. Progress by accident was the rule until far into historical times, and it is by no means altogether absent today. Sooner or later, however, men began an active search for new ways of doing things, and today we speak with deep respect of "research" in many fields of science. Industries, universities, foundations, and governments are engaged in a ceaseless quest for new knowledge. The results are apparent everywhere—in agriculture, industry, medicine, administration, education, transportation, finance, and, of course, the science of warmaking.

If writers on international relations seem to be too quick to measure technological advances in terms of war, it is not because they are unaware of the tremendous contributions of science to human welfare and happiness. It is because they are dealing with national states that still believe that only power can bring security, and because military effectiveness is the supreme test of power. Hence, we must be interested here, not in technology and the good life, but in technology and power. We need only to recall that our subject is "National Power."

Basic Technology. Less obviously related to warmaking than the technology of the manufacture and use of weapons is the technology of building the basic economy of a state. It is nonetheless an essential preliminary, for only an industrialized state can even begin to produce the highly mechanized weapons of modern warfare. We must remember that technology is a very broad term, that it goes far beyond iron and steel and machinery, that it means organized knowledge whether in agriculture, bookkeeping, or chemistry. In every field men have made advances in their ways of doing things, developing in each one highly specialized techniques, or what we call a science or a technology. All these are inextrica-

Bulletin of Atomic Scientists in which he asserted that other promising sources of human food were wood and cellulose, plankton (sea-borne micro-organisms), *Chlorella* (a green alga), and *Euglena* ("half-plant, half animal").

bly interwoven, and all contribute to a state's industrial potential. Together they make up what the speech-makers call "know-how."

Only when this base has been achieved can a state produce the weapons of modern warfare. Then technology carries on further to convert the productive facilities of the nation into the making of the instruments of war. Blueprints are translated into armies, guns, ships, planes, bombs, and countless other items of defense and destruction, and the generals and admirals take over. The point to remember is that immense technological progress must have taken place before the specialized technologies of modern war could be devised, expanded, and utilized. Even then they must continue to rest upon the technologies of peace, with added impetus to time-saving innovations and large-scale production. The majority continue in their old employments because they are doing jobs that sustain war industries, but many take up the specialized technologies of war-goods production. So complete is the dedication of the resources and manpower of the state to the business of making war that it is one of the reasons why we speak of "total war."

War Technology. We cannot undertake here to list the weapons of war and the special tools that are needed to produce them. Their number, variety, and complexity are almost infinite. We must, however, call attention to other kinds of technology that are vital in war and, indeed, oftentimes in peace as well. There must be efficient methods of mobilizing and training both workers and fighting men, of sustaining both public and military morale, of selling bonds, of conserving and allocating scarce materials and food, of organizing transportation, of banking, of taxation, of combating subversive activities, of guarding health, of settling labor disputes, of weather study, and on and on. Technology extends to every human enterprise in which there is some consciousness of method. It is vital on the fighting front as well as on the home front, for in the military operations area great numbers of men and vast quantities of supplies must be handled with a maximum of efficiency. There, perhaps even more than on the home front, it is tied in with the element of leadership.

Our emphasis here on basic technology must not let us forget for an instant that the "pay-off" is in the military establishment. Indeed some writers deal exclusively with the production of war goods when they discuss technology as an element of national power. Indispensable as is a broad, basic technology, it must eventuate in war production. Professor Ralph Turner had this beginning-to-end continuity in mind when he wrote that "every action from finding minerals in the earth and extracting them from it, through every process of manufacturing metals and shaping them, to all movements of metals to and upon the area of combat form a *grand technological sequence*. The organization and maintenance of this sequence is the central problem of waging total war. Subsidiary actions of all kinds support this sequence and facilitate its operation."¹⁰

World War II. The contribution of economic production to the victory

¹⁰ "Technology and Geo-Politics," *Military Affairs*, VII (Spring, 1943), 9.

of the United Nations in World War II is so well known that it needs no emphasis here. Hanson W. Baldwin wrote that "American production and construction, which reached Wellsian proportions, can be said to have been directly responsible for the victory over Germany and Japan," a victory that was won in spite of the fact that the enemy "was often on a par with us, or even superior to us" in "training for combat, in will-to-fight, in leadership, in tactics, and in the quality of.....equipment."¹¹ But, he added, "we could build an airfield or a pipeline in a fraction of the time the enemy needed ; and we could turn out ten tanks to his one." In making these judgments Baldwin acknowledged the importance of other elements of Allied victory.

The conclusions of Winfield W. Riefler are much the same. He declared that "the decision to inaugurate Lend-Lease, taken in the spring of 1941, must rank on any count among the two or three most far-reaching decisions that have determined the history of our time," and then added that "it is not difficult to select the American economic decision that played the determining part in the outcome of the war. Clearly, it was the decision to go 'all out' for war production after Pearl Harbor." He also attributed a number of technological triumphs to the British ; for one thing, they "pioneered in the development and application of administrative technique for a total-war economy that made more effective use of available resources, skills and technological capacity than did those of any other Power."¹²

The Atom and Relative Power. One of the greatest achievements of modern science and technology has been the harnessing of the power of the atom. The atomic bomb itself was the product of minds of many countries and of innumerable experiments in basic and applied research over many years. It could not have been developed without raw materials from all parts of the world. And above all, it could have been made only in a country which had the financial, economic, and human resources, the technological skills, and the advanced technological structure to launch such a gigantic experiment in time of war. Nor could the H-bomb have been made in a country which did not possess the necessary finances, skills, and facilities. Only a few countries—those with complex and well developed technologies—can hope to pioneer in the nuclear field. But atomic reactors are now being built, or soon will be built, in a number of countries which are by no means among the industrial giants of the present day ; and as the major atomic powers make available to other states usable supplies of atomic materials, atomic energy may become rather generally available for peaceful uses—and potentially, at least, for military uses as well. Among the many unanswered questions which the advent of the atomic age has raised are those of its implications for world politics and of its effect on the relative power position of states. Because of its funda-

¹¹ "America at War," *Foreign Affairs*, XXIV (Jan., 1946), 241.

¹² "Our Economic Contribution to Victory," *Foreign Affairs*, XXVI (Oct., 1947), 97, 100, 98, respectively.

mental importance, an entire chapter of this volume is devoted to the larger question. Here we shall essay a brief analysis of the power-position aspect.

The development of the atomic bomb has seemed to accentuate the offensive and enhance the might of the super-powers to an unprecedented degree. For some years the United States had a complete monopoly of the atomic bomb, and even today only two countries should really be called atomic powers. The same two countries are the only ones possessing the hydrogen bomb. According to this line of reasoning the development of nuclear weapons has added to the already disproportionate power of the major states of the world, especially the super-powers.

There is, however, another possible approach. Uranium and thorium can be found in many places, including the territories or possessions of many lesser powers—Australia, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Portugal, and South Africa, for example. Nuclear research is being carried on in many laboratories, and significant progress is being made in Holland, India, and elsewhere, as well as in the leading atomic-power states—the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France, and Canada. In the course of the proceedings of the International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, held in Geneva in the summer of 1955, it was disclosed that scientists of many countries were generally cognizant of the advances that had been made in the new field and had in fact made significant contributions of their own. These developments seemed to confirm the earlier view of observers that small states would soon be able to manufacture atomic weapons and would thereby be able to make aggression costly for even the most powerful state.¹³ With the rapid progress in atomic research this point of view has been expressed more frequently. The atom bomb has been called “the great equalizer.” Bernard Baruch harked back to a favorite saying of the American West : “Smith & Wesson makes all men equal.” The same analogy was employed by C. L. Sulzberger in 1954 :

The day is bound to come when not only Superpowers and Great Powers but also smaller nations will have access to atomic weapons and will regard them as conventional. The international balance has already altered as weak countries with large deposits of fissionable material have assumed new importance. It will alter again when little lands possess arms capable of blowing up the world. For the atom bomb will then become, among nations, the “equalizer” that the six-shooter was in the days of our own Wild West.¹⁴

A year later Thomas J. Hamilton declared that “so many countries now possess the capacity to split the atom that the pattern of the industrial revolution will not be repeated.....Such countries as India, Sweden, and

¹³ See, for example, Jacob Viner, “Implications of the Atomic Bomb for International Relations,” *American Philosophical Society Proceedings*, XC (Jan. 29, 1946), 55.

¹⁴ Dispatch from Paris, dated Nov. 19, 1954 ; in *New York Times*, Nov. 20, 1954.

Norway are now challenging the right of the pioneer atomic countries to dominate the new economy that is to be built on atomic reactors.”¹⁵ Developments in biological and chemical warfare also may place in the hands of lesser states the capacity for unlimited destruction as well as for unlimited progress. Poison gases and deadly germs can be manufactured in even small laboratories and in small countries on a wholesale scale. The great powers no longer possess a virtual monopoly of overwhelming power.

This line of reasoning may seem quite convincing ; but there are some serious flaws in it, and it does not in fact correspond to reality. The capacity for waging effective atomic warfare still rests in the hands of a few states, perhaps at present only two. This capacity rests upon a complex economy and technology ; it requires vast expenditures and constitutes a heavy drain upon both manpower and finances ; it calls for elaborate early warning systems, costly civil-defense measures, the maintenance of armed forces capable of fighting with both atomic and conventional weapons, quantities of effective carriers for nuclear weapons—whether long-range jet bombers or long-range and even intercontinental guided missiles—atomic-powered submarines, surface ships equipped to launch guided missiles, extensive and expensive research, both basic and applied, and other weapons, carriers, and techniques which only the major states can acquire or maintain. “It, therefore, seems unlikely,” concluded Quincy Wright, “that under conditions of power politics any small state would have both the capacity and the opportunity to equip itself with atomic weapons.....Small states in a jungle world would assume suicidal risks if they attempted to defend themselves by atom bombs.”¹⁶

Technological Position of the United States. The United States is the technological giant of the modern world—indeed, of all time. Whatever other peoples and nations may think of the United States and of her policies, they are acutely aware of her tremendous power, both actual and potential. The circumstances which gave the United States this unique preeminence have often been explored. They include : a fortunate geographical location and historical experience ; a large and well-endowed land mass ; a highly developed economy based on the effective utilization of natural resources ; mastery of the techniques of mass production ; great inventive skill and incentives to progress ; stable political institutions and a high degree of national unity ; relative freedom—at least until recently—from the troubles and vicissitudes of other parts of the world ; a relative absence of class distinctions ; and a skilled and energetic people. American industry today accounts for well over forty per cent of the world’s productive capacity.

But American resources, however great, are by no means inexhaustible. To keep up the level of her technology, and to expand it to meet expand-

¹⁵ “U. N. Debate Reflects Atom’s Growing Role” ; in *New York Times*, Oct. 23, 1955.

¹⁶ *Problems of Stability and Progress in International Relations* (University of California Press, 1954), p. 313.

ing needs, the United States must develop a long-range program for training needed scientists and technical personnel, as well as perfect her techniques of mass production and distribution. Furthermore, she is lagging in basic research. She has, in fact, always given far more attention to applied than to basic research. Yet the relationship between the two is often close indeed, and much basic research, even if a large part of it seems to lead nowhere, is a prior condition of significant practical results. "What takes place in the laboratories today, shapes the world of tomorrow. Every scientific advance translated into improved technology changes, and in some instances may revolutionize, the distribution of political power over the globe."¹⁷

Nor has the United States Government yet developed a well-coordinated program of scientific research and development in the tools of war, even though the need was amply demonstrated by wartime experience. The story of the work of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, under Dr. Vannevar Bush, has been told in a series of excellent volumes.¹⁸ Research is now being continued and actively promoted by several government agencies, including the Office of Defense Mobilization, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the National Science Foundation. But when this is balanced against estimated future needs—and against the present Russian program—it becomes evident that the United States is not doing enough to encourage young Americans to undertake scientific training.

Technology and Society. Two aspects of the relationship of technology to the social order must be kept in mind by those observers who see in Western industry the answer to the Communist threat. The first relates to governments and technology. Germany from Bismarck to Adenauer, under several different types of regimes, including that of the Nazis, became the leading industrial state of continental Europe. The Soviet Union has developed a solid technological base in the short space of hardly more than a generation, and she has done so without the incentives of the free enterprise system and without extending substantial freedoms to the great mass of her people. Japan, in an amazingly short time, acquired many of the techniques of industrial production and military organization from the West without effecting a major reorientation in her attitudes or institutions. The experience of these and other states suggests that technology is no monopoly of the Western world or of democratic states.

The second aspect relates to the truism that "technological progress is a function of the entire economy and social system of a country." This lesson has been driven home again and again by those who have been engaged in programs of economic development and technical assistance

¹⁷ *Foundations of National Power* (Revised outline for course in Foundations of National Power, published by the Bureau of Naval Personnel in July, 1947), p. 21.

¹⁸ Among these are J. C. Boyce, ed., *New Weapons for Air Warfare* (Little, Brown, 1947); L. R. Thiesmeyer and J. Burchard, *Combat Scientists* (Little, Brown, 1947); J. Burchard, ed., *Rockets, Guns and Targets* (Little, Brown, 1948); and I. Stewart, *Organizing Scientific Research for War* (Little, Brown, 1948). See also James P. Baxter, *Scientists Against Time* (Little Brown, 1946).

in underdeveloped countries. Equipment and methods have to be suited to the political, economic, and social environment of the "host" country, and the people of that country have to want the innovations as well as learn how to use them. "The social condition for the origin of science," Professor John Macmurray has observed, "is that a particular society wants to strike out upon a new path in its *social* behavior instead of maintaining its traditional way of behaving." China provides an excellent illustration of a country where the conditions for scientific progress have been largely absent. Several years ago Richard T. Hamilton and Robert Strauhs-Hupé stated this problem in words which are still applicable today in spite of the revolutionary changes that have taken place in recent years :

The current dilemma in China illustrates the converse relationship between science and the structure of society. It is obvious that any attempt to change the social structure of China without a commensurate increase in the scientific and technological resources of the people will result in chaos. The past thirty years in Asia have shown the fruitlessness of social acts such as, let us say, land reform, without a corresponding ability to increase farm production by the use of scientific techniques. On the other hand the introduction of science is well-nigh impossible unless there exists a climate of social progressiveness within which technology can be made to flourish. ¹⁹

Concretely, the dilemma has been suggested by Professor John K. Fairbank : "Modernizers of China in their attempts to introduce the machine have constantly run up against the vested interest of Chinese manpower, since in the short run the machine appears to be in competition with human hands and backs.....[and] there has been no premium on invention." He noted seven obstacles that had blocked the development of science and technology in China. These related to the system of logic, character writing, classical education, aversion to manual labor, the state monopoly of the economy, abundant manpower, and the powerful and conservative bureaucracy. ²⁰

Technology in war also has its quantitative measure. It is not enough that one plant can make planes and another precision instruments, any more than it is enough that one farmer can raise wheat and one man can fly a bomber. Here it is that population and raw materials clearly become elements of national power. And here it is that even better technologies add to the strength of the state, for they lead to even better planes and instruments, and to more of them. They produced the bombs that leveled Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but the victor in another war may have to have a thousand atom bombs.

As technologies enable a state to expand production and extend the variety and quality of goods produced, they add strength to its economy

¹⁹ Unpublished paper, University of Pennsylvania.

²⁰ See *The United States and China* (Harvard University Press, 1948), pp. 6-16, 30, 73-76.

and hence to its economic power. The essence of economic power is other states' dependence, whether for markets, raw materials, labor, or capital, and the greater the dependence the greater the power. British industrial domination of a century ago gave power to the Empire ; Germany's achievements in the making of dye-stuffs and precision instruments gave her power in more recent times ; and the efficiency of the United States in the making of machinery and in mass-production techniques gives her power today. These are instances of economic power through technology—not quite the same as the power of Malayan rubber, Iranian and Arabian oil, and Canadian nickel and wood pulp, which exemplify the power of natural resources.

IDEOLOGIES

Thus far we have been considering tangible and material factors of national power. Now we must turn to factors that are no less important although they are more difficult to isolate and define. These are the elements of ideology, morale, and leadership.

Meaning and Nature of Ideologies. The word "ideology" is now a common one in the vocabulary of international politics. We are told that the main issues that divide nations and peoples are basically ideological in nature, and that conflicting ideologies are a major cause of war. But what is an ideology? How does it differ from an idea, or a doctrine, or a belief? What gives it its pervasiveness, its power? Why is it a disturbing element in world affairs?

One of the most satisfactory attempts at definitions is as follows : "An ideology is a cluster of ideas, about life, society, or government, which originate in most cases as consciously advocated or dogmatically asserted social, political, or religious slogans or battle cries and which through continuous usage and preachment gradually become the characteristic beliefs or dogmas of a particular group, party, or nationality."²¹ Interpreted in such a broad and generic sense, the term "ideology" can be applied to a great variety of the moving ideas of our time, including many of the "isms"—totalitarianism, communism, fascism, Nazism, Marxism, socialism, liberalism, collectivism, and so on through a long list. Democracy also is in many respects an ideology ; the same is true of the major religions, notably the proselytizing ones such as Islam and Christianity. Ideologies may be classified in a variety of ways. Hans Morgenthau discusses certain "typical ideologies of foreign policies" under three headings : (1) ideologies of the status quo, such as peace and international law ; (2) ideologies of imperialism ; and (3) ambiguous ideologies, such as the principle of national self-determination.²²

²¹ Richard C. Snyder and H. Hubert Wilson, *Roots of Political Behavior* (American Book Company, 1949), p. 511.

²² Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 2nd ed. (Knopf, 1954), pp. 83-88.

Some of the ideologies which we have just listed are hardly ideologies at all, but rather umbrella terms which cover a multitude of idea systems and patterns. Thus there are many ideologies of totalitarianism and even more of democracy. Christianity, too, considered in its ideological aspects, clearly has many varieties of ideologies. Morgenthau speaks of "ideologies of imperialism." Perhaps the most powerful and most pervasive ideology of the twentieth century is nationalism ; some writers hold that there are many varieties of it, and others that it is not an ideology at all. Is peace an ideology as Morgenthau believes? Is capitalism?

We speak of the American type of democracy—or even the American Creed, the American Way of Life, or the American Dream—but what precisely do these terms imply? No one ideology, not even the general ideology of democracy, can be regarded as the motivating force of American political behavior and the major determinant of American national character. This does not mean that there is no point in attempting to ascertain the permanent sources of national character and conduct.²³ These are reflected in the great documents of American freedom, especially the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights of the Constitution. They are examined perceptively in many important works, including those of foreign observers. In his classic study *An American Dilemma* Gunnar Myrdal wrote : "America, compared to every other country in Western civilization, large or small, has the most explicitly expressed system of general ideals in reference to human interrelations." He found the "ideological roots" of the system in the European philosophy of Enlightenment, in Christianity, and in English law.

The term "ideology" was apparently coined only about a century and a half ago. According to Webster's *New International Dictionary* it was first used by Destutt de Tracy (1754—1836). Others have ascribed it to Jeremy Bentham or Napoleon. Although ideological factors have been a persistent element of social and political life throughout centuries of history, they were seldom of decisive importance before the twentieth century. In recent years, however, grown into a new strength and inclusiveness and called ideologies, they have injected passionate new drives into international relations.

"Ours is not the first age," observed Joseph Roucek, "which has produced new systems of ideas, and which has been marked by ideological conflicts. But no age, with the exception of the time of the religious wars of the sixteenth century, has seen such a variety of doctrines ; without any exception no age has seen the struggle of ideologies run so deeply and in such complex patterns."²⁴

The significance of ideologies in world politics today lies in the fact that in some instances they have become linked to national power. Just

²³ Snyder and Wilson, pp. 553-694. The chapters here indicated are entitled "The American Ideology" and "The American Character."

²⁴ Ideology as a Means of Social Control," *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, III (April, 1944), p. 364.

as power became the instrument of ambitious nationalism, it has now become the tool of ideologies. Without power of some kind, an ideology—even one which aspires to universalism—is a passive, harmless pattern of related ideas. What makes communism the dread of the free world is not the gospel of Marx and Lenin ; it is Soviet power associated with and sustaining the Communist ideology. Without power communism would be an impotent psychosis.

The “Ideologization of World Politics.” Certainly the “ideologization of world politics” is a phenomenon of the contemporary era. While this development has often produced a new cohesiveness within nations and groups of nations, it has generally exerted a disturbing and dangerous influence. Ideologies, in fact, are fertile sources of international conflict, and they greatly complicate the task of the peaceful resolution of all conflicts. At a time when the existing split between the Communist and the non-Communist worlds constitutes perhaps the major threat to peace, this point hardly needs elaboration. Ideologies are essentially irrational ; they have a considerable emotional content ; they can be used to obscure the real facts of a situation or the real motives of ambitious leaders ; they can be appealed to by extremists and thus can make reasonable approaches and compromises difficult or even impossible ; they frustrate efforts to find areas of agreement ; they make it hard to deal with international problems without undue sacrifice of national honor or prestige ; they turn international conferences into propaganda forums instead of opportunities for the accommodations of diplomacy. When strongly-held ideologies come into conflict with other strongly-held ideologies, international crises are bound to occur, and “solutions” are bound to become all the more elusive.

One of the most ominous trends of recent times has been the urge of totalitarian ideologies to universalism. This urge rests upon a gross perversion of the “One World” concept, for it envisages not interdependent states motivated by sentiments of mutual helpfulness but a single pattern of thought, emotions, and loyalties to which all men and nations must conform. Because ideologies of this kind can evoke fanatical support they must be regarded as instruments of national policy.

Ideologies may be “good” as well as “bad,” for they give strength to worthy causes, unity to nations, and a sense of common interest to peoples in many parts of the world. One can argue that any progress toward effective international cooperation and realization of the goals of human brotherhood—in itself, perhaps, an ideology—must depend upon an ideological motivation. Although it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the growing ideologization of world politics is on the whole an alarming development, it must be realized that love of a free world is also a powerful ideology, and that many great states have resolved that it shall remain stronger than any of its rivals.

MORALE

Morale is a thing of the spirit, made up of loyalty, courage, faith, the impulse to the preservation of personality and dignity, sentiment for the known, fear and dislike of the unknown, and self-interest. It has been described as a healthy frame of mind characterized by fidelity to a cause.²⁵ In political usage it commonly pertains to a large group or even a nation. More basic and constant than mood or "spirit," it may be regarded as the temper of the day rather than the "high" or "low" of the moment. It alone cannot produce raw materials, food, and the weapons of war, but it can provide the "drive" that leads to more raw materials, more food, and so on. It can make men and women work harder, sacrifice more, and fight harder. It can evoke that last ounce of strength, that tightening of the belt, that willingness to compromise domestic differences, that impulse to service "above and beyond the call of duty" that has so often been the margin of victory.

Morale and National Character. Morale seems to be related to what we call "national character," but the relationship is not clear. We tend to think of the Chinese in terms of cosmic unchangeability, of the Germans in terms of thoroughness, discipline, and efficiency, of the Russians in terms of relentless persistence, of all Latins in terms of esthetic instinct and volatility, of Americans and Canadians in terms of resourcefulness and inventiveness, and of the English in terms of dogged common sense. Whether these characterizations are correct and, if so, to what extent they are acquired traits are questions that we gladly surrender to the sociologists. What concerns us here is the part that national character plays in morale. Why, for instance, did the Finns fight so heroically in 1939 and the Greeks in 1940 whereas French resistance collapsed so completely in 1940? Why did Germany fold up so neatly in 1918 and fight almost to the last ditch in 1945? Or take the miracle of Dunkirk in the spring of 1940, one of the most dramatic pages in world history, and the thundering challenge of Winston Churchill that electrified the world and expressed the resolve of every Englishman: "We shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills; we shall never surrender." What have we here? "National character," "morale," or both?

Some writers list national character as one of the elements of national power, as does Professor Hans J. Morgenthau in his *Politics Among Nations*. It may be regarded as one of the major determinants of national morale, although, of course, it is broader than morale. But where it is more than the basis of morale, it may help to explain some other element, as American "resourcefulness and ingenuity" help to explain the advanced state of American technology. At other times it may account in part for the

²⁵ See J. A. Ulio, "Military Morale," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLVII (Nov., 1941), 321-330.

cohesiveness of population, or for the effectiveness of leadership. National character may be thought of as climate, morale as weather.

Morale is certainly related to ideologies and even to ideas. We have earlier discussed the importance of nationalism as a determinant of loyalties and conduct. History is replete with hero stories of men who died fighting for their king, for their religion, for freedom, for democracy, for national unity, for fascism, for Nazism, or for communism ; in fact, sometimes history seems wholly made up of men fighting and dying for what were to them holy and righteous causes. Devotion is not the whole of morale, but it is a large part of it. Other conditions may have to be added—hope, means, health, etc. Being essentially a thing of the mind and spirit, it cannot be analyzed like a cake of soap.

Culture. The relationship of morale to the general educational and cultural achievements of a people also is difficult to determine. One may reason that the members of an advanced society have clear advantages over those of a backward society : they are better qualified to devise new weapons and to improve their production techniques, to organize morale-building propaganda, to train their leaders, to recruit strength through diplomacy, to enlist financial assistance, and in many other ways to utilize their resources. He may believe that the people of an advanced society have a better realization that there are ups and downs in every war, that the last battle counts most, and that the miseries of submission may be worse than the horrors of war. On the other hand, he may contend that backward peoples are less dependent on "critical raw materials," on a smoothly functioning factory system, on the continued flow of the comforts and luxuries of life, and on the uninterrupted efficiency of a complex administrative system. He may argue that people on the lowest cultural level can gain new hope in ways that are closed to members of a more progressive society—from "signs," "tokens," rituals, and the assurances of "wise men."

Emphasis on culture—at least "modern culture"—as an important factor in morale does not appear to be justified by history. Backward peoples have at times been easy victims of conquest ; at other times they have fought with incredible valor and ferocity. Advanced people have the same contradictory record : witness the fighting France of 1914 and the defeatist France of 1940 ; and the capitulating Germany of 1918 and the fighting Germany of 1945. Until further studies have been made, it seems hardly correct to regard cultural differences as a significant factor in the determination of national morale.

Building Morale. College students who organize pep meetings and cheering sections, like the chambers of commerce which organize keep-our-city-clean and buy-it-at-home drives, know that morale can be manufactured. Statesmen are just as clever. Sometimes they may seek to mislead their people, but usually they are only trying to organize all the resources of the state in its own best interest. The instrument they use is propaganda, which, rightly defined, means anything said or done to influence the

thoughts or actions of a person or of people, regardless of whether the motive of the speaker or doer is praiseworthy, evil, or neither, and regardless of whether the final result is socially good or socially bad.

Exposure to propaganda is an everyday experience in life today. It may come through the radio, the newspaper, billboards, or the neighbor next door. It may come gently—"I didn't see you at services last Sunday"—or with the infuriating insistence and moron-appeal of a radio commercial. It may relate to anything in this world or others, in this life or the next. State propaganda in time of peace is usually prosaic : obey the law, pay your taxes, vote, join the Navy and see the world, use airmail, drive carefully and save a life, and don't pick flowers or start a fire in the national parks. In wartime the tempo is vastly accelerated, and the propaganda machines are thrown into high gear. National morale has to be built up to make possible the maximum fighting efficiency of which the country is capable.

Morale and Chance. Just as morale is not exactly a matter of national character or of cultural level, it is by no means entirely the product of the techniques of propaganda. It is partly that, but it is also the result of the impact on the public spirit of incidents of the war itself : the loss of a great battle, the death of a high leader, the sinking of ships, the defection of an ally, additions to the enemy's strength, new conscription demands, the announcement of a staggering budget, and the like. It may be affected by reverses on the home front : crop failures, floods, sabotage, strikes, industrial and railroad accidents, epidemics, and so on. Even good news can produce bad effects ; a single spectacular victory in the field may bring a premature relaxation of effort. National morale, we must conclude, is a complex of a few constants and many variables.

Perhaps as closely related to success in warmaking as high morale at home is low morale in the enemy's country. Even more than domestic morale it is a function of the techniques of propaganda, both civilian and military.

Morale and Leadership. Morale is related to leadership in that it is strongly influenced by personality, by success and failure, and by dramatic words and daring actions. Some leaders are trusted and others distrusted, often without regard to their proved merits. To cite the instance of several military leaders in the American Civil War : Frémont, Hooker, and Hood at times enjoyed wide acclaim, but all left consistent records of failure ; Meade and Joseph E. Johnson, on the other hand, were generals of ability, but neither ever aroused enthusiasm. In the main, however, it seems correct to say that leadership is justly appraised by a country, and that when it is competent or exceptional it tends to induce high morale. Words alone sometimes work miracles. American history is filled with dramatic phrases that whipped the nation into a fighting mood : "I have just begun to fight" ; "Damn the torpedoes—full steam ahead" ; "Remember the Maine" ; "We must make the world safe for democracy." World War II produced no single ringing call to arms, but several phrases caught on and contributed

to America's high morale : "Arsenal of Democracy" ; "Remember Pearl Harbor" ; "Sighted sub ; sank same" ; MacArthur's "I shall return" ; and General McAuliffe's reply of "Nuts" to a German demand for the surrender of an isolated unit in the Battle of the Bulge. Other words, together with many unforeseen incidents of war, have affected national morale for better or for worse, and they have often done so without benefit of well-oiled machinery.

We must not regard morale-building as something exclusively in the domains of government and chance. In a democratic country it is everybody's business, and in World War II thousands of persons made notable contributions. Acting through clubs and organizations of every kind, and often alone, these persons worked long and hard to awaken others to consciousness of the great issues involved and to the need for the best efforts of everyone. True, they frequently used the established techniques, but the motivation was often spontaneous.

In summary, morale must provide the will in the attainment of the military potential. It is, in part, a product of organized effort, but much of it is the result of unorganized effort, and some of it is accidental. It seems to have some relationship to national character and education ; it is certainly related to leadership and to other elements of national power—such as geography, natural resources, population, and technology—which give a people values to be defended and a consciousness of the strength to defend them.

LEADERSHIP

The importance of leadership in general probably needs to be called to nobody's attention, but two aspects of it as an element of national power may be somewhat less obvious. The first of these is the extent to which it overlaps other elements of power, and the other is the range of activities in which able leadership is essential to the realization of maximum power.

Leadership is interrelated with the other elements of national power because it is one of the measures of the extent to which those elements are utilized. Without leadership people cannot even constitute a state ; without it there can be no well-developed or integrated technology ; and without it morale is totally useless, if indeed it can exist at all. While leadership must be presumed if potential elements of national power are to be effective elements, leadership itself varies so greatly in quality that it may be regarded as a distinct factor or element.

Leadership in Total War. Gone are the days when effective leadership in time of war meant the authority to conscript or hire men, requisition supplies, and ride and fight well. Since the advent of total war, virtually every resource of the state must be guarded, developed, and utilized. Even in a democratic state the ultimate control of all war potentials is in the hands of the duly constituted leaders of the state. Theirs is the responsibility for the maximum utilization of everything that can be made to contribute to

national power in terms of ability to wage war. The range is staggering : food supply, raw materials of industry, industry itself, transportation, communications, public health, national morale, and war financing, plus the creation and maintenance of a vast military establishment, which itself has truly colossal problems of organization, supply and transport, health, strategy, morale, and, it hopes, of occupation and military government. Total war is total partly because it calls for total resources, total organization, and total effort, and often what is close to the assumption of total power by the government. Upon the political leaders of the state falls the final responsibility for the coordination of all the energies of the state.

Specialized Leadership. But it is not enough to have competent leaders of the state, regardless of the authority they may possess. There must also be leaders of great ability to direct the many phases of the national effort which the political leaders must control and coordinate but in which they have no special qualifications for technical direction. Perhaps of first importance would be the men at the top posts in the military and naval establishments, but the government also has vital need of bringing the ranking men and women in many fields to the support of the war. When William Green and Philip Murray promised that the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations would back the war effort to the limit, they were offering skill in the leadership of organized labor that existed nowhere in the government itself. So it was when spokesmen of industry, finance, education, farming, transportation, and other specialized groups pledged their support. Leadership is an elastic term, susceptible of various uses, but in the sense in which it is an element of national power it must include many persons upon whose qualities of leadership depends the development of the military potential.

Leadership in Diplomacy. Although the supreme test of a state's power is its effectiveness in waging war, most states are technically in a state of peace much more of the time than they are engaged in war. The United States, for example, has been at peace with all other nations of the world just about ninety per cent of the time between the Declaration of Independence and the present. Even in times of peace, however, states possess power. One measure of that power is the effectiveness of the state's diplomacy, which in turn is in part the measure of the competence of leadership.

Diplomacy can serve the interests of a state by protecting its people abroad ; by constant vigilance in the search for new opportunities for trade ; by facilitating established commercial intercourse ; by the accumulation of a wide range of information on the geography, resources, techniques, culture, military establishment, diplomatic interests, and people of a foreign state ; perhaps by the stimulation of immigration ; and, in general, by promoting respect and good-will for the state and by keeping its leaders "informed." All of this is, of course, more or less routine, quite different from what we might call "power diplomacy." States making their diplomacy an instrument of power must maintain constant alertness and keep their ablest men in the foreign office. They must exploit to the limit "the art of bring-

ing the different elements of national power to bear with maximum effect upon those points in the international situation which concern the national interest most directly.”²⁶ Diplomacy as an instrument of national power is discussed in Chapter 4.

Diplomatic effectiveness, like military effectiveness, is a combination of various elements of national power. Both of them are likely to be measured by the skill or genius of individuals. An astute diplomacy often achieves successes out of keeping with a state's power potential, just as brilliant generalship may win victories that upset all sober calculations. One might conclude that diplomatic and military talents ought to be regarded as more or less distinct elements of national power. One would then have to add still other elements, such, perhaps, as financial talent, which may be of such an order as to constitute the margin of victory. It seems much simpler to give leadership a definition broad enough to include all these special fields, and to regard it in this comprehensive sense as one of the elements of national power.

THE APPRAISAL OF NATIONAL POWER

We have presented national power as made up of seven elements : geography, natural resources, population, technology, ideologies, morale, and leadership. Now, in concluding the discussion, we must make a few observations that should be kept in mind if national power is to be correctly understood.

Relativity of Power. National power, like nearly everything else in this world of ours, is relative. A man with a million dollars is not rich in a group of multimillionaires ; a man of forty is old to a child of ten and youthful to an octogenarian. Similarly, with power the absolute has little meaning. One hundred divisions, five hundred war vessels, ten thousand planes—all these may represent overwhelming might against one opponent and miserable inadequacy against another. Power, however impressive on paper, is always to be measured in terms of the power of other states.

Changes in Power. Power is subject to continuous change. Absolute power may change for many reasons. A state may decrease or increase the size of its military forces ; equipment may deteriorate or become obsolete, or it may be replaced with better equipment ; morale may go down or up ; leaders may be changed ; raw materials may become less abundant or more abundant ; technological processes may be improved ; new instruments of war may be invented ; plagues, floods, and earthquakes may lower production, destroy supplies, kill workers, and depress morale ; alliances may be formed or broken—all these and countless other changes may affect one or more of the elements of power and thereby alter a state's

²⁶ Morgenthau, p. 129.

power potential. A change in absolute power will very likely produce a change in relative power.

A change in a state's relative power—the only important measure of power—may come with no perceptible change in its absolute power. The explanation is simple : another state has changed in its absolute power. It has expanded and improved its army, enlarged its navy, modernized its air force, gained an ally, developed a chemical industry, or adopted compulsory military training, or it has suffered reverses, perhaps a flood, a plague, insurrection, the loss of a great leader, depression, and so on. Changes in absolute power may come through policy, attentiveness or indifference, competence or incompetence, or mere caprices of nature. One example will illustrate. At the beginning of World War I the British navy was undisputed mistress of the seas ; at the close of World War II a stronger British navy was only second-rate. The United States had become navy-minded and had more money to spend.

Attention to Power. Leaders of states are, of course, aware of the essential elements of power and of their interdependence. If they are power-conscious, they try to bring about the maximum utilization of each of the elements within their respective states. Yet all the power-consciousness in the world cannot effect a precise measurement of power. Since power is relative, states would need to have information on enemy states, and this is never complete. Arms of the same size are not necessarily of equal effectiveness, and the same rule must apply to all weapons. Transportation efficiency may upset apparent equality in raw materials, and an abundance of oil can hardly be measured against adequate supplies of iron ore. Much depends on where military action is to take place, on morale, on the attitude of outside states, and on the caprices of nature. Many variable factors, both quantitative and qualitative, prevent mathematical calculations from being accurate. All of these considerations add enormously to the burdens of leaders who must see to the security of the state.

When the warnings of statesmen are not enough, high taxes and excited commentators often help to remind people that we are living in a world in which states still feel that their best assurance of security lies in their own strength. As long as that is true, regardless of the fervent wishes of some peoples to live in peace, states must be expected to protect themselves with whatever power they can muster. If the United Nations can eventually provide security for all, the need for reliance on power, as now understood, may pass. Until that time statesmen will remain deeply conscious of the elements of national power. To ask them to do less is to ask them to ignore the lessons of history and to blind themselves to their paramount obligation.

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Part Two

INSTRUMENTS FOR THE PROMOTION OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST

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Diplomacy as an Instrument.....4 of National Policy

Sometime during his service as the top American military commander in the China-Burma-India theater, General “Vinegar Joe” Stilwell recorded his thoughts as a “Deck-Hand Diplomat” :

A brief experience with international politics confirms me in my preference for driving a garbage truck. This is admittedly not the proper approach to the matter of international politics. It is a very serious business. A lot of Big Figures indulge in it, and a host of little ones trail along. Those who make the grade are of course interested to dignify and even glorify the profession, which can be done in a wink of the eye by using the term “diplomacy”—a word we usually utter on a hushed and respectful note. The term “diplomat” to the average American evokes a vision of an immaculately dressed being—pin-stripe pants, spats, cutaway and topper—and a coldly severe and superior manner which masks the lightning-like play of the intellect that guides the Ship of State, moves the pieces on the board with unerring precision, and invariably turns up in Washington without his shirt. Or rather our shirt.¹

¹ Joseph W. Stilwell, *The Stilwell Papers*, arranged and edited by Theodore H. White (William Sloane, 1948), p. 256.

More than a quarter of a century before General Stilwell wrote these words, a man of a wholly different background, Joseph Stalin, had paid his respects to the art of diplomacy in these words :

A diplomat's words must have no relation to actions—otherwise what kind of diplomacy is it? Words are one thing, actions another. Good words are a mask for the concealment of bad deeds. Sincere diplomacy is no more possible than dry water or wooden iron.²

General Stilwell had encountered almost as many difficulties with American diplomatic representatives and Chinese officials as he had with the jungles of Burma or from the Japanese. Moreover, he also reflected a deep-rooted American conviction that whenever representatives of the United States engage in negotiations with foreign diplomats they come out on the short end of the deal. Stalin, on the other hand, expressed the traditional attitude of modern dictators toward diplomacy, namely, that it is a means of concealing a nation's real aims and of providing a smoke screen for actions of a vastly different character. The two Joes, in short, took a cynical view of the art of diplomacy.

THE NATURE OF DIPLOMACY

While the sentiments of Stilwell and Stalin have some justification they do not suggest the real nature of diplomacy, which consists of the techniques and procedures for conducting relations among states ; it is, in fact, the normal means of conducting international relations. In itself diplomacy, like any machinery, is neither moral nor immoral ; its use and value depend upon the intentions and abilities of those who practice it.

Diplomacy functions through a labyrinth of foreign offices, embassies, legations, consulates, and special missions all over the world. It is commonly bilateral in character, but as a result of the growing importance of international conferences, international organizations, regional arrangements, and collective security measures, its multilateral aspects have become increasingly significant. It may embrace a multitude of interests, from the simplest matter of detail in the relations between two states to vital issues of war and peace. When it breaks down, the danger of war, or at least of a major crisis, is very real.

Definition. No general definition of diplomacy can be very satisfactory or very revealing. The *Oxford English Dictionary* calls it "the management of international relations by negotiation," or "the method by which these relations are adjusted and managed." A charming characterization, though vague and inadequate, is given in Sir Ernest Satow's *Guide to Diplomatic Practice*, a work which has been the bible of British diplomats for many years. "Diplomacy," wrote Sir Ernest, "is the application of in-

² Quoted in David Dallin, *The Real Soviet Russia* (Yale University Press, 1944), p. 71.

telligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between the governments of independent states.”³ Since the eminent author of these lines is no longer living, we cannot ask him this impertinent but timely question : If intelligence and tact are lacking in the relations between states, is diplomacy impossible?

Foreign Policy and Diplomacy. A necessary distinction to bear in mind is that between foreign policy and diplomacy. The foreign policy of a state, as J. R. Childs has said, is “the substance of foreign relations,” whereas “diplomacy proper is the process by which policy is carried out.”⁴ Policy is made by many different persons and agencies ; but presumably on major matters in any state, whatever its form of government, it is made at the highest levels, though subject to many different kinds of controls. Diplomacy provides the machinery and the personnel by which foreign policy is executed. One is substance ; the other is method.

One of the most astute students and practitioners of diplomacy in the twentieth century, Harold Nicolson, is particularly insistent on calling attention to this distinction. In some cases, however, his efforts to be very precise in this matter seem to raise further questions. For example, in his interesting study *The Congress of Vienna* Nicolson says :

It is useful, even when dealing with a remote historical episode, to consider where diplomacy ends and foreign policy begins. Each of them is concerned with the adjustment of national to international interests. Foreign policy is based upon a general conception of national requirements... Diplomacy, on the other hand, is not an end but a means; not a purpose but a method. It seeks, by the use of reason, conciliation and the exchange of interests, to prevent major conflicts arising between sovereign States. It is the agency through which foreign policy seeks to attain its purpose by agreement rather than by war. Thus when agreement becomes impossible diplomacy, which is the instrument of peace, becomes inoperative ; and foreign policy, the final sanction of which is war, alone becomes operative.⁵

The last sentence tends to destroy the nice distinction between diplomacy and foreign policy which Mr. Nicolson makes ; and it is misleading in that it suggests that diplomacy ceases to function when major international crises arise, especially if they lead to war. The object of diplomacy, as of foreign policy, is to protect the security of a nation, by peaceful means if possible, but by giving every assistance to the military operations if war cannot be avoided. Diplomacy does not cease to function, as Nicolson suggests, in time of war ; although it necessarily plays a different role in wartime, the work of diplomats, as of foreign ministers, may even expand. The diplomacy of the two world wars of this century provides convincing support for this contention.

³ 2 vols. (London, 1922), I, 1.

⁴ J. R. Childs, *American Foreign Service* (Holt, 1948), p. 64.

⁵ *The Congress of Vienna : A Study in Allied Unity, 1812-22* (Harcourt, Brace, 1946), p. 164.

FUNCTIONS OF DIPLOMATS

A diplomat is at times spoken of as the eyes and ears of his government in other countries. His chief functions are to execute the policies of his own country, to protect its interests and its nationals, and to keep his government informed of major developments in the rest of the world. In an address before the America-Japan Society in Tokyo, on November 22, 1938, Joseph C. Grew, United States Ambassador to Japan, thus explained the "supreme purpose and duty of an ambassador" :

He must be, first and foremost, an interpreter, and this function of interpreting acts both ways. First of all he tries to understand the country which he serves—its conditions, its mentality, its actions, and its underlying motives, and to explain these things clearly to his own Government. And then, contrariwise, he seeks means of making known to the Government and the people of the country to which he is accredited the purposes and hopes and desires of his native land. He is an agent of mutual adjustment between the ideas and forces upon which nations act.⁶

The functions of a diplomat may be broken down into what J. R. Childs has called the "four basic phases of diplomacy," namely, (1) representation (2) negotiation, (3) reporting, and (4) the protection of the interests of the nation and of its citizens in foreign lands. These functions, as we shall see, are closely interrelated.

Representation. A diplomat is both a formal and informal representative of his country in a foreign state. He is the normal agent of communication between his own foreign office and that of the state to which he is accredited. In the eyes of many citizens of the country in which he is stationed, he *is* the country he represents, and that country is judged according to the personal impression he makes. The diplomat must cultivate a wide variety of social contacts, with the ranking officials of the foreign office and of the foreign government in general, with his fellow diplomats, with influential persons in all walks of life, and with articulate groups in the country. Social contacts can be enjoyable, stimulating, and profitable : they can also be hard on the stomach as well as on the pocketbook, trying to the diplomat's patience as well as to his intelligence. Whatever else they may be, they seem to be an inescapable adjunct of the important duty of negotiation. Although these contacts have tended to become less formal, they have at the same time broadened in scope. Ambassador Grew, a career diplomat of long experience, referred to them as "the X-Ray language vibrating beneath the surface of the spoken and the written word," which is simply a diplomat's way of saying that a trained mixer-observer-auditor can often pick up information or intelligence of great value in — or from — conversations at social functions.

Negotiation. Virtually a synonym for diplomacy, negotiation is par

⁶ *Ten Years in Japan* (Simon and Schuster, 1944), p. 262.

excellence the pursuit of agreement by compromise and direct personal contact. Diplomats are by definition negotiators. As such, they have duties that, as described by Mr. Childs, include "the drafting of a wide variety of bilateral and multilateral arrangements embodied in treaties, conventions, protocols, and other documents of a political, economic, and social nature. Their subject matter ranges from the creation of an international security organization, through territorial changes, establishment of rules to govern international civil aviation, shipping and telecommunications, and the adjustment of international commercial relationships, to such particular matters as immigration, double taxation, waterway rights, tourist travel, and exchange control. Almost the entire gamut of human activities is covered."⁷

Because of the developments in communications and the increasing resort to multilateral diplomacy, as well as for other reasons, diplomats do not play as great a role in international negotiations as they once did. Most agreements between states are still bilateral and are concluded through negotiations between the foreign offices by the use of ordinary diplomatic channels. But the major international agreements, especially those of a multilateral character, are usually negotiated directly by foreign ministers or their special representatives, often at international conferences. Diplomats also have less latitude than they once enjoyed ; they are now bound more closely to their foreign offices by detailed instructions and constant communication by cable, diplomatic pouch, and transoceanic telephone ; but, although their stature has been somewhat reduced, they are more than glorified messenger boys at the end of a wire, and the value of the personal factor in diplomacy is still very great.

Reporting. Reports from diplomats in the field are the raw material of foreign policy. These reports cover nearly every conceivable subject, from technical studies to appraisals of the psychology of nations. Diplomats must, above all, be good reporters ; if they have the ability to estimate trends accurately, if they keep an eye out for all useful information, and if they present the essential facts in concise and intelligible form, they may be worth a king's ransom. According to a publication of the United States Department of State on the American Foreign Service, diplomats are expected to "observe, analyze, and report on political, social and economic conditions and trends of significance in the country in which they are assigned. Some major subjects of these reports are legislative programs, public opinion, market conditions, trade statistics, finance, production, labor, agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining, natural resources, shipping, freights, charters, legislation, tariffs and laws."⁸ American diplomats alone prepare thousands of reports of this sort every year.

Protection of Interests. Although a diplomat is expected to get along with the authorities of the state to which he is accredited — that is, he

⁷ Childs, p. 70.

⁸ *The Foreign Service of the United States*, Dept. of State Pub. 3612, Foreign Service Series 6 (Aug. 11, 1946).

must be *persona grata* to the government of a state — he is also expected at all times to seek to further the best interests of his own country. However selfish this approach may seem to be, it is the bedrock of the practice of diplomacy. While it is assumed that the interests of each state will be so interpreted that they will harmonize with those of the international community, it is not the function of the diplomat to make the interpretation. His duty is to look after the interests of his country as interpreted by the policy-makers back home and in accordance with treaties, other international agreements, and principles of international law. He also has the more specific duty of attempting to assist and protect businessmen and all other nationals of his own country who are living or travelling in the country in which he is stationed or who happen to have interests there. He seeks to prevent or correct practices which might discriminate against his country or its citizens.

CLASSIFICATION OF DIPLOMATS AND CONSULS

Thus far we have used the word “diplomats” in a loose and rather general sense to include all members of the foreign services of all nations, and particularly those acting as chiefs of mission. Not all diplomacy, however, is carried on by diplomats. In a sense every citizen of a state who travels in another country is a diplomat, sometimes not a very good or skillful one. In a professional sense, diplomats include two main groups : diplomatic officers and consular officers. All the diplomatic functions which have just been described are performed, to a greater or lesser degree, by both groups ; but, generally speaking, diplomatic officials specialize in representation and negotiation, whereas consular officials are particularly concerned with the protection of the interests of the nationals of their country. Reporting is an important function of both groups.

Diplomatic Personnel. The top positions in the diplomatic service are held by the chiefs of mission, most of whom have the rank of ambassador or minister. The various ranks of the diplomats who form the diplomatic hierarchy are still based on the rules agreed upon at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, but the second and third grades have been merged into a single class, usually called “envoys extraordinary and ministers plenipotentiary.” The number of ambassadors, the highest diplomatic officers, has greatly increased in recent years. The United States, for example, refused to appoint any ambassadors until 1893, because it was felt that this title was too suggestive of monarchical diplomacy. Until very recently the United States had more ministers than ambassadors abroad, but today there are only a few ministers in the American Foreign Service.

Ambassadors and ministers together constitute only a fraction of the total number of diplomats, most of whom are career officials or noncareer specialists. Unlike the upper diplomatic hierarchy, there is no agreed-upon basis for classifying all these lesser diplomats, but at least three

ranks are widely recognized. These are (1) counselors of embassy or legation, who rank highest among diplomatic staff members ; (2) secretaries of an embassy or legation, usually ranked as first, second, and third secretaries ; and (3) attachés, who may be junior career officers or non-career persons serving in a diplomatic capacity on a temporary basis—including commercial, agricultural, military, naval, air, petroleum, cultural, press, and other attachés.

Within this generally accepted framework the foreign service of each country has many distinctive features. As a result of the Foreign Service Act of 1946 the American Foreign Service was divided into five main categories : (1) Chiefs of Mission, divided into four classes for salary purposes ; (2) Foreign Service Officers, divided into seven classes (a top category of career ministers, plus Classes I-VI), the elite corps of the American Foreign Service ; (3) Foreign Service Reserve Officers, in six classes, who are assigned to the Service on a temporary basis (no more than four years of consecutive service) ; (4) Foreign Service Staff Officers and Employees, in 22 classes, who perform "technical, administrative, fiscal, clerical, or custodial" duties ; and (5) Alien Clerks and Employees.

Consular Duties and Personnel. Consuls are a part of the foreign service of a country. They often perform diplomatic as well as consular functions, but their duties are different from those of the diplomatic service. They form a separate branch of the foreign service, even though diplomatic and consular officials are interchangeable in most foreign services at the present time. Historically, the consular service is older than the diplomatic, since it is concerned largely with two general functions which were of importance long before the rise of the nation-state system and the beginnings of organized diplomacy. These functions pertain to commercial and business relations and to services to nationals.

The specific duties under the first general function include many activities in the promotion of trade : periodical and special reports ; replies to trade inquiries ; settlement of trade disputes ; certification of invoices of goods shipped to the country the consular official represents ; enforcement of provisions of treaties of commerce and navigation, and of regulations regarding plant and animal quarantine, sanitation and disinfectants, etc. ; protection and promotion of shipping ; entrance and clearance of ships and aircraft ; and other duties related to international commerce.

The second function refers to the varied work of consuls in many of the above respects but also to their work in helping nationals who live or are traveling in the country to which the consul is sent. These duties include welfare and whereabouts cases ; funeral arrangements, and settlement of estates of nationals dying abroad ; services to nationals who for any reason run afoul of local authorities or violate the laws of the foreign country ; protection and relief of seamen (a very special function) ; notarial services ; services to veterans ; and the like.

Consuls are usually divided into five classes : (1) consuls general ; (2) consuls ; (3) vice consuls of career ; (4) vice consuls not of career ; and

(5) consular agents. The first three classes are career foreign service officers who are assigned to duties as consuls general, consuls, or vice consuls ; the last two are noncareer officers, who may be promoted from the ranks of the clerical staff or who, in the case of some consular agents, may not even be citizens of the country which they represent. Consuls general have supervisory powers over a large consular district or several smaller districts — but not necessarily over a whole country — and over the consular officials within their area.

DIPLOMATIC RULES AND PROCEDURES

Diplomacy is still conducted largely on the basis of an intricate code that has evolved over many centuries. The unwritten rules of the game are as important as the written regulations, such as those laid down in the famous *Réglement* of 1815 or in the Convention on Diplomatic Officers and the Convention on Consular Officers adopted by the American states at Havana in 1928.⁹ Matters of procedure and protocol¹⁰ have often bulked very large in diplomatic relations ; indeed, in past centuries the relations between sovereigns and the fate of nations sometimes seemed to be affected by what Diplomat X said to Diplomat Y, or who preceded whom and who sat where at a formal diplomatic function. If diplomats violated the code, the consequences to their country as well as to themselves might be unfortunate.

Appointment and Reception of Diplomats. Each state appoints its diplomatic representatives in its own way, but appointments are generally followed by certain internationally recognized procedures. As a rule, the nomination of a diplomat will be publicly announced only after the country to which he is to be sent has given its approval. The approval is called *agrément*, and the procedure of determining upon it is known as *agrégation*.

* For a detailed consideration of the whole subject of diplomatic and consular procedure see Sir Ernest Satow, *A Guide to Diplomatic Practice*, 2 vols. (London, 1922) ; and Graham H. Stuart, *American Diplomatic and Consular Practice*, 2nd ed. (Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1952).

¹⁰ "Protocol" has two meanings in diplomatic usage. As used above, it means what might be called diplomatic etiquette. In its other sense, it refers a preliminary memorandum to be used as the basis for a later treaty or convention. Some light on the first meaning of protocol as well as on the range of matters covered by "procedure and protocol" may be gained from the following quotation from a recent advertisement of *The Diplomatic Yearbook* : "The most comprehensive book on diplomatic procedure and protocol you can own—it answers questions about.....techniques of correspondence — exchange of notes — forms of address — procedure for presentation of credentials and first official visits in each country — official and social precedence.....diplomatic immunities and privileges — clearance of customs — entry of personal effects — tax exemptions — conferences — treaty-making — ratification — accession — arbitration — mediation — good offices.....major terms of diplomatic language — addresses, telephone numbers of Chancery, residence of Chief of mission, offices of military, naval and air attachés of 90 countries — agricultural, press and cultural counsellors and attachés — marital and family status of diplomatic personnel.....It is the only book that includes a thorough index to 10,000 leading diplomatic personnel."

No country is obligated to accept a foreign representative who for any reason is *persona non grata* to it ; in fact, in the past there have been many cases in which the *agrément* has been refused.

Ordinarily, before proceeding to his new post, a diplomat will spend some time in his own capital. There he will confer with the head of the state, the foreign minister and other officials in the foreign office, and the diplomatic representatives in his own capital from the country to which he is soon to proceed. He will study the past relations between the two countries ; he will be briefed by experts in the appropriate geographical office or offices, and before leaving to assume his new post he will be furnished with important papers, including diplomatic passports for himself and his family and staff, and a letter of credence.

The letter of credence is a diplomat's formal commission. It is signed by the head of the state and is addressed to the head of the state to which the diplomat is accredited. As soon as he arrives at his new post he will immediately get in touch with the foreign minister to request an audience with the head of the state in order that he may present his letter of credence. The ceremony of presentation may be accompanied by the most elaborate ritual and formality. Essentially, it consists of a brief speech by the envoy, and another in the same vein by the head of the state as he accepts the letter of credence. Usually copies of both speeches are exchanged in advance so that there will be no surprises during the formal ceremony. The diplomat next confers with the foreign minister and other influential leaders of the government, and visits his colleagues of the diplomatic corps, who return his visit in due course. Then the real work of the diplomat begins.

Termination of a Diplomatic Mission. The termination of a diplomatic mission may come about in a number of ways. The diplomat may, of course, resign.¹¹ A mission may be terminated by the recall or dismissal of an envoy. He may be recalled by his own government on its own volition, or his recall may be asked for by the government of the state to which he is accredited. In the latter case, the request for his recall may be made because he has himself become *persona non grata* in the country, or because the relations between the states concerned have become so strained that recall is demanded, possibly as a preliminary to actual hostilities. If recalled by his own government, the diplomat may be brought home "for consultation" — a practice which is particularly common when relations between states are strained—or in order to be transferred to another

¹¹ A diplomat may resign because of disagreement with the policy of his own government. Thus in the fall of 1945 General Patrick Hurley resigned as American Ambassador to China, and immediately leveled a vitriolic blast at the Foreign Service Officers in China and in the Office of Far Eastern Affairs in the State Department, who he claimed, had sabotaged the announced policies of the United States in the Far East. Arthur Bliss Lane resigned as American Ambassador to Poland because of the "betrayal" of Poland at the Yalta Conference and the failure of the United States to seek to hold the Soviet Union to the Yalta Agreements. Once he was free to state his views, Lane did so at once, particularly in a powerful book entitled *I Saw Poland Betrayed* (Bobbs-Merrill, 1948).

post or as a preliminary step to dismissal. An envoy is rarely sent home on direct orders of a foreign government, because almost invariably that government will request the diplomat's own government to recall him and this will be done as a matter of course. Obviously, if his own government refuses to honor the request for his recall, the foreign government will thereupon hand the offending diplomat his passport and dismiss him forthwith. The most famous case of this kind in American diplomatic history was the dismissal of Lord Sackville-West by President Cleveland in 1888.¹²

A recent instance in which an ambassador became *persona non grata* to the government to which he was accredited was that of George F. Kennan, American Ambassador to the Soviet Union, in 1952. Kennan made a speech in Berlin on September 19 in which he said that an American's life in Moscow was not much different from that of American diplomats interned in Germany after Pearl Harbor. The Soviet government asked for Kennan's recall on the ground that he had engaged in "slanderous attacks hostile to the Soviet Union." The United States replied that "Ambassador Kennan's statement accurately and in moderate language described the position of foreign diplomats accredited to the Soviet Government." Kennan was nevertheless recalled. The incident demonstrates how one government may reject the charges and allegations of another government and at the same time recognize the right of that government to have an envoy who is acceptable to it.

Consular Officials. Much less formality attends the work of consular officials, but they must in the first instance be approved by the government of the state to which they are to be sent. When a consular officer is appointed he receives a commission signed by the head of the state. An *exequatur* is a consul's official authorization to discharge his duties at his assigned post. It is "in fact an executive order of the foreign government which recognizes the official character of the consular officer and grants him the privileges or immunities conferred upon his office by treaty, law or custom and permits him to exercise his official duties."¹³

Regular foreign service personnel are largely exempt from the formalities which are required of top diplomatic and consular officials. They do not have to be accredited. All they need are diplomatic passports and visas of the governments of the countries to which they have been assigned.

DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES

Diplomats. Certain privileges and immunities are extended to diplomats which are not granted to private citizens. The reasons for this special status are largely twofold: (1) diplomats are personal representatives of their heads of state and also, in effect if not in form, of the governments and hence of the people of their own countries; (2) in order to carry

¹² See *Foreign Relations of the United States* (Government Printing Office, 1888), II, 1667-1718; J. B. Moore, *Digest of International Law*, 8 vols. (Government Printing Office, 1906), IV, 536-548.

¹³ Stuart, p. 346.

out their duties satisfactorily, they must be free of certain restrictions which local laws would otherwise impose. Ordinarily they enjoy exemption from direct taxes and customs duties, from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the countries to which they are accredited, and, in fact, from the laws of the foreign state in general. They themselves, their families, and the members of their staff are personally inviolable. Embassies and legations, with all furnishings and their archives, are regarded as part of the national territory of the states which diplomats represent and are therefore immune from molestation by officials of the states or the local governmental units in which the properties are actually located. The same rights and privileges were extended to officials of the League of Nations and delegates to it : and they are now similarly granted to the United Nations.

Consuls. Consuls are not generally accorded as many rights and privileges as diplomats, and their status is regulated more by agreements between governments or by courtesy privileges than by well-established rules of international law. In certain instances they are extended all the privileges and immunities of diplomats, usually when they perform diplomatic as well as consular functions. On the other hand, noncareer consuls receive few if any immunities. Almost invariably consular offices and archives are regarded as the property of the nations which the consuls represent and are therefore in a sense extraterritorial. Consuls are usually exempt from local taxes and customs duties, but, except for the giving of testimony in civil cases, they are customarily held to be subject to the laws of the state of their residence.

There are, of course, many variations and exceptions to the generally recognized status of diplomatic and consular officials as here described. The Havana conventions of 1928, to which reference has already been made, constituted an effort to state the commonly accepted rules regarding the status of such officials, but even these conventions have not received universal acceptance. Moreover, cases are always arising in which diplomats or consuls are alleged to have abused their privileges, or in which a state is alleged to have violated the immunities of these representatives or their residences. Some cases are relatively minor — as, for example, traffic violations, unless they result in injury to persons — but they may cause bad feeling on the part of local officials or the populace, or both, and even on the part of the governments concerned. The United States granted full diplomatic privileges and immunities to United Nations officials and delegates over the protests of articulate groups in the country and in Congress. Since Soviet embassies, legations, and consulates seem to be head-centers for subversive and espionage activities, there is considerable feeling that strong measures should be taken, including search of the premises if necessary. According to international law diplomatic and consular officials are strictly forbidden to engage in espionage.¹⁴

¹⁴ For a detailed commentary on diplomatic and consular privileges and immunities, see Stuart, cited above.

The Kosenkina Case. In 1948 and 1949 the United States became involved, in different ways, in two widely publicized cases affecting consuls. The first was the famous Anna Kosenkina case in 1948, in which a Russian schoolteacher, in order to avoid being sent back to Russia, leaped from a third-story window of the Russian consulate general in New York. New York police entered the grounds in order to rescue Mrs. Kosenkina and to take her to a New York hospital for treatment. Although seriously injured, she survived, and begged the American authorities not to force her to return to Russia. The Russian consul general in New York, Peter Lomakin, made strong representations and equally strong accusations, as did the Soviet Government itself through diplomatic channels. The Kosenkina affair became an international incident. The United States refused to surrender Mrs. Kosenkina to Russian authorities against her wishes, and requested the recall of Mr. Lomakin on the ground that he had abused his rights as a consul general. The Soviet Government angrily refused to recall him and made countercharges that the police of New York had violated the property of the consulate general and that this action had been upheld first by their superiors in New York City and then by the State Department. The Department then promptly handed Mr. Lomakin his passport, and he was virtually escorted on shipboard, breathing defiance to the last.

Case of Angus Ward. The second case concerned Angus Ward, the United States consul general in Mukden, Manchuria. On November 1, 1948, Chinese Communist troops occupied the city. Shortly afterwards the consulate general was cut off from all connections with the outside world, except through Communist-controlled channels, and Ward and his staff were placed under house arrest, being strictly confined to the consular compound. This situation continued for more than a year. In May, 1949, the United States ordered the consulate general closed and asked that arrangements be made to allow Mr. Ward and his staff to leave China. This the Communist authorities promised to do, but instead, in October, they announced that Ward and four members of his staff had been arrested and would be tried by a people's court on charges of attacking a Chinese employee. Since the United States had not recognized the People's Republic of China, proclaimed on October 1, 1949, no regular diplomatic representations could be made, and the efforts of the American consul general in Peiping to get in touch with Chou En-lai, the foreign minister of the People's Republic, were ignored. On November 18, 1949, the United States took an unprecedented step when Secretary of State Acheson, in a personal message to the foreign ministers of all countries which had either diplomatic or consular representatives in China, asked their governments to bring pressure to bear on the Chinese Communist authorities to secure Ward's release. Several states made such representations. Finally after Ward and a vice-consul had been tried and given postponed sentences, the whole "American spy ring" in Muken was ordered deported. On December 7 the party was placed in a third-class car and transported

to Tientsin, where on December 11 Ward and his staff boarded an American ship lying off Tangku.¹⁵ The United States properly charged the Chinese Communists with flagrant violations of the "international practice of civilized countries" in their treatment of Ward.

THE ORIGINS OF MODERN DIPLOMACY

The beginnings of organized diplomacy may be traced to the relations among the city-states of ancient Greece. By the fifth century B.C., Nicolson states "special missions between the Greek city-states had become so frequent that something approaching our own system of regular diplomatic intercourse had been achieved."¹⁶ Thucydides tells us much about diplomatic procedure among the Greeks, as, for instance, in his account of a conference at Sparta in 432 B.C., in which the Spartans and their allies considered what action should be taken against Athens.

The Romans did little to advance the art of diplomacy by negotiation, but they did make important contributions to international law. In the Eastern Roman Empire, which was established after Constantine had moved his capital to the city that honored his name for many centuries, diplomatic methods were employed with great effect. The Eastern emperors had marked success in playing off potential rivals against each other, and the reports of their representatives at foreign courts gave them information which they were able to utilize to their advantage. Their representatives therefore became skilled diplomats and trained observers, thus extending the practice of diplomacy to include accurate observation and reporting as well as representation.

The Middle Ages. Until the late eighteenth or early nineteenth century diplomacy more often meant the study and preservation of archives than the act of international negotiation. This concept was especially prevalent in the Middle Ages. "It is no exaggeration to say that it was the Papal and other chanceries, under the direction and authority of successive 'masters of the rolls,' that the usages of diplomacy as a science based upon precedent and experience first came to be established."¹⁷

Modern diplomacy as an organized profession arose in Italy in the late Middle Ages. The rivalries of the Italian city-states and the methods which their rulers used to promote their interests are described in masterful fashion in Machiavelli's *The Prince*. The Holy See and the Italian city-states developed systems of diplomacy at an early date. It is possible that the Holy See was the first to utilize the system of permanent representation which is the characteristic feature of modern diplomacy ; but the first known permanent mission was that established at Genoa in 1455 by

¹⁵ In three dispatches sent from Tokyo on Dec. 28, 29, and 30, 1949, Mr. Ward gave his own version of his year as a virtual prisoner in Mukden. These were printed in many American newspapers.

¹⁶ Harold Nicolson, *Diplomacy* (London, 1939), p. 21.

¹⁷ Nicolson, *Diplomacy* p. 27.

Francesco Sforza, Duke of Milan. During the next century Italian city-states established permanent embassies in London and Paris and at the court of the Holy Roman Emperor ; a British ambassador was assigned to residence in Paris ; and Francis I of France "devised something like a permanent diplomatic machinery."

The Seventeenth Century. For nearly three centuries, however, the machinery appears to have been neither adequate nor standardized. Diplomacy was still the diplomacy of the court ; its object was to promote the interests of the sovereign abroad by various means, direct or devious, fair or foul ; and its standards were low and ill-defined. The ambassador, then as now, was deemed to be the personal representative of his chief of state in a foreign country. An affront to him was an affront to the chief of state himself and hence to the nation that he symbolized. In the absence of well-defined rules of procedure, frequent disputes — sometimes so bitter as to lead to duels or even to wars — arose from questions of precedence and immunity. Ambassadors who attempted to entertain in a style befitting the dignity of their sovereigns often found themselves in dire financial straits, especially if the sovereigns whose dignity they were trying to enhance by sumptuous display neglected to pay them a salary.

By the seventeenth century permanent missions were the rule rather than the exception, and diplomacy had become an established profession and a generally accepted method of international intercourse. The rise of nationalism and the nation-state system made some such machinery essential, especially after the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 had crystallized and formalized the state system. Diplomats from all European countries, as well as noblemen and other countries from all parts of France, graced the court of Louis XIV, and gave it that pomp and splendor which dazzled his contemporaries and set a pattern for decades to come. Many other monarchs of Europe tried, not too successfully, to ape the "Sun King" and to establish their own courts of Versailles.

The Eighteenth Century. The diplomacy of the courts entered its golden age in the eighteenth century. The game came to be played according to well-understood rules, with a great deal of glitter on the surface and much incompetence and intrigue beneath. Diplomats represented their sovereigns, and often were merely the willing tools in the great contests for empire and for European supremacy that were waged in that century. Strong rulers like Peter the Great of Russia and Frederick the Great of Prussia used diplomacy and force, as the occasion seemed to demand, to achieve their ends. The same comment might be made of important ministers of state, men like Pitt the Elder and Vergennes.

By the late eighteenth century the Industrial, American, and French revolutions had ushered in a new era of diplomacy, and indeed of history. Captains and kings passed from the scene in many lands, and the voice of the people began to be heard. The unassuming figure of Benjamin Franklin in the streets of Paris and London, representing a nation in the making, symbolized the coming era of more democratic diplomacy. To

attempt to represent a nation rather than a ruler, and to attempt to feel the pulse of a people rather than of the king alone, imposed far more complicated duties on the diplomat. Indeed, it called for a new kind of diplomat, but the remuneration remained so inadequate that the diplomatic profession was still largely confined to those who had other sources of income. Inevitably, this meant that so-called democratic diplomacy was still carried on by representatives of the aristocracy of wealth and often of rank.

As diplomacy became less formal and restricted, its rules became more standardized and more generally accepted. The Congress of Vienna made particularly important contributions in this respect. To place diplomacy on a more systematic and formal basis, the Congress laid down certain rules of procedure which are still commonly observed. These rules were embodied in the *Réglement* of March 19, 1815, and in regulations of the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818. The diplomatic hierarchy thus established consisted of four ranks or classes of representatives : (1) ambassadors, papal legates, and papal nuncios ; (2) envoys extraordinary and ministers plenipotentiary ; (3) ministers resident ; and (4) *chargés d'affaires*. The vexing question of precedence in a particular country was neatly solved by providing that the order of priority within each rank should be on the basis of the length of service in that country rather than on the more subjective basis of the relative importance of the sovereign or country the diplomat represented. The ambassador who was senior in terms of length of service in a country should be the *doyen* or dean of the diplomatic corps in that country. Since the papacy, as a general practice, changed its representatives less frequently than most states, many of the deans at foreign capitals were papal representatives.

CONDITIONS OF THE NEW DIPLOMACY

The new diplomacy of the nineteenth century, then, demanded new methods as well as new personnel. These methods were defined in many international agreements, and became an intricate and generally observed code. Under the aegis of the Holy Alliance and the Concert of Europe, buttressed by the operations of the balance-of-power system, the game was played according to the new rules with a fair degree of success. The system broke down in the twentieth century, but while it endured it provided the framework for the practice of diplomacy. It should be noted, however, that Europe was still the center of all the world that mattered, and that no important European state challenged the bases of the system. Diplomats were gentlemen who observed the rules of the game and understood each other.

Harold Nicolson, whose delightful little book *Diplomacy* has become a classic on the subject, has called attention to three developments of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries which have greatly affected the theory and practice of diplomacy. These are (1) the "growing sense of the com-

munity of nations.," (2) the "increasing appreciation of the importance of public opinion," and (3) the "rapid increase in communications."¹⁸ The first two developments have clearly enlarged the diplomat's functions and enhanced his importance. The result has been the "world-wide inter-meshing" of the foreign offices and diplomatic posts through which most of the contacts between states are now maintained. As the number of international organizations, groupings, and conferences increased, multilateral diplomacy took on added significance. The impact of public opinion on diplomacy is now generally recognized, but until the era of the new diplomacy that impact seemed to be slight. Today it is demonstrable that the policy-makers of all nations, including those of totalitarian states, are very sensitive to currents of public sentiment : witness the time and effort that are devoted to educational and propaganda work. One of the main functions of diplomatic representatives is reporting on the attitudes of the people in the countries to which they are accredited.

The third development, the rapid increase in communications, has in many respects reduced the status of diplomats and opened up more convenient channels of international negotiation. Under present conditions, by the use of the diplomatic pouch, the cable, or the transoceanic telephone the foreign minister or head of the government can direct virtually all important negotiations. If he so desires, he can by-pass the regular diplomatic representatives.

As a matter of fact, more and more the major international issues are being handled outside normal diplomatic channels. Roosevelt and Churchill talked by transatlantic telephone and exchanged views by direct correspondence and by special agents, such as Harry Hopkins. United Nations representatives of the U.S.S.R. and the United States met privately in a New York hotel room to arrange the ending of the Berlin blockade. Diplomacy by conference, as we shall see, and other multilateral procedures are becoming more and more popular. For these reasons there is some basis for Lord Vansittart's lament that although high-ranking diplomats are more numerous than ever "they have lost stature" and "are increasingly mouthpieces." But a study of the memoirs of practicing diplomats of recent years will show that their role is still a great one. Some may complain that not enough attention was given to their reports and recommendations, or that they were occasionally by-passed on important matters, but all give a picture of manifold and useful activities. There seems to be little danger that the diplomat will become the victim of technological unemployment.

"DEMOCRATIC DIPLOMACY"

By the early twentieth century the term "democratic diplomacy" had come into common use. It seemed to symbolize a new order in world affairs

¹⁸ p. 70.

— one in which governments were fast losing their aristocratic leanings and their aloofness, and peoples were speaking to peoples through democratic representatives and informal channels. Actually, the new order was not so different from the old as it seemed in the atmosphere of hope that ushered in the present century. While diplomacy remained a rather esoteric profession, carried on by men of wealth and influence and power, it was conducted with the assistance of a growing number of career officers, the elite guard of diplomacy, whose standards of competence and training were being steadily raised. Diplomacy was thus being put more generally on a professional and nonpolitical basis.

Irresponsibility and Ignorance. On the whole, experience in "democratic diplomacy" has been disappointing. Too often it has been associated with the diplomacy of the market place, or even plebiscitary diplomacy—that is, with conditions under which important and delicate negotiations between states cannot possibly be conducted with success. In a brilliant chapter in his *Diplomacy* Nicolson calls attention to some of the evils of "democratic diplomacy."¹⁹ The first and "most potent source of danger," he declares, "is the irresponsibility of the sovereign people." The second is ignorance, arising not so much from a lack of facts as from the failure of the ordinary citizen "to apply to the general theory of foreign affairs that thought and intelligence which he devotes to domestic matters." In other words, foreign affairs are too *foreign* to the citizens of a state, and their implications are not adequately grasped. Even more dangerous than ignorance, Nicolson continues, "are certain forms of popular knowledge." The willingness of partially informed people to make quick and positive conclusions and judgments on even the most complex issues of foreign policy is a constant source of embarrassment to those who must weigh all the evidence and accept responsibility for the eventual decisions. "Cracker-barrel philosophers" and "Monday morning quarterbacks" always seem to have all the answers; responsible statesmen, like trained football coaches, seldom do.

Delay and Imprecision. Two other serious dangers in "democratic diplomacy," according to Nicolson, are those of delay and of imprecision. In a democracy public opinion sets the limits within which the foreign policy of the country must operate. On the whole this is a healthy condition, but it may prevent the leaders of a nation from taking positive action at the opportune moment and thereby may hamper the effectiveness of diplomacy as "the first line of defense." Democratic states have often been criticized for following policies of "too little and too late," and the failure to act in time often seems to have caused greater crises at a later date. A case in point was the unwillingness of the American people to support President Roosevelt's plea of 1937 for the "quarantine" of aggressor states. In large part this failure has stemmed from the reluctance or unwillingness of the people to support strong measures which involve great risks. Leaders of democratic nations seldom launch foreign policies, however essential they may deem them to be to the welfare and security of their

¹⁹ Chapter IV.

country, until and unless they are reasonably confident of popular understanding and support. On the other hand, the historian can suggest instances in which the people's urge to action has been restrained by the chief executive. Thus the American public seemed to be far more belligerent than President McKinley in 1898 ; and President Wilson refused to capitulate a momentary war fever after the sinking of the *Lusitania*.

Imprecision became a common vice of the new diplomacy. Perhaps in no profession has the gulf between words and meaning been more marked. Diplomats were trained to be masters of double talk. The language of diplomacy, as well as its ritual and practice, became smooth, stilted, and incomprehensible to the uninitiated. When diplomats were allowed to make public addresses they were encouraged to say as little as possible but in the most pleasing fashion. If for any reason a diplomat was charged with the task of making a public statement of policy, it was usually necessary to read carefully between the lines to understand what he meant. Anyone who has listened to such addresses will realize that the art has not been lost. In the present war of semantics, in which diplomats of totalitarian states are particularly skilled, the confusion of meaning is equally marked, although the language used has become much less refined. The "language of politeness," stilted and circuitous as it was, was nevertheless much preferable to the "language of the fishmarket" in which many diplomatic exchanges, especially those of a public nature, are now conducted. Actually, as K. M. Panikkar, a skilled Indian scholar-diplomat, has remarked, the "language of politeness" was "fully understood by the persons to whom it was addressed," whereas today "the language of diplomacy has become abusive and is addressed over the heads of governments to the masses."²⁰

As related to "democratic diplomacy" imprecision suggests, in Nicolson's words, the "tendency of all democracies (and especially of Anglo-Saxon democracies) to prefer a vague and confirming formula to a precise and binding definition." Consider, for example, the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 — in which most of the states of the world renounced war as "an instrument of national policy" — or the countless general and almost meaningless resolutions adopted by the Assembly of the League of Nations and the General Assembly of the United Nations, or statements of "policy" that have emanated from the highest circles in democratic countries.

☞ **The Demand for Open Diplomacy.** "Democratic diplomacy" came to be associated in the popular mind with open rather than secret negotiations. Secrecy connoted undercover, shady dealings ; it was held to be incompatible with true democracy. It had been a cardinal feature of the old diplomacy and was the rule, rather than the exception, in the nineteenth century. The Congress of Berlin of 1878 represented a high-water mark of the practice of secret diplomacy. The demand for open diplomacy reached a climax at the time of the First World War, and it was given

²⁰ Lecture on "The Theory and Practice of Diplomacy" at the Delhi School of Economics, Delhi, India, Aug. 18, 1952.

classic expression in the first of Wilson's famous Fourteen Points, as presented in his message to Congress of January 8, 1918: "Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view."

The principle of open diplomacy was embodied in the Covenant of the League of Nations and later in the Charter of the United Nations. It became a shibboleth to which all statesmen paid lip service, but often lip service only. The principle was based at once on a well-founded distrust of secret diplomacy and on a naive misconception of the nature and functions of diplomacy. As a matter of fact, open diplomacy, as popularly defined, is an impossibility. Negotiations between states call for a high degree of compromise and finesse. They can seldom be conducted in the white glare of publicity with any useful results. The major issues involved, however, can and should be publicly declared and discussed, and the decisions and agreements which are reached by negotiation can and should be subjected to the most searching public scrutiny. There is an important distinction between negotiations — that is, diplomacy — and final decisions — that is, policy. Those who decry the evils of secret diplomacy usually mean that the secrecy but not the diplomacy should cease. Some have expressed the view that "open covenants" are certainly desirable but that they can hardly be "openly arrived at." Even Wilson came to believe that people had taken his famous phrase too literally. "When I pronounced for open diplomacy," he wrote to the Senate in 1918, "I meant, not that there should be no private discussions of delicate matters, but that no secret agreements should be entered into, and that all international relations, when fixed, should be open, above-board, and explicit."

✓ **Secret Diplomacy vs. Secret Agreements.** Secret treaties have left an evil legacy throughout modern history. They are still made — most notably today in the agreements which the U.S.S.R. has concluded with her satellite states. But the practice is by no means confined to dictatorships. In the secret treaties of World War I the Allies made sweeping promises to Italy and other states in order to win their neutrality or their participation in the struggle — promises which bedevilled the Paris Peace Conference and which conflicted with the principles which the Allied nations professed to hold. Many treaties of alliance and friendship have contained secret provisions — for example, the *Entente Cordiale* between Britain and France in 1904. The secret provisions of the Yalta Agreements of 1945 caused an international sensation when they became known. The secrecy was later defended on grounds of wartime necessity and expediency; but it is widely felt that the price was much too high. "The clandestine treaties themselves," as DeWitt C. Poole observed, "may not directly do the chief harm, but rather the poisoning suspicion and fear that are bred internationally, frequently beyond all real need, by rumors which inevitably leak out."²¹

²¹ DeWitt C. Poole in Francis J. Brown, Charles Hodges, and Joseph S. Roucek, eds., *Contemporary World Politics* (Wiley, 1940), p. 423.

The evil of secret treaties, as of secret diplomacy in general, is the deliberate concealment of the end products of negotiations, not of the negotiations themselves. Most international diplomacy is necessarily carried on in secret ; at least, very little publicity is given to it. The United Nations, for instance, provides a forum for the airing of grievances and the "open" consideration of major issues. As a forum it is a convenient vehicle for propaganda as well as for enlightenment. But these activities are not diplomacy in any real sense of the word. The United Nations plays an important role in international diplomacy, but not through its operation as a world forum : its real work is done in committees and in discussions, both formal and informal, behind the scenes.

Statesmen of democratic countries are constantly faced with the question of how much should be told, and when and in what manner. They must weigh the obvious value of keeping the public informed of major developments in foreign affairs against considerations of national security and the effect upon the negotiations in progress, and upon the other countries concerned, of telling too much too soon. A frequent complaint in the United States is that the people are not given the information necessary to make intelligent decisions in vital matters of foreign policy, or that if enough information is given, it is usually after decisions have been made. Too often, it is charged, the people are asked to approve what are really accomplished facts. Even members of Congress feel that at times they have to vote without full knowledge of the pertinent facts. The general feeling in the United States on this issue was well expressed in the report of the Task Force on Foreign Affairs of the Hoover Commission : "In case of doubt, it is far better, national security permitting, to give too much information too soon rather than too little and too late."²²

The Dangers of Democratic Diplomacy. The rise of democratic or popular diplomacy — a manifestation of the increasing participation of the people in the affairs of government — can be traced at least to the late eighteenth century, but it became a dominant trend only after the First World War. It has been largely responsible for the decline of diplomacy in the more conventional and more formal sense, a decline that has been deplored by many students of international affairs and modern society, including Walter Lippmann, Harold Nicolson, Hans Morgenthau, and Sisley Huddleston.²³ Many observers argue that unless there can be a return to some of the traditions and practices of more conventional and less public diplomacy the prospects for world peace are dim. Some of them, like Lippmann and Huddleston, seem at times to despair of democracy itself, for all their devotion to it. Lippmann's *Essays in the Public Philosophy*

²² *Task Force Report on Foreign Affairs*. Appendix H. Prepared for the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 134.

²³ Walter Lippmann, *Essays in the Public Philosophy* (Little, Brown, 1955) ; Harold Nicolson, *Diplomacy and The Evolution of Diplomatic Method* (Macmillan, 1955) ; Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 2nd ed. (Knopf, 1954), Chaps. XXXI and XXXII ; Sisley Huddleston, *Popular Diplomacy and War* (R. R. Smith, 1954).

is essentially a gloomy analysis of the prospects for the survival of democracy. Huddleston, whom Harry Barnes called "the ablest journalist who concentrated on international affairs between the two World Wars," was well aware of the defects of the pre-1941 type of diplomacy, but he regarded post-World War I diplomacy as infinitely worse — indeed, as the very negation of real diplomacy. "We must return to the more discreet and competent methods of professional diplomacy," he insisted and abandon "the limitless idiocies of popular diplomacy" ; but he, stated, "nothing short of a miracle will enable us to bring about those reforms in diplomatic practice which might prevent popular diplomacy from continuing its fatal trend toward world ruin."²⁴

The Virtues of Democratic Diplomacy. The shortcomings of democratic diplomacy are largely in the formulation of policies and in their implementation, and its virtues primarily in its objectives. In a democratic state the people, by and large, determine those objectives. Diplomacy serves their interests as the people understand and express those interests. That they are at times in error in conceiving what is best for themselves, that special groups can sometimes manipulate public opinion or government itself to their selfish ends, does not destroy the premise upon which all democratic government rests — that its purpose is to promote the welfare of the people who sustain it, and that, generally speaking, the people know and serve their own interests better than do leaders who lack the controls of democratic processes. An active free press and freedom of speech exert a continuous pressure on public officials for information, and organized private interests are constantly alert in their own behalf. Constitutional procedures for the ratification of treaties and for the appropriation of money also help to make the course of democratic diplomacy a matter of public knowledge. As we have suggested, open diplomacy can be carried to a point where it possesses very real disadvantages. Democratic processes serve the people best when they make it possible to hold leaders to a strict accountability for results and objectives but not to an obligation to negotiate on the television screens of a million homes and bars.

TOTALITARIAN DIPLOMACY

The rise of totalitarian states in the twentieth century introduced new and disturbing problems into international relations. These states were ruthless dictatorships ; they presented a fundamental challenge to human freedoms everywhere by their subordination of the individual to the collective will — determined in fact by a few men at the top — by their worldwide propaganda to disguise or hide aggressive policies, and by their contemptuous rejection of the traditions of the supposedly civilized world. They utilized modern techniques of military, political, and psychological power to expand their dominions and to gain control of other states. They

²⁴ Huddleston, pp. 256, 261.

debased their own peoples and lowered the standards of international life. They invoked strange doctrines of racial superiority, mysticism, materialism, and militarism in furtherance of their ends. They used diplomacy as an instrument of national policy, but in doing so they degraded its language and its practice. Diplomats became agents of conquest, double-dealing, and espionage, whose business was not to work for peaceful international relations but to provoke dissension rather than understanding—to make the leaders and peoples of other nations weak and blind and divided in the face of the growing totalitarian menace.

Diplomatic representatives of totalitarian states used most of the established rules of procedure, but they conformed to the generally accepted standards of international conduct only when this suited the schemes of their masters. In fact, modern dictators openly boasted that treaties and other international obligations, whether bilateral or multilateral in nature, would be broken at will. They preached the gospel of inevitable conflict between fascism and democracy or between the Communist and the non-Communist worlds. They isolated their own people within a closed system, walled off from the rest of the world and from the currents of world thought. They looked upon all gestures of friendship by other nations as evidences of weakness, or of appeasement, or of sinister intentions. At every opportunity they made the League of Nations, and later the United Nations, instruments of their propaganda. They used their embassies as centers of espionage, as the Germans and Russians did in Canada, Great Britain, the United States, and Latin America.

In dealing with totalitarian states the old techniques of diplomacy seemed to be of little use. Diplomats were restricted in their movements in the capitals of these states; they had little access to officials of the government and almost none to the people, and they were viewed with suspicion and dislike. Negotiations with representatives of totalitarian states at international conferences and in foreign capitals have frequently degenerated into endurance contests, usually ending in complete frustration. Again and again, as on the questions of the international control of atomic energy and the settlement of problems relating to Germany, real possibilities for acceptable compromise have apparently arisen, only to be shattered at the last moment by a dictator's intransigence. When agreements have been reached they have often been violated, in spirit or in letter, or in both, or evaded by unilateral definitions which destroyed the essence of the "understanding."

In the 1930's, after repeated rebuffs in the field of diplomacy, the democratic nations finally realized that appeasement of a Fascist state only whetted its appetite. In the postwar period, frustrations in diplomacy have led to the "cold war" and the generally unhappy state of international relations today. The Soviets apparently believe that there is a wide no man's land between diplomacy and war in the conventional sense of armed hostilities, and that they can operate in this no man's land until the "capitalist" nations collapse from internal weakness and external pres-

sure. The democratic states are already discovering that this "cold war" --- neither war nor peace --- is difficult, expensive, exhausting, and nonsensical, and that for this kind of situation diplomacy is particularly ineffective. Since 1953 the "cold war" seems to have given way to "cool war" or "cold peace," largely as a result of the "new look" in Russia. The Soviet leaders have used the technique of the smile instead of the frown; they have been more accessible and more friendly; they have relaxed many restrictions; they have been willing to engage in apparently endless negotiations on many subjects, and they have even made real concessions in a few instances, such as on the Austrian state treaty; they have publicly declared their desire to achieve a lessening of international tensions and a settlement of the major issues which divide the Communist and non-Communist worlds. But as yet the evidence is unconvincing that they have abandoned any of their basic tenets or altered the substance and objectives of their foreign policy.²⁵

DIPLOMACY BY CONFERENCE

The normal channels of diplomacy are the foreign offices and the diplomatic and consular establishments; but often these channels are either by-passed for one reason or another or used in a decidedly subordinate role. As an alternative, states have had increasing resort to "diplomacy by conference." In the postwar period international conferences have proliferated as never before. Although this is by no means a new technique - there were international conferences of a sort in the ancient world - it became really popular after the First World War under the stimulus of the League of Nations and the quest for regional and collective security. Since World War II it has become so common as to constitute a new development in international relations.²⁶

Six thousand to ten thousand sessions of international conferences are now held each year. Some deal with highly technical subjects and are attended by relatively few persons, mostly experts in their fields. Others are general international meetings, attended by hundreds of persons, including many foreign ministers or diplomats of the highest rank. Most numerous of all are the conferences held under the aegis of the United Nations and its agencies, which now sponsor more than five thousand meetings each year. The time and effort involved in the preparation and staffing of these conferences are staggering. This work is one of the chief functions

²⁵ After the "summit" conference in 1955 Lester B. Pearson, Foreign Minister of Canada, wrote: "Diplomatically, it is true, we seem now to be out of the trenches and manoeuvring in the open. This discloses hopeful possibilities of victories for peace. But it also has its dangers, inherent in any fluid situation. Now more than ever we shall need imagination and caution in the right balance." "After Geneva: A Greater Task for NATO," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXIV (Oct., 1955), 16.

²⁶ See Elmer Plischke *Conduct of American Diplomacy* (Van Nostrand, 1950), pp. 361-363, 384-388; William Sanders, "Multilateral Diplomacy," *Department of State Bulletin*, XXI (Aug. 8, 1949), 163.

of the Secretariat of the United Nations — especially of its Department of Conferences and General Services — and of important divisions of every foreign office. International negotiations are also a heavy burden on the foreign ministers and other top policy-makers. James F. Byrnes served as secretary of state for 562 days, and he spent 350 of these, or 62 per cent of the time, at international conferences.

That diplomacy by conference meets a real need seems to be proved by its growing popularity. For the personal observation of a qualified authority one might cite the comments of Lord Maurice Hankey, a member of Lloyd George's War Cabinet, who wrote in 1946 that this type of diplomacy had come to stay and that the "best hope" for the prevention of war "appears to lie in the judicious development of diplomacy by conference."²⁷ "My personal experience," he adds, "is that the most important elements of success in diplomacy by conference are elasticity of procedure, small numbers, informality, mutual acquaintance and if possible, personal friendship among the principals, a proper perspective between secrecy in deliberation and publicity in results, reliable secretaries and interpreters."²⁸

PERSONAL DIPLOMACY

The direct participation of foreign ministers, prime ministers, and even heads of states in diplomatic negotiations is not a recent innovation, but it has become increasingly common in recent years. Major and fateful decisions affecting the whole course of the war and the postwar international order were made during the several personal meetings between Churchill and Roosevelt, beginning with the rendezvous in August, 1941, that resulted in the Atlantic Charter, during the conferences of these two men with Chiang Kai-shek at Cairo (November, 1943), and with Stalin at Teheran (December, 1943) and at Yalta (February, 1945). These were followed by the Potsdam Conference of July—August, 1945, in which the main participants were Churchill (replaced by Attlee after the General Elections of July), Stalin, and Truman. The only postwar meeting at this level was the "summit" conference in Geneva in July, 1955, attended by the President of the United States and the prime ministers of France, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.S.R. Meetings of prime ministers of Asian countries, especially of the Colombo powers — India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, and Indonesia — have been frequent, and several Asian and African prime ministers attended the Asian-African conference at Bandung in April, 1955.

The foreign ministers of the Big Three of the war period — the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, and the United States — held an important meeting

²⁷ Lord Maurice Hankey, *Diplomacy by Conference* (Putnam, 1946), pp. 38, 39. The term "Diplomacy by Conference," incidentally, goes back at least to 1920, when Lord Hankey used it as the subject of a lecture.

²⁸ Hankey, pp. 37-38.

in Moscow in the fall of 1943 and again in December, 1945. Together with the foreign minister of France they met several times in the postwar period as the Council of Foreign Ministers to attempt to draft peace treaties for the defeated Axis states. They met again in Berlin in February, 1954, to attempt to resolve the deadlock on German unification, and in Geneva in October, 1955, to consider the same problem, plus the problems of European security, German rearmament, disarmament, and other pressing issues. As the "cold war" has developed, and as the ties that bind the North Atlantic community have become stronger, at least in a formal sense, the American secretary of state and the foreign ministers of Great Britain and France have met on numerous occasions to discuss matters of common interest. They have continued to hold consultations in the more relaxed international atmosphere that has developed as a result of the "new look" in Russia. Before the October, 1955, meeting in Geneva with Molotov, for example, they met in New York for preliminary discussions. The foreign ministers of the nations of Western Europe -- especially those of the Brussels Pact powers (England, France, Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg) often meet to consider problems which their countries share. At sessions of the General Assembly of the United Nations foreign ministers of many states exchange views.

Use of Personal Agents. Personal diplomacy may take many other forms, but invariably it has the effect of by-passing the normal channels of diplomacy or of using them only to a limited degree. Heads of states have often relied on personal representatives to handle delicate problems in international relations. The use of executive agents has been common for many decades. Henry Wriston's study of *Executive Agents in American Foreign Relations* shows that they have been employed in American diplomatic relations from colonial times. Wilson's reliance on Colonel House and Roosevelt's on Harry Hopkins are the best-known examples of this practice. *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House* and Robert Sherwood's *Roosevelt and Hopkins* provide excellent case studies of this type of diplomacy. Heads of states have sometimes preferred to consult personal favorites rather than their foreign ministers on major questions of diplomacy. Thus, as Lord Vansittart stated, "a rival Foreign Office was run by Lloyd George : it consisted of Lord Lothian." Vansittart, who was Permanent Under Secretary of the British Foreign Office and then Chief Diplomatic Adviser to the Prime Minister, confesses that "as Chief Diplomatic Adviser I saw Chamberlain only thrice in three years, and never once alone."²⁹

Churchill and Roosevelt. Another practice of heads of states, less frequently used except by certain practitioners, is the direct approach to their opposite numbers in other countries. Churchill and Roosevelt developed this practice to a fine art, especially by use of the transatlantic telephone. They also corresponded directly, or sent messages to each other by personal

²⁹ Lord Vansittart, "The Decline of Diplomacy," *Foreign Affairs*, XXVIII (Jan., 1950), 186.

emissaries and confidants. When Harry Hopkins was in England on war-time missions, he often spent weekends with Churchill and was therefore able to convey Roosevelt's views and get Churchill's in return with a maximum of frankness and a minimum of formality. When the American President tried to appeal directly to the heads of the Axis powers, however, he got nowhere. He sent repeated messages to Hitler just before the attack on Poland precipitated World War II, and to Mussolini just before Italy stabbed France in the back in June, 1940; but the answer of each of the dictators was made in angry public speeches and in armed attacks. On the eve of Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt tried to appeal directly to the Emperor of Japan to do his best to avert war. The Japanese answer was delivered, not by Kurusu and Nomura in Washington but by Japanese planes over Pearl Harbor. The personal diplomacy of Churchill and Roosevelt led to some unfortunate results in their dealings with Stalin. Roosevelt, in particular, was convinced after the Yalta meeting that Stalin was a reasonable man and that he could get along with him and induce him to accept necessary compromises. Before his death in April, 1945, FDR had reason to doubt that Stalin intended to abide by the Yalta Agreements.

The Merits of the Direct Approach. Most practicing diplomats and students of diplomacy view with strong misgivings the increasing tendency of heads of states, prime ministers, and foreign ministers to participate directly in international diplomacy.³⁰ They point out that the function of the top officials of a state is policy-making, not negotiation—a task that should be left to professional diplomats. They cite the experience of Woodrow Wilson, who insisted on attending the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 against the advice of his diplomatic advisers and whose stature as the spokesman of a new order in world affairs, as well as his health, was undermined as a result.³¹ They insist that personal diplomacy on the highest level, or the use of personal favorites in more delicate negotiations, is often characterized by incompetence and is based on subjective considerations which may effect the vital interests of a state. "The practice," complains Lord Vansittart, who speaks from bitter experience, "is an essay in omniscience, and it is only sometimes successful, because everyone needs advice."³² Harold Nicolson also has a marked distaste for the participa-

³⁰ In the fifteenth century Philip de Commines, "the father of modern history," observed: "It is the highest act of imprudence for two great princes, provided there is any equality in their power, to admit of an interview, unless it be in their youth, when their minds are wholly engaged and taken up with entertainments of mirth and pleasure." Under any other circumstances personal meetings were undesirable. "Though their persons should be in no danger (which is almost impossible), yet their heartburnings and animosities will certainly augment. It were better, therefore, that they accommodated their differences by the mediation of wise and faithful ministers." Quoted in Lindsay Rogers, "Of Summits," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXIV (Oct., 1955), 143. This is a review article of *The Memoirs of Philip de Commines, Lord of Agrenon*. Edited, with Life and Notes, by Andrew H. Scoble (London, 1856).

³¹ Whether Wilson was wise in deciding to attend the Paris Peace Conference as an active participant is still a matter of opinion; a strong case can be made in support of his decision, as well as against it.

³² Vansittart, p. 187.

tion of top policy-makers in international negotiations; to him it indicates a misunderstanding of their functions and of the important distinctions between foreign policy and diplomacy. He believes that foreign ministers should keep to policy-making, leaving the work of negotiation to the professional diplomatist; that they may take a dislike to each other which would effect all their relationships; and that with responsibilities in worldwide problems their time is needed in their home offices. Visits of an accredited representative to the foreign office, unlike those of a foreign minister, "arouse no public expectation, inspire no Press indiscretions, and if sterile lead to no public disappointment."³³ Sisley Huddleston shares this view: "In foreign affairs, in particular, a president, a prime minister, or any other high functionary of the state entrusted with the most vital responsibilities, should, first and last, make, as it were, an abstraction of himself."³⁴

Some experienced diplomats disagree with this view. Lord Hankey, for instance, believes that the solution of difficult problems may require "resources beyond those of the most competent and qualified diplomatist." He contends that some questions can be settled only in conferences by persons who, along with other qualifications, are "alone in a position to make real concessions" and that "nowadays, when governments are often responsible to Parliaments elected on the widest franchise, it is no longer advisable to rely entirely on intermediaries."³⁵

✓ PROPAGANDA AND DIPLOMACY

The use of the radio, the press, and other methods of making a direct appeal to peoples rather than to governments through formal channels is becoming a commonplace approach. Propaganda, in the words of George V. Allen, former Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, has become "a conscious weapon of diplomacy."³⁶ As Mr. Allen admits, the technique is not a new one. "The Duke of Wellington doubtless addressed messages to Napoleon through the press of his day, and Cyrus the Great probably started bizarre rumors for his purposes." Woodrow Wilson tried to appeal over the heads of the rulers of Germany to the German people. His famous Fourteen Points, which were eventually accepted as the basis of the armistice and the peace negotiations, were enunciated, not through diplomatic channels but in a message to Congress. When Wilson attempted to appeal to the Italian people to bring pressure on Orlando and the Italian

³³ Nicolson, *Diplomacy*, p. 101. Secretary of State Dulles is on record as a firm believer in the kind of personal diplomacy permitted by his peripatetic propensities. His Democratic critics spoke of him as an "unguided missile," and scholars too felt that Dulles was too much of the time up in the air or abroad. See, for example, Henry M. Wriston, "The Secretary of State Abroad," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXIV (July, 1956), 523-540.

³⁴ Huddleston, p. 230. Huddleston's relevant chapter bears the unequivocal title, "The Menace of Intimate Top-Level Conferences."

³⁵ Hankey, p. 38.

³⁶ George V. Allen, address at Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, Dec. 10, 1949; *Department of State Bulletin*, XXI (Dec. 19, 1949), 941-943.

government in connection with debates at the Paris Peace Conference, his efforts backfired. In other instances outside appeals to peoples to repudiate their rulers have served only to consolidate support for the ruling group in the state or to make the people resentful of "interference."

The State Department deliberately intervened in the Italian elections of 1948, in which great issues affecting the balance of power between the Communist and the non-Communist worlds seemed to be at stake. Allen has thus described the campaign :

By press, motion picture, and radio we tried our level best, through open propaganda methods, to persuade the Italian voter that democracy, although offering no immediate paradise, was a surer method of progress [than communism]. The Voice of America transmitted short-wave radio programs in the Italian language every day, beamed toward the people of Italy, extolling the advantages of democracy. Americans of Italian origin were encouraged to write to their relatives in Italy, counseling them to vote democratic. We arranged for American newsreels, showing the American way of life and American aid to Italy, to be shown in every Italian theater for several weeks prior to election day.³⁷

Mr. Allen ought to have added that James Dunn, United States Ambassador to Italy, assiduously met almost every ship bringing American supplies to Italian ports, and on each occasion made a public address on the aid which the American people were extending to the people of Italy. One of the first rules of the old diplomacy was that a diplomat must not attempt to interfere in any way in the internal affairs of the country to which he was accredited. If he did so, he usually met the fate of a Citizen Genêt or of a Lord Sackville-West. Both Genêt and Sackville-West were dismissed from their Washington posts for taking a hand in American internal politics ; and Sackville-West had done no more than indicate a presidential election preference in a supposedly private letter that he had been tricked into writing.

The use of the direct approach in diplomacy, by resort to all the instruments of propaganda, has been most fully developed in totalitarian states. Much of Fascist and Nazi diplomacy was conducted in this manner ; hence the functions of regular diplomats were rather different from those of the conventional type. The Russians have been adept in the same techniques. In the Italian elections of 1948, for example, Radio Moscow was even more vocal than the Voice of America, and all the agents of communism, inside and outside Italy, were apparently instructed to join in the chorus. When in the spring of 1948 General Walter Bedell Smith, American Ambassador to the Soviet Union, was engaged in presumably secret exploratory conversations with Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov on matters relating to Germany, Radio Moscow announced these conversations to the world in such a manner as to create the impression that the United States was trying to reach a basis of agreement with the U.S.S.R. without the knowledge of

³⁷ Allen, p. 942.

her other wartime allies, and perhaps even at their expense. When the Soviet Union decided that, in view of the success of the Berlin airlift and the stronger Allied measures in Western Germany, the blockade of Berlin was not achieving its intended purpose and should therefore be abandoned, Russia's willingness to negotiate an ending of the blockade was conveyed not through the Russian Foreign Office, via Ambassador Panyushkin in Washington or Ambassador Smith in Moscow, but through a cable from Stalin to an American newspaperman in Paris, who had addressed certain questions to him. But the chief vehicles of Russian diplomacy by propaganda are the radio and the press. Indeed, there is some basis for Lord Vansittart's flat statement that "Communist radio is Communist diplomacy."

There can be no question of the magnitude of the propaganda activities of the governments of modern states, especially totalitarian states and all major powers, but there can be all kinds of doubts concerning the relation of these activities to diplomacy. Do they supplement the efforts of diplomats or do they interfere with normal diplomatic procedures? Can the objectives of a state be furthered simultaneously by propaganda barrages for all the world to see and hear and by diplomacy, which for the most part works quietly behind the scenes? Is propaganda an arm of diplomacy or has diplomacy become the arm of propaganda? What is the connection between the foreign office of a state and its propaganda agency or agencies? In the United States, for example, what are the relative functions and responsibilities of the Department of State and the United States Information Agency? Whatever the answers to these questions, the relation of propaganda to diplomacy is obviously a matter of great importance in modern world politics.

The new and intimate connection between propaganda and diplomacy has altered the nature of the relations between states and has to a considerable degree weakened diplomacy in the traditional sense. Yet in an age of mass communications, of growing literacy, and of bitter war for the minds of men, it seems inevitable, if regrettable, that propaganda will rise in importance as "a conscious weapon of diplomacy," and therefore that diplomacy, viewed in this light, will increase in power and significance as an instrument of national policy.

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Propaganda and Political Warfare.....5

as Instruments of National Policy

Throughout history statesmen have used the devices of propaganda, at home and abroad, but only in recent years have they begun to suspect that there can be a great deal of science in the art of persuasion. Only in the past half-century have states established permanent agencies for the systematic exploitation of the possibilities of propaganda as an instrument of national policy. Today no state can safely ignore these possibilities.

The most important development of modern times in terms of the potentialities of propaganda has been the revolution in communications. This embraced new modes of transportation as well as the invention of the telegraph and the telephone. The expansion in educational facilities and techniques likewise contributed enormously, and so did the coming of cheaper and better mail service. The appearance of the "penny press" in Europe and America in the nineteenth century meant that for the first time the propagandist could exploit a "mass" medium. Low-priced magazines and books have re-enacted this revolution for the twentieth century. Motion pictures, radio, and, more recently, television have opened still other channels to the influence of propaganda.

Coincidentally with the growth in means of affecting the attitudes of people came an expanded need. The extension of the franchise in many nations gave large numbers of voters a share in the formation of government policy. These voters often became divided along political, economic, sectional, or class lines into groups whose conflicting interests had to be reconciled before an effective national policy could emerge. Propaganda, therefore, has been increasingly needed both to create some semblance of unified opinion at home and to exert influence abroad in behalf of national policies.

In the twentieth century propaganda has become a major instrument of national policy. Moreover, it has been developed by totalitarian states

into an evil science. An analysis of the techniques used by the Fascists in Italy, the Nazis in Germany, and the Communists in Russia, China, and elsewhere would be a depressing exercise in the application of psychological principles to group manipulation. A study of Mussolini's capacity for exhibitionism, of Goebbels' vast propaganda machine, and of Communist successes in confusing issues, in using "upside-down language," in exploiting weaknesses in opponents, and in pulling all the stops from "peace offensives" to "hate campaigns" not only would illustrate the staggering power of the propaganda weapon in the hands of the totalitarians but also would drive home the conviction that George Orwell's *1984* is unhappily not far removed from present-day realities.

Neither propaganda nor political warfare should be regarded as comprising a fixed list of devices or as instruments to be used at some precise stage in the changing relationships of states. On the contrary, states are always finding new propaganda approaches and improvising new forms of political warfare, and they may employ both propaganda and political warfare in times of ostensible peace as well as in times of open hostility. Moreover, propaganda may itself be a weapon of political warfare, and so may any one of the so-called instruments of economic warfare. But the use of propaganda by no means implies a state of political warfare, and political warfare may or may not take the form of propaganda. States have many occasions on which they wish to influence other states, both friendly and unfriendly, and to do this they often employ propaganda; and on some occasions they seek to exert greater pressures, and to do this they may employ some of the devices of political warfare.

We shall devote the remainder of this chapter to an analysis of how states utilize these two instruments to promote their national interests. The first section of this chapter will define propaganda, describe its various techniques and devices, and trace its development into a major instrument of national policy from the pre-World War II period to the present. The second section will present a definition of political warfare and a discussion of some of its forms.

THE NATURE AND TECHNIQUES OF PROPAGANDA

Definition. The word *propaganda* was first given general currency by the Roman Catholic Church to refer to the dissemination of its doctrine. More recently, after being taken over by the Marxists, it has been so used and misused that it defies exact definition. The reason for this difficulty in analysis stems from the figurative meanings, the malicious connotations, and the overtones of bias and partial or complete falsity which have become attached to it. For accuracy, the *method* of propaganda must be separated from the *aims* for which it is used. In the most general terms "any attempt to persuade persons to accept a certain point of view or to take a certain action" is propaganda. This definition is especially useful because it makes propaganda "morally neutral." To persuade

per se is neither "good" nor "bad" ; moral judgments must be directed to the purposes of the persuasion. Confusion arises from the failure to separate procedures from motives.

The meaning of propaganda may become clearer if we note its relationship to education. An authoritative handbook states : "Propaganda is the manipulation of symbols to control controversial attitudes ; education is the manipulation of symbols (and of other means) to transmit accepted attitudes (and skills)."¹ The advocacy of communism in the United States, therefore, is propaganda ; and so is the advocacy of capitalism in the Soviet Union. Other writers doubt that a line can be drawn between propaganda and education. They point out that to speak of "accepted attitudes" is to raise questions such as : accepted by whom? how is acceptance signified?

For the purposes of the present study the broad field of propaganda will for the most part be narrowed to mean only organized efforts by governments or members of governments to induce either domestic groups or foreign states to accept policies favorable --- or at least not unfavorable --- to their own. This definition takes into account the fact that the size of the group to be propagandized varies with the object of the propagandist -- all appeals are not to the "masses." We shall exclude the whole realm of "unofficial" propaganda, such as that issuing from individuals, business interests, and a host of special-purpose organizations. With the exception of totalitarian states, and others in wartime, most of these channels are beyond the control of governments.

Methods and Techniques. The science - or perhaps it is an art - of propaganda is similar to the arts of advertising and selling, and like the advertiser and salesman the propagandist must study his market and tailor his product to suit the demand. He must analyze the preconceptions, the fears, the desires, and the weaknesses of the group to be approached in order to use the most promising technique to achieve his purpose. The total number of available techniques is large. A recent treatise lists seventy-seven ;² but these may be grouped under four general headings : (1) Methods of Presentation ; (2) Techniques for Gaining Attention ; (3) Devices for Gaining Response ; and (4) Methods of Gaining Acceptance.

1. *Methods of Presentation.* The propagandist seldom presents his materials in such a way as to assert both the pros and cons of an issue. His approach is more like that of a trial lawyer who carefully organizes his argument to prove one side of the case. He may keep to the truth but not to the whole truth. He usually omits evidence contrary to his view. The Nazis, for example, claimed that their interest in Czechoslovakia was the return of the Sudeten Germans. What they failed to say was that the Sudeten area contained key mountain defenses and important industries, and that they really wanted not part but all of Czechoslovakia.

¹ Harold D. Lasswell and Dorothy Blumenstock, *World Revolutionary Propaganda* (Knopf, 1939), p. 10.

² D. Lincoln Harter and John Sullivan, *Propaganda Handbook* (Twentieth Century Publishing Company, 1953), p. 3.

Perhaps the classic example of propaganda by omission and distortion is the Ems dispatch of 1870. The French ambassador Benedetti was negotiating at Ems with King William of Prussia on the critical question of whether a Hohenzollern prince was to become king of Spain. At one point the King received a French proposal which he could not accept, whereupon he informed Benedetti that he had nothing more to say on the matter until he received further information. Neither the Ambassador in his offer, nor the King in his reply, meant to be offensive. When Bismarck, who wanted war with France, learned of the proceedings at Ems from a dispatch sent by the King, he edited the dispatch in such a way that it appeared that Benedetti had offended the King with his proposal, and that William, in turn, had broken off negotiations. The dispatch was then released to the press. Both nations felt insulted, and Bismarck's propaganda by partial truth brought about the result he desired — the Franco-Prussian War.³

Sometimes the propagandist may resort to lying or to the use of faked documents and incidents. Thus Hitler exploited a fantastic story that the Jews were plotting an international conspiracy to rule the world. He "proved" his charges by citing the infamous *Protocols of the Wise Men of Zion*. This amazing masterpiece of fraudulence started with a book published in 1864 as a satire on Napoleon III in which the author, Maurice Joly, proclaimed the coming of an "anti-Christ" who would stop at nothing to gain domination of the world. Four years later a German, Hermann Godsche, wrote a lurid novel entitled *Biarritz*, which described twelve rabbis convening in a cemetery at Prague from all corners of the earth, rejoicing over their conquest of the world. At the turn of the century a group of the tsar's secret police, planning a revolutionary movement and needing a scapegoat for Russia's misfortunes, combined the basic elements of the two books into the fabulous *Protocols*—a highly successful work if it is to be judged by its purpose. It eventually fell into the hands of one Alfred Rosenberg, a Russian of German extraction, who took it to Germany after the Bolshevik Revolution. Rosenberg became a top Nazi and the book a bible of Nazidom.

It must not be thought that deception is exclusively the product of totalitarian regimes, or that it has served only "bad" purposes. Benjamin Franklin, trying to win support for the American Revolution both abroad and in the colonies, forged letters showing how the British, by purchasing bales of scalps from the Indians, encouraged them to slaughter colonists. Lincoln must have known better when in his Gettysburg Address he implied that there had been conceded in 1776 an equality of men that was denied in 1861. McKinley did not deal with Congress or the country with full candor when in his war message of 1898 he failed to give due attention to the latest proposals of Spain. FDR has been criticized even by friendly

³ A. J. Butler, translator, *Bismarck, the Man and the Statesman: Being the Reflections and Reminiscences of Otto, Prince von Bismarck, Written and Dictated by Himself after his Retirement from Office*, 2 vols. (Harper, 1898), II, 100 ff.

historians for deceiving the American people about the seriousness of the war threat in the months before Pearl Harbor. Truth in itself may be effective propaganda. Churchill's "blood, sweat and tears" speech was a completely honest characterization of the struggle ahead ; his address merely put into eloquent words the great challenge to the British spirit. The later plea for "austerity" was another instance of effective truth.

Faked incidents are a convenient and often-used excuse for starting a war. On September 18, 1931, a small bomb happened to explode a few miles north of Mukden, Manchuria. Within three days the Japanese Kwantung Army had occupied strategic points throughout the province. Apparently the explosion was part of an elaborate plan to bring about war with China. The sinking of the battleship *Maine* in Havana harbor in 1898 may have been the work of Cuban revolutionists who wanted American intervention.

2. *Techniques for Gaining Attention.* Once his purpose has been formulated, the propagandist must attract attention to his cause. The notes, protests, official speeches, and declarations of a statesman in power will reach the government circles of foreign nations, but other means may be needed to reach the masses of the people. One of the more popular methods by which this is achieved is a show of strength. The Roman stunt of parading armies to impress observers has continued in popularity down to the present. The Nazis used this technique a great deal. With the advent of modern navies a variation on this same theme has been the naval demonstration. Since 1945, however, the most awesome demonstrations of power have been the tests of the atomic and hydrogen bombs. Several states have thus effectively called attention to their nuclear developments.

Nations are resourceful in their attempts to attract favorable attention to their ways of life. Embassies usually contain certain staff members called "cultural attaches" who use lectures, colorful folders, travel guides, posters, and movies to glorify the home country. The United States Information Agency, with personnel in many countries, "tells America's story abroad." The British Council, a semi-official organization with close ties with the British Foreign Office, performs a similar function for Britain. Compared with the propaganda machine of the Soviet Union, with reported annual expenditures of between one and two billion dollars, the overseas information programs of the democratic states are puny indeed. For 1955-1956, by way of comparison, the United States Information Agency had an appropriation of only about \$ 80,000,000, and Britain spent still less.

In addition to the normal methods of calling attention to themselves, countries sometimes devise special ones. The *Alliance Francaise*, formed in 1883, established centers of French learning throughout the world ; it heightened the prestige and influence of France abroad and in addition served as an adjunct to French diplomacy. In the Olympic games at Helsinki in 1952 the Russians attempted to prove that their system could

develop athletes superior to those from capitalistic countries. Americans, too, caught the spirit of nationalistic rivalry.

Visits of statesmen or monarchs to foreign countries are a way of indicating solidarity of interests and friendship. Tsar Alexander III's trip to France in 1893 was an important step in the completion of the Dual Alliance between Russia and France. The visits of English and Dutch royalty to the United States after World War II received friendly publicity in the American press and undoubtedly influenced both the President and Congress. In recent years heads of states have become ubiquitous features of the international landscape, and foreign ministers shuttle from country to country so frequently that many of them, notably Secretary Dulles, have become international commuters.

A favorable impression may be created by deeds as well as by words. Indeed, no words can be more effective than "the propaganda of the deed." Constructive policies will probably attract favorable attention even if the propaganda agencies fail to give them the Hollywood treatment. Although major efforts are made to "sell" countries' aims and policies as an advertising man sells soap or automobiles, there may be deep wisdom in the Gandhian conviction that "good ideas sell themselves." Certainly there is a close and significant relation between the success of propaganda and the soundness of policies and aspirations. Neither honest information nor ballyhoo is a substitute for solid performance, at least in the long run.⁴

3. *Devices for Gaining Response.* Advertisers rely upon fear of social disapproval, desire for prestige, pride in possession, and other normal emotions to gain one response: the purchase of goods or services. In a similar manner the propagandist attempts to appeal to certain basic emotions -- patriotism, love of justice, right of self-defense, and other -- in order to gain special responses. A common device is the slogan -- a short, catchy phrase used to incite action. Thus "No Taxation without Representation," "*Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité*," and "Bread for the Workers, Land for the Peasants, and Peace for All" became the battle cries of revolutions. The *Maine* and Pearl Harbor were "remembered" to remind Americans of the causes for which they were fighting. Texans fought their war for independence from Mexico with the cry "Remember the Alamo!"

Closely akin to the slogan is the symbolic device -- the pictorial or graphic representation. The Romans carried the *fascēs* to symbolize might, the Christians bore the cross as a symbol of faith, and the French tricolor came to represent the revolutionary cause. Today each nation is represented by a flag and, in addition, often by an animal, such as the British lion, the American eagle, or the Russian bear. It may have its national anthem, its national hero, and its national flower.

⁴ "The Loin Cloth or the Rajah?", *The Saturday Review*, Sept. 17, 1955, p. 14. Cherne's article is one of the seven in a symposium entitled, "What Do we Say to the World?" See also Victor Lasky, "Can Propaganda Make Friends?", the seventh article in the same symposium (pp. 19-20, 48).

The most effective symbol in recent history has been the swastika. Unlike many symbols, it had no intrinsic meaning either for the party which first used it or for the nation which later adopted it, yet it won fanatical devotion and rallied a people as few symbols have ever done. An aid to the strength of its hold on Germans was its extreme simplicity, which allowed anyone to draw it. It was copied over and over — on the streets, in the schoolroom, on the walls — until it at last became a mystic, almost religious symbol of faith. The words, treats, and promises of Hitler became associated with the swastika, and the German people came to revere the symbol and, through it, the person of *Der Fuehrer*.

Often a person, like Hitler in Germany, becomes the symbol or personification of an idea. When Benjamin Franklin visited France, plainly dressed, carefully unpretentious, a fur cap atop his unpowdered hair, he was to the French "the embodiment of the ideals of Rousseau and the personification of the American cause"⁵ — a representation which won many friends for his country. Other national heroes, particularly Washington, Jefferson, and Lincoln, have become symbols of American democracy. The tendency to associate a man with a certain idea is common in political cartoons. Often the person in power represents the nation. During World War II Churchill personified Great Britain, Stalin the Soviet Union, and Roosevelt the United States.

Times of great stress provide fruitful opportunities for propaganda, because usual attitudes and behavior patterns are then unsettled. Economic dislocation and insecurity — as in the Great Depression — incline men to accept any system which promises order and security. The effectiveness of the Soviet "peace" propaganda in the post-World War II years lies in the fact that people — especially Europeans — are sick of war and intensely want to believe that they can co-exist with communism. Fertile soil for American propaganda is provided by the fear of Soviet domination. Everywhere the propagandist capitalizes on existing attitudes and tries to manipulate them in such a way as to get responses that will further his purposes.

4. *Methods of Gaining Acceptance.* The establishment of a *rapprochement* or liaison between propagandist and "propagandee" is one of the successful ways of gaining acceptance for a program. In the attempt to convince men of his regard for their welfare the propagandist may stress his similarity to them. Many an American politician has been elected because he appealed to the voters as a "man of the people." The emphasis is usually on the candidate's humble origins. The idea was expressed most succinctly by Mrs. Calvin Coolidge, who once declared: "We're just plain folks." This kind of appeal is not peculiar to the United States, as can be seen in the case of Señora Eva Perón. When she displayed her fabulous jewels and furs to the people from whose ranks she had risen she would explain that it was for them that she had taken the jewels from the "oligarchs."

⁵ Thomas A. Bailey, *A Diplomatic History of the American People*, 4th ed. (Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1950), p. 15.

For years this somehow made sense to the *descamisados* ("shirtless ones") in the Argentine nation.

History is filled with examples of the "plain folks" technique on the national level, but in international affairs the propagandist usually resorts to exploiting more inclusive common characteristics such as race and religion. The expansion of Russian influence into the Balkans during the last two centuries has been continually cloaked in Pan-Slavism. Russia also posed as the defender of the Greek Orthodox Church. Hitler's use of the Aryan myth and Pan-Germanism is a more recent example of this type of appeal. The Japanese based their "Co-Prosperity Sphere" and "Asia for the Asiatics" slogans on the appeal of common interests.

Another approach used by the propagandist to make his cause more readily acceptable is the invocation of the higher sanctions of God, justice, and history. Pope Urban II launched the Crusades with the cry "*Deus vult*" ("God wills it"). In most wars both sides ask Divine blessing for their cause. The "lessons of history" are often used by propagandists to lend force to their arguments. In America, isolationists have misquoted George Washington's dictum on alliances in his Farewell Address to fortify their sentiments and to influence foreign policy. The Russians, combining history with a pseudo-religious fervor, quote Marx and Lenin to give sanction to current policies. The propagandist may in these ways strive to give his aims a more universal appeal.

One of the chief limitations to the effectiveness of propaganda is the sharp competition for the attention, response, and acceptance of those to whom it is directed. Propaganda efforts are seldom free from counter-propaganda. Yet even where the channels of information are state-controlled or where strict censorship prevails, it is well-nigh impossible in this technological age to seal off a country from the rest of the world. Censorship in a greater or lesser degree is practiced by virtually every state today; it is all-encompassing in totalitarian states and is very extensive in many other countries during periods of national emergency.

Since under normal conditions the propagandist must battle against other lines of propaganda, he often attempts to discredit his opposition. The Russians portray the Americans as the "capitalist-imperialist warmongers of Wall Street." The Allies in World War I referred to the Germans as "the Boche" or "Huns." Propagandists frequently try to associate their opponents with something bad. The Russians have paraded before the world the unsolved Negro problem in the United States. In American politics the Democrats are linked with two wars as the "War Party" while, on the other hand, the Republicans are called the "Depression Party." The important fact to remember is that competition is almost always present to restrict the effectiveness of propaganda.

Specialists in the fields of propaganda, public opinion, and pressure-group tactics have added immensely to the scientific stature of their studies in recent years. While we cannot here turn aside to explore the nature of their researches and conclusions, we must point out that earlier judg-

ments in this whole field must be regarded as subject to constant reevaluation. The present discussion will undertake only to suggest the role of propaganda in recent years and to note its gradual adoption as an important instrument of national policy.

PROPAGANDA IN THE DICTATOR STATES BEFORE WORLD WAR II

The Soviet Union. "Propaganda," wrote Lenin in 1905, "is of crucial importance for the triumph of the Party." Twelve years later he remarked that the revolution had succeeded "because it knew how to combine force with persuasion."⁶ The Bolsheviks soon put into practice the Marxian view that every phase of society should contribute to the indoctrination of the individual. They disseminated propaganda through party workers, the local soviets of towns and villages, and the army. Eventually they addressed appeals to everybody — peasants, workers, soldiers, intelligentsia, racial minority groups, all showing how the Utopian Soviet State, free of classes, conflict, and capitalism, provided everything for everybody "according to his need." Their aims were to consolidate the dictatorial control of the Government and Party, to gain adherents from their program, and to make the people willing to sacrifice, suffer, and die for Mother Russia.

The Soviet leaders proved to be masters both in developing propaganda devices and in adapting techniques to specific situations. First of all, Communist propaganda has always had a vocabulary of its own, rich in both "purr" and "poison" words. Such terms as "proletariat," "Communism," "Socialism," "toiling masses," and "revolution," for example, had a favorable meaning, while "capitalism," "bourgeoisie," "classes," "imperialism," and "parliamentarianism" became the epithets that Communists used in speaking of their enemies. They continuously diverted public dissatisfaction from themselves, and blamed all the nation's troubles upon "decadent bourgeoisie" and "counterrevolutionary influences." They made good use of slogans such as the traditional "Workers of the World, Unite" and of symbols such as the Red Star and the Hammer and Sickle.

Besides the propaganda machinery existing within the Soviet Union after 1918, the Communists promoted the Third International (the Comintern).⁷ Dominated from the start by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, the Comintern was a useful medium for directing the activities of Communist parties throughout the world and for exerting pressure

⁶ Quoted in Saul K. Padover and Harold D. Lasswell, "Psychological Warfare," *Headline Series*, No. 86 (Foreign Policy Association, March—April, 1951), p. 24.

⁷ The Third International was organized by the Communist Party to bring about a worldwide revolution. The famous Trotsky-Stalin fight was over this issue; Stalin wanted the energies of Communists to be devoted to the consolidation of party gains in Russia; Trotsky advocated the promotion of revolution outside Russia. Although Stalin's view prevailed, the Third International remained an instrument of Russian foreign policy until it was dissolved in 1943.

on foreign governments to follow policies favorable to the Soviet Union. Until 1935, with only minor parliamentary representation, if any, Communists in other states generally followed policies of opposition to other parties, hoping to clog the wheels of government or to incite revolution. This was the case in Germany before the fall of the Weimar Republic, when Communists cooperated on several occasions with the Nazis in the hope of defeating the hated Social Democrats ; they believed that if a reactionary government came into power the proletariat would arise. After 1935, however, Communist parties in Europe followed the Moscow directive for a "People's Front," i.e., cooperation with "liberal" groups against the Nazi threat. Thus the Soviet Union had the advantage of tentacles stretching throughout the world — a most effective aid to foreign policy.

Nazi Germany. After their defeat in 1918 the German people had been subjected to propaganda — chiefly from military sources — insisting that the German Army had never been defeated. Germany collapsed, according to this thesis, because alien and radical elements of the population had been easy prey for Allied propaganda. A few other ideas circulated among the people : the Versailles Treaty had been unjustly imposed upon them ; the leaders of the Weimar Republic had betrayed their country ; the "Jew-Communists" were the cause of their grievances ; they, the "*Herrenvolk*" (master race), needed "*Lebensraum*" (living space). Hitler and his followers exploited these ideas, made appeals to both labor and capitalist segments of society, enrolled unemployed youths in the Storm Troops, and finally maneuvered themselves into power, owing much of their success to propaganda.⁸

One of Hitler's first official acts was to establish a National Ministry of Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda, headed by Joseph Goebbels, who defined his job as the achievement of "one single public opinion." Whatever affected the minds of the people fell under the jurisdiction of at least one of Goebbels' thirty-one departments. The National Chamber of Culture had great powers of control and censorship over literature, movies, music, and the graphic arts, carefully and forcefully suppressing anything "incompatible with the cultural aims of National Socialism."

Hitler obtained fanatical support for himself by invoking the *Fuehrerprinzip* (the idea of a great leader) — a not too difficult task in postwar Germany. Before 1923 (the year of the Munich Beer Hall *Putsch*) Hitler had ridiculed the masses, calling them stupid, cowardly, and worthless. He had praised instead the "elite," the "intelligent group in society," and he had said that his party — and eventually the state — must be led by a "forceful minority."⁹ After 1923, however, he realized where his potential strength lay. Thenceforth there was no criticism of the masses—only praise and admiration of their power, and the constant assertion that the Nazis were working for them. This approach had by 1933 attracted a

⁸ Fritz Morstein Marx, *Government in the Third Reich*, 2nd ed. (McGraw-Hill, 1936), p. 99.

⁹ Serge Chatokin, *The Rape of the Masses* (Alliance Book Corp., 1940), p. 248.

large following of people who identified themselves with National Socialism. And where intellectual identification had not yet been achieved, Hitler was willing to accept physical, symbolic demonstrations of acceptance. Hence the "German salute" or "salute of the free man" was required of all civil servants in 1933. Early in 1934 it became compulsory for all Germans to salute one another with "Heil Hitler," for it was "a task of popular enlightenment to introduce the German salute among all sections of the German people as the expression of German solidarity."¹⁰ The omnipresence of the swastika and the use of slogans such as "One people, one state, one *Fuehrer*" seemed to demonstrate the solidarity of the German nation.

It would be a gross oversimplification to credit the creation of this semblance of unity and power to the personality and words of Hitler alone. The Nazis were well schooled in the use of propaganda, but mere words were accented by blackjacks, bullets, and the Gestapo. The chain of diplomatic victories which went from the Saar plebiscite (1935) to the absorption of Czechoslovakia (1938-1939) and the Soviet-German pact (1939) gave the Germans a feeling of superiority, supported not by murky theories of race but by the sight of Europe cowering before Nazi military strength. In addition, the large production of war material, the building of fortifications, and the construction of internal improvements created a prosperity that though false provided full employment and created the impression that the economy was flourishing. For a time Hitler was able to carry out his threats and to match words with deeds.

Fascist Italy. Mussolini's propaganda machine was much older than Hitler's organization, and it developed many techniques which the Nazis copied. The appeal of fascism was exerted on all groups within the country : on the army and navy (to win the guarantee of a strong government) ; on the monarchists (to gain support for the monarchy) ; on the "Irridentists" (to bribe the "patriots" and the enemies of the Versailles Treaty) ; on the clerics (to enlist the support of the Church) ; and on the malcontents in general (to pick up the hungry, the unhappy, and any loose ends). In consolidating his own power, Mussolini appealed to the people with the "plain folks" technique, often stressing his low background and distributing pictures of himself, toiling at some humble task. But his role was that of *Il Duce* (the leader). In other words, he was the common man become a Caesar.

Mass appeals were issued in all varieties. For the general public *Il Duce* painted glorious pictures : Italy as a resurrected Roman empire ; the Fascist legions as great as Caesar's ; the Adriatic as an Italian lake and the Mediterranean as an Italian sea. Slogans were used to inspire the people ; symbols such as the *fascies* were used to signify glory ; and badges and fancy uniforms were used to give a feeling of importance and status to soldiers and others. The system of incentives, rewards, and coercions em-

¹⁰ Morstein Marx, p. 96.

ployed was strikingly similar to that of the Soviet Union, from whom the Fascists, as well as the Nazis, were willing to learn.

PROPAGANDA AND WORLD WAR II

The outbreak of World War II found the totalitarian states provided with well-staffed and well-equipped propaganda machines. The democracies had no comparable organizations. Britain, however, had learned the importance of propaganda and psychological warfare in World War I, and the United States had substantial resources in money and ideas. Together they proved that unfettered ingenuity can be far more potent than standardized thinking such as characterized Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and Imperial Japan. With the worldwide cooperation of the Communists after June, 1941, they were able to wage war on the propaganda front with better results than the Axis.

Germany. As the German people had already been subjected to years of vituperation against the British, the French, the "Jew-Communists," and "Jew-Niggers," the Nazi leaders had no problem in whipping up hatred against their enemies. Censorship, manipulation of information, and indoctrination along Nazi lines had been so long in operation that there was less difficulty in winning war support in Germany than in the democracies. The Nazis had little to worry about on the home front; they could devote most of their energies to psychological warfare against the enemy.

America was the target of a mighty propaganda drive by the Axis. As far back as 1933 hundreds of American Fascist groups, calling themselves by such all-American names as "Crusaders for Americanism," "Christian Frontiers," and "American Guards," had blossomed forth. The goal of these "bunds" was to align groups—economic, religious, or ethnic—against one another, and their chief line of attack was to pit gentile against Jew. Thus in America, as in Germany, "Jew-Communists" were blamed for the country's economic and social ills. Furthermore, the New Deal or "Jew Deal," as it was often termed, was pictured as a gigantic plot to rob "one hundred per cent Americans" of their independence. Two official German organizations, the *Weltdienst* and the *Deutscher Fichte-Bund*, took on the task of supplying Axis agents in America with anti-Semitic posters, pamphlets, and bulletins. This material was reprinted in such patriotic-sounding papers as Father Coughlin's *Social Justice*, William Dudley Pelley's *Liberator*, and Gerald Winrod's *Defender*. The outbreak of the war brought the formation of something new on the propaganda scene: various "Committees," such as the "America First Committee" and the "Make Europe Pay War Debts Committee," which were soon infiltrated by Nazis and used to foster isolationist sentiment in the country in the hope of preventing America from aiding the Allies.

Nazi propaganda within Europe was at first successful because Goebbels

was able to exploit two basic human emotions — hope and fear.¹¹ Initial successes on the battlefield raised visions of quick victory and struck fear into the hearts of enemy soldiers and people. German propagandists were later thrown on the defensive, and their earlier and well-remembered boasts and misrepresentations then undermined their prestige and effectiveness. Toward the end, the fear of defeat rather than the hope of victory was used to rally the German nation to fight on.

Japan. In planning their psychological warfare the Japanese collaborated with the Germans, and the patterns of propaganda reflected more than a casual similarity.¹² For example, the favorite themes of the Nazis were the God-like *Fuehrer*, for whom it was the greatest possible honor for citizens to die, the *Herrenvolk* concept, the New Order for Europe, and scapegoats — Jews, Communists, Catholics. The Japanese had the God-Emperor, to whom they pledged their lives, the “Son of Heaven” idea, the new “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere,” and scapegoats—the “red-haired barbarians of the West” (British, Americans, and other Western “imperialists”).

Although the Japanese did not employ psychological warfare in support of military offensives on as grand a scale as did Germany in her attack on France, they nonetheless took propaganda wherever they went. Their promises of a “Greater East Asia” and their tales of Japanese victories won many Asian supporters, who believed that Japan would give them greater freedom and opportunity than would be possible under Western “imperialism.” If anything the Japanese were realists about propaganda. Setsuichi Aoki, a former official of the League of Nations said that “propaganda of Japanese culture is none other than the introduction of our national power.”¹³ Cut off from the United States by six thousand miles of Pacific Ocean and by faulty short-wave transmission, the Japanese were unable to reach the American people with any sustained campaign of political, psychological, or cultural warfare. Even in the Hawaiian Islands, nearly 2500 miles closer to Japan, with one-third of its population of Japanese descent and with a mixture of nationalities which seemed to offer fertile soil for racial tensions and for espionage and sabotage, Japanese efforts were notably unproductive. Against American troops in the Southwest Pacific, however, the Japanese scored propaganda as well as military victories. They were particularly adept in their efforts to induce homesickness among soldiers through the broadcasts of “Tokyo Rose,” the Asian sister of “Axis Sally” of Berlin, who played songs of home while describing the latest military defeats of the Americans. In the jungles, the Japanese soldiers were masters of tactical psychological warfare: strange noises and fake attacks gave the G.I.’s little rest.

¹¹ Ernst Kris and Hans Speier, *German Radio Propaganda* (Oxford University Press, 1944), pp. 479 ff.

¹² See Peter De Mendelssohn, *Japan's Political Warfare* (London, 1944). Although no clear distinction is made between propaganda and political warfare, the book is mainly about the former.

¹³ Quoted in De Mendelssohn, p. 2.

Great Britain. Propaganda activities were deemed of sufficient importance by the British to warrant a director of cabinet rank, and on September 1, 1939, Parliament set up a Ministry of Information. While its scope was not as broad as that of the German Propaganda Ministry, it was nevertheless efficient in maintaining tight censorship over mail and news and in carefully editing press releases. In addition, it managed the Overseas Services of the British Broadcasting Company and directed a large staff in the conduct of psychological warfare operations. The big job at home, of course, was to keep up the morale of the populace in spite of such disaster as the bombing of London. The bulk of British war propaganda work, however, was done not alone but in conjunction with the United States. It must therefore be regarded as an important part of what is here described under United States propaganda.

The United States. The United States waged her war of ideas chiefly through the Office of War Information (OWI), set up in 1942. To the OWI, headed by Elmer Davis, fell the tremendous responsibility of conducting psychological warfare abroad. It established outposts in foreign countries, operated several foreign-language radio stations in Europe, printed many pamphlets, and supplied the armed forces with personnel trained in propaganda techniques. The United States and Britain set up a joint psychological warfare division in the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) in the European Theater of Operations (ETO). This PWD-SHAEF, as it was called, had as its primary purpose the destruction of German morale. Headed by Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, a direct chain of command led from Supreme Headquarters to the battlefield, where every Allied army had psychological warfare teams, often at regimental and company levels. These teams usually had at their disposal mobile radio broadcasting systems, with public-address facilities, radios, mobile printing presses, and ready-made leaflets. In the last months of the war some commanding generals put loudspeakers on their forward tanks for the purposes of persuading the enemy to surrender.

The United States, Great Britain, and the U.S.S.R. all maintained "white" or openly identified radio stations, which broadcast news and advice to the Germans. Although listening to forbidden stations — "black listening" — was punishable by imprisonment or death, many Germans risked the penalties, according to postwar surveys. The main reason for this was that the Propaganda Ministry's lies of German successes had caught up with it. Particularly after Stalingrad, few thinking Germans were willing to accept the Goebbels version of anything. In addition to the "white" stations, there were the "black" stations — Allied stations posing as German. Their primary purpose was to confuse the enemy and make him turn to Allied broadcasts to learn the truth. Finally, there were the "grey" stations, which laid no claim to being either Allied or German.

Although their propaganda naturally gained in effectiveness as their mighty war machine took form and then gained momentum, the Allies were not completely successful in their propaganda and psychological

warfare efforts ; nor were they immune to enemy tactics. One of the moot questions of the war was the advisability of the "unconditional surrender" dictum.¹⁴ The original top-level plans had not called for psychological warfare against either Germany or Japan. According to one observer's views, the men in the higher echelons of command in Washington consistently overestimated the solidarity of the Japanese nation. This led to the bringing of Russia into the war in the Far East and to the dropping of atomic bombs — developments which might have been avoided by greater understanding of the actual Japanese weaknesses and by more intensive psychological warfare.¹⁵ Only in the last weeks of the war were intensive efforts made to weaken Japanese morale by propaganda as well as by aerial and naval attacks. Day after day throughout the summer of 1945, broadcasts over Radio Saipan drove home a message of betrayal and defeat to the Japanese people and soldiers. Almost every day this powerful station named a number of major Japanese cities, one of which, it added, would be the target of the next mass assault by American B-29's based in the Marianas and on Iwo Jima. After the war it was learned that political warfare of this sort, coupled with the growing power of the Allied forces in the western Pacific, had contributed immensely to the weakening of Japanese morale. In spite of their strict discipline as a people and as a nation, as evidenced by their devotion to the Emperor and to the traditions of Imperial Japan and by their unwillingness to surrender in battle and by their "Kamikaze" pilots, the Japanese proved to be vulnerable to psychological as well as military warfare.

Perhaps another major error was the failure to differentiate between the Nazi regime and ordinary German citizens. Goebbels felt that had such a distinction been made it would have ripped the German nation apart. "If I were on the enemy side," he said, "I should from the very first day on have adopted a slogan of fighting against Nazism, but not against the German people."¹⁶ After the "unconditional surrender" formula had been agreed upon in 1943, most Germans apparently believed that they were left with no alternative to resisting to the last. The testimony of Allied experts in psychological warfare and of Germans in the postwar years was virtually unanimous that this formula strengthened the determination of the Germans to resist and thus assisted Hitler in his last desperate months.

PROPAGANDA IN THE POSTWAR YEARS

At the end of the war the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was in possession of a propaganda machine second to none in history — the Ad-

¹⁴ Daniel Lerner, *Sykewar : Psychological Warfare Against Germany* (Geo. W. Stewart, 1949), pp. 229 ff.

¹⁵ Ellis M. Zacharias, *Secret Missions* (Putnam, 1946), pp. 387-388 and *passim*. See also United States Strategic Bombing Survey, *Japan's Struggle to End the War* (Government Printing Office, 1946).

¹⁶ Louis P. Lochner, ed., *The Goebbels Diaries* (Doubleday, 1948), p. 147.

ministration of Agitation and Propaganda (*Agitprop*). The head of this mighty organization had one of the biggest jobs in the Soviet Union, commanding more than 1,400,000 full-time professional propagandists, all of whom had to be loyal Party members.¹⁷ In addition to the *Agitprop* staff were the 250 employees of the Foreign Office whose job was to prepare propaganda specifically for foreign consumption. And in all her propaganda activities the Soviet Union was obediently aided by her satellites and by Communist parties throughout the world.

Soviet Propaganda. Between 1945 and 1947 Soviet propaganda aimed primarily at encouraging the growth of "People's Democracies" and, conversely, at lessening the power and influence of the United States abroad. Accordingly, emphasis was placed on the superiority of the Soviet way of life, the decadence of capitalism, particularly in the underdeveloped areas of the world, and the cruelties of capitalist-imperialist exploitation. Backed by active Communist subversive groups within each country and by Soviet power without, the propaganda offensive was part of an over-all drive to acquire satellites in Eastern Europe and to spread communism westward into Europe and eastward into China. In 1947, however, the United States inaugurated the "containment policy" with the speech of President Truman on March 12, soon followed by the offer of aid that eventually produced the Marshall Plan. As these policies took concrete form, *Izvestia* charged that West Germany's "military potential is being completely restored and will have to serve as a weapon in the aggressive policy of the American monopolies."¹⁸ Just a week later *Pravda* declared that the United States had contrived the "military and economic enslavement of Turkey" and had deprived that country of her "political independence" so that she might be used as a "strategic and military springboard for the U.S.A."¹⁹

In June, 1949, *Pravda* carried a series of articles by a member of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party, Liu Shao-Chi. These labored the old theme in describing the "despoilment of all the peoples of the world by the American imperialists and their ambition to plunder and oppress," and in characterizing American policies as an "attempt to enslave the world." President Truman's announcement of September 23 that the Soviet Union possessed the atomic bomb led *Pravda* scornfully to inquire why all the fuss: in 1947 the Soviet Union had "made no secret of the fact that it possessed an atomic weapon."²⁰

In 1949 the Russians launched a new major propaganda offensive, "a more vigorous and consistent struggle for peace" against the "instigators of a new war," as Foreign Minister Molotov explained it. The main purpose of the new drive, which *Bolshevik* termed "a holy conflict," was to convince the people of the Soviet Union — and whomever else could be

¹⁷ Richard L. Brecker, "The New Arm of Diplomacy," *The American Foreign Service Journal*, XXVIII (Aug., 1951), 23-25; and Padover and Lasswell, p. 24.

¹⁸ July 21, 1948; reprinted in *Soviet Press Translations*, 1948 (University of Washington Press), III, 453.

¹⁹ July 28, 1948, *Translations*, 1948, III, 484-486.

²⁰ Oct. 2, 1949, *Translations*, 1949, IV, 619.

convinced — that the Soviet Union was fighting with all her strength for peace, the abolition of atomic weapons, and disarmament. To support the new “peace offensive” the “Partisans of Peace” were organized on a world-wide scale, complete with an official organ of their own — *The Partisans of Peace*. The “Partisans” climaxed their campaign with the Stockholm Peace Appeal, to which 300,000,000 signatures, which had been obtained from people throughout the world, were affixed at the meeting of the World Congress of Peace Partisans in the summer of 1949. The United States took no formal notice of the “offensive” — although some Americans signed the Appeal — for this would have implied that the U.S.S.R. was indeed the foremost exponent of world peace. But her failure to do so gave *Agitprop* “proof” that America was against peace.²¹

Soviet propaganda techniques were further illustrated in the case of Korea. Soon after the end of World War II the Soviet press was littered with statements insisting that the Korean people resented the United States and admired the Soviet Union. Much attention was given to the comparison of the position of the North Koreans, with “extensive political rights and unlimited opportunity to develop their economy and culture,” with the wretched lot of South Korea, where the American forces had lingered on to exploit the people long after Soviet troops had left.²² Pursuing this theme, the Soviet press and radio featured stories of Soviet-Korean friendship, the corruption of Syngman Rhee and his puppet “government,” and abuses of “the American expansionists,” who wished to convert Korea into a colony of Wall Street and “a military and political springboard” for America. By June, 1950, there was at least one article a day in Soviet papers describing American abuses, Korean resentment, and the desire of Koreans to unite *immediately*. When the Korean War did break out, the Communist world was well prepared for it — militarily and psychologically.

American Propaganda. As the “cold war” became more intense, it began to dawn on Americans, including members of Congress, that the United States was handicapped by the lack of a major weapon: propaganda and counterpropaganda. To rectify this situation, the Smith-Mundt Act was passed in 1948 “to promote a better understanding of the United States, and to increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries.” An organizational framework was set up to administer the new program.

Within the Department of State there is now an Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, who has charge of the Public Services, News, Public Studies, and Historical Divisions, the International Educational Exchange Service, and the UNESCO Relations Staff. For some years he also had charge of the Office of International Information (OII), but in

²¹ An account of various Soviet “Peace offensives” in the postwar period, and of Soviet propaganda techniques during the era of the “new look,” is given in Chapter 21.

²² *Pravda*, Feb. 23, 1949, *Translations*, 1948, III, 229-232.

1951 this was replaced by the International Information Administration (IIA), a separate agency within the State Department. Two years later, on August 1, 1953, the President created the United States Information Agency (USIA) as an independent office responsible for the Government's overseas information program.

USIA maintains 210 overseas information posts in 79 nations of the free world. Its Press and Publication Service sends a wireless news file of 7,000 words six days a week to USIA posts in 66 countries. It distributes millions of leaflets, pamphlets, posters, newspaper and magazine features, photographs, cartoon strips, and other information material to more than 10,000 newspapers and magazines in non-Communist countries. The Agency operates 210 film libraries abroad ; its Motion Picture Service produces or acquires and distributes films in some 39 languages. It provides weekly newsreels and feature programs on TV film to 33 television stations in 22 countries ; it maintains 157 libraries in 67 countries ; and it has a major book-translation and book-distribution project, with its traveling exhibits reaching millions of people.

The most famous branch of the USIA is the "Voice of America." It now broadcasts around the globe, seven days a week, twenty-four hours a day, in 38 languages. Its facilities include 14 modern broadcasting studios in Washington ; a radio center in Munich ; Station RIAS in West Berlin ; million-watt transmitters in Munich, the Phillipines, and Okinawa ; and a floating transmitter on the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter *Courier* — usually anchored in the Mediterranean. More than three-quarters of the daily programs are directed to the U.S.S.R. and other countries behind the iron and bamboo curtains.²³ The broadcasts consist primarily of factual news and commentary ; the broadcasters include musicians, actors, statesmen, and religious leaders, as well as thousands of ordinary citizens of the United States and of foreign countries, free and satellite.

Besides these agencies specifically dedicated to information and propaganda, some mention must be made of the propaganda work done in connection with other phases of American policy. A great deal of good publicity, for instance, was given to the Marshall Plan. The Marshall Plan Mobile Exhibit which toured Europe was one of the better and more successful propaganda ventures of the United States.

An excellent example of effective cooperation between the United States Government and private American organizations and business concerns in propaganda efforts abroad is the recent participation in many international fairs and exhibitions. For some years the American exhibits at these displays, if there were any at all, had suffered in comparison with those of the Soviet Union. More recently these exhibits have been impressive demonstrations of American achievement and ingenuity. At the Damascus International Trade Fair in September, 1954, *This Is Cinerama*

²³ United States Information Agency, *Review of Operations, July 1-December 31, 1954* (Government Printing Office, 1951) ; United States Information Agency, *The U. S. Overseas Information Programs* (Government Printing Office, 1955).

drew huge crowds which surged past the Soviet exhibit. In 1953 the Communist display of consumer goods won first prize at the Constitution Fair in Bangkok, and the United States was not even officially represented. In the following year the United States won first prize for an exhibit called "Fruits of Freedom," developed by the Department of Commerce in co-operation with USIA and more than a hundred private business firms. Ten days before the Bangkok Fair opened the Soviets withdrew their exhibit.

There are several reasons why the Soviet Union leads the West, including the United States, in the use of propaganda. The most obvious one is longer experience. First used to consolidate the Revolution of 1917 and then to spread Communist ideology throughout the world, the Soviet propaganda machine gained momentum during the depression of the 1930's, the Spanish Civil War, and the period just before World War II. It is only since the recent war that the United States has assumed global responsibilities in peace time and has recognized the need for propaganda instruments of international scope. World propaganda presumes such a world policy. The one exception to the lack of official propaganda agencies in the United States was due to the assumption of the leadership in inter-American affairs. In 1938, in order to achieve solidarity and friendship within the Western Hemisphere, two special cultural and instructional agencies were organized under the jurisdiction of the State Department.²⁴

A further explanation of the backwardness of American propaganda organization in times of peace lies in the strong tradition of free speech. Just before World War II, when the United States became a battleground for competing propagandists, censorship or suppression was not considered; the government merely forced the identification of the origin of the propaganda and tried "to keep all channels of communication flowing as freely as possible."²⁵ Even today large segments of the American population and their representatives in Congress remain unconvinced that propaganda and the expense it entails are necessary.

POLITICAL WARFARE

Since 1890 Europe and the rest of the world have been in a state of war, or of preparation for war, much of the time. Peace has become an uneasy truce in which the supporters of various ideologies jockey for the most favorable positions. As the relations between states have assumed this uncertain status, old-style diplomacy has proved ineffective for imposing a nation's will on an unfriendly state. One instrument which has come into

²⁴ Charles A. H. Thomson, *Overseas Information Service of the United States Government* (The Brookings Institution, 1948), p. 3. This book contains an excellent study of the problems and achievements in the formation of postwar propaganda agencies.

²⁵ Thomson, p. 2.

increasing use to operate in the twilight zone between diplomacy and war is political warfare.

Characteristics. It is easier and less hazardous to cite examples of political warfare than it is to define the term. In general, it embraces the means — short of war — which a state takes to weaken a specific enemy or specific enemies. The persuasion of friendly diplomacy is not political warfare ; neither is propaganda which does not seek to impair or limit another state's freedom of action. On the other hand, diplomacy or propaganda which has the intent to coerce must be regarded as political warfare. Economic measures must be so characterized when they are aimed at a particular state. Thus a given act may or may not be political warfare. The distinction lies in its purpose. An embargo conceived solely to conserve domestic resources of a commodity is quite different from an embargo imposed to deprive an unfriendly state of essential imports, regardless of the fact that both may apply to exports to all states. Political warfare does not end with the coming of military conflict ; indeed, it is then likely to be accentuated and to lead to all sorts of diplomatic, propaganda, and economic measures to weaken the enemy. Whether political warfare always involves intervention in the affairs of the state or states against which it is directed hinges upon the definition of intervention.

Political warfare is by no means a recent innovation in the conduct of relations between states. The strategy of the Trojan horse has been practiced throughout history. The more dramatic devices of modern political warfare have included the following : propaganda to confuse and divide ; the support of minority groups and "fifth column" agents to disrupt the normal processes of the enemy state ; the encouragement of revolt to overthrow the existing government ; the use of sabotage to wreck industry and transport ; and the resort to assassination to remove key leaders and demoralize the population.

World War I. The most direct method of undermining the war production of an enemy country — or of a neutral country supplying an enemy — is through sabotage, or the destruction of machinery or materials. During World War I the German government employed a vast network of secret agents in America whose chief job was to sabotage production intended for the Allied powers. The Germans were blamed — probably rightly — for hundreds of mysterious explosions and fires throughout the United States ; the most famous explosion, that on Black Tom Island, near the Statue of Liberty, resulted in an estimated loss of 30,000,000.²⁶ These and other instances of sabotage by the Central Powers were a major factor in turning American public opinion against Germany — an example of political warfare boomeranging.

The ultimate triumph of the Allies was in part due to their effective waging of political warfare. Through British control of the cable lines and

²⁶ John Price Jones and Paul Merrick Hollister, *The German Secret Service in America, 1914-1918* (Small, Maynard, 1918) ; see also Henry Landau, *The Enemy Within* (Putnam, 1937).

through lurid atrocity stories the Allies won their greatest political victory of the war : obtaining the active participation of the United States on their side. Many other factors were, of course, involved. During the last year of the conflict the Allies capitalized on the propaganda value of Wilson's Fourteen Points — particularly the one on "self-determination." Numerous agreements were entered into with the slavic peoples of Austria-Hungary, and these led to the establishment of "governments in exile," desertions at the front to the Allies, and the eventual disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Another notable success of Allied political warfare was the negotiation of the so-called "secret treaties," aimed at building a winning alignment against the Central Powers. By this means Italy was detached from the Triple Alliance and brought into the war on the side of the Allies.

The Nazi Assault on Austria. A great deal might be written on political warfare during the years between the two world wars. This might include the efforts of the Allies to bolster and encourage the counter-revolutionary forces in Russia ; the worldwide agitation of the Comintern, including the promotion of uprisings in Bavaria, Saxony, Hungary, and China ; the assassination of French Prime Minister Barthou in 1934 and of Leon Trotsky in 1940 ; the intervention of Fascist and Communist forces in Spain ; and the Nazi penetration of Latin America. Here, however, we shall briefly describe only the dramatic Nazi assault on Austria, a notable instance of political warfare.

Even before Hitler assumed power Austria had her own Nazi party, which by 1930 numbered a million members. The Austrian Nazis maintained a close liaison with their comrades in Germany, using German propaganda, funds, and tactics. Hitler regarded them as members of his own party who would fight with him to return Austria to the Greater Reich. In July, 1931, he appointed his hatchet man, Theo Habicht, special "Inspector of Austria." After Hitler's assumption of power in 1933 the connection between the two Nazi organizations was no longer disguised. German newspapers began printing "evidence" of mistreatment of the Austrian Nazis, German stations broadcast a deluge of anti-Austrian programs, and German airplanes dropped propaganda leaflets in flights over the Austrian border. In July 1934, the Nazis planned to dispose of Chancellor Dollfuss and set up a government under Habicht and Rintelen. The *putsch* was soon put down : Theo Habicht, who ordered Dollfuss killed, went to the scaffold shouting "Heil Hitler !" The Austrian Nazi Party was outlawed.

By 1938 the Nazis were ready to try again. This time their plan was a model of thoroughness. Before it had been executed in March, 1938, the secretary-general of the Austrian Nazi Party, one Dr. Tavs, had outlined it in writing. Here is what he had to say :

At the beginning of March, 1938, a sudden wave of terrorism will break out over Austria. Acts of violence will be committed everywhere. Simultaneously, infernal machines will explode along the principal railway lines.

Immediately after, leaflets will be distributed announcing to the whole of Austria, but especially to foreign countries, that the Austrian Communists are the instigators of this terrorism. It will be described as a visible symbol of the deep-rooted indignation and hostility of the working classes against Dr. Schuschnigg's government. These "communist" pamphlets are intended to prove that Austria is faced with an imminent Bolshevik uprising. Further acts of terrorism, more particularly a staged attack upon the German legation, will confirm this impression.

At the moment when serious breaches of public order have reached their culmination, Austrian S.A. and S.S. will come forward. Collisions will occur between Nazis, on the one side, and paid *agents-provocateurs*, on the other. The world must be made to think that Austria is on the brink of a terrible civil war. At that moment pressing demands will be made for the immediate removal of the veto on the Nazi party and for sanction to be given to its militant section, on the ground that the Nazis are willing to help the State defend itself against a Bolshevik attack. Simultaneously, the Nazis' confidence-men in the army, police and *gendarmarie* will persuade their comrades that it is futile to proceed against the Nazis, even if the Schuschnigg government gives the order to do so. They will explain that armed intervention in Austria by the Third Reich is at hand and that the "Austrian Legion" will actually at the same time march on Austria in five columns. The invasion of the "Austrian Legion" will be covered by divisions of armored cars. Berlin will tell the world that intervention is necessary in order to prevent Germans from shedding German blood in Austria.²⁷

Germany and World War II. Simultaneously with her preparations for war Germany made elaborate plans for political warfare. In World War II, as in the previous war, she tried to prevent the United States from aiding or joining the Allies. To this end the Germans employed disruptive propaganda, especially rumors and lies; they created artificial movements and exploited genuine movements; they used bribery, blackmail, and threats. These activities had as their purposes the division of the American people by stirring up class, racial, and religious hatreds, the undermining of confidence in the Roosevelt Administration, the obstruction of preparations for war, and the creation of powerful Fascist groups to act as a fifth column." The German-American Bund, organized in 1936 by the German-American Fritz Kuhn, received generous assistance from the Nazis. When this collapsed the Nazis fomented trouble in America through supposedly "one hundred per cent American" organizations, supporting such groups as Father Coughlin's "Christian Front" and William Dudley Pelley's "Silver Shirts," and they tried to gain control of the powerful "America First Committee," a group originally organized by a young Yale student for the purpose of "defending America first." Nevertheless, Pearl Harbor brought about far greater unity in America than had been present in World War I. This act of treachery and a number of other factors—the

²⁷ Eugene Lennhoff, *The Last Five Hours of Austria* (Stokes, 1938), pp. 68-69.

loyal support of the war by Communists after the Nazi invasion of Russia, the fact that German-Americans had become American-Germans or Americans, and the anti-Nazi sentiments of many Germans living abroad — prevented Germany from repeating the political warfare successes of World War I in the United States.

The fall of France in 1940 attested to the internal weakness of that country as well as to the power of Germany's military machine, but political warfare was also an important contributing factor. Propaganda had been particularly effective in France because of the bitter party strife and the existence of strong pacifist elements. The "phony war" or "sitzkrieg" during the winter of 1939-1940 had given ample time for disillusionment and for the disintegration of morale, a process accelerated by Pierre Laval's urging of peace²⁸ and by the work of the Communists. Until June, 1940, industrial mobilization and war production were greatly slowed down by Communist workers.²⁹ Once the invasion of France began, Nazi fifth columnists started operating behind French lines, disrupting communications and directing German fire on troop concentrations. But "the defeat of the French forces was a military defeat";³⁰ courage was no substitute for tanks and airplanes and for vigorous leadership on the higher levels.

The Allies and World War II. The Western states gradually built up a war machine to match that of the Axis ; and at the same time they used political warfare with great success. In 1941, for instance, they supported a movement in Yugoslavia which overthrew the pro-German government and forced Hitler to declare war against Yugoslavia. In the following year the American representative in North Africa, Robert Murphy, organized a coup in Algiers which so embroiled the Vichy authorities that they were unable to prevent the landing of Allied forces. The invasion of Italy was skillfully coordinated with the announcement of an Italian armistice by Marshal Badoglio, Mussolini's successor, in order to hamper resistance.³¹ Support of the Free French and of other governments-in-exile, as well as of resistance movements in the various occupied countries, helped the Allies immensely. Representatives of the U. S. Office of Strategic Services and other Allied agents, operating mainly from Switzerland, were in constant touch with dissident elements inside Nazi Germany. They gave tangible support to the movement which led to the abortive attempt on Hitler's life in 1944, and they had some success in their efforts to weaken German morale, especially during the last months of the war when the military situation of Germany was obviously deteriorating.³²

After World War II. One of the most portentous developments of the postwar era has been the absorption of a large number of countries into the Soviet orbit. The changes in the political orientation of the governments of Eastern Europe came about through no accident, coincidence,

²⁸ J. P. T. Bury, *France, 1814-1940* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1949), p. 291.

²⁹ Andre Maurois, *Why France Fell* (London, 1941), p. 52.

³⁰ Bury, p. 294.

³¹ Lerner, pp. 326-328.

³² See Allen W. Dulles, *Germany's Underground* (Macmillan, 1947).

or spontaneous "peoples' movements"; they were the results of well-planned Soviet political warfare. In every case the general pattern of political conquest has been the same. First the Communist Party of a given country convinced the other parties that some sort of coalition government should be formed. Once this was done, the Communists saw to it that they received key positions in the department of the interior, enabling them to gain control of the police force. Finally came the coup in which Communists seized control of the government and, with a Communist-dominated police force and with a Soviet army usually nearby, there was little resistance.

In recent drives in Southeast Asia and the Near and Middle East the Communists have attempted to stimulate revolutions; and they have skillfully exploited native feelings of anti-imperialism and nationalism in order to do so. Clever Soviet propaganda, abounding in all sorts of mass appeals, with thousands of well-trained Communist agitators and organizers, plus ample funds and materials, adds up to a powerful "cold war" machine—one that works best in underdeveloped, dependent, or "exploited" countries.

While slowly extending and consolidating her sphere of influence, the Soviet Union has not neglected the "cold war" against the Western nations. Communists in Western Europe have pointed to the economic dislocations of the postwar period to support their pleas against huge military expenditures. They use the possibility of profitable trade with the countries behind the "iron curtain" as a lever in the attempt to pry allies away from the United States. The most successful maneuver of the Soviet Union to weaken America was an unusual type of political warfare. This was the Korean War, which proved expensive to the United States in men and materials while placing no great burden on the Soviet Union.

Admittedly, the United States and the other Western democracies have two great handicaps in their struggle against aggressive communism. One of these, as we have noted, consists of the restraints on political warfare imposed by the principles of free government. The other is the lack of coordination among themselves. Nevertheless, they also have immense resources: stable and popular governments, natural wealth, technological skills, and a developing consciousness of the imperatives of the situation. Fortified by these, they are moving to defend themselves. They are employing some of the techniques of political warfare, but they do so not to destroy other states but to reduce the potentialities of some states for aggressive action.

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Economic Instruments of.....6

National Policy

States differ greatly in the measure of control that they impose on economic activities within their borders and on their economic relations with other states. Under totalitarian regimes the control may be almost complete. In democratic states a very considerable freedom may normally be permitted. Both control and freedom are policies consciously adopted by states in pursuit of the national interest.

A state may adopt economic policies designed to promote its domestic welfare without having any intention to injure another state. A protective tariff may be levied to encourage home manufactures, and adulterated goods may be excluded to protect the public health. But a state may also adopt economic policies clearly intended to injure another state. Because every state is in some degree dependent on other states — because it must import or export or both — it is to some extent responsive to pressures which other states may bring to bear on it, just as it may itself bring pressures to bear on other states. Whenever economic policies are shaped to promote national ends — whether or not they are intended to injure other states — they are economic instruments of national policy.

Economic instruments are in constant use in furtherance of national policy. In times of peace all states have objectives which must be pursued whenever possible, such as raising the standard of living, promoting foreign sales, expanding employment, conserving natural resources, advancing technology, and improving health. Economic instruments may also be used when a state is preparing to go to war or is fearful of being attacked. It may wish to conserve certain goods and to stockpile others, or it may seek to impede the war preparations of the threatening state or states. Finally, war itself changes the nonviolent conflict of “near war” into a struggle that calls into play all the resourcefulness of the state in mobilizing its economic power as well as its military power. The state may then resort to the most drastic economic controls in order to husband its own resources and to reduce the war-making effectiveness of the enemy.

"Economic weapons" must not be assumed to mean the weapons of "economic warfare." Many of the operations of full-scale war are aimed at the destruction of the economic assets of the enemy : factories, railroads, harbors, warehouses, supplies, dams, power installations, ships, and the like. Some writers call this destruction "economic warfare,"¹ but the instruments employed are obviously military rather than economic. Indeed, in this sense much of modern warfare is economic. Economic instruments, on the other hand, are nonviolent in nature : they represent manipulations of a state's economic policy in an effort to advance the national interest. They reflect policy choices which lie within the right of the state under the law of peace, although their use may of course lead to reprisals and to armed conflict.

Economic instruments may serve either good purposes or bad ones ; they may be used to secure desperately-needed markets or to relieve widespread unemployment or, on the other hand, they may be used to establish foreign control, as during the rise of the "new imperialism," or to expand the power of an aggressor, as in Nazi Germany. Much as we may rail against "nationalistic" economic policies, we have not the means to distinguish between what a state ought to do in legitimate furtherance of its national interests and what, in the interest of a sound international economy and a regime of "live and let live," it ought to refrain from doing. The issues are highly subjective.

In our discussion of the economic instruments of national policy we shall first sketch the evolution of the international economy down to World War II. We shall see that at times states have carried on their trade relations with comparative freedom but at other times have imposed formidable barriers against each other. Next we shall see that the very nature and motivations of world trade reveal an interdependence that makes it possible for individual states to disturb the entire international economy through nationalistic practices. It is, of course, the *international* character of the modern economy that makes all states vulnerable to economic weapons in the hands of other states. Finally, we shall describe some of the more important economic instruments that are at the disposal of states which have the will and the strength to use them.

THE RISE AND DECLINE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE

The modern period of world trade may be dated from about 1800. At that time foreign trade began to expand rapidly in volume and the export of capital greatly increased. Perhaps the most important of the factors accounting for this growth was the development of industrialism in response to power technology. Other factors were the American Revolution and, somewhat later, the Wars of Independence in Latin America, which

¹ For instance, David L. Gordon and Roden Dangerfield in *The Hidden Weapon* (Harper, 1947).

and nationalistic. Backward areas received the gains and suffered the losses of imperialism. The century between Waterloo and Sarajevo was without a major international war. Two authorities have summarized the state of affairs as follows : "Until 1914 the international economy was organically so integrated that prices of goods and services and the financial side of the national economies in general harmonized fairly well with the distribution of real resources and the composition of national output. Change was orderly and gradual, and in the main it was toward higher living standards within a world possessing a common ideology."³

Effects of World War I. Economic historians are not in agreement on whether the world economy had begun to unravel by 1914, but unravel during the war it certainly did. "The war," say Professors Buchanan and Lutz, "tore a gaping rent in the intricate fabric of the international economy that hasty stitching in the twenties and extensive patching in the thirties quite failed to mend."⁴ It disrupted the old competitive economy. The blockade, government controls and purchasing, inter-Allied coordination, concentration on military production, the enforced liquidation of foreign investments, huge inter-Allied loans and credits, new taxes, and many other manipulations of finance and trade all operated to throw the international economy completely out of gear. The peace and the postwar years brought other obstacles to impede the return to "normalcy" : the job of restoring the ruined industries and lands of the battle areas ; reparations and the shackling of German productivity ; enormous war debts and woefully unbalanced national budgets ; low consumer purchasing power and unemployment ; the scarcity of food and raw materials ; inflation ; capital shortages ; a wrecked transport system ; and a Europe that needed desperately to buy but had too little to sell.

In a sense the interwar period can be divided into two parts. From 1918 to 1930 states sought to restore the economy in the image of that which had existed before the war. After the onset of the Great Depression they turned from essentially negative measures to drastically positive ones. The result was the economic nationalism that must be accounted one of the major underlying causes of World War II. It is still with us in the postwar years.

The concentration of gold holdings in the United States and the inflation of European currencies seriously disturbed the operation of the international gold standard ; and they made it increasingly difficult for European countries to control their fluctuating exchange rates. The United States, little affected by the war, tried to pretend that nothing had changed. She sought to revive her trade ; she loaned money ; she expected repayment. It worked for a while, and Americans lived high ; but "when the gong sounded the close of business on the New York Stock Exchange on October 29, 1929, it signaled more than the loss of thousands of

³ Norman S. Buchanan and Friedrich A. Lutz, *Rebuilding the World Economy* (Twentieth Century Fund, 1947), p. 36.

⁴ Buchanan and Lutz, p. 27.

personal fortunes : it signaled the end of a superficial effort to reassemble a global economy that had been deeply scarred and damaged.”⁵

The Great Depression. The United States could hardly be blamed for the Great Depression, but she could not avoid responsibility for certain unwise steps that were taken to meet the emergency. Outstanding among these was the passage of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 the highest tariff ever imposed by the United States and the highest tariff in the world at the time, approached only by that of Spain. Furthermore, the United States, unlike Spain, was a powerful creditor nation, in a unique position to exert an influence for good or ill in international economic relations. Her deliberate ignoring of the recommendations of the World Economic Conference of 1927 on the lowering of tariffs, and of the protests of leading American economists, had most unhappy consequences. “Such action,” warned over a thousand American economists in a statement protesting the proposed tariff bill, “would inevitably provoke other countries to pay us back in kind by levying retaliatory duties against our goods,” and “would inevitably inject a great deal of bitterness into our international relations.”⁶

Put into nontechnical language, the basic difficulties of the early 1930's were three : productive capacity so far exceeded purchasing power that some goods were sold on credit and some factories worked at less than full capacity ; the free price system could not bring prices down to those of countries that had suffered a serious deflation ; and investment capital sought short-term speculative gains as a consequence of the general political instability. Frantically, states fell back on the traditional nostrums—liquidation, lower prices, wage reductions, and credit restrictions—but with little effect on their sagging economies. Furthermore, as people lost faith in the futile and essentially negative programs of their governments, they observed the apparent success of authoritarian regimes in stabilizing their economies. Russia and Germany appeared to worry little about deficit financing and adverse trade balances, and they seemed to have little unemployment. In those states the government took matters into its own hands and “bent the price system to its iron will with subsidies, quotas, state enterprise and an outburst of deficit financing.” Other states, desperately seeking to rehabilitate their national economies, felt driven to do through state controls what they had not been able to do by ecoxing and pump-priming. The same urgency that impelled free-enterprise America to accept the “socialism” of the New Deal drove all democratic states into economic nationalism.

When a state undertakes to control the domestic economy, it is forced willy-nilly into restrictions on foreign trade. To sustain prices and encourage industry it must protect both against foreign competition. When it tries to promote exports and at the same time restrict imports, it soon faces countermeasures by other states and is often forced to use many of the conventional weapons of economic warfare and to improvise new ones.

⁵ Buchanan and Lutz, p. 30.

⁶ The text of this statement is given in the *New York Times*, May 5, 1930.

Furthermore, it will to some extent take account of ideological differences, for governments, unlike private trades, have both economic and political objectives, and they cannot wholly separate the two. Trade thereupon takes on a political complexion which further compromises the international economy. Finally, since trade is no longer generally free it comes increasingly to rest upon explicit agreement ; it presumes an understanding which is most easily made by two parties, thus fostering bilateralism, as against the multilateralism that is fundamental to a sound world economy.

New State Controls. Increasing economic difficulties during the Great Depression led one nation after another to impose restrictions upon imports and exports by such devices as quotas, licenses, clearing agreements and higher tariffs. Even Britain, the traditional home of free trade, yielded in 1932 to the demands of the Dominions for imperial preferences. In general this system was based on lower tariffs within the Empire-Commonwealth and higher tariffs on products from other countries. There were many attempts to organize economic "blocs" in the 1930's and early 1940's usually on regional lines. Nazi Germany built up such a bloc in Southeastern Europe ; instead of being an arrangement among equals, it was designed to promote German autarky. Japan tried to use her economic as well as her military power to further her aspirations in Manchuria and later in all of East Asia. Argentina took the initiative in plans to create a regional trading bloc in a large part of South America ; one result of this effort was the River Plate Conference of 1941, "the first meeting of its kind ever held in South America,"⁷ at which representatives of Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Paraguay, and Uruguay considered regional economic interests.

There can be little doubt that the economic plight of Germany accounted in large part for the success of the National Socialist Party. Before 1930 the Nazis had relatively little political strength ; they were definitely a minority protest group. In the elections of 1930, however, held as the pinch of worldwide depression was beginning to be felt, the Nazis won 107 seats in the Reichstag, an increase of no less than 95. Less than three years later Adolf Hitler was Chancellor of the German "Republic" and within a few months the Nazis were in complete control. Even before these portentous events took place, Germany had been forced to resort to emergency financial measures. The moratorium on all intergovernmental debts, proposed by the President of the United States, Herbert Hoover, in 1931, came too late to be of much financial or even psychological value. The economic crisis in Germany deepened, and in the gathering darkness the Nazis stole into power.

The Decline of Trade. One of the many unhappy consequences of the mounting restrictions on trade and other adverse economic trends, such as the disastrous fall in prices, was a serious decline in international trade. According to a League of Nations report, the total value of world trade, estimated at 68.6 billion dollars in 1925, had fallen to 24.1 billion dollars by

⁷ John C. Campbell, "Nationalism and Regionalism in South America," *Foreign Affairs*, XXI (Oct., 1942), 140.

1933. Later in the decade the value rose appreciably, but much of this was due to the rearmament effort of the major powers and to the rise in prices which resulted from increased military budgets. World War II, of course, completely altered the pattern of international trade, thus carrying into the postwar period the struggle between economic nationalism and the ideal of a relatively free world trade.

THE BASIS AND NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE

Trade occurs among nations "precisely because there are differences in costs of production between the various countries."⁸ Some commodities or goods cannot be produced in particular countries at all ; they can be produced in other countries only at a comparatively high cost ; and they can be produced in still other countries at a comparatively low cost. Consequently, the first group of states must trade rather than produce ; and the second group finds it advantageous to trade rather than produce ; and the third group sees that it can obtain goods which it cannot produce, or which it can produce only at high cost, by selling its cheaply-produced goods to the states where production of those goods is more costly or perhaps impossible. Since the natural endowments of countries differ, as do other factors of production, the classification of states into these three groups differ in respect to specific products.

The Factors of Production. Perhaps the most obvious difference among states in the factors of production is in natural resources and geographic position. Some states are rich in minerals, fertile soil, natural flora and fauna, climatic advantages, and general topographic amenability, or in some of these assets ; other states are poor in some or even virtually all of them. In some states labor is abundant ; in others it is scarce and relatively expensive. For historic or natural reasons, or a combination of them, some states have a high proportion of skilled labor ; in others the proportion is low. For similar reasons, the working population of some states may have special aptitudes, as the silver workers of Mexico, the textile makers of Guatemala, and the precision-instrument workmen of Switzerland. Advanced countries, with ample capital, are able to develop and maintain industrial processes unknown to underdeveloped states. One producing state may be located near populous areas and potential markets, whereas some states, favorably situated in other respects, may be unable to bear the added burden of transportation. Collectively these factors are of tremendous importance because, to repeat our point, "*fundamentally, international trade occurs because of international differences in costs.*"⁹

From this it seems to follow that from a purely economic point of view a country will profit most when it specializes in the area of its greatest comparative advantage. When a particular country enjoys no such ad-

⁸ Walter Krause, *The International Economy* (Houghton Mifflin, 1955), p. 4.

⁹ Krause, p. 6. Italics in the original.

vantage over every other state, it must fall back on the rule that its greatest economic gain will come from specialization in those products in which it is burdened with the least comparative disadvantage.

Obstructions to Specialization. Despite the theory of international production, states often specialize only to a limited extent and at times they seek to specialize in areas in which they are at a substantial natural disadvantage. Three of the factors limiting specialization are of particular importance.

For one thing, the cost of transportation, already mentioned, may operate to change a lower comparative production cost to a higher comparative delivered cost. For another, many industries are subject to the law of diminishing returns. In other words, after a certain output has been reached the per-unit cost of additional production may rise to the point where comparative disadvantage begins. The added cost may appear with the opening of new mines, the construction of new factories, the fertilization or irrigation of new land, the importation or training of additional technicians or workers, or the borrowing of needed capital.

The third factor, and the one which here concerns us most, is the employment of economic devices in the implementation of national policy. These may include the tariffs, bounty systems, dumping exchange controls, cartels, intergovernmental commodity agreements, and many other impediments to the operation of the natural law of supply and demand. Practices of this sort give rise to charges of "economic nationalism"—that is, to charges that states are using the control of economic policy to gain for themselves a share of the world's income that would go to other states if the international economy were permitted to operate on a more freely competitive basis. Such practices are therefore alleged to be "unfair," "selfish," "arbitrary," and "aggressive."

International Trade and the American Economy. The United States is now one of the few states in the world that approach self-sufficiency. In spite of the assumptions of bombastic American champions of the free enterprise system, nature is largely responsible for this. She has given the United States a stimulating climate, great expanses of fertile soil, vast mineral resources, adequate rainfall, favorable geography, and the attractions to lure resourceful and vigorous people from all parts of the world, but chiefly from Europe. Added to a great political heritage from England, these gave Americans so much more to work with and for — and be it remembered that they have been willing to do both — that they would have been degenerate indeed if they had not built a rich and powerful nation. For the same reason that Chileans are reported to say that "God is Argentine," millions of the people the world over may feel that "God is American." More thoughtful and humble Americans understand this.

For all the beneficence of nature, the United States is not self-sufficient. She imports all of her consumption of several vital minerals, more than three-fourths of her needs in such basic minerals as tin, chromite, mica, asbestos, manganese, platinum, antimony, and cobalt, and from a fourth to

three-fourths of her requirements in additional minerals, as, for instance, mercury, aluminum, lead, copper, tungsten, zinc. Among heavy imports of nonminerals are bananas, cocoa, coffee, tea, rubber, silk, newsprint, wool, jute and Manila fibers, and medicinals. The list might be extended. "The crux of the matter is that the United States does not import an *average* of 4 per cent of *every* item it uses, but it imports *all* or a *large proportion* of some *particular* items."¹⁰

Imports provide about 4 per cent of the American national income and exports about 5 per cent. These figures may seem trifling especially when compared with the Netherlands' 48 and 46, Japan's 38 and 24, Britain's 26 and 20, Canada's 23 and 23, and France's 15 and 15. But America must export if she is to import, and she must export to sustain certain domestic industries, such as those related to the production of rice, wheat, cotton, dried fruits, and tobacco, as well as the automotive, agricultural machinery, and machine tool industries. In these the export figure is not 5 per cent of production but often 30 or 40 per cent or more.

American foreign trade may also be appraised in terms of jobs for Americans. As long ago as 1947 a House Committee on Foreign Affairs calculated that the number of jobs within the country attributable to exports was in excess of 3,350,000. In a number of major industries the percentage was between 10 and 20. With the United States the situation may not be, as with some countries, "trade or die," but foreign trade nevertheless means added comforts to virtually all Americans and a decent livelihood for several millions. Beyond this there is an international aspect. The American national income is now about one-half of the world's total ; and the world economy as a whole is quite dependent upon the American economy. When the Great Depression shattered American prosperity it also destroyed the prosperity of many other countries. Between 1929 and 1932 American imports dropped by about 69 per cent, and exports fell in an almost identical ratio.

World Prosperity and National Policy. The economic interdependence of states is the basic premise of persons who urge the establishment of "One World" in form as well as its recognition in fact. However questionable may be their prescription, they are correct in their diagnosis. "No country," says one authority, "is now economically independent ; in the long run it needs trade with the rest of the world in order to survive."¹¹ He adds that "no country, not excluding Russia . . . commands all the economic factors in sufficient amounts to assure its independence." Some countries would face disaster if cut off from outside food supplies for their people or from raw materials for their industry ; some would be ruined if they could not export manufactured goods or raw materials ; and others would remain backward and primitive for generations if they could not import capital for the development of their natural resources.

¹⁰ Krause, p. 22. Most of the statistics in this section are taken from Krause. Italics in the original.

¹¹ Eulengurg, p. 200.

From this interdependence it is common practice to reach the facile conclusion that the use of economic controls as instruments of national policy ought to be abandoned forthwith. Certain difficult questions must be answered, however, before the careful student of international relations can be brought to believe that free trade would lead easily to improved well-being everywhere. In the first place, some states appear to be so dependent on one or a few products that their prosperity hinges on the maintenance of prices. Thus Bolivia relies on tin, Brazil on coffee, Chile on copper, Cuba on sugar, Indonesia on rubber and tin, Pakistan on cotton and jute, Thailand on rice and rubber, and a number of states in the Near East on oil; and the United States apparently takes this attitude toward a number of her agricultural products. In the second place, how is a state to determine at what point it should forego assistance to domestic interests? At what point is the balance of the internal economy disturbed? At what point the international economy? When do economic considerations give way to political ones? Finally, how do we answer that recurrent question: how to get eighty or ninety sovereign states to accept what some or most of them believe to be for the best interests of all?

Most persons deeply concerned with the effect of national measures on world prosperity and world peace believe that some modest controls must be available to underdeveloped and one-product states; but in general they are convinced that the best interests of most states would be served by a drastic modification of nationalistic economic practices. Although this judgment appreciably limits the area within which these practices may be pursued, it still leaves room for a great many subjective appraisals.

THE ECONOMIC ARSENAL

Before looking at economic instruments we should understand a number of conditions that may accompany their use. First, although these are usually employed by the government of a state, some of them—or at least some forms of them—may be used by persons within a state without actual participation by the government itself. Thus cartels may be controlled to the advantage of one state by private groups within the state, and informal boycotts may be imposed by an aroused public. Second, economic coercion may be used for ends that are essentially political rather than economic. Arms embargoes and economic sanctions are familiar examples. Third, the devices of economic pressure are often so intimately interrelated that the use of one leads to the use of another and then still another and so on. Moreover, when directed toward a particular state they invite retaliation, with the result that economic warfare may ensue. Finally, some but not all economic instruments become useless in time of actual war; others become much more important. Thus protective tariffs or export bounties become useless in the face of an effective naval blockade, whereas pre-emptive buying and the taking over of enemy assets are commonly employed only in time of war or of near-war crisis.

1. The Tariff

Definitions. A customs tariff is a duty or tax imposed upon imported or exported goods. Duties on exports are uncommon ; in the United States they are prohibited by the Constitution—a provision originally insisted upon by the Southern states to prevent the burdening of their great staples. The first duties on imports, levied in ancient times, were devised to provide state revenue. A tariff imposed for this purpose is known as a revenue tariff ; one designed to protect domestic industries against foreign industries is called a protective tariff. States may impose some duties for revenue and others for protection, and the same tariff may serve both purposes. Generally speaking, however, a tariff low enough to avoid discouragement of imports will yield more revenue than a higher, discouraging tariff, and an extremely high tariff may stop importation altogether. Protective tariffs first became important when the mercantilism of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries gave such a powerful impetus to economic nationalism. It is not too much to say that they have been a significant factor in power politics for more than two hundred years.

Purposes. Although it is conceivable that a tariff may operate to reduce the economic strength of a state—as when essential goods are kept out of a country or when the protection is so great that it encourages waste and inefficiency—tariff policy is usually formulated with the enhancement of the state's economic power in mind. Or it might be more accurate to say that theoretical considerations in behalf of the strengthening of the economy can always be advanced to support a tariff policy. A tariff for revenue requires only the positive justification of a need for income, but a protective tariff calls for further defense. It may be imposed to limit competition and protect domestic producers ; in this case the real motive may be increased profits for local industry, better wages or the promotion of manufactures to improve the economic position of the state in its relations with foreign states. If national well-being and security are the purpose, the tariff may afford a general protection or it may seek to foster a particular industry, as, for instance, when high tariffs were used after World War I to remedy the weakness which the war had revealed in the American chemical industry.

Tariffs may be used to strengthen the economy by discouraging the importation of luxury goods or encouraging the production of essential civilian goods or they may be used to advance military preparedness by adding to the profit margin on war goods. They may be used to discourage imports and thus conserve foreign exchange or reduce a balance of payments deficit. They may be used as an even more positive weapon of foreign policy through the enactment of high tariff schedules in order to give the state a position from which it might bargain, or through their use as an instrument of retaliation. High tariffs beget high tariffs, and it is a common occurrence to have one state try to breach the tariff wall of an-

other state by penalizing its export business. Tariffs and other restrictive devices that aim to further the prosperity of one country at the expense of another represent what is known as a "beggar-my-neighbor" policy. This "is not a game of solitaire ; it is as many-handed as there are governments concerned with their countries' foreign trade balances."¹² Its importance is further indicated by the fact that a revision of tariff policy has often been prescribed in the terms of peace following war.

Recent Trends. The general trend of tariff rates has been almost constantly upward since the early seventeenth century. During the first decades of the twentieth century the "free list" shrank more and more, rates continued to climb, and in the interwar period many of the larger states aspired to as much self-sufficiency as they could manage. The great Depression, with its unstable currencies and falling price levels, further encouraged the building of trade barriers. In 1932 Great Britain, the traditional stronghold of free trade, definitely adopted a policy of high tariffs, and in the same year she acceded to Dominion pressure for a system of preferential rates. The next year President Roosevelt's refusal to support the recommendations of the World Economic Conference in London wrecked all hopes for what had been a promising venture in international economic cooperation. Yet it was this same man's vigorous support of Secretary Cordell Hull's Trade Agreements Program that made possible the only genuine departure from a high tariff policy in recent American history. Some gains toward the relaxation of trade restraints were made elsewhere, notably in the Oslo Protocol of 1930, but the general trend toward economic nationalism was undeniable. World War II, like World War I, may be explained partly in terms of the economic policies which made effective political collaboration impossible.

The American Reciprocal Trade Agreements Program. Just as a tariff may be initiated or raised as a means of pursuing a national objective, it may be lowered or abolished to achieve the same general ends. The Trade Agreements Act passed by the United States Congress in June, 1934, was aimed at the promotion of American foreign trade through the adoption of a more liberal tariff structure, as well as at a number of other objectives. Because tariff reductions were conditioned upon equivalent concessions by other countries the program became known as the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Program. Agreements were to be negotiated on a bilateral basis, but the inclusion of an "unconditional most-favored-nation"¹³ clause made them in effect multilateral. The President was empowered to negotiate these agreements, with the new rates to be not more than 50 per cent higher or lower than those in effect. He could not transfer items from the free list to the dutiable list or from the dutiable to the free, and he was subject to some other restrictions. The Act, originally adopted for three years, has been renewed several times, with changes, but it

¹² Carroll and Marion Daugherty, *Principles of Political Economy*, 2 vols. (Houghton Mifflin, 1950), II, 1100.

¹³ For a definition of this term see Chapter 19, fn. 3.

is still in form a temporary measure. In 1947 an "escapeclause" was added and in 1948 a "peril-point" provision : these made it possible to protect adversely-affected American industries. The "peril-point" requirement was dropped in 1949. Later changes reflected growing opposition to the Program, but its main features have been preserved.

Although other factors have been involved, notably the implementation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) since 1947, the Trade Agreements Program has led to a reduction in the average tariff rates. Computed in terms of ratio of duties to the value of dutiable imports, the percentage dropped from 52.8 in 1933, to 37.3 in 1939, to 15.3 in 1947, and to 13.3 in 1952. Krause states that "about one-half of this apparent decline . . . was due to a rise in prices which lowered the ad valorem incidence of the specific rates of duty," but he concludes that "all factors considered, the operation of the trade-agreements program has contributed toward a substantial lowering of tariffs."¹⁴

Presumably the objectives of the Program have been the promotion of world trade, lower prices for American imports, the stimulation of American sales abroad, and the encouragement of solidarity in the Western Hemisphere, where the Program has been most emphasized.

2. International Cartels

Definition. A cartel may be defined as "an association of independent enterprises in the same or similar lines of business which exists for the purpose of exercising some sort of control over competition."¹⁵ It is spoken of as an international cartel "if the members are domiciled under more than one government or do business across national frontiers." It is not to be confused with a trust, a merger, a pool, a trading association, a corner, or a ring. The essence of a cartel is the contractual arrangement existing among independently owned businesses : "cartel," in fact, is derived from *charta*, meaning a contract. The purpose is to exert a monopolistic influence on the market, or, as cartel members prefer to put it, "to regulate the market." Its interest is usually in the seller's market, not the buyer's ; and it generally comes into being only when most of the enterprises which had been competing with each other agree to enter it. It may be a loose association based on informal understandings or a strong one based on explicit contractual agreements. The government of a state may participate, but it does not commonly do so. On the basis of the means by which cartels seek to influence the market, they may be divided into three general types : those which fix prices, those which limit production, and those which divide the sales territory. All have the objective of fixing prices. Beyond these three general types all sorts of combinations are possible, including

¹⁴ Krause, pp. 236, 238.

¹⁵ Charles R. Whittlesey, *National Interest and International Cartels* (Macmillan, 1946), p. 1. Used by permission of The Macmillan Company.

those allocating portions of a total fixed production, those using a central selling agency or syndicate, and those pooling and dividing all profits.

History. Something not unlike the modern cartel was used by certain industries and trading groups as early as the Middle Ages, and even more closely related organizations existed in England in the late eighteenth century and in Germany and France in the early nineteenth century, but the term itself did not come into common usage until the 1870's in Germany. The cartel movement reached its greatest development in Germany, and that country is still considered "the classic land of the cartel." A number of conditions help to explain this: the more favorable law respecting cartels; the closer government control of business; a strong German tendency toward mutual organization; and the slower trend toward corporate undertakings, itself a natural consequence of the diversities among the many German states.¹⁶ Cartels were eventually forbidden by law in England, the United States, France, Austria, and many other countries; they were encouraged in Germany and Italy, and at least tolerated in Russia, Spain, Rumania, and Norway.

German cartels of the 1870's are usually regarded as having sprung from the economic depression of the times, as an effort to prevent drastic cuts in prices. They flourished again during the two decades before World War I without benefit of the economic crisis in which they attained their first popularity. Set back by the war and the dislocations of the postwar period, they again became highly significant forces in world trade during the 1930's. According to a League of Nations estimate, at least 32 per cent of all international trade in 1937 was under some form of marketing control, but this calculation takes no account of the effect of cartels in restricting the volume of trade.¹⁷ Two years later, in 1939, the United States Department of Justice listed 179 international cartels, an enumeration incomplete because cartels are often highly secret arrangements.¹⁸ During World War II it was naturally expected that cartels would present a major problem for the years to come. To meet the expected challenge a group of economists collaborated to publish a little book entitled *A Cartel Policy for the United Nations*, already cited.¹⁹ Actually, the fears have been found to be exaggerated, as we shall see in our later chapter on economic nationalism in the post-World War II period.

Areas of Operation. Cartels are almost nonexistent in some industries, notably agriculture. They operate best in those in which mass production is possible and qualitative differences are unimportant, and in which exclusiveness is protected by patent rights. Ervin Hexner in his *Internation-*

¹⁶ Robert Liefmann, "Cartel," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* (Macmillan, 1937), III, 236. Used by permission of The Macmillan Company.

¹⁷ Corwin D. Edwards, Theodore J. Kreps, Ben W. Lewis, Fritz Machlup, and Robert Terrill, *A Cartel Policy for the United Nations* (Columbia University Press, 1945), p. 11.

¹⁸ Edwards and others, pp. 10-11.

¹⁹ See note 17 above.

tional Cartels presents about a hundred case studies of cartels, which he groups into eight categories : foodstuffs and related products, steel and ferro-alloys, non-ferrous metals, non-metallic minerals, raw materials not otherwise classified, chemical and pharmaceutical materials, other manufactured goods, and services.²⁰ Americans have been most conscious of the cartels in the chemical and electrical industries, and it is against these that they have directed much of their criticism

"The Wicked Cartellist." American public opinion is today definitely hostile to cartels or at least to the word "cartel." Professor Charles R. Whittlesey declares that "the word 'cartel' has become less a name than an epithet," and he quotes the editor of the London *Economist* as saying that in the United States "the wicked cartellist has taken the place of the wicked arms manufacturer in popular demonology."²¹ This aversion is by no means the exclusive property of the man in the street ; it is shared by some representatives of business, both big and small, and by such poles-apart thinkers as Henry A. Wallace and Eric A. Johnston. Suspicions that cartels are a weapon of Big Business might seem to be allayed by the resolutions of condemnation enacted by the National Association of Manufacturers.

Cartels and National Security. Although it may be contended that even free societies resort to cartel-like practices in time of war—as the United States certainly did in World War II—and therefore that free states themselves confess the inadequacy of the competitive system, two important weaknesses in this line of thinking must be pointed out. First, it assumes that maximum military power is the principal objective of the state, a condition that is rarely true. It does not even follow that maximum economic power is produced by wartime regimentation, but, as economic power is then secondary and as the two kinds of power are inseparable anyway, it does not matter what happens to economic power *per se*. Second, wartime integration merely utilizes the potentials accumulated during the years of peace ; generally speaking, it does not create them. It does not follow that they would have achieved equal vitality in a highly cartelized system.

Are international cartels a menace to world peace and a threat to American security ? The accusation here includes a number of more or less specific charges. First, cartels foster wars by dividing loyalties and creating a profit interest that rises above patriotism. Second, cartels can deprive a state of vital war materials by their restrictions on production and distribution. Third, cartels can be instruments of espionage and sabotage by serving as undercover agencies and by transmitting scientific information to potential enemies. Fourth, cartels may exploit third countries to the detriment of "legitimate" foreign investment interests. Fifth, cartels are the special tool of totalitarian states and therefore should be discouraged.²²

²⁰ University of North Carolina Press, 1945.

²¹ Whittlesey, p. 4

²² Whittlesey, pp. 36-54.

The threat of cartels to American security is the theme that runs through Joseph Borkin and Charles A. Welsh's *Germany's Master Plan : The Story of Industrial Offensive*.²³ The book is a scathing indictment of the whole system of cartels, and since its authors were men of established competence its conclusions must be seriously pondered. Summarized, these assert that "armed with patents, German cartels launched a shrewd and well-planned industrial offensive on a world scale. They laid siege to the business interests of the world, achieving conquests at a whole series of industrial Munichs, while the . . . industrial strength of the United Nations . . . drained away." And "if Germany keeps its cartel system it will be eternally armed for war even though we destroy every plane and tank that Hitler has built." The main target of *Germany's Master Plan* is the fabulous I. G. Farben Industries, which, with its vast physical plant of mines, factories, and railroads, its skilled research staff, its labor force of 350,000, its cartel agreements with powerful industries in other countries—including, in the United States, Standard Oil of New Jersey, Alcoa, Dow Chemical, E. I. duPont, Pennsylvania Salt, Hercules Powder, and Remington Arms—and its subordination of profits to nationalistic aims, became the driving power of the Nazi war machine. Its fields of operation were so broad and its range of products so vast that "the best-qualified investigators cannot name them all"; its functions were "as unlimited as the scientific application of physics and chemistry to raw materials."²⁴

Professor Whittlesey finds the accusations of *Germany's Master Plan* unconvincing. He believes that cartels may encourage international cooperation as well as exalt and arm nationalism, and that there was an understandable eagerness to charge against cartels the sins for which Nazism was responsible. He argues that cartels are two-way information channels. Admitting that the Germans gained valuable scientific information from American sources through cartels, he says that the United States also got vital information from Germany, and he points to the oil-hydrogenation process which led to a great expansion in the production of TNT and to a cut of 80 per cent in costs. He cites the opinion of American chemical manufacturers that the 'know-how' which the United States got from the Germans exceeded anything the Germans got from the Americans. Cartels, he believes, are merely instruments, usable for both good and bad purposes. National security, he says, "is perhaps the weakest ground on which to attack cartels."²⁵

A Cartel Policy. The leading American students of cartels seem to be in substantial agreement in holding that the United States should pursue an anti-cartel policy, with some basing their conclusions on security considerations and others on ideological ones. They appear to be in further agreement that a more precise formulation of policy is needed, that addi-

²³ Joseph Borkin and Charles A. Welsh, *Germany's Master Plan : The Story of Industrial Offensive* (Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1943). Copyright, 1943, by Joseph Borkin and Charles A. Welsh.

²⁴ Borkin and Welsh, p. 39.

²⁵ Whittlesey, p. 36.

tional research is required, and that we should judge cartels not *en masse* but on the facts as they pertain to particular commodities, practices, and circumstances. Moreover, as some writers insist, a cartel policy must be positive as well as negative, for "a let-business-alone policy leads to monopoly, not competition."²⁶

3. Intergovernmental Commodity Agreements

Definition. What is known as the intergovernmental commodity agreement is a device for assuring a particular state a definite share in the world market; it is always aimed at the protection of producers—never of consumers. It is entered into because of general overproduction in a specific commodity and to avoid the ruinous competition that may accompany a buyer's market. Such agreements may take a variety of forms; perhaps the most important are those which set up a buffer stock agency,²⁷ those which allot export quotas, and those which fix production quotas. When arrangements like any of these are set up by private interests, they are commonly regarded as cartels.

When a commodity is produced by more than one country, efforts by a single country to keep up world prices are usually foredoomed to failure. When one state restricts exports or limits production the producers of some other state will rush into the market. For this reason the Stevenson rubber restriction scheme of 1922, supported only by the British Empire, collapsed in the face of increased production in the Netherlands East Indies. A more effective agreement was concluded in 1934, subscribed to by producers of 90 per cent of the world's rubber. An American effort to bolster the domestic price of cotton only weakened the position of American producers in the world market; within ten years, 1928-1938, their contribution to foreign cotton consumption shrank from 47 per cent to 20 per cent.²⁸ Actually, surplus production, if it exists at all, is likely to embarrass all producing states, and unilateral efforts at control often lead to international commodity agreements.

Areas of Use. Intergovernmental controls in the past have applied to wheat, sugar, tea, coffee, beef, timber, tin, rubber, wool, cotton, and other primary commodities. That they have not been used with manufactured goods may require an explanation. Several points must be advanced: agricultural crops and minerals are far more standardized than manufactured goods; a country is far more likely to be dependent upon a single crop or a single mineral than upon a single manufactured product—hence the public welfare is more vitally concerned; industrial commodities are more

²⁶ George W. Stocking and Myron W. Watkins, *Cartels or Competition?* (Twentieth Century Fund, 1948), p. 380.

²⁷ Under the buffer stock scheme, an intergovernmental agency establishes a minimum price at which it will buy all of the commodity offered and a maximum price at which it will sell any amount wanted; the scheme entails no export or production quotas.

²⁸ Buchanan and Lutz, p. 263.

commonly produced by a few persons or interests—so few that they can readily combine in a private agreement, whereas the producers of minerals and particularly crops are so numerous that they can act effectively only through the government ; agricultural and mineral production respond more slowly to changes in short-term demand than does industrial production ; and, finally, by a kind of reverse Malthusianism, agricultural production is now increasing at a faster rate than the demand for agricultural products but at a slower rate than the demand for industrial products. All this means that certain minerals and agricultural products are specially suited to be the subjects of intergovernmental commodity agreements.

Proper Use. International agreements of this kind have escaped the bitter criticism that has been directed against cartels. In general, the judgment seems to be that they may serve a commendable purpose in some contingencies but must be carefully supervised, and that care must be taken lest they become permanent. The United States has participated in a number of such agreements, as in the Inter-American Coffee Agreement of 1940 and the International Wheat Agreement of 1949. Nevertheless, here and there warnings are sounded against them. One such warning comes from the Committee on Cartels and Monopoly of the Twentieth Century Fund, a private American research organization, which points to the danger of commodity agreements' becoming "not an umbrella for emergencies" but "a concrete shelter for permanent residence" for "inefficient producers." "The aim of commodity agreements," says the Committee, "should be to end the need for commodity agreements."²⁹ When they do not end with their legitimate purpose they become unwarranted barriers to international trade. Because they can be used as barriers, unwarranted or otherwise, they are potential instruments of national policy. Their use in the postwar period is discussed in Chapter 19.

4. Dumping

Definition and History. Dumping means the sale of goods for export at prices lower than those charged domestic buyers. Jacob Viner calls it "the foreign trade parallel of local price cutting in internal trade, as defined in American legal usage."³⁰ It first became a systematic and important trade practice about 1890, when it came into extensive use by German cartels and by the rising American trusts. The United States Steel Corporation, the International Harvester Company, and the Standard Oil Company had become leading practitioners of dumping by World War I.³¹ French, Belgian, Canadian, and, to a lesser extent, British concerns also resorted to systematic dumping. During the interwar period anti-dumping legislation and the

²⁹ Stocking and Watkins, p. 450.

³⁰ Jacob Viner, "Dumping," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* (Macmillan, 1937), V, 275. Used by permission of The Macmillan Company.

³¹ Viner, p. 275.

eventual stabilization of currencies operated to reduce its importance. Nor has it been a significant problem in the years following World War II. Quantitative estimates on dumping cannot be made with any confidence. Thirty years ago estimates for the United States ranged from one-half of one per cent to twenty per cent of the total exports of manufactured goods.³²

Purposes and Operation. Sporadic dumping may take place to move a temporary overstock, to build good will in a depressed market, to introduce a new commodity, to weaken or remove a competitor in the foreign market, or in retaliation against dumping in the producer's domestic market. Dumping may be used for the purpose of obtaining foreign exchange, as the Germans and the Japanese used it on the eve of World War II to finance their military preparations and presumably also to enlarge their factories, train skilled workers, and permit technological researches and experiments. Long-term dumping is practiced in order to enable the producer to gain the economies of large-scale production. Something approaching monopolistic control of the domestic market is almost necessary to long-term dumping, for only in the largest plants are fixed charges likely to be an important part of total production costs. Furthermore, tariffs are also a significant encouragement, as they help toward monopoly by giving protection against foreign competition. Perhaps most important are export bounties ; in fact, Viner says that "systematic long time dumping is not conceivable under competitive conditions in the absence of export bounties."³³

Effects. The net effect of dumping for the exporting country seems to be that it may stabilize production and maintain employment, it may induce an expansion in production facilities, and it may or may not reduce prices on the home market. For the importing country sporadic dumping may divert or ruin local competitive industries, more than offsetting the gain to consumers in the whole view of the state's economy. Long-term dumping may, of course, retard industrial maturity, and so may prevent the realization of the national economic potential.

5. Pre-emptive Buying

Definition. The purchase of goods in a neutral country to prevent their coming into the hands of the enemy is called pre-emption or pre-emptive buying ; "the whole substance of the principle of pre-emption lies in the diversion of supplies from the enemy irrespective of commercial considerations."³⁴ It may be employed when states are technically at peace but fearful of hostilities, but it would be nonsensical to buy "irrespective of com-

³² Jacob Viner, *Dumping : A Problem in International Trade* (University of Chicago Press, 1923), p. 93.

³³ Viner, "Dumping," p. 276.

³⁴ Paul Einzig, *Economic Warfare* (London, 1941), p. 49.

mercial considerations" except when national welfare may be served. Consequently, pre-emptive buying is peculiar to times of war and crisis. Stockpiling, no matter how great, is not in itself pre-emptive buying ; purchasing so qualifies only when controlled by the motive of depriving the enemy of needed goods.

World War II. Much earlier than the Allies, the Nazis revealed an awareness of the importance of pre-emption. Soon after World War II began, German agents in the Baltic and Balkan areas were given "unlimited resources" and instructed to buy at "any price obtainable and relieve the sellers of the problems of delivery" ; consequently, while the British haggled over prices and delivery schedules, worked with too little money, and persisted in all sorts of bureaucratic red tape, the Germans succeeded in "buying up everything worth having in the Balkans and in the Baltic States."³⁵ With the setting up of the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation in 1940 British buying practices improved, but political developments in the Balkans soon eliminated Hungary and Rumania from the market entirely and Yugoslavia in large part. The Nazis repeated their successes in Spain and Portugal, and Britain repeated her failures. Later the combined resources of Britain and the United States, plus Britain's hindsight wisdom, led the Allies to significant pre-emptive buying, especially in Spain, Sweden, Turkey, and Latin America.

Problems. Pre-emptive buying is by no means a simple and easy operation. Often the prices are driven to fantastic heights, domestic interests may intervene to obstruct a buying program, and, as in the case of Britain, price discrimination against one's own colonials may enormously complicate the problems. Further difficulties may appear respecting the availability of goods in the right currency and in the transport of purchased goods. Yet the gains of pre-emptive buying are so obvious that one may say that it has become a conventional weapon of true economic warfare.

6. Trade and Payments Agreements

Definition. Government participation in trade is largely a development of the past two decades. The Great Depression gave its impetus, for governments then sought desperately to find some way to reinvigorate the very sickly international trade. Sometimes they worked out agreements for the actual exchange or barter of particular commodities, usually on a bilateral basis, but more commonly they established credits in favor of each other, with these to be consumed by exports. If the exchange left a balance one way or the other, this would be liquidated by further trade or by payments in gold or foreign exchange. The actual buying and selling were usually carried on by private interests. Such was the common pattern of what we call bilateral trade agreements or — in the case of credit establishment—bilateral payments or clearing agreements.

³⁵ Einzig, pp. 51, 52.

Recent Use. The grip of governments on international trade was further tightened by the military demands of World War II ; actually during the war "practically all international trade was either carried on by governments or was strictly controlled by governments with respect to its amount, nature, and direction."³⁶ With the close of the war, shortages of foreign exchange, the breakdown in production and transportation, and the shortage of certain commodities, plus many political uncertainties, seemed to require that governments continue their controls over foreign trade. The United States tried to encourage a general return to a free economy, but economic and political conditions prevented anything like a hearty response to American urgings, even in the other democratic states. Instead, governments continued to rely on bilateral trade and payments agreements. Sometimes the agreements were multilateral, notably in the instance of the payments agreements engineered by Germany. Since all such arrangements can be utilized to reduce the share of outside countries in world trade, they can be significant instruments of discrimination.

7. Control of Enemy Assets

Definition. Most of the financial interests of foreign nationality in a particular state are owned by individuals, not by the foreign state as such. It is a state's seizure of these assets that is referred to as "control of enemy assets." These assets are usually in the form of credits, debts, funds on deposit, insurance policies, stocks and bonds, monetary claims, and patent rights, although, of course, they may be in ships, real estate, art treasures, or something else.

History. According to Edwin M. Borchard, confiscation of enemy assets was probably common until the thirteenth century, at which time these assets began to acquire a degree of immunity, often resting upon a reciprocal basis as provided for in treaties.³⁷ By 1914 the rule of immunity was "deemed impregnable" : it was "not the result of any outburst of humanitarian sentiment, but rested upon a sound development in political and legal theory which emphasized the essential distinction between private property and public property, between enemy owned property in one's own jurisdiction and in enemy territory, and between combatants and non-combatants."³⁸ The United States did not authorize the confiscation of enemy property in any war before October, 1917, when the Trading with the Enemy Act was passed. Even this was intended to set up a system of trusteeship rather than to legalize confiscation, but some of the practices actually used cannot be described except as confiscation. The Treaty of Versailles following World War I asserted the right of the Allied states to

³⁶ John Parke Young, *The International Economy* (Ronald, 1951), p. 366.

³⁷ Edwin M. Borchard, "Alien Property," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* (Macmillan, 1937), I, 636. Used by permission of The Macmillan Company.

³⁸ Borchard, p. 636.

appropriate German private property in all areas under their respective jurisdictions, with the proceeds of sale to be used to pay claims against Germany or her nationals, and with Germany to compensate her citizens for their assets thus confiscated. The other peace treaties had similar provisions. In practice the Allied states followed no common policy ; some compensated German nationals in full, some in part, and some not at all. The United States adopted a complicated program of conditional full restitution.

World War II. In 1940 the United States again invoked the legislation of 1917. On the day on which the Nazis invaded Denmark and Norway, President Roosevelt "froze" Danish and Norwegian assets in the United States. The purpose was to defend the interests of innocent neutrals rather than to deprive Hitler of potential gains; the assets of nationals of Axis states themselves were not frozen in the United States until more than a year later. Meantime, the freeze had been extended to the Low Countries, France, and the Balkan and Baltic states. When the United States entered the war, in December, 1941, the only new action required was prohibiting communication with the enemy territory and appointing an Alien Property Custodian to assume control of enemy assets.

The job of administering the controls was a sizable one. Two authorities have estimated that more than eight billions of dollars in assets were subject to freezing and that other transactions subject to control amounted to just as much more. Local banks and other financial institutions, already familiar with their clients' business, did most of the scrutinizing and checking. Probably the most serious problem was to distinguish between innocent neutral assets—which were to be free for use in legitimate trade—and Axis assets concealed behind foreign dummies. "Cloaking", as it was called, had become widespread among German firms long before the war. The usual form was to set up an establishment in a country likely to remain neutral, giving it a good front but no real authority and employing neutrals in the foreign agencies. I. G. Farben did this. Although the purpose of earlier cloaking may have been the evasion of taxes and controls at home, later cloaking "must have been known to the Nazi government, and tacitly approved or actively encouraged by them to camouflage German penetration and protect German interests from seizure or sanctions in the event of war."³⁹ The Alien Property Custodian uncloaked at least sixty German enterprises. The favorite sanctuaries for dummy companies were Switzerland, Liechtenstein, and Spain. That Americans are not above the use of cloaking for their own purposes, whatever those may be, is a conclusion that seems to be warranted by the fabulous tonnage of the merchant marine of Panama.

The "defrosting" of foreign assets is a trivial matter in an analysis of economic warfare ; it is something like collecting the scrap iron after a great battle. Complicated by the cloaking problem, it was handled during and after World War II largely by putting on the government of each liberated country the responsibility for safeguarding the welfare of its nationals.

³⁹ Gordon and Dangerfield, p. 146.

The snarls of private finances were baffling indeed ; they required the retention of some controls for several years after the close of the war.

8. Loans and Grants

Loans and gifts of all kinds—dressed up in a wide range of names and forms—date from many centuries ago, but they have become everyday occurrences in the modern world. The objective of the lender or donor may be specific or general, and the means taken to reach it may be direct or indirect. At times deals have been as bald as the purchase of military assistance, and at other times gifts have been as overtly without *quid pro quo* as disaster relief. Loans between governments almost always provide for the shipment of goods of a stated amount rather than the transfer of money or securities ; in such transactions the lending government is clearly promoting domestic industry, and it may be strengthening an ally or making a friend as well. Often the rate of interest—as with many American loans since World War I—has been so low as to constitute a partial gift. Postwar rehabilitation loans were significant and perhaps expected consequences of World War I and World War II. Sometimes the granting of a loan involves commitments to policy changes on the part of the borrower. The Anglo-American Financial Agreement of 1946 provided for a loan of \$3.75 billion at 2 per cent interest and a British promise to achieve full convertibility by July 15, 1947, if possible. The development of an acute dollar crisis in Britain prevented her from complying. The principal American foreign aid programs of recent years have included Lend-Lease, UNRRA, Truman Doctrine assistance, the Marshall Plan, the Mutual Security Program, including military assistance and Point Four, and Export-Import Bank loans. Most of these are discussed in Chapter 22.

States may also support international economic agencies for the purpose of advancing national interests—such, for instance, as the United Nations Technical Assistance Program, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary Fund, and the European Coal and Steel Community. The United States has not supported the Inter-American Bank that was projected at the Rio Economic Conference of 1954. She finally did agree to support the International Finance Corporation, under UN auspices, but only after early opposition, and she has not endorsed efforts to establish a Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED).

Some states have resorted to expropriation and repudiation, but these devices, although they have undoubted economic effects, are essentially political. In some instances they have amounted to nothing more than compulsory grants—that is, to confiscation. When handled by an honest government, expropriation can be an entirely ethical device similar to the exercise of eminent domain. Repudiation may be justified in very exceptional cases. Recent instances of expropriation include the acts of Mexico

in taking over the railway system in 1937 and the oil industry in 1938, Iran's nationalization of the British-owned oil industry in 1953, Guatemala's assumption of ownership of certain banana lands in 1953, and Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956. The most famous instance of repudiation in recent times occurred when the Bolshevik regime in Russia refused to assume the foreign debts incurred by the monarchy.

9. Exchange Controls

Nature. Exchange controls, which are invoked because a country's supply of foreign exchange is not equal to the demand, operate to establish a rationing system. If this is to be effective, the government or some designated control authority must have a complete or virtual monopoly of foreign exchange. The control authority receives the foreign exchange (all or perhaps a stipulated fraction) which is due the country's exporters for goods sold abroad. It also sells to importers the foreign exchange which they need for buying abroad. By putting the selling price high enough, it can curtail the demand to meet the supply, thus bringing imports into balance with exports. Moreover, by paying exporters for their foreign exchange according to a classified schedule, the control authority is able to stimulate certain exports and to discourage certain imports. There may be enough difference between buying and selling prices to pay the government a profit.

In addition to controlling trade and making a profit for the government, exchange controls may serve to prevent the flight of capital from a country, to maintain over-valued currencies, and to protect domestic programs by insulating a national economy. "It is because of this insulating effect that exchange control has long been a leading weapon in the economic arsenal of those countries which are committed to the idea of national planning."⁴⁰

Operation. The "sterling area"—those countries whose currencies are linked to the British pound—is far and away the most important user of exchange controls. It embraces about one-third of the world's population and conducts approximately one-half of the world's total volume of trade and finance.

As the operation of the sterling area is discussed in Chapter 23, we shall here illustrate the working of exchange controls by noting the system employed for nearly twenty-five years by Argentina, an even older user than the sterling area.

Exchange controls were instituted in Argentina in 1931 in response to two adverse developments; the dwindling of exchange reserves because of the Depression and monetary difficulties in Argentina's best customer, Great Britain, which produced an exchange-rate instability between the pound and the peso. The Argentine system, which featured a multiple exchange rate and the co-existence of a controlled exchange market and

⁴⁰ Krause, p. 163.

a free exchange market, was substantially modified in December, 1955, following the overthrow of Perón.

All of Argentina's major exports are handled through the controlled exchange market. The exchange which comes into the country is held by the government, which compensates the exporter at one of nine rates, depending upon the product exported. In practice most exchange receipts are converted at one of three rates. Most of the leading exports, including beef, wheat, and corn, are converted at the "basic export rate" of 5.00 pesos per dollar. Others, generally those more difficult to market, are converted at the "preferential export rate" of 7.50 pesos. Still others, limited in volume, are converted at the "free" rate of 13.95 pesos. This means that the exporter of products classified under the second of the three rates is, in effect, paid a 50 per cent subsidy as a means of encouraging the export of goods in that class. Exporters under the 13.95 classification are paid an even larger subsidy. The "free" rate is so designated because free market transactions take place at that figure. These involve only exchange derived from specific sources—tourist receipts, ocean freights, and imports of capital—and represent one-fifth or less of the country's foreign transactions.

Foreign exchange is sold to importers at one of three rates. Exchange for preferred imports (coal, coke, fuel oil, and crude petroleum) may be bought at the rate of 5.00 pesos for a dollar. Exchange for "essential imports" is priced at 7.50 pesos per dollar, and for nonessential and luxury imports at 13.95. By these differentials the importation of essential goods is promoted while the importation of luxuries is discouraged.

Since Argentina is an important trading country, and since most of the foreign exchange is purchased at the 5.00 rate and sold at the 7.50 rate, the government has realized a handsome profit. Under a free economy, of course, this profit would have gone to domestic producers and traders. The income which the government has derived has been used "in part to service or purchase foreign investments held within the country, and in part to finance new domestic projects without having to rely upon borrowed funds, either foreign or domestic."⁴¹

OTHER ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS

Subsidies. Subsidies are payments made to encourage production at home or sales abroad. Although their net effect on international commerce is the same as that of tariffs, they have advantages in special situations. Thus subsidies have been used to promote the expansion of the American merchant marine, an objective that would be hard to achieve by means of the tariff. They also forestall the grant of special tariff concessions that may have been agreed to in a preferential agreement, and,

⁴¹ Krause, p. 185. This discussion of exchange controls in Argentina is based on Krause, pp. 181-185.

strange as it may seem, they have been used by the United States to prevent the growth of an embarrassing surplus in the Treasury, as in the sugar bounty in the McKinley Act of 1890. "A subsidy may be thought of as a weapon of offense in international economic rivalry or warfare, whereas a protective tariff is a defensive weapon."⁴² As an offensive weapon, subsidies facilitate dumping, which a tariff could not do.

Quotas and Licenses. When a government wishes to impose a more direct control over imports it may use the quota system. By this it may fix a quota on each country separately or it may establish an over-all or global quota. The purpose may be to protect domestic producers or to make sure that imports do not exceed exports—that there is no unfavorable balance of trade. It has been increasingly used during the past twenty years to keep the total value of imports within predetermined limits. The use of quotas in export trade is limited to wartime, when it reduces the amount of goods which a neutral may buy to transship to an enemy of the exporting state. Perhaps the most rigid control over imports is attained by the licensing system. When this is in force each new importation of goods requires a separate license, and thus the government can effect a continuous limitation to accord with the state's changing economic position. As quota and licensing systems are an even more overt interference with the flow of trade than tariffs, they are more likely to invite retaliation. Nevertheless, they were used in increasing measure during the interwar years, with France perhaps the leading practitioner.

The United States uses the quota system in a limited but important way. Having adopted the principle of domestic price supports in consequence of the Great Depression, she foresaw that these supports would be meaningless unless American producers were protected against imports from lower-producing-cost countries. Under the controls adopted, the importation of certain goods is subject to quota limits or even to complete exclusion. These quantitative restrictions are usually imposed in addition to import tariffs. Cotton imports were put under the quota system in 1939 and wheat and wheat flour imports in 1941. The employment of the quota is an illiberal trade practice, and it tends to encourage a less economic use of labor and resources, but it is apparently unavoidable if a state feels committed to the support of certain aspects of the domestic economy. It may, of course, impose considerable hardship on foreign producers, and it raises prices at home.

Blacklists. Another device, blacklisting, was extensively used by the United States just before her entry into World War II. To prevent firms and individuals in Latin America from shipping supplies to the Axis countries, the American Government in July, 1941, published a "Proclaimed List of Certain blockaded Nationals" with whom Americans were forbidden to have commercial relations and whose assets in the United States were frozen. The original list contained the names of 1,800 corporations and individuals. Five months later it was extended to inhibit Latin-

⁴² Daugherty and Daugherty, II, 1104.

American trade with Japan, and one month after that it was expanded to cover Axis connections in neutral Europe. These blacklists, it must be noted, applied to private concerns and persons, not to states as such.

Valorization. The term "valorization" has come to be applied to any governmental measure for raising the price of a commodity, but in its original meaning it referred to an action taken by a government to raise the price of a commodity "above a level regarded as uneconomically low but not above the price that would in the long run be set by free competition." It was designed as a temporary measure to stabilize prices over a short period of lessened demand or bumper production. It was usually accomplished by purchasing and withholding from the market or by limiting production. Supposedly the government itself derives no direct profit. The best known instances of valorization have been in Brazilian coffee, Ecuadorian cacao, Mexican henequen, British rubber, Cuban sugar, and Egyptian cotton. Valorization has declined in importance in recent years, for the tendency has been to replace it with the more effective multi-lateral intergovernmental commodity agreements.

Miscellaneous. Only brief mention can be made of a number of other practices which enable states to exert economic pressures on other states. These include barter agreements, whereby states commit themselves to exchange certain goods in stipulated quantities or of stipulated value ; import surtaxes, which are special taxes superimposed on regular import duties ; sanitary regulations, which can be abused to limit imports ; and involved customs procedures which comprise the "invisible tariff."

The embargo may be used to prohibit the shipment of all goods or certain goods to a particular country or group of countries, and the boycott, which is the reverse of the embargo, may be used to stop imports. Both the embargo and the boycott may be unofficial or official—that is, they may be imposed by private groups or public sentiment or by governments. On the eve of World War II there was an unofficial but widespread movement in the United States to discourage the purchase of Japanese goods. After the war the Battle Act imposed a qualified embargo on shipments to Communist China. Purchase regulations may effect a kind of indirect and partial boycott. Legislation of 1933 stipulated that, with exceptions under certain conditions, materials and supplies for government use must be of American production. This "Buy American" mandate raises the cost of government purchases, bestows favors on some American industries, and, of course, discriminates against foreign producers and reduces the volume of world trade. Beginning in 1934 various laws have given a similar protection to American shipping. The usual provision—which applied to Marshall Plan aid and Mutual Security assistance—is that at least 50 per cent of the goods sent abroad on aid programs or purchased by loans from American government agencies must be shipped in American-flag vessels.

State trading is a highly restrictive practice engaged in by most governments on special occasions and with respect to a limited number of

commodities. It simply means that the government itself becomes a direct participant in trade. Since it is then in a position to control the volume, direction, and timing of foreign trade, it is also in a position to exert powerful economic and political pressures. In Communist countries state trading is more than a device ; it is the basic pattern of economic life. It is further discussed in Chapter 19.

THE ROLE OF ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS

The weapons that we have described are not all of those which states have in their economic arsenals. Indeed, governments are so resourceful in their improvisation of instruments of economic coercion that new ones are constantly appearing. The use of economic instruments to injure other states can be far more readily condemned than abolished ; it presents one of the truly grave issues in contemporary international relations. In the first place, the sovereignty of states interposes a formidable barrier between the idea of free and easy trade relations and its attainment. In the second place, as we have already observed, it is difficult to draw a sharp line between a state's obligations to its own people and its obligations—if any—to the world community. Nevertheless, along with the growing economic nationalism of the past twenty years there has developed a conviction on the part of many statesmen that the well-being of the whole world requires that vigorous action be taken to reduce the barriers to world trade and finance and to limit the means by which states, can by unilateral action impose their wishes on other states. Consequently, although the trend today is strongly in the direction of economic nationalism, efforts toward economic internationalism also are being made. We shall examine the present stage of these conflicting trends in Chapter 19.

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Imperialism and Colonialism.

7

The defenders of modern imperialism and colonialism have long pleaded their case in terms of the White Man's Burden. They have seen this as the obligation of advanced nations to help the people of backward nations--to civilize and "Christianize" them, to teach them the dignity of labor and to impress upon them the beauties of their own concepts of law and order. They have argued that colonialism was a necessary prelude to the emergence of most of the free and independent states of the world and to the twentieth century awakening of Asia and Africa. They have talked a great deal about roads, medicine, schoolhouses, trade, and self-government. There is much truth in what they have said.

The critics have used quite another vocabulary. Their indictment has been filled with such words as war, brutality, exploitation, misery, hatred, and degradation. They have insisted that the struggle for empire has led only to the urge to create greater and still greater empires and that the appetite of empire builders knows no limits. They too have spoken much truth.

Imperialism and colonialism have long been employed as instruments of national policy. They are closely related parts of the phenomenon that we are about to examine. The subject is a timely one, for most of the Western world and part of the Eastern are anxiously weighing the threat of Soviet imperialism, and at the same time vast areas of Asia and Africa are charging most of their woes to the colonialism of the once-great colonial powers.

We shall note first the use of terms, then the relation of imperialism to nationalism, and then the motives of imperialism. After this we shall quickly review the march of imperialism, examine its balance sheet, and then close with some observations on the new way in which certain states now discharge the obligations that they once professed to accept as imperialist powers,

WHAT IS IMPERIALISM ?

Imperialism can be discussed, denounced, defended, and died for, but it cannot be defined in any generally acceptable way. It means different things to different people. Let us note some of these differences as they appear in the definitions of a number of able writers on the subject.

Imperialism is a policy which aims at creating, organizing, and maintaining an empire ; that is, a state of vast size composed of various more or less distinct national units and subject to a single centralized will. (Moritz Julius Bonn)¹

Imperialism is . . . employment of the engines of government and diplomacy to acquire territories, protectorates, and/or spheres of influence occupied usually by other races or peoples, and to promote industrial, trade, and investment opportunities. . . . (Charles A. Beard)²

Imperialism . . . means domination of non-European native races by totally dissimilar European nations. (Parker T. Moon)³

It will be seen that Bonn imposes a quantitative measurement and presumably rules out the possibility of a "small imperialism." Beard excludes all except economic motivations, and he makes direct government action an inseparable part of imperialism. Moon injects the test of racial difference. The definitions of Hans Morgenthau, Joseph Schumpeter, E. M. Winslow, and Lenin suggest additional qualifications.⁴ Morgenthau scraps the conditions of exclusive economic motivation, size of operation, and difference of race ; he defines imperialism altogether in terms of the expansion of a state's power beyond its borders. Schumpeter deprives imperialism of all conscious motivation and definable objectives. He regards it as an "atavistic force, ancient in inception, decadent and self-conscious in an age of rationalism, yet still powerful enough to lord it over its rival, the upstart capitalism."⁵ Winslow reverses Schumpeter and sees both

¹ Moritz Julius Bonn, "Imperialism," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* (Macmillan, 1937), VII, 605. Used by permission of The Macmillan Company.

² Charles A. Beard, *American Foreign Policy in the Making, 1932-1940 : A Study in Responsibilities* (Yale University Press, 1946), p. 113n.

³ Parker T. Moon, *Imperialism and World Politics* (Macmillan, 1926), p. 33. Used by permission of The Macmillan Company.

⁴ Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 2nd ed. (Knopf, 1954), pp. 41-44 ; Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Imperialism and Social Classes*, edited by Paul M. Sweezy (Oxford University Press, 1951), pp. 6, 7 ; E. M. Winslow, *The Pattern of Imperialism : A Study in the Theories of Power* (Columbia University Press, 1948), pp. 3, 237 ; and E. Varga and L. Mendelsohn, eds., *New Data for V. I. Lenin's "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism"* (U. S. S. R., n. d.), p. 194.

⁵ Winslow, p. 229. Joseph A. Schumpeter was a distinguished German economist who spent his later years at Harvard. His "Zur Soziologie der Imperialismen," published as an essay in 1919, was, together with another essay, published in book form in 1951 by Basil Blackwell of Oxford. Paul M. Sweezy, editor of this edition, notes in his introduction (p. vii) that Schumpeter's work on imperialism "has apparently been almost totally ignored by Anglo-American social scientists."

organization and specific objectives in the imperialist operation, and he makes it evil by definition. Lenin asserts the traditional view of communism, in which imperialism is not only entirely economic but also a rather precise stage in the development of international capitalism.

It would be futile to attempt to reconcile these definitions—and a host of others—but it may be possible to make a number of helpful observations. The first and most obvious one is that imperialism is a highly subjective word—that writers define it pretty much as they please. Second, imperialism has become more of an epithet than anything else: the Russians use it to stigmatize the policies of the Western states, the anti-Communist powers use it to blacken Soviet policies, and the “uncommitted world” uses it to condemn the policies of both the Communist and anti-Communist worlds. As Raymond L. Buell remarked thirty years ago, “every unjustifiable demand made by one government upon another—every aggressive war—is called imperialistic. Imperialism is a word which indeed covers many sins.”⁶ Third, it seems that if there is any consensus in common usage certain occasional qualifications ought to be disregarded. Thus, what commonly passes for imperialism seems to warrant these assertions: (1) it may have powerful noneconomic motivations—it may, as a matter of fact, be without expectation of economic gain; (2) it may pertain to a very limited operation—a “vast empire” need not be contemplated at all; (3) it need not involve a difference of race—there may very well be imperialism within a single race; and (4) it may be planned or unplanned. Furthermore, imperialism may be with or without high regard for the welfare of the inhabitants of the area in question, it may be developmental or exploitative, and it may promote the capacity for self-government or ruthlessly suppress all impulses in that direction. Finally, it may be economically profitable for the imperialist country, or it may be decidedly unprofitable.

Shorn of the special conditions which individual writers attach to it, imperialism comes close to being what Charles Hodges called it many years ago: “a projection externally, directly or indirectly, of the alien political, economic, or cultural power of one nation into the internal life of another people. . . . it involves the imposition of control—open or covert, direct or indirect—of one people by another.”⁷ “The object of imperialism,” added Professor Hodges, “is to affect the destinies of the backward people in the interest of the more advanced from the standpoint of world power.” It seems that “backward” must here be interpreted in a power sense, for history furnishes many examples of peoples’ being held in bondage by stronger but culturally less advanced peoples.

“Economic imperialism” and “cultural imperialism” would appear to be very special kinds of imperialism, if, indeed, they should be called imperialism at all. Foreign trade and foreign investments are everywhere,

⁶ Raymond L. Buell, *International Relations*, revised ed. (Holt, 1929), p. 305.

⁷ Charles Hodges, *The Background of International Relations* (Wiley, 1932), pp. 422, 421.

and some aspects of the cultures of many states find their way into many other states. All these exert some influence ; hence if mere influence is to constitute imperialism the word is almost meaningless. If there is to be a pragmatic test it must center on the freedom of the "influenced" people to muddle in their own way through their own problems, economic and cultural pressures included.

Professor William L. Langer has made pretty much this same point in protest against the fuzzy use of the word "imperialism" :

Some may argue that imperialism is more than a movement toward territorial expansion and that financial imperialism in particular lays the iron hand of control on many countries supposedly independent. But if you try to divorce imperialism from territorial control you get nowhere. . . If imperialism is to mean any vague interference of traders and bankers in the affairs of other countries, you may as well extend it to cover any form of influence. You will have to admit cultural imperialism, religious imperialism, and what not. Personally, I prefer to stick by a measurable, manageable concept.⁸

It further appears that there have been both good and bad imperialisms. Therefore, unless one wishes to argue that it is *ipso facto* bad, imperialism itself must be regarded as amoral. This is not to say that the good balances the bad, but merely that imperialism, like the tariff or propaganda, is an instrument of the state, available for good purposes or bad. Finally, since no one assumes that imperialism has ended once a state has established control over an area outside its borders but rather that it has only begun, it is clear that what we are speaking of is a relationship and not an act.

It will be concluded from these observations that imperialism pertains to a relationship in which one area and its people are subordinate to another area and its government. Thus construed, imperialism is in essence always subordination ; it is a power relationship without moral implications of any kind.

WHAT IS COLONIALISM ?

The classic study of imperialism is J. A. Hobson's *Imperialism : A Study*, first published in 1902. Although Hobson failed to define imperialism, he did have this to say of colonialism : "Colonialism, in its best sense, is a natural overflow of nationality ; its test is the power of colonists to transplant the civilization they represent to the new natural and social environment in which they find themselves."⁹ Later writers also have attributed to colonialism something of the parent-and-offspring relationship

⁸ William L. Langer, "A Critique of Imperialism," *Foreign Affairs*, XIV (Oct., 1935), 107.

⁹ J. A. Hobson, *Imperialism : A Study*, 2nd ed. (London, 1948), p. 7.

that Hobson had in mind. Winslow speaks of it as the "occupation of virgin territory in which conflict was incidental, or even unnecessary, and subordinate to the desire of Europeans to find a new place to live."¹⁰ Townsend and Peake chose not to use "imperialism" because "it has come to connote a particular kind of colonial rule—generally exploitative—which has often characterized this modern movement, but not always."¹¹ Winslow has aversions of the same kind; "imperialism," he feels, "quite properly suggests something more organized, more military, more self-consciously aggressive, bent on objectives above and beyond" those of colonialism.

These distinctions in theory tend to break down in practice. It is sometimes impossible to draw a line between the "overflow of nationality" on the one hand and the "projection . . . of the . . . power of one nation into the internal life of another people" on the other hand. Hobson recognized this inaccuracy of terms when he said that "the 'colonial' party in Germany and France is identical in general aim and method with the 'imperialist' party in England." And President Sukarno of Indonesia certainly had imperialism in mind when in his opening address at the Bandung Conference of 1955 he said: "I beg of you not to think of colonialism only in the classic form which we . . . knew. Colonialism has also its modern dress in the form of economic control, intellectual control and actual physical control by a small but alien community within the nation." The Bandung Conference itself disclosed a total lack of agreement on the meaning of colonialism. This historic gathering of the representatives of twenty-nine countries of Asia and Africa solemnly resolved that "colonialism in all its manifestations is an evil which should speedily be brought to an end," but whereas the spokesmen of Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, Iraq, and Ceylon voiced apprehensions concerning Soviet colonialism, the representatives of the "uncommitted world," led by Nehru of India, denied that there was such a thing as Soviet colonialism. While the delegates could all agree that colonialism was "an evil," they could not agree on what it was or where it existed.

The most significant thing about imperialism and colonialism is not that they cannot be precisely defined or that they cannot always be distinguished from each other: it is that both terms refer to a superior-inferior relationship, and that hundreds of millions of people, particularly in Asia and Africa, have resolved to abandon their historic role as inferiors and to assert their equality with the people of the colonial powers. In current practice the two terms are used almost interchangeably. We shall not try to preserve the distinction during the present discussion.

¹⁰ Winslow, p. 4.

¹¹ Mary E. Townsend, with the collaboration of Cyrus H. Peake, *European Colonial Expansion Since 1871* (Lippincott, 1941), p. 9.

IMPERIALISM AND NATIONALISM

Imperialism is almost universally charged to nationalism, already indicted for most of the sins of the world community. "Modern imperialism," says one authority, "was born with the break up of mediaeval universalism. . . . (when) the rise of national self-consciousness brought a desire for expression in a wider sphere." The new states sought to extend their boundaries and create empires by the conquest of lands usually inhabited by peoples considered heathen, and "they more or less consciously tried to foist upon the natives their own social and cultural systems by 'Hellenizing the barbarians' in a particular and national rather than in a universal way." In doing so, "rivalries waxed strong : each modern nation wanted to extend its newly established nationality overseas in a New Spain, a New Holland, a New France, or a New England by sending out colonists or by assimilating in some degree the native races." Out of these endeavors emerged the Spanish Empire, "the first realization of modern imperialism." It was Spain's monopolistic exploitation of her colonies that "forced competitors along the path of imperialism." Later, after the imperialist recession which lasted until about 1870, "protectionism as a combination of national sentiments, lust for power and individual greed again became rampant," and the "new imperialism" was launched.¹²

So many other writers have charged nationalism with responsibility for the evils of imperialism that the indictment is commonly taken as proved. It has obvious plausibility : nationalism in the form of desire to exalt a state and to add to its prestige drives men into carrying their flag, their culture, their language, and their institutions into every power-weak area on earth ; and it compels governments to justify, defend, and champion the economic ventures of their nationals in foreign lands, especially weak ones. "Just as romantic nationalism clothed the crass materialism of expansion with a beautiful idealism, the concept of 'the white man's burden,' with humanitarianism and uplift of the 'little brown brothers,' so materialism with its 'economic necessity' advanced the national arguments of 'surplus population,' outlets for capital and bursting overproduction."¹³ During the last years of the nineteenth century "Darwin's catchwords—the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest—which he himself always refused to apply to the social organism, were snapped up by others who were less scrupulous, and soon became an integral part of popular and even official thought on foreign affairs. It . . . supplied a divine sanction for expansion."¹⁴ Professor Hans Kohn speaks of imperialism and nationalism as "interlocked" :

Imperialism is for the most part a later phase in the process begun by nationalism. Nationalism strives to unite the members of one nation,

¹² Bonn, pp. 606, 607, 609.

¹³ Townsend, p. 37.

¹⁴ Langer, p. 109.

politically and territorially, in a State organization. When that is accomplished the struggle for the possession of the earth proceeds further imperialism then inflames the nationalism of the oppressed peoples or fractions. Thus imperialism and nationalism are interlocked.¹⁵

Buell had in mind the same relationship when he said that "paradoxical as it may seem, pure nationalism has forced governments into the path of imperialism."¹⁶

Winslow enters a somewhat lonely dissent from the view that imperialism has been begotten of nationalism. He observes that it is much older than nationalism, which is certainly true, and that it was not "a product of popular mass revolt against absolutism such as produced democracy, industrialism, and nationalism, but the opposite"—which is a curious assertion, for nationalism, long existed under absolutism. His case against imperialism as an offspring of nationalism, however, is stronger than the which-was-first argument. He holds that the two are based on fundamentally different concepts :

Nationalism has within it the same feeling as has democracy, that of mutuality, but imperialism is an exclusive concept. Wherever the spirit of exclusiveness creeps into a nation, as it well may, it is a sign that the nation is losing the attributes of nationalism, internationalism, and democracy and is setting forth on the ancient business of telling "foreigners" what to do and what not to do, which is the path of empire. . . . nation-building and empire-building by no means involve the same set of attitudes ; in fact, they involve attitudes which are essentially opposed to each other, and which find their opposite expressions in popular rather than scholarly reactions.¹⁷

Winslow's thesis is more interesting than convincing. If nationalism and imperialism are antithetical, if states lose their nationalism when they take to imperialism, there never was a Spanish nationalism, a Russian nationalism, or even an English nationalism, and Americans have been losing their nationalism for at least half a century. And since when has nationalism prescribed democracy ? Or democracy prescribed anti-imperialism ? Langer declared that enfranchisement and free education brought the "rank and file" of the British public into the "political arena," where "colonial adventure and far-way conflict satisfied the craving for "excitement." "The upper crust of the working class," he continued, "was easily converted to the teaching of imperialism and took pride in the extension of empire." Hobson "was keenly aware of the relationship between democracy and imperialism" and held it to be one of the "contributory explanations of the phenomenon" of imperialism.¹⁸

¹⁵ *Nationalism and Imperialism in the Hither East* (Harcourt, Brace, 1932), p. 49.

¹⁶ Buell, p. 315.

¹⁷ Winslow, p. 7.

¹⁸ Langer, p. 108.

THE MOTIVES OF IMPERIALISM

Because the fruits of imperialism—the subordinate areas variously called possessions, colonies, protectorates, semi-protectorates, and dependent states—have long been regarded as valuable to the controlling state, they have been eagerly sought. To some extent they have been the badge of status in international society. Consequently, imperialistic rivalries have been a fertile source of interstate conflict, they have figured importantly in the international economy, they have often been an expression of belligerent nationalism, and they have been a major or a contributing cause of many of the great wars of the past three centuries.

At times imperialism has served in an economic way, at other times in a military or psychological way, and at still other times in a diversity of ways. It may be purely defensive in purpose but imperialism nonetheless. Its victims may be backward peoples and areas, as they often have been, but they may very well be populous and civilized communities, as in Nazi Germany's annexation of Austria and in the more recent "fall" of Czechoslovakia. The ensuing regime of the imperialist power may be characterized by complete ruthlessness or by vigilant humanitarianism. In short, the motives and techniques of imperialism reveal an almost infinite variety, and more often than not they are complex.

The leading motives of modern imperialism appear to have been as follows :

1. Economic Gain. This includes conquest for the sake of loot, the quest for competition-free markets and sources of raw materials, the search for virgin fields of investment for the capitalists of capital-glutted countries, and the urge to secure certain strategic raw materials. At times imperialism may have provided goods that could not be obtained otherwise ; at other times it merely made it possible to get them at a lower price or with less likelihood of interruption by war. While the nineteenth-century imperialist's declaration that "trade follows the flag" is not verified by statistics, as we shall see, nevertheless he believed it, and in any event he found in imperialism a short cut around foreign exchange difficulties. Some British Whigs of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries and some American statesmen of the nineteenth century insisted that "colonies do not pay," but until recently states have generally assumed otherwise.

2. National Prestige. Many defenders of imperialism have believed that a state must achieve its "manifest destiny" or its "place in the sun." Generations of Englishmen gloried in the boast that "the sun never sets on the British Empire."¹⁹ Not Texans alone, but many other people are intoxicated by dimensions. Benito Mussolini loved to move his hand over the map of those expanses of African desert and hill land that he had brought under the Italian flag. His chest expanded with his domin-

¹⁹ English workers of the nineteenth century at times preferred to speak of "the Empire on which the sun never sets and wages never rise."

ions. Indiscriminate Americans applauded the acquisition of territory that at the turn of the century made their country a world power, quite apart from any information or conviction about its intrinsic worth. More recently we have come to the sober realization that land for flag-flying may mean responsibility and expense rather than grandeur, but an analysis of imperialism shows that the desire for land and still more land has often been a product of aggressive nationalism.

A recent study of the motivations of French imperialism in Eastern Asia declares that the values which the French sought were far less tangible than those of land. The author's conclusions are unequivocal :

The taproot of French imperialism in the Far East from first to last was national pride—pride of culture, reputation, prestige, and influence. This was the constant factor which ran through the kaleidoscope of episodes of missionary dedication and daring, of naval coups, and of private adventures. . . . One need not discount the genuineness of the religious zeal which sustained the program of the Société des Missions Etrangères over two centuries or challenge the validity of the liberal religious revival under Louis Philippe to see in both of them an expression of supreme confidence in the superiority of French spirit and culture. . . . French honor was enlisted to vindicate the inherent superiority of its national culture and could permit no challenge of it to go unanswered.²⁰

Speaking of imperialism generally, Hans Kohn has made the following observation on its noneconomic impetus :

Besides the economic urge, psychological motives played a great role in imperialism—the lust for adventure and for power, the added prestige and glory which seemed to accrue from a vast colonial empire not only to the governing classes but even to the masses of the colonizing nations, the new sentiment of pride and superiority which animated even the lowest members of the white races in their dealings with the “backward” races.²¹

3. The White Man's Burden. Some members of an advanced society believe that their state has a moral obligation to carry the blessings of their own religion and civilization to “backward” peoples. In their view the white man has a duty to uplift his less fortunate brothers, usually in the yellow man's Asia or in the black man's Africa. Many of these people are wholly sincere, as is proved by the countless missionaries who have braved the perils of jungles, spears, and stewpots. Few will question the sincerity of Rudyard Kipling,²² the poet of British imperialism, or, perhaps,

²⁰ John F. Cady, *The Roots of French Imperialism in Eastern Asia* (Cornell University Press, 1954), pp. 294-295.

²¹ *Force or Reason: Issues of the Twentieth Century* (Harvard University Press, 1937), p. 80.

²² E. L. Godkin, English-born editor of the anti-imperialist New York *Nation*, once wrote of Kipling: “I think most of the current jingoism on both sides of the water is due to him. He is the poet of the barrack-room cads.” Rollo Ogden, ed., *Life and Letters of Edwin Lawrence Godkin*, 2 vols. (Macmillan, 1907), II, 30-31.

of President William McKinley, who announced that in answer to his prayer for guidance God told him "to take them all [the Philippine Islands], and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them, and by God's grace do the very best we could by them, as our fellowmen for whom Christ also died." The conquest of Latin America is a classic example of imperialism in behalf of a religious mission, for the Catholic sovereigns of Spain and Portugal were at least as religious as they were mercenary, and thousands of humble priests went willingly to do God's work in the wilderness. It is true, of course, that many a consecrated soul has unwittingly served the cause of militarism or economic exploitation, but it also is true that millions of people have been sincerely committed to the idealism of the White Man's Burden, particularly during the greatest age of imperialism, from 1870 to 1914.

Joseph Chamberlain, next to Disraeli perhaps Britain's leading exponent of imperialism, declared in 1893 that "it is our duty to take our share in the work of civilization in Africa," and John Bright, possibly the chief spokesman of the opposition, did not see how Britain could withdraw from India until that country had been made secure against discord and anarchy. Albert J. Beveridge, often regarded as the ablest defender of imperialism in the American Senate during the debates on the treaty of peace with Spain, thus interpreted America's responsibility: "God has made us adepts in government that we may administer government among savage and servile people."

Raymond L. Buell, one of the foremost students of imperialism, declared more than thirty years ago that "it would be a gross perversion of fact to say that European and American imperialism was originally inspired by a desire to better the lives of the people whom it forcibly subjugated"; but, he added, "there have been a number of instances where governments have established political control for humanitarian purposes....." He cited the occupation of New Zealand in 1833 to stop the debauching and robbing of the natives by white men; the assumption by the British Government of direct rule in India in 1858, partly to end the abuses of indirect administration by the British East India Company; the assertion of British jurisdiction over certain Pacific islands in 1872 to stamp out the slave traffic; and the fact that "thousands of Americans supported the war against Spain in 1898 because of their belief that Spain was pursuing a policy of oppression and exploitation in Cuba and Porto Rico."²³

4. National Defense. Imperialism may serve national defense in a number of ways: by providing areas for the defense of the state or its lines of communication, by providing much-needed markets and sources of essential raw materials, and by providing populations from which troops and laborers may be drawn. States have often sought to protect themselves by gaining control of outlying or border areas, either by completely subordinating the areas or by winning influence over nominally independent

²³ Buell, p. 318.

states, called buffer states. Moves of this sort are designed to fix broad belts of insulation around states by keeping enemies far from their borders, and sometimes by installing defenses within the protective belt itself. Thus through most of the nineteenth century England relied upon the buffer states of Afghanistan, Persia, and Tibet for the defense of India against Russia.

The acquisition and retention of sources of raw materials bring economic motivation and military motivation very much together. One has only to note the importance that some states attach to their colonial sources of oil, rubber, tin, and other raw materials to be convinced that certain products play an important role in imperialism. Colonies may also be valuable as reservoirs of manpower. During World War I France drew nearly 500,000 troops and more than 200,000 laborers from her colonies, while England drew nearly 400,000 troops from India.²⁴ Because of the entirely different character of World War II, colonial troops were used mostly to defend their homelands, when used at all. Nevertheless, casualties among British colonials exceeded 200,000.

5. Surplus Population. Statesmen have at times supported imperialism because they saw in colonies an outlet for a population growing with embarrassing rapidity. Economic interests may profit, too, for emigrating nationals promise to be good customers. Actually, however, overpopulated states have found little relief in emigration to their colonies. Germans and Italians have preferred the United States and Argentina to their own colonies, and migrating Japanese, largely excluded from the United States by law, have scattered widely. The French have never had a surplus population. Englishmen have gone to the Dominions in great numbers; but they have shown less interest in moving to colonial possessions. Of nearly 20,000,000 Europeans who emigrated between 1880 and 1940, nearly 17,000,000 went to the free nations of the Western Hemisphere.²⁵ Between 1925 and 1933, while Japan was trying to justify her designs on China with the population-pressure argument, less than four per cent of her population increase of that period migrated to her own colonies.²⁶ During the last decade of her colonial empire, 1904-1913, Germany sent only 1 out of 24,000 of her annual population increment to her colonies — in absolute numbers, about thirty persons a year.²⁷ All imperialist states have failed completely to win as much enthusiasm for home as for flags in those far-away places with strange-sounding names.

6. The Marxian-Leninist View. The Communists have their own interpretations of imperialism. They apply the term to a phase in the expansion of capitalism, but, of course, not to their own expansionism. There is

²⁴ Buell, p. 313.

²⁵ H. Arthur Steiner, *Principles and Problems of International Relations* (Harper, 1940), pp. 145-146.

²⁶ Grover Clark, *The Balance Sheets of Imperialism: Facts and Figures on Colonies* (Columbia University Press, 1936), p. 10.

²⁷ *German Statistical Year Book*, 1915, cited in L. S. Amery, *The German Colonial Claim* (London, 1939), p. 79.

thus a sharp distinction between Leninist imperialism, which is a Communist theory to explain the inherent and progressive iniquity of capitalism, and Soviet imperialism, which is a term applied by anti-Communists to the pattern of subversion and subjugation carried on by the Soviet Union.

The Leninist theory of imperialism rests upon the assumption that all political action springs from economic motives. Consequently, when capitalistic societies find that they have reached a point where the production of goods is so great that domestic markets are no longer adequate, they bring political forces into play in order to achieve the subordination of outside areas so that these may be held as controlled markets for surplus products and surplus investment capital. Therefore capitalism is itself the cause of imperialism.

While some of the Marxians believed that capitalistic states turned to imperialism more or less as a matter of choice, Lenin held that capitalism led inevitably to imperialism. "If it were necessary to give the briefest possible definition of imperialism," he wrote, "we should have to say that imperialism is the monopoly state of capitalism."²⁸ He severely criticized Kautsky for his "wrong and un-Marxian" contention that imperialism was the "preferred" policy of capitalist states rather than an unavoidable one.²⁹ The difference in the propaganda value of the two theories was immense, for in the Leninist view there was no stopping the worldwide imperialism out of which would come the proletarian revolution.

THE MARCH OF IMPERIALISM

What might be called modern imperialism may be divided into the old imperialism, usually called colonialism, for which we might set the somewhat arbitrary dates of 1492 to 1763, and the new imperialism, extending from about 1870 to the present. Between these two periods there was a full century of comparative quiet in the rivalry of states in the building of colonial empires. This is not to say that imperialism itself disappeared, for if we use the term to signify a relationship rather than a process it must be said to have continued in many areas. The dates of the old imperialism and of the new are literally the periods of imperialist expansion.

The impetus of the old imperialism was the emerging nationalism, its philosophy was mercantilism, and its tools were the innovations of civilized society that gave Europeans complete assurance of victory over the primitive folk of America, Africa, and Asia. Gunpowder was the most persuasive among the tools, but printing and banking also conferred immense advantages, as did advances in the building of ships, roads, and fortifications and in the science of navigation. The principal gainer was Britain, but Spain, Portugal, and the Netherlands also won great colonial empires. The

²⁸ Varga and Mendelsohn, p. 192.

²⁹ Varga and Mendelsohn, p. 200.

New World was the foremost area of imperialist activity, but Africa and Asia figured too.

The Imperialist Recession. The imperialist recession, which began in 1763 and lasted for a little better than a century, brought some expansion to counterbalance immense losses. France conquered Algeria, England took possession of the southern tip of Africa, New Zealand, and Australia. The reverses included the colonies lost to England by the American Revolution and the vast areas lost to Spain and Portugal in the Latin American Wars of Independence.

The relapse of imperialism calls for an explanation. Of first importance, the Industrial Revolution turned the attention of the more progressive states and their speculators to the prospect of juicy profits from the sale to home consumers of the products of the newly invented machinery. Also, much of the time Spain and England were using their energies to resist the efforts of their colonial subjects to achieve independence, leaving little strength for aggressive action. Moreover, Spain was a decadent empire, having used her fabulous treasure chest of colonial gold and silver in foreign wars and in maintaining an extravagant court rather than in building a solid economy, and England had already had her fingers burned in the American War of Independence. France, bankrupt, soon experienced the savage ordeal of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars. Napoleon's ambitions for overseas dominions were ended by the defeat of his fleet at Trafalgar. By 1820 France had recovered enough to dream again of an expanding empire. Germany and Italy had not yet entered the ranks of national states.

The New Imperialism. The impetus of the new imperialism, beginning about 1870, has been well summarized by Professor Parker T. Moon :

...an anti-imperialist, free-trade Europe was converted to imperialism, rather suddenly in the seventies and eighties, when England began to feel the competition of other industrial rivals, when manufacturing nations began to raise protective tariff walls around their own markets and to compete bitterly for foreign markets, when steamships and railways provided facilities for world commerce and conquest, when greedy factories and hungry factory towns called out for raw materials and foodstuffs, when surplus capital, rapidly accumulating, sought investments in backward countries, when the doctrine of economic nationalism triumphed over the old individualistic liberalism.³⁰

Imperialist control was established in many ways. At times it was asserted through complete military conquest ; and at other times it took the form of negotiations between representatives of two supposedly equal but actually unequal "states," wherein "empire builders" through the use of "gold, gimcracks, or gunpowder" induced native leaders to make their marks on or otherwise signify their assent to a treaty, of which they may not have had the remotest understanding. In such a transaction, as every

³⁰ Moon, pp. 56-57.

schoolboy knows, Manhattan was "purchased" from the Indians for twenty-four dollars' worth of trinkets, and in other dealings Americans got much of the present-day United States and Europeans got claims to most of Africa. In addition to these techniques of military conquest and fraud, imperialists devised others: the mere threat of force, demoralization through economic penetration, and the undermining of the established regime by friends of an outside state as in Hawaii. Colonies have also passed as the spoils of war in which the colonies, suffered no direct conquest, as was the case when Guam was acquired by the United States. They have passed by sale, as in the famous Louisiana Purchase. Plebiscites, held on quite a number of occasions to determine to what state a particular area should be joined, have been used in a few instances to permit a small population to choose its allegiance as a colony or possession, as with the Ionian Islands, St. Bartholomew, and the Danish West Indies. Recent history offers a political oddity in the form of "independent" states agreeing by plebiscite to subordinate themselves to another state, the Soviet Union.

1. *Great Britain.* The Industrial Revolution that a century earlier had begun to turn would-be English colonists into factory workers had by 1870 stocked warehouses with a surplus of manufactured goods. Sale abroad was possible, but it was not easy in competing industrial states, particularly those with high tariff walls, like the United States and Germany. It was easier in English colonies, where England could manipulate the tariff, control the currency, and, if she wished, post "No Hunting" signs for outsiders. There, too, she might acquire a protected source of supply of some of the commodities that she already regarded or was coming to regard as necessary: cotton, rubber, cocoa, coffee, tea, sugar, iron, hemp, oil, phosphates, and nitrates. Furthermore, her transportation, communication, and banking facilities were ready, and industrialization had produced an abundance of surplus capital, eager for dividends and unafraid of a sea voyage. The English spirit was ready, too, or in any event was soon readied. Greed, patriotism, nationalism, jingoism, militarism, navalism, Christianity, humanitarianism, adventure, and the simple desire to eat every day — all of these whipped Englishmen into a state of mind in which they were willing to accept the imperialist program announced by Disraeli in 1872. Even Gladstone's Liberal Party was won over in the course of the next dozen years. In the hands of friendly theorists, imperialism became a holy mission — in fact, a patriotic and profitable holy mission. The British accretions of the new imperialism amounted, in Africa alone, to more than two and a half million square miles, with a population of nearly fifty millions. The gains elsewhere, principally in Southeastern Asia, were small. In 1914 the British Empire, despite its losses, was still the world's largest and richest.

2. *France.* France acclaimed the imperialistic program of Jules Ferry in the early eighties, and within forty years had planted the tricolor on nearly three million square miles of soil and sand. Her prizes, too, were largely

in Africa, with lesser ones in Southeast Asia, especially Indo-China. These geographically impressive conquests, plus some trivial, scattered acreage, added to the surviving crumbs of her former empire, gave her the world's second largest empire on the eve of World War I.

3. *Germany*. Bismarck, father of the German Empire, reluctantly turned from continental politics to imperialism. Within six years (1884-1890) he acquired Togoland, Kamerun (the Cameroons), German South-West Africa, and German East Africa, with a total of nearly a million square miles, plus a portion of New Guinea, the leasehold of Kiaochow and extensive economic rights in the Shantung Peninsula in China, and scattered groups of islands in the Pacific. Germany had been late in entering the struggle for colonies, and all the swashbuckling and conniving of Kaiser William II could not produce a first-rate colonial empire.

4. *Italy*. The Kingdom of Italy, like Germany a new arrival among national states, shared the appetite of her neighbors. Although she lacked the strength to gain very much, she was able to carve out three colonies in Africa: Eritrea on the Red Sea, Italian Somaliland on the eastern tip of Africa, and Libya in North Africa. Libya was a unification of Tripoli and Cyrenaica, taken from Turkey in the Italo-Turkish War of 1911-1912. It is a large, barren tract of about six hundred thousand square miles. Italy tried to absorb Ethiopia and thus unify her East African colonies, but she suffered a crushing military defeat at the hands of the Ethiopians at Aduwa in 1896. Later, just before World War II, she tried again, succeeded, organized Italian East Africa, and then soon lost everything.

5. *Belgium*. The little country of Belgium was put on the road to imperialism through a venture of Leopold II, who early in the days of the new imperialism staked out for himself the Congo Free State, an empire-size tract in the heart of Africa. Acquired as a personal possession by the King in the 1880's, it became a Belgian colony in 1908 when the Belgian Government, responding to outside criticism of Leopold's abuse of the Congo natives, forced the King to relinquish his proprietorship. It has an area of nearly one million square miles and a population of more than eleven millions.

6. *Japan*. While Japan was rapidly becoming industrialized, she was also learning to play Western games. Of the Western culture imported on the breakdown of her isolation in the second half of the nineteenth century, she rejected democracy but accepted industrial capitalism, militarism, and imperialism. Supported by an astonishing industrial development, she began her career of militarism and imperialism in 1894 with a war on China. With victory hers, she annexed Formosa and the Ryukyu Islands and forwarded the eventual absorption of Korea, completed in 1910. With success in a second imperialistic conflict, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, she annexed southern Sakhalin, acquired a leasehold on Port Arthur on Liaotung Peninsula, and eliminated Russian influence from Korea and southern Manchuria. Such was her position when she entered World War I as an ally of Great Britain. She took no part in the division of

Africa and, indeed, confined herself to a regional imperialism. During World War I she took advantage of the preoccupation of the Western powers with the conflict in Europe to move into the Shantung Peninsula and to demand far-reaching concessions from China, especially in the Twenty-One Demands of 1915.

7. *Russia*. The imperialism of Russia differed from the imperialistic expansion that had in turn sliced up North and South America, Africa, and much of Asia. As Professor Frederick L. Schuman says, "it represented the spreading out over contiguous territory of a land-hungry agrarian population, rather than an imperialism of commerce, sea power, and investments over the ocean highways."³¹ Like the expansionism of the United States in continental America, that of Russia was unquestionably predatory but presumably was aimed at the absorption of new areas into the state itself and not at a permanent colonialism. She manifested some interest in the African scramble, particularly in Ethiopia, but she gained nothing there, nor, indeed, did she ever possess any noncontiguous territory, except coastal islands, after the sale of Alaska in 1867. Her continental gains between 1850 and 1914 amounted to more than a million square miles, plus an additional two millions in spheres of influence in Persia, Manchuria, and Mongolia.


During the interwar years the Soviet Union concentrated on domestic problems and on building up her industrial and military strength. She made no serious effort toward territorial expansion. She did put some pressure on Turkey in 1939, she dabbled in Iranian politics, she had a brief period of success in getting her foot in the Chinese door, and she fought a "semi-war" with Japan over Manchuria, but she brought no additional land or people under her control.

Since World War II, however, the threat of Soviet imperialism has given rise to the "cold war," grave international tensions, rearmament, and the proliferation of anti-Communist alignments. At a time when the imperialism of the traditionally great imperialist powers — notably Britain, France, and the Netherlands — has retracted from or been expelled from vast areas of Asia and Africa, the imperialism of the Soviet Union has expanded until it now encompasses virtually all of Eastern Europe and parts of Asia. Under the Communists the Soviet Union has annexed 264,000 square miles of land with a population of more than 24,000,000; and she has acquired as satellites parts or all of eleven countries to the extent of more than five million square miles with a population in excess of 731,000,000. Moreover, by her own latest official census (1939) Russians comprised only 58 per cent of the population of the Soviet Union.³²

The threat of further Soviet aggressions and of a still further expanded imperialism is the major anxiety of most of the civilized world. This is not the restless expansionism of tsarist Russia, working within the concept

³¹ *International Politics*, 4th ed. (McGraw-Hill, 1948), p. 528.

³² See "The only Empire that Never Stops Growing," *U. S. News and World Report*, May 25, 1956, pp. 40-47.



The New York Times, December 11, 1953

The Decline of Western Colonialism and the Expansion of Communism Since 1939

of co-existence. Rather, "the Soviet Union proceeds unswervingly toward the goal of world revolution, with all that this may imply for the free world."³³ In a most vital way its motivation differs from that of pre-Communist Russia :

The distinctive feature of Soviet as compared with traditional Russian motivation...is its dynamism. Part of Russia plus part of Marx formed a mixture far more explosive than either ingredient, and helped make a revolution that is still at work in the ferment of our century. Its driving force is enshrined in Lenin's doctrine of the vanguard of revolution : the party must never wait passively for the "inexorable laws of history" to destroy capitalism. Rather it must tirelessly push forward to exploit every weakness, every advantage. History has to be shoved.³⁴

8. *Other States.* Austria-Hungary, too, felt the urge to imperialism, but like Russia she found an outlet through expansion into contiguous territory rather than in overseas conquest. The lesser powers of Europe -- Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, and Denmark -- lacking capital and power to compete with major powers, kept the colonies they had acquired earlier, but only Spain and Portugal made efforts -- feeble ones -- to expand their holdings, with some modest successes in Africa. Thus five lesser powers -- these four plus Belgium -- possessed colonies at the outbreak of World War I, but of these only one was of great economic value -- the rich Netherlands East Indies, which antedated the new imperialism. Norway later established title to the Spitzbergen Archipelago.

Special Rights and Spheres of Influence. While European states were thus engaged in dividing the backward areas of the earth in an obvious form of imperialism, some of them were also advancing their interests in less backward regions through somewhat more subtle methods. Seeking special rights in states still nominally independent, several of them acquired "leaseholds" in China ; Great Britain and France divided Siam into "spheres of influence" ; and Britain and Russia did the same with Persia. Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and Japan established spheres in China, as did Britain, France, Germany, and Italy in Turkey. In some cases, spheres of influence preceded annexation, as was often the case in Africa ; in other cases, as in Turkey, they were later completely extinguished. The advantage sought was economic or military, and the form of control was variously tariff regulation, financial supervision, or military occupation. The United States has carefully avoided this subtle kind of imperialism in non-American areas, and, in fact, in 1899-1900 she sponsored the Open

³³ Christian A. Herter in C. Grove Haines, ed., *The Threat of Soviet Imperialism* (The Johns Hopkins Press, 1954), p. xv. This volume consists of twenty highly competent papers, together with summaries of general discussions, from a conference on "The Problem of Soviet Imperialism," sponsored by the School of Advanced International Studies and held in Washington in August, 1953.

³⁴ George A. Morgan, "The Motivation of Soviet Policy Toward the Non-Soviet World," in Haines, p. 35.

Door in China to protect American interests against monopoly-minded powers.

AMERICAN IMPERIALISM

The story of American imperialism may be divided into three parts : continental expansion, overseas expansion, and intervention. The first of these may be disposed of rather quickly if we disregard the rights of the Indians and think of legal titles as belonging to those European states which staked out generally-recognized claims. Most of the territory was acquired by purchase or by other voluntary procedures, but some of it was gained by conquest, notably the Mexican Cession in 1848. Happily, the precedent had been established that possession and settlement should be followed by full political equality as soon as feasible. Consequently, American continental imperialism was short-lived : and it now seldom occurs to anybody to think of it as imperialism.³⁵

Overseas Expansion. The many noncontiguous areas which have come under the American flag have been acquired through a variety of processes. Alaska and the Virgin Islands were purchased : the Hawaiian Islands and the Canal Zone were acquired by the voluntary acts of *de facto* governments, although there was chicanery in both instances ; Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines went to the United States as fruits of victory in the Spanish-American War of 1898, even though the transfer of the Philippines carried some compensation to Spain. Nobody knows just why Alaska was bought, but few people seem to regret it. With the other acquisitions the motives concerned national defense, trade economics, nationalism, and humanitarianism. The Canal Zone, of course, was leased for the building of a canal, regarded as necessary to American defense and American commerce. Many other bits of land, mostly uninhabited islands in the Pacific, have been picked up from time to time. Except for the new Philippine Republic, all these areas are politically subordinate to the United States, although some of them now have a large measure of self-government. The Philippines have been independent since 1946, and Puerto Rico now enjoys a very special status as a commonwealth associated with the United States.

While imperialism is still present, a number of extenuating considerations should be noted. For one thing, many of these areas are so small that they can never achieve independence and keep it. Furthermore, though not always conspicuously successful in all respects, American imperialism has

³⁵ Professor Dexter Perkins denies that imperialism was present in American continental expansion, saying that "it is important to draw a clear distinction between expansion and imperialism." He would rule out imperialism from the beginning because of the expectation of incorporation, whereas the definition used in this book would terminate imperialism with the fact of incorporation. The difference is unimportant in this instance, but it would be substantial in the event of long-delayed incorporation. *The American Approach to Foreign Policy* (Harvard University Press, 1952), pp. 30-31. Chapter II of this work is a brief and sensible answer to the question : "Is there an American imperialism?"

been comparatively enlightened and beneficent. Finally, "American rule over other peoples has always been rule with an uneasy conscience"³⁶--an observation which really means that the American people have been imperialistic less by choice than by real or imagined imperatives. On the positive side, it can hardly be questioned that American control has brought material and cultural advantages to the peoples of these areas beyond what would have been likely under the displaced regimes. Some of the American possessions, notably Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico, will probably attain statehood eventually ; others never will. All of them are now bound securely to the United States through their importance to national defense. None of them appears to prefer independence or another affiliation.

Intervention and the Monroe Doctrine. American intervention in the Western Hemisphere may be thought of as defense imperialism. To understand it we must first examine the Monroe Doctrine. This was first asserted in President James Monroe's address to Congress, in December, 1823, which declared, among other things, that the United States would oppose the transfer of any land on the American continent from one European state to another, the acquisition or further expansion of American holdings by a European state, or the interference by European states in the political affairs of the independent states of the New World. Monroe was prompted to take this position by the threatening actions of the Holy Alliance and by the evident coincidence of British and American interests. The declaration was merely an announcement of executive policy while Monroe was President. Nevertheless, and despite the infrequency of its use for many years, the Doctrine took increasing hold of the American mind until late in the century it had become a basic principle of the nation's foreign policy. The newly born states of Latin America welcomed Monroe's pronouncement. Only much later, when danger of Spanish re-conquest had passed and they themselves had grown in strength and national consciousness, did they begin to resent the imperialistic implications of the Doctrine. While disliking the unilateral character of the Doctrine, Latin American states have never quarreled with its objective of preventing foreign intervention in the Western Hemisphere. But, while shielding the Latin Americans from European states, the Doctrine did not shield them from the United States herself. Indeed, expanded and formalized by the Roosevelt Corollary in 1904, the Doctrine became the juridical basis of American interventions.

The Caribbean Policy. American imperialism of the early twentieth century in the general Caribbean area soon came to be spoken of as resting on what some writers call the Caribbean Policy and others the Panama Policy. This was simply the resolution of the United States to defend the Isthmus and its approaches, even, if need be, by violating the sovereignty of Caribbean republics. The first step was the establishment of a protectorate over Cuba in 1901, while the United States was still in military occupation of the island as a result of the Spanish-American War. Here the motivation

³⁶ Perkins, p. 32.

to imperialism was complex : Isthmian defense, determination to end a long-continued nuisance, economics, and humanitarianism. The next step in defense imperialism, the imposition of a protectorate on the new Republic of Panama in 1903, was a means to the single end of canal building and defense.

Here, in the Canal Zone, we have the diplomacy of American imperialism in its most ruthless form. The Spanish-American War made the United States a world power and an interoceanic canal a necessity. When Colombia delayed the ratification of a lease on an Isthmian strip in her province of Panama — as she had a perfect right to do — President Theodore Roosevelt stormed in, used the Navy to support a revolt hatched in the United States — though not by government officials — precipitately recognized the independence of Panama, and in general did enough to warrant his later declaration that “I took Panama.”

National defense was also the reason for the interventions in the Dominican Republic (1905), Nicaragua (1913), and Haiti (1915), although in these cases Canal defense was conceived not only in terms of naval and military installations but also in terms of preventing the occupation of Caribbean areas by another great power. This possibility became real when the Hague Permanent Court of Arbitration, in ruling on the claims of blockading powers to preferential treatment in the payment of debts—an outgrowth of the Venezuela blockade of 1902 — put a premium on the use of force in the collection of international debts.

Appraisal. Despite some unnecessary killings and isolated atrocities, American defense imperialism has been comparatively mild. It has been professedly temporary and rarely exploitative ; furthermore, it was almost everywhere terminated by Franklin D. Roosevelt. Going even further, at the Buenos Aires Conference of American States in 1936 Roosevelt renounced the “right” of intervention. That pledge has been kept. “The policy of the American government in the last twenty years has been an example almost without precedent in abstention from policies of force in relations with weaker states.”³⁷ Even before 1936, the famous Clark Memorandum of 1928 — a commentary on the Monroe Doctrine prepared by Under Secretary of State J. Reuben Clark — had declared that intervention could not be justified by the Doctrine but implied that it might well be necessitated by considerations of national security. Since then the defense of the Caribbean area has taken another tack : and, although what we have here called defense imperialism has ended, we may be sure that the United States will continue to regard Canal defense as a cardinal principle of American diplomacy, to be sustained by whatever means may be necessary.

Finally, we should note the charges of imperialism that Communists hurl at the United States in such great profusion. They accuse her of imperialism in Japan because of the security arrangements which the Americans and the Japanese have established, and they accuse her of imperialism

³⁷ Perkins, p. 38.



Alexander in The Philadelphia Bulletin

The Chain Gang

virtually everywhere because of her foreign aid programs and her sponsorship of mutual security arrangements. Neither charge deserves much serious attention on its own merits ; nevertheless, both can still be used effectively as propaganda.

THE BALANCE SHEET OF IMPERIALISM

The student of imperialism must do more than contemplate motives and techniques and measure loot. His natural humanitarianism will quickly lead him to ask about its effects on native peoples ; his business sense will lead him to ask if imperialism really pays in dollars and cents, or, more often, in pounds, francs, and guilders ; and, we hope, his interest in international relations will lead him to ask how imperialism is related to the larger field of world politics.

Effects on Native Peoples. A few facts will suggest the staggering possibilities for the abuse of the native inhabitants of the "backward" areas subjected to imperialistic control. As late as the mid-1920's half the world's land area and one-third of the human race had a colonial status.³⁸ European states possessed colonies with twice their own total population and twenty times their own area. To put it another way, the area of the colonial empires of the world in the 1920's was roughly eight times the size of the United States, and their population was more than five times that of the United States.

As profit from colonies usually depended upon the use of native labor, and as colonial peoples were strangers to capitalistic propaganda on the dignity of labor, imperialist powers were hard driven to find ways of forcing natives to till the soil, dig for gold, gather rubber, hunt for ivory, or collect coconuts. But the colonial powers were equal to the occasion, and through slavery, forced labor, heavy taxation, and the confiscation of land they succeeded in getting the work done. Sometimes the natives were forced to give a share of their crops or their time to the government; sometimes troops directed forced labor; sometimes a hut tax or poll tax was imposed, payable only in labor in certain products, sometimes native chieftains were rewarded according to their success in mobilizing their tribesmen for labor; and sometimes laborers were imported from strange and distant lands. Punishment was equally varied: lashing, mutilation, death, separation from wife and family, confiscation of land, and exclusion from hunting grounds.

Imperialist powers have also debauched their colonials in order to obtain revenue. At one time about half the revenue from French West Africa came from taxes on hard liquor. The British profited from the encouragement of gambling and opium smoking in the Far East. There have been no serious charges of debauchery or brutality in American colonies and protectorates, although on one or two occasions United States occupation forces have engaged in blood-letting on a scale to shock the American public. Everywhere there was sharp discrimination against the natives and in favor of white men. Lest we be too quick to conclude that depravity is peculiar to white men, however, we should remember that African chieftains were often equally ruthless with the natives, that black men were collectors of other black men to be sold into slavery, and that the yellow men of Japan and more recently of China have proved amazingly resourceful in the techniques of human torture and abuse. Morality is certainly not a matter of race, and the brutalities of imperialism suggest the disheartening conclusion that it may have little to do with "culture" or with what passes for Christianity.

Even before World War I colonial regimes made some contributions to the welfare of their dependent populations. Most of them undertook to set up public schools and encourage missionaries, and some of them sought to use natives in local government. Nevertheless, except for the United States,

³⁸ Moon, p. 513.

the expenditures on education in colonial areas were pitifully small. About 80 per cent of the educational work has been done by missionaries,³⁹ American colonies again excepted. For one thing, imperialist powers learned that education did not make for docility ; rather, the reverse was true. The Philippines remain the most notable instance in which a major colony has been carefully led along the road to complete independence by an imperialist power. The evolution of certain English colonies into "Dominions" is somewhat comparable, although here the granting of independence has not been wholly voluntary.

The Profits of Imperialism. The answer to the question whether imperialism and colonies have "paid" is complex. In the first place, what is the imperialist power trying to buy? Certainly the United States has never sought to buy an income ; instead, it has bought Canal defense, continental security, and the opportunity to do a bit of chest-thumping. Other colonial powers also have bought intangibles, often defense in the form of strategic areas, sometimes merely land to appease an aggressive nationalism. All these, of course, cannot be reckoned in dollars and cents ; they may be essentials or trinkets, priceless or valueless.

If, for instance, the incentive to French imperialism after 1880 was the "persistent urge to enhance national prestige and to vindicate French cultural superiority," as one careful student asserts, how well did the investment pay? It is obviously impossible to say, except to note the same writer's observation that "it may prove to be one of the tragedies of the decline of Western influence in Asia that France could not admit the possibility of cultural or political equality with herself, much less the outright surrender of colonial possessions, without seeming to repudiate not only her position as a world power but also the very rationale of her role in world affairs."⁴⁰ It is interesting to observe the further judgment that "French politicians after World War II were thus denied the easy rationalization of the eventual surrender of their colonial empire in Indo-China in terms of the vindication of French ideals," whereas "Americans could see in the emancipation of the Philippines a vindication of the principle of 'government by the consent of the governed,' and the British accepted the independence of India as fulfillment of the concept of a commonwealth of equal partners....."⁴¹ It might be added that British grace in granting independence to India was largely *ex post facto*.

A major difficulty in a purely economic appraisal of imperialism arises from the fact that often the expenditure is public and the income private. That is to say, a state may use its army and navy, build ports and roads, pay public officials and other necessary personnel, and even offer production subsidies, while the profits from all business enterprises may go into the pockets of private investors, merchants, shippers, and manufacturers. The government's balance sheet may be in the red, and still the colony

³⁹ Buell, p. 353.

⁴⁰ Cady, pp. 295-296.

⁴¹ Cady, p. 295.

may be a rich prize for a limited few, with some of the profits undoubtedly trickling through to the general population of the imperialist power. It may be impossible to determine whether the improvement of a state's economic well-being warrants the taxation required to sustain a colonial empire.

Hobson's *Imperialism*. Perhaps the ablest pioneer in the study of the economics of imperialism was John A. Hobson (1858-1940), an English writer of the liberal school. In his notable *Imperialism : A Study*, already mentioned, he concluded that colonies gave no assurance of the control of raw materials, that they formed no trading areas of substantial value, that they gave negligible relief to population pressures, and, in general, that they made little or no contribution to the economic welfare of the colonizing state. His test of the good and bad of imperialism was largely an exercise in comparative economic statistics ; thus tested, imperialism was "a depraved choice of national life, imposed by self-seeking interests which appeal to the lusts of quantitative acquisitiveness and of forceful domination surviving in a nation from early centuries of animal struggle for existence." "The laws which, operative throughout nature, doom the parasite to atrophy, decay, and final extinction," declared Hobson, "are not evaded.....by rendering some real but quite unequal and inadequate services to 'the host'."⁴²

Although Hobson later gave more attention to the political causes of imperialism, he never abandoned his conviction that economic causes were paramount. The impact of his *Imperialism* was immense : "No other book has been so influential in spreading the doctrine of economic imperialism," and Hobson's theory has had "a more direct and apparent influence on the writing of history, at least in the English language, than that of Marx and the Marxists."⁴³ The qualification is well made, for among Asians the generally accepted theory of imperialism is that of Lenin.

Clark's *Balance Sheets*. Later students followed Hobson's lead in checking the ledgers to see if imperialism paid. The results of such enterprises, tolerantly remarked a later scholar, "may not be very satisfactory or conclusive from a broad economic point of view, because, as in the case of tariffs, there are a number of questions that cannot be answered statistically, but, so far as it goes, drawing up balance sheets of imperialism is a salutary exercise."⁴⁴ For the most part these salutary exercises dealt with single colonies or with the colonies of a single imperialist power, but in 1936 Grover Clark published the results of a comprehensive appraisal subsidized by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. His ambitious project, completed just before Mussolini, Hitler, and World War II rang the curtain down on the old imperialist order, rates today as the broadest analysis of the economics of winning and holding colonies.

In the preface to *The Balance Sheets of Imperialism* Clark asserted

⁴² Hobson, pp. 368, 367.

⁴³ Winslow, pp. 94, 106.

⁴⁴ Winslow, p. 55.

that three main claims have been made about the value of colonies : they have provided important outlets for population ; they have made possible valuable trade opportunities that would not otherwise be available ; and they have added to the security of the colonizing state by assuring it of raw materials in both war and peace. He added that "the actual record..... demonstrates conclusively that each of these three claims is essentially fallacious."⁴⁵ This is not to say that individuals did not profit ; and of course it is true that states may buy an improved military position and, at a heavy cost, provide some degree of emotional satisfaction, people being what they are.

Kohn's *Reflections*. The Communist leaders of the Soviet Union and Red China have succeeded so well in their campaign to make imperialism and colonialism wholly odious things and to heap unrelieved guilt on the Western powers that many westerners, like most Asians, have come to accept the indictment as proved. It is therefore refreshing to have a scholar of the stature of Hans Kohn declare that "Western speakers should not put themselves on the defensive, but state the facts as they are." He has himself stated some of the facts in a brief paper entitled *Reflections on Colonialism*.⁴⁶

Professor Kohn declares that Americans themselves are in part responsible for propagating the curious idea that "empires are established by sea powers, whereas expansion into contiguous land masses does not produce empires or colonialism." The American reaffirmation of this fifteenth-century judgment was made to defend the morality of expansion into the West and Southwest in the course of the nineteenth century. Later, with Soviet coaching, the people of Asia have accepted this view ; in consequence, the United States and her allies are colonial powers but not so the Soviet Union. Kohn denies the charge that "imperialism introduced wars, poverty, racial and economic exploitation to Asia and Africa." Those conditions have existed from time immemorial. "As far as historical memory goes" Asian peoples have enslaved other Asian people, and African tribes have exterminated or enslaved other African tribes. Western imperialism, on the other hand, though guilty of "many injustices and cruelties.....has awakened and vitalized lethargic civilizations." Moreover, the standards of justice now used in condemning imperialism are themselves products of the West — "developd by the Western world and only by the Western world."

⁴⁵ Clark, pp. 9-17. George Padmore enters the following dissent from Clark's conclusions : "From a purely imperialistic point of view, Belgian colonial policy has been most profitable. According to Mr. Robert Godding, Colonial Minister in the exiled wartime Belgian Government, 'during the war, the Congo was able to finance all expenditures of the Belgian Government in London, including the diplomatic service as well as the cost of our armed forces in Europe and Africa, a total of some £ 40 million. In fact, thanks to the resources of the Congo, the Belgian Government in London had not to borrow a shilling or a dollar, and the Belgian gold reserve could be left intact.'" Cited in George Padmore, "Comparative Patterns of Colonial Development in Africa : 3. The Belgian System," *United Asia*, VII (March, 1955), 89.

⁴⁶ Hans Kohn, *Reflections on Colonialism* (Memorandum Number Two, Foreign Policy Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania, 1956).

Colonialism, continues Kohn, "has nothing to do with race or race superiority, one of the most bewildering myths of the present time." He points out that rule by one people of another is an old story in Europe and that resentment of it has been manifested as strongly there as in Asia and expressed in "the very same words as the anti-colonialists in Asia [use] today." Catalans, Slovaks, Ukrainians, and other European peoples have resented the domination of closely related peoples, but a leader of southern India complains that Brahminism has kept his people "for many a century on the lower rungs of the social ladder." Indeed, says Kohn, "though the position of the [American] Negro is by far not yet what it should be, it is infinitely better than that of the Indian Untouchables." In conclusion he warns Americans against the abandonment of their own spiritual values and against "competing in promises and panaceas with the Soviets" :

We can promise a Utopia.....neither for us nor for others, and should in all decency stress the fact. Sound progress can come only slowly and by great efforts and self-control. In Asia the moral and social conditions do not exist to make the Asians in any foreseeable future as rich as we are. This fact may be deeply regrettable, but it cannot be attributed to our or to anybody's fault. Yet the only thing which would apparently satisfy the emotional dissatisfaction of some Asian intellectuals seems to be the lowering of our and the British standards to theirs. That we cannot do. We are not free because we are rich ; it has been our long and hard developing tradition of individual liberty and responsibility which has made it possible for us to become rich.....We have to be respectful of the civilizations and attitudes of others, but we have also to respect our own traditions and dignity.⁴⁷

THE PRINCIPLE OF TRUSTEESHIP

The story of imperialism — or colonialism, or whatever word may be used — is not one of the unrelieved exploitation and abuse. The civilized world, in fact, has come a long way since the early sixteenth century, when the states of Europe began to extend their control into America, Asia and Africa with "no principles of law, policy, or morality to restrain them."⁴⁸ Progress was for a long time very slow, with only enlightened individuals like Bartolomé de las Casas and Francis de Victoria raising their voices in behalf of the oppressed peoples of other lands, and it was not until the late eighteenth century that humanitarianism became organized and effective. One of the first tangible results was legislation against the slave trade. In 1837 a British Parliamentary committee asserted what was in substance the principle of trusteeship, and by mid-century "the eventual

⁴⁷ Kohn, *Reflections on Colonialism*, p. 7.

⁴⁸ Quincy Wright, *Mandates under the League of Nations* (University of Chicago Press, 1930), p. 6.

self-determination of colonies was viewed with equanimity by nearly all British statesmen."⁴⁹ The United States occupied Cuba and the Philippines at the close of the Spanish-American War with the promise to grant them independence in due course. Nevertheless, "the principle that dependencies are a trust of civilization had influenced theory more than practice when the [First] World War broke out.....but the principle..... was beginning to have effects in practice."⁵⁰

The endeavours of the imperialist powers to put into effect the principle of trusteeship related to a number of aspects of colonial life : land ownership, native labor, imported labor, foreign capital, education, health, and preparation for self-government. Some efforts were made to break up the large plantations on which natives worked and to encourage private ownership of small land tracts. Higher wages, better working conditions, and controls on the involuntary movement of workers were substituted for more drastic methods of persuasion in some colonies. Some states entered into agreements to modify the severity of the conditions under which laborers were obtained in large numbers from China or elsewhere for service in colonial areas. In a few instances, notably that of the Basel Mission Trading Company, which had interests in Africa and India, dividends were limited to a given percentage, with profits above that figure to be expended in behalf of the colonials. Governments in some cases appropriated money for education : between one and four per cent of the budgets of British colonies in West Africa were so expended about the time of World War I, and American contributions in the Philippines and Puerto Rico ranged from thirty to forty per cent. Various missionary bodies spent far more than governments. Medicine, too, was long the province of missionaries, although late in the nineteenth century army physicians were sent to many colonies. The work of William Gorgas in Panama and that of Walter Reed in Cuba are perhaps the best known instances of the rendering of medical service by an imperialist power. The training of local personnel for handling the lower administrative posts has long been a feature of British colonial government, and the coaching of Cuba, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico for self-government was a declared policy of the United States from the time of the separation of those lands from Spain.

Despite these contributions and many others, the record of service by imperialist states is not an impressive one. The encouraging thing about it has been its acceleration : there has clearly been a growing sense of responsibility. Furthermore, it must be remembered that in respect to certain aspects of government service and policy all states, even the most advanced, have been doing no more than groping their way forward at home during the past few decades. This is true in labor relations, control of foreign capital, vocational training, and education, sanitation, and

⁴⁹ Quincy Wright, "Mandates," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* (Macmillan, 1937), X, 88. Used by permission of The Macmillan Company.

⁵⁰ Wright, *Mandates under the League of Nations*, pp. 10, 11.

health, and, in a formal sense at least, in preparation for citizenship. The imperialist states have enough to answer for without being charged with criminal offenses for being products of their own times.

Imperialism has often encountered powerful resistance in the homelands of the great imperialist powers. Anti-imperialist associations of various kinds sought to influence government policy in Great Britain, Germany and the United States. Newspapers too raised a cry against colonialism or against some of the abuses which it permitted. The press of Great Britain was especially critical, and it is to be given much of the credit for the distinct improvement in the treatment of colonial populations which began about 1910. But long before national reform made any significant modification in colonial practices the idea of international responsibility had taken root. The international conferences of Berlin in 1885 and Brussels in 1890 gave concrete form to the growing conviction that the control of backward areas was a trust for the benefit of the natives and for the good of the world. As Allied statesmen looked forward to the drafting of the peace terms that would end World War I, they saw that some form of international supervision of colonial peoples not yet ready for independence would please the idealists and at the same time somewhat assuage the feelings of the Germans and Turks who were about to be shorn of their colonies. The Mandates System which emerged from the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 was the answer to the rising demand for international guardianship. This system, administered by the League of Nations, and its successor, the Trusteeship System, administered by the United Nations, have removed many of the evils of the old imperialism. They are further discussed in Chapter 14.

COLONIALISM TODAY

Although imperialism—or, in present usage, colonialism—has suffered tremendous reverses since World War II, it is by no means a thing of the past. India, Pakistan, Indonesia, the Arab lands, and even parts of Africa have shaken loose from their earlier bonds, but most of Africa, parts of Asia, and scattered areas elsewhere remain subject to imperialist powers. Nehru has recently observed: "We talk about the crisis of the time and many people do it in different ways. Probably in the United States of America the crisis of the time is supposed to be communism versus anti-communism. Maybe so to some extent. Well, the crisis of the time in Asia is colonialism versus anti-colonialism."⁵¹ The anti-colonial group "has kept the colonial powers on the defensive almost since the day the United Nations started operating,"⁵² and, as it related to French North Africa, Cyprus, and New Guinea, colonialism dominated the Tenth Gen-

⁵¹ Quoted in *Indiagram* (issued by the Embassy of India, Washington, D.C.), No. 526 (Aug. 31, 1954).

⁵² Editorial in *New York Times*, Oct. 9, 1955.

eral Assembly. The admission of sixteen new members to the United Nations in December, 1955, added strength to the anti-colonial group, and seemed to indicate that problems of colonialism would continue to occupy the attention of the UN. The Soviet Union has heaped coals on the fires of anti-colonialism in Asia—where colonialism is almost invariably thought of as Western imperialism—although it would seem to non-Communists that the time to regard the Soviet critics as honest men would be when “the Kremlin takes off the fetters and turns loose Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania, and when its creatures in Red China and Viet Nam allow the people to choose between liberty and communism.”⁵³ To most anti-Communists, of course, the supreme imperialism of modern times is the handiwork of the Soviet Union.

While the vast imperialist recession of the postwar years and the labors of the United Nations Trusteeship Council have enormously reduced the territorial limits of imperialism and the harshness of imperialist practices, the problem of still-dependent peoples seems to have risen to new heights of harassment. Aroused spokesmen of colonial areas—some of the loudest come from now-liberated lands—may inveigh against colonialism in all its forms, but they too often accept the Leninist theory of imperialism, and they too often speak from resentment and frustration rather than from sober judgment. A deep sense of wrongs too long endured does not in itself constitute a qualification for decent and orderly self-government.

As we have already remarked, the problem is an infinitely complex one. No feeling person can fail to agree with the UN Charter's declaration that the interests of the peoples of non-self-governing territories is “paramount,” but how are those interests to be advanced? Not by traditional imperialism, not by a precipitate cutting loose of adolescent peoples, and, it seems not by grants and aid without controls. Perhaps most hopefully by the willingness of states to surrender a traditional but outmoded instrument of national policy, by courageous recognition by the United Nations of the principle of international trusteeship, and by generous and sympathetic assistance. Beyond these, “there has to be some accommodation, some patience and caution, some trust in the goodwill of the so-called colonial powers” and an awakening to the fact that “it is not the Western powers but only Russia that is failing to lead dependencies at a slower or faster pace toward freedom and independence.”⁵⁴

⁵³ Editorial in *Chicago Tribune*, Dec. 6, 1955.

⁵⁴ Editorial in *New York Times*, Oct. 9, 1955.

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War as an Instrument of. National Policy

8

War needs no documentation to prove its horrors. It destroys and ruins lives beyond number ; it makes anything like normal existence impossible ; it imposes immense burdens on national economies and imperils the freedoms of everyone ; it endangers man's very existence on this planet. It is the great curse of the international society, the endemic disease of the nation-state system. As the *ultima ratio* of power, it is always lurking in the background of international politics. The problem of war, as Edward M. Earle declared, is "the greatest unresolved riddle in politics,"¹ and the coming of total war has given it a new and greater urgency.

The study of war differs in form from the study of other instruments of national policy. With respect to diplomacy, propaganda, political warfare, and economic instruments we were concerned with the many techniques and devices available to states that care to use them ; but we are not here concerned with such military considerations as strategy, tactics, and logistics. Instead we shall note the various approaches to the study of war, inquire into the causes of war, determine what functions war has performed so well that states have been and still are unwilling to surrender their right to use it, and evaluate some of the many suggested alternatives to war.

APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM OF WAR

There is, of course, nothing new about the problem of war. Wars and rumors of war have filled the pages of history. It is quite unnecessary to review the gloomy record. It suggests that war, and not peace, is the "normal" condition of "civilized" human society. "It is doubtless safe to

¹ Edward M. Earle, "The Influence of Air Power upon History," *The Yale Review* XXXV (Summer, 1946), 592.

say," declared Raymond Fosdick, "that half the tragedies in the long story of the human race have been due to the inability of men to find any method except organized slaughter as a means of solving their rivalries and antagonisms."² War has occurred with alarming frequency under all forms of political and social order ; "recourse to war appears to follow no particular pattern in terms of race, form of government, social order, or stage of development after the appearance of warfare and property interests some five thousand years ago."³

Obviously any approach to the problem of war, like war itself, is likely to become bogged down in technicalities and in contradictions. The complexities and ramifications of the subject can be better understood from an analysis of some of the more detailed studies, such as Quincy Wright's two monumental volumes, *A Study of War*, and the third volume of Pitirim Sorokin's *Social and Cultural Dynamics*. The possible approaches to the study of war are numerous. Wright suggests the following : the legalistic, the technological, the sociological, the psychological, the biological, the ideological, and the synthetic.⁴ Another fruitful approach would be the historical as we have already suggested, it is a sad but undeniable fact that much of human history can be written in terms of wars and the preparations for and the consequences of wars. The literature on the major wars of history is enormous. One student has estimated that filing cases filled with records of World War II would reach from New York to Chicago.

WHAT IS WAR?

Before we continue with our analysis of the problem of war, it may be well to attempt a few simple definitions. What is war? How does it differ from other "nonamicable modes of settlement" such as police actions, the application of sanctions, blockades, and boycotts? Mussolini refused to admit that Italy's attack on Ethiopia in 1935-1936 was war. Technically, the military operations that began in Korea in June, 1950, were not war, although they involved major military units and brought heavy casualties.

Today the term "war" is used in many meanings. We have become accustomed to speak of the "cold war," total war, the propaganda war, psychological warfare, preventive war, and so on. In our time the term has been extended to include many kinds of hostile acts besides the direct use of armed force, and the borderlands between war and peace are becoming more and more blurred. Most authorities, however, still define war in a relatively narrow sense. According to the *New English Dictionary* it is a "hostile contention by means of armed forces, carried on between nations,

² "We Need New Words and New Faiths," *New York Times Magazine*, Dec. 19, 1948.

³ Charles Hodges, "Why War?" in F. J. Brown, Charles Hodges, and J. S. Roucek, *Contemporary World Politics* (Wiley, 1940), p. 25.

⁴ See Appendix III, "Approaches to the Study of War," in Quincy Wright, *A Study of War*, 2 vols. (University of Chicago Press, 1942), I, 423-437.

states, or rulers, or between parties in the same nation or state ; the employment of armed forces against a foreign power, or against an opposing party in the state." After presenting this relatively direct and simple definition the same dictionary devotes six and a half columns of fine print to various interpretations and usages of the term "war."

Hoffman Nickerson, in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, states that "war is the use of organized force between two human groups pursuing contradictory policies, each group seeking to impose its policy upon the other." This is a broader and somewhat more general definition than the first. Concerning the qualifying clause, Nickerson explains rather cryptically that it applies even to the party which is trying to resist aggression, since this party is trying to impose upon the aggressor its policy of retaining its freedom and independence. Quincy Wright examines many formal definitions of war and many characteristics of it. In the broadest sense he defines war as "*a violent contact of distinct but similar entities*," and in a narrower and more exact sense as "*the legal condition which equally permits two or more hostile groups to carry on a conflict by armed force*."⁵

One of the most famous and at the same time one of the most often misquoted commentaries on war is that of the great German student of war, Karl von Clausewitz. "War," wrote Clausewitz, "is only a part of political intercourse, therefore by no means an independent thing in itself.....war is nothing but a continuation of political intercourse with an admixture of other means."⁶ This statement — it can hardly be called a definition — reflects a rather cynical view of international relations, but it is useful in calling attention to the broader setting in which the nature of war must be examined ;⁷ and, ironically, it seems to have a particular relevance to the present condition of "not-war-and-not-peace."

⁵ Wright, I, 8 ; II, 685. For various definitions of war, see Quincy Wright, "Changes in the Conception of War," *The American Journal of International Law*, XVIII (Oct., 1924), 762. Italics in original.

⁶ *On War*, trans. by O. J. Matthijs Jolles (Modern Library, 1943), Book VIII, Chap. 6, p. 596.

⁷ "While modern war is waged on the diplomatic, economic, and propaganda fronts, as well as on the military front, and while in the broadest sense, the art of war co-ordinates all these elements to the purpose of victory, yet in the narrower sense used in the discipline, the art is confined to the military aspect. This embraces the organization, discipline, and maintenance of the morale of the armed forces on land, sea, and air ; the invention, development, and procurement of weapons ; the provision of transport and the movement of forces ; the conversion of policies into military objectives, such as enemy territory to be occupied, enemy forces or resources to be destroyed, and civilian or neutral interests or morale to be attacked ; and the strategy of campaigns and tactics of battles, sieges, blockades, or air raids to achieve these objectives. The larger problems of military policy, such as determination of the national policy it is to serve ; the preparation of national opinion, economy, and institutions for war ; the co-ordination of military preparation and action with diplomacy, policy, and government ; the co-ordination of national military action with that of allies ; the determination of specific war aims and peace terms ; and the conduct of diplomacy, propaganda, and economic relations with enemy, neutral, and allied countries lie in the realm of international politics and diplomacy. Yet the conduct of war is so closely related to these activities that the art of war cannot entirely ignore them. It is in fact subordinate to the art of politics." Quincy Wright, *The Study of International Relations* (Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955), pp. 149-150.

WAR IN THE MODERN PERIOD

No period of human history has been free of war, whether of tribe against tribe or of nation against nation. Fortunately, it is not necessary for our purposes to attempt a historical survey of the wars of the past. The results of many of these wars are amply recorded in the pages of history, but the issues which precipitated them are often buried with the bones of the victims.

The general tendency of warfare in the modern period — since about 1500 — has been to become more terrible in almost every respect. This tendency has been aggravated by the development of new and vastly more powerful weapons, the evolution of total war, especially as practiced by ruthless modern totalitarian regimes, and by many other concomitants of the age of industrialism, of militarization, and of ideological struggle on an unprecedented scale. Quincy Wright notes : “War has during the last four centuries tended to involve a larger proportion of the belligerent states’ population and resources and, while less frequent, to be more intense, more extended, and more costly.”⁸

In his seminal work *A Study of History* Arnold Toynbee presents an arresting analysis of the trend of war in modern times. By the latter part of the eighteenth century, he argues, war “was manifestly on the wane, not so much because wars were less frequent.....as because they were being conducted with more moderation.” The fundamental reason for this phenomenon, he believes, is that war “had ceased to be a weapon of religious fanaticism and had not yet become an instrument of nationalist fanaticism.” From about the time of the French Revolution, according to Toynbee, we have been in the period of “nationalistic internecine warfare, reinforcedby the combined ‘drive’ of energies generated by the recently released forces of Democracy and Industrialism.” Moreover, “this is a typical pattern of a time of troubles : a breakdown, a rally and a second relapse.”⁹ This analysis, though gloomy, is helpful in that it seems to give perspective to the troubles of our own days. It seems quite clear that the roots of these troubles extend far back into the past, as Toynbee forces us to realize, and that the seeds of some of the rankest plants of the twentieth century, such as total war and modern totalitarianism, are to be found in the Industrial and French Revolutions, which were thought to herald a new and happier order for men.

Vannevar Bush, who headed the Office of Scientific Research and Development in the United States during World War II, has declared that the technological innovations of World War I “made mechanized warfare possible,” that the scientific developments of World War II “rendered

⁸ Wright, *A Study of War*, I, 248. See Professor Wright’s analysis of the fluctuations of war in modern history, pp. 235 ff.

⁹ Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History*, Abridgment of Vols. I-VI by D. C. Somervell (Oxford University Press, 1947), pp. 283-284, 552-553.

conventional military practice obsolete," and that "over the horizon now loom radiological and biological warfare, new kinds of ships and planes, an utterly new concept of what might be the result if great nations again fly at each other's throats. It is this which makes the thinking hard."¹⁰

As man moves through the second half of the twentieth century it should hardly be necessary to demonstrate that another war would bring staggering burdens, untold miseries, and horrors beyond his capacity to grasp. Yet no matter how vividly the costs and tragedies of war are portrayed, horror pictures will actually do little to prevent war from coming again. The reasons for this disturbing and somewhat startling truth were analyzed in penetrating fashion by Philip C. Jessup in an article which he wrote more than twenty years ago :

The same song was sung before 1914 and long, long before. It has never deterred nations from war because it acts, if at all, on the individual and not on the mass, not on the nation, not on the government. Even for the individual it is too overwhelming and too remote to be grasped except by those in whom it touches and torments the chords of personal memory. Soon, pitifully soon, a new crop has ripened free from the memories and incapable of realization. Those impersonal things known as governments respond more readily to the stern high calls of national honor and prestige.¹¹

THE CAUSES OF WAR

Much thought and study have been devoted to the causes of particular wars, and of war in general ; but even experts differ sharply on these questions, and to the masses of the people the whole subject is a very confused one. Some of the confusion arises from a failure to distinguish between the immediate and the underlying causes of wars. Professor Sidney B. Fay, writing in the 1920's, found the distinction useful in his pioneer work on *The Origins of the World War*. After a careful study of the available documents from the archives of the belligerent powers and other original materials, Fay concluded that "the greatest single underlying cause of the War was the system of secret alliances which developed after the Franco-Prussian War." Other underlying causes which he singled out for special mention were militarism, nationalism, economic imperialism, and the newspaper press.¹² These and many other causes have been emphasized by other students of diplomacy. Quincy Wright has summarized some of the manifold approaches to this problem :

Writers have declared the cause of World War I to have been the Russian or the German mobilization ; the Austrian ultimatum ; the Sarajevo assassination ; the aims and ambitions of the Kaiser ; Poincaré, Izvolsky, Berchtold, or someone else ; the desire of France to recover

¹⁰ *Modern Arms and Free Men* (Simon and Schuster, 1949), pp. 16, 3.

¹¹ "If War Should Come," *Current History*, Jan., 1935, p. 393.

¹² 2 vols. (Macmillan, 1929), I, 32-49. Used by permission of The Macmillan Company.

Alsace-Lorraine or of Austria to dominate the Balkans ; the European system of alliances ; the activities of the munition-makers, the international bankers, or the diplomats ; the lack of an adequate European political order ; armament rivalries ; colonial rivalries ; commercial policies ; the sentiment of nationality ; the concept of sovereignty ; the struggle for existence ; the tendency of nations to expand ; the unequal distribution of population, of resources, or of planes of living ; the law of diminishing returns ; the value of war as an instrument of national solidarity or as an instrument of national policy ; ethnocentrism or group egotism ; the failure of the human spirit ; and many others.¹³

Some of these causes are immediate and some are basic ; some refer to specific events or activities, while others call attention to deep-seated forces and underlying trends. Each of these aspects would be well worth careful investigation and appraisal. Volumes have been written on almost every one of them. The abundance of materials should not be surprising, for a study of the causes of war leads into the most baffling labyrinths of international affairs.

Among the most exhaustive analyses of the causes of war have been those sponsored by the Conference on the Cause and Cure of War and by the Social Science Research Committee of the University of Chicago. Both studies were made over a period of several years in the interwar period. In the *Findings* of the Conference on the Cause and Cure of War, published in 1925, more than 250 causes were itemized, under four headings : political, economic, social, and psychological. Professor Quincy Wright summarized the findings of the Committee in a series of lectures published under the title *Causes of War and Conditions of Peace*. The causes of war were portrayed as being in a sense the obverse of the conditions of peace. Professor Wright related them to the following aspects of the world situation : "(1) a state of opinion violently hostile to the existing state of affairs ; (2) inadequacy of international organization to deal with conflicts ; (3) inadequate system of law ; (4) unstable equilibrium of material forces." He also emphasized the fact that economic and political factors entered powerfully into every one of these considerations.¹⁴

In the two formidable volumes which he devoted to *A Study of War*, Wright pointed out that the causes of war could be approached from many different angles. "War," he wrote, "has politico-technological, juro-ideological, socio-religious, and psycho-economic causes" ;¹⁵ and a substantial section of his work was built around this rather technical classification. Tell A. Turner, in a book entitled *The Causes of War and the New Revolution*,¹⁶ lists forty-one causes of war, under these headings : economic, dynastic, religious, and sentimental. Professor Charles Hodges, in a text-

¹³ Wright, *A Study of War*, II, 727-728.

¹⁴ Quincy Wright, *Causes of War and Conditions of Peace* (Longmans, 1935). See also Clyde Eagleton, *Analysis of the Problem of War* (Ronald, 1937), pp. 55-56.

¹⁵ Wright, *A Study of War* II, 739.

¹⁶ Marshall Jones Co., 1927.

book in international relations published more than a quarter-century ago, drew up an elaborate chart listing twenty-one causes of war under four "primary causes": social, political, strategic, and economic. The social causes were grouped under five subheadings: religious, racial, cultural, chauvinistic, and fear. The political causes were broken down into monarchic, domestic, nationalistic, imperialistic, diplomatic, and juridic. The strategic causes related to territory, disarmament, armament, world position, and vital interests. Under economic causes were grouped population, commercial policy, foreign investment, indemnities, and neutral rights.¹⁷ Obviously, even the subheadings are general rather than specific in character, and would require an extended breakdown and analysis in any meaningful study of war. In truth, it would seem that of the listing of causes of war there is no end.

It should be pointed out, however, that many commentators, sometimes with considerable objectivity and sometimes with none, have stressed one or at most a very few forces as the major cause of war. Thus Communist dialecticians distinguish between certain kinds of wars, such as imperialist wars, revolutionary wars, and struggles for freedom on the part of oppressed peoples; the seeds of war, they allege, are inherent in capitalism and in imperialism, which Lenin described as capitalism in its last desperate stages.

Wickham Steed has expressed the belief that fear is the chief cause of war. "The feeling of insecurity," he wrote many years ago, "and the fears which it engenders, are undoubtedly the strongest potential causes of war in the world today." These causes seem to be closely associated with the prevailing pattern of international society, composed as it is of a large number of "sovereign" states and lesser political units, with no adequate regulatory devices or agencies for peaceful readjustment on a supranational level. Here, perhaps, we come close to a major cause of modern war. "There is a cause of wars between sovereign states," declares Arnold Brecht, "that stands above all others — the fact that there are sovereign states, and a very great many of them."¹⁸ In quoting this comment Professor Wright supplies a very useful addendum: "Perhaps it would be no less accurate to attribute war to the fact that there are no sovereign states but a great many that want to be."¹⁹ The same eminent authority also suggests that wars occur because of the absence of an effective system of law and of international organization to control the use of force among nations.

Clearly, then, the causes of war are many and varied, and they may be analyzed in many different ways, all of which are likely to be at the same time useful and artificial. Under present conditions much of the difficulty can be associated with the nation-state system, and with the generally anarchic framework of contemporary international relations. We should remember, however, that wars have occurred under all types of political

¹⁷ *The Background of International Relations* (Wiley, 1932), p. 555.

¹⁸ "Sovereignty," in Hans Speier and Alfred Kahler, eds., *War in Our Time* (Norton, 1939), p. 58.

¹⁹ Wright, *A Study of War*, II, 896.

organization from the earliest recorded history of man. This is not to say that man is by nature warlike ; it suggests, rather, that man has never been successful in evolving political, economic, and social institutions of which the war institution has not been a part. This failure is particularly tragic in the era of nuclear and biological weapons and of modern totalitarianisms.

It is well to remember also that the roots of the war system are deeply imbedded in human society and institutions, and that there is no simple or single explanation for such a complex phenomenon as war. "A war, in reality," as Quincy Wright has pointed out, "results from a total situation involving ultimately almost everything that has happened to the human race up to the time the war begins."²⁰ Wars occur, of course, only where there is a profound conflict of interests, "material or ideal, actual or traditional" ;²¹ but doubtless the distinguished Catholic historian Don Luigi Sturzo is correct in stating : "War does not arise merely from differences of ideas nor from a clash of interests. Both these factors are overshadowed by a long-range psychological preparation and conditioning."²²

The causes of war are related to war as an instrument of national policy in that they tend to establish the objectives of national policy. Agitation for the recovery of lost territory may become so strong that the leaders of a state are driven to accept the recovery as an objective of state policy ; and they may find no way to attain that objective except by war. Militarism, nationalism, or the press may whip the people of a state into such a frenzy that they may demand a spectacular feat of arms. Imperialists, investment interests, or traders in foreign goods may foster the conviction of national economic insecurity or of national humiliation unless stipulated concessions be extorted from a foreign country. Munition makers may point to the preparations of another state and urge a country into preventive war. Invariably, when "something" causes a war between states it does so because the "something" has become identified with the national policy of one or more of the states.

THE FUNCTIONS OF WAR

The recurrence of war throughout history surely cannot be explained in terms of human cussedness or original sin. Unless war served some useful purpose, or at least unless rulers, governments, and peoples fancied that it did, it would not have become such a hardy perennial of the international society. Some social institutions came into being and then passed rather quickly from the scene, as the conditions which gave rise to them changed ; others, like slavery, persisted for centuries but then lost much of their former utility and gradually assumed less formidable proportions ;

²⁰ Wright, *A Study of War*, I, 17.

²¹ Alvin Johnson, "War," in *Encyclopaedia of the Social Science* (Macmillan, 1937), XV, 341.

²² *Nationalism and Internationalism* (Roy Publishers, 1946), p. 274.

others have endured throughout all ages of civilization. War belongs to the third group ; and no matter how bitterly men may attack it, or how convincingly they may prove that its costs far exceed the values gained from it, it will survive as long as the rulers of mankind can agree on no acceptable alternative to it. The hard fact is that, as Clyde Eagleton has pointed out, "war is a method of achieving purposes."²³ It has been a clumsy, costly, and indeed a rather stupid means of achieving certain ends and its frequent use has been a humiliating confession of man's inability to find more civilized means.

The point that we wish to emphasize here, however, is that war has persisted because of its social utility — that it has performed functions for which there have been no other workable procedures. While these functions tend to overlap, and while it is difficult to distinguish between primary and secondary functions and between proper and improper ones, we shall characterize them and discuss them as the major function and the minor functions.

Major Function : The Righting of Wrongs and the Enforcement of Rights

It seems indisputable that war has performed functions that have been socially desirable, and that it has made contributions quite beyond the capabilities of any other means. Professor Eagleton says that "for centuries, war has been regarded as a means of remedying unjust situations, of settling disputes, of enforcing rights."²⁴ Professor Shotwell adds that "war has been used as an instrument against criminal aggression as much as it has been the instrument of aggression itself. It has played a beneficent role in history as well as a criminal one." He then asks two pointed questions : "Where would this nation be now, or for that matter any other civilized nation, if it had not met oppression with force and asserted its determination to maintain as against the world those institutions which embody its political career?" "Are we of this generation to take the strange position that, after having made thorough use of the war tool to establish liberty, to secure democracy and to create our modern states, we are now to deny ourselves these uses?"²⁵

The student of history can point to countless instances in which war was the means by which peoples escaped from oppression which to them had become intolerable. The American Revolution ended a regime which the colonists had come to regard as denying the natural rights of man ; the French Revolution overturned a corrupt and autocratic monarchy ; the Latin American Wars of Independence removed the heavy hand of Spain and gave to Latin Americans the opportunity to build their own lives and

²³ Clyde Eagleton, *Analysis of the Problem of War*, p. 5.

²⁴ Eagleton, p. 5.

²⁵ James T. Shotwell, *War as an Instrument of National Policy* (Harcourt, Brace, 1929), pp. 15, 16.

fortunes ; the American Civil War ended once and for all the question of national unity and it brought the abolition of Negro slavery ; wars in the Balkans brought release from the misrule of the "unspeakable Turk" ; and the Spanish-American War gave Cubans relief from the tyrannical rule of Spain, and Americans relief from the constant nuisance of bloodshed and conspiracy on their doorstep. Who is to say that in these and many other cases war did no "good"? Who is to say that war produces only evil, that it is never rightfully accepted as a proper course of action, that it may not again serve to rescue the oppressed and bring better lives to many people?

Even Communists do not attempt to glorify war itself, although they appear to believe that they cannot achieve their final goals without war and although they preach the inevitability of conflict with the capitalist world. Lenin, in a famous passage, predicted "a series of frightful collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states." Stalin declared that "capitalism can only be overthrown by means of revolution which will take the form of protracted and violent struggle to the death." Mao Tse-tung wrote : ".....the central task and the highest form of revolution is to seize political power by force, to solve problems by war..... Political power emerges only from among the guns. Yes, we do uphold the revolutionary 'omnipotence of war,'This is not bad. It is good, it is Marxist..... The whole world must be recreated with guns."²⁶ These views are in accord with the familiar Marxist distinction between just and unjust wars.

There are many people today who would actually prefer war to any existing alternative. These are by no means only the would-be conquerors or the fanatics of our time. Millions of poverty-stricken, ignorant, and isolated people, living under almost intolerable conditions, might welcome another war in the hope of bettering their lot in life ; in any event they have little or nothing to lose, and to them life is cheap. Many living in the Soviet-dominated states of Eastern Europe, as well as refugees from this area, feel that war offers the only hope of regaining their lands and their freedom ; they can see no endurable future except through the holocaust of war, and no reassuring messages over the Voice of America can convince them that there is any other hope. In short, while it is doubtless true that the masses of mankind long desperately for peace, and that this longing is shared by most of their political leaders, this feeling is by no means universal.

We must draw a distinction between war of an earlier time and that of today. War was the instrument of kings for the destruction of the power of local tyrants and the unification of states. It is impossible to see how the same desirable ends could have been achieved by any means except war. Professor Shotwell says that "to eliminate this privilege at any earlier

²⁶ Quoted in unpublished dissertation (University of Pennsylvania, 1952) by Shen-Yu Dai, *Mao Tse-tung and Confucianism*, pp. 114, 131 ; from Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Writings of Mao Tse-tung* (Harbin, Manchuria, 1948).

stage of political development [before World War I] might have endangered the whole process of internal evolution, for liberty within the state, so slowly and so hardly won, had still to be maintained against possible external foes."²⁷ Today the picture is changed, but only in part. Internal security seldom requires more than police action — although no state would surrender the right to make war on its own rebellious elements — but has the external aspect changed? Can states safely renounce or abandon the right to make war?

The question of the abolition of war in any meaningful sense strikes at once at the obstruction of sovereignty. States will gladly renounce war as an instrument of national policy — on paper — as the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 demonstrated; they may pledge themselves to submit their disputes, or some of them, to the processes of peaceable settlement; and they may agree to collective action against an aggressor. What they will not do is put themselves in a position where they will be effectively denied the ancient right of "self-defense." They have never found equal security elsewhere.

An unsympathetic view of sovereignty is that it is a legal concept which states have embraced to put themselves above law, to justify their irresponsibility, to give legal validity to whatever capricious or predatory course they may choose to pursue. Undoubtedly some states have so interpreted it. A fairer and more realistic view is that sovereignty is essential equipment of the state for the discharge of its high obligation to defend the lives and interests of its people — an obligation, be it noted, that has been accepted or imposed nowhere else. In short, states cannot be denied the right to make war unless and until they are relieved of the obligations which now rest heavily and exclusively upon them.

If a careful student of war were to be asked whether he would abolish all war if he could, he would probably reply by inquiring whether the abolition of war also meant the abolition of all the oppression, injustices, and abuses which so often lead to war. If told that it did not, he might understandably decide that he would perform no service to humanity by decreeing that war should go.

It is easy to argue that the misery and abuse which have produced war should not have existed, or to insist that some other remedy should have been found. Both contentions must be readily granted. The fact remains, however, that the conditions did exist and that the people concerned saw no alternative — if, indeed, there was one. Short of long-suffering submission, which few persons would defend, it seems difficult or impossible to avoid the conclusion that resort to war has at times been the only hopeful course and that on many occasions the hope has been warranted. The judgment appears unavoidable that war has demonstrated real utility in the righting of wrongs and the enforcement of rights.

²⁷ Shotwell, p. 14.

The Minor Functions of War

We shall give particular attention to two of the minor functions of war and only passing mention to a number of alleged functions. The distinction between the major function and the first minor function, as we use the terms, is imprecise. There are many occasions in which military force has not been used to right a wrong or enforce a right and yet has profoundly affected the course of history. A case in point would be the conquest of the New World. It is such instances that we have in mind here.

The Reconstruction and Modernization of the Political and Social Order. In his significant book *War as an Instrument of National Policy*, Professor James T. Shotwell, one of the great modern crusaders for peace, asserts frankly : "War.....has been the instrument by which most of the great facts of political national history have been established and maintained. It has played a dominant role in nearly all political crises ; it has been used to achieve liberty, to secure democracy, and to attempt to make it secure against the menace of its use by other hands." "The map of the world today," wrote Shotwell, "has been largely determined upon the battlefield. The maintenance of civilization itself has been, and still continues to be, underwritten by the insurance of army and navy ready to strike at any time where danger threatens."²⁸ Professor Quincy Wright has developed this same theme : "War has been the method actually used for achieving the major political changes of the modern world, the building of nation-states, the expansion of modern civilization throughout the world, and the changing of the dominant interests of that civilization."²⁹

It may be superfluous to remind anyone that the great states of modern times have been the products of war, often of many wars. England, France, Spain, Russia, China, Japan, and the United States acquired their domains and their territorial integrity through war. Civilization and Christianity were carried to the New World by conquest. The resources of weaker lands and peoples have been made available to the stronger powers through exploitation made possible by the might of arms. Markets, too, have been opened by the British Royal Navy, by the ships of Commodore Perry in Japan, and by the fleets and soldiers of many states in a hundred lands. The technological progress of mankind has involved the use of raw materials from every section of the globe, and many of these have been surrendered at sword's point. The White Man's Burden of Rudyard Kipling and William McKinley was carried by men with a Bible and some trinkets in a satchel and guns in their hands. In short, war has been a chief maker of the modern world — its states, its industries, its morality, and its cultural pattern.

²⁸ Shotwell, p. 15.

²⁹ Wright, *A Study of War*, I, 250 : see also the section on "The Political Utility of War," II, 853-860. Wright explains that war may be "a valuable instrument of policy" under certain "conditions of law, of military technology, of foreign policy, and of international relations."

Admittedly, the world of today is not as most of us would have it. Can it not therefore be argued that in making the world as it is war has performed a disservice rather than a service, that it can be credited with no useful function? Is not the nation-state system, itself the product of war, the greatest obstacle to peace? The answer is that the absence of war as we have known it could not possibly have meant the evolution of a co-operative, peaceful world. The alternative to the building of powerful states would have been the continuation of a decentralized order of things, the persistence of literally thousands of quarreling, backward centers of population. Man's use of war — often the only instrument that he knew— has given us the modern world.

The Exaltation of Moral and Spiritual Qualities. Evidence abounds that in the past many persons have thought that war contributed to the attainment of higher moral and spiritual qualities. Some appear to have believed that the sacrifices of war were a form of atonement for past sins, others that suffering called attention to unrealized blessings, and still others that bloodshed and deprivation showed the superficiality of the materialistic ambitions that had led people to neglect spiritual values. Sentiments of this kind seem to be less common in more recent times — or at least less frequently expressed.³⁰ Perhaps they have been a casualty of total war.

We shall limit our example to a single crisis in American history, noting only what one editor had to say about the moral and spiritual values of war when the Civil War was getting under way. Not a few editors said about the same thing, but one of the best presentations of this point of view was printed on April 20, 1861, in the Springfield, Massachusetts, *Daily Republican*, one of the great American newspapers of the time. This editorial, entitled "War as a Means of Grace," closes with the following declarations :

The impulses, emotions and purposes that have moved...men for the last week have done more to elevate them than all the sermons of all the ministers of America could do in a century. They have grown better, larger, nobler, purer men for this experience. Verily war is a means of grace to them.....

So, bowed with sadness that it must be, we bend to the necessities of war, believing that it is best for us. Honorable war is better than dishonorable peace. Honorable war is better than corrupt peace. War that stirs us, and calls for self-abnegation and self-sacrifice—war that makes heroic the lives of common-place men—war that binds the hearts of men together as with bands of iron—war that brings forgetful men and women to their knees, and leads them to the acknowledgement of the God of nations—war that inspires with noble motives the brutal elements of society—war that makes us forget schemes of personal gain in devotion to

³⁰ Some more restrained sentiments on this subject may be found in A. Lawrence Lowell, *Public Opinion in War and Peace* (Harvard University Press, 1923), p. 267 ; and Henry M. Wriston, *Prepare for Peace* (Harper, 1941), p. 13.

the country—war that recalls and emphasizes the trials of the fathers of the republic—war that shows us what a true peace is worth—such war is not the greatest of evils. Peace must come at last with the millen[n]ium. We are not good enough for it yet. We grow foul with it, like stagnant water. We believe that when this struggle passes by, we shall be a better and stronger nation for it. The medicine is harsh, but who will dare to say that it is not needful? Let it come, then ; and may God in his mercy make it the blessing to us which he means it to be!³¹

The sentiments expressed by the *Republican* were by no means universal. Some editors took sharp exception to them, declaring that war could only debase and harden men, that its moral and spiritual effects were wholly negative.³² Nevertheless, the evidence is clear that in the United States on the eve of the Civil War an articulate segment of public opinion believed that war had or might have moral and spiritual functions. These sentiments, of course, are by no means peculiar to Americans. They have been expressed in other democratic states ; and nobody needs to be reminded of the extent to which spokesmen of totalitarian states extolled the virtues of war during the 1930's and early 1940's.

Other Functions. Some writers, particularly Germans, have insisted that war is a necessary process for weeding out weak and inferior peoples, leaving room for the growth and development of strong peoples. Early in World War II it was "an official credo of several powerful nations.....that war, elsewhere than on the battlefield, makes such peremptory demands upon a nation that it revitalizes the productive and creative processes of the whole of society."³³ One of the better-known proponents of this line of thinking was General Friedrich von Bernhardi. His famous pamphlet *Germany and the Next War*, published in 1914, is full of such passages as the following :

We are accustomed to regard war as a curse, and refuse to recognize it as the greatest factor in the furtherance of culture and power.....War is a biological necessity of the first importance, a regulative element in the life of mankind which cannot be dispensed with, since without it an unhealthy development will follow, which excludes every advancement of the race, and therefore all real civilization.....Without war, inferior or decaying races would easily choke the growth of healthy budding elements, and a universal decadence would follow.³⁴

Declarations of this sort require no serious refutation, particularly in an age of mechanized warfare. Addiction to the military life, the chance possession of essential war materials, and the over-all capacity to wage war

³¹ Reprinted in Howard C. Perkins, ed., *Northern Editorials on Secession*, 2 vols. (Appleton-Century, 1942), II, 1066-1067.

³² See Perkins, II, 1063-1096.

³³ Jesse D. Clarkson and Thomas C. Cochran, *War as a Social Institution : The Historian's Perspective* (Columbia University Press, 1941), p. 180.

³⁴ Pp. 11, 18, 20.

are certainly not adequate criteria for separating "healthy budding elements" from "inferior or decaying races." By Bernhardt's own standards, Germans have twice been proved to be the kind of "race" that should be removed as an impediment to civilization, a totally nonsensical judgment.

Other writers have also advanced controversial views of the functions of war : that foreign wars are sometimes essential to unity and peace at home ; that war may provide a less painful outlet for surplus population than starvation and disease ; that it has stimulated inventions ; and that it has produced a veritable revolution in industrial and agricultural production. Probably all of these claims can be verified in some instance or other, but in nearly every case they seem to magnify what was gained and to minimize what was paid.

WAR SOMETIMES PAYS

The evidence contradicts those persons who in their hatred of war loudly insist that war has never "paid." It does not sustain assertions like the following : "The most unfortunate thing about war is that it accomplishes nothing. All the effort that goes into it is wasted ; all its sacrifices are vain. The issues between nations, over which they go to war, still remain when the war is done ; war does not settle anything."³⁵ On the contrary, the evidence points inescapably to the conclusion that war has often paid — and, moreover, that it has paid not only for bad men working in bad causes but often for good men in good causes. For that reason it persists as an instrument of national policy. The attack on war must rest not upon misconceptions of its utility but upon the realization that it is an inhumane and barbarous way of achieving even good ends — that it should never be available to bad causes and never necessary to good ones.

ALTERNATIVES TO WAR

The reading of history with its never-ending recital of wars that were long and bloody and often futile, together with the realization of how many ruined lives they entailed, must lead the reader to raise the question : Wasn't there some other way out ? He must conclude that in many instances war could have been prevented by patience, information, and fair dealing. But what course was open to leaders of states who possessed those assets, who sincerely wished to avoid war but at the same time believed that fundamental interests were at stake ? We must recognize that in many instances they did find a way out ; one can readily imagine that the history of wars that might have been would be far bloodier than the history we actually have. But what about the wars that were fought ?

³⁵ Willard Waller, "War in the Twentieth Century," in Willard Waller, ed., *War in the Twentieth Century* (Dryden, 1940), p. 31.

Could they have been averted by some means? Were there not practicable alternatives?

We shall here consider a number of suggested alternatives to war. One such list was published a number of years ago by John Foster Dulles, later Secretary of State. Although prepared before the organization of the United Nations, Dulles' "False or Inadequate Solutions" must still be regarded as a thoughtful and useful compilation. We shall examine these in their original order, together with Dulles' critical comments, after which we shall note other alternatives that also have gained support.

Dulles' "False or Inadequate Solutions"³⁶

1. Education as to the horrors of war. The weakness of this approach to peace is that it relies primarily upon emotion. Preaching the violence and suffering of war is an appeal to people who are concerned about their welfare and that of their friends and families. It is "ineffective as a mass influence because.....war as it becomes totalitarian ceases to be a selfish pursuit." The emotions of wartime lead people to make precisely the kind of sacrifices that normally they would hate most to make, for sacrifice becomes the measure of patriotism. Moreover, devotion to the country's cause is not left to chance ; "when critical times arise, control of mass emotions tends to pass into official hands."

2. Education to the fact that "war does not pay." The inadequacy of this approach is also explained by the fact that "war is represented as a sacrificial act." Giving war this character "cuts the ground from under those who would stop war by emphasizing the risks to persons which are inherent in it." Furthermore, "we cannot gain our goal by persuading people that self-interest is the primary consideration, in terms of which all else must be judged" ; "the remedy is not to be found in deprecating unselfishness and extolling material or personal selfishness as the desirable standard of human conduct."

3. Isolation and economic internationalism. The purpose here is evidently to show the fallacy of isolation and of economic internationalism as two opposite approaches to peace and to suggest that something like a middle course is preferable to either.

The isolation argument is that contacts produce conflicts ; therefore to avoid conflicts, avoid contacts. As Dulles saw it, the weakness of the argument is twofold. First, it is difficult or impossible to isolate nations against ideas, and "the precipitant of modern war is primarily ideology and..... economic contacts are seldom its cause." Second, "the refusal of certain nations to facilitate economic intercourse with others may take a form which will itself be a contributing cause of war because it gives rise to a sense of repression and confinement." When states feel "shunned or iso-

³⁶ *War, Peace and Change* (Harper, 1939), pp. 72-99. Dulles also presents some interesting proposals for the prevention of war (pp. 100 ff.).

lated" by the isolation policies of other states, "they tend to develop emotional reactions and attitudes" and to become "abnormally sensitive"; consequently, they "are apt to strike out against others who are weaker than themselves."

Economic internationalism is an unsatisfactory approach to peace for several reasons. "It may be artificially stimulated [as by credit] to a point where a reaction becomes inevitable which causes isolation more complete or more repressive than would otherwise have been the case." A debtor state may be driven to economic regimentation, autarky, and an exaggerated nationalism. The creditor state may become irritated and resort to "aspersions" on the debtor state. Furthermore, ill will may arise against an exporting state because an importing state's domestic interests may be adversely affected by "obnoxious imports." Finally, since too much foreign trade may make a country dependent upon others and thus subject to embarrassment if the trade should be cut off, "a large measure of economic independence is desirable."

4. The Pact of Paris (Kellogg-Briand Pact). "So long as force is the only mechanism for assuring international changes then a purported renunciation of force is a nullity. Far from being sacred, it would be iniquitous, even if it were practicable, thus to put shackles on the dynamic peoples and condemn them forever to acceptance of conditions which might become intolerable." Dulles concludes that "the Pact of Paris would [seek to] realize a desirable result without taking any of the steps essential to achieve it."

5. The League of Nations. The Covenant of the League was "well conceived and susceptible of practical, constructive evolution." Article 19 authorized the Assembly to "advise the reconsideration by Members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world." Here was the germ of peaceful change, without which change by violent means becomes inevitable. The dominant members of the League, however, mistakenly conceived peace as the preservation of the status quo and the League as an instrument for that purpose. In fact, "true 'peace' means merely the avoidance of one particularly obnoxious *method* of change by facilitating a less obnoxious method — that 'security' can be attained only at the price of insecurity." As the Treaty of Versailles had been drawn up in an atmosphere of emotion and so embodied many injustices, only a willingness to promote peaceful change could prevent an eventual breakdown of peace itself. Largely because France and her European allies felt that their safety and even their existence would be imperiled by a slight concession which might lead to a whole series of concessions, the League Covenant became, for "all practical purposes, an alliance to perpetuate rigidly the post war status. 'Sanctity of treaties' became the League slogan, and those seeking change were branded as potential 'aggressors.'" The League was further incapacitated for its proper role by the refusal of the United States to join, by the withdrawal of cer-

tain dissatisfied powers, and by Britain's disengagement of her foreign policy from the framework of the League. The failure of the League was thus due not so much to its structural defects as to the unwillingness of its members to utilize the instrumentalities which the Covenant had created and put into their hands.

6. Nonrecognition of the fruits of aggression. This approach is "essentially another variant of the doctrine that peace means a rigid and unchanging world structure." In a practical sense it holds an intermediate position between the Pact of Paris and the League of Nations. All three aimed at preserving the status quo. The Pact of Paris involved no sanctions whatever, or at least no formal sanctions ; the League provided the possibility of severe economic and military sanctions ; nonrecognition imposed only the comparatively gentle sanctions of diplomatic disapproval, with a possible embarrassment or disruption of trade relations.

This approach has several weaknesses. Nonrecognition is not calculated to deter a major power ; it will influence only weak powers, especially those under the influence of some major power. It is not a policy which can be consistently and continuously applied, for it is based upon the absurd assumption that changes brought about by force are not changes at all. Such changes would accumulate to the point where the political relations of the states of the world would be hopelessly confused. We can condemn the use of violence in domestic society, for provision is made there for peaceful evolution and change, but we cannot "indiscriminately carry forward moral judgments of aggression into a society within which neither political nor ethical solutions are operative." Finally, "there are too few nations which have so controlled their own conduct that their officially expressed moral indignation rings true to others." Nonrecognition, when applied under circumstances of this kind, "serves as an irritant rather than a pacificator."

7. Armament. This approach to peace is supported by two theories. The first of these, and one officially presented by a number of states at the Hague Peace Conference, held that the more frightful war became "the less likelihood there was of its becoming a reality." While this argument appears to have some validity, two interrelated considerations make the theory unworkable and dangerous. For one thing, as we have noted before, the prosecution of war has shifted "from an operation motivated by selfishness to an operation motivated by unselfishness" ; the effect of this change is, of course, to arouse a sacrificial spirit among people which in part disregards or even embraces the frightfulness of modern war. Second, "the creation of vast armament in itself calls for a condition midway between war and peace. Mass emotion on a substantial scale is a prerequisite." Moreover, "a sense of peril from abroad must be engendered." Once these conditions have been brought about, "we have gone a long way on the path toward war" and "it is dangerous to rely upon reasoning as to consequence to restrain against the small additional transition necessary to the actual attainment of war." A third consideration must also be added : the effect

on the internal standard of living and on domestic tranquillity of huge expenditures for armaments.

The second theory of peace through armament was supported by France during the years following World War I. This called for heavy armaments for the status quo powers and disarmament for the states which would soon be seeking to revise the status quo in their own favor. The peace treaties saw to it that Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey were disarmed and forbidden to rearm. Two errors underlie this approach. First, it assumes that the classification of powers will be permanent, an assumption soon invalidated in this instance by the switch of Italy from the presumably satisfied powers to the dissatisfied powers. This was accomplished under the aggressive leadership of Mussolini. The theory also presumes the absence of national dynamics, a condition that will never exist. In addition, the success of this approach is contingent upon the continuous maintenance of superior armaments by the status quo countries. Actually, however, imagined security invariably leads to carelessness and to opposition to the cost of "needless" military establishments. A false sense of security eventually prompts these states to undo the very conditions on which they are dependent for the continuance of peace. Dissatisfied states are not so deluded about their national interests. War always comes again.

8. Disarmament. If armaments are conducive to war, should it not follow that disarmament is the road to peace? This appears not to be the case. "If limitation of armament comes, it will be a result rather than a cause of peace." It is more realistic to argue that "so long as the force system prevails, then armament has a utility" and that "so long as it has utility, so long will armament survive and the greater the utility, the greater will be the armament (subject to limitations of finance)." Armament limitation has been agreed upon in a few instances, but only for short periods of time when conflict between the participating states seemed impossible. While disarmament cannot be the means of obtaining peace, vast armaments do produce economic waste and emotional aberrations which become precipitating causes of war. We are unlikely ever to have "armament placed permanently on a non-competitive basis unless we first demote force from its role of supreme arbiter of change."

9. Sanctions. In his discussion of the weaknesses of sanctions, Dulles apparently had in mind both police force action and the operation of general collective security organizations such as the United Nations. If "public force serves as deterrent to individual acts of violence [within states]..... why should we not in the international field adopt a similar procedure?" The idea is right, but it requires some important qualifications. Domestic order is possible because the state provides peaceful means for revolving conflicts between individuals — not because the state is always prepared to suppress violence among a substantial part of the population. As long as peaceful procedures are available to them, most people will accept these alternatives to force. A police force can deal effectively only with "marginal

and usually abnormal elements" which do not accept the social forms agreeable to most of the people. "We must in the international field look upon sanctions as adapted only to play a comparable role." Sanctions cannot themselves be "a primary method of avoiding violence. This task is one to be achieved by the creation of a balanced form of world society. Until this is achieved it is premature to consider sanctions. When it is achieved, the role of sanctions will have shrunk to small dimensions and the problem of their form will be one of manageable proportions." As it is, "the premature development of sanctions" has led to their discrediting in many quarters.

Sanctions also have two other weaknesses. First, they may operate as a challenge to states. "Thus the dynamic nations, feeling themselves to be the likely subject of sanctions by the *status quo* nations, are spurred on to build up their armament and attain economic self-sufficiency." When states react in this manner, the result is the accentuation of nationalism and the encouragement of the very policies which the sanction concept was supposed to prevent. Another weakness of this approach is that it encourages the tendency toward undeclared wars. This comes about because the invocation of sanctions is contingent upon the announcement by some high authority of the existence of a state of war. In an effort to avoid commitment, the authority can pretend to see no war when none has been declared. The failure to declare war can thus disrupt the whole system of sanctions.

Mr. Dulles concludes his analysis of "false and inadequate solutions" with these words: "Most peace efforts have had only ephemeral results because they are limited to striking directly at an undesired manifestation. There is a failure to deal with causes which, if unaltered, inevitably produce that which we would avoid."

Additional Alternatives

Mr. Dulles' examination of nine suggested alternatives to war reveals some of the weaknesses of those approaches to peace. His discussion is somewhat academic or theoretical, and it is, of course, far from exhaustive. Other aspects of some of these approaches are examined elsewhere in this book.

Two frequently proposed approaches to peace do not appear in Mr. Dulles' list. These are the development of international law and the establishment of world government. We shall therefore briefly examine them to note their inadequacy as alternatives to war. After this we shall give some further attention to one of the most persistent of all proposals—the limitation of armaments.

International Law. To contend that wars of the past or the present could have been prevented by prohibitory law is to misunderstand the whole nature of international law or, indeed, of law in general. "No topic,"

says E. H. Carr, "has been the subject of more confusion in contemporary thought about international problems than the relationship between politics and law." He adds that "international law is a function of the political community of nations" and that it "can have no existence except in so far as there is an international community which, on the basis of a 'minimum common view,' recognizes it as binding." To put it another way, "law proceeds on the assumption that the question has been satisfactorily disposed of."³⁷ Seen in this light, international law merely registers agreement already reached ; it does not seek to impose a rule of action on a world of dissenting states. It is, in fact, made by states ; it expresses agreement, not compels it. Hence, states jealous of their sovereignty -- that is, all states -- have not "outlawed" war for the simple reason that they have regarded it as an indispensable instrument of national policy.

The outlawing of war has seemed to commend itself particularly to Americans, but it has had almost universal appeal. The high-water mark of this kind was represented by the famous Kellogg-Briand Pact, or the Pact of Paris, of 1928. Since it required nothing but the acceptance of the principles it enunciated, nations were quite willing to sign it ; sixty-one did so. It contained no provisions for enforcement ; it had no teeth. It had little legal significance, although it stated an important principle and although efforts were made to amend the Covenant of the League of Nations to bring it into harmony with the new pledge.³⁸ The Pact did not outlaw war, in spite of a rather widespread popular assumption that it did exactly that.³⁹ The signatories simply *condemned* recourse to war and *renounced* war as an instrument of *national* policy. Presumably, war could still be used as an instrument of *international* policy, and, as an American interpretation which was accepted by all the other signatories made perfectly clear,⁴⁰ it did not limit in any way the right of self-defense. Since every nation could decide "whether circumstances require recourse to war in self-defense," and since no nation would admit that it was engaged in an aggressive war, this reservation alone reduced the Kellogg Pact to a document of no more than symbolic importance. Events were soon to prove that war could not be prevented by paper pledges.

³⁷ *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939*, 2nd ed. (London, 1946), pp. 170, 178, 172.

³⁸ See *Report of the Committee for the Amendment of the Covenant of the League of Nations in Order to Bring It into Harmony with the Pact of Paris*, League of Nations, 1930, Vol. 2 ; and *Records of the Eleventh Assembly, First Committee*, pp. 131-132.

³⁹ In 1937 Professor Clyde Eagleton wrote : "International lawyers are unable to find in the Treaty any binding rule against war ; one of them even goes so far as to assert that this treaty for the first time in history makes war legal. This is so, he argues, because international law had never before admitted war to be legal, but had accepted it as an unavoidable fact, whereas the Pact of Paris admits all wars of self-defense as legal, and then makes it possible to call any war a war of self-defense. This exception, of course, vitiates the Treaty." pp. 84-85.

⁴⁰ This statement read as follows : "There is nothing in the American draft of an anti-war treaty which restricts or impairs in any way the right of self-defense. That right is inherent in every sovereign state and is implicit in every treaty. Every nation is free at all times and regardless of treaty provisions to defend its territory from attack or invasion and it alone is competent to decide whether circumstances require recourse to war in self-defense."

Nevertheless, international law has performed enormous services for peace. One of these has been the establishment of procedures for the peaceable settlement of international disputes. Behind every sane and peaceable international order must be a legal framework. The greater the number of disputes that are submitted to the arbitrament of law, the less the likelihood that some issue which originally would admit of a judicial approach will be allowed to grow and become a cause of war.

Another notable contribution of international law has been the development of the laws of war. Indeed, "the law of nations has contented itself, until our own day, with efforts to ameliorate the horrors of war by making rules for its conduct."⁴¹ The Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 formulated elaborate codes for land and naval warfare, and for the rights of belligerents and of neutrals in time of war. There was even some attempt to draft regulations for aerial warfare. Under the conditions of twentieth-century warfare the international law of neutrality has a very limited applicability; it cannot prevent the use of such weapons as the submarine and the atomic bomb, or the bombardment of industrial targets. But the rules of war are still being elaborated and are still generally obeyed. During World War II violations of these rules, even by Germany and Japan, were the exception rather than the rule, although the violations were often serious ones.

Although Hugo Grotius -- the first great writer on international law -- viewed war as a necessary evil, he tried to distinguish between a "just" and an "unjust" war, and he wanted to limit the "lawful" justification of war to self-defense and to the punishment of aggressor states. In recent years some attempts have been made to return to the concepts of Grotius, to limit the resort to war to certain well-defined situations, and to ban "unjust" wars. In the postwar period an effort has been made to revise or rewrite international law by declaring that "aggressive war" is a crime and that individuals as well as states can come within the purview of the law. Neither effort is wholly new. The records of both the League and the United Nations contain scores of proposed definitions of "aggression" and impassioned speeches in support of various proposals; but seldom have so much effort and so many words been expended with such limited results. Both the Covenant and the Charter contain strong provisions for dealing with acts of aggression, but nowhere do they attempt to define aggression.⁴² In the UN the task is left to the Security Council, and, since the passage of the Uniting for Peace Resolution in 1950, to the General Assembly in certain cases. It is up to them to determine when an act of aggression has occurred.

The most concerted effort to make aggressive war a crime in international law was made in the Nuremberg and Tokyo War Crimes Trials.

⁴¹ Clyde Eagleton, *International Government*, rev. ed. (Ronald, 1948), p. 389.

⁴² See Clyde Eagleton, "The Attempt to Define Aggression," *International Conciliation*, No. 264 (Nov., 1930); and Quincy Wright, "The Concept of Aggression in International Law," *The American Journal of International Law*, XXIX (July, 1935).

The defendants were accused of "crimes against peace," "war crimes," and "crimes against humanity." An "International Military Tribunal," composed of judges from the United States, Britain, France, and the U.S.S.R., acting under the authority of a Charter agreed upon by these four powers, sentenced a number of Nazi and Japanese political and military leaders to death, and others to terms of imprisonment ranging from life to a few years. It exonerated a few. "Various questions were raised by this procedure : could these four victor nations declare international law on behalf of the community of nations, and would it be *ex post facto* law? Is aggressive war a crime? Are individuals subjects of international law, and can they appear before an international court?"⁴³ Nevertheless, the principles of the Nuremberg trials were approved by fifty-five members of the General Assembly of the UN in December, 1946, and the International Law Commission of the UN has been attempting to translate them into rules of law. "Thus the precedent at Nuremberg seems well on its way to acceptance as a rule of law."⁴⁴ This may indeed represent a significant extension of international law and a step in the development of a stronger legal basis for international relations.

The usefulness of international law in the prevention of war does not lie in an unenforceable renunciation or prohibition. Rather, it lies in a persistent effort to close the gaps, to define the rights and duties of states more precisely, to register agreement on as many areas of the law as states can be brought to approve. In such a way, norms of international conduct will be established and the number of occasions for political decisions will be constantly reduced. For the foreseeable future, international law will not prevent recourse to war as an instrument of national policy, but it may reduce the frequency of such recourse.

World Government. Most of the proposed alternatives to war call for the strengthening and more effective use of procedures which have already been evolved, especially through such agencies as the League of Nations in the interwar period and the United Nations today. Since no procedures yet devised have been fully effective, however, it is only natural that other and more far-reaching "solutions" should also be considered. Most of the current proposals which might be placed in this category call for some kind of world government, on a regional or global scale. These proposals start with the thesis, which may be wholly correct, that there is no hope of averting war as long as the nation-state system is the prevailing pattern of international society ; therefore it logically follows that this increasingly anachronistic system must be replaced by effective supranational institutions to which the nation-states would surrender at least the most vital of their present powers. The experience of the United States in evolving a federal union after the unsatisfactory years under the Articles of Confederation is often cited as an historical parallel. Without inquiring into the validity of this comparison, it is doubtful that the remedy is a practicable one, even if

⁴³ Eagleton, *International Government*, pp. 118-119.

⁴⁴ Eagleton, *International Government*, p. 119.

the diagnosis is correct. As long as the nations of the world so jealously guard their "sovereign rights"—the Soviet Union is particularly sensitive on this point, but all other countries hold essentially the same point of view—there is little prospect that they can be persuaded or forced to surrender their rights to supranational agencies. The difficulty with any and all proposals for world government is that they would take us from where we are to where they think we should be, across bridges that have not been built to a heavenly city that does not exist. Perhaps we can and should move in the direction toward which they are pointing ; but, if so, we must move slowly from our present encampment, building roads and bridges to the future as we go along. No political leader in his right mind would advocate the abandonment of national sovereignty unless he was absolutely convinced that some larger association would actually work ; in such a vital matter he could hardly take an attitude of "let's try it and see." As Professor Shotwell tersely stated the issue : "Humanity cannot afford to trust its wistful hopes to anything, however promising, that may betray it in the hour of crisis."⁴⁵

An incisive analysis of "the illusion of world government" has been made by Reinhold Niebuhr, who is both a distinguished theologian and a realistic commentator on world affairs. "The fallacy of world government," he says, "can be stated in two simple propositions. The first is that governments are not created by fiat (though sometimes they can be imposed by tyranny). The second is that governments have only limited efficacy in integrating a community."⁴⁶ He declared that the idea of world government "assumes that constitutions can insure the mutual trust upon which community rests." and he observed that "no group of individuals has ever created either government or community out of whole cloth." The present sharp division of the world makes impossible the success of such a venture, for neither the Russians nor we are ready "at the moment, to submit our fate to a world authority without reservation, so long as the possibility remains that such an authority could annul a system of law and justice to which we are deeply committed." Even if a world government were established Niebuhr contended, it could not create a genuine community "for the simple reason that the authority of government is not primarily the authority of law nor the authority of force, but the authority of the community itself. Laws are obeyed because the community accepts them as corresponding, on the whole, to its conception of justice." To put it another way, "the police power of a government cannot be a pure political artifact. It is an arm of the community's body. If the body is in pieces, the arm cannot integrate it."

The Limitation of Armaments. The struggle for the limitation of armaments — usually called disarmament — has been motivated by the belief that the building up of armed strength by one state leads to belligerence

⁴⁵ Shotwell, p. 4.

⁴⁶ "The Illusion of World Government," *Foreign Affairs*, XXVII (April, 1949), 379-388.

on the part of that state and to feelings of insecurity on the part of other states, which then desperately augment their own strength or resort to preventive war. It is also motivated by a desire to get out from under the staggering budgets which result from competition in armaments. Sir Edward Grey, British Foreign Minister on the eve of World War I, declared that the increase in armaments "produces a consciousness of the strength of other nations and a sense of fear. Fear begets suspicion and distrust and evil imaginings of all sorts, till each Government feels that it would be criminal and a betrayal of its own country not to take every precaution, while every other Government regards every precaution of every other government as evidence of hostile intent."⁴⁷ A report issued by the American Friends Service Committee in 1951 expressed essentially the same view: "In the realm of arms, one nation's common sense is another nation's high blood pressure. Our arms create fear in Russia: Russian arms create fear in us. By seeking to deter the Russians by military might, we are inevitably forced to plunge the world into an arms race, and arms races are not conducive to security. Indeed, each new measure and counter-measure adopted by the principals in the name of defense has the effect of intensifying insecurity in both countries."⁴⁸

There has long been a consciousness of an inverse relationship between disarmament and security, and security has almost always won out. Unless some system can be evolved whereby nations will actually be more secure with less armed strength, disarmament will indeed remain a "pipe dream." It was no mere accident that instead of evolving formulas for reducing "the staggering burden of armaments" the First Hague Conference issued a Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes and established a Permanent Court of Arbitration. The Second Hague Conference, presumably called for the same purpose as the first, dropped the question of disarmament from its agenda. Very early in the prolonged discussions of arms limitation in the League of Nations, the question of security was raised, particularly by France; it persisted throughout the lifetime of the League. There is much justification for Professor Eagleton's rather contemptuous comments on the efforts of the League to bring about disarmament: ".....the League held hundreds of meetings in an impressive effort to reach agreement. Yet its whole history can be summed up in the change of the name of one of its committees, which started as a committee on the Reduction of Armaments, and ended as a committee on Arbitration, Security, and Disarmament. The latter order of words represents the evolution of the thinking of the League."⁴⁹

The discussions of armament reduction in the United Nations have followed a similar pattern. Indeed, the need for security has become all the greater in the age of the "iron curtain" and the atomic bomb. It accounts

⁴⁷ *Twenty-Five Years: 1892-1916*, 2 vols. (Stokes, 1925), I, 89. Used by permission of Sir Cecil Graves, K.C.M.G., M.C., and Messrs. Hodder & Stoughton, Ltd.

⁴⁸ *Steps to Peace: A Quaker View of U. S. Foreign Policy* (1951), pp. 13-14.

⁴⁹ Eagleton, *International Government*, p. 395.

for the strong insistence on the development of effective methods of inspection and control before any nation is willing to reduce its armed strength ; it is one of the major reasons for the failure of the efforts of the Atomic Energy, Conventional Armaments, and Disarmament Commissions. Of the five principles which were laid down for the guidance of the new Disarmament Commission in the Assembly resolution of January 11, 1952, three were concerned with security.

The point of view which has determined the policy of all great powers was succinctly described by Leo Pasvolsky :

.....the question is often raised whether competitive rearmament does not usually precipitate an armed conflict. That risk undoubtedly exists. Unfortunately, the pace of armaments is always set by the nations that intend to use military resources for aggressive purposes. My reading of history convinces me that there is more risk and danger in a continuing disparity of armed strength than in efforts to correct that disparity.....there are perhaps twenty or thirty different lines of action that must be pursued, domestically and internationally, to give us a reasonable expectation of peace and security. But I am also satisfied that none of these will suffice unless we are sufficiently strong militarily to deter the aggressor, if possible, or have a better chance of defeating him if that should become necessary.⁵⁰

American policy was well stated in the 1948 report of President Truman's Air Policy Commission :

.....the United States must have a double-barrelled policy abroad. It must work to achieve world peace through support and development of the United Nations. At the same time it must prepare to defend itself for the possibility that war may come. Not being able to count on the creation, within the future for which it now has to prepare, of a world settlement which would give it absolute security under law, it must seek the next best thing — that is, relative security under the protection of its own arms.⁵¹

There is no more tragic spectacle in our time than that of great nations squandering their resources, mortgaging their future, and imperiling the lives of their citizens in a costly and perhaps catastrophic arms race. Such a race saps economic and human resources, diverts creative energies from peaceful pursuits to purposes of destruction, heightens international tensions, and accentuates the feeling that the world is headed toward disaster. Is there no way to reverse this alarming trend? The dilemma which faces us was candidly stated by Raymond Fosdick : "There may be little logic in our course, because, by an ironical but demonstrable law, nations which have armed themselves to preserve the peace have seldom avoided war. But logical or illogical, there is nothing else we know how to do."⁵² It

⁵⁰ "The United Nations in Action," *Edmund J. James Lectures on Government* (University of Illinois Press, 1951), p. 82.

⁵¹ *Survival in the Air Age : A Report by the President's Air Policy Commission* (Government Printing Office, 1948), p. 6.

⁵² "We Need New Words and New Faiths," *New York Times Magazine*, Dec. 19, 1948.

does not necessarily follow, however, that failure to rearm will enhance the prospects of preserving the peace ; indeed, under conditions such as those which exist at the present time, unilateral or regional disarmament by the non-Communist states alone might well be the height of folly.

THE FUTURE OF WAR AS AN INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY

Professor Shotwell, after many years of careful study of World War I—he was the editor of *The Economic and Social History of the World War* in some one hundred and fifty volumes — came to the conclusion that war had reached such proportions of destructiveness that it would henceforth defeat its own purpose as an instrument of national policy. He wrote as follows :

Now...war is as uncertain in its direction as in its intensity, or its spread. It is no longer a safe instrument for statesmanship under such circumstances ; it is too dangerous to employ. It is no longer an *ultima ratio*, for it has lost its *raison d'être*. Victor and victim may suffer a common disaster. Its effects reach even into the unformed future, and rob the savings of generations yet unborn. Time, as well as space, levels its barriers to the march of destruction. This new dynamic world.....has no other defense against it, once it is loosed, than that which endangers it as well.....In short, war which was once a directable instrument of policy has now changed its nature with the nature of modern society and ceases to be controllable and directable in the hands of statesmen. By reason of its all-embracing needs, it becomes a contagion among the nations ; and one cannot safely use a contagion as an instrument.⁵³

The student of world affairs must not conclude too quickly that no gains have been made against the menace of war as an instrument of national policy, or that none can be made. Perhaps the common error is in believing that either we have war or we don't have war. A more hopeful approach would be to see to it that we have fewer and fewer wars and smaller and smaller ones, and that in particular another global war is averted. If, as seems to be the case, states cannot now safely abandon war as an instrument of national policy, perhaps they can be brought to use it more sparingly and only in morally defensible ways. Progress in disarmament, the development of international law, constructive work in international organizations, the improvement and utilization of the techniques of peaceful settlement and collective security, education for international understanding — these and other approaches may help to remove the scourge of war. This means, in short, that the realistic approach to the prevention of war is a piecemeal one. Eventually there may appear other assurances of security which will permit the total relinquishment of war as an instrument of national policy.

One distinguished authority on international relations, Edward M. Earle,

⁵³ Shotwell, p. 36.

has suggested the possible consequences of the rejection of the piecemeal approach :

It will, of course, be said that realistic grappling with Mars is Utopian. The charge might have some justification were we to hope for the eternal banishment of violence from human affairs. It is not Utopian if we consider that the problem is primarily one of removing specific causes of friction between the great powers and the adjudication of disputes, as they arise, through diplomatic negotiations and through the United Nations. ... The goal, then, should be a durable, although not necessarily an eternal peace ... Every war which is averted will be a war not fought, and every war not fought is a contribution to the long-range problem of reducing the area within which armed conflict operates in politics. The alternative is to assume that war is inevitable, to take less than the necessary measures to deal with recurring crises, to drift into catastrophe, and thus "to commit suicide in anticipation of death."⁵⁴

Realistic workers for peace will have to dismiss, though with genuine reluctance, various idealistic and religious approaches which call for a higher degree of perfectibility than can reasonably be expected of man and his social institutions. If men everywhere, and their leaders, really practiced the principles of the religions which they profess, war would disappear from civilized society. We may believe that peace would not be in jeopardy if all men truly loved one another ; but we could hardly argue that a nation should base its foreign policy and stake its existence on the assumption that they do. With all due respect to the Quakers and others of like mind, we cannot accept pacifism, or passive resistance, or Gandhi's "non-violent non-cooperation" as an effective preventive of war. As long as these sentiments are confined to a small minority of high-souled men and women they do not provide security against the danger of war. "Passive resistance destroys the means, but it does not achieve the end ; it offers no substitute for the means which it eliminates.....there are still many, whether persons or nations, who are willing to take advantage of their fellows, and who can only be restrained from doing so by the exercise of superior force. Passive resistance removes this superior force and leaves the criminal, who is willing to use force, in undisputed control."⁵⁵

To recognize the essential futility of pacifism and piety in building effective safeguards against war is not to deny that the job calls for morality and idealism, but it also calls for the realization that certain social functions have been performed by war because men and governments have devised no peaceful means for their performance. Now and then war has brought men closer to "justice" than any available peaceful recourse could have done. The door to war cannot be barred so long as the door to justice is thereby also barred. The task of peoples and of statesmen everywhere is to do every thing in their power to find alternatives to the war

⁵⁴ Earle, pp. 592-593.

⁵⁵ Eagleton, *Analysis of the Problem of War*, p. 69.

system. Now that the atomic age is here, this task is indeed the central problem of international relations. But alternatives to war will be workable only when they take over the defensible functions of war and, above all, when they are utilized by reasonable men with a will to keep the peace.

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Part Three

THE CONTROLS OF INTERSTATE RELATIONS

The Balance of Power.....9

“Sovereignty” and “power” are perhaps the two most frequently used words in the vocabulary of writers on international relations. This emphasis seems to suggest that states may do pretty much as they please — that the nation-state system is not a system at all but, instead, a polite label for international anarchy, as some critics have contended. Nevertheless, it is true that most states are on friendly terms with most other states most of the time. This condition implies that some restraints or controls must be in fairly continuous operation. We shall discuss some of these in this chapter and the five following ones.

The observer who fancies himself a “realist” may insist that all states are driven by an urge to enlarge their territory and enhance their prestige, and that only military power in the hands of other states restrains them. The economic determinist may emphasize the interdependence of states ; the legalist may think in terms of the rights and duties fixed by international law ; and the idealist may be convinced that such good-will and harmony as exist must be attributed to religion, to the fundamental decency of men, and to a world “public opinion.”

To point out the importance of national power to the security of a state is not to argue that all states are aggressive and predatory, or that they would be if they had the strength. It is rather to say that states must be

strong because some state or states may spurn all other controls and because a state's own power is its last line of defense. National power is therefore the most important of all controls in interstate relations. Much that has been written in the earlier chapters of this book is a commentary on that statement. National power can be used for peace-keeping or peace-making as well as for warmaking ; it has, in fact, proved to be the only effective instrument for halting aggression. It should be noted that the balance of power, which we are about to discuss, involves only the utilization or arrangement of national power in a special way, and that the same is true of collective security.

Our attention to national power, to the balance of power, to collective security, to procedures for peaceful settlement, to international law, and to international organization as institutionalized approaches to the control of interstate relations does not mean that other controls may not be of equal or even greater significance. Most of them, however, are too intangible for measurement or appraisal ; they include moral convictions, humanitarianism, pacifism, toleration, enlightened self-interest and many other ways of thinking that normally lead people and states to prefer to live in peace rather than in anarchy.

NATURE OF THE BALANCE OF POWER

The concept of the balance of power has been present wherever and whenever the multiple-state system has existed. It was known and applied in the ancient world, most conspicuously in the city-states of Greece, but also in Egypt, Babylonia, India and China ; indeed, David Hume, in his famous essay "Of the Balance of Power," called it "a prevailing notion of ancient times." With the coming of the Roman world-state its importance declined sharply, and it remained unimportant through the medieval period. Actually, as Quincy Wright says, it "scarcely existed anywhere as a conscious principle of international politics before 1500."¹

The great period of the theory and practice of the balance of power began shortly after 1500, and its rise to prominence coincided with the emergence of the nation-state system and with the Age of Discoveries. Increasingly, and especially after the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648, it became a cardinal feature of international relations. To quote Wright again : "While other factors have had an influence, the concept of the balance of power provides the most general explanation for the oscillations of peace and war in Europe since the Thirty Years' War."² The principle of the balance of power was written into several treaties of the eighteenth century, and was most fully applied in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It is still a basic principle of international relations, and doubt-

¹ Quincy Wright, *A Study of War*, 2 vols. (University of Chicago Press, 1942), II, 759.

² Wright, II, 756.

less will continue to be as long as the nation-state system is the controlling pattern of world politics. Under present conditions it operates far less efficiently and satisfactorily than in previous centuries when Europe was the main arena of international politics and when the nation-state system was not subject to the strains and stresses which characterize the mid-twentieth century.

• **Definitions.** Just what is meant by the phrase "the balance of power"? Professor A. F. Pollard, simply by consulting a good dictionary, concluded that there were several thousand possible meanings of the phrase, as analyzed word by word.³ The essential idea is simple enough: it is "equilibrium" of the type represented by a pair of scales. When the weights in the scales are equal, balance results. Applied to a world of sovereign states, uncontrolled by effective supranational agencies, the concept of the balance of power assumes that through shifting alliances and countervailing pressures no one power or combination of powers will be allowed to grow so strong as to threaten the security of the rest.

The balance of power may be described in a number of ways. Georg Schwarzenberger speaks of it as an "equilibrium" or "a certain amount of stability in international relations" that under favorable conditions is produced by an alliance of states or by other devices.⁴ He asserts that the balance of power "is of iniversal application wherever a number of sovereign and armed States co-exist,"⁵ whereas Hans Morgenthau describes it as "only a particular manifestation of a general social principle."⁶ G. Lowers Dickinson clarifies two uses of the term "balance": "It means, on the one hand, an equality, as of the two sides when an account is balanced, and on the other hand, an inequality, as when one has a 'balance' to one's credit at the bank." He adds, significantly, that "the balance of power theory professes the former, but pursues the latter."⁷

One of the most cogent of modern definitions is offered by Professor Sidney B. Fay in his article on the subject in the *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*: "It means," says Professor Fay, "such a 'just equilibrium' in power among the members of the family of nations as will prevent any one of them from becoming sufficiently strong to enforce its will upon the others."⁸ And Professor Morgenthau states that "whenever the term is used without qualification, it refers to an actual state of affairs in which power is distributed among several nations with approximate equality."⁹

Characteristics. Having suggested the essential nature of the balance of power, we may now observe a number of its characteristics.

First, the term itself suggests equilibrium — balance — but every student

³ "The Balance of Power," *Journal of the British Institute of International Affairs*, II (March, 1923), 51-64.

⁴ Georg Schwarzenberger, *Power Politics* (Pareger, 1951), p. 178.

⁵ Schwarzenberger, p. 181.

⁶ Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 2nd ed. (Knopf, 1954), p. 155.

⁷ *The International Anarchy, 1904-1914* (Century, 1926), pp. 5-6.

⁸ (Macmillan, 1937), II, 395. Used by permission of The Macmillan Company.

⁹ Morgenthau, p. 155n.

of history knows that almost the only certain thing about history is that it is subject to constant, ceaseless change, to shifting political patterns and power relationships — in short, to disequilibrium.

Second, the balance of power, as Nicholas J. Spykman has pointed out, is not "a gift of the gods" but is achieved by "the active intervention of man."¹⁰ States cannot afford to wait until it "happens" ; if they wish to survive, Spykman added, "they must be willing to go to war to preserve a balance against the growing hegemonic power of the period." Thus we are dealing with a diplomatic contrivance, not with a matter of historical causation.

Third, the balance of power has generally tended to favor the status quo, but again the lessons of history are instructive, for they reveal that a policy which disregards the forces making for change is doomed to eventual failure. To be effective, a balance of power policy must be a changing and dynamic one.

Fourth, how can a nation tell when a balance of power has been achieved? As any over-all comparison in power terms is a rough one at best, a real balance of power can seldom exist, and it probably would not be recognized as such if it did exist. The only real test, presumably, is that of war, and resorting to war not only upsets the balance but also creates the very conditions which a balance of power policy is supposedly designed to prevent.

Fifth, another characteristic of the balance of power is that it offers both an objective and a subjective approach. Martin Wight has suggested that the difference is that between the historian and the statesman : "The historian will say that there is a balance when the opposing groups seem to him to be equal in power. The statesman will say that there is a balance when he thinks that his side is stronger than the other. And he will say that his country *holds* the balance, when it has freedom to join one side or the other according to its own interests."¹¹ The historian, in other words, takes the objective view, whereas the statesman takes the subjective. The latter is perhaps the more realistic approach, for, as Spykman has declared, "the truth of the matter is that states are interested only in a balance of power which is in their favor. Not an equilibrium, but a generous margin is their objective."¹² Hence nations which play the balance of power game seek not a balance, but an imbalance — in their favor. The result, of course, may be political as well as mathematical absurdity.

Professor Quincy Wright, whose often-quoted work *A Study of War* contains the best contemporary analysis of the theory and practice of the balance of power, has described the manner in which statesmen have exploited the doctrine :

¹⁰ Nicholas J. Spykman, *America's Strategy in World Politics* (Harcourt, Brace, 1942), p. 25.

¹¹ *Power Politics*, (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1946), p. 46.

¹² Spykman, p. 21.

Each of the powers...especially the great powers, has been interested not only in preserving but also in augmenting its relative power ; consequently, there has never been wholehearted devotion to the balance of power principle among them. Each statesman considers the balance of power good for others but not for himself. Each tries to get out of the system in order to "hold the balance" and to establish a hegemony, perhaps eventually an empire, over all the others.¹³

Sixth, the balance of power seems to be a policy that is suitable neither for democracies nor for dictatorship. Unless geographical, political, military, and other considerations are peculiarly favorable, a democracy is a reluctant player and a poor leader in the balance of power game. It is deeply concerned with power politics only in periods of crisis. A dictatorship, on the other hand, is usually interested in dominating the contest, in establishing rules to suit its own convenience, and in gathering in all the rewards.

Seventh, the balance of power game is obviously one for the great states. Although small ones are vitally concerned in the outcome, they are more often victims, or at best spectators, rather than players. As Spykman observed, "unless they can successfully combine together," they "can only be weights in a balance used by others."¹⁴

The Role of Balancer. For the great powers, too, the balance of power is a dangerous game. The risks are great and the outcome uncertain. The most desirable role for a great power to play is that of holder of the balance, and not that of major participant in the balance itself. This is a role which England has filled more often than any other state, though with varying degrees of success. Morgenthau cites two early examples of this traditional feature of British foreign policy. Henry VIII "is reported to have had himself painted holding in his right hand a pair of scales in perfect balance, one of them occupied by France, the other by Austria, and holding in his left hand a weight ready to be dropped in either scale." William Camden, writing of England in the time of Queen Elizabeth I, stated that "France and Spain are as it were the Scales in the Balance of Europe and England the Tongue or the Holder of the Balance."¹⁵

In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries Britain, by virtue of her sea power, her semi-detachment from the continent, her industrial and political strength, her astute diplomacy, and other factors, was able to develop an effective balance of power policy and to act as a real balancer of the European state-system ; but the rise of new great powers on the continent of Europe and in America and the Far East, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, ended her enjoyment of this unique position. At the present time no real balancer exists ; indeed, under modern conditions it is doubtful that any nation can hope to succeed to England's former

¹³ Wright, II, 757-758.

¹⁴ Spykman, p. 20.

¹⁵ Morgenthau, p. 177. The latter quotation is from William Camden, *Annales of the History of the Most Renowned and Victorious Princess Elizabeth, Late Queen of England* (London, 1635), p. 196.

role. If this is true, then one of the outstanding aspects of the balance of power system in its classical period has disappeared, perhaps forever. In fact, those who believe that a balancer is essential to a balance of power system would argue that the system itself has lost its effectiveness.

The Polarization of Power. In the absence of a balancer, balance of power policies have tended toward the polarization of power, usually around the strongest members of rival alliances or groupings. Historical proof of this tendency need not be sought, for it is obviously one of the most alarming trends in world politics today. The bipolarity of power, with the Soviet Union and the United States at opposite poles and dominating "satellite" and allied nations, has created that simple balance which is the most dangerous and unstable form of the balance of power. Once bipolarity exists, it tends to become rigid as well as unstable, and a peaceful transition to a complex balance — one involving many states — becomes difficult. Most authorities would agree with DeWitt C. Poole that a good balance of power must be complex.¹⁶ When the principle was most effective, as on the continent of Europe in the eighteenth century, a complex or multiple balance existed. One of the great questions of our day is whether other centers of power will arise in the world in time to transform the bipolar balance of the present into a multiple balance, without resort to war.

The common result of these tendencies of the balance of power system toward polarization has been the establishment of a new balance by the intervention of outside states, the enlargement of the area affected by the balance, and the beginning of a new cycle of rivalries and wars. Quincy Wright has called attention to this tendency of the system "to make each civilization the cockpit of the next." His interpretation is arresting :

The balance of power having reached a state of polarization within a given situation, each faction tries to draw in states from the outside. As a result, when economic and social contacts have sufficiently progressed, a larger balance of power, dominated by states of a different civilization, has developed around the original area. The states of the original area, even though utilizing more advanced military techniques, remain divided by historic animosities and are unable to defend their civilization as a unit. Consequently, the civilization is overwhelmed... The disintegrating Holy Roman Empire was the cockpit for wars of all Europe in the seventeenth century. Europe, still intent upon its balance of power, has been and promises to continue to be the cockpit of wars involving the United States, Japan, Russia, and the British Empire. With a world balance of power established among these states, this process can no longer continue without interplanetary wars.¹⁷

It is significant that these words were written in the early days of World War II. Since then Japan has been eliminated, at least temporarily, as a

¹⁶ "Balance of Power," *Life*, Sept. 22, 1947, p. 77.

¹⁷ Wright, I, 382-383.

great power, and Great Britain has revealed weaknesses greater than most observers could have imagined a decade ago. Europe has indeed become a cockpit, or even a "power vacuum," and in an alarmingly bipolar world a "world balance of power" has by no means been established. Between Russia and the United States lie not only the once great states of the West but also the rising young nations of Asia. New forces and patterns are developing, and though still in their formative stages they may make the former preoccupations with balance of power seem inconsequential indeed.

Historical Significance. Historically, the concept of the balance of power has been of great significance only for limited periods. It was particularly successful in Europe from the sixteenth century to the nineteenth. When it was then extended to a world scale -- a development which began after 1815 at the latest and received great impetus from the rise of non-European states, notably the United States and Japan -- it proved to be less than adequate. Even in its heyday in Europe, moreover, it was, as Robert Strausz-Hupé has pointed out "but one of the many delicate balances" that regulated the equilibrium.¹⁸

The balance of power system, even in its most fully developed form, has been definitely limited in its operations. Although in the Western world in the modern period of history it has been a main regulator of interstate relations, even there it has been by no means a single system, possibly not a system at all. Within that area there have been many sub-systems, or local balances of power, which often affected the major power picture. Thus we can speak of an Italian balance of power in the fifteenth century, or later of a balance of power in the Western Hemisphere, or in the Balkans, or even in the Germanies. For some decades, especially in the eighteenth century, there seemed to be two major balances in Europe, one in the West, the other in the East. Local balances, however, usually had implications which directly affected the general pattern of great power relations; this was obviously true in the Balkans and the Germanies. Where the interrelations were less direct, the autonomous character of the balances was usually of a temporary nature, as in fifteenth-century Italy; or they were in areas which, during a period of autonomous development, were on the periphery of the zones of great power conflicts, as in Eastern Europe until late in the eighteenth century or in the Western Hemisphere until the present century.

Although the great powers of Europe long competed with each other for territorial possessions, spheres of interest, and economic concessions in China and elsewhere in Asia, and although one Asian country, Japan, rose to the acknowledged status of a great power long before the outbreak of World War II, only recently have Asian states entered the balance of power struggle in their own right. Today Communist China, independent India, and re-emergent Japan, though not great powers in any real sense, play major roles in international politics, and several other Asian states,

¹⁸ *The Balance of Tomorrow* (Putnam, 1945), p. 22.

including Indonesia, Pakistan, the Arab states as a group, and Turkey, exercise considerable influence in the councils of nations. Moreover, several Asian states, led by India, are deliberately trying to follow policies of "nonalignment" or "independence" in world affairs. These nations of the so-called "uncommitted world" may in effect be contributing to the evolution of a more complex balance of power than exists at the present time.

HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE BALANCE OF POWER

As we have already pointed out, David Hume held that the balance of power was "a prevailing notion of ancient times." This fact, he argued, should be no occasion for surprise ; for, as he explained :

The maxim of preserving the balance of power is founded so much on common sense and obvious reasoning, that it is impossible it could altogether have escaped antiquity, where we find, in other particulars, so many marks of deep penetration and discernment. If it was not so generally known and acknowledged as at present, it had, at least, an influence on all the wiser and more experienced princes and politicians.¹⁹

Like most students of the subject, Hume believed that the theory and practice of the balance of power in the ancient world found their most complete expression in the politics of Greece and in the Hellenistic era which followed the conquest of Greece by Alexander. Balance of power concepts received little attention in the Roman world after the final defeat of Carthage. Rome was able to exercise a virtual monopoly of power over all the world that mattered, and was able for several centuries to keep her potential enemies weak and scattered. Nor did these concepts mean much during the confused period that followed the decline and eventual collapse of the Roman Empire, or in the Middle Ages in general, with some exceptions. The idea of balance, on the interstate level, was foreign to scholastic thinkers and to the whole spirit of the medieval world.

Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries. The real beginning of the balance of power system dates from the late fifteenth century, when the political and secular basis of the modern world was being laid. The rivalries among the princes of northern Italy — the Medici, the Visconti, the Sforzas, and many others — and among Spanish, French, and German rulers who attempted to intervene in Italian politics, seemed to represent a conscious application of the system. In this area the modern study of statecraft and diplomacy, of political science and international relations, had its origin, and here the doctrine of the balance of power began to be formulated and consciously applied. The first explicit statement of the doctrine in early modern times is usually credited to Bernardo Rucellai (1449-1514), brother-in-law of

¹⁹ *Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects*, 2 vols. (London, 1788), 1, 305.

Lorenzo de Medici.²⁰ It was further elaborated by a more famous Florentine historian, Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527), whose classic essay *The Prince* analyzed the methods employed by successful princes in the city-states of northern Italy. About that time, too, Venice, a once-mighty city-state, was seeking to act as balancer between France and the Empire, leading Queen Mary of Hungary to say of the Venetians: "You know how they fear the power of the one and of the other of the two princes [Charles V and Francis I] and how they are concerned to balance their power."²¹

In the sixteenth century the concept of the balance of power was applied to a larger theater than the Italian peninsula. From that time until the rise of non-European powers to dominance in our own day, the concept has been a key to European politics. Morgenthau states that "the alliances Francis I concluded with Henry VIII and the Turks in order to prevent Charles V of Hapsburg from stabilizing and expanding his empire are the first modern example on a grand scale of the balance of power operating between an alliance and one nation intent upon establishing a universal monarchy."²²

England is regarded as the classic example of a country which long followed a balance of power policy. In the sixteenth century she attempted to hold the balance between France and the Holy Roman Empire; but occasionally, for her own good reasons, she supported the stronger side against the weaker — certainly a flagrant violation of the principles of the balance of power. Even Wolsey, sometimes called the originator of this historic English policy, violated these principles when, because of his overweening ambition to become pope, he led England into alliances with Charles V at a time when the Empire was stronger than France. The battle of Pavia in 1525, and the territorial concessions which Francis was forced to make for his release from captivity, nearly destroyed the balance of power in Europe in an early stage of its evolution. Thereafter, to right the balance, England swung over to a strongly pro-French policy.

The famous English philosopher Francis Bacon, writing during the reign of Queen Elizabeth (1558-1603), clearly analyzed the doctrine of the balance of power. In his essay "Of Empire" he pointed to some of its essential features. "First, for their neighbors," he wrote, "there can no general rule be given (the occasions are so variable), save one which ever holdeth — which is, that princes do keep due sentinel, that none of their neighbors do overgrow so (by increase of territory, by embracing of trade, by approaches, or the like) as they become more able to annoy them than they were." To illustrate his point, Bacon cited the two earliest modern

²⁰ Carl J. Friedrich, *Foreign Policy in the Making* (Norton, 1938), p. 123. Some historians believe that the famous French diplomat and writer Philippe de Comines, a contemporary of Rucellai, first formulated and defined the doctrine. Edward Vose Gulich, *The Balance of Power* (The Pacifist Research Bureau, 1943), p. 15. Friedrich (p. 123) suggests that the idea may have originated "with papal diplomacy."

²¹ *Papiers d'Etat du Cardinal de Granvelle*, 9 vols. (Paris, 1841-1852), IV, 121; quoted in Morgenthau, p. 177.

²² Morgenthau, p. 170.

examples of the operation of the balance of power : among the city-states of Italy in the fifteenth century, and among Francis I, Henry VIII, and Charles V in the early sixteenth century ; and he said of them, "there was such a watch kept that none of the three could win a palm of ground, but that the other two would straightways balance it."²³

Seventeenth Century. The Thirty Years War (1618-1648) can be analyzed from many points of view, including that of the balance of power. Cardinal Richelieu, for instance, sought not a real balance but one in favor of France. To weaken the Empire, in Europe as a whole as well as in the Germanies, he encouraged rival alliances, at first with the diplomatic and financial support of France and later with her military participation as well. The alliance of France with Sweden suggested new potentialities for an old doctrine. In the first place, it aligned a staunchly Catholic country, whose policy was being shaped by a Prince of the Church, with a Protestant nation whose great ruler, Gustavus Adolphus, was regarded as the champion of Protestantism in Europe. In the second place, it associated the balance of power in Western Europe with the new regional balance that had developed in the northern and northeastern sections of the continent.

The Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 firmly established the nation-state system and clearly delineated the general pattern of international relations. As a result, the balance of power began to play an even greater role than before. When the ambitions of Louis XIV of France (1643-1715) threatened to destroy the balance, he faced a series of wars against various coalitions of powers, with England and the Netherlands spearheading the opposition to him. For a time, before the nation awoke to the danger, England under Charles II was actually in alliance with France. The reaction to the alliance, and to Louis' political religious, and economic policies, however, was so strong that Charles and James II, his ardently Catholic brother, who succeeded him, could not prevent England's reversion to her now-traditional balance of power role.

Eighteenth Century. The Treaty of Utrecht of 1713, which closed the War of the Spanish Succession, in which an English-led coalition had defeated Louis XIV, expressly stated that its provisions for the division of the Spanish inheritance between Bourbons and Hapsburgs were made *ad conservandum in Europa equilibrium*. This phrase is frequently regarded as the first formal incorporation of the doctrine of the balance of power in an international agreement. The same principle, stated in greater detail, was embodied in several other treaties within the next half-century.

The eighteenth century, especially the period from the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) to the first partition of Poland (1772), has been acclaimed as the golden age of the balance of power, in theory as well as in practice. During that period most of the literature of the balance of power appeared ; and the princes of Europe accepted the balance of power as the supreme principle for their guidance in the conduct of foreign affairs. One must con-

²³ Quoted in Morgenthau, pp. 169-170.

clude that here was a kind of thread running through the maze of alliances and counter-alliances, the frequent shifts in alignments, and the devious maneuverings which marked the foreign policies of the great powers of that century. The evidence is abundant. In the first place, an analysis of the causes of the "diplomatic revolution" between the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748 and the outbreak of the Seven Years War in 1756 supports the conclusion. It is also sustained by the career of Frederick the Great of Prussia (1740-1786), an acknowledged master of the balance of power, who both wrote of his specialty and practiced it in his subtle intrigues and military ventures. Finally, one may cite the three partitions of Poland, in 1772, 1793, and 1795, as evidences of the application of balance of power principles, particularly that of compensations of territory. The treaty of 1772 between Austria and Russia explicitly stated that "the acquisitions.....shall be completely equal, the portion of one cannot exceed the portion of the other."

The eighteenth century, as we have noted, produced a prolific literature on the balance of power. By this time the concept had assumed great significance as the basis of international conduct, but it had not yet been exposed to criticism that challenged its fundamental assumptions. It was not surprising, then, that many British writers and statesmen testified to its merits, including two of the greatest of British philosophers, Edmund Burke and David Hume, and the elder and younger Pitts. Continental writers paid less attention to the doctrine, and ascribed less merit to it; but several important rulers, notably Frederick the Great, wrote about it as well as practiced it. All of them linked the idea of the balance of power with natural law and other prevailing conceptions of "the age of reason." As Carl J. Friedrich has said, "incredible as it may seem today, the theorists of the balance in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries saw it as a 'beautiful design.'" "At that period," he adds, "men were seeing 'natural balances' everywhere"; they believed in the "pre-established harmony" of the universe," and felt that "a harmonious society would result if each person pursued his own interests."²⁴

Toward the close of the century revolutionary events in France seemed to the rulers of Europe to conjure up new and serious threats to the stability of institutions everywhere. The states united in the first coalition against republican France, in 1792, proclaimed that "no power interested in the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe could see with indifference the Kingdom of France, which at one time formed so important a weight in this great balance, delivered any longer to domestic agitations and to the horrors of disorder and anarchy which, so to speak, have destroyed her political existence."²⁵

Nineteenth Century. The rise of Napoleon Bonaparte confronted Britain and other nations of Europe with a threat that they disposed of only after many years of war. The Allies formed one coalition or alliance after an-

²⁴ Friedrich, p. 119.

²⁵ Morgenthau, pp. 170-171.

other, but Napoleon seemed able to shatter them all. Finally, British sea power and finances, combined with the nationalism that Napoleon himself had evoked in Europe, brought Allied success and the restoration of the balance of power. The victors promised in the Convention of Paris of April 23, 1814, to "put an end to the miseries of Europe, and to found her repose upon a just redistribution of forces among the nations of which she is composed." The ensuing conference, the famous Congress of Vienna of 1814-1815, sought to establish a new balance of power in Europe, based upon the principles of legitimacy and, as far as possible, the preservation of the status quo.

A notable extension of the balance of power doctrine was revealed by the British foreign minister, George Canning, in a speech on December 12, 1826, before the House of Commons. "Is the balance of power a fixed and unalterable standard," he asked, "or is it not a standard perpetually varying, as civilization advances, and as new nations spring up, and take their place among established political communities?" After citing some historical evidence to support his point, Canning defended his refusal to resort to war to restore the balance in Europe after the French invasion of Spain in 1823, as Britain had been invited to do by the Congress of Verona of 1822. He said :

Was there no other mode of resistance, than by a direct attack upon France —or by a war to be undertaken on the soil of Spain? What, if the possession of Spain might be rendered harmless in rival hands...? Might not compensation for disparagement be obtained...by means better adapted to the present time? If France occupied Spain, was it necessary, in order to avoid the consequences of that occupation—that we blockade Cadiz? No. I looked another way—I saw materials for compensation in another hemisphere. Contemplating Spain...I resolved that if France had Spain, it should not be Spain "*with the Indies*." I called the New World into existence, to redress the balance of the Old.²⁶

The final sentence of Canning's statement has often been quoted by American historians, for it raises the question of Canning's part in the origin of the Monroe Doctrine. In any case, it suggests a highly important step in the evolution of the balance of power system : the beginning of its gradual extension to a worldwide system.

The interest of statesmen in the extension of the balance of power to include areas outside the major European states was also disclosed by the intervention of the great powers in the politics of the Balkans. Alarmed by the growing incapacity of Turkey and the rising influence of Russia in the Balkan Peninsula, Austria, France, and Great Britain banded together in 1854, declaring "that the existence of the Ottoman Empire in its present extent, is of essential importance to the balance of power among the states of Europe." The Crimean War followed. Later, the Congress of Berlin of

²⁶ *Speeches of the Right Honourable George Canning*, 6 vols. (London, 1836), VI, 109-111.

1878, called by the great powers of Europe, forced Russia to revise the Treaty of San Stefano which she had imposed upon defeated Turkey at the close of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878. The action of the European powers must be explained as another attempt to prevent a great power from gaining a position of dominance in the Balkan cockpit.

Meantime, however, while the doctrine of the balance of power was being cherished and practiced its assumptions were being seriously challenged. Foremost among the critics were the political philosophers of the Manchester school in Great Britain. These men espoused laissez-faire, nonimperialist, and often pacifist ideals. John Bright and Richard Cobden, the outstanding spokesmen of this school, repeatedly condemned the balance of power as a mechanical and almost satanic doctrine. Cobden in his *Political Writings* declared that "...the balance of power is a chimera ! It is not a fallacy, a mistake, an imposture --- it is an undescribed, indescribable, incomprehensible nothing ; mere words, conveying to the mind not ideas, but sounds."²⁷

For a substantial part of the century following the Congress of Vienna Britain held the enviable position of balancer. This *Pax Britannica* was made possible by a favorable combination of circumstances at home and abroad : England's leadership in the Industrial Revolution, in international finance, and in world trade ; her navy, which gave her control of the seas and free access to her widespread possessions and to the markets of the world ; and the post-Napoleonic situation in Europe, which gave Britain no formidable challenger to her unique position until the rise of Germany. The growth of the United States and Japan, the emergence of Germany, and the increasing competition for the markets and underdeveloped areas of the world, heralded the beginning of the end of England's political and industrial leadership, and, indeed, even of her naval supremacy. The rise of the United States and Japan furthermore served notice that the extension of the balance of power system, so dramatically begun by Canning, had reached around the world.

Twentieth Century. With the completion of the Triple Entente by the Anglo-Russian understanding of 1907 Europe was divided into two armed camps — that of the Triple Alliance and that of the Triple Entente. The complex balance of power of the previous century had become an alarmingly simple one. Moreover, England had been forced to emerge from her "splendid isolation," to abandon her role of balancer, and to become a member of one of the rival alliances. English statesmen, nevertheless, continued to follow balance of power policies, although they often eschewed them in theory.

The delicate balance in the Balkans persisted, and its threatened disturbance in 1914 produced a titanic conflict of the great powers. An authoritative statement on the point came from Tsar Nicholas II of Russia on August 2, 1914, when, in a telegram to King George V to England, he thus referred to Austria's ultimatum to Serbia :

²⁷ *Political Writings*, 2 vols. (Appleton, 1867), I, 258.

Object of that action was to crush Servia and make her a vassal of Austria. Effect of this would have been to upset balance of power in Balkans, which is of such a vital interest to my Empire as well as to those Powers who desire maintenance of balance of power in Europe...I trust your country will not fail to support France and Russia in fighting to maintain balance of power in Europe.²⁸

In the interwar period, from 1919 to 1939, the balance of power doctrine was still followed, although in theory it conflicted with the search for collective security and with the principles underlying the League of Nations. In fact, it proved stronger than collective security, inside or outside the League, and it provoked a series of alliances and counter-alliances, military preparations and rivalries, which, as was to be expected, eventually broke down in aggression and war. After World War II, as we shall explain later in this chapter, conditions seemed to be peculiarly unfavorable for the operation of the old system. Despite this, the balance of power remained and still remains a basic concept in international relations.

• DEVICES FOR MAINTAINING THE BALANCE OF POWER

The balance of power is an uncertain regulator, for it creates an equilibrium that is at best temporary and improvised. Even under ideal conditions its operation requires great skill and finesse and possibly a ruthless disregard of moral concepts and human welfare. As in any perfected game, it has developed rules, techniques, and devices of its own. Among these the following may be singled out for special emphasis :

1. Alliances and Counter-Alliances. These have been the most commonly employed devices of the balance of power system. Whenever one nation threatened the balance in Europe, other states formed coalitions against it, and were always able, at times after an exhausting war or series of wars, to curb the power of the overly-ambitious nation. Ad hoc or temporary alliances of a constantly shifting character have been standard practices in modern European history. After the Triple Alliance had been formed in 1882, portending significant changes in the European balance, a rival alliance — the Triple Entente — was slowly forged in dual agreements over a period of seventeen years (1891-1907), first between France and Russia, then between France and England, and finally between England and Russia.

Alliances are often divided into two kinds, offensive and defensive. Both are concerned with the balance of power, for an offensive alliance seeks to upset the balance in favor of its members and a defensive alliance aims at restoring the balance or at tipping it in favor of the states which make up the alliance. The balance of power which figures so importantly in national

²⁸ G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, eds., *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914*, 11 vols. (London, 1926-38), XI, 276. Used by permission of the Controller of Her Britannic Majesty's Stationery Office.

policies may be the world balance or it may be a strictly regional balance. Although it is conceivable that two or more states should form an alliance to discourage aggression when they could not hope to defeat it, such a move would probably be regarded as the first step toward a really effective alignment. It is not too much to say that balance of power considerations, whether regional, hemispheric, or worldwide, are a controlling factor in virtually every alliance of states. Hence the study of power alignments leads at once to the balance of power.

The first prerequisite of an effective alliance is, of course, power enough to achieve the purpose for which it was formed, whether that be aggression or defense. The second prerequisite is a common fundamental interest between or among the allying states. Other conditions, such as strategy, geography, common ideologies, cultural similarities, and complementary economies, help to make alliances relatively stable and even long-lived, but they are not prerequisites of an effective alliance for a temporary purpose. Thus alliance with the Soviet Union was a cornerstone of United States foreign policy during World War II ; despite geographical separation and all sorts of ideological and cultural differences, the two states were able to cooperate with each other, with Great Britain, and with other states so effectively that together they carried to a successful termination the most colossal military operation in history. "The Strange Alliance" was a joining of unlikes, kept together only because of desperate urgency, but its temporary effectiveness admits of no doubt.

The question whether alliances tend to promote wars is an old one. Of course offensive alliances bring war — at least the successful ones do, for that is their purpose. These alliances are usually to be condemned, but purely defensive alliances are quite another matter. The difficulty is that the nature and purposes of an alliance may be open to the most divergent interpretations. Every alliance is defensive from the point of view of those states which participate in it, and aggressive from the point of view of those states which are opposed to it. This terminological inexactitude makes most alliances suspect. No amount of declaiming will prevent aggression-minded states from combining for their evil purposes. The would-be victims must have the right to combine in defense, and no amount of declaiming will prevent them from doing so. To another charge — that defensive alliances do not defer — the reply must be that sometimes they do, sometimes they do not. When they fail to serve their purpose it is not because the idea is bad, but because they are poorly implemented or because they mount too little power.

2. Compensations. This common device usually entails the annexation or division of territory. Examples include : the division of the Spanish possessions, in Europe and outside, among Bourbons and Hapsburgs in the Treaty of Utrecht ; the partitions of Poland ; and the revision of the territorial arrangements of the Treaty of San Stefano at the Congress of Berlin. Territorial compensations have frequently been made by strong powers at the expense of weaker ones, and almost invariably by victor nations

at the end of a war. They were employed on a large scale during the great age of the new imperialism, from 1870 to 1914, as evidenced by the distribution of colonial territories and the delineation of spheres of influence in China and elsewhere among the European powers. When compensations do not relate directly to territorial areas, the principle is the same. "The bargaining of diplomatic negotiations, issuing in political compromise," for instance, as Morgenthau states, "is but the principle of compensations in its most general form, and as such it is originally connected with the balance of power."²⁹

3. Armaments and Disarmament. All major powers place great emphasis on military preparedness and other means of national defense. This policy may lead to an armaments race, to intensified rivalries among the major powers, and to an ever more dangerous and uncertain state of affairs. Moreover, improvements in weapons and methods of warfare may place an added premium on the offensive which may at least temporarily favor would-be aggressors.

In theory, a more stable balance of power could be created by ending armaments races and by proportionate reduction of armaments by rival powers. Although repeated efforts have been made to achieve reductions, the only outstanding exception to the record of continued failures and postponements is the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922, and even this famous treaty was limited in application and duration. Various kinds of disarmament have been proposed from time to time — quantitative and qualitative disarmament, arms-building holidays (as the Washington Naval Treaty), revision of the rules of war ("disarmament not of materials but of methods," as Quincy Wright put it), even moral disarmament (rather "moral rearmament"); but the net results of all of these well-intentioned efforts have been disappointing. Perhaps the real reason for this record of substantial failure has been suggested by that wise Spanish philosopher-statesman-litterateur, Salvador de Madariaga: "The problem of disarmament is not the problem of disarmament. It is really the problem of the organization of the World Community."³⁰ In essence, it is the problem of the maintenance of the balance of power.

4. Intervention and Nonintervention. These devices have been employed by countries in the position of balancer, most often Great Britain. Enjoying considerable freedom of choice, they have been able to utilize different methods for maintaining the European balance. Intervention may range all the way from slight deviations from neutrality, in the traditional sense, to full-scale military participation in a major war. Nonintervention suggests the kind of policy usually followed by small states and also by those great powers which are satisfied with the political order and can follow peaceful methods to preserve the balance. There is considerable justification for Talleyrand's remark that "non-intervention is a political term meaning virtually the same thing as intervention"; the record of the

²⁹ Morgenthau p. 168.

³⁰ *Disarmament* (Coward-McCann, 1929), p. 56.

Non-Intervention Committee during the Spanish Civil War, for instance, may be cited in support of it. Nonintervention also suggests neutrality, to the extent that such a policy is possible, or guarantees of neutrality for certain states, or efforts to localize wars or protect the "rights" of neutrals in time of war. Unfortunately, few nations have ever enjoyed the position which George Washington sought for the United States, "when we may choose peace or war, as our interest, guided by justice, shall counsel." But, as Quincy Wright has stated, "Whether taking the characteristic American form of profiting by other people's wars, the characteristic British form of divide (the continent of Europe) and rule (elsewhere), or the characteristic Scandinavian form of peace at almost any price, neutrality has assumed a balance of power, and the neutral has shaped its policy accordingly."³¹

5. Buffer States. The balance of power is especially precarious in a bipolar world, without buffer zones and neutral areas, and with the rival powers in direct contact with each other. To some extent this situation prevails today ; but the two super-powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, are widely separated by land and ocean barriers, even though an "iron curtain" is all that separates their allies in Europe, and though American troops are almost face to face with Russian soldiers in areas as widely separated as the Bering Strait and Germany. Buffer states are of great importance because of their cushioning effect between great powers ; they may be neutral or neutralized states, satellite states, or dependent territories, or they may be actively associated with one of two or more aggregations of power in a relatively honorable role.

According to Martin Wight, "the most important buffer zone in the world is that, dividing Russia from the British Empire." This is an area of weak states vast distances, formidable geographic barriers, rising nationalisms, and conflicting interests among the great powers. It is an area of never-ending interest to the geopoliticians ; it constitutes a large part of the "Inner Crescent" of Sir Halford Mackinder and of the "Rimland" of Nicholas J. Spykman. Of tremendous importance today, it may be of even greater significance in the future. If Russia should break through one of the weak points in the buffer zone -- through the Straits to the Mediterranean and possibly beyond, through Iran to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, through Afghanistan to the Punjab and the plains of the Indian sub-continent and the Indian Ocean, through Manchuria and Korea to the China seas and the Pacific -- if any one of these developments, not impossible in peacetime and highly probable in the event of war, should occur, the effects on the balance of power would be incalculable.

6. Divide and Rule. This is a time-honored policy, not necessarily associated with the balance of power ; for instance, it was employed by the Romans to maintain their control over scattered peoples, and by imperialist nations to keep native populations in subjection. Britain has been charged with "using this method to keep her Empire intact, at least until recent

³¹ Wright, II, 783-784.

years. But it has also been a device of the balance of power system. Perhaps the outstanding examples in modern times are the traditional policy of France vis-a-vis Germany ever since the seventeenth century, the policy of England toward the continent — to divide, and in a sense to rule — ever since the days of Henry VIII and Wolsey, and the policy of the Soviet Union toward the rest of Europe. This doubtless accounts in part for the persistent opposition of the U. S. S. R., to all plans and proposals for the closer political and economic integration of Western Europe.

COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND THE BALANCE OF POWER

A system of collective security has often been pictured as a pattern of international relations which is able to dispense with the balance of power and thereby to elevate the nature and tone of the world society. When nations are bound together in an international organization or association, so the argument runs, there will be no need for alliances, burdensome armaments, shady territorial deals, political manipulations and rivalries, instability, or war, all of which, it is charged, are inherent in the balance of power system. The record of attempts at collective security to date teaches a different lesson, namely, that short of effective world government such efforts are certain to be associated with balance of power policies and cannot operate unless a foundation of "power politics" exists. Quincy Wright is quite justified in asserting that "the relations of the balance of power to collective security have, therefore, been at the same time complementary and antagonistic."³² "Until world opinion is more unified than it is likely to be for a long time," Wright believes, "collective security must rely upon a balance of power which maintains such general stability that a localizing of policing actions is possible."³³

The three outstanding examples of systems of collective security in modern times have been the Concert of Europe, the League of Nations, and the United Nations. What has been their relations to the balance of power?

1. The Concert of Europe. This was the most successful application of an idea which had been entertained for centuries and had prompted many earlier experiments in international cooperation—the idea of a "Concert of Powers." The alliance system which emerged from the Congress of Vienna, centered in the Quadruple and Holy Alliances and extended and applied at a series of international conferences in the years following 1815, was presumably based on just such a concert, and was, in fact, called the Concert of Europe. The great powers were expected to co-operate harmoniously to prevent hostile groupings of powers; hence it was conceived to be on a different and perhaps a higher plane than the balance of power.

³² Wright, II, 781.

³³ Quincy Wright, *Problems of Stability and Progress in International Relations* (University of California Press, 1954), p. 106.

The Concert of Europe was a loose relationship among the major European powers which came into being soon after the Napoleonic Wars and lasted until World War I, with the second half of the nineteenth century as the time of its greatest effectiveness. Thus it was a controlling mechanism in Europe during one of the periods of the most successful operation of the balance of power. Within its broad framework the states of Europe played the power game according to traditional rules, which for a time concealed the basic changes which were occurring in the relations of states. On occasion the Concert helped to prevent major conflicts on the continent or in peripheral or colonial areas where the interests of various European states appeared to be divergent. On the whole, it was most successful in dealing with the Balkan area ; although it did not prevent serious wars, such as the Crimean War of 1854-1856 and the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, it did succeed, for several decades, in localizing wars in the Balkans, and in resolving the conflicting interests of the great powers there without resort to war. The Congress of Berlin of 1878 subjected the Concert of Europe to a critical test. In the late nineteenth century the Concert collapsed, for its foundations had not been as secure as its proponents had fancied. Its existence had been possible only under peculiarly favorable conditions, but with the rise of Germany, the growth of imperialistic rivalries, and the division of Europe into two armed camps with opposing alliances, the Concert disintegrated into a mêlée of contending states. Instead of superseding the balance of power, it had been dependent upon a balance which for a time had made great power cooperation both desirable and possible.

2. The League of Nations. It was the hope of Woodrow Wilson and other founders of the League of Nations that the League would provide a system of international cooperation and collective security which would supplant the balance of power, nurturing in its place a true "community of power." In the second of his Four Principles of February 11, 1918, Wilson expressed his firm conviction that "peoples and provinces are not to be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and pawns in a game, even the great game, now forever discredited, of the balance of power." From its outset the reality was but a faint shadow of the hope. The League concept implied universality ; yet the United States and several smaller nations refused to join, and Germany and Soviet Russia were not allowed to do so until a later date. The concept also implied that if the League's authority was challenged, enforcement machinery would be automatically invoked and members would abide by their obligations in the Covenant ; yet the League functioned haltingly, even in minor political disputes, and proved to be impotent in the face of flagrant acts of aggression by powerful member states. Several efforts to strengthen the League's collective security principles by regional security arrangements, notably in the Locarno Pacts, and by a solemn renunciation of war on a universal scale in the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, proved to be no more than momentary stimulants.

The League seemed to work satisfactorily as long as the impetus of post-war collaboration and the spirit of Locarno lingered on ; but with the coming of the worldwide depression after 1929, the rise of Hitler to power in Germany, and the succession of open challenges by the totalitarian aggressors, beginning with Japan's invasion of Manchuria in 1931, the League's impotence and inadequacies became painfully evident. Although it had been able to throw a cloak of internationalism and of collective security over the world of nation-states, it had never actually supplanted the balance of power, except in theory. It had become involved in a peculiarly unstable balance, and again collective security had failed to find a path out of the maze of the balance of power. Indeed, many careful observers came to believe with the British diplomat Lord D'Abernon that "the balance of power is a condition for an effective League of Nations" and with a distinguished authority on international law, L. F. Oppenheim, that "the existence of the League of Nations makes a balance of power not less, but all the more necessary, because an omnipotent State could disregard the League of Nations."³⁴

3. The United Nations. While the Allied powers were waging war against the Axis in World War II, they also were laying the foundations of a new international organization. Leaders in many nations studied the lessons of the League of Nations and also those which they had learned during the bitter harvest of depression, aggression, and global war. The United Nations, which they set up, was in many respects a stronger organization, more closely geared to the realities of the international scene, than the League had been. In some features, however, concessions to realities seemed to weaken it as an instrument of collective security ; for example, the great powers were given a privileged status and through use of the "veto" in the Security Council they could paralyze almost any action that the UN might wish to take. Again the Charter sanctioned and even encouraged steps for "individual and collective self-defense" outside the UN [Article 51] ; and it approved regional arrangements which could buttress but could also, in effect, by-pass the UN (Articles 52-54). It would be difficult to determine whether regional arrangements and understandings, such as the Rio Treaty of 1947 and the Organization of American States, the Arab League, and the Brussels Treaty and the North Atlantic Pact, tend to strengthen the United Nations system of collective security or to furnish current examples of the prevalence and persistence of the balance of power.

The United Nations, like the League of Nations, was launched with high expectations on the part of many of its founders. One of the most distinguished of these, the American secretary of state, Cordell Hull, on his return from the Moscow Conference of 1943, where the Soviet Union had agreed for the first time to join in the establishment of a new international organization at the end of hostilities, declared : "As the provisions

³⁴ L. Oppenheim, *International Law*, edited by R. F. Roxburgh, 2 vols. (Longmans, 1920-1921), I, 94.

of the Four-Nation Declaration are carried into effect, there will no longer be need for spheres of influence, for alliances, for balance of power, or any other of the special arrangements through which, in the unhappy past, the nations strove to safeguard their security or promote their interests."³⁵ Regrettably, this buoyant prediction was as native and groundless as Wilson's reference, a quarter of a century before, to "the great game, now forever discredited, of the balance of power." The UN, like the League, is based on the sovereignty of the members of the nation-state system, and does not operate in a vacuum. It is profoundly affected by its milieu, by contemporary international society, and especially by the nature of great power relations. Since these relations are still based in large measure on balance of power considerations, and since many aspects of the foreign policies of the great powers seem to operate outside the UN and to revolve around the fact of bipolarity and efforts to create a more complex balance, it is clear that the UN is likewise involved in a balance-of power situation.

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE BALANCE OF POWER

These examples seem to validate Quincy Wright's conclusion, already quoted, that "the relations of the balance of power to collective security have..... been at the same time complementary and antagonistic." The same statement may be made about the balance of power and international law. L. F. Oppenheim calls the balance of power "an indispensable condition of the very existence of International Law." "A law of nations," he argues, "can exist only if there be an equilibrium, a balance of power, between the members of the Family of Nations.....As there is not, and never can be, a central political authority above the sovereign States that could enforce the rules of the Law of Nations, a balance of power must prevent any member of the Family of Nations from becoming omnipotent."³⁶ Oppenheim's approach is typical of that of many authorities on international law. They are obviously thinking of a stable balance — which is in itself something of a contradiction in practice if not in theory — and are assuming that international law would have to continue to operate in a world of sovereign states. But perhaps most present-day students believe that international law, like international society, must move out of an era in which balance of power considerations are predominant and into another era in which really effective international organization and genuine collective security will exist. Perhaps, indeed, as Quincy Wright insists, "International law.....tends to convert the system of balance of power into a system of collective security."³⁷

Even in an international society in which law predominated over politics,

³⁵ *Memoirs*, 2 vols. (Macmillan, 1948), II, 1314-1315. Used by permission of The Macmillan Company.

³⁶ Oppenheim, I, 93-94.

³⁷ Wright, *A Study of War*, II, 765.

however, balance of power considerations would by no means be neglected. Wright himself fully appreciates this fact : "The difference between a world regime of law and a world regime of power politics," he wrote in 1954, "is not that the latter rests on balance of power and the former on union of power, but rather that the latter rests on a simple balance and the former on a complex balance." Hence, "if a law-governed world is to develop peacefully from the present situation, statesmen must seek to make the balance more complicated."³⁸

THE BALANCE OF POWER TODAY

We have already indicated some of the contradictions inherent in the assumptions of the balance of power and in its practical operation. Now we must consider the question : Does the concept have any validity today? The answer would seem to be twofold : (1) the conditions of the modern world are peculiarly unfavorable to the balance of power system, but (2) it is still the dominant pattern of international relations, and there is still no effective substitute for it.

Unfavorable Conditions. The balance of power worked best on the European continent in those periods of modern history in which a number of states of approximately equal strength, with policies controlled by a limited number of persons, competed with each other according to well-established and generally recognized rules. After the French Revolution, and particularly after the expansion of the European balance to a world system, conditions became less favorable for the successful adjustment of a balance among nations. The impact of new forces — nationalism, industrialism, democracy, mass education, new methods and techniques of warfare, the growing importance of public opinion, the developments in international organization and international law, the growing economic interdependence of nations and peoples in a shrinking world, the disappearance of colonial frontiers — all these and many other forces that shaped our contemporary world made the balance of power at once too simple and too difficult a policy. Other conditions unfavorable to its operation are : (1) the alarming bipolarity of power at the present time and the disappearance of the balancer of the system ; (2) the sudden, although perhaps only temporary, increase in the power of the offensive over the defensive, and the character and the frightening implications of total war — implications which would make even the most ruthless proponent of the balance of power hesitate before taking the risk of precipitating a world-wide struggle to right the balance ; (3) the growing importance of ideological considerations and other less tangible but nevertheless important elements of power ; (4) the increasing disparities in the power of states, with the super-powers becoming more and more powerful and the lesser states becoming weaker, at least in relative terms.³⁹

³⁸ Wright, *Problems of Stability and Progress*, pp. 270, 271.

³⁹ Wright, *A Study of War*, II, 760-766, 859-860.

Great Britain as Balancer? At the present time power is concentrated to a dangerous extent in two super-powers, and, as we have said, no real balancer exists. Perhaps even the conditions which made the existence of a balancer possible have disappeared forever. In the nineteenth century, profiting from peculiarly favorable conditions, Great Britain was an effective regulator ; but now the favorable conditions have passed into history, and British power and prestige have declined enormously. This is not simply a development of the postwar period, or of the past decade or two ; the process has been operating for at least three -quarters of a century. When Britain abandoned her "splendid isolation" and entered into alliances with Japan (1902), France (1904), and Russia (1907), she recognized the fact that the day had passed when she could remain aloof and play an independent and regulatory role ; but she by no means renounced her traditional balance of power policy, or her traditional position regarding it.

It has been asserted that Mr. Bevin's famous speech in the British House of Commons, on January 22, 1948, announced the end of this policy. Rather, the British Foreign Minister restated some of the cardinal aspects of England's policy toward Europe and then pledged his country's full participation in the work of "the consolidation of Western Europe." Britain's policy, he declared, was based on three principles : "The first is that no one nation should dominate Europe. The second is that the old-fashioned conception of the balance of power as an aid should be discarded if possible. The third is that there should be substituted four-power co-operation and assistance to all the states of Europe to enable them to evolve freely, each in its own way." "If we are to preserve peace and our own safety at the same time," Mr. Bevin continued, "we can only do so by the mobilization of such a moral and material force as will create confidence and energy in the West and inspire respect elsewhere. This means that Britain cannot stand outside Europe and regard our problems as quite separate from those of our European neighbors."⁴⁰

For a time after World War II it seemed that Britain, with the support of the Dominions and of a shrinking but still far-flung Empire, might become a kind of "third force," or a balancer, between the rival giants, the Soviet Union and the United States. This may be a role to which Britain still aspires, and apparently many of her leaders and her people continue to think in these terms ; but the weakness of Great Britain has proved to be greater than was generally anticipated, and the ties that bind the Commonwealth, though still strong, do not link together an aggregation of power sufficiently formidable or compact to constitute an effective "third force." Moreover, in addition to the political, economic, and imperial attrition of British power, the British Isles would be a particularly vulnerable target in an atomic war, and therefore their strategic importance also has deteriorated. In short, the country which once functioned as the regulator of the balance of power, from a relatively detached position, is now deeply involved, in a far different capacity, in postwar readjustments. Britain does not, and indeed cannot, play her earlier independent role.

⁴⁰ Quoted in the *London Times*, Jan. 23, 1948.

The United States or the U. S. S. R. as Balancer? Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union can hope to succeed to Britain's former position as holder of the balance. They are the rival poles around which the fatefully simple balance of the mid-twentieth century revolves. Although this is a role which neither power is particularly qualified to fill, and although both act like young giants who do not quite know where to put their hands or what to do with their feet, there is no escaping the fact of bipolarity and its serious implications. If the restoration of Western Europe, the strengthening of the British orbit, the development of potentially major states such as China and India, and other long-term forces could be accelerated, a more complex balance of power might come into being. If so, the Soviet Union and the United States might be freed from some of the consequences of their own strength and conflicting ideologies. As it is, neither country is well prepared to play the balance of power game, for the simple reason that the power of either alone is incomparably greater than that of any possible combination of other states. Moreover, one of the characteristics of the balance of power, as noted earlier, is that it is unsuitable as a conscious policy for either democracies or dictatorships.

Although some American statesmen have spoken of the balance of power without disapproval — Jefferson once expressed the hope “that a salutary balance of power may ever be maintained among nations,” and even Wilson, to whom the concept was anathema, believed that an attempt to dominate the continent of Europe was a threat to freedom everywhere—the United States has throughout most of her history prided herself on keeping out of “Europe's quarrels” and has developed a strong anti-balance of power tradition. She is saddled with historical, constitutional, and psychological handicaps — one might call them glorious handicaps — which seem to rule out the overt and covert manipulations that an active pursuit of a balancing role would require.

The handicaps of the Soviet Union are of a different nature. They include the traditional aloofness and suspicion of the Russian leaders and a theory of government and of society which assumes the implacable hostility of the non-Communist world and the necessity for expansion of influence and power to the utmost possible limits, with the ultimate goal of the overthrow of capitalism and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, by means of world revolution. Hence Soviet Russia is not interested in regulating the balance of power ; she is interested in destroying the present balance and—if she holds to Communist objectives—the society out of which it has developed.

The League and the UN as Balancers? When the League of Nations was being formed, some of its founders hoped that it would be able to act as a balancer among the great powers. General Jan C. Smuts expressed this hope as early as 1919. In *The League of Nations : A Practical Suggestion*, written as the Peace Conference was about to open in Paris, he said that “the league will have to occupy the great position which has been rendered vacant by the destruction of so many of the old European empires and the

passing away of the old European order."⁴¹ Obviously this hope remained unfulfilled. Today, however, the suggestion is sometimes advanced that the United Nations could act as the regulator of interstate relations : usually the suggestion is expressed in terms of collective security, but occasionally it is applied to a balance of power approach. Quincy Wright, one of the ablest modern students of the balance of power, has entertained such speculations. In 1948 he wrote :

The UN, with all the great powers participating, may succeed as a balancer where the League of Nations failed...If the UN should itself develop sufficient independent power to serve as balancer, the conditions for decentralization of power might exist.....If the UN could act as a balancer even though its independent power is inadequate to enforce its own law, it might reduce the intensity of the rivalry between the United States and the USSR, so that other regions of the world could organize independent power, thus further stabilizing the equilibrium.⁴²

This possibility, however desirable, seems so remote as to be hardly worth considering. The "ifs" in Professor Wright's statement are certainly large ones. Moreover, as he himself admits in the same article, the task of the UN is "much more difficult" than that of the League "because the conditions of the world have deteriorated."

Six years later he still believed that the United Nations could have a significant effect upon the balance of power, although the "ifs" remained :

Even if amendment of the Charter remains for a long time impossible because of the veto, even if the United Nations, for a long time or indefinitely, lacks the power to coerce the more powerful states by its own efforts, still it may, by throwing what weight it has always on the side of law, give an assurance of predominance to that side...If the United Nations itself were able to play a more vigorous role in world politics, the old dilemma between supporting international law and maintaining the balance of power may be solved.⁴³

Is the Balance of Power Obsolete? Those who believe that the age of nationalism and sovereignty is ending may logically contend that the concept of the balance of power, which has been intimately associated with nationalistic policies, is an outworn shibboleth of a dying phase of world history. Some students of society are convinced that the international relations of the future will be conducted between supranational groupings of states on principles other than that of the balance of power. Others hold that the ideological factor in world politics has become so potent in our time — consider, for example, the ideological implications of the "cold war"

⁴¹ Quoted in Frank M. Russell, *Theories of International Relations* (Appleton-Century, 1936), p. 345.

⁴² Quoted in William F. Ogburn, ed., *Technology and International Relations* (University of Chicago Press, 1949), pp. 192-193.

⁴³ Wright, *Problems of Stability and Progress*, p. 271.

--that it has superseded nationalism. This view was expressed in 1947 by Professor William G. Carleton, in a challenging article in the *Yale Review* :

...anyone called upon to answer the crucial question in international relations today would be, I think, on safe ground in saying that, from the rise of national states and up to about now, the chief element in international relations has been nationalism and the national balance of power. But he should warn the questioner not to be misled by this historic fact... because this middle of the twentieth century may be witnessing the epoch-making shift in the foundation of international politics from the nationalistic balance of power to ideology, evidence of which we shall ignore at our peril.⁴⁴

Professor Carleton suspects that ideologies may now be cutting across national boundaries, supplanting the ties of nationalism with those of a common ideology and thus undermining the balance of power concept. It is difficult to conceive of such a transformation. Ideologies and the balance of power concept are not necessarily antithetical ; actually both have operated in the past to intensify nationalism and are doing so today, but both can also be reconciled with a fundamentally different type of interstate relationship. On the other hand, it is true that where the foreign policy of a state is highly flavored by ideology, that state is usually not much interested in the balance of power and is poorly equipped to pursue it.

Again we return to the question : Does the balance of power have any validity under present conditions? We have seen that its importance in other periods of history has varied greatly, and that it has been invoked more effectively by some countries than by others. We have also seen that the conditions under which it worked best have largely disappeared, and that it is not well adapted to the international scene today. Many eminent authorities maintain that logically, if not actually, it is an obsolete concept. As long ago as 1938 Carl J. Friedrich wrote : "The value of the idea of the balance is, under present conditions, rather slight, both for the purpose of explanation and as a guide to action. New difficulties have been added to the old vagueness.....One could damn the principle today for not offering any solution at all, either in the light of justice, or of clarity, or even of understanding."⁴⁵ Five years later Quincy Wright asserted positively : "If democracy and human liberty are to survive, the nations that espouse these principles must find some device other than the balance of power to give them political security.....The balance of power as the structure of world politics is incompatible with democracy, with free enterprise, with welfare economy, and with peace."⁴⁶

Both Friedrich and Wright, being realistic students of world politics,

⁴⁴ "Ideology or Balance of Power?" *Yale Review*, XXXVI (Summer, 1947), 602. Copyright, Yale University Press.

⁴⁵ Friedrich, p. 132.

⁴⁶ "International Law and the Balance of Power," *The American Journal of International Law*, XXXVII (Jan., 1943), 138.

admit that the balance of power is still a basic element in international relations. As Friedrich remarks, it "may yet be preferable to the international anarchy which is prevailing at present" ; but, he adds, "it is a sorry concession to the foibles of human nature and the world at large."⁴⁷ The reason for the remarkable survival powers of the balance of power is obvious : as yet the nations and peoples of the world have not been willing to create any effective substitute. Such a substitute can probably be found only through world organization on the supranational level, backed by a world public opinion and a worldwide acceptance of the principles of international law. This prospect is distressingly remote. Quincy Wright, who would dearly love to write the obituary of the balance of power, felt impelled to warn that "*gradual* transition from a balance-of-power system to a juridical and co-operative international system is not likely and that states may find themselves in serious difficulties if they pursue policies adapted to the latter type of order before enough of them do so actually to establish that type of order."⁴⁸

Balance of Power or Balance of Terror? A simple balance of power exists at the present time, with two rival giants jockeying for position and for prestige and with most of the rest of the nations of the world associated with one or the other as allies, satellites, or economic dependents. Such a balance is bound to be an unstable one which will continue to threaten to break down into global war until a more complex balance develops or until other curative factors begin to have effect. Now that the Soviet Union can produce both atomic and hydrogen bombs and seems to be making rapid strides in perfecting other weapons of mass destructions, the two sides in the "cold war" may have arrived at an atomic or hydrogen stalemate. The effect of this development of weapons of mass destruction upon the balance of power cannot be precisely determined, but the new weapons certainly enhance the perils to people everywhere, and they may make old-fashioned adherence to balance of power politics as antiquated as the cannon that were such mighty weapons in the Crimea, at Gettysburg, and at Sedan. Commenting on the "summit" conference at Geneva in the summer of 1955, shortly before the conference took place, Max Ascoli wrote :

The trouble with the balance of power with which the democracies as well as the Communists are stuck is that it is actually a balance of terror and not of power. It does not lend itself to registering shifts and changes in the international equilibrium. Therefore it stands to reason that the first objective of the negotiations should be that of moving steadily from a balance of immeasurable terror to one of usable power. It is to be expected that both sides will earnestly engage in the search for practical ways to reduce armaments, for each is pursuing aims incompatible with the constant threat of reciprocal annihilation.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ Friedrich, p. 138.

⁴⁸ Wright, *A Study of War*, II, 1947.

⁴⁹ "Toward Geneva," *The Reporter*, XII (June 30, 1955), p. 8.

But not even a conference on the highest level, followed by long months of negotiations on disarmament, collective security, and more specific problems, could produce basic agreements between the Communist and non-Communist states on ways of reducing the danger of atomic-hydrogen warfare. Whatever the imperatives of the atomic age, the game of international politics is still being played according to pre-atomic rules ; and, whether obsolete or not, balance of power techniques and concepts are still very much in evidence. In fact, the prevailing grand strategy of dealing with the Soviet Union may be described as a herculean effort to create a sufficient array of power to discourage her from embarking on further campaigns of aggression or from attempting to hasten the "inevitable" world revolution. In other words, this strategy seems predicated on the assumption that the balance of power has been drastically altered in the postwar period, and that every effort must be made to restore some kind of balance. Some of the great champions of European unity, such as Winston Churchill and Paul-Henri Spaak, have frankly invoked time-honored principles of the balance of power. Speaking in the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe in September, 1953, Spaak declared : "I am, therefore, concerned.....that if we are ever to agree with the Russians, as I believe we must do if peace is to be assured, such agreements can only be reached on the basis of concrete facts and particularly on that of the balance of power."

A Final Appraisal. The concept of the balance of power, then, is still a meaningful one, although it has lost much of its validity. It is an important concept in international politics, and in its heyday it was a basic feature of the nation-state system. Its operation was by no means wholly destructive. It did sometimes help to preserve the independence of various states, and to prevent a single nation from becoming all-powerful. But, although the philosophers of the eighteenth century thought of it as a "beautiful design," it was full of contradictions and inconsistencies, even in theory. And it was sounder in theory than in practice. If it averted some wars, it led to greater ones. As long as the nation-state system is the prevailing pattern of international society, balance of power policies will be followed in practice, however roundly they are damned in theory. In all probability they will continue to operate, even if effective supranational groupings, on a regional or world level, are formed. In such an event, their normal tendencies toward war may be counteracted, and they may then contribute to the evolution of that "just equilibrium" which in theory they were always designed to create but in fact seldom achieved.

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Collective Security and. Peaceful Settlement

10

Collective security and the peaceful settlement of international disputes have been commonly regarded as the most promising of all the approaches to peace. The first seeks to confront would-be aggressors with the concerted power of states determined to keep the peace ; it involves a commitment to go to war if necessary, recognizing that the immediate peace is thereby jeopardized but assuming that future peace will be more secure if it has been clearly demonstrated that crime among nations does not pay. The peaceful settlement of disputes, on the other hand, aims at the prevention of war by the use of noncoercive or at least nonviolent procedures. The machinery of collective security has never been satisfactorily developed ; there is, in fact, only the vaguest sort of agreement on what kind of machinery is called for. By contrast, the techniques for peaceful settlement have been well developed and well marked ; they are available for all who would use them. Because these two general approaches are sometimes thought to go hand in hand and at other times to exclude each other, we must clarify their relationship to each other before we discuss them separately.

WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP?

Some authorities hold that collective security includes measures for peaceful settlement ; others, conversely, that the machinery of peaceful settlement, if it is to be adequate, must include regional arrangements and even broader agreements for collective security and defense. Still others, however, insist that the two approaches, far from being complementary, are antagonistic and even mutually exclusive, and that one of the great weaknesses of the United Nations — as earlier of the League of Nations—is that its member states have attempted to make it an instrument

serving both purposes. These points of view can hardly be reconciled, especially as they affect the emphasis in approach to the problem of war. The differences among them are highly significant. We must therefore note the current support for some of these views.

The UN View. The founder of the United Nations incorporated elaborate provisions for both approaches into the Charter. Chapter VI (Articles 33-38) deals with the Pacific Settlement of Disputes and Chapter VII (Articles 39-51) with Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression. This juxtaposition cannot be explained as a mere coincidence. Apparently the framers of the Charter believed the two approaches to the prevention of war to be complementary. Later statements by UN officials have generally been of the same tenor. Thus Secretary-General Trygve Lie, in his annual report to the General Assembly in the fall of 1951, stated :

I believe that the development of a strong and effective United Nations collective security system combined with renewed efforts at mediation and conciliation, can improve the chances of ameliorating and, in time, settling the great political conflicts that most endanger world peace today. The greater the ability of the United Nations to foil attempts to solve conflicts of national interest by force, the more likely will it be that those conflicts can be settled by negotiation.

Another statement, made by Benjamin V. Cohen, an American delegate to the General Assembly, may be regarded as typical :

The pacific settlement of disputes is a chief function of the United Nations; most of our time here in the political field is devoted to it. Some have expressed the fear that by emphasizing collective measures we are in some sense detracting from pacific settlement. My Government regards pacific settlement and collective measures as inseparable parts of collective security under the Charter. . . . If we succeed in building an effective security system, there will be less likelihood that an aggressor will risk the penalties bound to follow aggression. The object of effective security is to relieve the world of the scourge of war and the fears of war. Thus by building collective security we can release the constructive energies of the world for the constructive tasks of peace and human welfare. We can open up new possibilities for pacific settlement and the processes of peaceful change.¹

In a sense, the UN itself is the most important agency for collective security *and* peaceful settlement that has ever been created. But even though it seeks to promote all possible means "to maintain international peace and security," there is no unanimity of opinion among its members on the relative emphasis that should be placed on particular means or on relative priorities.

The View of Western Powers. Whenever they have had the opportunity,

¹ The text of Mr. Cohen's statement is given in the *Department of State Bulletin*, XXVI (Jan. 21, 1952), 98-102.

in the United Nations or elsewhere, spokesmen for the United States have endorsed the UN position. But, speeches in the United Nations notwithstanding, it is clear that the United States and other major powers of the Western world are now placing first emphasis on various forms of security programs and arrangements. They are relying more upon heavy expenditures and elaborate plans for national defense and for regional measures for "individual or collective self-defense," to use the language of Article 51 of the Charter, than upon the more general and more nebulous safeguards provided for in the Charter. In other words, they seem to be more concerned with security than with peaceful settlement; and in the field of security they seem to attach more significance to individual and regional than to collective security in its true and broader meaning. They regard this course not as a matter of preference but of necessity; in the face of present dangers they can see no alternative.

After the First World War the French placed primary emphasis on security, the British on peaceful settlement. In the early days of the League of Nations delegates from most of the member states spoke hopefully of the possibilities of arbitration and disarmament, without showing realistic appreciation of the relation of these two worthy causes to security; but as the international atmosphere darkened in the late twenties and early thirties concern for security pushed all subordinate questions more and more into the background. In the United Nations security considerations have been more prominent from the beginning; today they seem to be dominant, whatever the Charter may say. They are never far from the thoughts of the delegates, and outside the UN they are obviously matters of major concern.

What is the UN's Primary Function? The conclusion seems inescapable that the great Western powers are now emphasizing collective security rather than peaceful settlement, both in the UN and outside it. Some member states of the UN, and many organizations and individuals in most if not all of the nations of the world, believe that this attitude reflects a deplorable absorption in the present power struggle and a kind of hysterical and unbalanced approach to world problems. They hold that unless it is corrected it will make constructive work on the part of the UN impossible, and may even lead to the complete impotence of the UN and to another war. India may be taken as a leading example of a member of the UN which seems to hold this view. A well-known Quaker report entitled *Steps to Peace*, prepared for the American Friends Service Committee by a special working party and published in 1951, asked the following questions: "May not the most important function of the United Nations in an armed world be as an agency through which peaceful settlement can be continuously sought? Is it possible to keep this central function uppermost and have it unhindered by continuing discussions of the collective measures which the majority will take against the minority if and when the political conflict erupts into a military conflict?"² In the

² *Steps to Peace: A Quaker View of U. S. Foreign Policy* (American Friends Service Committee, 1951), pp. 42-43.

opinion of the Quaker group the primary function of the UN is peaceful settlement, and anything that makes it more difficult for the UN to fulfill this function is unwise and should be avoided.

These misgivings call attention to dangers in the present trends of national and international policies, and they point to a "higher way" toward a peaceful world. They tend, however, to be unrealistic and even escapist in nature. It is hard to see how the United Nations, which is itself a product of the nation-state system and is in no sense a supranational organization, can remain aloof from the conflicts of national interests and of power politics which exist today or may arise in the future. If the UN does not place continued emphasis on collective measures to deal with acts of aggression and other threats to the peace, it will not only abdicate some of its major responsibilities but it will also in all probability weaken its usefulness and influence in the field of negotiation and peaceful settlement.

The failure to recognize the relation between the activities and functions of the League of Nations and the power-political system within which it was forced to operate gave an air of unreality and impotence to the deliberations at Geneva. The same clouds of unreality hang low over the United Nations and tend to obscure the view of the world in which the organization is trying to function. If the UN conceives its mission to be solely "sweetness and light" and recoils whenever it encounters opposition or unpleasantness, it will become more a kind of international old ladies' home than a center of world activity. It will become as ineffective in international relations as the gentle souls who urge the Golden Rule as the road to peace.

Thus far we have considered the relationship between collective security and peaceful settlement, and we have summarized very different views regarding that relationship. We next turn to a more detailed analysis of the nature of these two broad approaches to the prevention of war and the maintenance of peace and of the measures which are available or are being developed for implementing them.

COLLECTIVE SECURITY

Few terms are more popular today in the Western world than "collective security"; and few are used in such vague and diverse ways. Judging from the statements of spokesmen for the American government, collective security is the most promising road to peace — indeed, the only one. Secretary of State Dean Acheson used the term no fewer than fourteen times in his address at the opening meeting of the Sixth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, on September 20, 1950. More recently, President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles have expressed the same view again and again.

Is collective security actually the responsible and realistic road to peace? When General MacArthur, who had just been relieved as commander of the United Nations forces in Korea, where presumably the principle of

collective security was meeting its greatest test, was asked in the course of hearings before the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees in May, 1951, to indicate his attitude toward this principle, he replied : "What do you mean by 'collective security?'" This question must be answered before we can assess the true significance and possibilities of collective security in international affairs.

The Nature of Collective Security. Although it appears to be simple and almost self-explanatory, the concept is in reality a complex and elusive one. It has been defined by Georg Schwarzenberger as "machinery for joint action in order to prevent or counter any attack against an established international order."³ It clearly implies collective measures for dealing with threats to peace. In a sense Ernest A. Gross, United States Deputy Representative to the United Nations, stated a truism when he declared : "There is no alternative to collective action for the achievement of security. The opposite of collective security is complete insecurity."⁴ But not all collective action is collective security. Very few ventures in collective action are designed to carry as far as collective security ; of those that are, most are in fact limited by the vague and general nature of the commitments and by the unwillingness of the states concerned to take sufficiently vigorous action to deal with major emergencies. Some efforts of this sort may in truth be better described as pointed toward noncollective insecurity.

Whereas collective action may mean the limited collaboration of a few states on an ad hoc basic, collective security implies far-reaching commitments and obligations on the part of the majority of the states of the world, including all or at least most of the great powers. It is clearly incompatible with neutrality and with a balance of power policy except under most unusual conditions of balanced stability over a period of time. As Quincy Wright explained, "The relations of the balance of power to collective security have been at the same time complementary and antagonistic" ; but "the fundamental assumptions of the two systems are different."⁵ Collective security and a balance of power policy are incompatible under usual circumstances because the object of the one is to align all other states against an offending or war-making state, whereas the other contemplates the maintenance of such an equilibrium of power that no state will dare undertake a resort to arms. The substance of the first is a world front against a possible aggressor ; the substance of the second is two approximately equal and opposing fronts.

A collective security system, to be effective, must be strong enough to cope with aggression from any power or combination of powers, and it must be invoked if and as aggression occurs. It involves a willingness to apply sanctions as and when necessary, and even to go to war. As Stanley

³ Georg Schwarzenberger, *Power Politics* (Praeger, 1951), p. 494.

⁴ Address at the University of Virginia, July 13, 1951 ; printed in the *Department of State Bulletin*, XXV (July 30, 1951).

⁵ Quincy Wright, *A Study of War*, 2 vols. (University of Chicago Press, 1942), II, 781.

Baldwin, himself anything but a stout-hearted champion of collective security in spite of his professions, declared in April, 1939 : "Collective security will never work unless all the nations that take part in it are prepared simultaneously to threaten with sanctions and to fight, if necessary, an aggressor."

Such a system involves acceptance of the view that the national interests of the participating states can in grave emergencies best be defended by collective action, even at the cost of limitations on the freedom of decision of the individual states. As Professor Friedmann explains :

A successful system of collective security does not necessarily presuppose a complete abandonment of national independence or individuality. It does, however, require the submission of the individual national will to collective decisions...and in order to be effective it requires the international control of military forces and vital weapons, which is certainly not possible without a severe restriction of national sovereignty.⁶

Furthermore, such a system must be far more than an alliance. It calls "upon nations to go beyond aligning themselves with each other only to meet the threats emanating from common national enemies and to embrace instead a policy of defense directed against aggression in general or, more precisely, against any aggression anywhere."⁷ It must be open to those states which are willing to accept its obligations in good faith. It must not be directed against any specific power or combination of powers. The decisive tests would seem to be whether the system is strong enough, whether the states associated in it abide by their obligations to the fullest extent necessary in times of crisis, and whether all, or at least most, of the great powers adhere to it.

Collective Security and Regional Arrangements. It is often stated that regional arrangements for collective defense and for other purposes establish a collective security system. This is seldom if ever true, not so much because such arrangements are geographically too limited as because they are not sufficiently binding in character and do not represent such an aggregation of military strength that they can deal with any other power or combination of powers. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, alone among regional arrangements past or present may possibly be such an aggregation of strength ; but even if it possesses adequate might it will not provide real collective security unless its members voluntarily assume more binding obligations than they were willing to accept in the North Atlantic Treaty.

Regional arrangements, however, could conceivably be an important part of a broader collective security system. This point was stressed by the

⁶ W. Friedmann, *An Introduction to World Politics* (Toronto, 1951), p. 57. Used by permission of the author, Macmillan and Company, Ltd., London, and St. Martin's Press, N.Y.

⁷ Arnold Wolfers, "Collective Security and the War in Korea," *The Yale Review*, XLIII (June, 1954), 482.

Collective Measures Committee of the United Nations, established under the Assembly's Uniting for Peace Resolution of November, 1950, in its first report to the Assembly in October, 1951. Regional arrangements, the report stated :

constitute an important aspect of the universal collective security system of the United Nations... There should be a mutually supporting relationship between the activities of such arrangements or agencies and the collective measures taken by the United Nations. Thus, collective self-defense and regional arrangements or agencies may, within the limits of their constitutional status, provide effective forces and facilities in their respective areas in order to carry out the Purposes and Principles of the Charter in meeting aggression.⁸

The exact relationship between regional arrangements and the United Nations has never been clarified. Presumably the former are supplementary to the UN system and do not supersede it ; but the final wording of a UN resolution of January 12, 1952, suggested that many of the member states of the UN viewed their obligations to regional arrangements as superior to those of the Charter. Before giving the resolution final approval, the Assembly accepted an amendment proposed by Argentina and Chile which made it clear that obligations under regional agreements and arrangements such as the Rio Treaty of 1947 and the Organization of American States, provided for at the Bogotá Conference in 1948, had priority over recommendations of the General Assembly.⁹

Collective Security and Disarmament. The relationship between collective security and disarmament has received little attention. For the most part they have been regarded as separate approaches to the problem of war. While it has not yet appeared feasible to link the two in an interdependent way in a practicable measure for maintaining peace, it may be well to observe their theoretical relationship. A forceful statement of this was made in January, 1952, by Benjamin V. Cohen of the United States delegation to the General Assembly :

I should like to stress the fact that there is an intimate relationship between a program of collective security and a program of disarmament. The two, by their nature, go hand in hand. In the disarmament field, we look to the day when no nation will have armed forces or armaments which could pose a threat to a neighbor. In the collective-security field, we look to the day when nations will not rely so much on their own forces as on the United Nations for their security. If states are assured that in case of attack they will not stand alone, they will need fewer arms for their defense. As progress is made in disarmament, the task of building collective security becomes simpler. The two march together...Disarma-

⁸ U. N. Document A/1891.

⁹ See the *New York Times*, Jan. 13, 1952. The text of the Assembly's resolution of Jan. 12, 1952, may be found in United Nations, *Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly during the 6th Session* Nov. 6, 1951-Feb. 6, 1952, p. 2.

ment and collective security are the two great enterprises for peace that this General Assembly has before it.¹⁰

Collective Security and the League System. As an instrument for the development and enforcement of collective security the League of Nations was severely handicapped and indeed virtually impotent from the start. The failure of the United States to join, the rise of the Soviet Union outside the League system, the reluctance of Great Britain to assume international obligations, and later its open defiance by Japan, Italy, and Germany—all these combined to destroy and hopes that the League would be effective in major international crises. From the beginning it was not sufficiently broad in membership; it never included all the great powers and those which belonged were by no means stout champions of collective security. France and the Soviet Union may appear to be exceptions to this judgment; but France was interested in security against Germany rather than in a genuine and universal security system, and, although Russia later joined the League and Litvinov and other Soviet delegates spoke eloquently and often of the need for collective security, Russia as primarily concerned with security against the rising menace of fascism, and she would have been prevented by her ideological orientation from joining in good faith with capitalist states in implementing a permanent system of collective security. Presumably the members of the League were committed to undertake measures of collective security, if necessary, under Article 16 of the Covenant. The Article, however, was never really implemented. Many of the League members had misgivings about it from the outset, and from time to time resolutions interpreting the obligations of the members under it were adopted. Most of these resolutions were of a limiting and restrictive nature. Together with unilateral interpretations of its meaning, and the general failure of League members to pay more than lip service to it, they took the heart out of the article.

At no time did the League assume even the external appearance of an effective security organization. In some of the disputes brought before it, especially in the early years, it rendered useful service, but in every major case involving open defiance of the Covenant by a great power the League's security structure proved unequal to the test. From the Manchurian crisis in 1931-1932 to the series of acts of aggression by Nazi Germany which culminated in the attack on Poland and the beginning of World War II, the absence of any effective security system was tragically revealed in one act of international banditry after another. In the Manchurian crisis, which began the march of aggression by the totalitarian powers, the League sent a commission to the Far East to make a firsthand investigation, discussed the question at length in Assembly meetings, usually at the insistence of the victim of aggression, China, and finally, early in 1932, passed a resolution branding Japan as the aggressor. This step, which provoked Japan to withdraw from the League, helped to keep

¹⁰ *Department of State Bulletin*, XXVI (Jan. 21, 1952), 101-102.

the record straight, but it was not followed by any concerted action against the aggressor — only by ineffective protests and fulminations.

In the history of the League the most extensive effort to give teeth to the Covenant and to make the embryonic provisions for collective security work was made during the Ethiopian crisis of 1935-1936. When Italian forces invaded the independent African state, the matter was immediately brought to the attention of the League ; and when Italy refused to suspend hostilities the Council of the League, in spite of Italian protests, voted to impose sanctions against Italy. The Italo-Ethiopian War thus became the chief test case — indeed, the only real one — of the effectiveness of the League's security system. As all the world knows, the League failed in this crucial test. With strong moral support but little official cooperation from the United States, the members of the League did not apply sanctions "automatically, simultaneously and comprehensively," but "haltingly, gradually and piecemeal."¹¹ Oil sanctions were never applied, and the Suez Canal remained open to Italian ships. When the tragicomic farce was over, Mussolini had added Ethiopia to his dominions and the weakness of the League as an instrument of security had been clearly revealed. Haile Selassie, the diminutive but dignified Emperor of Ethiopia, appearing before the League's Assembly, spoke more as the voice of international conscience than as the fugitive ruler of a backward African state. He reminded the delegates that Mussolini's successful defiance of the League had not only resulted in the loss of independence of his country but had also dealt a body blow to the hopes for world peace. Gently but firmly he warned the hushed gathering that there would be more Ethiopian incidents and still more until the totalitarian states dominated the world or until the peace-loving nations united to resist further acts of aggression, even at the risk of war.

The gloomy prophecies of Haile Selassie proved all too correct. Not long after Italy's occupation of Ethiopia came the Nazi conquest of Austria, then the surrender to Hitler at Munich, then the obliteration of Czechoslovakia, and then the invasion of Poland that began World War II. After 1936 the League as such made no further attempts of any consequence to arrest the alarming course of events. The year 1936 was "the year of decision." England and France, after the dismal failure of appeasement, began frantically to rearm. The United States was still influenced by the delusions of isolation, although she protested strongly against the acts of aggression, and although President Roosevelt, after 1937 at least, did his best to arouse the country to the possible dangers to it from unchecked aggression by the Axis powers. The Soviet Union, unable to gain support for collective security, developed a deep-seated suspicion and distrust of the policies of the major Western states, and turned more and more to alternative courses in diplomacy and to an accelerated defense program at home. In March, 1939, soon after the Nazi occupation of Czechoslovakia, Stalin made this bitter but accurate remark : "The non-aggressive

¹¹ Schwarzenberger, p. 498.

states, primarily England, France and the United States ... have rejected the policy of collective security, the policy of collective resistance to the aggressors, and have taken up a position of non-intervention, a position of 'neutrality.' " "The policy of non-intervention," he warned, "means conniving at aggression, giving free rein to war, and, consequently, transforming the war into a world war." Within six months after Stalin had uttered this warning, the series of acts of aggression, of "little wars," had culminated in World War II. The feebleness of the attempts at collective security had brought forth bitter fruit.

From the experience of the League of Nations we may conclude that half-hearted efforts in the direction of collective security are almost certain to be unavailing. The League never did develop a security system worthy of the name — in spite of Article 16 of the Covenant, emphasis on security in the interwar period, and the extensive discussions of the principle of collective security in the 1930's. The failure of the League in this vital respect was due to no absence of machinery but to the vacillations and myopia of what Stalin called "the non-aggressive states," particularly the major democratic nations, and to their unreadiness and unwillingness to take the risks which an effective system of collective security necessarily entailed.

Collective Security and the United Nations. The price of the failure to provide collective security after World War I was World War II. It was too high a price, and during the second global conflict within a single generation much more careful preparation was made for a postwar order. Even before V-J Day the states of the world, again with the major peace-loving states bearing the primary responsibility, were confronted with the same choice they had faced after November, 1918— the choice, as Hans Kohn once described it, "between making the post-war system of law and order genuinely work or else seeing the frail structure relapse into the chaotic anarchy which had begotten not only the war of 1914-1918 but one war behind another before that."¹² What choice did they make in April, 1945? Did they profit from the lessons of experience? Did they this time lay the foundations for a really effective collective security system, and erect a strong edifice on these foundations?

1. *Provisions of the Charter.* At first glance it may seem that the foundations were well laid. The provisions of the Charter of the United Nations for collective action are much more extensive and apparently much more far-reaching than those of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Furthermore, the UN system has been buttressed by regional arrangements and agreements, some of which, notably those existing in Western Europe, the Atlantic Community, and the Western Hemisphere, establish strong regional security systems which are presumably consistent with and supplementary to the UN system.

Article 1 of the UN Charter calls for "effective collective measures for

¹² Quoted in Arnold Toynbee, ed., *Survey of International Affairs 1935, II, Abyssinia and Italy* (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1936), p. 6.

the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace," and Chapter VII of the Charter points out in great detail what these "effective collective measures" may be. If the Security Council finds that an act of aggression or other threat to the peace has occurred, and if the parties concerned do not comply with such measures as the Council shall deem necessary, the UN body may call upon the member states to take any of a wide variety of nonmilitary and, if necessary, military measures against the offending state or states. Article 43 provides that "All Members of the United Nations.....undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call or in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities.....necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security." Article 45 stipulates that "Members shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action." Article 47 provides for a Military Staff Committee "to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament." Here again problems of security and disarmament are related.

Article 49 states that "The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council." The famous Article 51 specifically recognizes "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations," but it also plainly states that "measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right..... shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council.....to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security." Chapter VII of the Charter thus clearly envisions collective action of a far-reaching nature, and the members of the UN, by adhering to the Charter, accepted a commitment to abide by and give full support to the decisions of the Security Council.

Until the Korean crisis developed in 1950, the potentialities of the United Nations for collective action against aggression were largely untested ; but because of the very nature of the organization it was obvious from the beginning that it could not become an effective instrument of collective security without radical changes in the Charter. Even the preliminary planning necessary to put into effect the measures provided for in Chapter VII was by no means adequate, and many of the provisions of this Chapter have remained a dead letter. The Military Staff Committee held lengthy sessions in secret, but was unable to agree on the nature, employment, and command of the forces which member states were expected to place at the disposal of the Security Council. In point of fact these forces were nonexistent, in spite of the obligations under Article 43, the strong reaffirmation of these obligations in the General Assembly's Uniting for Peace Reso-

lution of November, 1950, and the replies of many member states to the inquiries regarding the steps they were taking to make armed forces available. They are still nonexistent.

It could hardly be expected that an organization "based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members," and in which the great states had a special position to the extent that they were largely exempt from the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter by virtue of their "veto" power in the Security Council, could satisfy the tests of an effective collective security system. No amount of praise of the United Nations could gloss over its basic limitations in this respect. Collective security would be meaningful only if it applied to great as well as lesser powers, and only if all, or at least most, of the major powers cooperated to the fullest extent in supporting it. The United Nations was based on a very different concept. As Georg Schwarzenberger has observed, "collective security as understood at Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco, meant collective security against danger to peace from the middle powers and small States and collective insecurity in the face of aggression by any of the world powers." This was exactly the opposite of what was needed. "When minor parties to a dispute thought that the Security Council might act," adds Schwarzenberger, "the need for collective action did not arise. When the contingency arose, the world power which backed the aggressor or was itself held by the other members of the Security Council to be the culprit made action impossible."¹³

2. *UN Action in the Korean Crisis.* But what about Korea? Did not the concerted action of the United Nations in the Korean crisis prove that collective security under the UN was possible? The Seventh Report of the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, issued in July, 1951, stated: "The enforcement action undertaken by the United Nations, under its resolutions of June 25 and 27, 1950, is historic in the sense that it marks the first time that the organized community of nations, in accordance with the principle of collective security, has employed armed force against an aggressor." Assistant Secretary of State John D. Hickerson declared in October, 1950: "Korea has become a tremendous spur to the U. N. efforts to build an effective system of collective security."¹⁴ Let us examine briefly the role of the United Nations in the Korean affair, with the object of determining whether this did in fact, as Benjamin V. Cohen hoped, "mark the beginning of the progressive development of an effective collective-security system."¹⁵

In resolutions of June 25 and 27 and in subsequent recommendations in early July the Security Council took prompt action to deal with the unprovoked attack on the Republic of Korea from the northern part of the

¹³ Schwarzenberger, pp. 510, 515.

¹⁴ Address in New York, Oct. 21, 1951; text in the *Department of State Bulletin*, XXV (Nov. 5, 1951), 732-735.

¹⁵ Statement to Political and Security Committee of General Assembly of the United Nations, Jan. 2, 1952; text in the *Department of State Bulletin*, XXVI (Jan. 21, 1952), 98-102.

country. If found that aggression had occurred, it called upon the members of the United Nations to send troops and other assistance to Korea, and it asked the President of the United States to designate a supreme commander of UN forces. Thus the Council demonstrated that even though it had no armed forces at its disposal, as provided for in Article 43 of the Charter, it was not impotent in the face of open aggression. The demonstration, however, was not a conclusive one. That the Council was able to agree on positive action at all was due only to a series of unusual circumstances, including the temporary self-imposed absence from the Council of the representative of the Soviet Union, and the presence of substantial units of American air, land, and naval forces in Japan, the Ryukyus, and adjacent waters. If the Council had not acted promptly, and if sufficient strength to meet the first onslaughts of the surprise attack had not been available and immediately ordered into action, in all likelihood the UN would have been faced with a *fait accompli* in Korea before it had proceeded beyond the discussion stage. As soon as Jacob Malik assumed the presidency of the Security Council on August 1, 1950, a complete stalemate developed. This continued throughout the entire month of August, while Malik was president; thereafter, with the Soviet representative in vigilant attendance, the Council was virtually impotent.

Because of this situation, and because of the clear lesson in Korea that the UN's procedures for collective security needed strengthening, the Fifth Session of the General Assembly, in the fall of 1950, endorsed proposals which seemed to herald a considerable shift in emphasis or even a major change in the character of the United Nations. The proposals, first outlined specifically by the American Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, were known at first as the Acheson Plan, but in amended form became the Uniting for Peace Resolution, adopted by the Assembly on November 3.

3. *The Uniting for Peace Resolution.*¹⁶ This historic measure was a three-part affair, but only Resolution A, the longest and most important of the three parts, is customarily referred to in comments on the Uniting for Peace Resolution. After a lengthy preamble, Resolution A contained four significant provisions. The first called for immediate consideration by the General Assembly of any situation involving an act of aggression or other threat to the peace, if the Security Council failed to exercise "its primary responsibility"; if the Assembly were not in session at the time, an emergency meeting could be held within twenty-four hours. The second part established a Peace Observation Committee of fourteen designated members, including the Soviet Union. The third in effect recommended that the members of the UN fulfill their obligations under Article 43 of the Charter. In it the General Assembly recommended

...to the States Members of the United Nations that each Member maintain within its national armed forces elements so trained, organized and equipped that they could promptly be made available, in accordance

¹⁶ For a discussion of the legal aspects of the Uniting for Peace Resolution see Chapter 14.

with its constitutional processes, for service as a United Nations unit or units, upon recommendation by the Security Council or General Assembly, without prejudice to the use of such elements in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized in Article 51 of the Charter.

Part four of Resolution A established a Collective Measures Committee of fourteen members and instructed it "to study and make a report to the Security Council and the General Assembly, not later than 1 September 1951, on methodswhich might be used to maintain and strengthen international peace and security in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter." In a final and more general section Resolution A recognized "that enduring peace will not be secured solely by collective security arrangements," and urged the members of the UN to cooperate in other important ways.

Resolution B urged the Security Council to "devise measures for the earliest application of Articles 43, 45, 46, and 47 of the Charter regarding the placing of armed forces at the disposal of the Security Council by the States Members of the United Nations and the effective functioning of the Military Staff Committee." Resolution C recommended that the permanent members of the Security Council "meet and discuss, collectively or otherwise all problems which are likely to threaten international peace and hamper the activities of the United Nations, with a view to their resolving fundamental differences and reaching agreement in accordance with the spirit and letter of the Charter."

The Uniting for Peace Resolution was a conscious effort to develop and implement the security provisions of the United Nations Charter. Since its adoption, more attention has been given to problems of implementation than ever before ; in this sense it has indeed been a major landmark in the progress toward an effective collective security system. The Peace Observation Committee is ready to function as needed ; some of its members have already been given specific assignments, such as keeping an eye on developments along the Greek frontiers. The Collective Measures Committee has made some significant reports, which have been carefully considered by the General Assembly and which have indicated areas for further exploration. The Assembly itself has passed a resolution on collective security as a result of its consideration of the first report of the Committee, and has instructed the Committee to continue its work. Nothing of any importance has been done to carry out Resolutions B and C of the Uniting for Peace Resolution.

A year after the adoption of the Uniting for Peace Resolution only twenty-nine states had given even generally affirmative responses to inquiries regarding their plans for maintaining UN units within their armed forces ; twenty-two had not even deigned to reply. Almost every one of the states expressing a willingness to implement the recommendation simply pointed to certain units of their armed forces which were then engaged in overseas operations, particularly in Korea. The United States

referred to her forces in Europe and in Korea and tried to gloss over her evasiveness by diplomatic double-talk : "After termination of hostilities in Korea and after the United States forces have been withdrawn, the extent to which the United States will maintain armed forces which could be made available for United Nations service will be reviewed."¹⁷ If any such review has been made since 1953, when the truce in Korea entered into effect, the results are not apparent.

4. *Reports of the Collective Measures Committee.* The first report of the Collective Measures Committee, approved for submission to the General Assembly on October 3, 1951, was a pioneer study in the sense that it constituted the "first systematic attempt by the United Nations to study the whole field of collective security."¹⁸ It analyzed a wide variety of political, economic, and military sanctions which might be applied in dealing with acts of aggression. "In respect to each sanction, the report outlines basic considerations which should underlie a decision of the United Nations to apply collective measures ; it considers national action which should be taken by cooperating states ; the extent to which the co-ordination of national action is necessary ; and the techniques and machinery that should be established to make the imposition of a particular sanction most effective."¹⁹ It also explored the relationship between collective and regional security arrangements and summarized the replies of the members of the UN to the Committee regarding the organizing and earmarking of United Nations units within their armed forces.

In April, 1952, the Collective Measures Committee began its second year of deliberations, in accordance with the instructions of the General Assembly. Among other actions it continued its analysis of the developing situation in Korea, studied how best it could assist member states of the UN to coordinate their efforts to implement the Assembly's Uniting for Peace and collective security resolutions, and considered "the nature of the machinery that the United Nations should have for the future in order to continue its progressive development as a collective-security organization." In its second report to the Assembly, in the fall of 1952, the Committee made useful suggestions on all of these important matters. Its work since then has been continuously helpful in encouraging and developing a more realistic and practical approach to the will-o'-the-wisp called collective security.

5. *Lessons of the Korean Experience.* In the opinion of an official of the United States State Department, "the collective effort against aggression in Korea, the pragmatic adaptation of the Charter in the security field by means of the 'Uniting for Peace' resolution, and the more undramatic, yet no less significant analyses made by the Collective Measures Committee"—plus, it may be added, the continued concern of the General Assembly,

¹⁷ Joseph J. Sisco, "The U. N. and Collective Security," *Department of State Bulletin*, XXV (Nov. 12, 1951), 772.

¹⁸ Sisco, p. 774.

¹⁹ Sisco, p. 773.

the Secretariat, and other UN agencies with the whole problem of collective security — “represent concrete progress toward a goal which has eluded man for over 2,000 years.”²⁰ We may endorse this statement without suggesting that the “concrete progress” under UN auspices has been very great. From the experience of collective action in Korea and from our study of the efforts of the United Nations to profit from this experience, we can find nothing that forces us to change our original conclusion, namely that the United Nations, by its very nature, was not, is not now, and never can be an effective instrument for real collective security.

In actual fact, the operations in Korea never even remotely assumed the aspects of a collective security effort. To be sure, in a symbolic way, and to some extent in actuality, the action was a collective one. Besides the United States, fifteen or more member states of the UN sent armed forces to Korea, and nearly fifty countries provided various kinds of material assistance. More than sixty nations, including some not in the United Nations, endorsed the UN's recommendation of a strategic embargo against Communist China. But in spite of this brave front, Korea was primarily an American effort ; the other military units were of small size ; most member states of the UN cooperated only in a token fashion — an ambulance unit, a medical team, a hospital ship, and the like ; some members not only did not cooperate, but bitterly attacked all of the actions of the UN in and regarding Korea and gave active support to the forces which the UN had branded as aggressors. Under such conditions real collective security could hardly be hoped for ; it was, in fact, impossible.

Even the most sanguine interpreters of the Korean experience could not claim much for it beyond the fact that it had led the United Nations to consider more seriously and more realistically the whole problem of collective security. Secretary of State Acheson, in an address of June 29, 1951, declared : “Korea's significance is not the final crusade. It is not finally making valid the idea of collective security. It is important, perhaps, for the inverse reason that in Korea we prevented the invalidation of collective security.”

Korea did “not establish the practicability or reality of collective security Instead of being a case of nations fighting ‘any aggressor anywhere’ and for no other purpose than to punish aggression and to deter potential aggressors, intervention in Korea was an act of collective military defense against the recognized number-one enemy of the United States and of all the countries which associated themselves with its action.”²¹

• **Pitfall or Bulwark?** The lessons of historical experience, especially the action taken under the aegis of the League of Nations and the United Nations, have shown that in spite of all the official and unofficial statements about it — and, as we have noted, “collective security” is one of the most popular terms in the jargon of international diplomacy today— nothing like an effective collective security system has ever been devel-

²⁰ Sisco, p. 774.

²¹ Wolfers, p. 492.

oped. Such examples of collective action involving the use of sanctions as the League's efforts to prevent Italian aggression in Ethiopia and the United Nations operations in Korea are few and far between, and cannot properly be regarded as real tests of collective security. It is difficult to test something which does not exist. The tests for real collective security, which were mentioned earlier in this discussion, indicate that the acceptance by states of far more binding commitments than they are now ready or willing to enter into is a stern prerequisite. "Such a policy," as Arnold Wolfers has observed, "would constitute a radical break with tradition."²²

Because of these considerations the student of international politics must regard collective security as one of those desirable goals which under present conditions are distant and unattainable, perhaps "illusive myths."²³ Quincy Wright concludes that it will be reached "only when the balance of power has been so stable that attention has been diverted from it" and perhaps only when there has been created "a democratic organization of the world able to supersede the balance of power as the basis of security."²⁴ Georg Schwarzenberger believes that "until the day when the Western and Eastern worlds no longer consider each other as *the* potential aggressor, collective security, as envisaged under the Charter of the United Nations, must remain a dead letter."²⁵

Hans Morgenthau regards collective security as not only an unworkable but an unwise and dangerous principle, chiefly because in his view it means that under it no war could be localized, that every war would become a world war.²⁶ Walter Lippmann, in many of his newspaper columns, articles, and books has questioned the desirability as well as the practicability of a collective security system; he holds that in the absence of a true international community, and in the presence of grave threats to the freedom and survival of democratic and peace-loving nations, to concentrate on the establishment of such a system would divert attention from present dangers, weaken more practical and promising arrangements for cooperation in defense and in other matters, lead some states to put too much reliance upon such a system while others were giving only lip service to it, and in general be foolhardy and perhaps disastrous. An inadequate collective security system, Lippmann contends, is worse than no "system" at all. His views are well summarized in the following quotation:

The trouble with collective security is . . . that when the issue is less than the survival of the *great* nations, the method of collective security will not be used because it is just as terrifying to the policeman as it is to the lawbreakers. It punishes the law-enforcing states, at least until they have paid the awful price of victory, as much as the law-breaking states. . . . It

²² Wolfers, p. 482.

²³ F. J. Brown, Charles Hodges, and J. S. Roucek, *Contemporary World Politics* (Wiley, 1939), p. 3.

²⁴ Wright, II, 781, 783.

²⁵ Schwarzenberger, p. 529.

²⁶ Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 2nd ed. (Knopf, 1954), pp. 388 ff.

proposes to achieve peace through law by calling upon great masses of innocent people to stand ready to exterminate great masses of innocent people. No world order can be founded upon such a principle ; it cannot command the support of civilized men.

Let us then be very careful not to sacrifice all that, which is most important though it is largely invisible, on the altar of the principle of collective security—which in practice is not collective and does not bring security.²⁷

In the general parlance of today, however, the term "collective security" is used in a narrower and at the same time a less specific sense. Almost any form of international cooperation and of collective action in dealing with threats to the peace and open acts of aggression is called "collective security." This is particularly true of efforts of the United Nations to give effect to Chapter VIII of the Charter, to the Uniting for Peace Resolution, and to the recommendations of the Collective Measures Committee. Certainly if peace is to be maintained, it must be through collective action ; but, as has been emphasized, there is a vast difference between most forms of cooperative action and real collective security. Because of this vague and general use, the term should be viewed with caution by serious students of international affairs, for attached to the impressive terminology there may be a minimum of substance. "Collective security" may be a pitfall for the naive and the unwary rather than a bulwark for the strong and the free.

PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT

Now that we have considered the relationship between collective security and peaceful settlement, the nature of the so-called "collective security" that is so frequently extolled and so earnestly sought after today, and the tests of a truly effective security system, we shall turn to the methods for the pacific settlement of international disputes. Although this subject is closely related to that of collective security, as we have seen, it is based upon a different set of assumptions and procedures. It emphasizes negotiation, conciliation, arbitration, and other amicable methods rather than sanctions and other nonamicable procedures. Instead of seeking to build "situations of strength"—to use a term of which Dean Acheson was fond—which may act as a deterrent to aggression or would place the peace-

²⁷ New York *Herald Tribune*, Jan. 15, 1951. Commentators of the "revisionist" school have been much more scathing in their criticisms of the concept of collective security. Harry Elmer Barnes, for example, a perennial and indefatigable "revisionist," has charged that the free world "conducts its foreign policy under the slavish domination of, and in complete conformity with, the most sinister and dangerous Communist dogma which has thus far gained general acceptance—the myth of collective security which, following the Geneva Protocol and the Briand-Kellogg policy, Litvinov sold to League of Nations liberals in the 1930's.....this can produce only that strange and menacing paradox of 'perpetual war for perpetual peace'." Foreword to Sisley Huddleston, *Popular Diplomacy and War* (R. R. Smith, 1954).

loving states in a more advantageous position if aggression occurs, it emphasizes recourse to all possible methods of amicable settlement and the avoidance of coercive policies or practices that may jeopardize the chances of agreement. It is altogether possible, of course, that negotiation and other methods of peaceful settlement will be effective in dealing with the most critical problems only if "situations of strength" exist—i.e., only if there is some approximation to a balance of power between the nations which are interested in preserving peace and order and the potential aggressor or aggressors.

In origin the methods of peaceful settlement are very old indeed. The earliest existing treaty dates back to about 3000 B.C. ; carved in stone, it records the successful arbitration of a boundary dispute between Egyptian kings. The Greeks developed the mechanism for the peaceful settlement of disputes to a degree not surpassed until our own time. In the modern period no well-developed machinery existed until the present century, although certain procedures were widely used in the nineteenth century, or even slightly earlier. Jay's Treaty of 1794, for example, is often described as the beginning of the extensive use of arbitration in modern times.

Some of the landmarks in the evolution of the machinery for peaceful settlements in the last half-century or so are the Hague conventions of 1899 and 1907 for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes ; the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice ; the Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (the so-called Geneva Protocol) of 1924, which never went into effect ; the General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, which was adopted by the Assembly of the League of Nations in 1928—one of the most significant and comprehensive attempts to develop a system for peaceful settlement ; the Inter-American Arbitration and Conciliation treaties drafted at the Washington Conference of 1929 and soon ratified by most of the American republics ; the Charter of the United Nations and the Statute of the International Court of Justice ; the studies and recommendations of various UN agencies, notably the "Little Assembly" and the Secretariat ; and the Charter of the Organization of American States, and the Pact of Bogota adopted at the Ninth Inter-American Conference at Bogota in 1948. We shall have occasion to discuss some of these landmarks at greater length, especially the work of the UN and of regional arrangements such as the OAS.

The Chief Methods of Pacific Settlement. The Charter of the United Nations lists the chief methods of pacific settlement as negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, and resort to regional agencies or arrangements (Article 33). These conventional devices may be divided into two main categories : (1) those based on persuasion, with no binding force ; and (2) those which have a binding character by virtue of the fact that the parties commit themselves in advance to accept the findings of a neutral board or court. Negotiation, good offices, enquiry,

mediation, and conciliation fall within the first category ; arbitration and judicial settlement fall within the second. When direct negotiations fail, conciliation and arbitration are the most commonly used techniques of peaceful settlement.

1. *Negotiation.* Most disputes which arise between states are settled through the normal channels of diplomacy—that is, by negotiations between diplomatic representatives. These efforts may be supplemented by meetings of foreign ministers or even of heads of states ; by international conferences ; or by resort to machinery provided by the UN or by a regional organization such as the OAS. But the first step whenever a dispute arises is invariably direct negotiation. The relatively few instances in which this procedure fails are likely to be the most serious ones, involving real threats to peace and security, for the devices of diplomacy tend to break down in crisis situations. Hence, in order to avert serious consequences other methods for the peaceful settlement of disputes have been developed.

2. *Good Offices and Mediation.* If a state offers to be of service in attempting to compose differences between two other states, it is said to tender its “good offices.” If the offer is accepted by the disputing states, good offices may lead to mediation. The difference between the two is that in “good offices” the third state acts simply as a friendly “go-between,” whereas a mediator may make suggestions of his own. In 1905 President Theodore Roosevelt tendered his “good offices” to Japan and Russia to end the Russo-Japanese War. The offer was accepted, but he actually became a mediator, for he exerted a direct influence in averting a threatened impasse in the negotiations and in bringing about ultimate agreement. Russia and Japan were not bound in any way to accept his suggestions but they saw fit to do so.

The tender of good offices may be made by one or more states, or by individuals acting in an official capacity, such as the head of a state or officers of the principal organs of the United Nations. The tender of good offices or of mediation is never to be regarded as an unfriendly act, and the parties to a dispute are not bound to accept the offer or to regard suggestions of a mediator as binding. Small neutral powers, especially Switzerland, have often assisted in arranging terms of peace between belligerents through good offices or mediation. The UN Good Offices Committee for Indonesia and its successor, the UN Commission for Indonesia, performed notable service in helping to settle the many disputes between the Dutch Government and the self-proclaimed Indonesian Republic in the period following World War II.

3. *Enquiry and Conciliation.* Closely related and often more effective than good offices and mediation are enquiry and conciliation. The first Hague Conference recommended the use of commissions of enquiry. The Second Hague Conference renewed this suggestion, and provisions for such commissions have been incorporated into many bilateral and multi-lateral treaties. The Assembly of the League of Nations strongly endorsed

the idea in 1922, and within five years 52 conciliation treaties had been entered into, 35 of them without reservations.²⁸ In spite of all this, however, the use of commissions of enquiry has "upon the whole . . . been negligible."²⁹

A commission of enquiry investigates the facts of a dispute, but largely confines itself to a statement of the facts and a clarification of the issues. Although it may also present conclusions and recommendations, these are in no sense binding on the disputants. This technique was successfully employed in the Dogger Bank incident of 1904, when the Russian Baltic Fleet fired upon some British fishing vessels in the North Sea, sinking two of them. The explanation offered was that the Russians thought that the British vessels were Japanese torpedo boats! A commission of enquiry, accepted by both Great Britain and Russia, found the Russian action unwarranted; and on the basis of the report the Russian Government apologized and paid a substantial indemnity.

In 1913 Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan negotiated treaties with some thirty states providing for permanent boards or commissions of enquiry, and for a "cooling off" period while investigations were under way. Although the machinery provided for in the Bryan treaties was never utilized, the principles they embodied were incorporated in a number of later conventions, such as the Central American Treaty of 1923, the Locarno Treaties of 1925, and, in many respects, the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Charter of the United Nations.

Conciliation differs from enquiry in that it assumes an obligation on the part of third parties to take the initiative in the search for agreement. A conciliation commission may advance proposals, ask for compromise or concessions, and, in general, actively seek to effect an understanding between the contending parties. Conciliation is scarcely to be distinguished from mediation; the usual difference is that mediation is commonly performed by an individual and conciliation by a committee, commission, or council.

Conciliation is often held to be an especially constructive approach to those disputes which are not justiciable in nature but also are not so exclusively political—that is, involving delicate questions of national interest and prestige—that they can be dealt with only by diplomatic or power-political means. Since many kinds of disputes fall into this in-between zone, the possibilities of conciliation would seem to be great, even though they have not been utilized to the full.

The United Nations has been trying to call attention to these opportunities and to suggest procedures for appointing and utilizing commissions of conciliation;³⁰ it has itself already made successful use of such com-

²⁸ Clyde Eagleton, *International Government*, rev. ed. (Ronald, 1948), p. 236.

²⁹ Edwin D. Dickinson, *Law and Peace* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1951), p. 71.

³⁰ See, for example, a memorandum on "Elaboration of Procedural Suggestions as to Procedure for Peaceful Settlement," submitted to the Interim Committee of the General Assembly by China and the United States in June, 1948; U. N. Document A/AC. 18/SC /2/2, June 16, 1948.

missions, as, for example, in dealing with the problem of Palestine. Some members of the UN think that the organization should pioneer more boldly in this field, both in handling disputes which are brought before it and in providing well-developed machinery for enquiry and conciliation. In January, 1948, for example, the Lebanese delegation submitted to the Interim Committee of the General Assembly a proposal for the establishment of a Permanent Committee of Conciliation. This Committee would do all it could to assist parties to a dispute to reach a friendly settlement, and if no agreement could be reached it would submit "a detailed report on the reasons for the disagreement" and would "formulate proposals which it deems fair and legal for the pacific settlement of the dispute."³¹

Many private organizations, especially those which tend to regard the UN as either primarily or almost wholly an agency for peaceful settlement, have urged more general resort to conciliation. This method, they argue, has greater flexibility than arbitration or judicial settlement, and can be adapted to a greater variety of issues. At the same time, they reason, it facilitates the settlement of potentially explosive questions through the use of disinterested and competent third parties or commissions, and thus helps to keep them out of the political arena in which conflicting national interests, coercive techniques, and ideological antagonisms make any kind of amicable settlement difficult.

4. *Arbitration and Judicial Settlement.* Arbitration differs from conciliation in a number of ways. In particular, it is a judicial process, whereas conciliation is an attempt at accommodation. Conciliation recommends, arbitration decides; conciliation is friendly counsel, arbitration is binding decree. Conciliation can take into account national honor and "face"; arbitration must keep to the letter of the law, regardless of the cost or embarrassment to the contending parties.

Judicial settlement, or adjudication, is in a sense a form of arbitration, one in which a permanent court is the arbitral tribunal. As explained in a statement by the Legal Section of the Secretariat of the League of Nations, "arbitration is distinguished from judicial procedure in the strict sense of the word by three features: the nomination of the arbitrators by the parties concerned, the selection by these parties of the principles upon which the tribunal should base its findings, and finally its character of voluntary jurisdiction. The boundary between the two kinds of judicial procedure can not be definitely fixed."³² Because it is less impromptu than arbitration and requires permanent tribunals, judicial settlement assures "a larger measure of jurisdictional and procedural consistency. It should also assure a somewhat more favorable climate for the progress of the law from precedent to precedent."³³

³¹ The text of this proposal was published in U. N. Document A/AC. 18/15, Jan. 28, 1948.

³² Permanent Court of International Justice, Advisory Commission of Jurists, *Documents Presented to the Commission Relating to Existing Plans for the Establishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice*, p. 113.

³³ Dickinson, p. 73.

The nineteenth century added some four hundred examples of successful arbitration to the precedents set by the arbitrations under the famous Jay's Treaty of 1794 between Great Britain and the United States. The most celebrated case involved the settlement of the *Alabama* claims controversy. The *Alabama* was a cruiser built in Liverpool for the Confederacy during the American Civil War. It inflicted heavy damages on Northern shipping, and, according to the American government, its use prolonged the war. After extended and none-too-friendly negotiations, Great Britain agreed to an American proposal to arbitrate the points in dispute. A tribunal specified in the Treaty of Washington of 1871, composed of five jurists appointed by the President of the United States, the Queen of England, the King of Italy, the President of Switzerland, and the Emperor of Brazil, met in Geneva and awarded the United States direct damages amounting to \$15,500,000.

The United States stood as the foremost champion of arbitration during the nineteenth century, but in the present century her interest has slackened. Although she did participate in some eighty-five arbitrations up to the end of World War I, in several cases she refused to arbitrate, or she delayed action for many years. The United States Senate, more because of jealousy over its prerogatives in treaty-making than because of any hostility to the principle of arbitration, rejected a number of arbitration treaties between 1890 and 1914, or so emasculated them by amendment that they were withdrawn.³⁴

Attempts to create permanent courts of arbitration, and thereby to provide machinery for the judicial settlement of disputes, date from the First Hague Conference of 1899, which established the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Actually, this was neither permanent nor a court but a panel of arbitrators whose names were on file at The Hague, to be drawn upon if disputing states so chose. Despite its limitations, the Permanent Court was utilized successfully in fifteen cases before 1914, including the Venezuelan debt controversy of 1904 involving Germany, Great Britain, and Italy, and the Newfoundland fisheries dispute between Great Britain and the United States. Although still in existence today, the "Hague Court" has been little used since the opening of the Permanent Court of International Justice in 1922.

From 1907 to 1917 a Central American Court of Justice, "which may be called the first real international court ever to be established,"³⁵ functioned with some success in eight cases. It was wrecked by the refusal of the United States, one of the sponsoring powers, to accept the decision of the Court in 1917 regarding the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty between the United States and Nicaragua.³⁶

The most elaborate permanent court for the judicial settlement of dis-

³⁴ W. Stull Holt, *Treaties Defeated by the Senate* (Johns Hopkins Press, 1933), pp. 154-162, 204-212.

³⁵ Clyde Eagleton, *International Government*, rev. ed. (Ronald, 1948), p. 227.

³⁶ See Manley O. Hudson, *The Permanent Court of International Justice* (Macmillan 1943), Chap. III.

putes have been, of course, the Permanent Court of International Justice, which functioned in the interwar period in loose association with the League of Nations, and its successor, the International Court of Justice, which was brought into being in 1946 as one of the principal organs of the United Nations. Although the two courts were given different names and derived their authority from different statutes, the present International Court of Justice regards itself as a continuation of the older court. The Carnegie Peace Palace at The Hague has been the seat of both courts.

Since the time of the First Hague Conference many attempts have been made to secure the consent of states to the compulsory adjudication of disputes. These attempts have met with only limited success, for the nature of the state system is not conducive to really binding limitations on the separate states, to put it mildly. Usually agreements to resort to adjudication have been hedged about by reservations in areas involving "vital interests," "matters of domestic concern," or "national honor"—reservations which are obviously so general and so all-inclusive that when interpreted unilaterally they can make the original commitments virtually meaningless. Thus the Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of Disputes called for resort to arbitration "in so far as circumstances permit."

A real advance in the prospects for compulsory adjudication was made by the Permanent Court of International Justice and the International Court of Justice. Paragraph 1 of Article 36 of the Statute of the former court, also used almost verbatim in the same article in the Statute of the present International Court of Justice, reads as follows: "The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it and all matters specifically provided for in treaties and conventions in force." In general, therefore, the jurisdiction originally conferred was voluntary; but in fact both courts were given a wide compulsory jurisdiction, through "treaties and conventions in force" and through the so-called "Optional Clause," also contained in Article 36 of both statutes. This clause provided that states may of their own accord accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court "in all legal disputes concerning: (a) the interpretation of a treaty; (b) any question of international law; (c) the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation; (d) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation." More than half the states of the world, including all the major non-Communist powers, have accepted the Optional Clause, though in some instances, as with the United States, with devastating reservations.³⁷

³⁷ See *Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice*, Dept. of State Pub. 3540, International Organization and Conference Series II, 31 (June, 1949). This publication contains the texts of the declarations of the 35 states which had accepted the Optional Clause up to June, 1949. The declaration of the United States, dated Aug. 14, 1946, listed the following reservations:

"Provided, that this declaration shall not apply to
a. disputes the solution of which the parties shall entrust to other tribunals by virtue of agreements already in existence or which may be concluded in the future; or

Pacific Settlement and Regional Arrangements. The United Nations Charter commends the settlement of disputes between nations not only by the conventional methods and through the normal channels of diplomacy but also by resort to "regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means." It also provides that "the Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council."

All regional systems contain some provision for the pacific settlement of disputes among the participating states in the spirit of the United Nations Charter. As would be expected, such provisions are most elaborate in the most fully developed regional agency of the present time, the Organization of American States. The Charter of OAS devotes an entire chapter to the "Pacific Settlement of Disputes" (Chapter IV), and a special treaty, known as the Pact of Bogotá,³⁸ contains elaborate provisions for peaceful settlement. The eight chapters of the Pact are entitled as follows : (1) General Obligation to Settle Disputes by Pacific Means ; (2) Procedures of Good Offices and Mediation ; (3) Procedures of Investigation and Conciliation ; (4) Judicial Procedure ; (5) Procedure of Arbitration ; (6) Fulfilment of Decisions ; (7) Advisory Opinions ; (8) Final Provisions.

Pacific Settlement and the United Nations. One of the major objectives of the United Nations, as we have seen, is "to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace" (Article 1). Hence, if all other efforts and procedures fail, or if the services of the international organization are needed at any stage of a controversy, the whole machinery of the United Nations is presumably available. The Security Council may "call upon the parties to settle their disputes" by the means provided for in Article 33, may investigate any dispute, may "at any stage of a dispute . . . recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment," and may keep abreast of "any procedures for the settlement of the dispute which have already been adopted by the parties." Article 37 provides that if the parties to a dispute "fail to settle it by the means indicated" in Article 33, "they shall refer it to the Security Council," which may take such action as it considers necessary. If it cannot bring the parties immediately concerned to a settlement, or if its recommendations are not followed and

b. disputes with regard to matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States of America as determined by the United States of America ; or

c. disputes arising under a multilateral treaty, unless (1) all parties to the treaty affected by the decision are also parties to the case before the Court, or (2) the United States of America specially agrees to jurisdiction."

* See William Sanders, "Bogotá Conference," *International Conciliation*, No. 442 (June, 1948).

the Council feels that there has developed a "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression," then it may decide that it has exhausted the possibilities of Chapter VI (containing Articles 33-38 : Pacific Settlement of Disputes) and that it has become necessary to use its powers under Chapter VII (containing Articles 39-51 : Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression). If so, it may resort to "measures not involving the use of armed force" (Article 41) or, if necessary, call upon member nations to use their armed forces (Article 42).

The provisions of Chapter VI of the Charter are more elaborate than the comparable ones in the Covenant of the League of Nations. Together with the provisions for judicial settlement contained in the Statute of the International Court of Justice, they seem to open the way to new and impromptu procedures by UN agencies if the stipulated modes of settlement are unavailing, although Professor Clyde Eagleton observes that "it can be debated whether the Charter of the UN represents any advance over the methods for the settlement of disputes of the League of Nations, especially as regards legal or judicial settlement."³⁹

Be this as it may the UN has continued the detailed consideration of the procedures for peaceful settlement which was carried on by the League. Most of this work has been undertaken by a Subcommittee of the Interim Committee of the General Assembly, by the Interim Committee, and by the Secretariat. The Subcommittee on Peaceful Settlement, composed of fifteen members of the permanent delegations to the "Little Assembly"—as the Interim Committee came to be known—held twenty meetings between January and August, 1948. In March it submitted a preliminary report to the Interim Committee, and in July a final report. The Interim Committee in turn submitted a report to the General Assembly in August. These three documents are deserving of careful study.⁴⁰

Of equal importance was a series of nine studies prepared for the Subcommittee by the Secretariat.⁴¹ These examined the use by the organs of

³⁹ Eagleton, p. 432.

⁴⁰ *Implementation of Paragraph 2 (c) of the General Assembly Resolution of 13 November 1947* — U. N. Doc. A/AC. 18/48, 19 March 1948 ; *Study on Methods for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Political Field* — U. N. Doc. A/AC. 18/73 and A/AC. 18/73 Add. I, 19 July 1948 ; *Study on Methods for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Political Field*—U. N. Doc. A/605, 13 August 1948.

⁴¹ *Use by Organs of the United Nations of Measures and Procedures of Pacific Settlement* — U. N. Doc. A/AC. 18/61 ; *Use by the Organs of the League of Nations of Measures and Procedures of Pacific Settlement* — U. N. Doc. A/AC. 18/68 ; *Analysis of the Main Features of the Inter-American Peace System* — U. N. Doc. A/AC. 18/46 and Add I ; *History and Analysis of the General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, 26 September 1928* — U. N. Doc. A/AC. 18/56 ; *History and Analysis of the General Convention for Improving the Means of Preventing War and the Regulations for the Execution of Article 4 of this Convention* — U. N. Doc. A/AC. 18/55 ; *Analysis of Provisions in Pacific Settlement Treaties Calling for Action by Organs of the League of Nations or the Permanent Court of International Justice, and of United Nations Documents Relating to the Assumption by United Nations Organs of Functions of the League of Nations and of the Permanent Court of International Justice* — U. N. Doc. A/AC. 18/57 ; *Analysis of Structure and Working of Arrangements of Enquiry and Conciliation under Existing Treaties, with Respect to (a) Nature*

the League of Nations and of the United Nations of procedures for peaceful settlement ; the General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes of 1928 and the General Convention for Improving the Means of Preventing War of 1931 ; the provisions for peaceful settlements in existing treaties ; the "main features of the Inter-American peace system," with particular reference to the Pact of Bogotá of 1948 ; and the implications of Article 11 (1) and Article 13 (1a) of the United Nations Charter.

In the Assembly resolution which authorized its creation the Interim Committee was given authority to consider methods of giving effect to that part of Article 11 (1) of the Charter dealing with the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security and to that part of Article 13 (1a) which deals with the promotion of international cooperation in the political field. From the beginning of its studies of peaceful settlement, the Committee was well aware that this was but a part of the broader field that had been assigned to it. It was also aware that its studies concerned matters that required continuing research and consideration. When it died of "innocuous desuetude," the work of developing and encouraging the use of procedures for peaceful settlement was carried on by regular UN organs, notably by the Assembly and the Secretariat and in a sense also by the International Court of Justice.⁴²

AN EVALUATION

Collective security and the peaceful settlement of international disputes are only two of the approaches to the problem of preventing war. While some writers regard them as contradictory, and while they can in theory be separately pursued, perhaps the most common view is that they are logical components of a single program. The supporters of this view find it difficult to conceive of a collective security arrangement that does not provide some alternative—some machinery for peaceful settlement—to the prompt and automatic employment of armed force. Indeed, some alternative seems necessary, for, although force alone may be called for to stop an aggressor, peace without accommodation may be only an uneasy truce.

The devices of collective security and peaceful settlement are disparaged by the enthusiasts who would remake the world in a single great constitutional convention of all nations or in an overnight purification of the minds

of Commission, (b) Time Schedules, (c) Methods of Appointment, (d) Extent to Which Positions Have Been Kept Filled, and (e) Actual Cases Referred to Conciliation and Fact-Finding Procedures — U. N. Doc. A/AC. 18/64 ; *Analysis of the Main Features of the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement (Pact of Bogotá)* — U. N. Doc. A/AC. 18/72 ; *Study on Articles 11, Paragraph 1, and 13, Paragraph 1 (a) of the Charter* — U. N. Doc. A/AC. 18/33.

⁴² See *Systematic Survey of Treaties for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, 1928-1948*, UN Pub. 1949, V. 3.

and hearts of men. These people are not to be satisfied with a day-by-day or month-by-month avoidance of war ; they seek a new order in which war will be both physically and theoretically impossible. They would in one unrealistic leap cover the ground which supporters of collective security and peaceful settlement would traverse more slowly and with expected halts and perhaps reverses. Some of them come close to repudiating "settlement" and urging what amounts to collective suppression.

Believers in international law as an approach to peace are far more patient with collective security and peaceful settlement. Indeed, peaceful settlement is, in a sense, the basis of the international law prescription. Advocates of this approach seek an expansion of the area in which judicial processes can be made to operate and a contraction of the area in which political processes must be resorted to. Thus they would change the emphasis within "peaceful settlement." In doing so, they would keep in mind the true nature of law—that it registers agreement already reached rather than seeks to institute rules of idealistic conduct. For the most part they would utilize collective security as an interim measure, hoping to find its importance diminishing as international law slowly grows to its potential stature.

Peaceful settlement has an encouraging record ; together with collective security, it may lead us toward a regime of law. In the meantime, it may give opportunity for the amelioration of disturbing economic and social injustices, and it seems to embrace an honest recognition of the realities of international politics.

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International Law.

11

We have already observed a number of the "controls" of interstate relations. We have seen that balance of power policies, collective security arrangements, and procedures for the pacific settlement of disputes operate to fix the relationships of states to each other. To the extent that they operate effectively they are stabilizing factors in interstate relations. More general and continuous than these controls is international law. In theory this law is common to all states. It incorporates the experience of many centuries during which peoples have lived side by side and have done business with each other ; it may properly be spoken of as the moral code of states, for it is the body of rules upon which they have agreed so that they may survive.

Many writers have quarrelled with the term "international law," saying that it implies the existence of a law over states. They contend that in reality international law is a law *among* states—not *over* them. The difference is a fundamental one, for it involves the basic nature of the state system. Indeed, international law must be studied with the realization that it not only presumes the sovereignty of states but also seeks to preserve sovereignty—that, in general, it has been the friend rather than the enemy of sovereignty.

To fix international law in its proper relationship to the state system and to the conduct of international politics, we shall offer some definitions of that law, examine certain aspects of it, note its sources and development, review codification and the international legislative process, observe the changing position of individuals under it, and discuss some of its limitations and possibilities.

THE NATURE AND CONTENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Definitions. We might do well to begin our brief study of international law by noting some definitions which distinguished writers have used. Oppenheim, a standard authority, spoke of it in 1905 as "the name for the body of customary and conventional rules which are considered legally binding by civilised States in their intercourse with each other." He added that it is "a law for the intercourse of States with one another, not a law for individuals" and that it is "a law *between*, not above, the single States."¹ Ellery C. Stowell, writing in 1931, offered this definition: "International law embodies certain rules relating to human relations throughout the world, which are generally observed by mankind and enforced primarily through the agency of the governments of the independent communities into which humanity is divided."² More recently, in 1948, Philip C. Jessup wrote that international law is "generally defined as law applicable to relations between states," but he declared that "there has welled up through the years a growing opposition to this traditional concept." He is so confident that individuals are becoming more and more subject to international law that he has outlined a "modern law of nations" based upon the hypothesis that the law of nations is applicable to individuals in their relations with states and even to certain interrelationships of individuals.³

While Dr. Jessup's view of the expanding nature of international law is certainly warranted by the developments of our time, we must as yet regard that law as primarily "the body of rules accepted by the general community of nations as defining their rights and the means of procedure by which those rights may be protected or violations of them redressed," to use Professor Charles G. Fenwick's excellent definition.⁴ We shall later note the changes that are now under way.

Public and Private International Law. The international law we have defined is at times spoken of as "public international law." This is to distinguish it from what is known as "private international law," a branch of the law which deals entirely with the relations of persons living under different legal systems. Occasions for the application of private international law arise when justice requires that the law of some outside jurisdiction—not necessarily a foreign state—be applied in a particular case. For example, to cite a famous English situation, when couples left England to be married in Scotland, where the marriage laws were less stringent, the question arose whether the validity of the marriage should be determined by English law or by Scottish law. The English courts held that the laws of Scotland should apply. Frequently the nationality of a person is the

¹ L. Oppenheim, *International Law*, 2 vols. (Longmans, 1905), 1, 2.

² *International Law* (Holt, 1931), p. 10 fn.

³ Philip C. Jessup, *A Modern Law of Nations* (Macmillan, 1943), pp. 15-16. Used by permission of The Macmillan Company.

⁴ Charles G. Fenwick, *International Law* (Century, 1924), p. 34.

issue. As Professor Edwin D. Dickinson has stated, "there is a host of problems concerning the adjudication and regulation of matters of private right and duty which arise uniquely from the continuing movement of persons or things from one nation to another and from the increasing ease with which relationships of agreement, family, property, enterprise, or the like may be consummated across national frontiers."⁶ Differences in law have long presented annoying problems in such matters as bills and notes, sales, carriers, shipping, and the like. It might be added that "private international law" is a term more current in Europe than in the United States. American lawyers commonly use "conflict of laws" to mean the same thing, but this term is also used in relation to the laws of states of the United States.

Other Branches of International Law. Two other branches of international law should be mentioned. One of these is admiralty law, which is the law of maritime commerce. It somewhat resembles private international law in that in large part it is concerned with differences between separate national jurisdictions. In the United States, for instance, the system of admiralty or maritime law which prevails by general consent in all commercial states has no inherent force of its own; it is operative only to the extent that it has been adopted by American customs or law. Another branch of international law is administrative law. It consists of the body of rules growing out of the regulations adopted by international administrative agencies, as, for example, the Universal Postal Union. There is, of course, no direct national aspect to such "law", but presumably it will be observed by those states which have accepted the obligations of membership in the relevant administrative union, and it may provide cases and precedents to which national courts will give due heed. Finally we should mention what is called "international comity." The term itself has been the subject of much controversy. It was earlier held that when the courts of one state gave force to the laws of another state in order to render justice to the parties involved they did so as a matter of comity or grace. More recently the conviction has grown that a state is bound by its own rules on the conflict of laws or by international law to grant recognition and protection to foreign-created rights. Some writers would abandon the term entirely as it has been applied in private international law. It is used in public international law to explain the practices which states more or less consistently observe, even though they are not legally bound to do so. As practices based on comity tend to become legally binding custom, the scope of international comity is thereby diminished. Comity thus influences the growth of international law.

The Subject Matter of International Law. International law proper—that is, public international law—is commonly divided into the law of war and the law of peace. Hugo Grotius, "the Father of International Law," called his great pioneering work *On the Law of War and Peace* ;

⁶ Edwin D. Dickinson, *Law and Peace* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1951), p. 59.

Oppenheim divides his treatise into one volume on peace and one on war. The conventional view is that public international law is thus made up of two separate and distinct branches, with the law of war being necessary to regulate the rights and obligations of belligerents and neutrals when the law of peace is no longer applicable. Some understanding of the subject matter of international law may be gained through merely reading the International Law Commission's listing of twenty-five topics in the field :

1. Subjects of international law
2. Sources of international law
3. Obligations of international law in relation to the law of States
4. Fundamental rights and duties of States
5. Recognition of States and Governments
6. Succession of States and Governments
7. Domestic jurisdiction
8. Recognition of acts of foreign States
9. Jurisdiction over foreign States
10. Obligations of territorial jurisdiction
11. Jurisdiction with regard to crimes committed outside national territory
12. Territorial domain of States
13. Regime of the high seas
14. Regime of territorial waters
15. Pacific settlement of international disputes
16. Nationality, including statelessness
17. Treatment of aliens
18. Extradition
19. Right of asylum
20. Law of treaties
21. Diplomatic intercourse and immunities
22. Consular intercourse and immunities
23. State responsibility
24. Arbitral procedure
25. Laws of war⁶

Every one of the twenty-five topics raises fundamental questions of international conduct and obligations and has been the subject of careful examination and discussion. It will be noted that the "laws of war" is only one item—and the last one—on the list, yet it is in itself of such scope that Professor Edwin M. Borchard speaks of it as "the vast complex of rules governing the relations of belligerents and neutrals in time of war."⁷

Two of the topics listed above, "Diplomatic intercourse and immunities" and "Pacific settlement of international disputes," are discussed in other chapters.

The Laws of War. Until recently international law has not even at-

⁶ The topics are listed in *The American Journal of International Law*, XLIV (Jan., 1950), O.D., 5-6.

⁷ "International Law," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* (Macmillan, 1937), VIII, 168. Used by permission of The Macmillan Company.

tempted to prohibit or "outlaw" war, for such an effort would leave states no means for redressing wrongs where the law of peace afforded no remedy. To deny states the right of self-help when no other help is available would be no furtherance of justice ; and such an unrealistic attempt to control conduct by rule-making would bring all law into contempt. Although war itself may in some instances be lawful, and necessarily so, it does not follow that warring states are without obligations. Hence the laws of war.

Laws of war on land and sea have been formulated in various codes and conventions, notably in the conventions drafted at the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 and in many Geneva conventions. Among the aspects of warfare dealt with in these documents are the following : privateering, blockade, prize courts, the care of sick and wounded, protection for medical personnel and facilities, the qualifications of lawful combatants, the treatment of prisoners, forbidden weapons and agencies, the powers of military commanders in occupied enemy territory, the status of spies, the beginning of hostilities, the use of merchant vessels as warships, naval bombardments, the use of submarine mines, the right of capture in maritime warfare, the rights and duties of neutrals, and the use of poison gases. On some of these subjects the agreements were largely nullified by sweeping reservations ; on others the agreements were never ratified. In some instances the law is detailed and explicit. "The convention on the treatment of prisoners of war is a veritable code of ninety-seven articles. . . ."⁷ Nevertheless, a substantial part of the law of war is still based on custom and usage.

The laws of war have helped to humanize warfare—if such a thing is possible—and even by the totalitarian states they have been more generally observed than disregarded ; but they have not availed to prevent the most inhuman practices, such as unrestricted submarine warfare and the use of flame-throwers, napalm, and atom bombs. They have never been adequately revised to cover the new and more terrible weapons of destruction that were developed during World Wars I and II and in intervening years. In particular, no effective codes of aerial warfare have been agreed upon.

Before the First World War an important offshoot of the laws of war was the laws of neutrality. Among the subjects with which these were concerned were the forms of neutrality and of neutralization, the proclamation of neutrality, and especially the relations between neutral states and belligerent states and between states and individuals. Specific problems involving the rights and duties of neutrals included the maintenance of the inviolability of the territorial jurisdiction of neutrals ; the obligation of neutrals not to permit the use of their territory as a base for military operations ; the regulation of the rights of asylum and of internment ; the conditions under which enemy ships may enter and leave neutral ports ; the obligation of a neutral state not to furnish military assistance to any bel-

⁷ James Wilford Garner, "Laws of Warfare," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* (Macmillan, 1937), XV, 363. Used by permission of The Macmillan Company.

ligerent or to permit enlistment of troops for a belligerent state ; and the neutral's obligation to enforce its neutrality laws and to exercise "due diligence" in preventing violations of its status.

Traditional laws of neutrality lost much of their meaning as a result of the practices of the combatants in World War I. In many cases where they should have been honored they were flagrantly disregarded ; and in others, relating to the use of such new weapons as the airplane and the submarine, they appeared to be largely inapplicable. Woodrow Wilson sternly insisted on the rights of the United States as the greatest neutral state. His adamant position in this matter led to strained relations with Great Britain over interference with American ships, goods, and nationals and to the American declaration of war upon Germany, since Germany's use of the submarine was to the President a clear violation of America's rights as a neutral. Traditional laws of neutrality must be listed among the casualties of World War I. They have never been satisfactorily revised since that time, and during World War II they seemed quite anachronistic. One of the important questions in present-day international law is whether laws of neutrality can be meaningful in times of total war and whether the nations can agree on a thorough revision of previous codes. Perhaps even more important is the question of the relationship of neutrality to collective security. Writing before World War II, Philip C. Jessup declared that "it may well be argued that in the present or future condition of world solidarity, neutrality is an antisocial status."⁹ The point is still debatable.

The Laws of Peace. Most of the aspects of public international law which we shall consider come under the heading of the laws of peace, not of war and neutrality. The subject matter of the international law of peace is varied in the extreme. It embraces the bulk of the matters with which the international lawyer usually deals. To illustrate, we may refer to "six grand aspects or divisions of the subject" which are discussed by Professor Dickinson in a brief chapter on "The Law of Nations." The first is the law relating to the nation-state, "the traditional and principal subject of law in the international system," with particular attention to "its birth, recognition, life, and death." If the law of recognition were better defined, many vexatious political differences could perhaps be avoided. The second aspect deals with nationality and "the principles which determine human allegiance to the nation, including the severance of allegiance and the protection of nationals abroad." Third comes "the law of the national domain or homeland, including such earthy business as acquisitions, transfers, boundaries, internal authority and external responsibility." The fourth and fifth aspects cover the laws of jurisdiction and of intercourse and agreements. Finally, number six relates to the settlement of disputes. On each of these aspects a vast literature exists, and in these areas international law is rather well developed. At the same time, however,

⁹ Philip C. Jessup, "Neutrality," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* (Macmillan, 1937), XI, 364. Used by permission of The Macmillan Company.

as Dickinson points out, there are in the law that has been generally agreed upon "characteristic weaknesses," "important gaps," and "extraordinary paradoxes." That "the deficiencies observed in various divisions of the law of nations are no more than varying aspects of the same thing" is due to the character of the international society. "The law has developed among the members of an organized community of basically dissimilar subjects." After all, "are not subservience to politics, evasions of reality, exaltation of sovereignty and all the rest" natural among sovereign states?¹⁰

International Law and Municipal Law. International law is largely but not altogether concerned with relations between states, whereas municipal law controls relations between individuals within a state and between individuals and the state. The two kinds of law are similar in their sources — chiefly custom and express agreement — with, however, substantial differences in legislative machinery. They differ altogether in their judicial processes. Both are usually applied by national courts, with the result of complete decentralization of the judicial function in international law and effective centralization in municipal law. What is true of the judicial function is also true of the executive function. As in tort in domestic law, traditional international law always depended for its enforcement upon the initiative of the injured party. Most municipal law, on the other hand, is enforced by a responsible executive unknown to international law.

The relationship of international law to municipal law was once a matter of controversy. The principal question at issue was this ; in the event of a conflict between international law and domestic law, must a national court apply international law? Oppenheim held that in such a case the national courts neither may nor could apply the law of nations, for "the latter lacks absolutely the power of altering or creating rules of Municipal Law."¹¹ Clyde Eagleton, on the other hand, insisted that "to admit that international law is ultimately dependent upon domestic law and courts, or that municipal law may override international law, would be to deny international law outright, and no state makes such a denial" ; the "decisions of the courts putting its [the state's] own law above international law are not final, but may be reviewed and reparation may be demanded by an international tribunal."¹² He further pointed out that after World War I the constitutions of Germany and Austria specifically made international law a part of municipal law, and that court decisions have achieved the same result in the United States. Eagleton wrote much later than Oppenheim, and time may in part account for their different interpretations, for earlier writers were much more awed by sovereignty than more recent ones.

The Sources of International Law. The sources of international law are three in number --- treaties, custom, and general principles of law. Thus

¹⁰ All the quotations used in this paragraph have been taken from Dickinson, Chapter II.

¹¹ Oppenheim, I, 26.

¹² Clyde Eagleton, *International Government*, rev. ed. (Ronald, 1948), pp. 48-49.

the Statute of the International Court of Justice (Article 38) stipulates that the Court shall apply.

- (a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states ;
- (b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law ;
- (c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations ;
- (d) ...judicial decision and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.

It should be noted that (d) merely indicates means by which (b) and (c) may be determined.

The question of the law as fixed by treaty or convention is a fairly objective one, but even this presents at least two difficulties. One is the matter of interpretation, and the other is that of knowing just when a rule agreed to by some states but not by all becomes international law.

Custom or customary law is often difficult to prove. The task here is to show that a particular rule has been accepted in practice by the community of states, even though the various states have never reached an explicit understanding to that effect. The rule must be proved, if at all, by the presentation of evidence. Generally speaking, this evidence comes from judicial decisions, diplomatic correspondence, state papers, and the findings of research societies and private scholars.

The "general principles of law" have been variously spoken of as justice, common sense, and right reason. Yet they must not be regarded as entirely subjective -- that is, as something which each individual determines for himself. Instead, they may be thought of as principles common to the great legal systems of the world. They can be determined with some degree of objectivity, and they make it possible for judges to fill in the gaps between the rules of "positive law" -- the term applied to law based upon practice or express assent.

The Enforcement of International Law. Traditional international law did little more than recognize a right of self-help on the part of injured states. While world public opinion has long exerted some pressure on states to observe the rights of other states and of individuals, no international organization intervened to enforce the law. Supposedly states were morally bound to exhaust the means of peaceful settlement of disputes before resorting to forcible measures ; they might or might not be bound by law to do so. If they were bound, it was only with their own consent, as given in treaty or convention. If peaceable means failed, they could with complete legality resort to coercive ventures, including war. Each state was the judge in its own cause. Moreover, while states possessed a right of action in behalf of themselves and their citizens, no right of action was lodged anywhere in the international community when a state mistreated its own nationals.

Until recently the community of states has had little machinery for enforcing its own laws, and it has relied upon member states for enforcement. States or their citizens injured by the action of a particular state had the right to expect satisfaction in the courts of the offending state, in which international law was applied. If redress was not afforded by these courts, then the injured state or the state whose citizens had been injured could resort to diplomatic or economic pressures, to reprisals, or even to war. Thus under traditional international law self-help, or, more formally, unilateral action, was the ultimate means of enforcement. To the many kinds of compulsion which a state might use against another state, and more recently, which the organized international community might use against a state, we apply the term "sanctions."

Is International Law True Law? Some writers, especially those of the Austinian school, insist that what is called international law is not law at all but a branch of international morality. Others declare that the matter is one of definition, while still others staunchly defend the validity of the term. The average man would probably assume that where there is violence and obvious injustice there is no law. Against this assumption it must be pointed out that international law, unlike domestic law, is very limited in scope, and that the greater portion of international relations has not come within its jurisdiction at all. While it may be true that it *should* govern all the relations of states, traditional international law in reality has applied only to those subjects on which states have agreed that it should apply. Economic discriminations, imperialism, and war may have often revealed greed and the will to aggression, but they were not necessarily violations of international law.

It is also argued at times that international law is not true law because it is not binding. Admittedly it is impossible to reconcile the dogma of sovereignty with the idea of a law to which states must submit whether they like it or not. Some authorities have dodged this contradiction by supporting what is called the theory of consent -- that is, by insisting that states cannot be bound without their own consent but once consent has been given they are bound without infringement of their sovereignty because the limitations were voluntarily accepted. More generally, it is held that states enter the community of nations with the assumption that they accept its laws, and that the continued *general* observance of certain rules of conduct implies a tacit acceptance of those rules. The theory of tacit consent does not answer the question whether a state may be bound against its will and, if so, what happens to the doctrine of sovereignty. J. L. Brierly, an English authority, argued that the views of Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes, the great champions of absolute and indivisible sovereignty, have been misunderstood, and that those worthies never meant to underwrite "international anarchy" as some of their followers have done.¹³ He added that "the doctrine was developed for the most part by political theorists who were

¹³ J. L. Brierly, *The Law of Nations*, 4th. ed (Oxford University Press, 1949), pp. 7-16, 46.

not interested in, and paid little regard to, the relations of states with one another, and in its later forms it not only involved a denial of the possibility of states being subject to any kind of law, but became an impossible theory for a world which contained more states than one." In practice individual states may be bound by international law even against their will, but that law must rest upon the general consent of the community of nations.

What is called the Austinian definition holds that law is a rule of conduct issued by a superior authority to persons over whom it has jurisdiction. By such a definition international law is not true law, for neither the United Nations nor any other international organization has jurisdiction over persons or even in any real sense over states. This view no longer enjoys much support.

Some writers who persist in measuring international law by national law believe that the absence of centralized legislative, judicial, and executive authority disqualifies international law as true law. The status of international law is thus frequently impugned by persons who feel that it cannot be true law because "it is not enforced." The assumption of non-observance -- admittedly not quite the same thing as nonenforcement-- has been pretty well demolished by jurists from the time of John Bassett Moore to the present ; and the assumption of a necessary inviolability reveals unawareness of the very nature of jural law. Quincy Wright has this to say on the point of enforcement :

A considerable failure of realization is.....to be expected of any rule of jural law. Its status as law depends not only on objective observation that persons and official agencies within the society generally conform to the rules but also on subjective assumption of a duty to conform by such persons and agencies. If that assumption is generally made in the society, the rule may be valid law even though its imperfect observance and enforcement makes it ineffective.¹⁴

The answer to the question here raised thus depends upon definitions ; but, as Eagleton complacently remarks, "the theorist who wishes to deny to the law of nations the title of true law does not in the least affect the actual conduct of affairs in that society, nor the fact that those affairs are regulated by rules as well enforced and obeyed as those of domestic law."¹⁵

THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Like many other institutions of modern times, international law had its beginnings in the prehistoric world. Historians suggest that tribal communities must have been driven to some sort of understandings about places of habitation, water holes, hunting areas, trespass, warfare, and perhaps intermarriage. At first these inter-group relations were conducted on

¹⁴ Quincy Wright, *The Study of International Relations* (Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955), p. 220.

¹⁵ Eagleton, p. 53.

the assumptions that war and conflicts of interests were normal conditions and that peace was to be achieved only by express agreement. Friendly relations between tribal groups were not unknown, however, and as states emerged in the ancient world certain peoples, perhaps especially the Hebrews and the Hindus, asserted ideals of justice and order in the relations of states. The increasing respectability of commerce added a personal interest in law and order and thus contributed to peaceful relations among trading peoples.

Pre-Grotian International Law. The distinctive feature of the political organization of ancient Greece in the time of its greatness was the supremacy of local loyalties and law. It was in relations among the city-states that the Greeks made their greatest contribution to the law of nations, but they also furthered orderly interstate or international relations through their belief that these relations should be based upon certain rules. In their inter-city-state relations they acknowledged rules of warfare and diplomatic immunity, they made considerable use of arbitration, and they evolved a system of maritime law. With a greater genius for government and administration, the Romans extended the authority of Rome by conquest and alliance until they achieved what we speak of as a world-state. Their contributions, like those of Greece, sprang from the effort to regulate the relations of peoples and areas which did not qualify as "states," and their legacy to international law was the ideal of a common citizenship and impartial justice everywhere, the idea of a universal law, and the breaking down of the old isolationism and the old contempt for foreigners. To aid them in the government of conquered areas, Roman jurists formulated the principles of the *jus gentium*, or law of peoples, a body of rules and usages believed to be applicable to all peoples and resting upon natural justice. These principles survived the chaotic centuries that followed the fall of Rome and toward the close of the Middle Ages were accepted as part of the emerging international law. In this manner the way was prepared for the modern belief that definite legal principles should control the relations of states.

Between the passing of Rome and the late fourteenth century the ideal of a world-state, urged and sustained by the Church and the Holy Roman Empire, left small room for international law. With the rise of Britain, France, Portugal, and Spain as nation-states, international relations in the modern sense of the term began to develop. Regulations became imperative for the conduct of war, the preservation of neutrality, the use of the seas in both peace and war, and the fixing of boundaries in colonial claims. Agreements were made between states by treaty and conference. A law of neutrality also took form, the principles of Roman law respecting private property were applied to boundary lines and colonial claims, and a law of war was slowly formulated.¹⁶

¹⁶ The progressive character of international law is well illustrated in the evolution of maritime codes. The earliest of these known today was that of the island of Rhodes, dating from the third or second century B.C. The Rhodian Sea Law, imita-

Writers long ago began to point out that in the agreements of states, in the principles of Roman law, in practice and custom, and in what they called "natural law" there was a growing body of rules of conduct that states were approving by observance and commitment. Thus while international law was made by the actions and agreements of rulers, it was collected and systematized by scholars through researches in the past and current relations of states. "International law as now practised by the states of the world," wrote Pitman B. Potter a number of years ago, "is largely the product of private scholarship, taken over later by the states more or less in spite of their natural instincts."¹⁷

Perhaps the first of the important writers was Legnano, an Italian, whose study of the rules of war was written in 1360, although not published until 1477. No outstanding writer appeared in the fifteenth century, but at least six legal scholars produced notable works on international law in the sixteenth century. The most important of these were Vitoria, a Spaniard who "laid down the principle that the nations formed a community based upon natural reason and social intercourse";¹⁸ Suárez, also a Spaniard, who "first distinguished between reason and custom as sources of international law, a distinction followed ever since";¹⁹ and Gentilis, a British subject of Italian extraction, who added historical and legal precedents to natural reason and natural law as sources of international law. Gentilis is remembered today for his *De jure belli*, but probably even more as the direct forerunner of the man destined to become known as the "Father of International Law," Hugo Grotius.

Grotius (1583-1645) and Natural Law. Hugo Grotius was born in Holland in 1583. He took the degree of doctor of laws at the University of Leyden at the age of fifteen. In 1609 he published *Mare liberum*, wherein he argued for freedom of the seas, a view then not generally held. Later he went to Paris, where he lived for ten years and where in 1625 he published the work which has given him permanent fame, *De jure belli ac*

tively named after the earlier code, was formulated during the later Roman Empire as a guide to Roman practice; it embraced both old and new principles. The Italian codes were written in the eleventh century, and by the close of the thirteenth century many cities of the Mediterranean had their own compilations of maritime customs. In the early twelfth century the Rolls of Oleron, showing the influence of the Rhodian Sea Law, was accepted by many countries of Europe; as late as 1779 it was approved by the state of Virginia. The famous *Consolato del Mare* (Consulate of the Sea) was compiled in Barcelona about 1340; it exerted great influence in Italy and the western Mediterranean. Successive codifications by the Hanseatic League between 1447 and 1592 were much observed by the countries of North Europe. The last of the great maritime codes was the French *Ordonnance de la Marine*, issued in 1681 after ten years of preparation. It was widely observed in England, which has never had a maritime code of its own, and it was cited in American admiralty courts as late as the twentieth century. A significant feature of most of these compilations was the indebtedness of each to earlier formulations.

¹⁷ *An Introduction to the Study of International Organization*, 5th ed. (Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1948), p. 58.

¹⁸ Fenwick, p. 50.

¹⁹ Eagleton, p. 31.

pacis, or *On the Law of War and Peace*. He issued an enlarged and revised edition in 1631 and later three other editions with little change. A total of sixty-four editions had been issued by 1928. It is significant that this notable work appeared in the midst of the bloody Thirty Years War.

With *De jure belli ac pacis*, particularly Part II, "the science of the modern Law of Nations commences.....because in it a fairly complete system of International Law was for the first time built up as an independent branch of the science of law."²⁰ One authority describes it as having four main characteristics. First, Grotius would hold states to the same rules which regulate the lives of individuals and make the violation of them a crime subject to punishment. Second, basing his judgment upon researches in the Scriptures, ancient history, and the classics, he formulated the "law of peace" which became the foundation of his whole system. Third, he argued that states may properly punish other states which violate the law. Fourth, he accepted natural law -- or right reason -- as the primary basis for determining rules for the rightful conduct of states.²¹

Grotius is much admired today for his earnest desire to bring nations to accept the principles of humanity. Indeed, in our esteem for international conduct based on moral principles and in our growing conviction that peace-loving states must accept the obligation to punish lawless states, we are closer to the spirit and mind of Grotius than were the men of the nineteenth century with their glorification of sovereignty.

The natural law or law of nature to which Grotius appealed was made up of those rules of conduct which arose from the attempt to reason out the way by which men and states could best get along with each other. Grotius defined it as "the dictate of right reason which points out that a given act, because of its opposition to or conformity with man's rational nature, is either morally wrong or morally necessary, and accordingly forbidden or commanded by God, the author of nature."²² In a sense it was a theoretical approach ; it sought to assert what ought to be the law rather than to list the rules to which men and states had actually committed themselves by custom or agreement. To these latter we apply the term "positive law." While Grotius did not ignore positive law, which he called "voluntary law," he kept it distinct from the rules which he took from natural law, and he felt it to be of minor importance. He did not originate the concept of natural law, for that was very old, but his formulation of the rules of state conduct which he felt rested upon or sprang from natural law won such acceptance by other legal writers that it dominated thinking on international law for two centuries.

Zouche (1590-1660) and Positivism. Twenty-five years after the appearance of Grotius' *De jure belli ac pacis*, Richard Zouche, an Oxford Professor of civil law, published a little book in which he asserted views

²⁰ Oppenheim, I, 76.

²¹ Cornelius van Vollenhoven, "Hugo Grotius," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* (Macmillan, 1937), VII, 177.

²² Book I, Chapter I, Section X.

quite opposite from those of Grotius.²³ Whereas Grotius had emphasized natural law and minimized customary law, Zouche reversed the order. As the first important champion of the customary-law or positivist school of thought he is sometimes spoken of as the "Second Founder of the Law of Nations." Zouche also contributed to the name "international law," for instead of using Grotius' term, *jus gentium* or law of nations, he used *jus inter gentes* or law between nations, thus supplying the "inter" for the term "international law," first used by Jeremy Bentham a century and a half later.²⁴

The Three Schools of Thought. For nearly two centuries after Grotius had published his monumental work in 1625, roughly during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, writers tended to divide into three schools of thought : the naturalists, who took their cue from Grotius but often went far beyond him to deny all positive law ; the positivists, who rejected Grotius' natural law and supported Zouche's customary law, some even out-doing Zouche and denying all natural law ; and the so-called Grotians, who accepted both natural and customary law, although most of them accepted more customary law than had Grotius.

The Ascendancy of Positivism. During the nineteenth century international law lost much of its subjective character, and the distinguished names associated with it came to be those of compilers of treatises rather than of philosophers and moralists. The positivist way of thinking slowly rose in prominence until its methods had won general although not exclusive or universal acceptance. This development seemed to reflect the growing secularism of the times, with its emphasis on the practical rather than the idealistic. Perhaps another factor was the rising popularity of written constitutions, as in the United States and the new republics of Latin America. Commerce and representative government were driving men to insist on the precise terms of their rights and obligations, with these to be measured by custom and statute rather than by some uncertain law of nature.

The writers of the first two-thirds of the century showed the influence of Grotius, for while most of them were positivists they were unable to exclude completely all assumptions based on natural law, sometimes using it merely to fill the gaps in positive law. As scholars in considerable number delved into archives, they narrowed the field in which positive law was lacking ; and as states more and more frequently entered into law-making treaties they lessened the need for appeals to natural law. Consequently, by the last third of the nineteenth century positivism had become the prevailing school of thought.

²³ This little volume bears the fascinating title of *Juris et judicii fecialis, sive, juris inter gentes, et quaestionum de eodum explicatio, quae, quae ad pacem et bellum interdiversos principes out peretis exhibentur.*

²⁴ Oppenheim, I, 81.

THE CODIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Legal scholars of the past half-century have tended to accept the separation of positive law and natural law that was in progress during the nineteenth century. Although many books and articles continued to be written on the rules of conduct that ought to be embraced and practiced by states, these came to be regarded more as ethics and less as law. Yet they gave a real impetus to the making of international law, for they often stimulated the making of international agreements on subjects not already covered by law. The most significant developments have taken the form of an expanded interest in the collection and systematization of existing law and of organized efforts to translate ideas of improved interstate relations into the law of nations by multilateral agreements. To these developments, commonly known as codification and international legislation, we must turn for a better understanding of the progress that is now being made in international law. We shall see that the difference between the two, though clear in theory, often becomes completely vague in practice. To formulate a code means to systematize the law in a certain field, a process which entails filling in the gaps. States ratifying the code are therefore in a position of approving new law — that is, they are sharing in a legislative process. Professor Eagleton says that “the codification of international law, if it means anything at all, means systematic legislation.”²⁵

Beginnings. While proposals for codification date from the late eighteenth century, it was not until the 1860's that the earliest attempts were actually made, the first being a *précis* formulated in 1861 by an Austrian jurist. Two years later, in 1863, Francis Lieber (1800-1872) prepared *A Code for the Government of Armies*, which in revised form was used by the Union armies in the Civil War and by Germany in the Franco-Prussian War. In 1868 Bluntschli (1808-1881) produced a more comprehensive codification, declaring that his intention was “to formulate clearly the existing ideas of the civilized world.” In 1872 an American, David Dudley Field (1805-1894), issued a *Draft Outline of an International Code*, and an Italian jurist, Pasquale Fiore (1837-1914), published in 1889 a code covering the whole field of international law.²⁶ While in more recent years many scholars have published excellent treatises on international law, the preparation of codes, with their more formal arrangement and definitive treatment, has become almost entirely the work of private associations and of international conferences and commissions of jurists.

Institutional Codification. The year 1873 was a memorable one in the science of international law, for it saw the founding of the *Institut de Droit International* and the Association for the Reform and Codification of the Law of Nations, which in 1895 changed its name to the International Law

²⁵ Eagleton, p. 207.

²⁶ Published in an English translation by Edwin M. Borchard in 1915 as *International Law Codified*.

Association. The *Institut* has issued a number of draft codes, perhaps the most important being the *Manual of the Laws of War on Land*, published in 1880. A compilation of fifty-six "resolutions" and "views" of the *Institut* was published in 1916 by James Brown Scott, Director of the Division of International Law of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The International Law Association, like the *Institut*, has concentrated upon the statement of law on particular topics. The American Society of International Law, founded in 1905, publishes a journal of notable excellence, *The American Journal of International Law*, but it does not emphasize codification.

The American Institute of International Law, on the other hand, has devoted its energies almost exclusively to the drafting of codes, particularly as they embody practices in the Western Hemisphere. Founded in 1912 through the efforts of Alejandro Alvarez of Chile and James Brown Scott of the United States, this organization was closely associated with the Union of American Republics and its Commission of Jurists, and it enjoyed the financial support of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. In June, 1950, the Inter-American Council of Jurists acknowledged the "notable contribution" of the Institute and asked for its continued cooperation. The Institute's part in the codification of "American international law" — the very existence of which some writers have denied — has largely taken the form of making recommendations to the official organs of the inter-American system. A German organization, the *Institut für Internationales Recht* at Kiel, also gave a great deal of attention to codification. Finally, a number of draft conventions were issued by Harvard University's Research in International Law, set up in 1926 to aid the League of Nations in the work of codification. The first three of the Harvard Research drafts related to nationality, responsibility of states, and territorial waters.

Early Official Codification. Meantime, official codification began when the representatives of twelve states, assembled at Geneva in 1864, endeavored to describe existing practice in respect to the care of the wounded in battle. Meeting on the invitation of the Tsar of Russia at Brussels in 1874, representatives of the leading powers drew up a draft code of the rules of war on land, but it was never ratified. More ambitious ventures in codification were undertaken by the famous Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907. The first of these approved a code of the laws and customs of war on land and adapted to maritime war the principles formulated in the Geneva Convention of 1864 for the care of the sick and wounded in land warfare. The conference of 1907 adopted conventions on the codification of the rights and duties of neutrals and on certain phases of the conduct of naval warfare. Both conferences also accepted many conventions that embodied new rules of international law. On an average, the conventions were ratified by more than half the states participating in the conferences, but at least one was ratified by none at all. In 1900 the United States Government published *The Laws and Usages of War at Sea*,

thus supplementing Lieber's rules of warfare on land : but this, of course, was a unilateral action. In 1909 the leading maritime powers sent delegates to a conference in London to work out a code of warfare on the sea, but the resulting Declaration of London was ratified by only a few states. World War I soon prevented other efforts. Thus, as Professor Fenwick says, "until the creation of the League of Nations, attempts at codification were haphazard and infrequent."²⁷

Codification of "American International Law." Proposals for undertaking codification of "American international law" were made at the Inter-American Conferences of 1889-1890 in Washington and of 1902 in Mexico City, but no work was actually begun. The Third Conference, however, meeting in 1906 in Rio de Janeiro, approved a convention for setting up a Commission of Jurists to draft codes of international public and private law. When the Commission finally met in 1912 it agreed upon a report on extradition and set up six committees to study subjects for codification. Then World War I intervened, and in the immediate postwar period the Latin American states became engrossed in the League of Nations. Moreover, the United States welcomed the respite from the insistence of her neighbors that the American republics write into American international law a categorical renunciation of the right of intervention.

The Commission, revitalized by the Fifth Inter-American Conference at Santiago in 1923, submitted twelve projects of codification to the Havana Conference of 1928. But Yankee intervention was again the bogey. "It was at Havana," says Professor Bemis, "that the United States made its last defense of the interventions still unliquidated in the Caribbean."²⁸ The clash was between the United States' insistence on recognition of international *duties* and the Latin American insistence on international *rights*. Although the United States again engineered defeat of the doctrine of non-intervention, she ratified a resolution condemning aggression and she joined in the approval of projects for codifying public international law on the status of aliens, treaties, diplomatic officers, consular agents, maritime neutrality, asylum, and rights and duties of states in event of civil strife. The Havana Conference also approved the Bustamante Code of private international law and invited the American republics to ratify it. The United States declined to do so, pleading the division of jurisdiction inherent in federalism. The Sixth Conference also directed the Commission of Jurists to continue its work.

Actual work on codification languished, but when the United States accepted the Doctrine of Absolute Nonintervention at Buenos Aires in 1936 it seemed that the American republics might regain their interest. Yet the Mexico City Conference of 1945 "recognized that the frequent attempts to codify international law up to that time had largely failed."²⁹ At the

²⁷ Fenwick, p. 209.

²⁸ Samuel F. Bemis, *The Latin American Policy of the United States* (Harcourt, Brace, 1943), p. 252.

²⁹ Edward O. Guerrant, *Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy* (University of New Mexico Press, 1950), p. 80.

Ninth Inter-American Conference, held at Bogotá in 1948, the machinery was again revised, this time as part of the general reorganization of the inter-American system. An Inter-American Council of Jurists was made one of the three organs responsible to the governing body (the Council), and the Inter-American Juridical Committee was made the permanent committee of the Inter-American Council of Jurists. All other juridical agencies were abolished. One of the four departments of the general secretariat --- the Pan American Union --- is the Department of International Law and Organization. The Department has begun the publication of the *Inter-American Juridical Yearbook* "to present a survey of the development of inter-American regional law during the current year" ; and it continues the issuance of the *Law and Treaty Series*.

Holding its first meeting in Rio de Janeiro in May and June, 1950, the Council of Jurists approved a draft statute which included a detailed plan for development and codification. This statute directed the new Council of Jurists to "establish relations of mutual cooperation with the International Law Commission of the United Nations."³⁰ Although the Judicial Committee continues its work on the projects set up at Rio, one might well make the observation that has been made so often in the past on the codification of international law --- the American republics have really not accomplished very much but they have made a good start.

Codification by the League of Nations. Although the Covenant of the League contained nothing on codification, sentiment mounted in favor of such action until in 1924 the Assembly and Council set up a Committee of Experts to begin the task. After years of preparatory work, a Codification Conference met at The Hague in 1930 to consider three subjects : nationality, territorial waters, and the responsibility of states for damage caused in their territory to the person or property of foreigners. One convention and three protocols were adopted, but the delegates clung tenaciously to the practices of their respective governments, and the one big venture of the League of Nations into the codification of international law accomplished almost nothing.

Codification by the United Nations. Unlike the League Covenant, the United Nations Charter specifically provides for the codification of international law. Accordingly, the General Assembly early created a seventeen-member ad hoc Committee on the Progressive Development of International Law and Its Codification, and assigned to it the duty of studying methods by which the Assembly could discharge its obligation under Article 13 of the Charter of "encouraging the progressive development of international law and its codification." In its report to the Assembly in September, 1947, the Committee recommended the creation of an International Law Commission, to which would be assigned the dual task of studying subjects of law not yet highly developed and the "precise formula-

³⁰ The draft Statutes of the Inter-American Council of Jurists are printed in *Annals of the Organization of American States*, II, No. 3 (1950), 278-290.

tion of the law in matters in which there was extensive practice, precedent, and doctrine.”³¹

The Committee also recommended that the Commission be instructed “to survey the whole field of customary international law together with any relevant treaties with a view to selecting topics for codification, having in mind previous governmental and non-governmental projects,” and it further recommended that the International Law Commission (ILC) “consider ways and means of making the evidence of customary international law more readily available by the compilation of digests of State practice, and by the collection and publication of the decisions of national and international courts on international law questions.”³² The Committee observed that its responsibility involved the two duties of “progressive development” (of new law) and “codification” (of existing law), but at the same time it marked a distinction between the two areas of its labors — a distinction which many authorities regard as purely theoretical. It suggested that conclusions in respect to codification should be submitted to the Assembly in the form of multipartite conventions, which, whether accepted or not, would have value as formulations by a distinguished tribunal. The General Assembly established the International Law Commission on November 21, 1947, adopted a statute for its government, and later elected fifteen members of the Commission for three-year terms.

The most notable achievements of the ILC toward the “progressive development of international law and its codification” have been the preparation of a Declaration on the Rights and Duties of States and the formulation of some but not all of the principles of law underlying the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials. The basic rights of states, the Commission found, include independence, equality in law, jurisdiction over their own territories, and self-defense; duties include the peaceful settlement of international disputes and the observance of human rights and fundamental personal freedoms. The Nuremberg Principles assert that both individuals and governments are to be held responsible for “crimes against peace,” “war crimes,” and “crimes against humanity.” Neither of the two formulations has been approved by enough states to give it the status of law. In the area of “codification” the Commission has concentrated its labors upon four topics; Law of Treaties, Arbitral Procedure, Regime of the High Seas, and Territorial Waters.

On request of the General Assembly the ILC considered the advisability of establishing an international criminal tribunal, and in 1950 it reported that such a court was both desirable and feasible. In 1951 the Assembly suggested that the Commission attempt a definition of aggression, but after much discussion the ILC reported that a precise definition was impracticable.

The UN’s work in developing and codifying international law has not been confined to the ILC. The Secretariat has drafted conventions on

³¹ *International Organization*, 1 (Sept., 1947), 492.

³² *Yearbook of the United Nations 1946-1947* (United Nations, 1947), p. 259.

certain aspects of the status of the UN, and the International Court has prepared an agreement on its own status in the Netherlands. The Human Rights Commission drafted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, two covenants on human rights, and the Convention on Genocide.

The United States has declined to approve the formulation of the Nuremberg Principles, has deferred action on the Draft Statute for an international criminal court, has refused to support any of several projected drafts of a covenant or covenants on human rights, and has taken no action on the Genocide Convention. Believing many of these efforts premature, she is unwilling to see the sincere commitments of a few states abused by the expediency of states not yet prepared to put law above politics. Indeed, as "international law is ultimately enforceable only through the consent of sovereign states," law-observing states may understandably consider that "measures which out-run that consent may weaken those doctrines that have finally gained general acceptance."³³

INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION

The acknowledged sources of international law came to be custom and treaties—custom because it disclosed what states had already agreed to in practice, and treaties because they involved express consent. Custom is not always easy to ascertain, for it involves deciding when a practice has become a custom and has achieved something like general acceptance. Consequently, it is not a satisfactory basis for making law. It is therefore upon treaties that the making of new international law has largely depended. But this method too has been unsatisfactory. Historically treaties have usually been bilateral, with a specific *quid pro quo*, with hallowed rights of nonratification, reservation, interpretation, and termination, and often with an implicit exclusiveness. More recently states have turned away from conventional treaties for the making of international law and instead have tended to use what is known as international legislation.

The Nature of International Legislation. Here is a term that must be used with care. Eagleton says that while it "may be used in a general sense, the process is of course far from being really legislative."³⁴ If international legislation were true legislation, states would automatically be bound by the enactments of a properly constituted international legislative body, just as individuals within a state are bound by laws to which they have not given their express assent. But no international body has ever been set up with a status comparable to that of national legislatures. On the contrary, states almost invariably regard agreements arrived at by treaty or conference as valid and binding only when they have been expressly ratified "in accordance with the respective constitutional processes"

³³ "Issues Before the Tenth General Assembly," *International Conciliation*, No. 504 (Sept., 1955), p. 143.

³⁴ Eagleton, p. 190.

of the signatory states. This is true even of most actions taken by any of the organs and agencies of the United Nations, an organization of almost universal membership. While some public international organizations make exceptions to the rule of express assent, the exceptions are few and usually relate to less important matters. Nevertheless, despite its inaccuracy and the protests of some writers, we do use the term "international legislation," having in mind a wide participation in formulating principles of rights and duties rather than a perfect analogy to the national legislative process.

International legislation does not imply a specific procedure. States or, rather, the representatives of states --- may reach an agreement by any one of a number of means or combinations of means. Whatever device is used to reach an understanding, however, that understanding must be ratified by each individual state in order to be binding on that state. Even then the state is not necessarily bound, for the agreement may provide that a certain number of ratifications are required to make it effective, even for ratifying states.

While international legislation closely resembles the conventional multilateral treaty process — that is, negotiations or conference followed by ratification of agreements reached — there are certain important differences. More generally, it seeks to assert rules of law rather than to compromise differences, and it is commonly open to accession by all interested states. While it is still subject to all the obstacles that capricious sovereignty may devise — failure to ratify, nullifying reservations, and unilateral termination — there is some evidence that states are now feeling a stronger moral obligation to accept the "legislation" in good faith. Ten years before the founding of the UN, Manley O. Hudson declared that international legislation was more important than international jurisprudence as a source of "currently developing international law." That judgment would certainly be valid today.

The Evolution of the Legislative Process. The Congress of Vienna of 1815 "may be taken to have inaugurated the process of international legislation."³⁵ Agreements of continuing importance were reached at Vienna on the classification of diplomatic agents and on the free navigation of the international rivers of Europe. Another notable conference, that of Paris of 1856, approved a declaration on the abolition of privateering which became securely fixed in international law. International legislation on telegraphic matters dates from 1865, on postal matters from 1874, and on weights and measures from 1875. During these years technological changes in communications and transportation were creating problems of general concern that could be handled only by what amounted to almost continuous international legislative activity. This commonly took the form of ad hoc conferences which, becoming somewhat standardized and regularized and at times being supplemented by the maintenance of permanent

³⁵ Manley O. Hudson, "International Legislation," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* (Macmillan, 1937), VII, 175. Used by permission of The Macmillan Company.

offices, led inevitably toward a more general form of permanent international organization. The Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 may be said to have represented a transitional step from ad hoc conferences and specialized international organizations toward the League of Nations, the first great experiment of an organization open to all states and without a special-purpose character.

International Legislation by the League of Nations. The League of Nations ushered in a new era of legislative effort. In its first dozen years the League produced more international legislation than had issued from all sources during the entire century before World War I or than was currently being issued from all other sources combined. The subjects were almost as broad as human interest. They included communications and transit ; slavery ; pacific settlement of disputes ; the traffic in opium, women and children, arms, and obscene publications ; buoyage and lighting of coasts ; counterfeiting ; uniformity of bills of exchange ; and labor. Under the persuasion of the League's Secretariat states came to feel more and more bound to follow signature with ratification and while the international legislative process was by no means perfected, considerable improvement certainly took place during the lifetime of the League.

Professor Hudson found at least sixteen different names for the understandings reached between or among states since the founding of the League. Alphabetically these were as follows : act, agreement, arrangement, convention, covenant, declaration, final act, general act, pact, plan, protocol, regulation, rule, scheme, statute, and treaty. It is significant that he included them all in the monumental collection to which he gave the name *International Legislation*. Although his compilation, covering the period from 1919 to 1949, fills eight volumes, it is a selective and not an exhaustive one, as will be gathered from the fact that before its termination the *League of Nations Treaty Series* had reached two hundred volumes.

International Legislation by the UN. Within the UN the legislative procedure operates in this fashion : The General Assembly directs one of the commissions or agencies to prepare a "draft statute" — the term varies — on a particular subject. A committee of the agency does the work, keeping at it until the agency approves a report for submission to the General Assembly. This body may approve the draft statute or it may send it back to the agency for revision. If approved, the statute is sent to member states for ratification. We shall review some examples of legislation in a later chapter on the UN.

The volume of international legislation has become so great that merely keeping a record of it is a problem. Hudson's *International Legislation*, already mentioned, includes only the texts of agreements registered with the League. That these texts are in print is insufficient in itself, for it is often important to know which ones are still in force, what revisions have been made, what states were bound by a particular agreement at a particular date, etc. The *United Nations Treaty Series*, issued by the Secre-

tariat, contains texts of treaties, conventions, and the like entered into by member states since the Charter became effective : other agreements—those antedating the Charter and those between nonmember states—may or may not be included, depending upon the acceptance of the Secretariat's invitation to submit them. There is considerable support for the proposal to have the Secretariat undertake the all-inclusive publication of international legislation—truly a formidable enterprise.³⁶

THE LIMITATIONS AND POSSIBILITIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Our review of international law should include some mention of the ways in which, according to eminent authorities, it must be improved and developed if the states of the world are to establish an international order of justice and lasting peace. The limitations listed here should not be regarded as implying a program upon which scholars are agreed. Rather, some are emphasized by one writer and some by another, but together they suggest the chief inadequacies of international law as it now exists. These limitations consist of the following : (1) the incompleteness of the legislative function ; (2) various and serious limitations in the judicial function ; (3) the lack of effective enforcement ; (4) limitations on the scope and functions of international law ; and (5) widespread misunderstanding of the nature and purpose of the law. Basically, all the limitations of international law are inherent in the present character of international society, in which the concept of a legal order is not generally accepted but is, in fact, regarded as actually inapplicable in the most vital areas of international relations.

The Legislative Function. We have already noted that the two chief sources of international law have been custom and treaty. Since much of the customary law has been codified, and since the frequency of international conferences has provided states with abundant opportunity to insist upon giving their express assent to international obligations, treaties have become the chief source of international law. Within the past century the multilateral treaty, frequently negotiated at a conference of many states, has become increasingly important. Nevertheless, even states participating insist upon a right to accept or reject the negotiated agreement ; and they may individually qualify the agreement or may ratify and then ignore or repudiate it. Such right of independent action rests upon the doctrine of sovereignty.

Codification presents some of the same difficulties as lawmaking, even when the word is used to mean simply transformation of customary law into statute law. To assemble the customary law on a given subject and to organize it into a coherent whole often involves agreement upon interpretation and the filling of gaps. In these matters states frequently dis-

³⁶ Salo Engel, "On the Status of International Legislation," *The American Journal of International Law*, XLIV (Oct., 1950), 739.

agree, and when they do agree they are legislating, that is, making new law, at least in details. Indeed, as legal authorities and the UN itself recognize, codification and legislation cannot always be differentiated.

The Judicial Function. The problem of the judicial function is more complex. To state this problem as briefly as possible, it may be said to be made up of the limitations arising from the following conditions :

1. *The nature of international judicial machinery.* International law, for the most part, is enforced by national courts. Thus, an individual injured in a foreign state may seek redress in the local courts, which presumably will apply local law enacted to meet the international law requirement of justice to aliens. If the injured person feels that he has been denied justice he may appeal to his own government, which in turn may resort to negotiation, to some form of international adjudication, or, as a last recourse, even to nonamicable pressures. Until the founding of the Permanent Court of International Justice as part of the League of Nations system, international adjudication was always performed by a specially chosen individual or body, with a new "court" for each dispute. The Permanent Court of International Justice and its successor under the United Nations, the International Court of Justice, have provided an established court, but other difficulties remain. For one thing the ICJ is not the highest in a real hierarchy of courts, and so there is necessary uniformity of law only in those matters on which the International Court has spoken and in which its decisions have been accepted. Furthermore, the International Court of Justice is not bound by the doctrine of *stare decisis*—that is, the obligation to follow precedents—and national courts are technically free to ignore each other's rulings on international law and even the decisions of the International Court of Justice itself. It is this "combination of hierarchial organization and of the rule of *stare decisis*," stated Hans Morgenthau, speaking of national courts, that "produces one system of jurisprudence throughout the judicial system, one body of coherent law ever ready to go into action at the request of whoever claims to need the protection of the law." And, added Morgenthau, "nothing in the international sphere even remotely resembles this situation."³⁷ Professor J. L. Brierly, a member of the International Law Commission, however, noted that "precedents are taking their proper place in the system . . . creating for international law an ampler stock of detailed rules, testing its abstract principles by their fitness to solve practical problems, and depriving it of the too academic character which has belonged to it in the past."³⁸

2. *The lack of compulsory jurisdiction.* International law does not require any state to submit its disputes to an international tribunal against its will. Consent to judicial process may be given on a particular occasion, or it may be given in advance to cover all or certain stipulated classes of disputes, but in theory consent is always a prerequisite. States, either singly or in collaboration, may of course condemn a state and even punish

³⁷ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 2nd ed. (Knopf, 1954), p. 269.

³⁸ Brierly, p. 65.

it, but the form of judicial process is not present unless the state so condemned or acted against has consented to the procedure used. The Optional Clause, which is contained in the statutes of both the Permanent Court of International Justice and the International Court of Justice, was devised to bring states closer to compulsory jurisdiction, but states are free to accept or ignore the Optional Clause (whence its name), and the Clause itself limits compulsory jurisdiction to certain types of legal disputes and is operative only when both - or all - parties to a dispute have accepted it. Furthermore, the acceptance of the Optional Clause has often been attended by many and significant reservations, those of the United States being perhaps the most far-reaching. Thus there is nowhere in international law anything like real compulsory jurisdiction, either outside the UN or in it.

3. *The ambiguity of the law.* The uncertainty about what the law is arises in part from the lack of a judicial hierarchy and from the doubtful character of the rule of *stare decisis*, which we have already described. But it is also due in part to the vague and general terms in which international agreements are frequently expressed. This vagueness is probably unavoidable, for states shy away from precise stipulations and find refuge in agreements that may later be interpreted to their own liking. The ambiguity of the law also arises in part from uncertainty about the customary law and doubt whether repeated violations by other states have operated to annul the law or have left its binding character unimpaired. Important, too, is the fact that there is no repeal process for international law comparable to that for national law.

The ambiguity of the law also directly affects the limitations of jurisdiction. This situation arises in part from the conviction that positive law must be supplemented by what is very close to natural law. Torsten Gihl has said that "the risk of surprises owing to the tribunals' deciding by rules of their own invention can hardly fail to deter states from having recourse to international tribunals."³⁹ As we have already pointed out, the Statute of the International Court of Justice authorizes the Court to apply "the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations." While such a grant of power may be unavoidable, it is certainly true that the "general principles" cannot be ascertained with complete objectivity.

4. *Subjects as judges.* Another serious defect in the judicial function has been that the subjects of international law have also been its judges. By this we mean that individual states - the principal subjects - or their agencies possess the right to interpret the law which they are under obligation to enforce. Being in the position of both subject and judge, they are able to exploit every ambiguity and technicality to their own advantage. This has been true even under the League and the UN, for only those disputes that somehow reached the Permanent Court of International Justice or the International Court of Justice have been adjudicated by an international tribunal.

³⁹ *International Legislation* (Oxford University Press, 1937), pp. v-vi.

5. *The limitation of justiciable disputes.* So long as states are not subject to compulsory jurisdiction, it is clear that they have the right to say which disputes they will submit to international judicial process and which ones they will not. Generally speaking, they distinguish between "justiciable" and "non-justiciable" disputes. Some international lawyers have contended that the two groups are really different in nature -- that the first is made up of those for which rules of law exist and the second of those for which there is no applicable law. Other authorities insist that the distinction is unreal. Brierly, for instance, called it "imaginary" and analyzed it as follows :

International law then is never formally or intrinsically incapable of giving a decision, on the basis of law, on the respective rights of the parties to any dispute, and if that is so, we must look for the difference between justiciable and non-justiciable disputes elsewhere than in some assumed specific quality which distinguishes that law from other systems. Probably to-day most writers would regard it as depending upon the attitude of the parties : if, whatever the subject-matter of the dispute may be, what the parties seek is their legal rights, the dispute is justiciable : if, on the other hand, one of them at least is not content to demand its legal rights, but demands the satisfaction of some interest of its own even though this may require a change in the existing legal situation, the dispute is non-justiciable.⁴⁰

The distinction between justiciable and nonjusticiable disputes is unknown to domestic law. M.A. Weightman called attention to the significance of this difference in one area of personal and state action -- steps taken in self-defense : "In municipal law the legality of measures taken in self-defense is universally acknowledged to be a proper subject for judicial determination. No such determination has of course even been attempted in the international sphere, and indeed publicists have declared --and diplomats have insisted loudly - that recourse to self-defense must be left to the unfettered judgment of the state which believes that it is being attacked." Weightman pointed out, however, that this means only that "no determination of legality can be made in advance" and that "the measures taken are capable of subsequent legal appreciation and, by extension, of judicial interpretation."⁴¹

The Executive Function. The limitations of the executive function are more obvious than those of the legislative or judicial, for international law does not provide for international enforcement agencies of any kind. Rather, it gives injured states certain rights of action but confers on nobody the obligation to act. Thus states may legally undertake certain actions to obtain a redress of grievances ; but if they fail to take action the injury remains unredressed. Collective law enforcement, as by the UN, may be attempted with complete legality, but such collective action

⁴⁰ Brierly, pp. 263-264.

⁴¹ "Self-Defense in International Law," *Virginia Law Review*, XXXVII (Dec., 1951), 1115.

is not a requirement of traditional international law. It is a voluntarily and specially assumed obligation. Moreover, even UN action is commonly inaugurated by the complaint of a state : it is by no means as automatic as in national law. And, despite the Charter's grant of authority to the Security Council to "call" upon member states for armed forces to support its decisions, the Korean crisis of 1950 found the Council inviting aid from all sources rather than stipulating contributions of UN members. Law enforcement was still a matter of national choice. Nevertheless, both the Covenant of the League and the Charter of the UN declare certain offenses to be the concern of all states. But this brave assertion applies only to offenses of a war-threatening character, with enforcement in the hands of sovereign states. Despite the UN Charter, wrote Philip C. Jessup, "the traditional legal foundations of unilateralism remain largely unshaken," and he quoted Elihu Root as saying that "if the law of nations is to be binding.....there must be a change in theory, and violations of the law of such a character as to threaten the peace and order of the community of nations must be deemed to be a violation of the right of every civilized nation to have the law maintained and a legal injury to every nation."⁴²

The Narrow Range of International Law. In discussing what he calls one of the "most serious shortcomings of the present system," Brierly asserted that "it is because the demands that international law makes on states are on the whole so light that its rules in general are fairly well observed." He pointed, for example, to the whole field of economic relations as one in which the individual states have exclusive jurisdiction over matters which often provide the causes of international disputes. Other areas he mentioned are immigration, naturalization, a state's treatment of its own nationals, and the choice of a form of government. "Law will never play a really effective part in international relations," declared Brierly, "until it can annex to its own sphere some of the matters which at present lie within the 'domestic jurisdictions' of the several states."⁴³

Actually, the range of international law is far greater than may be assumed from a short discussion of its place in international relations. To say that certain areas of interstate relations are at present *outside* the scope of international law is not to minimize the number and importance of those already *inside*.

Furthermore, as Jessup has observed, it is "the fundamental tenet of traditional international law that it is a law only between states, not between individuals or between individuals and states." To provide a legal basis for the redress of wrongs to individuals, we have long employed Vattel's fiction that a state is injured when one of its citizens is injured, and the state alone has had a right of action. Only the state may collect damages and then may compensate the citizen if it wishes. Admittedly, there have long been exceptions to the rule that international law is a law only between states, notably in the case of piracy.

⁴² Jessup, *A Modern Law of Nations*, p. 11.

⁴³ Brierly, pp. 75-76.

Individuals as Subjects of International Law. After World War II the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials raised in dramatic fashion the question of the liability of individuals under international law -- specifically, could the Nazi war leaders be properly tried and punished by an international tribunal for "war crimes," "crimes against the peace," and "crimes against humanity"? Even in the Allied countries several objections were raised : international law had no application to individuals ; the accused could not be held personally accountable for acts performed on direction from authorized spokesmen of the German state ; the "law" was in the nature of *ex post facto*. Nevertheless, by the London Agreement of August 8, 1945, Great Britain, France, the U. S. S. R., and the United States set up an International Military Tribunal, adopted a Charter for its guidance, and then proceeded to the trial of the alleged offenders.

The General Assembly affirmed the principles laid down in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and later requested the International Law Commission to "formulate the principles of international law recognized in the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal and in the judgment of the Tribunal." The Commission prepared the formulation, but it declined to express any "appreciation" of the principles of international law involved, saying that such action was beside the point after the General Assembly's affirmation. The Commission listed seven principles, which, to summarize, declared the responsibility of individuals under international law, denied the immunity of high government officials and of persons acting under orders when a moral choice was open, and noted the crimes punishable under international law.⁴⁴ The legality of the Nuremberg Trials and Judgment remains in dispute, but the fact also remains that a number of Nazi war criminals were hanged.

The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, approved by the General Assembly in December, 1948, alluded to a possible "international penal tribunal," and an Assembly resolution of the same date invited the International Law Commission to study the need and feasibility of "a Crime Chamber of the International Court of Justice." As yet no action has been taken and despite much discussion an international criminal law does not yet exist.

Philip Jessup believes that the expansion of international law to include individuals should have high priority if we are to develop what he termed "a modern law of nations" :

Two points in particular are singled out as keystones of a revised international legal order. The first is the point that international law, like national law, must be directly applicable to the individual. It must not continue to be remote from him, as is the traditional international law, which is considered to be applicable to states alone and not to individuals. The second point is that there must be basic recognition of the interest which the whole international society has in the observance of its law.

⁴⁴ *International Organization*, IV (Nov., 1950), 714-721.

Breaches of the law must no longer be considered the concern of only the state directly and primarily affected.⁴⁵

Hans Kelsen also has declared his belief in the importance of personal liability : "One of the most effective means to prevent war and to guarantee international peace is the enactment of rules establishing individual responsibility of the persons who as members of government have violated international law by resorting to or provoking war."⁴⁶ Quincy Wright has observed that "juristic opinion is divided as between advocates of the old and the new international law," and well it might be, for the new law "in principle changes the world society from a system of sovereign states to a world union in which the United Nations protects human rights, punishes international crimes, and enforces its law against both states and individuals."⁴⁷ From the legal point of view and in the short run, says Wright, realizing the new international law "concerns the amendment, interpretation, implementation, and supplementation of the United Nations Charter," while "from the factual point of view" its realization "lies in the realm of international politics, international organization, international economics, international education, and international communications."⁴⁸

International Law and World Peace. We should remember that international law is only one aspect of international relations, and by no means the most important one. The great issues of international politics, those most clearly involving issues of peace or war, are largely outside its purview. This is not because many of these issues do not lend themselves to judicial settlement, but because the states of the world will generally not submit them to judicial settlement. Matters of national honor and prestige are too closely involved. International law, moreover, is still in a very primitive stage of development. Professor Dickinson, a friendly critic, described it this way : ".....as regards its institutions and procedures of adjustment the law of nations has been a jungle law imperfectly ameliorated by a fragmentary and hesitant progress in the direction of legal order."⁴⁹ In Professor Brierly's judgment, "the system is still at what we may describe as the *laissez-faire* stage of legal development." Nevertheless, it represents a positive attempt to build an international legal order, in the absence of which peace and sanity in the international community are in constant jeopardy.

We must not regard international law as an alternative to diplomacy. Clearly, diplomacy too is essential to the family of nations ; in fact, as we have seen, it is the usual method of conducting interstate relations, in-

⁴⁵ Jessup, *A Modern Law of Nations*, p. 2.

⁴⁶ Hans Kelsen, *Peace Through Law* (University of North Carolina Press, 1944), p. 71 ; see also "Collective and Individual Responsibility in International Law with Particular Regard to the Punishment of War Criminals," *California Law Review* XXXI (1943), 530 ff.

⁴⁷ Wright, pp. 229, 230.

⁴⁸ Wright, p. 231.

⁴⁹ Dickinson, p. 76.

cluding the adjustment of differences and disputes. Even if one argues, as some writers do, that international law now provides rules that are adequate for the solution of all disputes among nations, he must concede that there remains the need for diplomacy to bring nations to seek settlement by law and to accept it. If one argues that diplomacy must take up where law leaves off -- that is, that there are "justiciable" and "non-justiciable" disputes -- then there falls to diplomacy the whole area of "political" differences among states.

We must not expect either too little or too much of international law. Persons who have little faith in it point to the occasions on which it has been violated with impunity and to the continuance of war in international society. Faithfulness to the law occurs in countless routine, undramatic matters, and its violations often appear in highly publicized, dramatic incidents. War itself, even when resorted to in violation of law, must not be regarded as flaunting all international law but only as representing the failure of that law to perform what is actually its ultimate service.

Professor Josef L. Kunz has warned against what he describes as the swing from overestimation to underestimation of international law. He recalls that at the close of World War I "there was everywhere, in victors, neutrals, and vanquished, not only the will to achieve a better world through international law, but also the firm conviction that it could be done." After World War II, continued Kunz, came the flowering of the new "realism" with its emphasis on politics and power. International law was not even mentioned in the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, and it barely escaped exclusion from the UN Charter. Whereas the Permanent Court of International Justice was busy in its early years, the International Court of Justice has had very little business. Kunz protested against this "underestimation" of international law; he declared that the law is not "sterile" and that it must necessarily play an important role in international relations.⁵⁰ That "realism" and regard for international law are not mutually exclusive is proved by the writings of many distinguished contemporary authorities. Professor Dickinson, for example, followed a rather severe critique of international law with a volume of essays entitled *Law and Peace*, in which he affirmed his faith in international law as a realistic approach to peace.⁵¹

Belief in international law as a basis of enduring peace was also expressed by Senator Robert A. Taft. Although he supported and voted for the UN Charter, he confessed that he was "never satisfied." He objected to "peace and security" as the basis for enforcement action of the Security Council: these, he believed, were not "synonymous with justice." He contended that the veto power in the Security Council of the United Nations "completely dispels the idea that any system of universal law is being

⁵⁰ "The Swing of the Pendulum: From Overestimation to Underestimation of International Law," *The American Journal of International Law*, XLIV (Jan., 1950), 135-140.

⁵¹ "International Law: an Inventory," *California Law Review*, XXXIII (Dec., 1945), 506-542; see also, the same author's *Law and Peace*.

established, for surely nothing can be law if five of the largest nations can automatically exempt themselves from its application."⁵² "It seems to me," he wrote, "that peace in this world is impossible unless nations agree on a definite law to govern their relations with each other and also agree that, without any veto power, they will submit their disputes to adjudication and abide by the decision of an impartial tribunal....."⁵³

Distinguished scholars who point to the development of international law as the most hopeful road to world peace rarely lose sight of the inter-relationship of law and power. They are constantly aware that the development of international law into an effective guarantee of a peaceful world order will require a revision of some fundamental concepts and a change in some traditional relationships and practices. Kelsen asserted categorically that "it is the essential characteristic of the law as a coercive order to establish a community monopoly of force" ; in 1944 he proposed a Permanent League for the Maintenance of Peace, "with compulsory jurisdiction" for an international court and with the four guarantor states—the United States, Great Britain, China, and the Soviet Union— as "the power 'behind the law.'"⁵⁴ Jessup declared that "until the world achieves some form of international government in which a collective will takes precedence over the individual will of the sovereign state, the ultimate function of law, which is the elimination of force for the solution of human conflicts, will not be fulfilled."⁵⁵

Professor Dickinson's approach is more cautious and perhaps more realistic. He is sure that for a long time to come we are not going to have "an international constitutional convention." In the meantime, he would have us escape the "immediate and inescapable choice between panaceas for global salvation and the disintegration of all civilization" which the forecasters of doom offer us and instead "use and develop the institutions at hand to better advantage." While he admits that "world law has yet to assure the order and decency which exclude violence and supplant anarchy," he is convinced that "there is a vast body that is useful, indeed indispensable, and contained in its practices and principles are great potentialities of growth." The law in custom, he says, is "tough law," but it "grows glacially." It needs "invigoration and extension." He advances suggestions for the expansion and improvement of the law and of what may be called the international judicial system, but he takes care to warn that labors on this front should be accompanied by accommodation at the highest levels. "Every day of peace is a time for the extension of law"—a time for moving forward on "a vast and complicated front."⁵⁶

There is, of course, validity in sensible realism. Americans have learned in domestic affairs that to be enforceable law must enjoy the support of a

⁵² Robert A. Taft, *A Foreign Policy for Americans* (Doubleday, 1951), pp. 39, 40.

⁵³ Taft, p. 40.

⁵⁴ Hans Kelsen, *Peace Through Law* (University of North Carolina Press, 1944), p. 66.

⁵⁵ Jessup, *A Modern Law of Nations*, p. 2.

⁵⁶ The quoted passages appear in Dickinson, *Law and Peace*, Chapter IV.

substantial proportion of the citizens. To attempt to write off the world's woes by making laws against them would be just as futile as to expect the U.S.S.R., to abandon her present foreign policy if somehow the Western states contrived to trick her into surrendering her "veto" power in the Security Council. The intent to cooperate must be present. The logical order is the will before the law, not after.

With a consciousness of the defects and limitations of international law -- the inadequacies of the legislative, judicial, and executive functions, the narrowness of its range, and the too-frequent misunderstanding of its nature and of its proper role -- the men and women who seek a world of peace and order see that law as an index to their progress. Offering no formula by which the putting of words on paper can compel states to follow a course of justice and friendship, international law does provide almost the only means by which states can register and secure the gains which they make toward a better international order.

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The Evolution of International.....12 Organization

One of the promising developments of the twentieth century in interstate relations has been the proliferation of international organizations. For the first time in history permanent organizations of a nearly-universal type have emerged. Perhaps the world "permanent" may seem hardly justified, for the League of Nations lasted for only about a quarter of a century, and its effective period was barely fifteen years, and the United Nations is little more than a decade old.

Associated with today's general international organization — the UN — are many lesser ones, some of which, as the specialized agencies, are equally broad in membership but more limited in function, while others, as the Economic Commission for Europe, are both regional and specialized. Outside the UN structure, regional organizations of a general character, as the Organization of American States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and some more specialized in function, as the Organization of European Economic Cooperation and the Caribbean Commission, are also numerous and active. In addition to the scores of public international organizations, concerned with almost every conceivable aspect of international relations, hundreds of private international organizations (the so-called nongovernmental organizations), such as the International Red Cross or the Rotary International or the International Chamber of Commerce, play useful but less publicized roles.

BEFORE THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

The great burgeoning of international organizations has come only in the present century, when the complexity of the world society has created a need for them. While they have an obvious indebtedness to the conferences, nonpermanent associations, international public unions, and other

nineteenth-century ventures into the institutionalization of interstate relations, their roots go far back into the past.

From the Beginning to Westphalia. Prototypes of today's organizations are to be found in ancient and medieval history, and the modern pattern of international organization has been evolving ever since the nation-state system emerged several centuries ago, and especially since the Congress of Westphalia of 1648.

Professor Pitman B. Potter distinguishes six special forms of international organization -- diplomacy, treaty negotiation, international law, conference, administration, and adjudication -- and one general form, international federation.¹ This classification actually relates more to procedures in international intercourse than to varieties of international organizations. The term "international organization" is defined in a recent treatise as "any cooperative arrangement instituted among states, usually by a basic agreement, to perform some mutually advantageous functions implemented through periodic meetings and staff activities."² In this well developed sense few examples of international organizations can be found until the modern period, whereas, according to Professor Potter's conception, international organization has existed in at least primitive form throughout most of recorded history.

Long before the golden age of ancient Greece interstate relations of a sort existed in many parts of the known world, including China, India, Mesopotamia, and Egypt. Contracts between rulers and kingdoms were not uncommon, and there was a fair area of agreement on diplomatic practices, commercial relations, treaties of alliance, codes of warfare, and terms of peace. "The treaties of the past are the first steps toward international organization."³

Although local loyalties prevented the Greeks from achieving a true national unity, the procedures and patterns in use among their city-states, as well as their theories of interstate relations, appear strikingly modern. In some ways ancient Greece seems much like the modern world in miniature. Treaties, alliances, diplomatic practices and services, arbitration and other methods for peaceful settlement of disputes, rules of war and peace, leagues and confederations, and other means for regulating interstate relations were well known and widely used.

The Roman contribution to international organization was of a different sort. After the final defeat of Carthage and the conquest of all the Mediterranean world and of most of Western and Central Europe, Rome established a kind of universal empire: the inclusiveness of this empire and its remoteness from other centers of power, such as China and India, precluded interstate relations. The idea of international organization was

¹ "International Organization," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* (Macmillan, 1932), VIII, 180-181.

² Daniel S. Cheever and H. Field Haviland *Organizing for Peace: International Organization in World Affairs* (Houghton Mifflin, 1954), p. 6.

³ Gerard J. Mangone, *A Short History of International Organization* (McGraw-Hill, 1954), p. 14.

therefore foreign to the Romans. Nevertheless, the Romans contributed legal, military, and administrative techniques, and they established the basis of the *jus gentium* which in later centuries became a fertile source of international law.

During the late Roman period, too, in spite of occasional bitter persecution, the foundations of the Christian Church were firmly established. As Rome declined, the Church asserted its claims to temporal as well as spiritual authority. Through the papacy, the Holy Roman Empire, and the strong appeal of "the faith," the Church of the Middle Ages provided a kind of universalism which helped to counteract the decentralizing tendencies of feudalism and other forms of political fragmentation and continued to exert an appeal long after the Church itself had split. Under the aegis of a divided Church the Council of Constance, "the most spectacular international congress of history," assembled in 1414 to attempt to resolve rival claims to the papacy and thereby to shape the political as well as spiritual fortunes of Europe. While it was nearly everywhere defeated in its aspirations to temporal power, and while it lost even the spiritual allegiance of a good part of the civilized world, the Roman Church has remained to this day the most powerful of all international nongovernmental organizations.

Throughout the Middle Ages alliances and associations of political, commercial, and religious areas and groups were often formed. An outstanding association for the promotion of trade, which became a kind of political organization as well, was the Hanseatic League. Possibly the most famous confederation of medieval times was that developed from a treaty among the Swiss cantons of Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden in 1315; joined by five other cantons before the end of the fourteenth century, it became the nucleus of the modern state of Switzerland.

Westphalia to Vienna. With the breakdown of the medieval system and the coming of the Protestant Revolt, the Catholic Renaissance, the Reformation, the Age of Discoveries, an expanded trade and commerce, and the present state system in the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries, international relations assumed a new meaning and character. The theories, practices, and institutions of modern international society began to take shape, although they did not become crystallized and fully developed until the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Machiavelli described the practices which prevailed in the relations of the city-states of northern Italy in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century, and he gave a new realism to the study of interstate relations. Bodin in the sixteenth century formulated the legal concept of sovereignty, generally regarded as the most basic of the attributes of the nation-state. Grotius, writing while the Thirty Years War was raging, laid the foundation for the evolution of a "law of nations." Denying that sovereignty, or sovereigns, were absolute, he argued that "there are laws for the community valid both in respect to war, and during war."

The Congress of Westphalia was a notable milestone in the development

of international organization, as it was in the evolution of the modern state system. The significance of this great Congress has been well described by Gerard Mangone :

No international organization was established by the Peace of Westphalia in 1648... But the joining of practically every European state in a diplomatic conference signaled the opening of a new era in international relations.....As an international assembly, the Congress of Westphalia bore little resemblance to the intricate organization of twentieth-century peace conferences... Of the greatest importance to international organization, however, were the gathering of hundreds of envoys in a diplomatic conference which represented practically every political interest in Europe and the achievement by negotiation, rather than by dictation, of two great multilateral treaties which legalized the new order of European international relations.⁴

During the dynastic and colonial struggles of the eighteenth century, alliances, coalitions, diplomacy, wars, conferences, and peace settlements became commonplace techniques of international relations. The conference system, which has been perhaps the most conspicuous feature of modern international organization, was developed to a high degree. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries some of the best known early plans and proposals for peaceful relations and for international organization were advanced. These included the "Grand Design" of Henry IV of France and the Duc de Sully (early seventeenth century), William Penn's proposal of a "Parliament of Europe" in his *Essay Toward the Present and Future Peace of Europe* (1693) the Abbe de Saint-Pierre's *Project to Bring Perpetual Peace in Europe* (1712), Jeremy Bentham's "Plea for an Universal and Perpetual Peace" in his *Principles of International Law* (1793), and Kant's famous proposal of the same nature in his essay "Perpetual Peace" (*Zum ewigen Frieden*, 1795).⁵

Vienna to Versailles. The Congress of Vienna (1814-1815) met to deal with the European political problems which remained after the defeat of Napoleon. The French Revolution and the Napoleonic period had caused profound changes throughout the continent. Dedicated to the principle of "legitimacy," the rulers of Europe attempted at Vienna to restore the old order of affairs as far as possible, and to arrest the spread of the virus of revolution. In this effort they succeeded only partially and temporarily ; but unwittingly they did lay the foundations of a political and international system which for a century shaped the course of European and to some extent of world affairs.

The central agency for enforcing the Vienna settlement was the Quadruple Alliance of Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, which became

⁴ Mangone, pp. 21, 22.

⁵ See Edith Wynn and Georgia Lloyd, *Searchlight on Peace Plans* (Dutton, 1944) ; Gerard J. Mangone, *The Idea and Practice of World Government* (Columbia University Press, 1951) ; Hans Kohn, *World Order in Historical Perspective* (Harvard University Press, 1943).

a quintuple alliance in 1818 with the addition of France. "This development was a landmark in the history of international organization for several reasons. First, the alliance, though forged in war, was continued after hostilities to enforce the peace. Second, periodic conferences were instituted when the great powers agreed to renew their meetings at fixed intervals. Third, despite the suspicions of the smaller powers it was generally agreed that the maintenance of peace depended on this sort of big-power collaboration. These notions were carried over into both the League and the UN."⁶ Out of the experience of the years that followed the Congress of Vienna emerged the informal pattern of conferences and consultations and occasional concerted action which is known as the Concert of Europe. It scored a resounding success at the Congress of Berlin of 1878, which dealt with Turkey and the so-called Eastern question. It was, however, unable to cope with the nationalistic rivalries and other divisive tendencies which eventually led to World War I.

The conference system which had been a significant feature of eighteenth-century diplomacy was the main instrument for international collaboration in the century after the Congress of Vienna. Conferences were held with increasing frequency, especially after the middle of the century. According to one tabulation, the number in each decade from 1840-1849 to 1900-1909 was, respectively, 9, 22, 75, 149, 284, 469, and 1,082.⁷ Relatively few of these were primarily political conferences, like the Congress of Paris of 1856 or the Congress of Berlin of 1878. Many more dealt with administrative or technical questions.

One of the most promising developments in the history of international organization was the emergence of a multitude of international administrative agencies or public international unions in the latter half of the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. They arose in response to the growing need for cooperation in economic and social problems which could not be handled satisfactorily by states alone or without planned coordination. Among the organizations set up were the European Commission for the Danube (1856); the International Geodetic Association (1864); the International Bureau of Telegraphic Administrations (1868); the Universal Postal Union (1875); the International Bureau of Weights and Measures (1875); the International Copyright Union (1886); the International Office of Public Health (1903); and the International Institute of Agriculture (1905).⁸ Some of these are still in existence; others have given over their functions to UN agencies. One of the UN affiliates—the Universal Postal Union—has been described as "one of the most significant international organizations in the history of nations."⁹

Outstanding among the conferences of the years prior to World War I were the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907. The story of these

⁶ Cheever and Haviland, p. 35.

⁷ See James A. Joyce, *World in the Making* (Henry Schuman, 1953).

⁸ See Mangone, *A Short History*, pp. 67-90.

⁹ Mangone, *A Short History*, p. 78.

relates primarily to the development of international law, but it is also of significance in the evolution of international organization. The First Hague Conference attempted to place arbitration procedures on a more formal and more generally acceptable basis. In its Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes it established a Permanent Court of Arbitration. While this was neither permanent nor a court -- as has often been remarked -- it did offer the services of a panel of members, an Administrative Council, and an International Bureau. At the Second Hague Conference the American Secretary of State, Elihu Root, advocated the acceptance of compulsory arbitration for certain types of disputes and "the development of The Hague tribunal into a permanent tribunal." Neither objective was achieved, but before World War I the United States and a few other states entered into several treaties of arbitration, and a few cases were submitted to the Permanent Court of Arbitration. The Court was actually never very active. Nominally it still exists, although it has long since been overshadowed by the world courts set up by the League of Nations and the UN.

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

A permanent general international organization of a nearly universal character came into existence for the first time after World War I. This development marked another stage in the history of international organization. The new era owed much to the experience and experiments, including the many abortive plans and projects, of the past. "Modern international organization" states Mangone, "with its wide array of institutions, evolved from the conferences of the preceding centuries."¹⁰ In the new world of the twentieth century the older techniques were not adequate, but they did provide the foundations upon which the present complex structure of international organization has been built.

Setting Up the League

The idea of an association of nations was an old one, dating back at least to Sully's Grand Design of the early seventeenth century, but the coming of war in 1914 naturally gave it a new impetus. Formulation of a charter or constitution for a world organization began in the fall of 1916. The Covenant that finally emerged after long and bitter argument provided for a League of Nations with three main organs: the Assembly, the Council, and the Secretariat. Perhaps next in importance were the Permanent Court of International Justice, the International Labor Organization, and the Technical Organizations.

Assembly members were to present for discussion "any circumstance whatever affecting international relations which threatens to disturb in-

¹⁰ Mangone, *A Short History*, p. 61.

ternational peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends." The Assembly's function, however, was not to act but to confer, advise, and deliberate. Here it was that small states were expected to have their say. The Council was planned as the executive organ of the League. Although the great powers wished to have its membership restricted to themselves, they had to give way and admit a limited number of smaller states. Thus the Council was designed to consist of five great powers with permanent seats and four lesser powers with nonpermanent seats. The failure of the United States to join the League kept the membership of the Council at eight until two nonpermanent seats were added in 1922. Germany was given a permanent seat in 1926 and the Soviet Union was granted one in 1934 ; and the number of nonpermanent seats was eventually increased to eleven. The Council was to direct the work of the Secretariat, arrange for international conferences, receive reports from the subsidiary organs of the League, determine which reports should be submitted to the Assembly, deal with disputes among League members, and supervise the observance of the mandates, the Minorities Treaties, and other agreements. Upon it rested primary responsibility for safeguarding the peace of the world.

The Secretariat was a permanent civil service agency headed by a Secretary-General. Its work was to assist all organs of the League by providing services of many kinds : clerical, research, drafting, publication, coordination, registration of treaties, keeping of records, arrangement of meetings, and the like. It came to have a staff of about seven hundred persons, working through eleven "sections" and numerous "services" and "offices."

The Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice was completed in December, 1920. By the start of World War II fifty-one states had become members of the Court. For a period of nearly twenty years, until World War II interrupted its work, this Court functioned with "surprising success," according to Manley O. Hudson, one of its judges.¹¹ During the period of its activity the Court tried sixty-five cases and handed down thirty-two judgments, twenty-seven advisory opinions, and several hundred orders.¹² Although the International Labor Organization was regarded as one of the main organs of the League of Nations, it had—and still has — a large measure of autonomy. In 1940 it moved its headquarters to Montreal, and it continued to function throughout World War II. It became a specialized agency of the UN in December, 1946. The League structure also contained three so-called Technical Organizations : the Economic and Financial Organization, the Communications and Transit Organization, and the Health Organization. Each had its standing committees and each held general conferences from time to time, "thus resembling the League as a whole with its Council and Assembly."¹³ All

¹¹ Manley O. Hudson, "The World Court" in Harriet E. Davis, ed., *Pioneers in World Order* (Columbia University Press, 1944), p. 67.

¹² Hudson, pp. 69-70.

¹³ Pitman B. Potter, *An Introduction to the Study of International Organization* (Appleton-Century, 1935), p. 249.

relied upon a similarly-named section of the Secretariat for continuous administrative and secretarial assistance.

The Pacific Settlement of Disputes

The Covenant of the League may be said to have contemplated three approaches to the settlement of international differences. First, and very important, states were expected to do everything possible to reach a solution by direct negotiation, making every possible use of the traditional devices of diplomacy, conciliation, and arbitration. It is by these means that the vast majority of disputes have always been settled. Second, states were urged to accept the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice with minimum reservations. The Optional Clause was devised to induce states to commit themselves to the authority of the Court. Third, the Covenant charged the Council with the ultimate responsibility for keeping the peace — or for punishing violators — when all other means had failed or, indeed, if other means had been left untried.

The most conspicuous feature of the Council's handling of disputes was the extreme flexibility of its procedure. The constant objective was not to observe a ritual but to bring the parties into agreement. To that end the Council might resort to any or all of many devices : it might urge direct negotiations, clarify points of law with jurists or the Court, defer proceedings, utilize committees of the Council or of League agencies, call upon the Secretariat for information, attempt only partial settlement in the first instance, turn the dispute over to the Assembly, or contrive still other devices. The entire process was informal and conciliatory, often with private sessions, usually without recorded votes, and always with representatives of all parties sitting as regular or ad hoc members of the Council.

The Promotion of Collective Security

During the fifteen years following the setting up of the League, five major efforts were made to establish systems of collective security, and four of these were made under the aegis of the League. All five will be briefly examined.

Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance. This proposal was approved by the Assembly in 1923. According to its terms, within four days of the outbreak of hostilities the League Council would name the aggressor and indicate the measures of financial or military assistance to be furnished the victim of aggression, but military aid was to be required only of states in the same hemisphere as the aggressor. Disarmament was linked with security ; thus, unless a state agreed to limit or reduce its armaments and had already taken real steps to do so, it would receive no general assistance. "The peg upon which all else hangs is disarmament."¹⁴ Largely because of British opposition — due to the hemisphere feature — the plan collapsed.

¹⁴ Frances Kellor, *Security Against War*, 2 vols. (Macmillan, 1924), II, 738.

The Geneva Protocol. The Draft Treaty, together with the coming to power of more liberal governments in Britain and France under MacDonald and Herriot and the general easing of the political situation by the adopting of the Dawes Plan with its modification of reparations terms, led to the famous Geneva Protocol of 1924. Signatory states were required to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the World Court in all disputes covered by the Optional Clause. Nonlegal disputes were to be submitted to the Council, and the failure of a state to accept the jurisdiction of the Court or the unanimous report of the Council would be accounted an act of aggression. Before the year ended, however, MacDonald fell from power, Britain rejected the Protocol, and it failed of ratification by the necessary number of states.

The Locarno Treaties. The Geneva Protocol led more or less directly to the Locarno Treaties, which some historians believe carried the League of Nations to the zenith of its prestige. The representatives of seven states met at the Swiss village of Locarno in October, 1925, and drew up seven agreements, known as the Locarno Treaties: (1) a Five-Power Treaty, signed by Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, and Italy, guaranteed the Franco-German and Belgian-German frontiers and the permanent demilitarization of the Rhineland; Belgium, France, and Germany promised not to resort to war except in self-defense or after "flagrant breach" of the agreements on the demilitarized Rhineland zone or in fulfillment of League obligations, and they further agreed to settle all disputes by peaceful means; (2-5) conventions between Germany on the one hand and Belgium, Czechoslovakia, France, and Poland separately, on the other hand, pledged arbitration of disputes; (6-7) pacts between France and Czechoslovakia and between France and Poland provided for mutual assistance against unprovoked aggression by Germany. As part of the general understanding, insisted upon by France, Germany was to join the League of Nations.

The Pact of Paris. The Locarno agreements were everywhere taken as heralding a new and better day in international relations. "The spirit of Locarno" was still manifest in 1928, when the Pact of Paris, also called the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the Kellogg Pact, and, officially, the General Treaty for the Renunciations of War, was signed. The Pact mentioned no sanctions, it asserted no positive obligation to seek a peaceful settlement, and, technically at least, it did not outlaw war. It merely "condemned" and "renounced" war, whatever that may mean in diplomatic parlance. Moreover, reservations excluded wars of self-defense and permitted each state to be its own judge. The Pact, signed on August 27, 1928, was eventually ratified by nearly every state in the world. The Soviet Union was the first to ratify. The Pact was the only one of the five major efforts to achieve security by collective action before 1935 in which the United States joined, and it was the only one entirely outside the League.

The General Act of 1928. The popularity of the Locarno agreements prompted the League to attempt the further development of interrelated

arbitration, nonaggression, and mutual assistance pledges. Using the various Locarno treaties as models, an Assembly committee drafted a series of form agreements "to serve as a standardized multilateral system of conciliation for all disputes, of arbitration for those of a legal nature and of arbitral procedure for other disputes."¹⁵ The Assembly collected these into a General Act and opened it to accession in September, 1928. By 1935 twenty-three states had acceded to the Act — hardly an impressive proportion of the total number of states. Regarded by some persons as the League's most important single effort to establish a system of collective security, it probably remains the least known.

The Limitation of Armaments

The commitment of the League to the principle of the reduction of armaments was equivocal from the start, despite the fact that the carrying out of a disarmament program was one of the chief purposes of its founding.¹⁶ The League Council early set up the Permanent Advisory Committee to formulate a reduction program, but the committee soon demonstrated the futility of expecting a group of military men to sponsor disarmament. About a year later the Council created the Temporary Mixed Commission, a larger body with a civilian majority. Before it went out of existence in 1924 the TMC had been largely responsible for four ventures in disarmament. The first was Lord Esher's plan for fixing land forces according to national needs. This was rejected. The second was the effort to extend the principles of the Washington Conference Treaty of 1922 to nonsignatory powers. This too failed. The third, an indirect approach that would institute collective security as a basis for the reduction of armaments, led to the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance. This also was rejected. The fourth venture produced the Geneva Protocol, another indirect approach, one which sought to extend the area of compulsory arbitration and impose sanctions against aggressor states, thus creating an atmosphere of security in which disarmament projects might hopefully be undertaken. This too was rejected. The League took no hand in the Washington Conference of 1921-1922, the Geneva Conference of 1927, or the London Conference of 1930.

The establishment of the Preparatory Commission (PC) for a Disarmament Conference by the Council in 1925 put the League on the long road that led to its supreme attempt at limiting national armaments—the Geneva Disarmament Conference. The job assigned to the PC was to prepare a provisional draft treaty dealing with all the principal questions relating to disarmament. After six years of work, marked by sharp differences, considerable acrimony, and frequent pessimism, the draft treaty

¹⁵ Denys P. Myers, *Handbook of the League of Nations* (World Peace Foundation, 1935), p. 288.

¹⁶ Benjamin H. Williams, *The United States and Disarmament* (McGraw-Hill, 1931), pp. 238-239.

was finally completed. The Council set the opening date of the conference as February 2, 1932, and the place as Geneva.

Viewed from the outside, from the arena of world politics, the prospects of the Geneva Conference were almost hopeless. The Great Depression was at hand, and in attempting to do something about it the London Economic Conference had just collapsed. Germany had defaulted on her reparations and President Hoover had asked for a year's moratorium on all intergovernmental debts. Japan had begun her invasion of Manchuria. Germany had just concluded a customs union with Austria, to the consternation of France and other countries, and she was openly threatening to break the Versailles Treaty if denied arms equality with the leading powers. Hitler was rising, and indeed came into power while the Conference was in session. The Fascists in Italy and the Communists in Russia were scheming to use the Conference for demagogic ends. France was determined that effective security arrangements must precede disarmament, and Britain and the United States were not prepared to commit themselves unreservedly to the defense of European frontiers. In this sombre atmosphere the World Disarmament Conference at Geneva dragged on intermittently for twenty-eight months before it adjourned, never to meet again. Its collapse marked the end of disarmament efforts by the League of Nations.

The League was proving impotent to insure the peace, and states were falling back on their own right arms to protect themselves against the growing threat from Germany, Italy, and Japan. "The letters of FAILURE, written large over the portals of successive disarmament conferences during the two decades after Versailles, became letters of impending catastrophe for the Western World."¹⁷

The Mandates System

The mechanism set up by the League for the administration of the colonial areas taken from Germany and Turkey by the Allied and Associated Powers was the Mandates System. To supervise it the League established the Permanent Mandates Commission, with authority to receive reports from the mandatory powers, hear petitions, and make recommendations to the League Council, where alone positive action could be taken.

The fourteen mandated regions were divided into three groups, known as A, B, and C. The A mandates applied to those areas which, with some supervisory assistance, might be expected to reach statehood within a comparatively short period of time. Of the three in this group—all Turkish—Iraq and Palestine were mandated to Great Britain and Syria to France. The B mandates applied to areas where greater assistance would be required and where independence would probably be long delayed. The

¹⁷ Frederick L. Schuman, *International Politics*, 5th ed. (McGraw-Hill, 1953), p. 233.

six areas of the B group were all former German colonies in Africa. In the A and B classes the mandatory powers were to assert no special economic advantages over other states, and they were to discharge their obligations with the moral, cultural, and economic welfare of the natives as the first consideration.

Of the five C mandates, huge but unpopulated German South-West Africa was entrusted to the contiguous Union of South Africa ; Western Samoa went to New Zealand ; German New Guinea and the German South Pacific islands to Australia ; the German North Pacific islands to Japan ; and Nauru jointly to Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand. These areas were to be administered as integral parts of the mandatory states, with self-determination only a remote possibility.

The chief weapon which the Mandates Commission could use in support of its authority was publicity. When, through constant observation and inquiry, it found a mandatory state guilty of improper practices or incompetent administration, publication of the facts usually produced quick removal of the evils. Among the matters subject to its scrutiny were the slave trade, the arms and liquor traffic, the building of fortifications, the training of natives for military purposes, freedom of conscience and religion, land tenure, wages, health, and the economic equality of trading states.

Within ten years Britain had chaperoned Iraq into the League of Nations, an accomplishment that may have been due more to British insistence than to any conviction of the Mandates Commission that statehood was actually warranted.¹⁸ Syria was proclaimed a republic in 1944, but the last French occupation forces were not withdrawn until 1946. Lebanon became independent soon after the beginning of World War II ; Transjordan and Palestine had to wait until the close of the war. All B and C mandates were still under the supervision of the Permanent Mandates Commission when, on April 18, 1946, the Trusteeship Council of the UN assumed the functions of the Mandates Commission.

The Protection of Minorities

The protection of minorities' rights was entrusted to the League of Nations and became the specific responsibility of the Council. In undertaking to set up appropriate machinery, the Council tried to keep two objectives in mind : the protection of minorities for both humanitarian and political reasons and the safeguarding of the sensibilities of the states in which the minorities lived. The procedure agreed upon was a compromise between international supervision and meticulous regard for sovereignty.

Statistically, the League's record in the handling of minority complaints was rather impressive. By 1935 it had examined nearly four hundred petitions, and of the 271 examined during the last five years of that period 192

¹⁸ Rupert Emerson, "Iraq : The End of a Mandate," *Foreign Affairs*, XI (Jan., 1933), 355-360.

were regarded as "finished." It seems beyond question that the League reduced the oppression of minorities, discouraged the aggressive intercession of outside states, asserted the interest of the whole international community in the welfare of minorities, and established usable precedents for the attack on minority problems.

Nevertheless, it may be doubted that the League effected any final solutions; it certainly did not silence the complaints of discrimination. Devoted to removing tensions that might provoke war, the system never gave a straightforward answer to the important question whether it sought to lead minorities into an eventual assimilation by the preponderant ethnic group in the minorities state or, on the other hand, sought to protect and promote the cultural individuality of the different minorities. The first of these objectives was naturally preferred by dominant ethnic groups, the second by minority groups.

The Nonpolitical Activities of the League

The League's work in "all spheres of human activity where there were common international interests to be served" has come to be spoken of as its "nonpolitical activities." The program was amazingly broad and its success so impressive that it is universally regarded as the League's outstanding achievement.

The Economic and Financial Organization. The most important agencies of the Organization were the Financial Committee and the Economic Committee. The Financial Committee advised the Council on financial matters in general, on financial assistance to governments, and on financial problems which might be solved by international action. The Economic Committee did the preliminary work on a number of major international conferences, notably the World Economic Conference of 1927 and the Monetary and Economic Conference of 1933. It engaged in studies and on occasion held special conferences on a wide range of problems of an economic nature: economic statistics, customs formalities, the standardization of commercial practices, tariffs, tourists, arbitration of commercial disputes, whaling, crop exports, currency stabilization, restrictive trade devices, cartels, animal diseases, unfair competition, and economic nationalism.

The Communications and Transit Organization. To implement Article 23 of the Covenant, "to make provision to secure and maintain freedom of communications and of transit and equitable treatment for the commerce of all members of the League," the autonomous Communications and Transit Organization was created and provided with a Constitution in 1920. Among its interests were the following: the freedom of international transit, the collection of transit statistics, press facilities and the accuracy of reporting, the simplification of passports and other travel documents, regulations concerning international waterways, discrimination against foreign shipping in ports, regulations pertaining to buoyage

and other maritime signals, the use of inland waterways, tonnage measurement, the codification of the permanent obligations of states regarding railway transport, the uniformity of highway traffic regulations, the transmission of electric power across state lines, calendar reform (this involved the study of 185 schemes), the stabilization of Easter, the coordination of national public works programs, and oil pollution of the sea.

The Health Organization. Fulfilling a promise in Article 23 of the Covenant that the League "will endeavor to take steps in matters of international concern for the prevention and control of disease," the Health Organization was set up in 1923 and equipped with a Health Committee and a Secretariat. It cooperated closely with governments, performing an incalculable service in reporting on epidemics and their spread, helping to improve national health work conducting technical conferences, studying medical resources, assisting in the interchange of information, promoting the standardization of biological products, drafting sanitation projects, and organizing action against malaria, cancer, tuberculosis, syphilis, smallpox, heart disease, leprosy, rabies, and other afflictions. It performed notable work in combating infant mortality, collecting statistics, fixing dietary standards, and controlling plagues. It received substantial assistance from the Rockefeller Foundation. By the mid-1930's the labors of the Health Organization had assumed great proportions, and they had become perhaps the least-criticized phase of League activity.

Refugee Care. World War I created the problem of the care and resettlement of millions of war prisoners and displaced persons. By 1934 the League had provided assistance to nearly four millions of these, the largest groups being Russians, Greeks, and Armenians. Although the resettlement of a million persons still remained to be accomplished in 1934, the work seemed well on the way to completion when it was complicated by Hitler's expulsion of the Jews. The driving force behind the resettlement of refugees from 1920 to 1930 was Dr. Fridtjof Nansen, acting as High Commissioner for Refugees; on his death in 1930 the Nansen International Office for Refugees was established in his honor. The contribution of the League to refugee relief was largely that of coordination, with funds being provided by states with refugees and by private charitable groups.

Intellectual Cooperation. The League Council in 1922 appointed an International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation, which as its first task sought to assist intellectuals in devastated areas. The International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, set up at Paris in 1926, assumed the functions of an executive organ for League activities in this field. It sought to coordinate "international collaboration with a view to promoting the progress of general civilization and human knowledge, and notably the development and diffusion of science, letters, and arts."¹⁹ Some of the ventures in intellectual cooperation were aimed directly at building public opinion against war, such as the use of conferences, lectures, and published materials to urge collective security, support of the League, moral

¹⁹ Myers, p. 184.

disarmament, the study of public affairs, and the elimination of inflammatory material from textbooks and radio broadcasts.

The League's program of good works extended into other areas of cooperation : control of the opium traffic, the promotion of child welfare, the extinction of slavery, prison reform the prohibition of traffic in women, the suppression of trade in obscene publications, and various relief projects.

Secretary of State Cordell Hull, writing in 1939, said that "the League of Nations has been responsible for more humanitarian and scientific endeavor than any other organization in history,"²⁰ and Arthur Sweetser, analyzing the nonpolitical achievements of the League, declared in 1940 that "the experience has been deeply valuable, for it marks a phase in the slow transition of mankind from international anarchy to the world community."²¹

The League after Fifteen Years

The discerning observer of 1935 must have suspected that the League of Nations was doomed. True enough, he could have pointed to a host of impressive achievements in nonpolitical cooperation, but the drive for collective security had taken the League from one qualified commitment to another, each reflecting on the adequacy of the others and all lacking visible means of enforcement. Despite increasing collaboration, the United States was still outside the League; and the resignations of Japan and Germany would become effective during the year. Disarmament efforts had come to a halt, and the great powers were about to begin a race for naval strength, with all treaty limitations abandoned. Reparations was a dead letter, and so was the restriction on German rearmament. The League Council had stood impotently if not silently by when Japan had invaded Manchuria and laid her plans for the conquest of China proper. Mussolini had found his excuse for the subjugation of Ethiopia, and his legions were ready to intervene in Spain. Hitler could no longer be ignored, for he was already the master of Germany and had begun the marshalling of Germany's strength to execute the plans of *Mein Kampf*. The Nazi underground had shackled Austria.

In December, 1934, Italian and Ethiopian troops had clashed at Wal Wal, some fifty miles within Ethiopian territory. Both sides appealed at once to the League of Nations. Not until September of the following year did the Council take up the dispute. The Italians recited a tale of abuse by the Ethiopians and declared that League states were really under no obligations to observe the Covenant when dealing with a backward and uncivilized state such as Ethiopia ; and when the Ethiopians, in turn, presented their case to the Council the Italians walked out to avoid contamination from the representatives of a "barbarous" state. Sanctions against Italy were approved by the votes of fifty-one states, but as their

²⁰ Warren O. Ault, *Europe in Modern Times* (Heath, 1946), p. 643.

²¹ "The Non-Political Achievements of the League," *Foreign Affairs*, XIX Oct., 1940), 192.

effective use depended upon the full support of Britain and France the attitude of those powers was decisive. Both of them, but particularly France, wanted to be able to count on Italian support against possible aggression by Hitler's Germany. Out of British retreat and French desperation came the infamous Hoare-Laval Plan. In a Pact signed in December, 1935, the two foreign ministers agreed to delay oil sanctions, to avoid military sanctions, and to offer to placate Mussolini by giving him about two-thirds of Ethiopia. When the Plan was prematurely disclosed, Hoare was forced to resign. In effect, so too was the League.

The Manchurian affair of 1931 had dealt the League a savage blow, but not necessarily a fatal one. To check Japan was one thing—she was a power of the first rank, she operated far from the bases of the other great powers, and Russia was not then a member of the League; to check Italy was another—she was a third-rate power, she was far more vulnerable, and the Soviet Union was in the League and was urging effective sanctions. While the United States, outside the League, discouraged the imposition of sanctions by her uncertain attitude and so must bear some of the guilt, "French and British anxiety to avoid war with Italy at almost any cost proved to be the decisive factor."²² From the blow of the Ethiopian War the League never recovered. It took virtually no hand in the Spanish Civil War. The Loyalists made several appeals to it, but it did nothing beyond giving moral support to the nonintervention formula and later helping to supervise the withdrawal of foreign volunteers. The League played no significant part in the events leading to the surrender at Munich in 1938 and to the outbreak of World War II less than a year later. It maintained a shadowy existence until 1946, when it was formally dissolved.

THE UNITED NATIONS

From the earliest stages of World War II people everywhere assumed that some kind of world organization would be established after the final victory of the Allied powers. The statesmen of the West hoped that the nations would profit from the League experience and that the generation which had reaped the bitter fruits of two world wars, a worldwide depression, mass extermination on a scale unprecedented in history, and threats to human freedom everywhere would be more earnestly committed than ever before to the building of a stronger and more equitable international order in which a new world organization would play a central role. The organization which emerged was, of course, the United Nations.

Laying the Foundation

The Charter of the United Nations was signed by representatives of fifty nations in the city of San Francisco on June 26, 1945. During the war

²² C. Grove Haines and Ross J. S. Hoffman, *The Origins and Background of the Second World War* (Oxford University Press, 1943), p. 385.

many meetings, conferences, and declarations had laid the foundation for the United Nations and had prepared the way for final agreement on the terms of the Charter. The planning which went on was necessarily conducted in private, mostly by "experts" on a national rather than an international scale, and was overshadowed by the wartime activities. A great deal of planning was also done on a concerted basis at several international conferences. Most important among the results of these conferences were the following :

1. *The Atlantic Charter, August 14, 1941.* This is often referred to as marking the birth of the United Nations. In this document Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt, meeting on a battleship in the North Atlantic, laid down eight general principles "on which they base[d] their hopes for a better future for the world."

2. *The Declaration of the United Nations, January 1, 1942.* In this declaration, issued a few weeks after Pearl Harbor and using the name later adopted for the new international organization, twenty-six nations agreed to cooperate in war and in peace.

3. *The Casablanca Conference, January, 1943.* Churchill and Roosevelt meeting with French representatives in the North Africa city of Casablanca, planned the invasion of Sicily and Italy, agreed on an "unconditional surrender" formula, talked over terms of peace, and discussed the role of their countries in the postwar period.

4. *The Food and Agriculture Conference of May-June, 1943, at Hot Springs, Virginia.* Representatives of forty-four nations studied the problems of feeding millions of displaced persons, and laid the groundwork for activities that led to the establishment of the Food and Agriculture Organization in late 1945.

5. *The Moscow Conference, October-November, 1943.* In this important conference the foreign ministers of Great Britain, Russia, and the United States, and the Chinese ambassador to Russia, on behalf of their governments, pledged that "their united action" would be "continued, for the organization and maintenance of peace and security," and declared that they recognized "the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a central international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving States and open to membership by all such States, large and small." This declaration was particularly significant in that it marked the first time that the Soviet Union had agreed in specific terms to the establishment of a world organization after the war.

6. *The Teheran Conference, November, 1943.* This was the first of two meetings of Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin. In a joint statement they promised "that large and small nations would be invited to join a world organization."

7. *The Bretton Woods Conference, July, 1944, "the financial half of the Conference in San Francisco."* Representatives of forty-four nations, acting on the assumption that no peace could last if economic and financial

chaos prevailed, drew up agreements establishing two important institutions : (1) the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and (2) the International Monetary Fund. Both are now actively functioning as specialized agencies of the United Nations.

8. *The Dumbarton Oaks Conference in Washington, D. C., September-October, 1944.* Here representatives of China, Great Britain, the U.S.S.R., and the United States drafted "Proposals for a General International Organization," the first draft of the United Nations Charter. These Proposals were briefer than the final Charter, particularly in respect to economic and functional organization, but the basic resemblance between the two documents was striking.

9. *The Yalta Conference, February, 1945.* Meeting in the Crimea for their second and final conference, Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin not only drafted plans for the occupation and control of defeated Germany and for keeping order in liberated Europe and made fateful decisions in secret agreements regarding Eastern Europe and the Far East but also agreed on the "veto" formula later embodied in the UN Charter and called for a full-scale United Nations Conference to convene in San Francisco on April 25, 1945.

10. *The Mexico City Conference, February-March, 1945.* Representatives of twenty American republics — the United States and all the Latin-American countries except Argentina — here discussed questions of inter-American defense and cooperation, including the conditions under which Argentina could resume her full participation in inter-American affairs, and they adopted the "Act of Chapultepec" — a far-reaching understanding on the defense of the Americas — and prepared for the forthcoming San Francisco Conference.

11. *Committee of Jurists' Meeting, Washington, D. C., April, 1945.* Jurists from forty-four nations drew up a "Draft Statute and Report," which in amended form became the Statute of the International Court of Justice.

12. *The San Francisco Conference, April 25—June 26, 1945.* This was the culmination of the steps leading to the emergence of the United Nations. The proceedings and records of the San Francisco Conference—the United Nations Conference on International Organization—have been published in fifteen volumes, and already voluminous commentaries have been written upon both the Conference and the Charter.²³

²³ An excellent account of the San Francisco Conference, and of the origin of each provision of the Charter, is given in Leland M. Goodrich and Edvard Hambro, *Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents*, rev. ed. (World Peace Foundation, 1949). The basic documents of the San Francisco Conference were published in 15 volumes in 1945-1946 by the United Nations Information Office, in cooperation with the Library of Congress, under the title *Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, 1945*. A selection of these documents was published in one volume of 992 pages by the U.S. State Department in 1946 : *The United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, California, April 25—June 26, 1945: Selected Documents*, Pub. 2490, Conference Series 83.

The Conference "was organized in four Commissions and twelve Committees, most of the actual work being done in the Committees. A Co-ordination Committee and a Committee of Jurists put the pieces together into a final document ; there was a Steering Committee to guide the work and resolve problems ; and above all were the Big Five meetings in the penthouse on top the Hotel Fairmont."²⁴

At San Francisco the principles of national sovereignty and of great-power unanimity were written into the Charter. China and France, as well as the "Big Three," were given permanent seats on the Security Council, and the voting formula agreed upon at Yalta, giving the permanent members of the Council a "veto" on all important questions, was incorporated into Article 27. Temporary flurries arose over innumerable issues, large and small, such as the admission of the Ukraine and Byelorussia, Argentina, and Poland, the relative powers of the General Assembly and the Security Council, and voting procedure in the Security Council. Spokesmen of smaller powers, notably Herbert Evatt of Australia, took strong exception to the favored position of the great powers in the new organization. But the delegates made the necessary compromises, accepted many imperfections, and in the end created the United Nations.

On July 28, less than five weeks after the Charter had been signed, the United States Senate approved American membership in the UN by a vote of 89 to 2. To many persons, recalling the refusal of the Senate to ratify the Covenant of the League of Nations, this vote symbolized America's new role in world affairs. Within another three months the Charter had been ratified by all of the permanent members of the Security Council and by a majority of the signatories ; and on October 24, 1945, the United Nations was formally declared in being.

The Charter

The Charter of the United Nations clearly reveals the purposes and general nature of the new organization. This remarkable document contains more than ten thousand words, with 111 Articles divided into 19 Chapters. Article 1 states the broad purposes of the UN : "to maintain international peace and security," "to develop friendly relations among nations," "to achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all," and "to be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations." Article 2 declares that the UN is "based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members," a statement well worth remembering. The bulk of the Charter is devoted to the provisions creating and controlling the principal organs. These are the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship

²⁴ Clyde Eagleton, *International Government*, rev. ed. (Ronald, 1948), pp. 300-301

Council, the International Court of Justice, and the Secretariat. The original members of the UN were the states represented at San Francisco, plus Poland, a total of fifty-one ; but, according to Article 4 of the Charter, membership was "open to all other peace-loving states..... able and willing to carry out these obligations" — a provision which has produced sharp differences in interpretation.

The General Assembly. This body consists of all members of the UN, with each state having one vote and a maximum of five representatives. Its duties are to "discuss," "make recommendations," "consider," "call the attention," "notify," "initiate studies," and "receive and consider." Except in a limited field, it works largely through recommendations and advice to member states and to the Security Council ; and it may not even make recommendations on matters already before the Security Council unless that body so requests.

The Assembly, however, was given broad supervisory and investigative responsibilities. It possesses authority in respect to UN finances, certain matters relating to non-self-governing territories, the election of members of the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, and the Trusteeship Council ; on the recommendation of the Security Council it admits states to membership in the UN ; and it shares with the Security Council the duty of electing judges to the International Court of Justice. Decisions on important questions are made "by two-thirds majority of the members present and voting" and on all other matters by a majority vote.

The Security Council. This body consists of eleven members of the UN, each having one representative. Five are permanent members : China, France, the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, and the United States. The six nonpermanent members are elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms, without eligibility for immediate re-election.

The Security Council was designed to be the UN's only action agency ; it was therefore charged with primary responsibility for the "maintenance of international peace and security." If parties to a dispute fail to exhaust the procedures for pacific settlement, the Security Council may call upon them "to seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice." The Council may also ask the members of the United Nations to apply such measures as "complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations" ; and it may even "take such action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary," using the "armed forces, assistance, and facilities" that UN member states are pledged to provide.

Article 51-54 in a sense qualify the authority of the Security Council. Article 51 states that "nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and

security." This article has figured prominently in debates on the North Atlantic Pact, the Rio Treaty, and other regional arrangements for collective defense. According to Harold E. Stassen, a leading member of the United States delegation to the San Francisco Conference, this "basic and important" change in the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals was made on the insistence of the United States and other countries "after it became evident that the completed Charter would either contain the veto or there would be no Charter at all."²⁵ Articles 52-54 deal expressly with regional arrangements. (Their tenor is suggested by the first paragraph of Article 52 :

Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.)

Economic and Social Council. ECOSOC consists of eighteen states of the UN, each of which has one representative with one vote. It has been established as the chief coordinating agency of the UN in promoting the following important objectives

- (a) higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development ;
- (b) solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems , and international cultural and educational cooperation ; and
- (c) universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.

The Council's instruments are studies, recommendations, conferences, and coordination activities, carried out by special committees and by regional and functional commissions. It is charged with coordinating the activities of the specialized agencies "through consultation with and recommendations to such agencies and through recommendations to the General Assembly and to the Members of the United Nations." It is authorized to deal directly with nongovernmental organizations.

The Trusteeship Council. Chapter XI of the Charter — "Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories" — opens with these words : "Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the administration of territories whose people have not yet attained a full measure of self-government recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount." These words constitute the most specific recognition of the rights of native peoples that has ever been incorporated into a major international document.

²⁵ Address at the Model General Assembly of the United Nations, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey, March 30, 1949.

Chapter XII provides for an international trusteeship system, to apply to territories which come within the following categories : "(a) territories now held under mandate ; (b) territories which may be detached from enemy States as a result of the Second World War ; and (c) territories voluntarily placed under the system by States responsible for their administration." The objectives of the system are declared to be : the furtherance of international peace and security ; the promotion of all the interests of the inhabitants of trust territories, including progress toward self-government or independence ; the encouragement of respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms without distinction of race, sex, language, or religion ; and the insurance of equal treatment for UN members and their nationals in all respects in the trust areas. Except for certain strategic areas, which are the direct concern of the Security Council, the functions of the United Nations with regard to trust territories are performed by the General Assembly and, more immediately, by the Trusteeship Council.

The International Court of Justice. The Statute of the Court was drafted at the San Francisco Conference, but variations from the Statute of the earlier Permanent Court of International Justice were "comparatively trivial, and mostly for adaptation to the United Nations system."²⁶ The new Court is an integral part of the United Nations, whereas the Permanent Court of International Justice had been associated only indirectly with the League of Nations.

Members of the UN are *ipso facto* parties to the Statute of the Court, and other states may become parties to it. UN members pledge themselves to comply with the decisions of the Court, although they retain the right to use other tribunals. The General Assembly and the Security Council, and the other organs and specialized agencies of the UN, if authorized by the Assembly, may request advisory opinions. The Court itself consists of fifteen distinguished jurists, representing the major legal systems of the world. Its seat, like that of the earlier court, is at The Hague.

The Secretariat. Articles 97-101 of the Charter establish a Secretariat resembling that of the League of Nations. Its administrative head, the Secretary-General, is aided by several Deputy Secretaries-General in his direction of a staff of about four thousand advisers, experts, administrators, and clerks. Many of these are assigned to other organs and organizations of the UN. The Secretary-General is authorized to "bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security." He and his staff are required to take an oath of loyalty to the principles of the UN, and they are enjoined from seeking or receiving instructions from any state or from any authority "external to the Organization." More than two-thirds of the UN budget of approximately 45,000,000 is spent on the Secretariat.

²⁶ Eagleton, p. 346.

COMPARISON OF THE UN WITH THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

The United Nations is not a super-state, nor is it a form of world government in any real sense of the term. It does not seek to supplant the normal channels of international relations or to supersede bilateral or multilateral arrangements of a local or regional character. Moreover, since the UN was designed to *maintain* peace rather than to *make* it, its emphasis is on accommodation rather than on coercion. Thus in its basic character the UN is very much like the League of Nations : both were set up as associations of sovereign states with only limited powers.

One important practical difference is that the League included as continuous members only two of the five great powers of the time, whereas to date the UN has included all three of the super-powers of the post-World War II period. Since the United States never joined the League, and since Germany and Japan withdrew before the Soviet Union entered, the League of Nations never possessed the array of the world's power that is now present in the United Nations.

Professor Eagleton says that "although there is a resemblance between the two systems in structure and general appearance, fundamental differences show, when added up, that the United Nations is quite different in concept and character" from the League.²⁷ The most crucial point of difference is in the position of the great powers, which have been given a privileged position within the UN Security Council. The UN Charter was realistic enough to forswear any intention to provide for committing any great power to war against its will. Thus the UN is spoken of as based on "the principle of great power unanimity."

The UN has a number of general advantages over the League. It is a more flexible system, and more comprehensive in scope ; in particular, its provisions and agencies for economic, social, and humanitarian advancement are more extensive and more definite. It gives greater latitude to the operation of regional organizations and to other agencies and agreements. The division of functions between the General Assembly and the Security Council of the UN is much more precise than that between the Assembly and the Council of the League. The General Assembly is more of a general directing agency under the Charter than was the Assembly under the Covenant, while the Security Council has been given greater responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security than the League Council possessed. In spite of the "veto" in the Security Council, the voting procedure in UN organs is much less rigid than in the agencies of the League, where the unanimity rule generally prevailed.

Despite the differences, it is probably correct to regard the UN as basically similar to the League. This would seem to raise the question

²⁷ "Covenant of the League of Nations and Charter of the United Nations: Points of Difference," *Department of State Bulletin*, Aug. 19, 1945. Reprinted as Dept. of State Pub. 2442.

why it was necessary to set up a new organization. Could not the old one have been revamped and revitalized? If so, certainly a great deal of labor would have been saved, and many legal questions involving succession would have been avoided. The answer is that the League bore the stigma of failure, that it had unhappy memories for the Russians — they had been thrown out of it, and that it had been a party issue in the United States. The UN, it was hoped, could start with a clean slate.

SETTING UP THE UN MACHINERY

The Charter entered into force on October 24, 1945, but as early as November-December, 1944, even before the San Francisco Conference, representatives of fifty-two nations had laid the foundations of the International Civil Aviation Organization. From October 16 to November 1, 1945, delegates from forty-two states met in Quebec to establish the Food and Agriculture Organization. During the first two weeks of November representatives of forty-four nations met in Paris to draft a constitution for the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. Between January 10 and February 15, 1946, the General Assembly met for the first time and began the real work of general organization.

Other organizational meetings were held in rapid order. The Security Council first met on January 17, 1946, in London. The Boards of Governors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and of the International Monetary Fund held a preliminary joint meeting on March 8 near Savannah, Georgia. The inaugural session of the International Court of Justice convened on April 3 at The Hague. The Atomic Energy Commission held its first meeting on June 14; and an International Health Conference, with representatives from sixty-one nations, convened in the same month to draft a constitution for a World Health Organization. From these beginnings international meetings and conferences under UN auspices soon became a regular occurrence.

The General Assembly. The General Assembly has held regular annual sessions. The First, Third, and Seventh Sessions were held in two parts; the others have been continuous meetings of several weeks' duration, usually from September or October into December. Two special sessions—one in 1947 and another in 1948—considered the Palestine question, and one was called in November, 1956, to deal with the Near East crisis.

At its First Session the Assembly established six main committees to deal with problems covering the entire range of the work of the United Nations: (1) Political and Security; (2) Economic and Financial; (3) Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural; (4) Trusteeship; (5) Administrative and Budgetary; and (6) Legal. The chairmen of these committees, together with the President and seven Vice Presidents of the Assembly, constituted a general or steering committee. The first Assembly also elected the six nonpermanent members of the Security Council and the eighteen

PRINCIPAL ORGANS AND SUBSIDIARIES



members of the Economic and Security Council, approved the recommendation of the Security Council that Trygve Lie of Norway be appointed Secretary-General, participated in the election of the fifteen judges of the International Court of Justice, established the Atomic Energy Commission, provided for the organization of the Secretariat, approved the constitution of the International Refugee Organization, set up the International Children's Emergency Fund, assumed various functions of UNRRA²⁸ and the League of Nations, took over certain assets of the League, authorized the creation of specialized agencies responsible to the Economic and Social Council, and established a number of special committees, ad hoc committees, and subcommittees. In addition, the First Session took a great many other steps to complete its organization, select its working personnel, and effect coordination with other organs and agencies of the UN and with outside bodies.

In later sessions the General Assembly has further elaborated its machinery, mostly by the addition of committees and commissions to enable it to carry out its constantly expanding functions. It has retained the six main committees and added a seventh — the Ad Hoc Political Committee — created to share the heavy burden of work which fell on the Political and Security Committee. It has established a special Committee on the Balkans, a Conciliation Commission for Palestine, an International Law Commission, a Commission on Korea, a Peace Observation Commission, and a Collective Measures Committee. It set up the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees to aid and resettle the more than 800,000 people who became refugees as a result of the Israeli-Arab war, and the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency, which assists war-damaged Korea.

The political role of the General Assembly has expanded well beyond the intentions of the framers of the Charter, largely as a result of the virtual impotence of the Security Council in the face of great power differences. This has been particularly marked since the Korean War and the passage of the Uniting for Peace Resolution in November, 1950. The comparative increase in the Assembly's power at the expense of the Security Council has altered the character of the UN as an instrument for the maintenance of peace and security. The Assembly still can only make recommendations in this field, but its recommendations may have considerable weight.

The Second Session of the Assembly voted to create an Interim Committee to meet whenever circumstances required during the interval between the Second and Third Sessions. The Committee functioned so satisfactorily that some expectation developed that it might become permanent. Indeed, it became known as the Little Assembly. But after 1948 its use declined until by 1950 or 1951 it had ceased to operate altogether. The Assembly itself, through longer sessions and regular and

²⁸ The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), despite its name, had no administrative relationship to the United Nations organization.

special committees and commissions, took over the work of the Interim Committee.

The Security Council. This key organ of the UN has been in continuous session since it was organized in January, 1946. As authorized in the Charter, it has adopted its own rules of procedure. The presidency rotates among the members of the Council, changing the first of every month.

To assist it in discharging its functions in the security field, the Council has relied heavily on three important agencies directly responsible to it : (1) the Military Staff Committee, provided for in Article 47 of the UN Charter and established in early 1946 ; (2) the Commission on Conventional Armaments, set up in 1947 ; and (3) the Atomic Energy Commission, created by the Assembly in 1946. In January, 1952, the latter two commissions were merged into a Disarmament Commission. The work of these agencies will be described in the following chapter.

The Security Council has set up other committees and commissions as occasion has required. One was the Good Offices Committee for Indonesia, replaced in January, 1949, by the UN Commission for Indonesia, which performed useful work as mediator in negotiations between representatives of the Dutch government and leaders of the Indonesian Republic. Others are the Commission on India and Pakistan, the Truce Commission on Palestine, and the Technical Committee on Berlin Currency and Trade.

Although the Security Council was envisioned as the central agency of the United Nations, it has not been able to play its expected role. The reason is clear. Instead of great power unanimity, on which the United Nations was predicated, the postwar years have brought major rifts and disagreements among the most powerful states of the world. Under these circumstances, the Security Council, in which five permanent members possess an individual "veto," has been unable to function effectively. Since the Korean War and the return of the Russian representative to the Security Council on August 1, 1950, the Council has faded into the background, and its place has been taken in considerable measure by the unwieldy General Assembly, which was not designed to play a major role in the security field.

The Economic and Social Council. Normally the Economic and Social Council has met at least twice a year. During 1946 and 1947 its sessions were devoted largely to organizational matters and to working out operating relationships with various specialized agencies, but in 1948 it began to deal primarily with substantive questions.

ECOSOC has been criticized for an apparent lack of concrete achievement, for delays in considering important problems, and for the interminable debates that take place at each of its sessions on questions which often seemed merely procedural, relatively inconsequential, or largely political in character. In fairness the following considerations should be borne in mind : (1) the Council is dealing with long-term problems, which in time may prove to be more important than current political and

security considerations but which admit of no easy or immediate solutions ; and (2) it is primarily an advisory body, designed "to provide a sense of direction and coherence in world economic and social policies," as President Truman once observed, and it must rely upon governments and upon the Security Council, the General Assembly, and specialized agencies of the UN to implement its recommendations.

Functional and Regional Commissions under ECOSOC. The Economic and Social Council is a coordinating agency for an elaborate machinery of commissions, specialized agencies, and committees. Many nongovernmental organizations are connected with it in a consultative status. It oversees eight functional and three regional commissions.²⁹ The functional commissions are : (1) Transport and Communications ; (2) Statistical ; (3) Fiscal ; (4) Population ; (5) Social, with a close connection with the International Children's Emergency Fund ; (6) Human Rights, with subcommittees on Freedom of Information and of the Press, and on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities ; (7) Status of Women ; and (8) Narcotic Drugs. The following regional commissions are now in existence : (1) the Economic Commission for Europe, with headquarters in Geneva ; (2) the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, with headquarters in Bangkok ; and (3) the Economic Commission for Latin America, with headquarters in Santiago.

In 1951 the whole rather cumbersome structure of committees and commissions under the Economic and Social Council was subjected to a searching review. ECOSOC considered proposals for the elimination of most of its subordinate agencies, with the work of these bodies to be taken on by ECOSOC itself, by groups of experts, and by the Secretariat.³⁰

Specialized Agencies. Ten specialized agencies are now fully organized and affiliated with the Economic and Social Council. These are as follows, with alphabetical designation, date of formation, and headquarters also noted :

1. Universal Postal Union (UPU, 1875, Bern)
2. International Labor Organization (ILO, 1919, Geneva)
3. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (The Bank, 1944, Washington)
4. International Monetary Fund (IMF, 1944, Washington)
5. International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO, 1944, Montreal)
6. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO, 1945, Rome)
7. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO, 1945, Paris)
8. World Health Organization (WHO, 1946, Geneva)
9. International Telecommunication Union (ITU, 1934, Geneva)
10. World Meteorological Organization (WMO, 1947, Lausanne)

²⁹ The Economic, Employment and Development Commission, created in 1946, was abolished in 1951.

³⁰ We are indebted to Dr. H. W. Singer of the Economic and Social Affairs Department of the UN Secretariat for this information.

The International Refugee Organization (IRO), established in 1947 and affiliated with the UN as a specialized agency in 1948, was dissolved in 1951. Its successor — the Office of High Commissioner for Refugees— was not authorized to assume operational responsibilities, and with its limited budget, staff, and functions, plus the further handicap of the rather unsympathetic attitude of many governments, it has been unable to cope with the grave and continuing refugee problem.

In March, 1948, at the end of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, representatives of fifty-two nations signed the Charter for an International Trade Organization (ITO) and established an Interim Commission. This Commission (with headquarters in Geneva) is still functioning, but the ITO Charter has not yet been approved by a sufficient number of states, and current prospects are not bright. The convention for another specialized agency, the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO), was also opened for signature in March, 1948, and a Preparatory Committee was set up ; but this convention too has failed to receive the required number of ratifications. Two of the specialized agencies — the Universal Postal Union (with more than 90 members), and the ILO, the one surviving agency of major importance associated with the League of Nations — are considerably older than the UN. Some of the specialized agencies, perhaps most of them, have absorbed or are working closely with much older organizations in the same field.

Since they are concerned with all the basic economic and social problems of mankind, the specialized agencies have a great role to play in fostering international cooperation and in improving the life conditions of the people of the world. We are often inclined to take for granted such inestimable benefits as international mail service ; improved labor standards ; facilities for international communication by telegraph, telephone, cable, and radio ; weather data from all parts of the world ; more adequate food production and distribution ; assistance in long-term reconstruction programs ; reasonable foreign exchange procedure ; high safety standards for international air travel ; improved economic and cultural relations and educational facilities ; assistance in fighting epidemics and plagues ; and generally improved health standards.

UNICEF. The United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), which is neither a commission nor a specialized agency, also is affiliated with the Economic and Social Council. It has been doing useful work in helping children, adolescents, and nursing mothers in those areas of the world where such help is desperately needed. "By early 1953 the Fund was providing emergency and long-range food programs for more than a million children and mothers, conducting anti-tuberculosis campaigns covering fourteen million persons and yaws control campaigns affecting five million."³¹ Today UNICEF is regarded as one of the most important and useful affiliates of the UN,

³¹ Cheever and Haviland, p. 543.

Nongovernmental Organizations. Article 71 of the Charter states that "the Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for consultations with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence." To carry out this provision ECOSOC established three categories of nongovernmental organizations ("a," "b," and "c"), and appointed a committee to study applications for recognition from such organizations. Category "a" is designed to include "organizations which have a basic interest in most of the activities of the Council, and are closely linked with the economic or social life of the areas which they represent." There are at present nine organizations in this category: the World Federation of Trade Unions, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, the International Co-operative Alliance, the American Federation of Labor, the International Chamber of Commerce, the International Federation of Agriculture Producers, the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the International Organization of Employers, and the World Federation of United Nations Associations. Category "b" consists of "organizations which have a special competence but are concerned specifically with only a few of the fields of activity covered by the Council." There are about eighty-five organizations in this category. Category "c" contains more than a hundred organizations which have been placed on a register by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and have a consultative status on an ad hoc basis.

Altogether there are something like a thousand international nongovernmental organizations. Their general nature and importance are indicated in the following illuminating comment:

These bodies are composed of private or unofficial groups in different countries which have formed a joint organization to promote some common interest. A large proportion of the people of the world are connected with one or more of these organizations, for they include in their membership nearly all the large churches, trade unions, businessmen's associations, co-operative societies, farmers' groups, and women's organizations, as well as numerous professional, scientific, humanitarian, and social reform organizations. They deal with almost every possible subject from theology to the Olympic games, from child welfare to astronomy, from cancer to the problems of labor, from aviation to women's rights... Surely the time has come for the students and teachers of international affairs to realize that international nongovernmental organization is a great unexplored continent in the world of international affairs and that expeditions should be sent in search of the great riches to be found there. For it is there that one finds the most positive and constructive elements working for world unity.³²

³² Lyman C. White, "Peace by Pieces — The Role of Nongovernmental Organizations," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, CCLXIV (July, 1949), 88, 95. See also the same author's *International Non-Governmental Organizations* (Rutgers University Press, 1951), a study of nongovernmental organizations up to 1945. Dr. White is secretary of the Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations of ECOSOC.

The Trusteeship Council. While the First Session of the General Assembly was in progress in the spring of 1946, all states which held class "B" and class "C" mandates under the League of Nations, with the notable exception of the Union of South Africa, announced their intention of placing their mandates under the international trusteeship system provided for in Chapters XII and XIII of the UN Charter. Although the drafting of agreements for the territories in question proved to be a difficult matter, on December 13, 1946, the Assembly finally approved eight trusteeship agreements. The Soviet Union voted against approval of all of them, holding that they violated the Charter in three respects : (1) "the states directly concerned," which had to approve the agreements, had never been identified ; (2) the agreements made the trust territories integral parts of the administering states ; and (3) the agreements failed to provide for approval by the Security Council of military arrangements in the trust territories. For these reasons the Soviet Union announced that she would not participate in the work of the Trusteeship Council ; but her abstention lasted only until 1948.

The United States submitted a "strategic trusteeship" agreement for the former Japanese-mandated islands in the Pacific— the Marshall, Caroline, and Marianas Islands -- to the Security Council ; and in April, 1947, to the surprise of those who expected a Soviet veto, the Council approved the agreement.

The Trusteeship Council had completed most of its organizational work by the end of the spring session in April-May, 1948. By the end of 1949 visiting missions had been sent to all of the trust territories under the International Trusteeship System. In the fall of 1950 the General Assembly placed Somaliland under the Trusteeship Council. Italy was thereby made a nonvoting participant in the meetings of the Trusteeship Council ; since she was not a member of the UN she could not be a full-fledged member of the Council.

Normally the Council meets in regular sessions twice a year to examine reports by administering authorities, to consider petitions from inhabitants of trust territories, to review the reports of visiting missions, and to handle related matters. It now consists of fourteen members with seven which administer trust territories and seven which do not.

The International Court of Justice. The first session of the Court, held from April 3 to May 6, 1946, was devoted wholly to administrative and organizational matters. Although the services of the Court have not been used as often as was hoped, it has handed down a series of decisions in one important case, the Corfu Channel dispute between Great Britain and Albania ; three ambiguous rulings in a dispute between Colombia and Peru over the right of asylum for Haya de la Torre, a well-known Peruvian political leader ; a ruling that it did not have the authority to deal with Britain's charge against Iran in the oil nationalization issue ; a judgment favorable to Norway in a fisheries dispute with Great Britain ; and an opinion favorable to the United States on the rights of American citizens

in Morocco. The Court has also given advisory opinions on reparations for injuries suffered in the service of the UN, on the competence of the General Assembly in the admission of new members to the UN, on the interpretation of the peace treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania, on the international status of South-West Africa, and on reservations to the Convention on Genocide. Other questions are now pending. Less than half of the member states of the UN — but including all of the Big Five except the Soviet Union — have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in certain types of legal disputes. In 1948 Switzerland, not a member of the United Nations, became a party to the Statute of the Court.

The Secretariat. Much of the day-to-day work of the United Nations is done by the Secretariat, an international civil service drawn from many countries, with headquarters in New York City and a branch in the former seat of the League of Nations at Geneva. Three-fourths of the Secretariat's staff of more than four thousand persons normally work at UN headquarters in New York, in a thirty-nine-story skyscraper of glass and steel which rises high above the East River in a rather unlovely section of the city at the foot of 42nd Street. Affiliated agencies of the UN employ more than ten thousand other persons.

The directing head of the Secretariat is the Secretary-General. Trygve Lie of Norway was the first occupant of this important post. His support of the UN action in Korea, however, aroused the ill will of the Russians, and in the fall of 1952 he resigned in order to remove a source of East-West friction. After a long deadlock the General Assembly on April 7, 1953, approved Dag Hammarskjold, a Swedish Minister of State, as his successor.

There are now eight major departments in the Secretariat : (1) Security Council Affairs ; (2) Economic Affairs ; (3) Social Affairs ; (4) Trusteeship and Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories ; (5) Public Information ; (6) Conference and General Services ; (7) Administrative and Financial Services ; and (8) Legal Department. On January 1, 1955, a rather thorough reorganization of the top command of the Secretariat, directed by Hammarskjold in the interests of efficiency and economy, went into effect. Ralph J. Bunche and Ilya S. Tchernychev were made Under Secretaries-General without portfolio, and five appointments were made of Under Secretaries-General with portfolio.

Besides the headquarters office in New York and the Geneva Office, the Secretariat provides the staffs for small field services for the regional commissions and for information centers in Bangkok, Belgrade, Buenos Aires, Cairo, Copenhagen, Jakarta, Geneva, Karachi, London, Mexico City, Monrovia, Moscow, New Delhi, Paris, Prague, Rio de Janeiro, Shanghai, Sidney, Teheran, Warsaw, and Washington.

The Secretariat performs a multitude of undramatic but necessary and exacting tasks. It arranges for and services the meetings of the organs and agencies of the UN, a herculean job in itself. It prepares studies and background materials for these meetings. It acts as the executive agent

and provides secretarial services for the other principal organs, except the International Court of Justice. It provides information, through all available media and in as many countries as possible, on the purposes and activities of the UN.

THE PRESENT-DAY ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

We have seen that some forms of international organization have existed throughout most of recorded history, and that most of the techniques and procedures that are customarily employed by the complex international organizations of today have been developed over a long period of time and in many parts of the world. The nineteenth century, in particular, developed techniques such as the administrative unions which have been of central importance to twentieth-century international organization. But nothing like the present complex pattern has ever existed before.

The formation of the League of Nations marked the beginning of a new era in the history of international organization ; and the United Nations, essentially like the League, is even more comprehensive and more active—and, let us hope, more permanent. As we have noted, scores of organs, agencies, and commissions are affiliated with the United Nations system. There is hardly a phase of international life that does not come within its purview. It is limited in power by its very nature, but it is certainly not limited in the scope of its interests. Although it is by all odds the most comprehensive international organization in history, it does not embrace all the major organizations of the present day. Some of these, notably regional arrangements such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Organization of American States, are in many respects more powerful than the United Nations, although they are geographically and functionally more limited. Thus a study of present-day international organization must cover even more than the UN system ; but some knowledge of this system is clearly a *must* for those who wish to understand how the world's work is being done.

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The United Nations: Political.....13

and Security Issues

The United Nations has been charged with vast responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security. According to Article I of the Charter, it is expected "to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by lawful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace." The procedures available for the discharge of these stupendous obligations are laid down in the Charter in elaborate detail, particularly in Articles 33-51. The chief responsibility rests with the Security Council, but the General Assembly has played an increasingly significant role in this field. To the "breaches of the peace" or the disputes between states which are brought to the United Nations we give the name "political disputes" or "political problems."

The UN also has great responsibilities in what are called "security problems." These relate not to one state's charges of aggression or other misconduct against another state but to the UN's obligation to promote conditions of general security so that breaches of the peace by any state will become less likely, and so that effective sanctions can be invoked if breaches do occur. More particularly, its responsibilities pertain to the performances of three specifically assigned security duties: (1) the placing of military forces at its disposal, (2) the regulation of armaments, and (3) the international control of atomic energy.

We shall examine in this chapter the UN's record in the handling of both political and security problems. Turning first to political problems, we shall present a brief account of some major disputes that became "cases" before the Security Council.¹ Next we shall discuss the steps

¹ More detailed accounts of these disputes may be found in the official records of the Security Council and the General Assembly. Excellent summaries are given

taken by the UN to discharge its obligations in the promotion of security in the international community. Finally we shall attempt an evaluation of the work of the UN in the whole field of political and security problems.

POLITICAL ISSUES

The most difficult task of the United Nations has been the adjustment of political disputes. In evaluating its work in this field certain broad considerations should be borne in mind. In the first place, it should be recalled that the Charter imposes primary responsibility on the Security Council but that under certain conditions the General Assembly may take a hand. We shall observe this in a number of instances. Second, it should be remembered that the Security Council is bound to no specific procedure ; it is authorized to use any or all of several indicated ways of reaching a settlement, or it may devise ways of its own. Its preference is to induce the disputing parties to settle their differences by direct negotiation. Third, the distinction between political disputes and legal disputes should be kept in mind, but it should not be overemphasized. Generally speaking, political disputes go to the Security Council and legal disputes to the International Court of Justice, but any attempt to divide all disputes into these two categories would lead to confusion.

The record of the Security Council in dealing with the large number of political disputes brought before it has been a varied one. While no spectacular successes have been scored, the Council, as we shall see, has contributed, directly or indirectly, to the settlement of several controversies which might otherwise have become serious threats to world peace. A detailed analysis of almost any one of the disputes would require several volumes. Here we can only summarize a few of them, after first pointing out the distinctive and interesting features of the "cases" to be reviewed.

1. *Iran*. This was the first dispute taken to the UN. It was settled entirely by direct negotiation on the urging of the Security Council.

2. *Indonesia*. Here the original complaint was brought by a Communist state. It was the first instance of the use of special commissions. After an early reluctance the defendant state cooperated to effect a satisfactory settlement.

3. *Greece*. This dispute was marked by persistent Communist aggression, repeated use of the veto, and substantial Assembly participation.

4. *Kashmir*. The India-Pakistan dispute produced the first important

in the annual *Yearbook of the United Nations*, in the pertinent issues of the *United Nations Bulletin* (until July, 1954) and the *United Nations Review* (since July, 1954), and in the annual reports of the President to the Congress on the activities of the United Nations and the participation of the United States therein (pursuant to the United Nations Participation Act of 1945). Also see *International Organization*, published quarterly by the World Peace Foundation.

use of a personal mediator. The Security Council, which retained exclusive jurisdiction, was unable to accomplish anything beyond a continued truce.

5. *Palestine.* In this instance the dispute did not originate as a complaint. It involved a reversal of United States policy, concurrent action by the Security Council and the Assembly, and two special sessions of the Assembly. UN mediation helped to produce a cease-fire and an armistice but no final settlement.

6. *Former Italian Colonies.* Here the Assembly was given full jurisdiction and achieved an almost complete settlement.

7. *Berlin.* The Berlin blockade led to the first head-on clash of Communist and anti-Communist members of the UN, which proved impotent in the face of great power disagreement. The dispute was ended by direct negotiation.

8. *Korea.* Communist aggression in Korea prompted the UN's first use of military sanctions. This has been the only test to date of the collective security provisions of the Charter. The results were inconclusive, as we noted in Chapter 10.

1. Iran

On January 19, 1946, two days after the Security Council met for the first time, and before it could agree on matters of organization and procedure, Iran formally charged the Soviet Union with interference in her internal affairs and asked the Council to investigate and attempt to effect a settlement. Differences involved the continued presence of Russian troops in Iran, the alleged support by the Soviet Union of a revolt in the Iranian province of Azerbaijan, and the Russian demand for oil concessions in Iran.

Although the U.S.S.R. "categorically opposed" any discussion of the charges whatsoever, the Council the next day voted to ask the two governments to settle their differences by direct negotiation and to report to the Council on the progress of their consultations. On March 19 the Iranian Government, again invoking Article 35 of the United Nations Charter, declared that the Soviet Union was "continuing to interfere in the internal affairs of Iran through the medium of Soviet agents, officials, and armed forces," and was maintaining troops in Iran beyond the period stipulated in the Tripartite Treaty of 1942, under which Allied troops had been stationed in Iran during World War II. When, on March 27, 1946, the Council voted down a Soviet motion to postpone consideration until April 10, Andrei Gromyko walked out of the Council chamber.

After examining Iranian and Soviet statements on the facts of the case, the Council on April 4 decided to defer further consideration of the Iranian appeal until May 6. Shortly after this step had been taken, Gromyko returned to the Council table and demanded that the question be dropped from the Council's agenda. This was followed by a message

from the Premier of Iran agreeing to drop the complaint, the announcement of an agreement between the contending countries for a joint oil company, and an unsolicited opinion from Secretary-General Trygve Lie that the Council no longer had jurisdiction in the matter. In spite of these developments the Council decided to keep the question on its agenda for an indefinite period. Iranian reports in May on the status of the dispute were inconclusive, but on May 23 Moscow and Teheran announced that evacuation of Soviet troops from Iran had been completed on May 9.

On December 5, 1946, the Iranian Government advised the President of the Security Council that it had not yet been able to re-establish full authority over Azerbaijan and that troops were being sent to all provinces to assure fair practices in coming elections of members of the Majlis, the Iranian parliament. Iran was soon able to reassert her authority in the troubled province. In early 1949 the Iranian Government reported uneasiness over increasing activity of Soviet troops along its borders and over other forms of Soviet pressure. Although the Iranian question remains on its agenda, the Security Council has taken no further action regarding it.

2. Indonesia

Negotiations between the Netherlands Government and Indonesian leaders, begun in 1945, led to the Linggadjati Agreement, formally signed on March 25, 1947, for the establishment of a United States of Indonesia within the framework of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Each side soon charged that the other had violated this agreement, and on July 20, 1947, Dutch troops began military action against the so-called Indonesian Republic. This action was immediately brought to the attention of the Security Council by Australia and India, and on August 1, 1947, the Council called on both parties to cease hostilities and to settle their differences by peaceful means.

To assist in the settlement the Council set up a Committee of Good Offices, composed of representatives of Australia, Belgium, and the United States, with Dr. Frank P. Graham as the first American member. After negotiations aboard the U. S. S. *Renville* under the auspices of the UN committee, Dutch and Indonesian negotiators signed, on January 17, 1948, a truce plan and a set of principles to serve as a basis for settlement. Despite the strenuous efforts of the Committee, negotiations for the political implementation of the *Renville* agreement dragged on through the rest of 1948.

In December Dutch troops resumed military operations. The United States formally requested an emergency session of the Security Council to deal with the new situation. The Council issued a cease-fire order and passed several resolutions ; but for weeks the Dutch Government refused to comply with these resolutions, even re-enforced as they were by pressure of world public opinion, by official remonstrances from several na-

tions, and by the resolutions of an Asian conference convened in New Delhi by the Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru.

The United Nations Commission for Indonesia, which had replaced the Committee of Good Offices, was finally able to effect an agreement under which Netherlands troops evacuated Jogjakarta, leaders of the Indonesian Republic were released from their confinement, and the hostilities which had commenced in the previous December were brought to a halt. In July, 1949, the Indonesian Government returned to Jogjakarta, and on the twenty-third of that month Republican and Federalist leaders announced that they had reached an agreement on the creation of a United States of Indonesia. A round-table conference at The Hague, held shortly afterwards and attended by representatives of the Dutch Government, Indonesian Republicans and Federalists, and the UN Commission for Indonesia, confirmed the general terms of the Understanding and outlined the steps by which the transfer of sovereignty should be effected. Both Dutch and Indonesians, encouraged by the UN Commission, implemented these far-reaching agreements in good faith. As a result, a new state—the Republic of Indonesia -- was born.

3. Greece

Cases involving the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece were on the agenda of the Security Council almost continuously from 1946 to 1951. In January, 1946, the Soviet Union charged that the presence of British troops in Greece constituted a threat to peace. After some debate the Council adopted a resolution saying that it had heard the statements in the matter and considered the incident closed.

In August, 1946, the Ukrainian S.S.R. complained of internal conditions in Greece and of incidents along the Greek-Albanian frontier, allegedly provoked by Greek troops. A proposal that the Council establish a commission to investigate the facts relating to the alleged border incidents was vetoed by the Soviet member.

On December 3, 1946, Greece contended that her neighbors to the north were aiding Greek guerrillas and were, in fact, promoting civil war, and asked the Council to order an on-the-spot investigation. The Council unanimously voted to create a Commission of Investigation, composed of representatives of the eleven nations represented on the Council. Between January and July, 1947, the Commission held ninety-one meetings in Athens, Salonika, Sofia, Belgrade, Geneva, and New York, conducted thirty-three field investigations in Greece and the countries on her northern border, heard 238 witnesses, and considered many written statements. On May 27, 1947, eight of the eleven members of the Commission reported to the Security Council that "Yugoslavia, and to a lesser extent, Albania, and Bulgaria" had "supported the guerrilla warfare in Greece." With only the Soviet and Polish members dissenting, the Commission proposed the establishment of a new "watch-dog" commission. With the

Council's approval the Commission thereupon appointed a Subsidiary Group to keep the Council informed of activities along the Greek border.

From June 27 to August 29, 1947, the Security Council discussed the report of the Commission of Investigation. The debates were filled with bitter attacks by the Soviet Union on Greece, and all attempts of the Council to act in defense of Greece were frustrated, several times by Soviet vetoes. On September 15, by a vote of 9 to 2, the Council removed the Greek question from its agenda in order that it might be placed before the General Assembly.

At the Second Session of the Assembly the case was discussed at length. On October 21, by a vote of 40 to 6, with 11 abstentions, the Assembly made a number of recommendations to Greece and her neighbors, and established an eleven-nation Special Committee to conduct investigations on the spot and make reports to the Assembly. In December, 1947, UNSCOB, as the Committee was called — meaning United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans — established headquarters at Salonika. Poland and the U.S.S.R., named as members of the Committee, declined to participate in its work, and Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia consistently refused to allow it access to their territories or even to recognize its existence ; but in spite of this noncooperation UNSCOB persisted in its work. Through personal observation groups along Greece's northern frontier, from testimony obtained from scores of interviews, and from other sources, it accumulated overwhelming evidence of large-scale aid to Greek guerrillas from Greece's northern neighbors. In 1948 it submitted one main and two supplementary reports to the General Assembly.

During the Third Session of the Assembly, in the fall of 1948, the First Committee spent more time on the Greek problem than on any other, but the spirited opposition of the Soviet bloc, featured by bitter attacks on UNSCOB and Greece, prolonged the debate and confused the issues. The year 1949 brought considerable improvement in the situation, due in large measure to the fact that Yugoslavia's aid to the Greek guerrillas had practically ceased. A further improvement was signified by the restoration of diplomatic relations between Greece and Yugoslavia on November 28, 1950.

On December 1, 1950, after hearing UNSCOB'S report the General Assembly adopted three resolutions pertaining to Greece. Two of these resolutions dealt with old questions of the repatriation of members of the Greek armed forces and Greek children. The first resolution noted that with the exception of Yugoslavia none of the states involved had complied with the previous requests of the General Assembly for the repatriation of Greek soldiers captured by the northern guerrillas. On record, when the Assembly met for its fifth session in 1950, were the requests of 10,344 Greek families for the return of their children. Again the Special Committee reported that Yugoslavia was the only nation which had complied with previous General Assembly recommendations. Also missing were over 3,000 adult Greeks. Albania, Bulgaria, Czecho-

slovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and the Soviet Union — the other nations concerned — had all refused to cooperate in repatriation efforts. In a further move to bring about repatriation the Assembly established a standing committee composed of representatives of Peru, the Philippines, and Sweden, and urged the International Committee of the Red Cross and the League of Red Cross Societies to continue their efforts to return Greek nationals.

In its report to the Sixth Session of the General Assembly in 1951 UNSCOB noted that there had been a change in the character of the Greek situation since the retreat of the guerrillas in 1948. The report pointed out that during 1950 the guerrillas had not ventured to undertake any military operations against the Greek army but UNSCOB had obtained evidence that "a widespread and carefully coordinated system now exists for selecting, training and eventually smuggling armed subversive groups into Greece across the Albanian and Bulgarian frontiers." It asked the General Assembly to take note of the "changed but continuing threat to Greece, [and to] consider the advisability of maintaining United Nations vigilance of the Balkans in the light of the present nature of the threat to Greece in that area." The Sixth Assembly also voted to terminate the Special Committee on the Balkans, and by the same resolution set up a Balkan subcommission of the Peace Observation Commission, with authority to send observers to any area of international tension in the Balkans.

4. Kashmir

Kashmir was one of the more than five hundred princely states whose status was left undetermined when the Dominions of India and Pakistan came officially into existence on August 15, 1947. Shortly afterwards fighting broke out in Kashmir (officially, the State of Jammu and Kashmir), a predominantly Muslim state ruled by a Hindu maharaja. The maharaja asked the Government of India to send troops into Kashmir to assist him in re-establishing his authority, and requested that the state become a part of the Union of India. India granted both requests on condition that as soon as peace was restored the future of Kashmir should be determined by plebiscite.

On January 1, 1948, India filed a complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations, charging that the Government of Pakistan was providing assistance to raiders who were attacking the state of Kashmir. Pakistan denied these charges and brought a number of counter-allegations against India. The Security Council voted to establish a United Nations Commission on India and Pakistan (UNCIP). After weeks of investigation UNCIP, on August 13, 1948, presented to the governments of India and Pakistan a resolution calling for a cease-fire and truce agreement, withdrawal from Kashmir of Pakistani and Indian troops, and a plebiscite to determine the future status of the state. During the

next three months UNCIP met in Geneva, where it prepared an interim report to the Security Council, and in Paris, where it held informal conversations with representatives of India and Pakistan. On December 11 it submitted more specific proposals to the two governments for a plebiscite to be supervised by an administrator nominated by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. India and Pakistan agreed to these proposals and to a cease-fire and truce arrangement, effective January 1, 1949.² Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz of the United States was appointed by Trygve Lie as plebiscite administrator, a choice approved by all parties concerned. Admiral Nimitz spent several weeks in India and Pakistan, but was unable to secure agreement on the conditions under which the plebiscite should be held.

Through UNCIP agreement was reached on the demarcation of a permanent cease-fire line in July, 1949, but no progress was made in arrangements for the withdrawal of armed forces or for a plebiscite. After the Commission's proposal of arbitration had been rejected by India, it recommended that the Security Council name an individual to replace the five-member Commission and through him continue its efforts to bring the two governments together on the unresolved issues.

On March 14, 1950, the Council asked both parties to prepare and carry out within a five-month period a program of demilitarization. Sir Owen Dixon of Australia was appointed to assist in reaching this objective. In September, however, Dixon reported that he had been unable to make any progress toward demilitarization or arrangements for a plebiscite and requested that he be relieved of his assignment.

In February, 1951, the Council again brought up the question of Kashmir, and in March it appointed Dr. Frank Graham of the United States to the position left vacant by Dixon. During months of patient investigations Dr. Graham made a variety of specific proposals regarding demilitarization, and the Security Council discussed the issue at length; but all these efforts led to no basic agreement. The question of a plebiscite was not even discussed. Neither India nor Pakistan replied officially to Dr. Graham's fifth report. The Security Council gave very little attention to the problem after 1953. Occasional efforts to resolve the dispute by direct negotiations between the prime ministers of the two countries

² A United Nations observers' group, headed by General Nimmo, an Australian, has been in Kashmir since 1949. It is charged with ensuring the observance of the cease-fire and truce agreement, and its presence in that beautiful but hotly-contested area has been a powerful deterrent to violence. During the visit of one of the authors of this volume to Kashmir in September-October, 1952, he was told repeatedly by natives of Kashmir, from shikara men and tonga drivers to high government officials, and by outside observers, that if the UN groups were not in the area violence would be almost inevitable, so delicate is the situation and so strong are communal and other tensions. While the presence of the UN group in Kashmir was rather generally welcomed, on both sides of the truce line there seemed to be a growing feeling that the UN would never be able to bring about a solution of the difficult question of the future political status of Kashmir and that therefore it might be desirable to withdraw the issue from the UN and to attempt to deal with it by direct negotiations between India and Pakistan.

were fruitless, and in 1956 Pakistan, apparently convinced that further discussions with India would lead nowhere, asked the Security Council to renew its consideration of the issue.

The whole Kashmir situation is one for which no satisfactory solution seems possible. It may have been unfortunate that the question was brought before the United Nations at all ; but it was obviously a matter which constituted a breach of the peace. The efforts of the UN did not lead to a happy solution, but without them the Kashmir dispute would almost certainly have precipitated a major international crisis.

5. Palestine

Around the historic land of Palestine, "a center of international rivalry intermittently since the beginning of human history," some of the thorniest problems to confront the United Nations have gathered. The rival claims of Jews and Arabs "have created a dilemma of infinite complexity. Few issues of modern times have taxed statesmanship so heavily ; few have offered a greater challenge to an international organization."³

The Palestine question was first brought before the United Nations by Great Britain on April 2, 1947, in a letter requesting the Secretary-General to call a special session of the General Assembly to create and instruct a special committee to prepare recommendations for the future government of Palestine. Some action was necessary, as Britain had announced her intention to terminate the mandate that she had assumed at the close of World War I. Accordingly, the First Special Session convened on April 28, 1947. After lengthy debates in the First Committee, the Assembly, over the violent opposition of the Arab states, appointed a committee of eleven members, not including any of the permanent members of the Security Council, gave it "the widest powers to ascertain and record facts, and to investigate any questions and issues relevant to the problem of Palestine," and instructed it "to submit such proposals as it may consider appropriate for the solution of the problem of Palestine."

The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) held its first meeting at Lake Success on May 26 and concluded its report at Geneva on August 31. It spent six weeks in Palestine and a month in final consideration at Geneva. Its report to the General Assembly contained eleven general principles unanimously agreed upon by the Committee, a majority plan for the partition of Palestine, with economic union, and a minority plan for a federal state. On November 29, in a tense plenary session, the General Assembly adopted by the required two-thirds vote the plan for the partition of Palestine, with economic union, and an international area for Jerusalem. It then named a commission to implement the recommendations.

³ *The United States and the United Nations : Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1947*, Dept. of State Pub. 3024, International Organization and Conference Series III, 1 (Feb., 1948), pp. 42, 44,

For once the United States and Russia had agreed on a major political issue. Both had supported the partition plan, and the United States had been largely responsible for its adoption by the General Assembly. Jewish leaders hailed the action of the Assembly as a great victory ; but Arab spokesmen warned that such a plan would never be accepted, and the increasing tempo of violence in the Holy Land gave weight to their warnings. The Palestine Commission soon reported to the Security Council that it could not "discharge its responsibilities on the termination of the Mandate" unless assisted by armed force. Until early March, 1948, the United States continued its firm support of the partition proposal ; then, on March 19, Warren R. Austin, the American representative in the Security Council, without previous warning to the British or any other government, formally proposed that the Security Council instruct the Palestine Commission to suspend its efforts to implement the partition plan. He urged, instead, that a temporary trusteeship for Palestine under the Trusteeship Council of the UN be established and that a special session of the General Assembly be called to consider this new proposal.

Although Secretary-General Trygve Lie pointed out that a trusteeship for Palestine might be even more difficult to implement peacefully than the partition plan, he issued a call for a special session of the General Assembly, to meet on April 16. On April 17 the Security Council requested all groups in Palestine to desist from acts of violence, and on the 23rd of April it established a Truce Commission. The special session of the Assembly — the second special session to consider the Palestine problem — showed little enthusiasm for the "Draft Trusteeship Agreement for Palestine" which the United States submitted on April 23. Instead it passed an innocuous resolution, instructed UNSCOP to terminate its activities, established the office of United Nations Mediator for Palestine, and appointed Count Folke Bernadotte of Sweden to that office.

At midnight on May 14, 1948, at the expiration of the British mandate, the new state of Israel was proclaimed. This action, plus other developments of April and May, led to renewed hostilities in Palestine and to attempted invasion of the Holy Land by Egyptian troops. A cease-fire order of the Security Council, issued on May 29 and vigilantly supervised by Count Bernadotte and military observers from Belgium, France, and the United States, produced a truce of four weeks. Thereafter fighting was resumed, with the armed forces of Israel quickly gaining the advantage over the combined Arab armies. In mid-July a stronger cease-fire order of the Security Council was generally observed, except in the Jerusalem area, until well into October, when serious fighting broke out in the Negev in southern Palestine. On September 16 Count Bernadotte finished his last and most definite plan for a settlement in Palestine. Two days later he was murdered in Jerusalem. Dr. Ralph Bunche, an American who had been Count Bernadotte's chief assistant, was named acting mediator. His efforts, reinforced by two strong resolutions of the Security Council in November, met with only partial success throughout the

remainder of 1948, but early in 1949 Egypt and Israel agreed to suspend hostilities and to undertake armistice negotiations.

On December 11, 1948, the General Assembly voted to establish a Conciliation Commission to assume the functions of the mediator and the Truce Commission. At the Second Part of the Third Session, held in the spring of 1949, Israel was admitted to the United Nations as the fifty-ninth member, in spite of the bitter opposition of the Arab states. Lengthy negotiations between Israel and the Arab states, conducted by Dr. Bunche mostly on the island of Rhodes, resulted in four general armistice agreements being signed between February 24 and July 20, 1949. On August 11, the Council declared that these superseded the truce directed by the Council on July 15, 1948, and it relieved the mediator of further responsibility to the Council. Later negotiations at Lausanne failed to bring agreement on final terms of peace. An often-violated truce then continued until late October, 1956, when the armed forces of Israel launched an attack in force on nearby Egyptian areas. This aggression, together with the Anglo-French intervention which quickly followed, confronted the UN with the most serious challenge of its life.

6. The Former Italian Colonies

The future of the former Italian colonies of Libya, Eritrea, and Italian Somaliland was left unsettled in the Italian peace treaty. Instead, the treaty provided that final disposition should be determined by the governments of France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States within one year after the treaty became effective; if agreement could not be reached within the specified time the matter should be referred to the General Assembly, whose recommendations should be binding.

Since the Big Four had reached no agreement by September 15, 1948, the delicate question was referred to the General Assembly. After some delay it was considered at length in the Second Part of the Third Session, held in April-May, 1949, but with no constructive results. A resolution based on an Anglo-Italian agreement for the disposition of the colonies, in which France and the United States concurred, was defeated, with the Soviet and Arab blocs and nineteen Latin American countries in opposition. A similar fate befell a Soviet proposal for a collective United Nations trusteeship. The case was therefore referred to the Fourth Session of the General Assembly without provision for further investigation.

The Fourth Session managed to work out a solution for two of the three former colonies. The great importance of this decision is that it marks the "first time that the Assembly has acted definitively in a problem which the Big Four were unable to solve."⁴ It is also the only matter in which the Assembly has been empowered to make a binding decision. Accord-

⁴ Quoted in "Issues Before the Fifth General Assembly," *International Conciliation*, No. 463 (Sept., 1950), p. 351.

ing to the Assembly's decision in late 1949, Libya was to be granted complete independence, effective January 1, 1952. Until that time it was to be under the authority of a United Nations Commission with an Advisory Council of ten. Italian Somaliland was to be administered as a trust territory, with Italy as administrator. Its independence is to become effective ten years from the date of the approval of a trusteeship agreement by the General Assembly, which came on December 2, 1950.

Since the General Assembly failed to arrive at a solution for Eritrea, it decided to establish a five-member Commission of Investigation to conduct an on-the-spot study of the situation and to report its findings to the Fifth Session of the Assembly. After two months in Eritrea the Commission completed its report on June 10, 1950. This embraced three different proposals. One was that Eritrea be constituted as a self-governing unit of a federation in which Ethiopia would be the other member; another was that Eritrea be reintegrated with Ethiopia; and the third was that, after ten years under the International Trusteeship System, with the United Nations itself as the administering authority, Eritrea be made an independent state.

The Fifth Session of the Assembly, on December 2, 1950, adopted a resolution which provided that after a period of transition Eritrea was to constitute an autonomous unit federated with Ethiopia under the Ethiopian Crown. It also called for the appointment of a United Nations Commissioner to be assisted by experts appointed by the Secretary-General. Four days before the deadline of September 15, 1952, Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia signed the act which federated Eritrea with the Ethiopian empire. A new Eritrean constitution automatically went into effect at the moment of his signature.

7. Berlin

On September 29, 1948, Great Britain, France, and the United States brought the Soviet blockade of Berlin, begun in June, before the Security Council as a threat to the peace under Chapter VII of the Charter. This was an issue which concerned problems of the peace settlements rather than of the maintenance of peace once it had been established. In other words, it could be regarded as one in which the UN was not supposed to be involved at all. At the same time, however, it clearly might develop into a grave threat to peace, and as such it could be held to come within the province of the United Nations.

Although Soviet representative Vyshinsky vigorously dissented and his Ukrainian colleague concurred, the rest of the members of the Security Council voted to place the question on the agenda. On October 22 the six "neutral" members of the Council prepared a draft resolution calling for the lifting of the blockade, immediate consultations by the four military governors to arrange for the unification of currency in Berlin on the basis of the Soviet mark, and a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers to consider all outstanding problems relating to Germany as a whole. Nine

members of the Council voted in favor of this resolution, but it was defeated by a veto of the Soviet Union.

The President of the Security Council at the time, Juan Bramuglia, Foreign Minister of Argentina, was particularly active in seeking a formula on which Russia and the Western powers could agree. Secretary-General Trygve Lie and Herbert Evatt, President of the General Assembly, also attempted to promote a settlement. On November 13, 1948, they sent a joint communication to the heads of the delegations of the four powers involved in the Berlin dispute, and four days later, after the Big Four had all professed a desire to settle the issue, they renewed their appeal. On November 29 Bramuglia established a Technical Committee on Berlin Currency and Trade, composed of experts named by the six neutral members of the Security Council, plus one designated by Secretary-General Lie. The Committee made a detailed investigation of the problems assigned to it, but its recommendations were rejected.

The Berlin question has been one of the most delicate to come before the United Nations. In the presence of great power disagreement the Security Council could only explore the fringes of the question, although Bramuglia and the other five neutral members of the Council made heroic efforts to facilitate a settlement. The delegates to the Third Session of the General Assembly, realizing their inability to act effectively in the Berlin crisis and conscious of the gravity of the issues involved, unanimously approved, on November 3, 1948, a resolution appealing to the great powers to compose their differences amicably and to redouble their efforts to make final peace settlements. The question was finally settled as a result of direct negotiations among the four powers. These were begun in April, 1949, and on May 4 the Council received word that an agreement on lifting the restrictions had been reached.

8. Korea

The Early Korean Problem. The failure of the United States and the U.S.S.R., to agree on steps to implement the wartime promise of independence for Korea "in due course" led the United States, on September 17, 1947, to submit the Korean question to the General Assembly. That body, over the protests of the Soviet bloc, voted to establish a United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea, with authority to observe elections for a national assembly, which, in turn, would establish a national government for Korea. The Commission was welcomed in the American zone, but was denied all access to North Korea, which was under Soviet control. It observed the elections of May 10, 1948, in South Korea and reported that they were "a valid expression of the free will of the electorate in those parts of Korea which were accessible to the Commission." On August 15 the "National Government of Korea" was proclaimed, with Syngman Rhee as President, and the United States military government was declared to be terminated.

On December 12, 1948, the Assembly adopted a resolution providing for a new commission of seven members to continue to function in Korea. On the same day it recognized the Republic of Korea as the only legal government in the entire country. The United States extended recognition on January 1, 1949, and thirty-one other states followed suit. The Soviet Union withheld recognition and employed the veto to prevent the new republic from becoming a member of the United Nations. Instead, she sponsored the "Democratic People's Republic of Korea" in North Korea, proclaimed in September, 1948. This government also claimed to be the only legal one in Korea.

The General Assembly in the December resolution had recommended that the occupying powers "withdraw their occupation forces from Korea as early as practicable." The United States announced the complete withdrawal of her forces on June 29, 1949. The United Nations Commission on Korea verified this in its report of July 28, 1949, but it had not been allowed access to North Korea and so was in no position to substantiate the Soviet claim of withdrawal as of December, 1948.

At the Fourth Session of the General Assembly the Korean Commission was continued with a more comprehensive mandate to observe and report on developments which might result in armed conflict, as well as to note steps toward representative government and to seek to facilitate the removal of barriers to economic, social, and other friendly intercourse caused by the division of Korea.

Invasion and Early UN Action. On the morning of Sunday, June 24, 1950, armed forces from North Korea began an assault in great force across the 38th parallel upon the Republic of Korea. This action precipitated the greatest international crisis since the end of World War II.

United States Ambassador John J. Muccio, who was in Seoul, reported the attack to the Department of State, where it was received on Saturday, June 24, at 9:26 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time. The United States Government at once contacted the United Nations, and at 3 : 00 A.M. on June 25 it requested an immediate meeting of the Security Council. When the Council met at 2 : 00 P.M. of the same day, it already had before it the report of the United Nations Commission on Korea, which confirmed the attack. The Commission's cable to Secretary-General Lie stated that the situation was "assuming character of full-scale war."

At its meeting on June 25 the Security Council passed by a 9 to 0 vote a United States resolution which noted "with grave concern the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea," stated that the Security Council "determines that this action constitutes a breach of the peace," called for the immediate cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of North Korean forces to the 38th parallel, and requested "all members to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities."⁵

Shortly thereafter the United Nations Commission on Korea sent a more

⁵ UN Doc. S/1501 (1950).

detailed report of the events which had led to the invasion of South Korea. The Commission noted that the North Korean regime was apparently carrying out a well planned, concerted, and full-scale invasion of South Korea and that the South Korean forces had obviously been deployed on a defensive basis and had been taken completely by surprise.⁶

On June 27 the Security Council took a momentous step — it adopted a more specific United States-sponsored resolution *recommending* assistance to the Republic of Korea from all member nations. Fifty-three states pledged their moral support, and a smaller number promised direct assistance. On July 7 the Council set up a Unified Command under the UN flag and requested all members providing assistance to Korea to make such assistance available under the leadership of the United States.

It should be noted that the Security Council could take this action only because of a unique combination of circumstances. First, the Soviet Union had been boycotting the Council since January because it had voted against a U.S.S.R., proposal to exclude the representatives of Nationalist China and seat those of the Chinese Communist regime. Consequently there was no Soviet veto. Second, American occupation forces in Japan and other nearby bases were readily available.

A cable from Moscow to the Secretary-General on June 27 charged that the Security Council's resolution of that date was illegal (1) because it had been adopted by six votes, the seventh vote being that of the "Kuomintang representative," who, the Soviet Union contended, had no right to represent China, and (2) because the provisions of the United Nations Charter required the concurrence of the five permanent members on all substantive decisions. On August 1 the U.S.S.R., sent her representative, Jacob Malik, back to the Security Council to assume his turn as president. From that time on further attempts to deal with the Korean question in the Security Council were effectively blocked.

Beginning in September, 1950, increasing demands were made to ensure that should another "breach of the peace" occur sole reliance need not be placed on the Security Council. The next time the Russians might not be absent. Consequently the Assembly, on November 3, 1950, after considerable debate, adopted the famous Uniting for Peace Resolution, generally credited to American Secretary of State Dean Acheson. The nature of this Resolution, which greatly expanded the political role of the General Assembly, is described in Chapters 10 and 14.

After the Korean Communists had nearly succeeded in occupying the whole of the Korean Peninsula, the UN forces began to fight their way back from the Pusan area to the 38th parallel. The United States pressed for a decision that would authorize crossing of the parallel and entering North Korea. The Assembly approved on October 7 by a vote of 47 to 5, with 7 abstentions. The representative from India expressed strong dissatisfaction with the decision, saying that it might very well lead to an

⁶ *Background Information on Korea: Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs Pursuant to H. Res. 260* (Government Printing Office, 1950), p. 45.

enlargement of the war. In spite of this warning United Nations forces crossed the 38th parallel and soon had pushed northward close to the Yalu River, which divides Korea from Manchuria.

The Chinese Enter the War. On November 5, 1950, with United Nations forces very thinly deployed far up in northern Korea, organized Chinese Communist forces intervened on a large scale. General Douglas MacArthur, head of the Unified Command, reported that "a new war" had begun and that his forces were being attacked by a considerable portion of the Chinese continental armed forces.

On November 10 Cuba, Ecuador, France, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States submitted a joint resolution to the Security Council. This called on all states and authorities to refrain from assisting or encouraging the forces of North Korea, affirmed the United Nations policy of holding the Chinese frontier with Korea inviolate, and urged attention to the grave danger which continued intervention by Chinese forces in Korea would entail. The Chinese troops — called "volunteers" by the People's Republic — had meanwhile launched a huge offensive which threatened for the second time to drive United Nations forces from Korea.

The Security Council had invited the Chinese People's Republic to send a spokesman to attend the meetings of the Council at which the question of Formosa would be discussed. Before the Council, the Chinese Communist representative bitterly attacked the United States, claiming that she had bombed Chinese territory ninety times, and declared that the advance of American forces toward the Manchurian frontier — they actually reached it at one point — had endangered China's security. He further contended that Formosa was not a proper subject of discussion by the United Nations because it was an integral part of China and international agreements (Cairo and Teheran) had recognized it as such.

With United Nations forces retreating before the onslaught of the Chinese Communists and the United States pressing for Peking's condemnation as an aggressor, twelve Arab-Asian nations under India's leadership offered proposals on December 14 with the objective of attaining a cease-fire in Korea and ultimately negotiating other outstanding issues in the Far East. The resolution was adopted and a Group on Cease-Fire was set up. Its first proposals were rejected by the People's Republic on December 21 with the blunt announcement that it considered all resolutions passed by the United Nations without the participation of the People's Republic of China "as illegal and null and void."

The Cease-Fire Group, not entirely dismayed, drafted a set of principles designed to clarify the United Nations position on the stand taken by the Chinese Communists. On January 13, 1951, this draft of principles was sent to Peking. When the People's Republic replied by offering a set of counterproposals, the Indian Government, through its ambassador in Peking, made another effort to clarify points of difference. The reply of the Chinese Communist Government to this new overture again brought mixed reactions.

Two resolutions expressing these divergent opinions were introduced in the General Assembly. A United States resolution declared that the Security Council had "failed to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in regard to Chinese Communist intervention in Korea" and asked that the Chinese People's Republic be condemned as an aggressor. The resolution also made provision for a Committee on Additional Measures which would consist of the same membership as the Collective Measures Committee. This Committee would search for new ways to combat the aggression in Korea. On February 1 the United States resolution passed by a vote of 44 to 7, with 9 abstentions, over the protests of most of the Arab-Asian representatives.

While the debate raged, so did the fighting. Early in 1951, after serious reverses in November and December, the United Nations forces began to advance again ; but April brought another heavy North Korean-Chinese counterattack, and a virtual stalemate developed at the 38th parallel. With the prospects for a negotiated peace appearing very slim, the Committee on Additional Measures noted that a considerable number of states had already imposed an embargo on war materiel to China and suggested that this might be extended to include more states. By September fifty-one members and thirteen nonmember states had complied with a General Assembly resolution of May 17 embodying this suggestion.

Truce Talking. On June 23, 1951, with the UN forces again advancing, Jacob Malik proposed in a radio broadcast that, as a first step toward settling the conflict in Korea, the belligerents should begin discussions for a cease-fire and an armistice providing for the common withdrawal of forces from the 38th parallel. On July 10 delegations from the United Nations Command and from the North Korean-Chinese commanders opened negotiations in Kaesong, one of the few towns below the 38th parallel still in Communist hands. Because of alleged violations of the neutral zone around Kaesong by the United Nations, the North Koreans and the Chinese suspended negotiations on August 23 but agreed to resume them on October 25 at Panmunjom, not far from Kaesong.

The negotiations entered their second year in July, 1952. Ostensibly only one issue stood in the way of a settlement, but this issue was a very large one — the exchange of prisoners. Close to 200,000 were involved. There was, in addition, a principle at stake. The United Nations insisted that no prisoner in its hands should be forced against his wishes to return to Communist areas. The Communist thesis was that since the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War (1929) provided for general repatriation the United Nations stand was contrary to international law. A matter of prestige was also involved as far as the Chinese and North Koreans were concerned, and they repeatedly stated that only torture and starvation could have forced any of their men to prefer to stay with the Western "imperialists." The Communists' strongest bargaining point was their holding of some 12,000 United Nations prisoners.

Marked by another momentarily promising peace effort by the Arab-Asian group in late 1952 and by another suspension in late 1952 and early 1953, the truce negotiations limped on until the Soviet "peace offensive" in the spring of 1953 introduced a more hopeful note. An armistice agreement was finally reached on July 27, 1953. It provided for a political conference within three months to formulate terms of a final peace settlement and for the voluntary repatriation of the prisoners of war under the supervision of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. In a hostile atmosphere and in the face of many complications the Commission attempted to carry out its task. On January 21, 1954, the Indian guards at Panmunjom released the prisoners on both sides who had refused repatriation.

Korea is no longer a battleground, but the scars of more than three years of fighting remain. Moreover, the Korean question is still unresolved. The Geneva Conference of 1954 wrestled with it without making any appreciable progress. A UN Korean Reconstruction Agency is giving assistance in rehabilitation efforts, but a Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission which attempted to supervise the truce was withdrawn in 1956. The Commission was forbidden access to North Korea, and was even regarded with suspicion in the territory of the Republic of Korea. There seems to be little immediate prospect that the long-delayed conference will be held or that the people of Korea will soon be given a chance to work out their own destiny in a united country.

Other Disputes

Many other political issues have come before the Security Council or the General Assembly, or both. Among these have been such vital issues as the following : a complaint by Syria and Lebanon in 1946 about the slowness of Britain and France in withdrawing troops from their territories ; measures against the Franco regime in Spain ; charges by India that the Union of South Africa was discriminating against the sizable Indian population in that country ; a request by Egypt for the assistance of the Security Council in forcing Britain to evacuate her troops from the Suez Canal area and to terminate the joint Anglo-Egyptian rule in the Sudan ; a complaint of the Nizam of Hyderabad against India ; the events leading to the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia in February, 1948 ; complaints of violations of human rights in Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, and the U.S.S.R. ; a charge by Nationalist China that the Soviet Union was aiding the Chinese Communists ; an allegation by Communist China that the United States had committed "armed aggression" against her ; British claims against Iran during the dispute over oil nationalization ; and complaints by Arab-Asian countries against French policies in North Africa.

The supreme test of the capabilities of the UN to settle disputes and keep the peace came in late 1956 when Israeli forces invaded Egypt, Britain and France intervened to secure the Suez Canal, and the Soviet Union took ruthless measures to suppress an uprising in Hungary.

SECURITY ISSUES

The United Nations Charter, Chapter VII, defines the broad area of "security problems." Three provisions, contained in two articles, relate particularly to military security. Article 47 provides for the setting up of a Military Staff Committee, to be composed of the chiefs of staff of the five permanent members of the Security Council (the Big Five) or their representatives, "to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament"; and Article 26 places upon the Security Council final responsibility for formulating plans "for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments." We shall discuss the attempts to implement these provisions and to deal with the problems raised by the development of weapons of mass destruction under three heads: armed forces for the United Nations; the regulation and reduction of armaments; and the control of atomic energy.

1. Armed Forces for the United Nations

The Military Staff Committee was established by the Security Council on January 25, 1946, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter. It was then specifically directed to undertake an examination of the military aspects and implications of Article 43, paragraph 1 of which reads as follows: "All members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security." This was certainly a large order. While Article 43 did not call for a real international police force, it did provide that strong national contingents should be made available to the Security Council.

Most of the twenty-five meetings held in 1946 were devoted to consideration of the basic principles which should govern the organization of the national contingents and to work on a standard form of agreement to be used in negotiations between the Security Council and member states of the UN for the provision of "armed forces, assistance, and facilities." On April 30, 1947, the Committee submitted a lengthy report to the Security Council. It revealed that little progress had been made by the military experts of the Big Five and that serious differences of opinion had arisen between the representative of the Soviet Union and the other members of the Committee. The Soviet member insisted that under Article 43 each of the Big Five should make available to the Council armed forces of exactly the same strength and type. While the Western

powers also favored a balanced force, with a comparable over-all contribution by each of the Big Five, they favored different contributions in land, sea, and air components. Later various estimates showed the major powers to be far apart in their views of the strength and approximate composition of the armed forces which in their opinion should be made available by their nations to the Security Council.

The Uniting for Peace Resolution of November, 1950, recognized that the UN could not implement Article 43. According to this, the General Assembly's Collective Measures Committee, rather than the Security Council's Military Staff Committee, would prepare for the application of sanctions. The military units to be at its disposal, however, would not be true United Nations forces but "national armed forces elements" made available by previous agreement — in effect, a return to the League of Nations system of voluntary contributions. The Resolution, of course, contemplated first of all the political inability of the Council to act, not an inadequacy of its military resources ; and it certainly did not shelve the Council as the UN's primary security agency.

2. The Regulation and Reduction of Armaments

On October 29, 1946, the Soviet Foreign Minister, V. M. Molotov, introduced into the General Assembly a resolution calling for a general reduction of armaments by the nations of the world and for a prohibition of the production and use of atomic energy for military purposes. A draft presented by the United States became the basis for a resolution which the General Assembly passed, by unanimous vote, on December 14, 1946. Besides urging the Atomic Energy Commission to expedite its work, the resolution requested the Security Council to accelerate as much as possible the implementation of Article 43 of the Charter and to formulate practical measures for the regulation and reduction of armaments. Three months later the Council established the Commission on Conventional Armaments, composed of representatives of the members of the Security Council. The Commission was instructed to present to the Council proposals for the regulation and reduction of "conventional" armaments. It was specifically enjoined from considering plans for the control of atomic bombs or other weapons of mass destruction, which came within the province of the Atomic Energy Commission.

The discussion within the Commission and later in the Security Council revealed a fundamental difference of approach. The position of the U.S.S.R., supported by Poland, was that immediate reduction of armaments was a "first and indispensable step" in restoring world confidence and that proposals for the prohibition of atomic weapons should also be considered by the Commission. The position of the United States, endorsed by all other members of the Commission and the Council except the U.S.S.R. and Poland, was stated by Secretary of State Marshall on September 17, 1947 :

I say frankly to the General Assembly that it is the conviction of my Government that a workable system for the regulation of armaments cannot be put into operation until conditions of international confidence prevail. We have consistently and repeatedly made it clear that the regulation of armaments presupposes enough international understanding to make possible the settlement of peace terms with Germany and Japan, the implementation of agreements putting military forces and facilities at the disposal of the Security Council, and an international arrangement for the control of atomic energy.

After attempting for months to agree on a formulation of basic principles, the Commission on Conventional Armaments, on August 12, 1948, adopted a resolution embodying the views of the United States, and five days later it approved a draft progress report to the Security Council. The Soviet Union opposed the resolution and prevented the draft report from becoming official and the Soviet delegate introduced a resolution calling for the total prohibition of atomic weapons and for the reduction of armaments by the permanent members of the Security Council by one-third within one year. The debate on this proposal led to the passage, on November 19, 1948, of a different kind of resolution, approved by forty-three members of the General Assembly, with only the Soviet bloc in active opposition. This resolution affirmed the view that "the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces can only be attained in an atmosphere of real and lasting improvement in international relations"; but at the same time it urged the Security Council to continue its study of the problem through the Commission for Conventional Armaments, and suggested that the Commission "devote its first attention to formulating proposals for the receipt, checking and publication, by an international organ of control within the framework of the Security Council, of full information to be supplied by Member States with regard to their effectives and their conventional armaments." When, in early 1949, the Commission submitted plans for carrying out the Assembly's suggestion, the Soviet Union prevented their adoption by the Security Council.

On June 6, 1950, Secretary-General Trygve Lie asserted that efforts toward the control of armaments had been "virtually a complete failure," but he called upon the UN members for further efforts. Later in the same year, President Truman suggested that the Commission on Conventional Armaments and the Atomic Energy Commission be merged. This was done, and further developments thereupon became a part of the story of atomic energy control.

3. The Control of Atomic Energy

We are here to make a choice between the quick and the dead. That is our business.

Behind the black portent of the new atomic age lies a hope which, seized upon with faith, can work our salvation. If we fail, then we have

damned every man to be the slave of Fear. Let us not deceive ourselves : We must elect World Peace or World Destruction. ⁷

With these vigorous words Bernard M. Baruch, United States representative on the Atomic Energy Commission of the United Nations, opened his address at the first session of the Commission, on June 14, 1946. A year before, when the final touches were being put on the United Nations Charter, the statesmen at San Francisco had been unaware that a new era was soon to be born. Less than two months later, however, the terrifying secret was disclosed when atomic bombs were dropped on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima (August 6) and Nagasaki (August 9), with devastating effect.

Setting up the AEC. Realizing that atomic control could not be accomplished on the national level, the President of the United States and the prime ministers of Great Britain and Canada, representing the governments which had collaborated during the war in the development of the atomic bomb, met in November, 1945, and issued an Agreed Declaration urging that international action for the control of atomic energy be taken under the auspices of the United Nations. The Soviet Union endorsed the Declaration. In January, 1946, the General Assembly established the Atomic Energy Commission, composed of one representative of each of the states on the Security Council and one from Canada. The Council was to issue directives to the AEC, approve its reports, recommendations, and rules of procedure, and transmit such of these as it chose to other UN agencies. In the same resolution the Council instructed the Commission to proceed "with the utmost dispatch" to its work and to make specific proposals :

- (a) for extending between all nations the exchange of basic scientific information for peaceful ends ;
- (b) for control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes ;
- (c) for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and all other major weapons adaptable to man's destruction ;
- (d) for effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying States against the hazards of violations and evasions.

⁷ The official records of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, the Disarmament Commission the Security Council, and the General Assembly contain detailed accounts of the consideration of questions relating to the international control of atomic energy by the United Nations. Brief but still detailed summaries are contained in the following publications of the U. S. Department of State: *The International Control of Atomic Energy: Growth of a Policy*, Dept. of State Pub. 2702 (1946) ; *The International Control of Atomic Energy: Policy at the Crossroads*, Dept. of State Pub. 3161 (1948) ; *The First Report of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission to the Security Council*, Dec. 31, 1946, Dept. of State Pub. 2737 (1947) ; *The Second Report of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission to the Security Council*, Sept. 11, 1947, Dept. of State Pub. 2932 (1947) ; and *The Third Report of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission to the Security Council*, May 17, 1948, Dept. of State Pub. 3179 (1948).

Proposals of the United States and the U.S.S.R. When the AEC met in New York on June 14, after some months' delay, two basic plans were presented to it— the United States plan, presented by Bernard Baruch, and the Soviet proposals, presented by Andrei Gromyko. The United States plan was based largely on the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, which had been drafted in the spring of 1946 ; it proposed the creation of an International Atomic Development Authority empowered to control "all phases of the development and use of atomic energy, starting with raw materials." The plan further provided that after some effective system of international control had been put into effect, by specifically defined stages, the production of atomic bombs should cease and all existing stockpiles should be destroyed or otherwise disposed of according to the terms of the agreement. The UN would exclusively control and operate all means for the production of atomic energy. The veto was to be inapplicable when the Security Council considered action against states engaged in illegal production. The United States then made a formal offer of potentially tremendous significance : to surrender her secrets regarding the manufacture of atomic bombs and to destroy the bombs in her possession. She would do this, however, only after the UN had acquired control of all atomic facilities.

The Soviet proposals were fundamentally different in character and implications. The U.S.S.R. wanted a convention for the immediate outlawing of the production and use of atomic bombs, and the destruction of all existing stockpiles within a brief period. She would accept day-to-day inspection within prescribed limits. As these suggestions were elaborated it became clear that they meant that the Security Council would have to handle cases in this field in the same way as any other threats to peace—in other words, that the veto would apply to enforcement against violators ; that inspection would be largely—but not altogether— restricted to scheduled visits to stipulated plans ; and that member states could own and operate atomic facilities subject to the regulations of a control commission. Atomic weapons would be outlawed at the instant controls legally entered into force, regardless of when they went into actual operation.

These early exchanges crystallized the issues that have persisted throughout the UN's efforts to set up effective controls in the use of atomic weapons. These issues are (1) the general operation of the control system ; (2) the timing of inspection and controls as against the destruction of stockpiles ; (3) inspection procedures ; and (4) the use of the veto in enforcement actions.

First Report of the AEC. Early in its deliberations the AEC established a Working Committee, a Committee on Controls, a Legal Advisory Committee, and a Scientific and Technical Committee. On October 2, 1946, the Scientific and Technical Committee reported that there was no reason to doubt that the effective control of atomic energy was technically feasible. On December 26 the Committee on Controls, after careful

investigation, submitted the conclusion that an international agency was necessary. A few days later the AEC, with the Soviet and Polish members abstaining, approved the so-called First Report, based on a series of proposals submitted three weeks earlier by Mr. Baruch. With minor changes and additions, the Report embraced the American proposals of June for an International Development Authority.

The Security Council debated the First Report in its session of February 3, March 10, 1947, and, except for the Soviet and Polish members, informally approved it. During the discussion Gromyko brought before the Security Council some "Amendments and Additions to the First Report of the Atomic Energy Commission." The Council discussed this document in only a general way. Gromyko then transmitted these "new proposals" to the AEC on June 11, 1947, to supplement the proposals of June 19, 1946, the original statement of the Soviet position. They amounted to a reiteration of the earlier proposals.

The Second Report of the AEC. The Second Report of the Atomic Energy Commission was submitted to the Security Council on September 11, 1947. Its major conclusion was stated in the following terms :

The majority of the Commission concludes that the specific proposals of this Report which define the functions and powers of an international agency, taken together with the General Findings and Recommendations of the First Report, provide the essential basis for the establishment of an effective system of control to ensure the use of atomic energy only for peaceful purposes and to protect complying states against the hazards of violations and evasions.⁸

After the presentation of its Second Report, the AEC virtually suspended work for the remainder of 1947, although in December the Working Committee decided to enter into a detailed reconsideration of the Soviet proposals of June 11, 1947. This was done in a series of seven meetings, held between January 16 and March 6, 1948. The same arguments were repeated, with no significant variations, by both sides. On April 5 the Working Committee, by a vote of nine to two, adopted a report and a resolution which declared that the Soviet proposals "ignore the existing technical knowledge of the problem of atomic energy control, do not provide an adequate basis for the effective international control of energy . . . and therefore, do not conform to the terms of reference of the Atomic Energy Commission."

The Third Report of the AEC. The Atomic Energy Commission had virtually reached a dead end. On May 17, 1948, with the usual two dissenting votes, it approved a Third Report to the Security Council and recommended that its three reports be transmitted to the next session of the General Assembly and that the Commission suspend its labors until

⁸ *The Second Report of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission to the Security Council*, Sept. 11, 1947, Dept. of State Pub. 2932 (1947), p. 2.

a basis for agreement was deemed to exist. The Third Report contained statements of far-reaching implications :

Unless effective international control is established, there can be no lasting security against atomic weapons for any nation, whatever its size, location or power.

The majority of the Commission is fully aware of the impact of its plan on traditional prerogatives of national sovereignty. But in the face of the realities of the problem it sees no alternative to the voluntary sharing by nations of their sovereignty in this field to the extent required by its proposals.⁹

The Third Session of the General Assembly, in the latter part of 1948, called upon the Atomic Energy Commission to resume its work. It also endorsed the majority plan of the AEC as a feasible and effective system for the international control of atomic energy, and in effect made it "the United Nations plan," but one without the remotest chance of implementation.

Merger of the Commissions. The next significant step came when President Truman, addressing the United Nations in the fall of 1950, intimated that the United States might be willing to support a merger of the armaments and atomic commissions. The General Assembly, on December 13, 1950, thereupon established a Committee of Twelve to consider the advisability of such a course and to report to the Sixth Session about a year later. On November 8, 1951, just before the report of the Committee of Twelve, Britain, France, and the United States submitted proposals for the reduction of all armaments, including atomic weapons. The proposals embraced the earlier American ideas of national arms inventories, international verification of inventories, accompanied by regulation and "balanced reduction," with everything to move along together on a stage-to-stage basis. It was this set of proposals that gave Mr. Vyshinsky his historic sleepless night : according to his account, he laughed all night. By November 16 he had recovered to a point where he was able to reply to the tripartite proposals.¹⁰

In spite of the opposition of the Soviet bloc, the General Assembly, on January 11, 1952, voted to merge the Commissions on Conventional Armaments and Atomic Energy into a single commission, to be composed, like its predecessors, of the eleven members of the Security Council, plus Canada.

Work of the New Commission. In April the United States submitted a working paper on the "Essential Principles for a Disarmament Program."¹¹

⁹ Quoted in *The International Control of Atomic Energy : Policy at the Crossroads*, Dept. of State Pub. 3161, General Foreign Policy Series 3 (June 1948), pp. 171-172.

¹⁰ A. Y. Vyshinsky, "Speeches Delivered at the Plenary Meetings of the Sixth Session of the United Nations General Assembly," *Information Bulletin* of the Embassy of the U.S.S.R., Dec., 1951, pp. 35-36.

¹¹ The working paper is summarized in *Report to the President by the Deputy United States Representative on the United Nations Disarmament Commission*, Dept. of State press release, Jan. 14, 1953, No. 24.

These were summarized under five points : inventory and verification; the calculation of limits and reductions for all armed forces and all armaments; the determination of national armament programs through negotiations among states; the fixing of methods for implementing disarmament; and agreement upon a disarmament timetable. The Soviet representative, Jacob Malik, presented an alternative program. This differed from earlier Soviet proposals largely in that it gave considerable attention to bacteriological warfare, which the U.S.S.R. charged the United States with waging in Korea.

On June 28, 1952, the United States proposed in the Disarmament Commission that China, the Soviet Union, and the United States accept troop quotas of 1,500,000 men, France a quota of 800,000 and Britain one of 700,000 and that all other states have smaller forces. Sir Gladwyn Jebb, the British representative on the Security Council, reckoned that these quotas would mean a greater reduction for the United States than for the U.S.S.R. ; he performed this telling bit of mathematics by taking Malik's word on the size of the Soviet army. As the London *Economist* remarked, "here the Russians have been neatly hoisted with their own petard, since their real armed strength is believed to be over 4,000,000 men."¹² Malik's figure had been 2,500,000.

As was to be expected, the Soviet Union rejected the new disarmament suggestions. Her two major criticisms were that they did not specify in what proportion military strength was to be divided among armies, navies, and air forces and that the proposals did not deal concretely with limitations on weapons, atomic as well as conventional.

The General Assembly, on November 28, 1953, provided for a Subcommittee of Five of the Disarmament Commission to "seek in private an acceptable solution." From May 13 to June 22, 1954, the Subcommittee held nineteen secret meetings in London.¹³ It considered various new proposals, but it was unable to find anything approaching "an acceptable solution." During the latter half of 1954 the Subcommittee did not meet, but in the spring of 1955, at the behest of the General Assembly, it held many sessions between February and May. On May 10, 1955, the Soviet delegate, Jacob Malik, presented what was in many respects the most comprehensive and most significant of the scores of proposals which the Soviet Union has advanced in relation to the atomic weapons.¹⁴ Meanwhile, the whole atom business had taken a somewhat different slant.

¹² June 7, 1952, p. 645.

¹³ The records of seventeen of these meetings were made public later in 1954. For a summary of the proceedings in the Subcommittee, see *The Record on Disarmament : Report of U. S. Deputy Representative to Disarmament Commission on London Meeting of Subcommittee of Five and on Disarmament Commission Meetings—July 1954*, Dept. of State Pub. 5581, International Organization and Conference Series III (Sept., 1954), p. 102.

¹⁴ The text of the Soviet proposal of May 10, 1955, is given in the *New York Times*, May 12, 1955. For texts of documents submitted by the United States to the Subcommittee of Five between Feb. 25 and May 9, see *New York Times*, May, 14 1955,

The Geneva Meetings of 1955. Several events in 1953 had seemingly created a more hopeful atmosphere for the efforts to reach agreement on disarmament, and at least one event—the Russian explosion of a hydrogen bomb—gave these efforts an even greater urgency. In this first foreign policy speech, on April 16, 1953, President Eisenhower proposed the limitation of armaments and the international control of atomic energy with “adequate safeguards, including a practical system of inspection under the United Nations.” On December 8, in a dramatic address before the General Assembly of the United Nations, he further proposed that “the governments principally involved . . . begin now and continue to make joint contributions of normal uranium and fissionable materials to an atomic energy agency.” Obviously this proposal was related only indirectly to the use of atomic energy for military purposes, but it did capture the imagination of people throughout the world and call attention to the great potentialities of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. At first the leaders of the Soviet Union shunned the President’s “atoms-for-peace” plan, but later they agreed to give it serious attention. One of the consequences of the detailed consideration of the proposal by the United Nations was the convoking of an international conference on the peaceful uses of atomic energy. At Geneva in the summer of 1955, for the first time, representatives of the Soviet Union as well as of the Western atomic powers revealed many of the secrets of their progress in the development of this fabulous new source of energy.

Questions relating to disarmament were also discussed at the “summit” meeting in July, 1955—held at Geneva just before the UN conference—and all four principals advanced different plans. Premier Faure stressed what he called “positive disarmament” and proposed that money saved from military budgets be used for underdeveloped areas. Sir Anthony Eden suggested that atomic inspection—the main stumbling block to agreement on disarmament measures—begin in a demilitarized zone which he proposed to create between Eastern and Western Europe, and that inspection then be gradually extended to the rest of the world. Marshal Bulganin presented a plan modeled on the Soviet proposal of May 10, with emphasis on a step-by-step reduction of nuclear weapons and a limitation on troops for each country, and also with a reference to the necessity for “effective international control.” President Eisenhower contributed the most imaginative idea when he proposed that the Soviet Union and the United States immediately “give to each other a complete blueprint of our military establishments from beginning to end” and “provide within our countries facilities for aerial photography.” His was an unprecedented and bold proposal which was enthusiastically received throughout the non-Communist world, but there seemed to be little possibility that it could ever be implemented.


At the close of the “summit” conference the Big Four jointly suggested that the Subcommittee of the UN Disarmament Commission meet again on August 29, and they instructed their foreign ministers, at their meeting

in October, "to take note of the proceedings in the Disarmament Commission, to take account of the views and proposals advanced by the heads of government at this conference and to consider whether the four Governments can take any further useful initiative in the field of disarmament." Neither the UN Disarmament Commission and its Subcommittee of Five nor the Big Four foreign ministers, however, were able to translate the hopes of the Heads of Government into comforting reality; but after six weeks of rather fruitless discussions by the UN Subcommittee on Disarmament in London in the spring of 1956 both sides seemed determined to keep the ten-year old negotiations alive.

AN APPRAISAL

While one must admit that the United Nations has failed to "settle," definitively, a single dispute brought before it, this is not to say that it has not relieved tensions in many crucial situations. That it has failed to achieve any of the three major objectives of the security provisions admits of less qualification.

Two points should be mentioned in defense of the UN's record of limited success in the settlement of political disputes. (1) Few international disputes are really "settled"—they may be compromised, postponed, or otherwise prevented from leading to serious international crises, and with the passage of time may lose much of their explosive character. (2) The



Vicky in *The London Daily News Chronicle*

"Big Job for a Child Prodigy"

United Nations encourages the parties to a dispute to "seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice" (Article 33 of the Charter). In other words, the role of the UN is an intermediary one, and only when all other procedures for peaceful settlement have been exhausted is the Security Council requested to invoke the more stringent provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter. Moreover, it is well to note again that the Council cannot act unless all the great powers are ready and willing to support its action.

Although the UN does not have many striking successes to its credit in the handling of political disputes, its services as a mediator have been valuable in several instances. The work of the UN Committee of Good Offices in Indonesia, the services of various UN commissions dealing with Greek frontier incidents, India and Pakistan, and Palestine, and the indefatigable labors of Count Bernadotte and Dr. Ralph Bunche in the delicate negotiations between Jewish and Arab spokesmen — all these deserve high commendation, much more than has yet been accorded. Although the efforts of other commissions and committees, such as the UN Temporary Commission on Korea and the Technical Committee on Berlin Currency and Trade, were less fruitful, they were nonetheless conscientious and zealous, and their limited results were due to "circumstances beyond their control."

In dealing with security problems, however, the UN ran into obstructions just as real and even more serious. The main security agencies of the Security Council — the Military Staff Committee, the Commission for Conventional Armaments, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Disarmament Commission — prepared elaborate plans which the majority approved, but all of these plans encountered the great power deadlock that has frustrated every effort to implement the security provisions of the Charter and hampered international cooperation everywhere in the postwar period. If the failure to provide armed forces for the United Nations and to regulate and reduce armaments is particularly serious — as it certainly is — what shall be said of the complete impasse in the efforts to set up an effective system for the international control of atomic energy? Atomic control may well be the central problem in the international relations of our time. Even if the choice is not so inexorably between "one world or none," as many scientists tell us, or between "the quick and the dead," to use Bernard Baruch's phrase, the problem is still a crucial one. Until some answer is found to the question of the control of the power of the atom — an answer which, we can be sure, must be sought on the international plane — insecurity and ever-present danger will be the lot of the people of the world. The question seemed to have a new urgency when the Eleventh General Assembly convened on November 12, 1956.

It would be unfair to blame the United Nations for this most tragic of failures on the international scene. The roots of this failure lie deeply

embedded in nationalism, sovereignty, and nation-state psychology, and also in the perversities of the human race. The United Nations has made a thorough study of the technical and political requirements for the effective control of atomic energy ; beyond that it cannot go unless the peoples of the world, or at least those of the great powers, are willing to support its efforts on their behalf.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

See the list at the end of Chapter 14.

The United Nations : Economic,.....14

Social, and Organizational Issues

Overshadowing the political and security activities of the United Nations, in scope, achievement, and perhaps in ultimate significance, are its operations in economic and social fields. As stated in Article 1 of the Charter, the third major purpose of the UN is the achievement of "international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms." The UN is thus concerned not only with the maintenance of peace but also with promoting the conditions under which genuine peace will be possible. "In the long run, United Nations leadership in the struggle for world welfare holds the chief promise of creating the underlying conditions of social stability and human satisfaction essential to a lasting peace."¹

The Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, the Council's commissions and specialized agencies, the Trusteeship Council, and the Secretariat are primarily concerned with work in these fields.² We shall here present a survey of that work under the following main headings : (1) economic questions ; (2) social and cultural questions ; (3) human right and fundametal freedoms ; and (4) problems of dependent peoples. Then, having completed our examination of the functioning of the UN, we shall note some of the criticisms that have been made of the UN structure and operation, and review actions taken and proposals made to strengthen the organization.

¹ Philip E. Jacob, "The United Nations and the Struggle for World Welfare," *Pennsylvania School Journal*, Oct., 1950, p. 60.

² See *Catalogue of Economic and Social Projects of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies*, 1953, UN Pub. 1953. II. D. 2. This Catalogue lists, describes, and indexes the work of the secretariats of the United Nations and the specialized agencies in the economic and social fields. See also note on United Nations Publications in appendix of this book.

ECONOMIC ISSUES

The Charter of the United Nations specifically states that the UN shall promote "higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development."

General Factual Studies. The paucity of reliable statistics and other vital information on conditions in most of the countries of the world has been one of the greatest handicaps to intelligent planning and action. The UN is now helping to supply this information. Especially noteworthy are its general economic surveys. In January, 1948, it issued a report entitled *Salient Features of the World Economic Situation, 1945-47*, the first comprehensive world economic report to be published since before the war. Since 1949 the UN has put out an annual report on world economic conditions and, in addition, annual economic surveys of Europe, Asia and the Far East, and Latin America. Many agencies of the UN have also issued important studies. *A Survey of the Economic Situation and Prospects of Europe*, prepared by the Economic Commission for Europe in 1948, is probably the most thorough economic report published by any organ of the United Nations thus far. In May, 1949, the Secretary-General issued a report giving a detailed and specific statement of what each agency in the UN was prepared to do in extending technical assistance to underdeveloped countries. The Secretariat and the specialized agencies have since published a number of studies in the field of technical assistance and economic development, and others are in preparation.


Technical Assistance and Economic Development. In 1948 the General Assembly requested the Economic and Social Council and the specialized agencies to give particular attention to the problems of technical assistance and economic development in underdeveloped countries, and expressed the hope that the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development would make loans for such purposes. The Assembly made available to the Secretary-General the sum of \$ 288,000 for 1949 ; this was intended to finance pioneering work in preparation for the operational program. The grants have risen substantially in more recent years.

1. *TAB, TAC, and TAA.* In a sense, the Economic and Social Council was forced into the assumption of leadership in this area by the fact that the specialized agencies of the UN had already undertaken so many independent activities that overlapping, serious gaps, and cross-purposes were beginning to appear. While these agencies were especially well qualified to do their particular jobs, some coordination had to be effected. Further impetus to the establishment of coordinating machinery came from President Truman's announcement of the Point Four Program in January, 1949. Consequently, the UN in 1949 created two new bodies : the Technical Assistance Board (TAB), consisting of the executive heads of the UN and of the specialized agencies ; and the Technical Assistance Committee (TAC), composed of delegates from states with representa-

THE UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS



Two-thirds of world population live in the underdeveloped areas



Headline Series, Foreign Policy Association

tion on ECOSOC. The General Assembly established a Technical Assistance Administration (TAA) as a separate branch of the Secretariat.

2. *Financing the Programs.* Under the present program the UN has two sources of funds for technical assistance : a relatively small item in its regular budget, and a much larger allocation in the form of a special grant -- the so-called expanded program of technical assistance. The first such grant amounted to some \$20,000,000, of which the American contribution was \$12,000,000.

For 1954 seventy-six governments and the Vatican pledged more than \$24,000,000 to expand the technical assistance program. The problem of financing the economic development of underdeveloped countries, and not simply of giving them technical assistance, is a difficult one under any conditions, as the United States is discovering, and is particularly difficult for the UN to handle satisfactorily. The UN does not command sizable amounts of capital. The only organization in the UN system which is in a position to make substantial loans is the International Bank, and this agency is not accustomed to making loans without ironclad guarantees. Most of its loans, however, have been for purposes related to economic

development. The Ninth Session of the General Assembly in 1954 approved the establishment of an International Finance Corporation to draw private capital into the development program, and on July 25, 1956, the International Bank announced the formation of the Corporation. A Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development has also won considerable support.

3. *Studies on Financing and Related Problems.* While the UN is not prepared to assist substantially in the financing of economic development, it has been helpful in making studies bearing on the matter. In 1949 the Secretary-General issued a report, prepared by the Secretariat with the assistance of experts from all parts of the world, entitled *Methods of Increasing Domestic Savings*. Other related studies have dealt with international capital movements, relative prices of exports and imports in underdeveloped countries, conditions governing private investment in certain countries, the domestic financing of economic development, the formulation and execution of development projects, and the effects of price fluctuations and of the rise in raw-material prices upon underdeveloped countries. Of particular importance was a report made in 1951 by a group of experts appointed by the Secretary-General, entitled *Measures for the Economic Development of Under-developed Countries*.³ The report analyzed at considerable length the capital requirements for increasing national income per capita by two per cent annually. It also recommended an International Development Authority in the UN, with power to make grants to underdeveloped countries.

4. *Technical Assistance Programs.* "The methods of technical assistance vary from simple, short-range ones, like the introduction of new seed strains, to infinitely complex ones, like the support of an operating mission authorized to reorganize the civil service system of a requesting government."⁴ At times single experts may be sent to conduct a study in a particular country, but more frequently teams of two or more are sent. These "expert missions" are of three kinds: the survey mission, the advisory mission, and the operating mission. The survey mission is often an indispensable preliminary to any real work, but as it is expensive it is not likely to be sent unless the requesting government is clearly prepared to take further action. The advisory mission, like the survey mission, has proved to be readily acceptable to host governments. The operating mission sometimes encounters local resistance, for it may have to attempt basic social and economic reforms. Haiti was the first member of the UN to request and receive a technical assistance mission. In 1948 a twelve-man mission of experts in tropical agriculture, fisheries, industrial development, finance, education, and public health, drawn from the UN Secretariat and specialized agencies, conducted a two-month study. The report of this mission, published in 1949, provides materials for a profitable

³ UN Pub. 1951. II. B. 2.

⁴ Marian Neal, "United Nations Technical Assistance Programs in Haiti," *International Conciliation*, No. 468 (Feb. 1951), p. 62.

study of the problems of technical assistance.⁵ The two most publicized projects inaugurated to date are the Marbial fundamental education experiment and a two-year campaign against yaws and syphilis.

Technical assistance to Bolivia has since expanded into a comprehensive operational program, usually called "the Bolivian Operation." Based upon the report of the Keenleyside survey mission of 1950, a formal agreement was drafted and adopted in 1951. A large corps of UN experts, headed by Hugh L. Keenleyside of Canada and Dr. Martinez-Cabañas of Mexico, undertook a five-year program of economic, social, fiscal, and administrative reforms.

There are many phases of the technical assistance program. These include regional projects in the Southeast Asian, Latin American, Middle Eastern, and African areas, an extensive fellowship program, an International Centre for Training in Public Administration, a training center in El Salvador, a Technical Assistance Conference in Geneva, and public-administration training centers in Brazil, Turkey, Egypt, and elsewhere.


In 1950 the Secretary-General reported to the General Assembly that the UN had provided technical assistance to ten states. In 1954, according to the Secretary-General's tenth annual report, "almost 1,600 experts in many fields were recruited from over sixty different countries, and 1,500 fellowships were awarded for specialized training and study in ninety-four countries and territories. Seventy-four governments contributed to the program and ninety-seven countries and territories received technical assistance in some form."

World Food Problems. "The rapidly increasing population of the world, together with the decreasing productivity of the soil," wrote Lord Boyd-Orr in 1949, "makes world famine as great a threat to our civilization as the atomic bomb."⁶ Two-thirds of the people of the world do not get enough to eat. It is estimated that food production must be increased by 110 per cent in the next twenty-five years if mass starvation is to be avoided. Such facts as these are of particular concern to the UN, especially to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). During the postwar world food crisis the FAO played a significant role. Especially through the World Food Council and the International Emergency Food Committee it focused attention on the gravity of the crisis and on the need for coordinated action by national governments and international agencies. It supplied essential statistical and technical information, sent missions of experts to several countries, sponsored a series of conferences, and helped member states of the UN in a variety of other ways. It assumed responsibility for the World Agricultural Census of 1950, and was instrumental in drafting the International Wheat Agreement, to which most of the major wheat-producing countries have adhered.

FAO plays a major role in the UN's technical assistance work ; already it has given technical aid on a wide variety of problems, such as animal

⁵ Neal, pp. 81-118.

⁶ "Science, Politics, and Hunger," *The Nation*, CLXIX (July 16, 1949), 61.



Based on data in UN, National and Per Capita Incomes, Seventy Countries, 1949, New York, 1950, table 1, pp. 14-16

Per-Capita Incomes, Selected Countries, 1949
(1949 U.S. dollars)

and plant disease control, storage of grains, conservation and prevention of soil erosion, and fishery production and conservation. The regional commissions of the UN have set up joint working groups with FAO to eliminate bottlenecks in the production and distribution of food, fertilizers, and agricultural machinery. FAO has fostered such agencies as the International Rice Commission, the Indo-Pacific Fisheries Council at Bangkok, the General Fisheries Council for the Mediterranean, and Forestry Commissions for both Latin America and Europe. The International Labor Organization deals with problems of agricultural production in connection with its manpower and technical training programs. The World Health Organization cooperates with FAO on many projects, for instance in anti-malarial campaigns and joint nutrition programs. Both FAO and WHO work with the International Children's Emergency Fund on nutritional aspects of child-feeding programs. FAO has a joint project with UNESCO to promote worldwide education on problems of "Food and People."

Transport and Communications. The Transport and Communications Commission of the UN gives particular attention to such problems as the coordination of sea and air safety activities, inland transport in Asia and Latin America, the simplification of passport and frontier formalities, and the improvement of road and motor-traffic regulations. The Inland Transport Committee has been markedly successful in securing the designation of international highways and the removal of restrictions on through truck and bus transportation.

In February-March, 1948, a conference convened by ECOSOC framed a convention for an International Maritime Consultative Organization, to be associated with the UN as a specialized agency. This convention has not yet received enough ratifications to bring IMCO formally into being ; but a Preparatory Committee, assisted by the Transport and Communications Division of the UN Secretariat, is carrying on in the interim. IMCO (now through the Preparatory Committee) has important functions in the field of maritime safety ; it was given responsibility for administering a new convention on safety of life at sea, drawn up in 1948, and for all matters affecting international shipping.

The International Civil Aviation Organization is doing good work in increasing the safety of international air travel. It has sponsored a series of safety and operational regulations, and has been instrumental in establishing Loran (long-range aid to navigation) stations and in stationing weather-observation-rescue ships in the North Atlantic. In the winter of 1948-1949 one of these ships rescued all the passengers and crew of the transoceanic plane *Bermuda Queen*, which had been forced down. The incident was highly publicized and the UN was given due credit.

The International Telecommunication Union has devoted a great deal of time and effort to solving the difficult technical problems that are involved in the allocation of radio wave-length frequencies ; the announced requirements of the nations of the world are three times the available supply. ITU has also tried to secure agreement to revised reg-

ulations for the transmission of international telegraph and telephone communications.

Another highly important but unspectacular service is the supervision and regulation of international mail. The Universal Postal Union is making every effort to assure uninterrupted postal communications, without which international business, and perhaps even international relations in any meaningful sense, would be impossible.

Labor. For nearly forty years the International Labor Organization has been working for the improvement of labor standards and conditions throughout the world. Within the UN system it now has special jurisdiction in this field, but many other agencies, notably the Economic and Social Council, the Council's Population Commission and its Economic and Employment Commission (until it was abolished in 1951), and the economic divisions of the Secretariat also have taken a hand in labor questions. While it functioned, the International Refugee Organization, too, gave help on labor problems in connection with its work with displaced persons. This work involved assistance in migration and settlement, problems with which other agencies of the UN are still deeply concerned.

The organs of the ILO are : (1) the General Conference, (2) the Governing Body, and (3) the International Labor Office. The General Conference is composed of four delegates from each member state, two representing the government, one the employers, and one the workers. Except for government representatives, the delegates vote as individuals, with a two-thirds vote required for the adoption of a "convention" or a "recommendation." The Governing Body is the executive head of the ILO. It selects items for the Conference agenda, appoints the Director-General, supervises the International Labor Office, directs the various committees and commissions, and prepares the budget. The International Labor Office serves as a secretariat.

ILO is interested in encouraging a workable system of international migration as a means of helping workers in surplus labor areas to migrate to countries where labor is in demand. This is a phase of its long-continued efforts to improve the utilization of manpower throughout the world. To work toward this goal it has also assisted several countries in establishing technical training programs and employment service organizations. ILO is also active in the extension and protection of trade-union rights and freedom of association. It has already adopted two important conventions in this field (in 1948 and 1949).

In 1948 the American Federation of Labor -- which as a nongovernmental organization in category "A" has a right to suggest items for the agenda of the Economic and Social Council -- submitted to ECOSOC a lengthy document charging that forced labor existed in the Soviet Union and in the Soviet satellite states. Two years later the whole question was discussed both by ECOSOC and by the ILO. In this way a deplorable practice was brought officially before the United Nations. At its annual

conference in June, 1949, the ILO declared that forced labor was "a matter of grave and widespread concern" and suggested an impartial inquiry. At the Ninth Session of ECOSOC, in the summer of 1949, the United States proposed a commission of inquiry, but this proposal was not approved, owing to the refusal of the Soviet Union to participate. Forced labor, however, remains on the conscience of mankind if not on the agenda of the UN, and undoubtedly the last chapter on it is yet to be written.

Economic Commission for Europe. On March 28, 1947, the Economic and Social Council, in accordance with a resolution of the General Assembly of December, 1946, created the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), the first regional commission of the United Nations. Since then two other regional economic commissions — one for Asia and the Far East and one for Latin America — have been established, and at least two others — for the Middle East and for Africa — are contemplated. All of the three regional commissions now in existence are doing useful work.⁷

To illustrate the nature of the work of the regional economic commissions we shall review the activities of the oldest of them — the Economic Commission for Europe.

ECE deserves much more attention and recognition than it has received. Its broad functions are to initiate and participate in measures for facilitating concerted action for the reconstruction of Europe, for raising the level of European economic activity, and for maintaining and strengthening the economic relations of the European nations with each other and with the other countries of the world. In its early stages it gave special attention to the reconstruction of war-devastated areas; now it is concentrating on long-term aspects of European economic development and cooperation. It should be noted that its activities are not confined to Western Europe; it attempts to operate on both sides of the "iron curtain," to facilitate intra-European trade, and to promote economic cooperation between East and West in every possible way. "Almost from its inception it became the central organ for all-European economic cooperation."⁸

Twenty-six European countries, Iceland, and the United States take part in the work of ECE, although only states which are members of the UN have voting rights. Its headquarters are in the former palace of the League of Nations in Geneva. Its Secretariat consists of nearly two hun-

⁷ For interesting and informative summaries of the work of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) and the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), see the illustrated pamphlets dealing with them in the "What the United Nations Is Doing" Series, published by the Department of Public Information of the UN Secretariat, UN Pub. 1949. I. 11 and No. 1948. I. 15.

⁸ *The Economic Commission for Europe*, one of the "What the United Nations Is Doing" Series published by the Department of Public Information of the UN Secretariat UN Pub. 1950. I. 13, p. 4. This pamphlet was prepared by the Secretariat of ECE. Another interesting pamphlet on ECE, also published by the Department of Public Information, is *ECE in Action: The Story of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe*, UN Pub. 1949. I. 1. See also *The Economic Commission for Europe*, UN Pub. 1954, I. 3.

dred members, headed by an Executive Secretary, Professor Gunnar Myrdal, famous Swedish sociologist and a former minister of commerce in his own country. The sessions of ECE and of its many committees, subcommittees, working groups, and groups of experts attract thousands of representatives to Geneva each year.

As soon as it was organized, ECE assumed the functions of three inter-governmental organizations which had been set up after the war to assist in alleviating the distress and economic disorganization in Europe. These organizations were the European Central Inland Transport Organization, the European Coal Organization, and the Emergency Economic Committee for Europe. ECE has worked closely with many nongovernmental organizations, with the principal agencies of the UN, notably WHO, ILO, FAO, and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, with its parent body, the Economic and Social Council, and with OEEC and other organizations for intra-European economic cooperation.

Among the permanent committees of ECE are those on agricultural problems (established jointly by ECE and FAO), industrial development and trade, industry and materials, coal, electric power, steel, timber, inland transport, and manpower. Through these ECE is endeavoring to increase the production and improve the distribution of basic foodstuffs, fertilizers, chemicals, steel, coal, coke, mining and smelting equipment, motor vehicles, bauxite, rolling stock for railroads, timber, and other raw materials, natural resources, and manufactured products. The problems with which it deals are staggering in their proportions and in their complexity.

The improvement in East-West relations after 1953 led to greater cooperation on the part of the Communist states. In his report for 1954 the Secretary-General of the United Nations stated : "There has been increased participation by the countries of Eastern Europe in the day-to-day work of the Commission, and patient East-West trade consultations have begun to yield results."

SOCIAL ISSUES I : GENERAL

In the Charter the UN is charged with promoting "solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems" and "international cultural and educational cooperation." Thus the UN is vitally concerned with the furtherance of human welfare, social justice, and the aspirations of men for a better lot in life. We shall here discuss its work in social welfare and social defense, cultural activities, health problems, control of narcotic drugs, refugees and stateless persons, and aid to children.

Social Welfare and Social Defense. The Department of Social Affairs of the UN Secretariat, and especially its Division of Social Welfare, ECOSOC and its Social Commission, and a number of the specialized

agencies are interested in such aspects of the social field as technical assistance for social development, social conditions and levels of living, social services, housing, town and country planning, community organization and development, family, youth, and child welfare, social defense and juvenile delinquency, rehabilitation of the handicapped, population, migration, and refugee questions, and social policy and development.⁹ The UN budget provides for advisory social welfare services, including "technical assistance in such special aspects as public welfare administration, social insurance, child welfare, and vocational rehabilitation." Aid to physically handicapped persons in several countries has been an especially popular phase of this work. Social defense, which is of particular concern to the Social Commission as well as to the Social Welfare Division of the Secretariat, includes programs for the prevention of crime, the treatment of offenders, the suppression of prostitution, probation, the reduction of juvenile delinquency, and related questions.

In 1950 the Secretary-General issued a comprehensive report, at the request of ECOSOC, on housing and town and country planning. The Social Welfare Division now issues a regular bulletin on these subjects, and is doing a great deal of work in this field. The General Assembly authorized a tropical-housing mission, which in 1950 visited the countries of Southeast Asia to investigate "technical questions relating to housing for low-income groups in the humid tropics."

Community organization and development, to which housing and town and country planning are related, is regarded by the Secretary-General as "one of the most promising activities of the United Nations family of agencies." These activities are described in detail in a series of country monographs and reports of regional survey missions which were inaugurated jointly in 1952 by the Department of Social Affairs and the Technical Assistance Administration.

The UN has taken an active interest in continuing and extending the good work done by the League of Nations for suppressing the traffic in women and children. In 1949 the General Assembly approved a new convention relating to this subject, which had been prepared by the Social Commission and recommended by ECOSOC, but for various reasons a number of major states, including the United States and the colonial powers, have failed to ratify it.

Health Problems. With the establishment of the World Health Organization in 1948 a systematic effort to improve health conditions throughout the world was launched. Some of the activities of WHO have been dramatic and have received well-deserved acclaim — for example the prompt action in dealing with the cholera epidemic in Egypt in 1947 and the typhus outbreak in Afghanistan in 1949 ; others have been less spectacular though equally important.

In 1946 the General Assembly decided to assume the functions and powers of the League of Nations relating to the control of narcotic drugs.

⁹ See *Preliminary Report on the World Social Situation*, UN Pub. 1952, IV, 11.

The matter was referred to the Economic and Social Council. That some action was called for was indicated by the fact that only one-tenth of the world's production of opium was needed for medicinal and scientific purposes. The Economic and Social Council decided at its first meeting to establish a Commission on Narcotic Drugs. The Permanent Central Opium Board and the Supervisory Body, set up in 1925 and 1931 respectively, have continued to function, but they are now so closely affiliated administratively with the Commission on Narcotic Drugs that the three bodies may be said to constitute a single organ of control.

The most important recent development in the field of international narcotic drug control was the adoption in 1948 of the "Draft Protocol," which brought under control all drugs capable of producing addiction. In 1949 an ad hoc committee of representatives of the principal opium-producing countries convened in Ankara, Turkey, and adopted a proposal for an international opium monopoly. While most nations have agreed to this in principle, the monopoly has not yet been established. The Commission on Narcotic Drugs also adopted a resolution in May, 1952, to convene an international conference to draft and adopt a protocol on the limitation of opium production. Meantime, it is taking measures to close the gaps in the control of narcotics. To date its work has been of a high order ; one authority says that it "represents perhaps the most effective program undertaken within the Economic and Social Council."¹⁰

Refugees and Stateless Persons. The termination of the International Refugee Organization in 1951 was largely a result of the insistence of the United States that since most of the refugees and displaced persons had been resettled or repatriated the burden of the care of the "hard core" refugees still remaining should be assumed by the individual countries concerned. But the United Nations continued to be interested. On January 1, 1952, a UN High Commissioner for Refugees opened an office in Geneva. While he has been able to promote the interests of refugees in non-Communist lands in many ways, he has no power or resources for providing for them.

From the beginning of the operations of its Preparatory Commission on July 1, 1947, until its termination, IRO performed a great and difficult service. Altogether it assisted in the resettlement of more than a million persons. The United States, in spite of the limitations of the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, received more than 150,000, Israel almost as many, and Australia more than 100,000 ; the United Kingdom and Canada also took large numbers. About 70,000 were repatriated, presumably all with their consent. Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt and others, in hot debates in the General Assembly and the Human Rights Commission, staunchly resisted the demand of the Soviet Union that former nationals of countries

¹⁰ *The United Nations : 4 Years of Achievement*, Dept. of State Pub. 3624, International Organization and Conference Series III, 36 (Sept., 1949), p. 21. See also Herbert L. May, "The International Control of Narcotic Drugs," *International Conciliation*, No. 441 (May, 1948).

now behind the "iron curtain" be returned, regardless of their own feelings in the matter.

The largest numbers of refugees in IRO camps were in Europe, especially in Germany, but IRO also looked after refugees in other parts of the world. A special problem of great proportions was created by the conflict between Jews and Arabs over Palestine. IRO, WHO, UNESCO, UNICEF, the Conciliation Commission for Palestine (especially its Technical Committee of Refugees), and other UN agencies did what they could to deal with this problem. The main work, however, was directed by the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees, established by the General Assembly in November, 1948. In the first year of its operation UNRPR cared for nearly one million refugees. Numerous church groups and philanthropic agencies, such as the Red Cross and the American Friends Service Committee, also gave substantial assistance, either through UNRPR or through their own field agencies.

The whole question of the status of refugees and stateless persons calls for a new approach by the states of the world. Current practice, which is inclined almost to regard stateless persons as having no rights or even as having no legal existence at all—at a time when countless thousands have lost their national status through no fault of theirs—seems barbarous and outmoded. "Tasks of special concern include the issuance of travel documents, access to courts, social insurance benefits, the right to work, privileges of education, and the right to remain in a country of asylum."¹¹ The International Law Association,¹² the UN, and a number of other official and unofficial agencies are taking a continuing interest in these questions.

Aid to Children. One of the brightest chapters of the UN story is the record of the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund. This agency is a true "international cooperative." It is supported by voluntary contributions of money, goods, and services from the governments and peoples of forty-five countries and more than thirty territories. The major financial support has been provided by the United States. UNICEF has launched ambitious programs, many in connection with WHO, for infant and school feeding, milk conservation, the training of doctors, nurses, and social workers, the control of malaria and tuberculosis, and the equipment of child welfare institutions. It has provided supplementary meals for some 7,000,000 children and expectant mothers in Europe and for half a million Arab refugees in Palestine. Through the efforts of UNICEF, in cooperation with WHO and the Red Cross in the Scandinavian countries, 50,000,000 European children were tested for tuberculosis

¹¹ *United States Participation in the United Nations: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1949*, Dept. of State Pub. 3765, International Organization and Conference Series III, 48 (May, 1950), p. 129.

¹² "Resolutions of the international Law Association Concerning Nationality and Statelessness, the Development and Codification of International Law, and the Illegal Use of Force," UN Document A/1785 (Mar. 6, 1951).

and some 15,000,000 were vaccinated—"the largest single mass-immunization campaign ever undertaken."¹³

In the field of child welfare the Social Commission of ECOSOC and the Social Welfare Division of the UN Secretariat have also played a major role. At the present time a draft declaration on the rights of the child is being prepared.

Cultural Activities. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) seeks to stimulate basic education, to raise educational standards, to disseminate information, to provide for the exchange of persons, to foster cultural activities, and to promote international understanding. These goals are of course shared by the UN in general. UNESCO's projects are among the most important but least tangible and definable in the UN's program.

UNESCO has devoted major attention to fundamental education. It is conducting a "pilot project" in this field in Haiti in collaboration with other agencies of the UN, and it has acted in a consulting capacity in connection with similar projects in a number of states. It has been greatly concerned with the reconstruction of educational facilities in war-devastated countries and with the improvement of standards in underdeveloped areas. It sponsored a program for the examination and improvement of textbooks and other teaching materials, which revealed alarmingly low quality and a shocking amount of distortion and chauvinism in the texts to which the world's children are exposed. UNESCO also conducted a major study of the psychological tensions affecting international understanding, collaborated with various nongovernmental organizations in a study of the concepts of "democracy" and "liberty" as interpreted by peoples of different countries, and launched a series of comparative studies of cultures.¹⁴

In the natural sciences UNESCO is equally active. It has science offices in Uruguay, China, India, and Egypt. It has made a sizable grant to the International Council of Scientific Unions. It helped to establish the Institute of the Hylean Amazon, and has taken a special interest in the development of arid land.

Many countries have national commissions for UNESCO. The United States National Commission, in whose work many organizations participate, is associated with the State Department. It has held several large national conferences—usually attended by more persons than the international conferences of UNESCO itself—and has engaged in a variety of useful activities. UNESCO has been quite successful in securing the cooperation of nongovernmental organizations, international and national, and has encouraged the formation of international associations of political scientists and other professional groups.

¹³ Jacob, p. 60.

¹⁴ For an illuminating survey of the UNESCO tensions project see Otto Klineberg, *Tensions Affecting International Understanding: A Survey of Research* (Social Science Research Council, 1950).

UNESCO has enlisted the services of some of the ablest specialist from many lands in the broad fields in which it is interested. Its three Directors-General—Julian Huxley, a world-famous British scientist ; Jaime Torres Bodet, a former foreign minister and educational leader of Mexico ; and Luther Evans, former Librarian of Congress—have provided dynamic leadership. It would be difficult to assess the results of its varied activities, for it works in the area of intangibles where the temptation to woolgather is great, and UNESCO has not always been able to resist temptation. Concerned with improving the cultural life of mankind, its work is by no means unrelated to the central problem of war or peace, for in the oft-quoted words of the Constitution of UNESCO, "since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defenses of peace must be constructed."

SOCIAL ISSUES II : HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS

In only a few parts of the world are human rights and fundamental freedoms really secure, and in large areas they still have little meaning. "The lot of the Chinese peasant, the Egyptian fallen [fellah], the South African native, the Latin American peon, the Russians' political prisoner demonstrates the contradiction between principle and practice which is the present overwhelming challenge to United Nations action in the struggle for human rights."¹⁵ Spokesmen of the United Nations, as well as thoughtful leaders everywhere, are painfully aware of the barriers to progress. "Actually, all organs of the United Nations touch in greater or less degree upon this same subject of human rights, for it lies at the root of all the aspects of effective organized cooperation among nations in carrying out the United Nations Charter."¹⁶ The UN is specifically pledged to promote "universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion."

Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Within the UN system the Commission on Human Rights has spearheaded concrete efforts towards this great goal. After two and a half years of painstaking labor the Commission, under the able chairmanship of Mrs. Roosevelt, with frequent clashes between champions of the Western and the Soviet concepts of fundamental human freedoms, drafted a Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as a "common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations." This Declaration, the first of its kind in history, was approved by the Third Session of the General Assembly on December 10, 1948, by a vote of 48 to 0, with the six nations of the Soviet bloc, Saudi Arabia, and the Union of South Africa abstaining. The first part reaffirms the

¹⁵ Philip E. Jacob, "The United Nations and the Struggle for Human Rights," *Pennsylvania School Journal*, Jan., 1951, p. 200.

¹⁶ *United States Participation in the United Nations*, 1949, p. 137.

political and civil rights and freedoms embodied in the American Bill of Rights and other basic Western declarations of the rights of man. The second part enumerates the "newer economic, social and cultural rights and freedoms which have in the twentieth century come to be recognized as fundamental to man."¹⁷ The Declaration is merely a statement of principles, not a legally binding instrument. Whether it will prove to be "a great event in the struggle of man for freedom" or simply a platitudinous reminder of men's hopes remains to be seen.

Covenant on Human Rights. Having framed the Declaration, the Commission on Human Rights then turned its attention to the even more difficult task of drafting an International Covenant on Human Rights. Unlike the Declaration, the Covenant, if approved by the General Assembly, would be submitted to the member nations of the UN as a treaty and would therefore be binding on all states that ratified it. At first the Commission decided not to include economic, social and cultural rights, although they had been in the Declaration. The Soviet bloc demurred, but the United States, and to a lesser extent the states of Western Europe, argued that while civil liberties lend themselves readily to judicial processes, social and economic rights entail the development of practical institutions and the making of appropriations to implement the kind of policy sponsored by UN agencies. After a number of shifts in policy the General Assembly in the fall of 1951 requested the Commission to prepare drafts of two covenants, one on civil and political rights and the other on economic, social and cultural rights, and to submit them to the 1952 General Assembly. The Commission found the drafting a long and difficult process. Not until 1954 were the two covenants presented to the General Assembly, with the understanding that their consideration should be spread over at least two sessions.

It is highly doubtful that Covenant or Covenants on Human Rights will ever be approved or will be really implemented even if approved. Indeed, it may be wiser not to press for a covenant at all, but to rely upon the force of moral pressure and the constant reminder of the rights embodied in the Universal Declaration. No one who has followed the debates in the Human Rights Commission can fail to be conscious of the great distances which separate the nations in their views of what constitute human rights and how they should be enforced.

Convention on Genocide. On December 9, 1948, the General Assembly gave unanimous approval to a Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. It also invited the International Law Commission "to study the desirability and possibility of establishing an international judicial organ for the trial of persons charged with genocide." The Commission reported in 1950 that an international criminal court for this purpose was both desirable and possible.

¹⁷ *United States Participation in the United Nations: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1948*, Dept. of State Pub. 3437, International Organization and Conference Series III, 29 (April, 1949), p. 131.

Genocide is the destruction, in whole or in part, of a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group.¹⁸ It has been a particularly barbarous aspect of the policies of certain supposedly "civilized" states in the twentieth century, notably of Nazi Germany. The General Assembly, in a resolution approved on December 11, 1946, declared it to be a crime under international law; and it instructed the Economic and Social Council to prepare a draft convention on the subject. The convention was drafted in March-April, 1948, by an Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide set up by ECOSOC, and in slightly revised form became the document approved by the Assembly on December 9 of the same year.

With its ratification by twenty-three states—three more than the required number—the Convention came into effect in January, 1951. It will continue in effect for ten years and after that for five-year periods for those states which still adhere to it, except that it shall become inoperative if and when the number of adhering states drops below sixteen. Ratifying states agree to implement the Convention with whatever legislation may be necessary and to permit extradition for persons formally accused of genocide. Government officials as well as private individuals come within its provisions.

The Convention provides that five kinds of acts, aimed at the destruction of "a national ethnic, racial, or religious groups," are punishable as genocide. More specifically, these include: (1) killing members of a group because of their group affiliation; (2) causing bodily or mental harm to group members; (3) deliberately inflicting conditions on the group to bring about its physical destruction; (4) imposing measures to prevent births within the group; and (5) forcibly transferring children from one group to another. It also covers conspiracy or incitement to commit genocide, as well as complicity in the crime.

The United States has not ratified the Convention on Genocide. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations has insisted upon certain interpretations of the Convention, and the American Bar Association has taken a stand in opposition. Both groups appear to have doubts on the score of the effect on domestic laws and on the status of American court decisions. One American student, deeply concerned with human rights, has declared that "in America as elsewhere, the ghost of national sovereignty intrudes to scare off support for an *international* commitment to protect the rights of men. No one would dare to suggest that genocide be tolerated in this country. But we hesitate to obligate ourselves before the rest of the world to prevent it."¹⁹ Some distinguished American opponents of ratification would say that the United States is obligated before the world by a multitude of constitutional provisions to prevent genocide within her borders, but hesitates to grant an international agency the right to police American territory.

¹⁸ Acts constituting genocide and other acts punishable under the Convention on Genocide are enumerated in Articles II and III of the Convention.

¹⁹ Jacob, "The United Nations and the Struggle for Human Rights," p. 201.

In late 1950 the Assembly asked the International Court to hand down an advisory opinion on the question whether reservations to the proposed Convention on Genocide required the unanimous consent of the other parties before the accession containing the reservations could be accepted. By a margin of 7 to 5 the Court ruled that such unanimous consent was not necessary as long as the reservations were compatible with the spirit of the Convention.

Freedom of Information. The problem of international guarantees of freedom of information and of the press has been another difficult one for the UN. In the spring of 1948 a UN Conference on Freedom of Information met in Geneva and formulated several draft conventions and recommendations. The General Assembly, ECOSOC, the Subcommission on Freedom of Information and of the Press, the Commission on Human Rights, and the Secretariat have given a great deal of attention to implementing these proposals. The General Assembly on May 19, 1949, against the opposition of the Soviet bloc and with thirteen abstentions, adopted the first international Convention on the International Transmission of News and the Rights of Correction. It had more difficulty with the proposed Convention on Freedom of Information. The evolution of the proposed convention into a document that contained so many restrictive governmental controls that it belied its title is a sad lesson in the limited prospects in our time for genuine freedom in this field. The convention submitted to ECOSOC in the summer of 1951 was so unsatisfactory that the United States Government, which had strongly championed the idea of a covenant, is now on record in opposition to it.

Status of Women. In only a few countries do women have legal, political, economic, and social rights comparable with those of men; in fact, even the principle of equality is still rejected in large areas of the world. A great deal of data was presented in a report by the UN Secretariat on the political rights accorded to women throughout the world. ECOSOC, in transmitting this report to the General Assembly, recommended that information on this subject be circulated annually to members of the United Nations "until all women throughout the world have the same political rights as men." Its Commission on the Status of Women has as its first objective the extension of equal suffrage to women everywhere. Other goals are the better protection under national laws of the rights—including that a nationality—of married women, the extension of educational opportunities for women, the guarantee of equal pay for equal work, the removal of discrimination against women in employment in public services, and the increased participation of women in the work of the UN.

In 1952 an international conference on the status of women was held in New Delhi. In the same year the General Assembly adopted a Convention on Political Rights for Women.

Protection of Minorities. Not so much progress has been made in dealing with another problem in the human rights field, that of the protection

of minorities, although presumably many of the rights promised in the Declaration of Human Rights and in the Covenants apply to minorities as well as to all other groups. In 1947 a Subcommission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities, under the Human Rights Commission, began a thorough study of the problems of minorities to the end that the UN "may be able to take effective measures for the protection of racial, national, religious or linguistic minorities."

Before the Subcommission had been able to accomplish a great deal the Economic and Social Council decided that it should be discontinued after its fourth session in 1951, at least until the end of 1954. Apparently ECOSOC took this action because the Subcommission found that the most hopeful courses of action were through the Genocide Convention and the Covenant on Human Rights rather than by an independent approach.

SOCIAL ISSUES III: DEPENDENT PEOPLES

The provisions of the UN Charter relating to dependent peoples represent an advance over the corresponding section of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Perhaps the most notable difference lies in the scope of application. The Covenant brought the former colonies of Germany and Turkey under the Mandates Commission of the League, but it established no special position for the colonies and other non-self-governing territories of other states. The Charter, on the other hand, provides for a Trusteeship Council to perform functions much the same as those of the Mandates Commission, but in addition it asserts principles to be applied by member states to all their colonies. With the League, actual administration was in the hands of "mandatory states"; under the UN, while the direct administration is commonly in the hands of states singly or jointly as "administering authorities," the UN itself may take direct control, as it did in Eritrea.

International Trusteeship System. Territories are placed under the trusteeship system by agreements approved by the "states directly concerned," whatever that may mean, and by the General Assembly or Security Council, depending upon whether they are regular trust territories or "strategic areas." Trust territories fall into three categories: (1) the old mandated areas as of the time of the San Francisco Conference of 1945; (2) territories taken from enemy states in World War II; and (3) other territories voluntarily placed under the trusteeship system by the states which administer them. No state has chosen to avail itself of the opportunity to subject its colonial administration to the supervision of the Trusteeship Council. All of the trust territories are therefore former colonies of Germany (lost in World War I) or of Italy or Japan (lost in World War II). Consequently the non-self-governing territories under the trusteeship system are in several ways less impressive than those which have no relation to the system: they are smaller in number (11 as

compared with more than 60), in area (about one million square miles as compared with about eight million), and in population (less than 20,000,000 as compared with more than 200,000,000).

The pre-World War I German colony of South-West Africa is the only former mandated territory (disregarding those area which have become independent states) which has not been placed under the International Trusteeship System as a trust territory. Although the Assembly has repeatedly recommended that this be done, the Union of South Africa, the administering authority, has refused to do so. For a time the Union submitted reports to the UN on its administration, but in 1949 it announced that no further reports would be forwarded ; and it has consistently maintained that the status of South-West Africa was solely within its domestic jurisdiction. The matter was appealed to the International Court of Justice, which in July, 1950, held that the Union of South Africa continues to have international obligations concerning South-West Africa resulting from the mandate it assumed in 1920, and that the mandate can be modified only with the approval of the United Nations. It also held, however, that the Charter imposed no obligation on South Africa to place South-West Africa under trusteeship.

The Trusteeship Council supervises the eleven trust territories under the International Trusteeship System in three main ways : (1) by considering annual reports from the administering authorities, (2) by receiving and examining petitions, and (3) by sending visiting missions to the trust territories.

1. *Consideration of Annual Reports.* The annual reports are based on a lengthy questionnaire prepared by the Trusteeship Council, as required by Article 88 of the UN Charter. Each administering authority—the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Italy, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States—is required to furnish detailed information “on the political, economic, social and educational advancement of the inhabitants of each trust territory.” The Council devotes a great deal of time to an examination of these annual reports : usually a special representative from the trust territory concerned is present to answer questions and supply further information, if requested. The Council thereupon formulates its own report, with conclusions and recommendations, for the General Assembly. The recommendations, which are often very numerous, deal with such matters as the extent of the participation of the indigenous inhabitants in the political and economic life of the trust territory ; steps for the economic development of the territories: the establishment of hospitals and health services ; educational development ; the modernization of the tax structure ; the increase of wages, improvement of working conditions, nondiscrimination, and encouragement of trade unions ; and improved systems of land tenure.²⁰

²⁰ We are indebted for this information to Dr. Victor Hoo, former Assistant Secretary-General in charge of Trusteeship and Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories.

Serious problems often arise because of differences in point of view between the administering authorities and the native peoples of the trust territories. There is, furthermore, the difficult question of "the relationship between indigenous cultures and the new Western influences in colonial territories. . . . Thus the question has often been raised whether the Trusteeship System was instituted for the purpose of laying down new lines of development for native peoples and bringing them under Western patterns of life or whether it was intended as a system that would encourage them, in full freedom to develop along their own modes of life."²¹

2. *Examination of Petitions.* Inhabitants of the trust territories or other interested parties may petition the Trusteeship Council on specific grievances or on general matters. At first this opportunity was seized only infrequently--in the first two years of the Trusteeship Council's operation fewer than fifty petitions were received; but in recent years several hundred petitions have been presented. Some 100 petitions have related to the most highly publicized case to be brought before the Trusteeship Council--that involving the Ewe (usually pronounced ā'vā) people in West Africa. These people, numbering about the million, claim that their political, economic, and social life has been disrupted because after World War I the former German protectorate of Togoland, in which they lived, was divided and given to Britain and France as mandatory powers. The two countries now hold the former mandated areas as trust territories. Thus the boundary line divides the Ewe people. The situation is further complicated by the fact that the boundary line also divides other tribes, some of which do not share the resentment of the Ewes. On several occasions representatives of the Ewe people, as well as of other native tribes in the two Togolands, have appeared before the Council to make oral presentations of their views. A visiting mission to the two Togolands in late 1949 made an on-the-spot investigation of the problem. Representatives of the Ewe and other native groups traveled long distances to present petitions to the mission and to voice their complaints. To date the Trusteeship Council has not found a solution that will give full justice to all parties concerned.

In recent years the emphasis has shifted from the Ewe problem to a demand for a unified, independent state of Togoland. Another possibility is the union of the British Trust Territory of Togoland with the Gold Coast, which, as the United Kingdom has informed the United Nations, is now "in the last stage of constitutional development before independence." The British Government has formally requested the termination of its agreement regarding Togoland. In 1955 a visiting mission of the Trusteeship Council was charged with the task of devising ways of ascertaining the wishes of the inhabitants of the territory. Plebiscites held in 1956 disclosed that British Togoland preferred union with the Gold Coast, and French Togoland membership in the French Union.

²¹ Ralph Bunche, in Clyde Eagleton and Richard Swift, eds., *Annual Review of United Nations Affairs*: 1950 (New York University Press, 1951), pp. 143-144.

3. *Visiting Missions.* Unlike the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations, the Trusteeship Council, under the authority of the General Assembly, is empowered to make "periodic visits to the respective trust territories." These visits must be made "at times agreed upon by the administering authority." Normally a mission visits each trust territory at least once every two years. The presence of these missions has great symbolic value. Flying the UN flag, members of the Commission meet openly with spokesmen of the native peoples as well as with local officials, visit different sections of a territory, and bring home to the people the fact that the UN is concerned with their welfare and is working for their eventual freedom. The missions also give representatives of the Trusteeship Council and the Secretariat an opportunity to make firsthand investigations of the areas for which they are responsible.

Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. The one strategic trust territory, created in accordance with Article 82 of the United Nations Charter, consists of the Pacific islands of the Gilberts, Marshalls, and Marianas (except Guam), which were formerly a Japanese mandate. These islands extend over an ocean area of some 3,000,000 square miles but they have a total land area of only 687 square miles and a total population of about 55,000, forming at least eight different cultural groups. The United States is the administering authority for these islands, now known as the Strategic Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. For the first three years or more of American supervision the territory was governed by naval authorities, with headquarters at Guam, which is geographically but not politically within the Trust Territory. More recently, a civilian administration has been in charge, and the capital will soon be transferred to Truk.

The islands are so widely scattered and there is so little feeling of unity that political independence is hardly feasible. Instead, emphasis has been placed on the establishment of local self-governing municipalities and the development of self-government on a regional basis.

According to the UN Charter, the functions of the United Nations relating to strategic areas are to be exercised by the Security Council. This body, however, has asked the Trusteeship Council to act for it in discharging the functions specified in Articles 87 and 88 of the Charter for strategic trust territories.

Other Non-Self-Governing Territories. Quite naturally, there is a considerable difference of opinion about the responsibilities and authority of the United Nations with respect to non-self-governing territories other than trust territories—that is, the colonies and dependencies of the colonial powers. In general the countries possessing such territories—notably the United Kingdom, France, and Belgium—have tended to give a strict interpretation to Chapter XI of the Charter and to oppose substantive recommendations of the General Assembly on the ground that this constitutes intervention in matters exclusively within their jurisdiction; whereas, on the other hand, non-administering states, and especially

those which have recently emerged from a colonial status, have favored a broad construction of the provisions of Chapter XI.

When the member states of the UN were first asked to enumerate their non-self-governing territories under Chapter XI, seventy-four territories were so listed ; since then the number has declined, largely because some of these areas, especially some which are now a part of the French Union, have declared themselves to be independent. Whether the UN must automatically accept such unilateral declarations of independence is a point of controversy ; but in practice it has been compelled to do so.

Under Article 73 (e) of the Charter, states possessing non-self-governing territories are obligated to submit regular reports to the UN, subject to such limitations as security and constitutional considerations may require. The states concerned are asked to supply information requested in a form approved by the General Assembly. This information is more limited in scope and detail than that required for trust territories, but it is nevertheless quite extensive. The Assembly was at somewhat of a loss as to what it could or should do with this information, but it worked out a procedure which has proved to be reasonably satisfactory. A special Committee of the General Assembly is charged with examining the information submitted under Article 73 (e) and with making recommendations to the Assembly.²²

There is real doubt whether Chapter XI was intended to create a system of accountability. The United Kingdom, France, and Belgium opposed the extension of the life of the Special Committee of the Assembly on the ground that the UN has no authority to create machinery of this sort. Whatever the limitations of Chapter XI, it is well to remember its broad significance. In the words of Ralph Bunche :

One may still say that the obligations under Chapter XI are unique and a very great step forward over anything the world had yet seen. . . . The acceptance of the principle that the international community does have a proper concern for these territories and the right to devote its attention to them automatically removed them from the hidden realm of exclusive domestic jurisdiction. This was, even without raising the question of international accountability, a unique advance.²³

ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES

"The United Nations has already achieved the simplest criterion of success . . . it has made itself indispensable in the lives of nations."²⁴ This was the theme that echoed through the Opera House in San Fran-

²² The United States submits information annually on five territories and possessions : Alaska, American Samoa, Guam, Hawaii, and the Virgin Islands. In 1952 the United States informed the UN that she would no longer transmit information on Puerto Rico since a new constitution granting a full measure of self-government had entered into force in July.

²³ Quoted in Eagleton and Swift, pp. 149-150.

²⁴ United Nations Press Release SF/5, June 21, 1955, p. 1.

cisco in June, 1955, when representatives of sixty states met to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the signing of the United Nations Charter. Yet about two years earlier, when the General Assembly had discussed the subject of Charter revision, twenty of the twenty-eight states which had expressed their views had gone on record in favor of amending the existing document.²⁵ These sentiments were by no means incompatible; they revealed general approval of the UN as a working reality, coupled with a rather widespread feeling that some changes in the operation of the organization would permit still more effective performance.

To the world at large the record of the UN has unquestionably been disappointing. Observers seem to forget the basic character of the UN—that it is an organization of sovereign states, that success in its vital political and security functions is dependent upon great power unanimity, and that it is sharply limited in its coercive power. They complain that states pursue national interests, national objectives, and national policies in an international organization—as though any state could possibly do anything else. Above all, they point to the “veto” in the Security Council, and they apparently believe that all the failures of the United Nations could be summed up in that one word.

Because of the importance which the veto has assumed in the minds of many persons who deplore the shortcomings of the UN, and, indeed, because of the importance which it has actually possessed in the functioning of the Security Council, we shall first examine the veto its origin and nature, its abuses, and the suggestions for its modification. After that we shall review some of the many proposals and actions designed to strengthen the UN.

The “Veto” in the Security Council

The voting procedure in the Security Council was the most sharply debated issue at the San Francisco Conference, and it has been the most generally criticized aspect of the UN's procedure ever since. Representatives of smaller powers in the UN have attacked the veto arrangement in every session of the General Assembly and they have introduced scores of resolutions to limit or eliminate the “veto”. Because its frequent use has tied the hands of the Security Council in many crucial matters, various devices for circumventing the Council have been employed.

The word “veto” nowhere appears in the United Nations Charter. While technically inaccurate, it has come into common usage. It refers to the voting procedure in the Security Council as laid down in paragraph three of Article 27, which reads as follows :

Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters [that is, on non-procedural matters] shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members

²⁵ “Issues Before the Tenth General Assembly.” *International Conciliation*, No. 504 (Sept., 1955), p. 9.

including the concurring votes of the permanent members ; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.

This means that any one of the five permanent members of the Security Council—China, France, the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, and the United States—can veto a decision on nonprocedural matters which all other members of the Council support. It should be remembered, however, that a negative vote by one of the Big Five is a veto only if this vote defeats an action which would otherwise have been approved.

Origin and Purpose. The wording of Article 27 was based directly on a voting formula proposed, be it noted, by Franklin Roosevelt and approved by Churchill and Stalin at the Yalta Conference in February, 1945. The formula included an informal agreement that a state should not vote on substantive matters relating to a dispute in which it was involved.

The Yalta formula was left essentially unchanged at San Francisco in spite of scores of amendments proposed by almost every delegation except those representing the great powers. Britain, France, and the United States were as firm as the Soviet Union in insisting that the veto be incorporated, as agreed to at Yalta. Dr. Grayson Kirk, who served as Executive Officer of the Third Commission of the San Francisco Conference, which gave detailed consideration to the composition and role of the proposed Security Council, has described the "basic assumptions" on which their decision rested :

Open as it is, on theoretical democratic grounds, to serious objection, this Council voting arrangement rests upon two basic assumptions to which the sponsoring powers attached great importance. The first was that in any enforcement action the permanent members of the Council would be those whose forces must necessarily bear the predominant burden. In consequence, it would be unrealistic to expect those Council members to allow their own forces to be committed to an action which they, or any one of them, opposed. The other argument was that the organization must depend for its strength upon the essential solidarity of the great powers. If this solidarity fails, then the security of enforcement arrangements will as surely fail.²⁶

The only joint declaration of the great powers on the Yalta formula as embodied in Article 27 of the Charter was the "Statement by the Four Sponsoring Governments on Voting Procedure in the Security Council," issued during the San Francisco Conference.²⁷ This reaffirmed the Yalta formula with its denial of a right of veto in procedural questions ; and it clarified the process to be used in determining whether the status of a

²⁶ "The United Nations Charter," *International Conciliation*, No. 413 (Sept., 1945), p. 468.

²⁷ The Statement is printed in *The United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, California, April 25 to June 26, 1945, Selected Documents* (Government Printing Office, 1946), pp. 751-754.

question was to be shifted from substantive to procedural. The San Francisco understanding provided that the veto could be used to prevent this shift. Consequently a permanent member of the Council could use its veto power to keep a motion from being declared procedural (and as such exempt from the operation of the veto) and then use it again to defeat the substantive motion. Thus the Statement validated the "double veto." It added, however, that "it is not to be assumed that the permanent members, any more than the non-permanent members, would use their 'veto' power wilfully to obstruct the operation of the Council." The representatives of the United States placed special emphasis on this assurance.

Use of the Veto. UN experience with the veto has been wholly different from that envisioned in the joint statement issued at San Francisco. During the first two years, 1946 and 1947, the veto was used twenty-three times, twenty-one of these by the Soviet Union. Since then it has been employed less frequently, but by November 1, 1956, the Soviet Union had cast seventy-eight vetoes. In justice to the U.S.S.R. two considerations should be presented. The first is that, as Professor Padelford found, "the record plainly shows that the Soviet Union has no monopoly on negative voting." In 165 votes in the Security Council on substantive questions in 1946 and 1947, including the 23 vetoes, China voted "no" 27 times, France 23 times, Great Britain 29 times, the Soviet Union 24 times, and the United States 34 times. The votes of Britain, China, and the United States, and all but two of those of France, were not classed as vetoes because in each instance others of the Big Five—and usually all or most of the non-permanent members of the Council—voted the same way; whereas in 21 of the negative Soviet votes no other permanent member voted with the U.S.S.R., and in all these instances the measures proposed would have been approved if the Russian representatives had not voted against them.²⁸

The second consideration frequently advanced by spokesmen of the U.S.S.R., or of the Soviet bloc, is that the other permanent members of the Security Council, which are on the other side of the East-West split, can produce almost as many Soviet vetoes as they wish. Thus they can make the Russians appear as even more obstructionist than they actually are, simply by forcing votes on issues which they know will not be approved by the Soviet Union but will be approved by every other great power and by most of the nonpermanent members of the security

²⁸ Norman J. Padelford, "The Use of the Veto," *International Organization*, 11 (June, 1948), 231-232. Professor Padelford thus explains this important point: "It is clear from the record that when the Soviet Union finds its vital interests at stake there are now no other great powers generally inclined to stand with it. Therefore, the negative vote of the Soviet delegate usually becomes a sole veto, accompanied ordinarily only by the vote of whatever satellite holds a non-permanent seat on the Council. When other great powers, particularly the United States and Great Britain, find their national interests at issue they can usually persuade other permanent members to go along with them either in casting a multiple negative vote sufficient to stop a proposal without the stigma of exercising a sole veto (or near-sole veto), or to join in introducing and passing a resolution more suitable to their desires." p. 233.

Council. The Soviet Union vetoed Italy's application for membership three times before July 1, 1948, and presumably would have vetoed it thirty times if it had come up that often.

In practice, various methods have been employed to evade the veto and, in effect, to bypass the Security Council. One clear result has been to give enhanced importance to the General Assembly, where the power to veto does not exist. Article 12 of the Charter provides that the General Assembly may not consider a dispute with which the Security Council is seized ; but the practice of removing matters from the agenda of the Council by a procedural vote has facilitated the reference of even political issues to the Assembly, as, for instance, the Greek frontier case in the fall of 1947, or, even more important the Korean crisis three years later.

Furthermore, another way out seems to have been provided by the Uniting for Peace Resolution of November, 1950, of which we shall take notice later. Undoubtedly, also, the difficulties in the Security Council explain, in part at least, the steps taken outside the UN for individual and collective self-defence, as provided for in Article 51 of the Charter and for the increasing reliance on "regional arrangements" (Articles 52, 53, and 54 of the Charter). Indeed, as we have noted, Articles 51-54 of the Charter were inserted expressly to counterbalance the Yalta formula for voting in the Security Council, a precaution which has been justified by subsequent events.

The Conflict of Interpretations. The action of the Security Council in the Korean crisis of June, 1950, launched a vigorous debate on all aspects of the "veto" question. It will be recalled that the Council voted to recommend the use of military force against the aggression from North Korea, and that the vote was taken during the walkout of the Soviet representative, Mr. Malik. The ensuing discussions, engaged in by both diplomats and scholars, involved the precise meaning of "concurring votes," the legal effect of absence, and the equivalence or nonequivalence of absence and abstention.

The Soviet Union took the position that the "affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members" meant the concurring votes of all five permanent members. Granted this interpretation, the action of the Council was obviously invalid. Most of the Western states, however, supported another interpretation. To them "the concurring votes of the permanent members" meant "the concurring votes of the permanent members that voted at all." Otherwise, they argued, any one of the permanent members could prevent the Security Council from functioning at all for as long as it chose to absent itself from the Council's meetings ; and they cited Article 28 of the Charter, which states : "The Security Council shall be so organized as to be able to function continuously. Each member of the Security Council shall for this purpose be represented at all times at the seat of the Organization."

Despite considerable support for the position that abstention—or, to a lesser extent, absence—does not constitute a "veto" within the meaning

of Article 27, paragraph 3, of the Charter, the realities of the situation at the time the formula was adopted would seem to direct that the meaning of the controversial phrase "concurring votes of the permanent members" should not be given anything but a strict and literal translation. The very fact that all great powers were so insistent on its being included would appear to indicate that its purpose was to preclude the taking of any substantive decisions without the unanimous concurrence of the Big Five—all present and all voting affirmatively.

Admittedly, Russian obstructionism in the UN has been a persistent annoyance, and it certainly precludes the achievement of some of the goals set by the founders. But the point here is a purely legal one.²⁹ The leading Western states, themselves once the unyielding supporters of the principle of the great-power veto, seem ready to assert a principle of unanimity-except-one, now that they have cemented their own solidarity. The dilemma is a truly distressing one, for the choice may become one between unanimity-except-one and the paralysis of the United Nations. On the one hand, perhaps minor crises may be weathered, a great deal of good work accomplished, and the future kept open by the well-meaning proponents of parliamentary legerdemain. On the other hand, effective security action in a major crisis will require unanimity in fact rather than in legal fiction; it was so recognized at Yalta, and it is true today.

Proposals and Actions to Strengthen the UN

Short of world government, proposals to strengthen the UN range all the way from a reorganization of the present structure without the Soviet Union to formal modifications of the voting procedure in the Security Council, with relatively minor changes in the Charter. Most of the plans for more basic revisions have come from unofficial organizations and in-

²⁹ For discussions of the veto, see the cited writings of Ieland M. Goodrich, Hans Kelsen, Myres S. McDougal and Richard N. Gardner, Norman J. Padelford, and Francis O. Wilcox and Carl M. Marcy. See also H. Field Haviland, Jr., *The Political Role of the General Assembly* (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1951); and Jiménez de Aréchaga, *Voting and the Handling of Disputes in the Security Council* (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1951). Two additional points with respect to the veto should be mentioned. Hans Kelsen calls attention to the fact that the English version of the Yalta Agreement reads "including the concurring votes of the permanent members," whereas the French version reads "*les voix de tous les membres permanents*"—the votes of *all* the permanent members. The Chinese, Russian, and Spanish versions agree with the French. It had been agreed at Yalta that all five versions would have equal validity. See Kelsen, *Principles of International Law* (Rinehart, 1952), p. 180n. Second, the "Statement by the Four Sponsoring Governments on Voting Procedure in the Security Council," mentioned above, makes it difficult to believe that as of June 8, 1945, the governments of Britain, China, the Soviet Union, and the United States disagreed on the meaning of "concurring votes," for the Statement says that "the first group of decisions [on substantive matters] will be governed by a qualified vote — that is, the vote of seven members, including the concurring votes of the five permanent members....." *The United Nations Conference on International Organization*, p. 752.

fluent private citizens in various countries ; many of the less drastic changes have been advocated in the form of official proposals to the General Assembly.

Lie's Proposals. Trygve Lie, in his third annual report to the General Assembly in the summer of 1948, made some pertinent recommendations for the strengthening of the UN. In the first place, he declared that "nothing could contribute more to the effectiveness of the United Nations than a settlement" of the problem of the future of Germany. Second, he urged "fuller use of the existing powers of the Security Council for the settlement of international disputes and for the preservation of peace." Third, he called attention to the value of implementing Article 43 of the Charter by providing armed forces for the use of the Security Council. Fourth, he suggested that the UN should "begin a study of some of the problems involved in the control of bacteriological and lethal-chemical weapons." Fifth, he expressed the hope that the permanent members of the Security Council would not continue to exercise their "veto" powers to prevent the UN from moving "as rapidly as possible toward universality of membership." Finally, he asked members of the UN to give "all possible weight and support to the decisions of the General Assembly and of the Council, even though they be in the form of recommendations to the member states."³⁰

On June 6, 1950, Mr. Lie proposed a "Twenty-Year Program for Achieving Peace Through the United Nations," calling for the implementation of the following ten-point program : (1) "periodic meetings" of the Security Council, to be attended "by foreign ministers, or heads or other members of Governments," for the purpose of "consultation—much of it in private—in efforts to gain ground toward agreement on questions at issue, to clear up misunderstandings, to prepare for new initiatives that may improve the chances for definite agreement at later meetings"; (2) a renewed effort to achieve agreement on the international control of atomic energy ; (3) a new approach to control of armaments of all sorts ; (4) a new attempt to make armed forces available to the Security Council ; (5) rapid progress toward universality of membership in the UN ; (6) a sound and enlarged technical assistance program ; (7) more vigorous use of the specialized agencies of the UN ; (8) wider respect for human rights ; (9) promotion of equality for dependent peoples ; and (10) further development of international law.³¹ The only new feature of this "Twenty-Year Program" was the first proposal. The other points were reminders of oft-expressed aspirations rather than specific plans for action.

Lie's successor, Dag Hammarskjöld, has been less positive and less specific in his proposals for making the United Nations a more useful instrument for international peace and cooperation. Both Secretaries-General have deplored the tendency of some states to emphasize regional ar-

³⁰ The New York Times, Aug. 8, 1949.

³¹ For the text of Mr. Lie's memorandum, see "A Fresh Start toward Peace," *United Nations Bulletin*, June 15, 1950.

rangements and so to bypass the United Nations. In his second annual report as Secretary-General, Mr. Hammarskjöld stated : "We have only begun to make use of the real possibilities of the United Nations as the most representative instrument for the relaxation of tensions, for the lessening of distrust and misunderstanding, and for the discovery and delineation of new areas of common ground and interest." The failure to utilize these "real possibilities" has led Carlos Romulo to assert: "The UN is dying!"³²

Uniting for Peace Resolution. The action of the UN in dealing with aggression in Korea has been described in a previous chapter. One of the results of that crisis was the adoption by the General Assembly, on November 3, 1950, of the so-called Uniting for Peace Resolution. The Resolution contained five major provisions :

(1) It authorized the General Assembly to meet on short notice in an emergency in which the Security Council was prevented from acting, and to recommend appropriate collective measures, including the use of armed force when necessary.

(2) It established a fourteen-nation Peace Observation Commission to observe and report on dangerous situations in any part of the world.

(3) It asked all member states to maintain in their armed forces special elements which could be made available for United Nations service on call of the Security Council or the General Assembly.

(4) It established a fourteen-nation Collective Measures Committee to study and report on these and other methods for maintaining and strengthening international peace and security.

(5) It urged all United Nations members to renew their fidelity to the United Nations, honor its decisions, and promote respect for human rights and achievement of economic stability and social progress.

While the delegates of the Soviet bloc opposed most parts of the Resolution — they supported provisions (2) and (5) — they did not offer a very determined resistance. Nevertheless, they did contend that some portions of the Resolution were completely illegal.³³ Mr. Vyshinsky

³² "The UN Is Dying," *Collier's*, July 23, 1954, pp. 30-33.

³³ The legality of the Uniting for Peace Resolution seems to rest on the proper interpretation of Article 12, paragraph 1, of the Charter, which reads as follows : "While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests." Authorities on the UN Charter differ widely on this point. Professor Leland M. Goodrich asserts : "From the point of view of law it is highly doubtful whether the General Assembly has the power to recommend enforcement measures while the matter is still on the agenda of the Security Council," "Development of the General Assembly," *International Conciliation*, No. 471 (May, 1951), p. 273. Professor Kelsen, on the other hand, has this to say : "The words while the Security Council is exercising the.....functions.....may be interpreted to mean : while a dispute or situation is still on the agenda of the Council. But it may also be interpreted to mean : while the Security Council is actually exercising its functions ; so that when the Council because of the exercise of the veto right is reduced to inaction, it should not be considered as 'exercising' its functions. Article 12, paragraph 1,

argued that Article 11 of the UN Charter imposed limits on the powers of the General Assembly and insisted that the changes proposed could properly be made only by amendment of the Charter. Nevertheless, the Resolution was adopted by the General Assembly by a vote of 52 to 5, with 2 abstentions.

Charter Revision and Review. The Charter provides (Article 109, paragraph 3) that if a conference for the purpose of reviewing the Charter itself has not been held previously, the proposal to call such a review conference will be placed on the agenda of the Tenth Session of the General Assembly, "and the conference shall be held if so decided by a majority vote of the members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any seven members of the Security Council." Consequently, the question of the revision of the Charter was widely discussed in the two or three years prior to the convening of the Tenth Assembly in September, 1955. The foreign offices of most of the member states gave some consideration to technical aspects of the problem. Scholars, private organizations, and foundations in many countries carried on pertinent studies and made recommendations for amending the Charter along various lines.³⁴ The Ninth Session of the General Assembly instructed the Secretary-General to initiate preliminary studies.³⁵ On July 28, 1953, the United States Senate established a special Subcommittee on the United Nations Charter under the Foreign Relations Committee. The Subcommittee, headed by the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, collected basic documentation relating to the review of the Charter, initiated a series of staff studies, and held several public hearings.³⁶ In 1954 it held a series of

does not prevent the General Assembly to make [*sic*] a recommendation after the Security Council has made a recommendation in the same case. The competence of the Assembly to make recommendations is restricted only temporarily. The Council may lift this restriction by requesting the General Assembly to make a recommendation. Thus the purpose of this restriction, to avoid conflicts between the General Assembly and the Security Council, is not completely assured." Hans Kelsen, *The Law of the United Nations* (London, 1950), p. 217. See also Myres S. McDougal and Richard N. Gardner, "The Veto and the Charter: An Interpretation for Survival," *Yale Law Journal*, LX (Feb., 1951), 290-291.

³⁴ For a specific and sweeping proposal for revising the UN Charter in the direction of a form of world government, with national disarmament as a prerequisite, see Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn, *Peace Through Disarmament and Charter Revision: Detailed Provisions for Revision of the United Nations Charter* (Preliminary print by the authors, 1953). One of the most thorough series of studies on major aspects of the United Nations system is being sponsored by the Brookings Institution. See especially Francis O. Wilcox and Carl M. Marcy, *Proposals for Changes in the United Nations* (The Brookings Institution, 1956).

³⁵ In accordance with instructions of the Ninth General Assembly of the UN, the Secretariat prepared "a comprehensive summary of the decisions of United Nations organs, together with related material, organized by Charter articles and presented in such a way as to throw light on questions of application and interpretation of the Charter which have arisen in practice." From the Preface by Secretary-General Hammarskjöld to Vol. I in this series: *Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs*, Vol. 1, *Articles 1-22 of the Charter*, UN Pub, 1955, V. 2.

³⁶ U. S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on the United Nations, *Review of the United Nations Charter: A Collection of Documents* (Senate Doc. No. 87, 1954). Ten staff studies were published in 1954. They dealt with the following subjects: (1) "The Problem of the Veto in the United Nations Security Council"; (2) "How the United Nations Charter Has Developed"; (3) "The Problem of Membership in the United Nations"; (4) "Representation and Voting in the

five open hearings outside Washington — “the first attempt to take a major question of foreign policy directly to the people of the United States for testimony and discussion.”³⁷ On August 9, 1955, the Subcommittee issued a rather noncommittal report, saying that “if a review conference is held it might profitably explore the twilight zone where national powers commingle to determine whether further clarification is desirable in our national interest.”

Two years earlier, in August, 1953, Secretary of State Dulles had announced that the United States would vote in favor of a review conference when the question came before the Tenth UN Assembly. This official American position never changed, although it had become apparent by 1955 that the United States viewed the prospect of a review conference with limited enthusiasm and even with some alarm. In the United States there was growing support for a point of view expressed by Ernest Gross, former Assistant Secretary of State and Deputy Representative at the United Nations, in the January, 1954, issue of *Foreign Affairs*. Gross had stated that a Charter review conference would almost certainly be of one of three types : it might be a “punctuation” conference, in which case it “would not seem worth the effort or expense” ; it might be a “show-down” conference, which “would precipitate a break-up of the organization” ; or it might be a “propaganda” conference, “a sort of peace conference in the cold war.” Questions such as disarmament (“a major cold war issue”), domestic jurisdiction (“a major issue within the free world, embittering vast sections of it in connection with the ‘colonial’ issue and evoking controversy at each session of the General Assembly”), and membership (“involving differences in basic attitudes within the free world regarding the universal or selective character of the organization”) were, in his opinion, “real issues” ; whereas “questions of structure and procedure such as those involving the veto or changes in voting methods [might] be regarded either as false issues, or as real issues which are often given false weight in the balance of judgment about the United Nations.”³⁸

In testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on the Charter, on January 18, 1954, Secretary Dulles discussed “the more important Charter amendment issues which particularly concern the United States.” These related to : (1) universality of membership ; (2) security ; (3) membership and voting in the Security Council ; (4) voting in the General Assembly ; (5) armaments ; and (6) international law.

United Nations General Assembly” ; (5) “Peaceful Settlement of Disputes in the United Nations” ; (6) “Budgetary and Financial Problems of the United Nations” ; (7) “Enforcement Action under the United Nations” ; (8) “The International Court of Justice” ; (9) “The United Nations and Dependent Territories” ; and (10) “The United Nations and the Specialized Agencies.”

³⁷ Alexander Wiley, “The Senate and the Review of the United Nations Charter,” *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, CCXCVI (Nov., 1954), 161.

³⁸ Ernest A. Gross, “Revising the Charter : Is It Possible? Is It Wise?” *Foreign Affairs*, XXXII (Jan., 1954), 203-216.

For a decade after the establishment of the UN the Communist and non-Communist states managed to agree on the admission of only nine states : Afghanistan, Iceland, Sweden, Thailand, Pakistan, Yemen, Burma, Israel, and Indonesia. In December, 1955, however, sixteen more nations were admitted as a result of a "package deal." These nations were Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Ceylon, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Laos, Libya, Nepal, Portugal, Rumania, and Spain. These substantial additions to the roster of the United Nations, bringing the total membership to 76, added six new members to the Asian-African group in the UN and four to the Soviet bloc, thus profoundly affecting the voting patterns within the organization. The UN became for the first time a nearly universal organization ; but Japan and Western Germany are still outside the fold, and the question of the proper representation of China continues to haunt the UN's deliberations.

The problem of security to which Mr. Dulles referred centers on the capabilities of the United Nations in view of the state of great-power relations and the limitations of the Charter. Mr. Dulles posed three pertinent questions : "Can Charter changes better enable 'the Security Council to discharge its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security'?" "Or must that primary responsibility be left to security organizations, the formation of which is authorized by Article 51?" "Or should greater responsibility be given to the General Assembly, where there is no veto?"

In discussing the moot question of voting in the Security Council Mr. Dulles reaffirmed his willingness to support the removal of the veto power on questions involving the pacific settlement of disputes and the admission of new members, as recommended in the Vandenberg Resolution of 1948, but he declared that "the United States would itself hesitate to go much further than this in now surrendering its 'veto power.' " He also asked whether the one-nation-one-vote formula in the General Assembly was the best arrangement, and he raised the much-discussed matter of weighted voting. "If the General Assembly is to assume greater responsibilities, then should there not be some form of weighted voting, so that nations which are themselves unable to assume serious military or financial responsibilities cannot put those responsibilities on other nations?" More than once Mr. Dulles has suggested that the UN Charter might have been quite different if its framers had drafted it after instead of before the existence and potentialities of the atomic bomb had become generally known.

Noting the fact that "so far little progress has been made" in "encouraging the.....development of international law and its codification." in spite of the clear intention of the Charter, and emphasizing "the importance of law as an accepted standard of international conduct," Dulles asked whether the Charter provisions were adequate to achieve the desired results. Many other students of international law have also been concerned with the limited achievements of the UN in this field, the reluc-



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Gulliver

tance of nations to submit disputes to the International Court of Justice, and the tendency to seek political rather than legal settlement even of issues primarily of a legal character.

Dozens of suggestions for amending the UN Charter have been advanced. There is little likelihood, it seems, that any revisions, even if recommended by a review conference, would be finally accepted; they would still require approval by two-thirds of the member states of the UN, including *all* the permanent members of the Security Council. This rigid amendment procedure has dampened the enthusiasm of many who think the review conference should be held and that changes in the UN Charter should be made.

Much can be done in another way, however, through what may be called the process of informal amendment. In fact, many changes have already been brought about in this manner. Obviously the United Nations of today is not the United Nations of 1945. The basic premise on which

it was founded — great power agreement — has proved to be invalid, profound changes have occurred in the general international situation, and the UN itself has evolved in ways not contemplated by its founders. In a staff study prepared for the Senate Subcommittee on the United Nations Charter, Francis O. Wilcox found that the Charter had been amended informally in the following ways : “(1) through the nonimplementation or nonapplication of certain provisions of the Charter ; (2) through the interpretation of the Charter by various organs and members of the U.N. ; (3) through the conclusion of supplementary treaties or agreements, such as the Headquarters Agreement of 1947 and the North Atlantic Pact ; and (4) through the creation of special organs and agencies.”³⁹ Much more can and doubtless will be done by this process of adaptation. Indeed, as Professor Clyde Eagleton has pointed out, “many of the things which have been suggested for consideration by a conference could be done by general acceptance, if that could be obtained.”⁴⁰

Failure to hold a conference might disappoint UN supporters in many quarters, but possibly an even greater disappointment would be a conference that got nowhere. By 1955 the reluctance to hold the conference had become quite apparent. Secretary-General Hammarskjöld in his annual report of that year suggested as a possible way out of the dilemma that there might be “valid arguments for a decision at the coming Assembly session in favor of holding a Charter review conference, while leaving until later the questions of when it should be convened.” The Tenth Assembly debated at some length the item on its agenda regarding a proposal to call a conference, but in the end it elected to adopt the suggestion of the Secretary-General. Thus a conference of this kind is scheduled, but it may well remain in a state of indefinite suspension, pending the coming of a more hopeful international atmosphere.

THE UNITED NATIONS : AN APPRAISAL

The United Nations, in spite of its limitations as an organization of sovereign states, has done more than survive ; it has proved itself to be, as Walter Lippmann has said, “an indispensable institution.” It has been repeatedly defied, bypassed, and ignored ; but it has contributed more, both directly and indirectly, to the maintenance of peace than has been generally realized. It has been the major coordinating agency for a vast number of organizations and commissions which are dedicated to the service of nations and peoples throughout the world. Its chief failures or “limited successes” have been on major issues of peace and security, and

³⁹ Francis O. Wilcox, “How the United Nations Charter Has Developed,” *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, CCXCVI (Nov., 1954), 4.

⁴⁰ Clyde Eagleton, “Proposals and Prospects for Review of the Charter of the United Nations,” in Clyde Eagleton, Conley H. Dillon, and Carl Leiden, *The United Nations : Review and Revision* (Marshall College, Huntington, West Va., 1954), p. 40.



Alexander in The Philadelphia Bulletin

"Why is the Doughnut Less Interesting?"

these have tended to obscure its achievements in less newsworthy areas.

Admittedly, the United Nations for all its activities is an inadequate instrument for collective security and an imperfect instrument for human betterment under present world conditions ; and yet, as one top official of the UN has said : "It seems that we now have about as much United Nations as today's world is prepared to accept." Here is the root of the problem. Experience with the UN has shown that men and nations are not yet ready to create the only kind of international institutions that can offer any hope of proving adequate to the imperatives of the atomic age. Perhaps even more important, they have made little progress in developing the sense of community that is essential for the successful functioning of international political institutions, however carefully conceived.

Thus the basic failure of the United Nations, which has diverted attention from its very real achievements, is hardly chargeable to the world organization itself ; it is inherent in the kind of national and international life that exists today. In a period when man's ideas and institutions are unequal to his scientific accomplishments and his social needs, the UN has not only survived but won acceptance and approval on an amazingly wide scale. In June, 1955, Walter Lippmann wrote : "In the whole of our recorded history there have been few periods, perhaps no period, when so many people have been involved in such deep changes in the ways of their life, or engaged in such a diversity of conflicts. It is astounding, therefore, that the universal society of the United Nations survives and that it is, if anything, more deeply rooted, more tenaciously adhered

to, than it was ten years ago." ⁴¹ In these words we find the measure and the limitations of the UN's achievement.

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Part Four

CONFLICT AND CHANGE IN THE POSTWAR WORLD

The Rebuilding and Reorientation .. **15** of Europe

Europe has for centuries been the center of Western civilization. Until the late nineteenth century all the great powers were European. Their economic strength and cultural contributions, as well as their political and military might, gave them a dominant position in the world. Although World War I exposed grave structural and economic weaknesses and profoundly affected the pattern of world power, the nations of Western Europe, notably Britain and France, seemed to recover much of their old strength without great loss of prestige. Defeated Germany, after the low ebb of the 20's and early 30's became resurgent under the Nazis ; and Russia, under Bolshevik rule, gained enormously in strength and influence. On the eve of World War II these four states were unquestionably great powers, and even Italy, under Mussolini, was making an impressive bid for similar recognition.

After six years of war a wholly different picture emerged. The old balance of power was shattered. The nation which under the Nazis had been the strongest state in Europe in 1939 and had succeeded in achieving European and threatening world domination was a divided and occupied country. Italy had been liberated from the Fascist regime but it was

wrestling with serious economic and political problems. France, smashed by the Nazi *blitzkrieg* and smarting from the humiliation of defeat and collaborationism, was in a plight almost as serious as that of Italy. Britain, it soon became clear, had been fundamentally weakened by accumulated strains and the wartime efforts which overtaxed her resources, and she did not stage as rapid a recovery as had been expected. Only the Soviet Union was more powerful than ever, in spite of tremendous loss of life and destruction of property during the war. "The condition of Europe after the second world war," in short, "was without precedent in modern history."¹

Immediately after the nonaggression treaty with Germany in August, 1939, Soviet troops occupied a large part of eastern Poland, and in June, 1940, the Baltic states of Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. At the Yalta Conference of early 1945 Churchill and Roosevelt were faced with a Soviet *fait accompli* in Eastern Europe, and they had to be content with Stalin's signature on agreements for the "liberation of Eastern Europe," free elections in Poland and elsewhere, and similar pledges. In violation of the Yalta Agreements, the Russians reduced Poland, Czechoslovakia (after the coup of February, 1948), Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria to the status of satellite states. They virtually sealed off their zone in Germany and, to a lesser extent, their zone in Austria. The Soviet Union stood astride Eastern Europe, and there was no comparable power alignment elsewhere on the continent.

Aside from the growing power of the Soviet Union — which is only in part a European state — the position of Europe has undergone a change so fundamental as to lead students of history to speak of "the passing of the European age."² William T. R. Fox has declared that "the transition from the old, world-dominating Europe to the new, 'problem-Europe' is a central fact in the international politics of our time."³ Europe still holds a far more important place in world affairs than these statements suggest; but it is a fact, as Harold and Margaret Sprout have pointed out, that "Central and Western Europe no longer enjoys a virtual monopoly of political power and world leadership."⁴

The decline of Europe did not begin with World War II. The war merely accelerated a deterioration which, though largely unperceived, had been in progress for several decades. But the recuperative powers of the continent were not sufficient to assure recovery from the vast dislocation and destruction of a second world war. It was suffering from a gigantic loss of capital, its earnings from capital investment had largely vanished, and on other invisible transactions, such as shipping and tourist trade, it had a net deficit instead of a favorable balance. This situation

¹ *Major Problems of United States Foreign Policy, 1949-1950* (The Brookings Institution, 1949), p. 93.

² This is the title of a challenging book by Eric Fischer, published by the Harvard University Press in 1948.

³ *The Super-Powers* (Harcourt, Brace, 1944), pp. 12-13.

⁴ *Foundations of National Power*, 2nd ed. (Van Nostrand, 1951), p. 186.

was not new, but Europe's ability to pay for its imports had now seriously declined. Production was at a low level. The population was greater than before the war and was still rising. There were more mouths to feed, and not enough food to satisfy even minimum caloric requirements. The shortage of consumer goods was serious. Moreover, the shortage of dollars abroad — the much-talked-about "dollar gap" — and of supplies at home produced inflationary pressures and a serious disequilibrium in the currencies of many countries. Europe was plagued by inconvertible currencies, currencies of varying degrees of stability, and many serious internal barriers to trade. Intra-European trade, which before the war had been a major factor in the life of the continent, fell off alarmingly. Severe winters and poor crops in 1946 and 1947 further complicated the problem of recovery.

To add to the economic woes there were grave political and moral weaknesses and ideological divisions. As the hopes for postwar cooperation among the great powers receded, the dictates of the "cold war" took priority over considerations of recovery and rehabilitation. The stricken continent, which needed to muster all its resources in an effort to survive, was rent in two between East and West, separated by an "iron curtain" which ran from Stettin on the Baltic to Trieste on the Adriatic and divided the Communist from the non-Communist world. Germany became the hottest spot in the "cold war," the greatest bastion for both sides ; and hopes for her unification — or even for a German peace settlement — seemed to fade away.

These developments seriously retarded the economic recovery of Europe, raised again the old problem of security against aggression, and prevented the distraught people of Europe from resuming their normal lives. The future of millions was jeopardized by the real or supposed imperatives of the "cold war."

PROBLEMS OF PEACEMAKING

Before peace could be preserved in the postwar period it first had to be made. The major victors were in agreement on one point at least : there would be no general peace conference such as followed World War I. Instead, the heads of the governments of Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States — Churchill and Attlee, Stalin, and Truman — agreed at the Potsdam meeting of July-August, 1945, to create a Council of Foreign Ministers of five powers — the Big Three, plus China and France — "to continue the necessary preparatory work for the peace settlements." The Council, therefore, became the principal agency for peacemaking in Europe. Since all its decisions had to be unanimous, its success was conditioned on great power unanimity ; but from the outset of its deliberations it was apparent that real unanimity was highly unlikely. The first meeting of the Council, held in London in September-October, 1945,

came to a dead end on disagreement over the nations which should be allowed to participate in the peace negotiations.

Preparatory Work on the Early Treaties. The London impasse was seemingly broken at a conference of the foreign ministers of the Big Three in Moscow in December, 1945. They agreed to consider peace treaties with Italy, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Finland before attempting the more difficult assignment of writing treaties for Austria and Germany. A compromise was worked out which seemed to reconcile the American desire to bring all belligerent members of the wartime United Nations into the peace negotiations with the Russian view that the great powers, through the Council of Foreign Ministers, should determine the terms of peace. According to this compromise, the preparatory work on each of the five treaties would be conducted by those victor nations which had in each instance signed the terms of surrender (the 4-3-2 formula) ; this meant that the Big Three, plus France, would draft the Italian treaty, the Big Three would draft the three Balkan treaties, and Great Britain and the Soviet Union would draft the treaty for Finland. Then the draft treaties would be considered at a general conference of all states which had participated in the European campaign against the Axis. The final treaties would thereupon be drafted by the Council of Foreign Ministers, with due heed to the recommendations of the conference.

In two lengthy sessions in Paris in 1946, from April 25 to May 16 and from June 15 to July 12, the Council of Foreign Ministers managed to supervise the preparation of draft treaties for the five states, after much debate and disagreement. The Italian peace treaty, in particular, posed many thorny problems. Among these were the disposition of Trieste, which Russia had promised to Yugoslavia but which Italy, backed by Great Britain, France, and the United States, wanted for herself ; the disposition of the former Italian colonies of Libya, Eritrea, and Somaliland ; Italian demands for the return of territory around the Brenner Pass which had been ceded to Austria after World War I ; French demands for small but strategically and economically important bits of territory on the Franco-Italian frontier ; and Russian demands for very heavy reparations for herself and Yugoslavia. There were also serious problems in connection with the Balkan treaties, particularly the free navigation of the Danube and equality of economic opportunity in the Balkans.

Paris Conference, 1946. Having agreed at last on the terms of the draft treaties, the major powers issued invitations to a general conference to consider the proposed peace settlements. As the price of Russian cooperation the United States had been forced to agree to support the draft treaties as prepared by the Big Four — now France is included — and even to join in presenting some “suggested” rules of procedure which would further limit the scope and power of the general conference. These restrictions did not prevent a searching scrutiny of the draft treaties by the smaller powers. Some sixty articles on which the Big Four had seen unable to reach complete agreement were submitted to the conference.

From July 26 to October 15, 1946, more than 1,500 delegates from twenty-one nations, meeting in the Luxembourg Palace in Paris, examined the drafts article by article, both in committees and in plenary sessions. The fruits of these arduous labors were modest : "the possibility of arriving at generally accepted solutions by negotiation was ruled out both by the methods adopted and by the temper of the delegates."⁵ Most of the recommendations on disputed points were passed over the strong opposition of Russia and her satellites present. Foreign Minister Evatt of Australia, who tried to lead a revolt against the iron-handed control of the great powers, abandoned his efforts after a few weeks and left the conference.

Major Provisions of the Treaties. Although the Paris meeting was generally regarded as a failure, its recommendations were seriously reviewed by the Council of Foreign Ministers, and in some instances they were adopted, at least in modified form. Meeting in New York later in 1946, the Council agreed on the final terms of the five treaties. Its decisions on the major issues in dispute may be quickly summarized :

1. Trieste, with most of the Istrian Peninsula, plus a narrow strip of territory extending to the Italian border, was created as a Free Territory under the supervision of the Security Council of the United Nations. This "solution" pleased nobody, but it was the only compromise on which the Big Four could agree.


2. The boundary line between Italy and Yugoslavia was drawn roughly midway between the lines proposed by the Soviet Union and the United States.

3. There were no further major changes in the boundaries of postwar Italy, although Briga-Tenda and a few other small areas were ceded to France.

4. The question of the disposition of the Italian colonies was "solved" by postponing a solution and providing for a method of eventual settlement. The Italian peace treaty stipulated that if the Council of Foreign Ministers was unable to reach a decision within one year after the effective date of the treaty, the question should be referred to the General Assembly of the United Nations and the Assembly's decision should be regarded as binding. In spite of an eleventh-hour effort by Russia to convoke a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers to seek an agreement, the deadline of September 15, 1948, passed without a decision. Accordingly the General Assembly took up the problem in the spring of 1949. The action of the Assembly has been described in Chapter 13.

5. Italian reparations were fixed at \$260,000,000, most of which was to go to Greece and Yugoslavia. Some of this amount was to come from current production, but such payments were not to begin until 1952, and they were not to be made if they imposed a serious strain on the Italian economy. Hungary, Bulgaria, and Finland were each to pay \$100,000,000

⁵ J. C. Campbell, *The United States in World Affairs, 1945-1947* (Council on Foreign Relations, 1947), pp. 136-137.



European Territorial Changes as a Result of World War II

in reparations, mainly to Russia. Bulgaria was to pay \$25,000,000 to Yugoslavia and \$45,000,000 to Greece.

6. All of Transylvania was assigned to Rumania, which in turn agreed to Russia's possession of Bessarabia and Bukovina.

7. Finland ceded the province of Petsamo to the U.S.S.R., and gave the Soviets a fifty-year lease on the Porkkala-Udd area.

8. With the approval of Russia, the Balkan treaties guaranteed the free navigation of the Danube, but all attempts to implement this pledge were later blocked by Russian maneuvers. The Big Four agreed to hold a conference to establish an international navigation authority for the

Danube within six months after the treaties went into effect. Such a conference was finally held in Belgrade, in July-August, 1948, almost a year after the effective date of the treaties.

Treaty Violations : Trieste. Some two years after the cessation of hostilities, the peace treaties with Italy, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Finland were finally declared to be in effect as of September 15, 1947. Many of their provisions, however, have been deliberately violated, evaded, or ignored. Only lip service has been paid to the guarantees of freedom and independence for the peoples of Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania. The provision for the free navigation of the Danube went overboard when at the Belgrade conference in 1948 Russia and her satellites forced through a treaty which, while endorsing the principle, in reality completely subverted it. The Western powers refused to sign the treaty and instead strongly denounced it. In effect, the control of the Danube passed to the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc, with only Yugoslavia disputing the Soviet position.

Because of great power deadlocks the Security Council was unable to take the necessary steps for the creation of the Free Territory of Trieste, as provided for in the Italian peace treaty. Thus, while theoretically the Free Territory of Trieste was internationalized, in reality Yugoslavia controlled Zone B and American and British forces administered Zone A, which included the city of Trieste. On the eve of the Italian elections in 1948 the United States, Britain, and France suddenly proposed that Trieste be returned to Italy ; but this proposal too proved to be impossible of fulfillment. Obviously no real settlement could be achieved without the consent of both Italy and Yugoslavia. Relations between these two countries improved after the "Tito split" in 1948, but the Trieste issue remained at dead center for many months thereafter. At length, on October 6, 1954, after long discussions in London, representatives of Italy, Yugoslavia, Great Britain and the United States initialed a "Memorandum of Understanding" on Trieste.⁶ According to this, the city itself and almost all of Zone A were given to Italy, and a slightly enlarged Zone B was awarded to Yugoslavia.

The Italian peace treaty, like the treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania, has become almost a dead letter. In late 1951 the United States, Britain, and France proposed to the Soviet Union and other interested nations that the treaty be revised, and that Italy be granted full sovereignty and admitted to the United Nations. Since Italy had cast her lot with the nations of Western Europe and the Atlantic Community, and since the primary purpose of the suggested treaty revision was to remove the limitations on the size of Italian armed forces, it is hardly surprising that the Russian reply was unsatisfactory.⁷ Charging the Soviet Union

⁶ The text of this memorandum is given in the *New York Times*, Oct. 6, 1954.

⁷ For the texts of the statement of the three Western powers regarding Italy of Sept. 26, 1951, and the Soviet note on Italy of Oct. 11, 1951, see *Current History*, XXI (Dec. 1951), 362, 365-366.

with bad faith, and alleging that full independence and national defense were vital to her existence, Italy has in effect repudiated most of the peace treaty, with the acquiescence and in many respects the strong encouragement of the Western powers.

Peace with Austria. Having disposed of five peace treaties, the Council of Foreign Ministers, meeting in Moscow in the spring of 1947, turned to even thornier problems — the treaties for Austria and Germany. There seemed to be real hope for a basic agreement regarding Austria. Technically it would not be a peace treaty, since Austria was regarded as a liberated and not an enemy state. She had been promised full independence in the Moscow Declaration of 1943.

Disagreement between the Soviet Union and the Western powers was complete on three major issues : (1) the claim of Yugoslavia to a portion of Austrian territory in southern Carinthia ; (2) Yugoslavia's demand for \$150,000,000 in reparations ; and (3) the definition of German assets. The last issue was the most basic. The Potsdam Agreement, in a loosely worded provision, had assigned to the Soviet Union, as part of her share of German reparations, all German assets in the Soviet zone in eastern Austria. The U.S.S.R. argued that the provision embraced all property acquired by the Germans, through whatever means. Since Austria had been governed as a part of Germany from 1938 to 1945, this interpretation would deprive Austria of most of her properties and resources. The Western powers strongly opposed the Soviet interpretation.

Unable to agree at Moscow on these disputed issues affecting the Austrian treaty, the Foreign Ministers decided to establish a four-power Treaty Commission to meet in Vienna for the purpose of resolving the issues. The Commission held 85 sessions in 1947, but it could not agree on a single one of the nineteen questions submitted to it. After futile efforts in 1947 and 1948, the Council of Foreign Ministers itself, meeting in May-June, 1949, seemed to make real progress on the Austrian treaty. The reparations issue was apparently settled by agreement of the Western powers to allow the Soviet Union extensive rights to the oil and shipping facilities in Austria and a cash payment of \$150,000,000 over a six-year period in lieu of other "German assets," but attempts to implement the agreement were unsuccessful. The deadlock over Austria was broken at long last as a result of a *volte-face* by Russia in 1955. On February 8 Molotov blandly announced that an Austrian treaty could be signed if "effective guarantees" against an *anschluss* could be secured. In April the Austrian Chancellor, Julius Raab, pledged his country to a policy of neutrality, the Russians accepted the commitment, and the way seemed clear for an Austrian state treaty. After further negotiations the foreign ministers of the Big Four went to Vienna, and on May 15 they affixed their signatures to the treaty.⁸ Austria was "re-established as a sovereign, independent and democratic state," with the same frontiers she had had before her forced union with Germany in 1938. She agreed not to "enter

⁸ For the text of the Austrian State Treaty, see the *New York Times*, May 16, 1955.

into political or economic union with Germany in any form whatsoever," or to "possess, construct or experiment with" any weapons of mass destruction. All forces of the Allied and Associated Powers and members of the Allied Commission for Austria would be withdrawn "in so far as possible not later than December 31, 1955." The treaty contained detailed provisions regarding claims arising out of the war, including the question of German assets. Thus Austria regained her independence in "the first major European settlement between East and West since the outbreak of the cold war."⁹

Peace with Germany. The Council of Foreign Ministers avoided any real consideration of a German peace settlement until 1947, when the central problems of a German treaty were considered at two meetings of the Council, the first in Moscow in March-April, the second in London in November-December. When they were over, the prospects for a treaty were as remote as before. The first item on the agenda at Moscow was the consideration of a two-volume report of the Allied Control Council in Berlin on the implementation of the Potsdam Agreements. The bitter debates on demilitarization, denazification, democratization, deindustrialization — "barbarous and not easily defined expressions which had been accepted at Potsdam"¹⁰ — almost disrupted the conference. At the London meeting the Western powers wanted to discuss measures for the economic recovery of Germany, whereas the Soviet Union wanted to debate the establishment of a central German government and the collection of reparations. The complete failure of the London meeting marked the virtual end of four-power efforts to negotiate a treaty of peace with Germany. Henceforth "the German problem" was one of implementation of the Soviet policies in East Germany and of tripartite policies in West Germany.

All of the four former occupying powers are on record in favor of German unification and the conclusion of a peace treaty for a unified Germany at the earliest possible date. Nevertheless little or no progress has been made toward these professed objectives. At the Berlin conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Big Four in January-February, 1954, issues regarding Germany were discussed at length, but in the end all that the Foreign Ministers could report was "a full exchange of views on the German question." The heads of states of the same four powers, at their meeting in Geneva in July, 1955, frequently referred to German problems, which they agreed that their foreign ministers should discuss at a meeting in October. The foreign ministers, however, were unable to resolve the impasse; it was obvious that more than "the Geneva spirit" was needed to produce agreement on concrete issues. A German peace treaty still seems to be remote, for it is bound up with many issues in dispute between the Soviet Union and the Western powers.

⁹ The New York Times, May 13, 1955.

¹⁰ J. C. Campbell, *The United States in World Affairs, 1947-48* (Council on Foreign Relations, 1948), p. 62.

THE PROBLEM OF GERMANY

Potentially Germany is the most powerful state in Europe, aside from the U.S.S.R. Although she is now weak and divided, she is the focal point of the "cold war," and much depends on her evolution. She remains a significant factor in the present international picture. It would make a great deal of difference whether a strong, united Germany associated herself with the Western powers or with the Soviet Union or followed a relatively independent course. In short, the future of Germany and the character of the institutions which she develops are matters of the gravest concern.

Germany : Occupied and Divided. In the detailed agreement on Germany which emerged from the Potsdam Conference of July-August, 1945, spelling out the decisions reached at Yalta a few months before, substantial portions of prewar Germany were transferred to the U.S.S.R. and to Poland, and the rest of the country was divided into four zones. Berlin, in the heart of the Russian sphere, also was divided into four zones and made the seat of a four-power Allied Control Council authorized to make decision for Germany as a whole. The machinery for four-power cooperation in the governing of Germany was from the outset weakened by basic disagreements among the occupying powers, and it broke down completely in 1948, when the Soviet representatives ceased to attend the meetings of the Council. The occupying powers did cooperate after a fashion in certain matters, including the long-drawn-out and much-discussed War Crimes Trials at Nuremberg in 1945-1946. Local governments were established in each of the four zones. In Eastern Germany a program of sovietization was carried out from the beginning, with the Communist-dominated Socialist Unity Party as a convenient mouthpiece. In 1949 a "People's Democratic Republic" was proclaimed in the Soviet zone. The three Western occupying powers cooperated rather closely from the outset, although France was inclined to favor much harsher policies than either Britain or the United States and took a position regarding the Saar, which she was occupying, which caused frequent disagreements with her Western allies.

After 1947 Great Britain and the United States, with the increasing cooperation of France, concentrated their efforts on plans for the economic and political integration of the western zones of Germany. Tripartite conversations in June, 1948, led to agreement on a general plan for future action. It was the three-power program in West Germany that precipitated the crisis of 1948.

The Berlin Crisis of 1948. The first important move of Britain, France, and the United States was to carry out a much-needed currency reform in West Germany. The new currency was not introduced into Berlin until the Soviet Union had rejected proposals for quadripartite control of the circulation of eastern marks in the city and had instead announced a

currency reform of her own. But the main Russian countermove to the active cooperation of the other occupying powers were withdrawal from the Allied Control Council and the Berlin Kommandatura and the imposition of increasingly drastic restrictions on traffic between the western zones and Berlin. The reply of the Western powers was the famous "Berlin airlift." This afforded a convincing demonstration of the determination of the democratic states to remain in Berlin and not to give in to further Soviet pressures. As such it was a stimulus to the morale of the non-Communist world.


In July and August, 1948, the Western powers made joint representations to Moscow regarding the Berlin impasse. After many conferences the Russians agreed to end the blockade, but they soon declined to cooperate in implementing the agreement. Faced with this situation, the Western states referred the dispute to the Security Council of the United Nations; but the Council's efforts, led by its President, Juan Bramuglia, Foreign Minister of Argentina, and supported by Foreign Minister Herbert Evatt of Australia, President of the General Assembly at the time, and Secretary-General Trygve Lie, produced no solution.

Founding the West German State. During the negotiations in Moscow it had become apparent that the Soviet Union wanted the Western powers to postpone or cancel their plans for a West German State in return for the lifting of the Berlin blockade. This they refused to do, and after the failure of further efforts to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union they turned again to the task of doing the best they could with a divided Germany. In September, 1948, while the Berlin dispute was before the Security Council, a German parliamentary council met in Bonn, to draft a "provisional constitution" or "basic law" for a West German state, and the military governors of the three occupying powers began work on an occupation statute to define the limits within which the "basic law" must operate. In December these three states, plus the Benelux countries, agreed on a draft statute for an International Authority for the Ruhr, and a month later the three military governors established a Military Security Board to keep watch over German disarmament and demilitarization. In April, 1949, after the formal signing of the North Atlantic Pact, the foreign ministers of France, Great Britain, and the United States discussed all major problems relating to Germany and in a few days reached agreement on the terms of the occupation statute. On May 5 the "Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany," drafted by the Bonn parliamentary council of German leaders and approved by the military governors of the western zones, was promulgated.

These developments placed the Western powers in a more favorable bargaining position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and apparently helped to persuade the Russians to agree to lift the Berlin blockade. This agreement was reached as a result of a series of conversations in New York City in February-March, 1949, between Jacob Malik and Philip C. Jessup, Soviet and United States representatives at the United Nations. After some



Germany Today



weeks of negotiation through these and other channels, the four governments concerned announced an agreement to lift the blockade on May 12 and to hold a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Paris later in the same month.


Accordingly, from May 23 to June 20 the Council of Foreign Ministers met again, for the first time since December, 1947. It soon became apparent that no compromise was possible on the basic problem of the political and economic unification of Germany. The month of discussions produced only frayed nerves and minor agreements, mostly relating to Austria. The Foreign Ministers did agree to try again at some unspecified future date, and they promised that "the occupation authorities, in the light of the intention of the Ministers to continue unity of Germany, shall consult together in Berlin on a quadripartite basis."

Relations with West Germany. The Western occupying powers and the Soviet Union next proceeded to sponsor "democratic" governments in Germany. In September, 1949, the newly elected Parliament of the Federal Republic of Germany established other organs and agencies of the new government. Theodor Heuss became President and Dr. Konrad Adenauer became Chancellor. After these steps the three Western powers declared the military occupation of their zones to be at an end and civil government formally began with the promulgation of the Occupation Statute and the establishment of the Allied High Commission. In November the West German state was admitted to the Council of Europe, and in the Petersberg agreement with the Allied High Commission it promised to cooperate in the defense of Western Europe in return for a relaxation of the restrictions upon its freedom of action. These restrictions were further relaxed in 1950, especially as a result of the decision of the foreign ministers of the Western occupying powers to permit the creation of a West German foreign ministry and a mobile police force.

In November, 1951, the foreign ministers of Britain, France, and the United States, and Chancellor Adenauer approved the draft of a general agreement which, they announced, would be "a concise step toward the realization of the common aim of the three Western Powers and the Federal Government to integrate the Federal Republic on a basis of equality in a European community itself included in a developing Atlantic community."¹¹ They agreed, however, that the new arrangement would not enter into effect until a number of related conventions had been accepted and until the association of Western Germany with the proposed European Defense Community had been assured.

These matters were worked out in the spring of 1952 after the North Atlantic Council had agreed to the creation under NATO of a European army, including West German troops. On May 26 the three Western states and the West German state signed the "peace contract" which gave the Federal Republic of Germany virtual autonomy in both foreign and

¹¹ The text of this important joint statement on Germany is given in the *Department of State Bulletin*, XXV (Dec. 3, 1951), 891-892.



Four Stages in German History

domestic affairs. On the following day the foreign ministers of the Benelux countries, France, Italy, and West Germany signed the treaty for the European Defense Community. Shortly afterwards an amendment to the North Atlantic Treaty was signed, extending the guarantees of the Treaty to the European Defense Community. The effect of this amendment was to put Germany under the protection of the North Atlantic Treaty and make her "a quasi-member of the larger alliance pledged to fight with it, if necessary."¹² The signing of these three documents made the week of May 25, 1952, in the opinion of the *New York Times*, "one of the most important weeks in the history of the Old Continent."

Despite strong opposition, Chancellor Adenauer secured full approval of the contract and the EDC treaty by the federal parliament; but with the refusal of the French National Assembly, in August, 1954, to approve the EDC treaty the agreements of 1952 became void. An alternative solution for the problems of European security and Western Germany's role in a reorganized Western Europe was embodied in the London and Paris agreements of October, 1954.¹³ On May 5, 1955, almost ten years

¹² *The New York Times*, May 25, 1952, E8.

¹³ For the text of these agreements, see the *New York Times*, Oct. 24, 1954.

to the day after V-E Day, these agreements entered into effect, thus ending a decade of occupation and marking the emergence of West Germany as a sovereign state.¹⁴

The Western powers fully subscribe to the goal of Germany's ultimate unification, but they are also determined to help to make West Germany as viable a unit as possible and to associate her ever more closely with Western Europe and the Atlantic community. Russia loudly proclaims her desire for a united Germany, but certainly she does not envision a Germany integrated into the Western European community. At the "summit" conference in July, 1955, and at the Big Four Foreign Ministers conference in the following October, the Russians insisted that German reunification should be considered only in relation to the whole issue of European security. They have organized their zone along Communist lines, and they are doing everything possible to ensure that the Germany of the future will be a Soviet-dominated state.

In June, 1953, the Soviet Union revised her tactics in Germany. A civilian commissioner replaced the military commander in the Russian zone, and the severe policy of sovietization was moderated. These steps, which may have been taken in consequence of the "new look" in Russia, were followed by the uprising in East Berlin on June 11, one of the most dramatic episodes of postwar history. As a result of the ruthless suppression of the June riots and the inability of the Western powers and West Germany to make any progress towards German unification, morale in East Germany has deteriorated greatly.¹⁵

ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND INTEGRATION

Within three years of V-E Day the prospects for great power collaboration in peace as in war — pledged in the Moscow Declaration of 1943, in the United Nations Charter, and in many other solemn agreements — had become dim indeed. The refusal of the Soviet Union to participate in the Marshall Plan, or to allow any of the states within her orbit to participate, was a clear indication that the problems of European recovery could not be considered on a continental scale. Zhdanov's statement of October, 1947, that the Soviet Union would "bend every effort in order that this plan be doomed to failure" was in a sense an open declaration of war against the Marshall Plan and its sponsors.

Faced with a divided continent, the countries of Western Europe took up the tasks of recovery and rehabilitation and of defense on a regional rather than a continental basis. Driven together by a common disaster and a common danger, their peoples have achieved an unprecedented degree of cooperation in the postwar period. Indeed, the closer "integration" of Western Europe — disregarding for the moment the exact mean-

¹⁴ *The New York Times*, May 6, 1955.

¹⁵ "East Germany after Berlin," *Current Germany*, I (March, 1954), 1.

ing of this term and the limited progress in the direction of real union—has been one of the significant developments of recent years.

The problems which the nations of Western Europe had to face, individually and collectively, were basic ones. They included inflation, trade restrictions, balance of payments, the production and distribution of goods, the rebuilding of factories, the recovery of agriculture, the feeding and housing of an increasing population in an area with a reduced capacity to sustain existing numbers, the settlement of displaced persons, the replacement of destroyed materials, industrial unrest, political instability, and military insecurity. "But," said General George C. Marshall at a ceremony in 1950 marking the halfway point of the plan which bears his name, "slowly I learned that the most serious phase of rehabilitation was related to other considerations—political, moral, spiritual. These were less tangible, but far more difficult to deal with."

Benelux. The first major official step in the direction of closer integration in Western Europe in the postwar period was the formation of the Benelux Customs Union. As early as September, 1944, the governments-in-exile of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg had signed a convention for the creation of such a union. The convention, as modified in March, 1947, entered into effect on January 1, 1948. It provided for the elimination of all customs duties between the participating states and for a uniform tariff schedule for imported goods. The ultimate objective was proclaimed to be a complete economic union.¹⁶ In June, 1948, the foreign ministers of the Benelux countries set January 1, 1950, as the target date for the beginning of economic union. This date has been repeatedly postponed, for the difficulties have proved to be greater than expected. The attempts to harmonize the internal economic policies of the member states encountered serious obstacles—-with the balance of payments problem as a major stumbling block—-giving rise to a growing "conviction that these obstacles can be overcome only within a wider framework of economic union embracing France and western Germany," or even a much larger area. The Benelux countries "have concluded therefore that Benelux as originally planned is not enough, and that greater sacrifices of the interests of particular industries, as well as greater subordination of national interests, must be made the price for achieving greater economic advantages over a wider European area."¹⁷

¹⁶ See Howard J. Hilton, Jr., "Benelux — A Case Study in Economic Union," *Department of State Bulletin*, XXIII (July 31, 1950). This important and informative article describes the major difficulties which have been encountered by the Benelux countries in planning for a full economic union. For further details, see *Final Report on Foreign Aid*, House Report, No. 1845, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess. (Government Printing Office, 1948), pp. 181-189. For the Conference of Cabinet Ministers of the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg held at The Hague, Mar. 10-13, 1949, see *Report, Customs Convention of the Netherlands Belgium, and Luxembourg* (The Hague, 1949).

¹⁷ *Major Problems, 1949-1950*, p. 414. Economic union is still the goal of the Benelux countries, and considerable progress is being made in this direction. A concise summary of the progress toward economic union is contained in *News Digest from*

The European Recovery Program. All the nations of Western Europe developed national programs for recovery (for example, the Monnet Plan in France), but the major effort was made cooperatively through the Marshall Plan. The participants in the Plan — probably the most ambitious program of economic cooperation in history — included all of non-Communist Europe except Franco Spain, plus Iceland and Turkey. After Secretary of State George C. Marshall's famous address at Harvard on June 5, 1947, representatives of the sixteen participating states met in Paris to draft a program of joint effort for recovery and to consider the amount of outside assistance necessary. Molotov and a large delegation of advisers joined them for a few days and then left. Soon afterwards the Russian government announced its strong opposition to the whole idea of the Marshall Plan, which it charged was an American imperialist and anti-Soviet plot in thin disguise. At its insistence Czechoslovakia and Poland, which had indicated their intention to participate, withdrew their acceptance. These actions "set a seal to the breach between the west and the Soviet *bloc*; the history of Europe for years ahead was settled within these weeks."¹⁸

Undaunted by Russia's action, the foreign ministers of the West European states set up the Committee of European Economic Cooperation. After hard work through the summer of 1947, the Committee issued a two-volume report¹⁹ outlining a four-year program "similar in general scale to that achieved by the United States in the mobilization years 1940 to 1944." This report formed the basis of the planning which resulted in the European Recovery Program.

OEEC. On April 16, 1948, after the United States Congress had passed the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948, which established the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), the CEEC adopted a Convention for European Economic Cooperation. In this Convention the sixteen participating states agreed "to work in close cooperation in their economic relations with one another," with "the elaboration and extension of a joint recovery programme" as "their immediate task." To further these objectives the Convention established the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC).

OEEC, therefore, was the coordinating agency for this great experiment in cooperative action. Long before the Marshall Plan had passed into history OEEC had demonstrated so convincingly that it met a continuing need that its members announced their intention to extend its life for an indefinite period. It is still doing useful work. Among its outstanding accomplishments have been arrangements for the allocation of Marshall

Holland (issued by the Netherlands Information Service, N. Y.), June 20, 1955. See also John Goormaghtigh, "European Integration," *International Conciliation*, No. 488 (Feb., 1953), 79-83.

¹⁸ Herbert Luethy, *France Against Herself* (Praeger, 1955), p. 353.

¹⁹ *Committee of European Economic Cooperation Report*, Dept. of State Pub. 1930, European Series 28, 2 vols. (Government Printing Office, 1947). Vol. I contains the general report and Vol. II the technical reports.

Plan funds among the various participating countries, the establishment of the Intra-European Payments Scheme (which paved the way for the European Payments Union), and, in general, unprecedented success in coordinating the economic programs and policies of member states. Its main efforts, aside from the preliminary task of organization, study, and exchange of views, have been directed toward the increase of production and the expansion of trade.

The first annual program of OEEC, drawn up in the short space of seven months, was adopted unanimously. Its main features were : (1) an internationally integrated and screened recovery program including the allocation and use of \$4,875,000,000 of United States aid ; (2) the introduction of a system of intra-European payments linked to United States aid but dependent upon aid furnished by European countries to each other ; (3) the adoption of a set of rules of commercial policy to guide the future financial, economic, and commercial relations of the member countries.


The Payments Plan. One of the first tasks of OEEC was to propose and put into effect the Intra-European Payments Scheme. This complicated plan was incorporated in the Agreement for Intra-European Payments and Compensations, approved on October 16, 1948.²⁰ Through exhaustive analysis the experts of OEEC had sought to determine the contributions of the creditor countries and the drawing rights of the debtor countries. The Bank for International Settlements at Basle acted as a clearing agent for all transactions under the balance of payments plan. The sterling area was treated as a unit, and each country was obligated to provide all necessary information relative to its international transactions.

The payments scheme of 1948 was a major achievement and helped to pave the way for the even more ambitious European Payments Union, which came into existence in 1950. In its report to ECA on the first annual program, OEEC stated that "it is not too much to say that as a direct and immediate result of that scheme more than 800 million dollars worth of goods will move which would otherwise never have been made, or would have rusted or rotted away."²¹

Counterpart Funds. ECA aid was given largely in the form of outright grants, although some funds were earmarked for conditional grants, loans, and technical assistance. Countries receiving grants deposited in a special account amounts in their own currencies equivalent to the dollar grants of the United States. These deposits were known as counterpart funds, and could be spent only for basic recovery projects, upon approval of ECA. "In general, the 'counterpart' funds are to be used for (a) reconstruction, expansion, and modernization of industrial capacity, (b) stabilization of internal financial and monetary conditions, and (c) development and

²⁰ See *Agreement for Intra-European Payments and Compensation* (OEEC, Paris, Oct. 16, 1948), Part I.

²¹ Organization for European Economic Cooperation, *Report to the Economic Cooperation Administration on the First Annual Programme, July 1, 1948—June 30, 1949* (Paris, 1949), Part I, Chap. 10, p. 2.



How European Counterpart Worked

expansion of the productive capacity of raw materials.”²² “The governments reimburse themselves for the money they deposit in the counterpart funds by selling the dollar credits the United States advances them to those of their own citizens who require dollars to import goods from dollar countries.”²³ This explains why people of the Marshall Plan countries paid in their own currencies for products made available by American aid grants.

ERP : An Appraisal. At its halfway mark in 1950 the Marshall Plan had apparently been a brilliant success as far as its immediate objectives were concerned. ECA reported then that industrial production in Europe was 20 per cent above prewar levels ; that agricultural production had almost reached the prewar level ; that inflation had been brought under control in all countries ; that “a sustaining diet had been restored” ; that real wages and living conditions had greatly improved ; and that substantial progress had been made in removing quota restrictions, exchange difficulties, and other barriers to intra-European trade. It also reported, as “collateral facts” of great importance, that communism had been “rolled back

“European Recovery,” *International Conciliation*, No. 447 (Jan. 1949), p. 36.
Counterpart Funds (Economic Cooperation Administration, March, 1950), p. iii.

throughout Western Europe": that individual freedom and democratic institutions had been strengthened; that "cooperation for economic recovery has led to cooperation for military defense"; and that "institutions of European cooperation have been started and are growing in strength."²⁴ When the Marshall Plan came to an end on December 31, 1951, the statistical indices of recovery were even more impressive.

In its long-range objectives, however, the outlook for the success of the Marshall Plan was less reassuring. Mounting production figures and optimistic statements from ECA and OEEC could not obscure the fact that Western Europe was not a viable economic unit and that its fundamental problems remained unsolved. Paul G. Hoffman, then Administrator of ECA, who had made repeated pleas for "economic integration" in Western Europe, had to admit that "Western Europe's progress toward integration has been disappointing." Yet the cooperative effort symbolized by the term "Marshall Plan" represented a great advance along the road to European unity. "When future historians look back upon the achievements of the Marshall Plan," declared Richard M. Bissell, Jr., formerly Acting ECA Administrator, "I believe they will see in it the charge that blasted the first substantial cracks in the centuries-old walls of European nationalism — walls that once destroyed will clear the way for the building of a unified, prosperous, and, above all, peaceful continent."²⁵


The Schuman Plan. The most far-reaching measures for the economic integration of Western Europe have been taken in the efforts to implement the Schuman Plan. This famous scheme may be described as an economic plan with a political purpose. By placing the entire production of coal and steel of the Benelux countries, France, Italy, and Western Germany under a joint high authority, and by creating political institutions of a supranational character as well, the Schuman Plan seemed to offer a means of getting to the heart of the Franco-German problem and of providing a remedy for some of Europe's basic maladies.

In late June, 1950, despite British abstention,²⁶ representatives of six European states — the Benelux countries, France, Italy, and West Germany — met in Paris to consider French Foreign Minister Schuman's proposal. It was soon clear that the central issue was not the creation of a joint high authority but the establishment of a kind of European federal parliament to which the authority would be responsible. During the second session of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, held in Strasbourg in August-September, 1950, the Schuman Plan was discussed at length. On August 26 the Assembly endorsed the Plan by a vote of 73 to 0, with 32 abstentions. It asked that "members of the

²⁴ *The Marshall Plan: Where We Are and Where We're Going* (Economic Cooperation Administration, March, 1950), p. 1.

²⁵ *Department of State Bulletin*, XXVI (Jan. 14, 1952), 43. For an excellent appraisal of the Marshall Plan, see Harry B. Price, *The Marshall Plan and Its Meaning* (Cornell University Press, 1955).

²⁶ For the British attitude, see Chapter 23.



The New York Times, August 17, 1952

The Saar's Role in Western Europe's Steel-Making Complex

France has long insisted on the importance of Saar coal to her steel industry. The Schuman Plan recognizes a much broader interdependence.

common parliament envisaged for the steel-coal authority be selected from the membership of the Consultative Assembly."²⁷

On April 18, 1951, nine months after the negotiations had opened in Paris, the foreign ministers of the six countries signed a draft treaty for the creation of a "European Coal and Steel Community."²⁸ The Netherlands ratified promptly, but the other states seemed reluctant to take the plunge. Even France, the sponsoring power, hung back; but at length,

²⁷ The New York Times, Aug. 27, 1950.

²⁸ For the texts of the draft treaty and the accompanying documents see *The Schuman Plan Constituting a European Coal and Steel Community*, Dept. of State Pub. 4173, European and British Commonwealth Series 22 (April, 1951).

on December 13, 1951, the National Assembly ratified the treaty by a vote of 377 to 233. Next to act was Western Germany. When the treaty was presented to the Bundestag a bitter debate ensued; but in January, 1952, the Bundestag followed the example of the French National Assembly, and on February 1 the Bundesrat gave it unanimous approval. The three remaining states fell into line soon thereafter. The nine-man high authority of the Plan took office on August 10, 1952, with Jean Monnet as chairman.

Early in September representatives of the six nations participating in the Schuman Plan took several significant steps which not only gave the new Coal and Steel Community "a solid foundation" but also advanced "the timetable of European unity." On September 8 the Council of Ministers, composed of one representative of each of the six states, held its organizational meeting in Luxembourg. Two days later, in Strasbourg, the Common Assembly of the Community, consisting of seventy-eight members representing the parliaments of the participating countries, met for the first time. Five months later, in February, 1953, the first trainload of coal crossed the Franco-German frontier without the traditional customs formalities. After nearly four years of planning, the Schuman Plan was in operation.

The record of the European Coal and Steel Community has been impressive in terms of its immediate economic objectives.²⁹ The Community has greatly expanded trade in coal and steel, and its Joint High Authority, under the leadership of two distinguished Frenchmen - Jean Monnet, and, since June 10, 1955, René Mayer - has made distinct progress in shaping policies to deal with cartels, investments, credit facilities and resources, and even social questions.

Whether the Community is really "Europe's first supranational organization" is a matter of definition - in any event, it is a bold new experiment in integration. Some observers had thought that the rejection of EDC by France would deal a fatal blow to the Community, but in fact the organization has continued to press for further pooling of vital resources and for expansion of its activities. In May, 1955, the Common Assembly called for an integration of European transport, invited "proposals from the Community on an expansion of its competence and of its powers," and suggested "one or more inter-governmental conferences to draw up.....draft statutes required for the realization of further stages in European integration."³⁰

On May 20 the governments of the Benelux countries sent formal proposals to France, Italy, and Western Germany for new integrative moves "which may best be taken in the economic field." The Benelux Memo-

²⁹ The Community publishes many reports on its activities. See especially the *Bulletin from the European Community for Coal and Steel*, published by the High Authority, and the annual general reports. See also John Goormaghtigh, "European Coal and Steel Community," *International Conciliation*, No. 503 (May, 1955).

³⁰ "Assembly Urges Extension of Community's Federal Powers," *Bulletin from the European Community for Coal and Steel*, No. 8 (June, 1955), p. 1.

randum proposed a conference for the purpose of beginning work on (1) a treaty on the pooling of transport, power, and atomic energy, (2) a treaty on general economic integration, and (3) a treaty defining the European institutions necessary to carry out the entire program. The foreign ministers of member states appointed a committee to study the problems raised by the integration plans, with Paul-Henri Spaak, Foreign Minister of Belgium, as chairman.³¹

THE MILITARY DEFENSE OF WESTERN EUROPE

Under present conditions the problem of the military defense of Western Europe is a particularly difficult one. Whether Russian troops could push to the English Channel in a few days, a few weeks, or a few months is a matter of speculation; but certainly there are no formidable geographic or military barriers to *blitzkrieg* from the East. The chief assurance of the West European countries lies in the implication of the presence of American troops between them and the Russians.

More recently the military posture of Western Europe, like its economic position, has greatly improved, although the basic weaknesses remain. The countries of that area have been driven by sheer necessity to make concerted efforts, and through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization they have associated themselves with the United States and other powerful nations of the free world. Eight West European states have formed a Western European Union, which, together with American, British, and other support through NATO, will, it is hoped, give Western Europe a force of sufficient size and strength to act as an effective deterrent to aggression.

The Dunkirk and Brussels Treaties. Quite logically, Britain and France took the initiative in promoting common defense efforts in Western Europe. The first concrete step was directed not against the new danger, Russia, but against the old aggressor, Germany. On March 4, 1947, nearly seven years after the unforgettable evacuation of Dunkirk, British and French officials met in that city to sign a fifty-year treaty of alliance and mutual assistance.

In the year that followed the signing of the Dunkirk Treaty relations between the East and the West rapidly deteriorated. With the Truman Doctrine, the breakdown of four-power negotiations on the German peace settlement, the Berlin crisis, Soviet opposition to the Marshall Plan, and other developments, the "cold war" began in earnest. The Communist coup d'état in Czechoslovakia in February, 1948, steeled the determination of Britain, France, and other countries to take further concerted measures for defense. British, French, and Benelux representatives met in Brussels to consider new security measures for Western Europe, and

³¹ "The Benelux Proposals," *Bulletin from the European Community for Coal and Steel*, No. 8 (June, 1955), pp. 2-3.

on March 17, 1948, they signed a fifty-year treaty of economic, social, and cultural collaboration and collective self-defense. The Brussels Treaty also set up a Consultative Council composed of the foreign ministers of the five participating states. Under the supervision of the Council an elaborate pattern of committees and defense machinery was developed, including a permanent defense organization with headquarters at Fontainebleau.

The North Atlantic Pact. No amount of coordination could give the Brussels powers, by themselves, a satisfactory defensive posture. They did not have the resources in manpower, finances, or equipment to develop more than a skeleton organization. The next step, therefore, was the association of the countries of Western Europe with the United States in a security pact. On April 4, 1949, after many months of negotiations on military, diplomatic, and political levels, representatives of twelve nations -- the Brussels Pact powers, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, and the United States -- signed the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington. In this notable document the major nations of the West, representing some 350,000,000 people, pledged themselves to strengthen "their free institutions," to "encourage economic collaboration," to "maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack," and, most important of all, to consider "an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America.....an attack against them all."

In general, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as the elaborate structure of commands and committees which was created to implement the North Atlantic Treaty is called, provides the essential framework for the concerted defense of the North Atlantic area, broadly defined. Most of the participants are European states, and the defense of Western Europe is *the* major concern of the organization. Its permanent headquarters are located in Paris, and SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Powers in Europe) has been established nearby. SHAPE was the result of an important decision of the North Atlantic Council in September, 1950, to establish, "at the earliest possible date.....an integrated force under centralized command, which shall be adequate to deter aggression and to ensure the defense of Western Europe." At a meeting in Lisbon in February, 1952, the Council agreed to undertake more effective defense measures, but for various reasons the military programs of the European members have not approached the proportions envisioned at Lisbon. The "new look" in Russia after Stalin's death produced a more relaxed atmosphere in the non-Communist world and thereby further undermined support for greater sacrifices and expenditures for collective defense. The spectacular developments in nuclear warfare also raised serious questions regarding the feasibility of existing defense planning for Western Europe. Indeed, many people wondered whether in the atomic age Western Europe was defensible at all. Under these circumstances the gap between the actual programs and the defense effort

needed to give Western Europe even a minimum degree of security remained disturbingly great.

The European Defense Community. With the attack on South Korea in June, 1950, the United States in particular became convinced that West German rearmament could no longer be avoided. Since a separate German army could not be tolerated, the only answer seemed to be to integrate German troops into a West European army. The idea was formally approved by the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, meeting at Strasbourg in August, 1950 -- the same meeting at which the presence of German delegates signalized Germany's formal re-entry into the community of European states. A month later, at a meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Secretary Acheson suggested the organization of ten German divisions, to be placed under the operational control of the NATO commander in Europe. Unwilling to go along with this proposal, which seemed to revive memories of the German menace, French statesmen turned their thoughts to an alternative concept. Realizing that they must soon reconcile themselves with as much grace as they could muster to the idea of a sizable German force, they proposed the development of a European army simultaneously with that of the integrated North Atlantic force. This projected European Defense Community, a military counterpart of the Schuman Plan, became known as the Pleven Plan, after the French premier who proposed it.

In February, 1952, both the German Bundestag and the French National Assembly approved the negotiations for the European army, but both attached important conditions. The Germans agreed to rearm only if they were given almost complete independence and were fully accepted into the West European community and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The French, reflecting what the *New York Times* called "an abiding suspicion of the good faith of Germans in uniform," would consent to German rearmament only after West Germany had finally accepted the Schuman Plan and after the European Defense Community had actually been created. Soon afterwards the North Atlantic Council, in the historic meeting in Lisbon, approved the plan for a European Defense Community and agreed on "cross guarantees" between NATO and the Community. Encouraged by these developments, the delegates working on a draft treaty completed their work, and in May, 1952, the treaty for the establishment of the Community was signed by the foreign ministers of the six participating states.


Developments of January, 1953, at least temporarily dampened the enthusiasm of the supporters of unified European defense and, indeed, of European integration. Rene Mayer succeeded in forming a new government for France -- to replace that of Pinay -- only through promising the Gaullists that, for one thing, the European Army Treaty would be renegotiated. Chancellor Adenauer of West Germany thereupon disclosed that he too would ask for some revisions in the Treaty. Mayer next revealed that he would hold up the Treaty until some agreement had been

GERMAN REARMAMENT — THREE VIEWS



Visky in The London Chronicle

"It's got to fit in."



Die Welt, Hamburg

"Well, anyway, we are secure from the rear."



Woop in L'Aurore, Paris

reached on the future of the Saar. In an election of November 30, 1952, the voters of the Saar had clearly indicated their preference for economic attachment to France, much to the consternation of most West Germans. Here, for the first time, the Saar trouble spot was linked with proposals for European unity.

The Paris Agreements : A New Approach. Throughout 1953 and the first half of 1954 weak French governments showed a notable reluctance to press forward with EDC, and the general climate of opinion in France became increasingly unfavorable to the proposal. On August 30, by a vote of 319 to 264, the French National Assembly voted to kill the EDC Treaty. In the fall of 1954 the foreign ministers of nine states — seven of Western Europe, plus Canada and the United States — met in London to consider alternatives to EDC. Here Sir Anthony Eden made an explicit pledge of Britain's willingness to maintain forces on the continent of Europe, and on October 3 the delegates signed accords for the military and political association of the West German state with the other states of Western Europe. On October 23, in Paris, representatives of fifteen nations signed thirty separate treaties and agreements to implement the decisions of the London conference. These provided for ending the occupation of Western Germany and granting full sovereignty to the West German Republic, the enlargement of the Brussels Treaty Organization into a Western European Union by the inclusion of West Germany and Italy, the admission of West Germany into NATO, and British, American, and Canadian guarantees for participation in the defense of Western Europe. France and Western Germany signed a separate agreement for the "Europeanization" of the Saar.

Instead of establishing a supranational organization for European defense, as the EDC Treaty proposed, the new agreements called for cooperation and closer association on many fronts without approaching the sensitive issue of sovereignty. They provided a broad framework for the defense of Western Europe until more permanent arrangements became possible. In May, 1955, the London-Paris agreements entered into effect. On May 2 the North Atlantic Council met for the first time with West Germany as a member. Three days later the occupation of Germany formally ended, and Chancellor Adenauer proclaimed the beginning of a new era in German history. But the great issue of German unification remained unsettled.

THE POLITICAL INTEGRATION OF WESTERN EUROPE

For those who believe with William C. Bullitt that "without European federation none of the basic problems can be solved" or with Clement Attlee that "Europe must federate or perish," concrete progress toward the political integration of Europe in the postwar period has been disappointing. Obviously, as long as the East-West split continues, the pros-

pects for a real United States of Europe are fantastically remote. The only kind of integration that can take shape to the east of the "iron curtain" is integration by conquest and not by federation — a process not unknown to earlier periods.

We should not underestimate the cumulative effects of historical experience and postwar realities upon the peoples of Western Europe. The necessity of self-preservation has driven them and their governments closer together and has produced a great variety of cooperative plans and organizations. It may well be that as a result of this experience Western Europe is being in fact unified to a far greater degree than most persons realize. This is the conviction and the hope of many distinguished European statesmen and scholars, as well as of sympathetic observers across the Atlantic. In his message to Congress of March 6, 1952, on the Mutual Security Program for fiscal 1953, President Truman expressed the view that "Europe has moved faster toward integration in the last five years than it did in the previous 500." Although this sounded good a bit of historical research would have disclosed that it meant very little.

The Idea of a United Europe. The idea of a United Europe is an ancient one. In the Roman Empire, the empire of Charlemagne, the universality of medieval Christendom, and the Napoleonic empire it came close to realization — usually, however, through conquest. Although the rise of national states resulted in the fragmentation rather than the unification of Europe, the idea persisted. In one form or another it has been advocated by many famous men from the time of Henry IV and the Duke of Sully to that of Winston Churchill. In the years between the two world wars, especially between 1922 and 1930, the idea of European federation received a great deal of attention and support. In 1923 Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, an Austrian, perhaps the most persistent of the modern advocates of European unity, published *Pan-Europe*, the first of a number of challenging books and pamphlets from his pen. In October, 1926, the first Pan-European Congress, attended by some 2000 delegates, met in Vienna and organized the Pan-European Union, with Coudenhove-Kalergi as President. The movement received powerful support from the leading European statesmen of the mid-and late 1920's, notably Edouard Herriot and Aristide Briand of France and Gustav Stresemann of Germany.³²

In a brilliant speech to the Assembly of the League of Nations in 1929 Briand invited all European members of the League to join in setting up a Union of Europe; and in the following year he submitted his famous "Memorandum on the Organization of a System of European Federal Union."³³ The Memorandum aroused great interest but led to no con-

³² The early projects for European unity have been described in a number of volumes. See, for example, Andrew and Francis Boyd, *Western Union: A Study of the Trend Toward European Unity* (Public Affairs Press, 1949); Edith Wynner and G. Lloyd, *Searchlight on Peace Plans* (Dutton, 1944); Sydney D. Bailey, "United Europe: A Short History of the Idea," *National News-Letter* (1947).

³³ The full text of Briand's Memorandum is printed in Boyd and Boyd, *Western Union*, Appendix A, pp. 95-108.

crete results. After 1930 the international situation rapidly deteriorated, and with it the hopes for European unity.

Postwar Movements. In the postwar period the official and semi-official pressures for European federation have been powerfully manifest. In December, 1947, the United Europe movements in England and France, headed by Churchill and Herriot, joined with the European Union of Federalists, headed by H. Brugmans of the Netherlands, and the Independent League for European Co-operation, headed by Paul van Zeeland of Belgium, to create an International Committee of the Movements for European Unity and to issue a call for a Congress of Europe to be held at The Hague. Within a short time several other groups, notably the International Society for the United States of Europe and the European Parliamentary Union, agreed to send representatives to the Hague Congress.

The Congress at The Hague, in May 1948, was the most important of the many meetings of unofficial organizations for European unity. More than seven hundred delegates from fifteen countries of Europe and observers from most of the rest, except Russia, and from Canada and the United States attended this notable conference. In his opening address Winston Churchill, who presided, declared that "we cannot aim at anything less than the union of Europe as a whole."³⁴ The Congress adopted a number of stirring resolutions,³⁵ and it established the International Committee of Movements for European Unity as a permanent agency to influence governments to act along the line of the Hague resolutions. In August this Committee addressed a memorandum to the Brussels Pact states, urging them to undertake the task of organizing a European Assembly. Unquestionably the pressure from the Committee and the expressions of approval from unofficial organizations helped to persuade the Brussels Pact states to establish a Committee on European Unity and to take the steps leading to the creation of the Council of Europe.

The Council of Europe. In July, 1948, Georges Bidault, then Foreign Minister of France, submitted a proposal to the Consultative Council of the Brussels Pact powers for the creation of a European Assembly "in which there would be represented, in addition to our Parliaments, those of the other States who wished to participate in this great and notable enterprise." Ernest Bevin of Britain rejected the proposal as premature, but he later agreed to the appointment of a special intergovernmental Committee on European Unity. The Committee hammered out a compromise plan for a Council of Europe, with a Committee of Ministers, which should meet in private, and a Consultative Assembly, which should hold public sessions to discuss agenda approved by the Council of Ministers. Britain was reluctant to endorse even this proposal; but at a meeting of the Brussels Consultative Council in January, 1949, Bevin joined

³⁴ For the full text of this important speech see the *New York Times*, May 8, 1948.

³⁵ The texts of the resolutions of the Hague Congress are given in full in Boyd and Boyd, Appendix H, pp. 159-164.

the foreign ministers of the four other powers in a decision to establish a Council of Europe, as proposed by the Committee on European Unity. Its headquarters would be in the Alsatian city of Strasbourg.

In March, 1949, representatives of ten nations -- the Brussels Pact countries, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Norway, and Sweden -- met in London to draft a Statute for the Council of Europe. The Statute was signed and made public on May 5, 1949. While it marked the beginning of something like a parliament of Western Europe, that parliament is in reality a futile sort of thing, with no sovereign powers. The Consultative Assembly, which is the deliberative organ of the Council, is limited almost entirely to a consideration of matters referred to it by the Committee of Ministers and can only make recommendations to the Committee of Ministers. A statement issued by the foreign ministers who signed the Statute expressly declared that "matters relating to national defense do not fall within the scope of the Council of Europe," and it implied that political matters were excluded as well. Moreover, in effect the main work of economic integration was largely outside its compass, since the OEEC Council and other bodies were already functioning in that field.

The second session of the Consultative Assembly, held in August-September, 1950, was highlighted by the adoption of a resolution, proposed by Winston Churchill, for the creation of a "unified European army," and by vigorous debates on the Schuman Plan. By taking a stand on a European army, or even by discussing the subject, the members of the Consultative Assembly were challenging and in a sense modifying the provision of the Statute that "matters relating to national defense" were outside the Council's jurisdiction.

At almost every subsequent meeting of the Consultative Assembly proposals for extending the Council's powers and activities have been advanced, usually without leading to concrete results. The Assembly has frequently considered problems of relations with new institutions and communities in Western Europe, either contemplated or actually in existence, and with the European federation, when and if it is established.

The Council of Europe has carried on a rather undramatic existence, but it has served as a useful forum for European opinion on a political level and it has given encouragement to other and bolder movements for West European cooperation. It is eager to expand its own powers and activities. Six of its members, including West Germany, have adhered to a European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which entered into effect in 1955. The Council has a small but competent Secretariat at its headquarters in Strasbourg, the unofficial capital of Western Europe. Leading statesmen still come to the Council's sessions, and often they speak more frankly in the "House of Europe" than they are wont to do elsewhere.

Political Implications of the Schuman and Pleven Plans. When he outlined his proposal for a European Coal and Steel Community on May 9, 1950, French Foreign Minister Schuman declared: "By pooling basic pro-

duction and by creating a new high authority whose decisions will be binding on France, Germany, and the other countries who may.....join, this proposal will create the first concrete foundation for a European federation which is so indispensable for the preservation of peace."³⁶ Accordingly, when delegates from six West European nations met in Paris in June, 1950, to consider the Schuman Plan, their meeting was called "unique among international conferences. It was unique because its aim was unique. This aim was a pooling not only of power but of a measure of sovereignty.....it was to be the first real step, an unprecedented step, toward a federation of European nations."³⁷ Because of its bold and sweeping character, the Schuman Plan "captured the imagination as no other proposal has done since the war." It was the first major test of the willingness of the European nations to give up some of their sovereignty in fact as well as on paper.³⁸

The Pleven Plan presented an even more searching test. In attempting to implement it the governments of the West European states, with the strong encouragement of the United States and of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, and in spite of British aloofness, agreed to create supranational political as well as military institutions. They expressed a hope that a single directly-elected bicameral parliament, with the power "to levy taxes, administer a combined defense budget, and oversee management of coal and steel industries united under the Schuman Plan," could be established by January 1, 1955. This agreement was hailed at the time as "the most important move yet taken for a United States of Europe."

Even more significant was a decision by the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community, made at its first meeting in September, 1952. At the suggestion of the Council of Ministers, the Assembly decided to undertake the task of preparing a treaty which would create "a European political community," with "a common Parliament which, presumably, would have real powers and would be a further step toward a federation of the six states and possibly later of other states."³⁹ In 1953 the draft plan for a European federation was submitted to the respective

³⁶ For the text of this statement see *Department of State Bulletin*, XXII (June 12, 1950), 936-937. When representatives of France, the Benelux countries, West Germany, and Italy met in Paris to study the French coal-steel plan, the French proposed that the suggested joint high authority be responsible to a federal parliament chosen by the national legislatures of the participating states.

³⁷ Harold Callender, dispatch from Paris, June 24, 1950; in the *New York Times*, June 25, 1950, E3.

³⁸ In February, 1955, the head of the French Steel Federation stated publicly that Jean Monnet should pay more attention to coal and steel and less attention to politics. This remark revealed a basic lack of comprehension of the real nature and objectives of the organization which M. Monnet was serving so ably. "For the Coal and Steel Community is above all political. It does not aspire to offer Europe a federal constitution, but it does aspire to point the way toward something like a United States of Europe." Harold Callender, "Coal-Steel Pool Has Politics, Too," the *New York Times*, Feb. 28., 1955.

³⁹ The *New York Times*, Sept. 14, 1952, E5; see also E1 and E2.

governments. A new chapter in the long story of efforts toward European unity was thus opened.

Since 1953, however, the trend has been away from the federal approach. Since the defeat of EDC the plan for a European political community has been all but forgotten. The governments of Western Europe now seem content to emphasize further cooperation along conventional lines ; but they may eventually gain from that cooperation the desire for a federal system for Europe.

The United States and European Unity. The United States has consistently urged the nations of Western Europe to move farther and faster along the road to integration. But on the whole her approach has been a gentle one, confined largely to exhortation and praise. Congress has been more insistent than the Executive that steps toward unity should be taken by the nations of Europe as an indication of their willingness to do everything within their power to help themselves ;⁴⁰ but even on Capitol Hill, with the exception of some ardent advocates of "Atlantic Union," the pressure has been confined largely to talk. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1948 was silent on the matter, but in 1949 act was amended to read that it was the policy of the "people of the United States to encourage the unification of Europe." In 1950 the word "further" was inserted before "unification." The Mutual Security Act of 1951 stated that the funds authorized were to be used "to further encourage the economic unification and the political federation of Europe" ; and in the Mutual Security Act of 1952 Congress gave additional evidence of its support of unification by providing that part of the funds for foreign economic and military assistance might be allocated directly to NATO and to the political authorities to be set up to supervise the Schuman Plan and the plan for a European Defense Community.

Many influential persons in Western Europe as well as in the United States believe that the United States has been too cautious in her approach to Europe. This was the judgment of a group of fourteen members of the Senate and the House of Representatives who conferred in Strasbourg for five days in November, 1951, with eighteen members of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe. The Americans reported that "they encountered considerable opinion on the part of the European statesmen with whom they met that the United States should have been more forthright and insistent in earlier legislation that substantial steps be taken by Western Europe toward economic and political federation in return for the aid tendered."⁴¹

No American has been more outspoken in favor of European federation

⁴⁰ Senate Resolution No. 269, introduced by Senators Fullbright, McMahon, and Sparkman in 1951, declared : "It is the sense of the Senate that collaboration of a United States of Europe and the United States of America, along with the other free nations of the world dedicated to the same principles, would be one of the greatest contributions of this century to the preservation of freedom and the attainment of peace on earth."

⁴¹ Senate Resolution No. 269.

than Dwight D. Eisenhower. On July 3, 1951, in a memorable speech in London to a distinguished gathering that included Winston Churchill, Eisenhower referred to the great benefits which would result from European federation. Later, in January, 1952, he endorsed the Council of Ministers' proposal, already noted, for the establishment of a federal parliament for Western Europe. Throughout the presidential campaign of 1952 he reiterated his strong support of steps toward the unification of Europe. As President he soon intimated that more forthright efforts toward integration might be the price of continued American aid, but the actions he recommended never materialized. In more recent years he has recognized that Europeans have preferred cooperation to federation, and he has accommodated himself to that shift.

"FEDERATE OR PERISH"?

In the twentieth century, and especially since the end of World War II, great changes have occurred in Europe and in Europe's position in world affairs. The countries which were at the heart of Western civilization for many centuries have been fundamentally weakened, and their political and economic progress since V-E Day has not obscured this underlying reality. Europe is no longer a going concern. Its future depends as much upon the trend of world events as upon its own evolution. It is the center of the East-West struggle, or the "cold war," with Germany as its primary focus. It needs an open rather than a closed world; it can survive only with difficulty if present trends toward economic and political seclusion continue.

Although some of the general observations in this chapter apply to Europe as a whole, we have concentrated our attention on non-Communist Europe, reserving for a later chapter the developments east of the "iron curtain." There a system of Soviet-dominated states — the so-called "people's democracies" — has come into existence. An exception to the pattern of Soviet domination appeared in 1948 when Tito of Yugoslavia asserted and made good an independent national communism. More consistent with Soviet policy than the acquiescence in Tito's "deviationism" was the ruthless suppression of the anti-Communist, anti-Russian, and pro-nationalist uprising in Hungary in late 1956.

The countries of Western Europe have achieved a remarkable degree of economic recovery since the end of the Second World War, and they have taken a number of important steps in the direction of military and political as well as economic integration. The greatest contributions to economic recovery were made through and as a result of the Marshall Plan. This plan was dependent, of course, on generous assistance from the United States; but it also stimulated heroic concerted efforts by the participating nations. On the whole, it was a marked success in its early phases and immediate objectives, but there is considerable doubt whether

it achieved its ultimate goal of a self-sustaining Europe or whether it contributed to a solution of Europe's basic economic problems.

Many important leaders have publicly stated their belief in the necessity of the "consolidation of Europe," to quote Ernest Bevin : but they have hesitated to take steps to give meaning and substance to their words. One of their greatest achievements has been the establishment of the Council of Europe, but the Council is far from being a real European, or even West European, parliament. Its Assembly can do no more than make recommendations to the Committee of Ministers, which possesses the right to veto and whose decisions, in turn, are subject to approval and review by the member governments.

More significant, perhaps, is the community approach, which represents a curious and practical amalgam of the federal and the functional types of association. This approach has already taken tangible form in the European Coal and Steel Community, and it has given rise to proposals for many different kinds of communities, economic, social, military, and political. The defeat of the treaty for a European Defense Community was a severe blow to the whole community idea. The proposed European Political Community is still in the blueprint stage. In the meantime, the nations of Western Europe are trying to deal with their common problems along essentially national lines.

The strongest pressure for the political integration of Western Europe, or of Europe as a whole, has come from non-official groups, such as the United Europe Movement. Although they differ considerably in membership and in specific proposals, they are all in favor of some kind of federation. They believe that the problems of Europe cannot be resolved within the existing political and economic framework and that they must therefore work for the federation of all of Europe, or of as much of it as can be persuaded to unite for its own salvation.

In the postwar years the countries of Western Europe have moved forward more rapidly in the direction of cooperative efforts than at any previous period in their long history. Thousands of their people and scores of their political leaders have espoused the cause of unity, although few have really been able to think in truly supranational terms. A bewildering complex of agencies and organizations for West European cooperation has evolved, and the experience in common action on many fronts may lead to more binding association. But Western Europe is still a long way from effective unity,⁴² and the prospects for real unity on an all-European or Atlantic community basis seem remote indeed. The gap between the Council of Europe and a United States of Europe represents

⁴² There is unfortunately much truth in Herbert Luethy's observations on "the fate of all European undertakings ; they were never able to mature, but were always overtaken by a hurried new beginning in a totally different direction or using different methods ; the result was that they were obscured or pushed to the sidelines, with the result that 'Europe' ended by resembling a chaotic building site on which a dozen half or quarter-finished buildings lay higgledy-piggledy, making the whole look astonishingly like a heap of ruins." *France Against Herself*, p. 359.

the distance between reality and idealism in the European scene today.

The measurement of Europe's progress toward integration must take account of more than the proliferation of organs and agencies ; it must note possible changes in motivation as well. How much of the postwar willingness to venture toward unification has been due to temporary desperation brought on by the miseries of World War II? How much to the Communist threat, which even now may be receding? How much to please the rich uncle across the seas? How much to the idealism and vigor of a handful of European visionaries? How much to a deep belief in the good to be gained from expanded production, enlarged markets, cultural fusion, and all the other products and by-products of unification? If something like a United States of Europe does come to pass, what have we then? A long step toward the brotherhood of man? Or a tri-polar world?

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The Shifting Scene in Asia.

16

The "revolt of Asia" may prove to be the most significant development of the twentieth century. Arnold Toynbee ventures the prediction that even the challenge of communism "may come to seem a small affair when the probably far more potent civilizations of India and China respond in their turn to our Western challenge. In the long run they seem likely to produce much deeper effects on our Western life than Russia can ever hope to produce with her Communism."¹

Much of Asia is in the process of emerging into the modern era and of establishing an entirely new pattern of relations with the rest of the world. There has been, as Jawaharlal Nehru has emphasized, "a certain historic change in the relationship of forces in Asia." Declining colonialism and rising nationalism are symptomatic of a new order of affairs. But the free nations of Asia are finding that independence is attended by a host of problems; they are beset from without by the repercussions of the "cold war" and of power diplomacy and from within by political divisions, by the clash between the old ways and the new, and by demands which they are in no position to fulfill. Although the revolution for national independence in Asia has been largely won, the more deep-rooted "revolution of rising expectations" has just begun. The masses of the people are beginning to be articulate — a development that has revolutionary implications for the world. The life conditions of the Asian peoples are still close to intolerable, and they are improving slowly, if at all. Unless life becomes better for the Asian masses there can be no peace in Asia or in the world. The net effect of these tendencies — accentuated but not initiated by World War II — is certain to be that Asia

¹ *Civilization on Trial* (Oxford University Press, 1948), p. 221.

will play a more active role in world politics, a role more commensurate with its size, its population, and its potential might.

Perhaps, as Robert Payne insists, "the major task of our generation is the understanding of Asia, for Asia represents potentially the mastery of the world in manpower and resources."² We of the Western world are poorly prepared to seek this understanding. To us the history of the world is the history of Western civilization — an assumption which is a logical result of our formal education and conditioning but which never did make much sense. Actually, civilization began in the Orient, and for many centuries the rich cultures of Asia were far superior to those of the Western world. The tradition of ancient greatness lingered long after the reality had gone, and has, in fact, never completely died out.

The people of the West are not yet conscious of either the extent or the revolutionary implications for their own society of the awakening of Asia. Students of international politics, in particular, can no longer concentrate on the Western state system to the exclusion of the rest of the world. They must now really study *world* politics. Unfortunately, for some time to come they will have neither adequate source materials nor experienced teachers in the field of Asian studies.

THE ASIAN SETTING

Geography. Asia is the giant among the continents — so large that on the map Europe appears as hardly more than one of its several great peninsulas. Asia has one-third of the land area of the globe. From north to south it extends for more than 5,000 miles, from well above the Arctic Circle to below the Equator if we include the Indonesian chain of islands. From east to west it extends for more than 5,500 miles. Its coastline is some 35,000 miles in length.

Central Asia has been called "the roof of the world." It is an area of great tablelands and lofty mountain ranges, including the Himalayas, the highest on earth. It is also an area of vast desert and wasteland. It includes such remote lands as Sinkiang, the "pivot of Asia," Outer Mongolia, and the Central Asia portions of the U. S. S. R. These are the "inner frontiers of Asia."³

"Almost every known climate occurs in Asia, from the equatorial rainy type of Malaya to the ice field climate of Nova Zemlya."⁴ Sections of India receive some of the heaviest rainfall in the world, while several of the desert areas of the continent receive some of the lightest. Temperatures vary from extremes of 100° or more below zero in parts of Siberia

² Robert Payne, *The Revolt of Asia* (John Day, 1947), p. 290.

³ See Owen Lattimore and others, *The Inner Asian Frontiers of China* (American Geographical Society, 1940) ; also Owen Lattimore and others, *Pivot of Asia* (Little, Brown, 1950 ; McClelland, 1950).

⁴ George B. Cressey, *Asia's Lands and Peoples* (McGraw-Hill, 1944). p. 20.

to 120° and above in parts of India. Average temperatures range from around 0° to 80° or more.

For the student of international relations the continent of Asia may be regarded as consisting of five major areas : (1) Soviet Asia, (2) the Far East, (3) Southeast Asia, (4) South Asia, and (5) Southwest Asia. "Southwest Asia" is probably better, although less widely used, than either "Near East," to which Americans are accustomed, or "Middle East," the favorite British designation, which Americans are beginning to use. There is some doubt whether Iran, for example, belongs in the "Near East" or whether Turkey can be placed in the "Middle East," but there is no doubt at all that both are in Southwest Asia. Even this more comprehensive designation can include Egypt, as it must, only by a certain amount of geographic license.⁵

Western students today are inclined to think of Asia as divided into two inharmonious parts : Communist Asia and non-Communist Asia. The area under Communist control includes Soviet Asia, China, and most of inner Asia, including Tibet and Sinkiang. It embraces considerably more than half of the entire continent. On the map it appears as a huge mass resting in a bowl or crescent running from Turkey to Japan. Students of geopolitics may think of it in Halford Mackinder's terms as an expanded, more highly developed, and more militant Heartland pressing upon a steadily diminishing Inner Crescent or Rimland.

Many Asians will object to this Communist versus non-Communist division on the ground that it reflects the "two camps" or "two worlds" obsession of the West rather than the "many worlds in one world" philosophy of the East. Moreover, any reference to the East-West conflict, one of the standard clichés in the Western world, is likely to be misunderstood everywhere in Asia, for all Asians, Communist and non-Communist, belong to the East.


In many respects, however, the distinction between East and West has considerable validity. As an anonymous Indian official put it,

It is more truly a distinction between peoples and governments preoccupied with the elementary needs of humanity, with food and freedom and peace -- and peoples and governments preoccupied with the more complex aspirations arising out of the possession of vast power. It is the distinction, as one might say, between the spinning wheel and the atom bomb. This is what lies at the root of the protest against "power politics" that is so often to be heard in the east.⁶

The Social Pattern. In population Asia comprises more than half of the world. More than 1,300,000,000 people live in the vast continent, mostly

⁵ The Indian Government has announced that henceforth it will use the terms "East Asia" and "West Asia." There may be some uncertainty about where India herself fits in these two categories, but they are less relative than the conventional designations, which reflect geographical realities only when viewed from Europe.

⁶ "India as a World Power," *Foreign Affairs*, XXVII (July, 1949), 550.



in China, India, Japan, Indonesia, and Pakistan. Asia has sparsely populated areas, as in the great deserts in the Arabian Peninsula and the Gobi Desert, and in the wastelands of northern Siberia; and it also has densely inhabited areas, as in Java and along the lower reaches of the Yangtze and Yellow Rivers in China and the Ganges River in India.

The vast majority of the people of Asia are landless agricultural workers, living at the starvation level, illiterate, inarticulate, sunk in age-old poverty, torpor, superstition, and disease. Birth rates are still appallingly high and life expectancy is appallingly low. Asia's people are engaged in a bitter struggle for survival. There is not enough food for all; and if improved methods of health and sanitation are introduced without great increases in food production and without voluntary limitations on the size of families, the population, already increasing rapidly, will tend to expand so tremendously that many millions more will die of malnutrition and disease. In a sense, crude Malthusianism is operating in Asia, creating a situation with political as well as human implications that cannot be assessed.

The widespread illiteracy in nearly all Asian lands is another serious

problem. In some respects this is both the cause and the natural result of the deplorable living conditions, for until at least the barest rudiments of learning can be made available to the masses, with advanced training in technical and social fields for a substantial number of potential leaders, there is little hope for real improvement. On the other hand, as long as the vast majority live at the subsistence level or below it, they can never have the opportunity, the incentive, or the vigor for even the most elementary kind of formal education.

These problems of poverty, illiteracy, disease and population pressure must be kept in mind if Asia is to be understood. Here are the basic social facts: Most of the people are peasants in a relatively low stage of agrarian economy, subject to all the vagaries of nature and the oppression of landlords, moneylenders, and feudal masters. They cannot be expected to appreciate the blessings of "democracy" or the dangers of "communism." They will judge any political system by its apparent effects on their conditions of life. They may respond to nostrums rather than to reason, and they may listen to false prophets and demagogues who exploit their grievances and promise them better things. They represent "the hewers of wood and the drawers of water" who have been the victims of knaves and despots throughout history. Yet the power of these heretofore inarticulate masses is potentially greater than that of atom bombs.

In an era of growing social consciousness the explosive possibilities of the Asian masses are aggravated by the fact that throughout large sections of Asia misery is on the increase. This is largely a result of the dislocations caused by World War II and the disorders of the postwar period. In Korea a tolerable economic order was made impossible by the artificial division of the country, the loss of Japanese markets, and political weakness. Since the invasion of South Korea in June, 1950, the entire country has been devastated, millions of Koreans have died, and millions more are homeless refugees in their own country. In China the civil war, following eight years of warfare against the Japanese, was more than the tottering political and economic structure could withstand. It now seems apparent that the fancied blessings consequent upon the victory of the Chinese Communists have proved to be illusory, and that the effects of extensive requisitions from the countryside, widespread famine, and the intervention in the Korean War have been well-nigh disastrous to the people of China. In the great "rice bowl" of Southeast Asia, particularly in Indo-China and Burma, civil war and other disturbances have driven thousands from their homes and their rice fields. In the republics of India and Pakistan millions of people are threatened with starvation. In many other Asian countries the same gloomy situation prevails.

The Problem of Population. Every year there are more mouths to feed in Asia. Estimates put the total increase between 1850 and 1900 at 200 millions, and between 1900 and 1950 at 400 millions. "A population increase in Asia of 800 million to one billion people within the next 50

years is a distinct possibility."⁷ Demographic statistics are notoriously inadequate and inaccurate in Asian countries, but even the most conservative estimates of future population growth in the already overcrowded parts give cause for alarm. In Japan more than 85,000,000 people are crowded into an area about the size of California, with limited natural resources and with only some 15 to 20 per cent of the area in arable land. Demographers predict that the population of Japan will continue to increase rapidly for decades, and will not begin to level off until it reaches perhaps 100,000,000. The picture in China and India, already the most populous nations of the world, is almost equally depressing. China now has more than 500 million people ;⁸ by 1980 the figure may be close to 700 million. The Union of India and Pakistan have a combined population of nearly 450 million ; in the next generation, if present trends continue, it may exceed 600 million.

No student of international relations can ignore demographic facts, for they do much to determine group and national behavior. Their significance is forcefully stated by Robert Strausz-Hupe :

The rapid and massive increase of Asia's population is perhaps the greatest problem facing the world today...perhaps the greatest challenge which ever faced mankind. It is rendered doubly poignant by the fact that the population of western Europe and the United States is slated for the same period for no increase and, more likely, for absolute decline. It requires no particular feats of imagination to perceive that this change of population distribution is fraught with immense consequences in terms of the distribution of world food supplies, relationship of population density to arable soil, and shifts of world centers of economic and political power.⁹

Attitude Toward Change. These problems would be serious enough if they could be dealt with rationally and scientifically, with the full co-operation of native leaders, other governments, and international agencies. But any far-reaching changes in the life conditions of the Asian masses would tend to upset the existing social and political order, and would threaten the position of the privileged few who exercise a determining influence in most countries in Asia today. Almost nowhere is there a powerful and influential native middle class ; instead, a great gulf intervenes between the rulers and the ruled, between those at the top of the social and political hierarchy and the uncounted millions who live on the edge of the abyss or in it. With some happy exceptions, the leaders of many Asian states are hostile to all attempts at social change.

It is hard for well-fed Occidentals, accustomed to a relatively stable political and social structure, to understand the cumulative ills which

⁷ Robert Strausz-Hupe, "The Future of Asia," *Social Science*, XXV (Jan., 1950), 5.

⁸ On the basis of the Census of 1953 the Chinese Communist Government claimed a population of 590,000,000 for Mainland China and Taiwan (Formosa). These totals were about 100,000,000 larger than previous estimates. See George B. Cressey "The 1953 Census of China," *The Far Eastern Quarterly*, XIV (May, 1955), 387-388.

⁹ Strausz-Hupe, pp. 5-6.

beset so much of Asia, especially when they are described in general terms. Perhaps a concrete illustration will be helpful. In June, 1951, at the height of the controversy over the proposed nationalization of the oil fields in Iran, an American correspondent wrote from Teheran :

Iran today is sick with disease, with poverty, with governmental corruption and bureaucracy. Nine-tenths of its people live, almost literally, in the 15th century. Its 43,000 villages are owned by a few hundred families, and the average farm income is \$50 a year. Between 80 and 90 per cent of the population is illiterate, and utterly ignorant of politics and the outside world.

Hygiene, outside the larger centers, is almost unknown. One baby in every three dies before he is a year old. In great areas of the country 88 per cent of the people have malaria.

Politics, as the West knows it, hardly exists. Eight of the 136 members of the Majlis (Parliament)—the eight who forced the nationalization of oil—were elected in free elections in the city of Teheran.

The rest, with scattered exceptions, are wealthy landlords or their representatives, whose "voters" cast their ballots automatically for the owner of their village. Corruption and bribery are accepted as the rule, not the exception.

Business and government are equally feeble, corrupt and slipshod. Provincial officials are appointed from Teheran, rule over people who never saw them before, and count it their right to line their pockets while the appointment lasts. A bloated bureaucracy stumbles helplessly through red tape, and it takes a letter ten days to cross the country.¹⁰

The events in Iran in mid-1951 were typical of what Sir Olaf Caroe has called "that political malaise which turns men aside from reasonable action and disturbs the course of international planning."¹¹

East Is East. Western students of international politics need to be reminded that the standards of values, the attitudes toward life, and the concepts of society of Oriental peoples are often very different from those which lie at the base of Western civilization. "Man and society have not been seen by East and by West through identical spectacles."¹² At the risk of making facile generalizations which are subject to all kinds of qualifications, it may be said that in the Orient a greater emphasis is placed on spiritual and nonmaterial values ; that the Oriental tradition has been one of group or collective behavior, with a definite subordination of the individual ; that Oriental customs and traditions, deeply rooted and often ages old, impose formidable obstacles to technological

¹⁰ Morley Cassidy, dispatch from Teheran, June 11, 1951 ; in the *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin* of the same date.

¹¹ *Wells of Power* (Macmillan, 1951), p. 190. Used by permission of the author, Macmillan and Company, Ltd., London, and St. Martin's Press, New York.

¹² Paul H. Clyde, "Post-War Government in the Far East," in Taylor Cole and John H. Hallowell, eds., *Post-war Government in the Far East (Journal of Politics, 1947)*, p. 484. See also Derk Bodde, "Dominant Ideas," in H. F. MacNair, ed., *China* (University of California Press, 1946), pp. 18-28.

progress and social advance ; and, in short, that a wholly different concept of the nature of man, his purpose in life, and his place in the universe prevails. The Confucianist concept of the Ta Tung, the Great Unity, the universal unity of man and nature, has meaning to most Oriental peoples. It has little meaning for Occidentals.

Time, too, is one thing in the East, another in the West. The typical Chinese view, Graham Peck believes, is that "Man's position in time is that of a person sitting beside a river, facing always downstream as he watches the water flow past," whereas a characteristic Western view is that "Man faces in the other direction, with his back to the past, which is sinking away behind him, and his face turned upward to the future, which is floating down upon him."¹⁸ Many of the attitudes of Asians toward world problems which Americans, in particular, regard as of the greatest urgency can be better understood if it is remembered that Asians are conditioned by what Robert Trumbull has called "an oriental consciousness of limitless time."

THE HERITAGE OF THE PAST

The past weighs heavily upon the Asian present. That past is a long and varied one. It goes back to the most ancient of civilized societies. Perhaps the first of the world's civilizations were those in Egypt, Mesopotamia, Persia, the Indus Valley, and northeastern China. Those of India and China are today the world's oldest continuous civilizations, but they have somehow pretty much escaped the consciousness of Western man.

Culture Currents in Ancient Asia. From the beginnings of recorded history until the Renaissance, the Reformation, and other developments ushered in the modern -- and European -- era of history, Asia was the home of much of the vivification of the globe. Even the Greeks owed a great deal to the earlier cultures of Asia, and Hellenistic civilization reached its highest development in Egypt and Western Asia rather than in Greece. The debt of the Romans to Asia was more indirect, chiefly through the Greeks ; but Western Asia formed an important part of the Roman Empire, and Asian influences -- such as Christianity and Mithraism -- had a profound effect on Rome. Indeed, all the great religions -- Judaism, Buddhism, Zoroastrianism, Christianity, Mohammedanism -- originated in Asia, and Hinduism and Confucianism, which perhaps should be regarded as systems of philosophy rather than as religions, also are products of Asia.

Of all the civilizations that developed in Asia, after the mighty empires of antiquity had passed from the scene, those which had the most lasting effect were the Arab-Persian, the Indian, and the Chinese. The Arab-Persian had roots deep in the past, but it developed a conquering zeal after the rise of Mohammed in the deserts of Arabia in the late sixth

and early seventh centuries. In the eighth and ninth centuries Bagdad became "the biggest intellectual center of the civilized world," where Greek, Hebrew, Christian, and Indian scholars mingled with their Muslim colleagues and thousands of precious manuscripts and books were collected. Later the Muslims drove across North Africa into Spain, and there established universities and other centers of culture. Islam eventually spread throughout most of North Africa and into Central and South-eastern Asia. Even today the peoples of these areas, from Morocco to Pakistan, are overwhelmingly Muslim.

Indian civilization, the product of the fusion of many peoples and cultures over many centuries, reached out to put its mark on distant lands, especially in Central and Southeast Asia and in the Far East. Rulers of Indian empires governed parts of Central Asia, and in turn strong men emerged from Central Asia to sit on Indian thrones. Southeast Asia has long been under Indian influence — it is still sometimes referred to as "Greater India" — chiefly as a result of the establishment of Indian colonies and the spread of Indian cultures and customs.

For many centuries, and to a marked degree even up to the present, Chinese civilization has dominated the Far East. Confucius, Lao-tzu, and Mencius — still the greatest of Chinese philosophers — lived during the Chou dynasty, and the Chou had passed into history by two and a half centuries before the birth of Christ! By the time of the fall of the Han dynasty in 220 A.D. "China and its civilization had developed most of the main aspects which were to characterize them down into the twentieth century."¹¹ Early Chinese culture was by no means wholly isolated from other flourishing cultures elsewhere in Asia, or even from those which eventually arose in Europe; but it was basically self-satisfied and self-centered, and it had a peculiar concept of its relations with the rest of the world. While the richness of ancient Chinese culture was pre-eminently one of philosophy, it was also notable for its achievements in art and literature. It is significant that printing was developed in China centuries before the first book was printed in Europe.

The early civilizations of Asia provided the "Oriental background against which Greek culture rose, and from which it was never completely isolated save in the minds of classical scholars."¹² Greek contacts with Egypt and the civilizations of Asia Minor and other parts of the Near East were quite close and easy. Furthermore, as Nehru has pointed out, "Greece and India were in contact with each other from the earliest recorded times, and in a later period there were close contacts between India and Hellenized western Asia."¹³ Moreover, no one of the major civilizations of Asia was insulated from any of the others. An extensive trade between India and China, and between India and Western Asia,

¹¹ Kenneth S. Latourette, *A Short History of the Far East* (Macmillan, 1946), p. 110. Used by permission of The Macmillan Company.

¹² E. R. Dodds in Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India* (John Day, 1946), p. 141.

¹³ Nehru, p. 146.

both by land and by sea, had developed by the third and second centuries B.C., and "there was regular maritime intercourse between India and the Far East at least as early as the first century A.D." ¹⁷ In the early centuries of the Christian era Buddhism began to spread to China and Southeast Asia, and, changed and adapted to the traditions of the native civilizations, it is still the dominant religion of China, Japan, and Korea.

For nearly four and a half centuries, during what K. M. Panikkar has termed "the Vasco da Gama epoch of Asian history," much of Asia was under the domination of foreign powers, and the rest was isolated and backward, out of the stream of international life. Even between major areas, as between China and India and between China and Japan, relations were limited and unimportant.

The Impact of the West. From the sixteenth century to the present the impact of the West upon these ancient lands has been tremendous and — it should be confessed — generally unfortunate for the Asians themselves. While Christian missionaries were trying to save the souls of the people, and often their bodies as well, officials and traders from the West were extorting what wealth they could, with little concern for the welfare of the inhabitants. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries England gained footholds in India and attempted to win concessions in Japan and China. French missionaries and traders established contacts with Indo-China as early as the seventeenth century, but nearly three hundred years were to elapse before French Indo-China came into being. Portugal, too, early contended for possessions in the East, but managed to pick up and retain only small holdings in India and the island of Macao, near Hong Kong. Holland took over the East Indies, and in the seventeenth century won from the *shoguns* — who were leading Japan into isolation — concessions on Deshima Island in Nagasaki Bay, which became Japan's only window to the outside world.

China was opened to foreign penetration in the nineteenth century through the Opium War of 1839-1842 with Great Britain and the treaty concessions that followed. Soon after the middle of the century the "black ships" of Commodore Perry forced Japan to open her gates. Meantime Russia had long since pushed eastward. In the mid-nineteenth century she reached the Pacific and in 1860 founded Vladivostok as a military outpost. It is still her best port on the Pacific. In the same year she obtained the northern half of the island of Sakhalin from Japan. Russia's building of the Trans-Siberian Railway, begun in the 1890's and completed in 1905, was an engineering triumph comparable to the building of the first transcontinental railroad in the United States after the Civil War. Extending for 6,300 miles, nearly one-fourth of the circumference of the globe, the Trans-Siberian linked Europe with the Far East and the Pacific and did much to make the vast expanse of Siberia an effective part of the Russian realm.

India experienced the most intimate contact with the West, and in

¹⁷ Nehru, p. 196.

some ways the most disturbing one. Clive's defeat of the Nawab of Bengal at Plassey in 1757 traditionally marks the beginning of the British Empire in India. By the early nineteenth century British power had been consolidated there, and no serious challenge to that power arose until the years following World War I, when the Indian nationalist movement became an effective force. In India three civilizations — the Hindu, the Islamic, and the Western Christian, to adopt the terminology of Arnold Toynbee — have met. The encounter has led to a considerable degree of fusion and cross-fertilization, but it has also produced frictions and tensions on a mammoth scale.

Almost all of Asia has been profoundly affected by the impact of Western technology and Western ideas. Both have made a deep impression, although both seem to be ill-adapted to the Asian scene. In a sense the nations of Asia have used the new strength which they acquired from the West to throw off the shackles of Western domination. Western ideas underlie the present Asian revolution. Above all, as Toynbee has pointed out, the impact of the West gave the peoples of Asia "an idea, an ideal, a hope," and implanted in their minds the dream of the "possibility of a change for the better." If the West is reaping the whirlwind in Asia today, it should remember that it began to sow the wind many decades ago.

The Western student of international affairs must never minimize or forget the greatness of Asia's ancient past or the tribulations of its recent past. Today the people of Asia, and especially their leaders, are very conscious of these as their lands begin to stir after the lassitude and the foreign domination of the past. Although in some respects consciousness of the older past and loyalty to its customs, traditions, and superstitions rest with weight upon the people of Asia, at the same time the legends of by-gone ages give them a sense of pride, of achievement, and of confidence in themselves. Nehru has expressed these same views in speaking of India :

The tremendous inertia of age and size [has] weighed her down, degrading custom and evil practice have eaten into her, many a parasite has clung to her and sucked her blood, but behind all this lie the strength of ages and the subconscious wisdom of an ancient race. For we are very old, and trackless centuries whisper in our ears ; yet we have known how to regain our youth again and again, though the memory and dreams of those past ages endure with us.¹⁸

ASIA "OUT OF CONTROL"

The Turn of the Century. For centuries political and social instability has been a constant feature of the Asian scene, and for at least the past

¹⁸ Nehru, p. 144.

three centuries external pressures, chiefly from the Western powers, have been generally present. At the beginning of the twentieth century, however, a kind of momentary political equilibrium existed. The major stabilizing element, perhaps, was British power. Strongly entrenched in India, Singapore, Hong Kong, and elsewhere, Britain's influence was felt from the Mediterranean to the Far East. In Southwest Asia she was cultivating close ties with the Arab world, ties which were to be exploited during World War I, when British and Arabs worked together to bring about the collapse of the decadent Ottoman Empire. India, though on the verge of a strong national awakening, was relatively tranquil under British rule. Most of Southeast Asia was under the control of the French and the Dutch. Russia was beginning to develop Siberia, but, as the Russo-Japanese War demonstrated, she was not strong enough to upset the equilibrium elsewhere.

In China the weak Manchu Dynasty, which had barely survived the Taiping Rebellion of the mid-nineteenth century, was tottering; it held on a bit longer largely through the dynamic energy of the Dowager Empress, Tzu Hsi. China herself escaped extinction chiefly because of the rivalry of a number of great powers. Britain, France, Germany, and Russia all had major spheres of interest and special concessions. Japan was the only Asian power which had risen to first rank. Her easy defeat of China in 1894-1895, her alliance with Great Britain in 1902, and, above all, her victory over Russia in 1904-1905 won for her general recognition as a great power. Nevertheless, she had not yet embarked on a career of continental expansion.

World War I and its Aftermath. World War I had an upsetting effect in the Far East and elsewhere in Asia, and the old equilibrium was never to be fully restored. Britain began to lose her dominant position there and with it the role on the world stage which she had played so effectively during the *Pax Britannica*. The Russian Revolution had profound effects on Asia, and communism began to have a powerful appeal for Asian minds. Nationalism became an increasingly potent force, especially in the Near and Middle East and in India. China floundered in a revolution of many phases, and in the 1930's Japan embarked on a policy of expansion and conquest on the mainland. Asia began to experience the full impact of the changes which had been gathering momentum for many decades. New stabilizing forces did not develop to arrest the tendencies toward dislocation and disequilibrium. The situation was illustrated by "the tragedy of the Chinese revolution," the retentive power of imperialism, and the success of military fascism in Japan and of Japanese expansion in Asia.

The New Asia. The power equilibrium which prevailed throughout most of Asia half a century ago has been shattered beyond repair. Possibly the fundamental cause has been the growing national consciousness of the Asian peoples and the growing weakness of the colonial powers. The more immediate cause was probably the actions of Japan, whose invasion

of Manchuria in 1931 inaugurated a campaign of expansion on the mainland of Asia and set in motion a train of events which culminated in World War II. The Japanese slogan of "Asia for the Asians," although it proved to be a thin disguise for Japanese imperialism, had explosive effects which lasted long after the sun of Nippon had set in the waters of the Pacific. The defeat of Japan, however, had at least one major disturbing result: it upset the international balance of power in that part of the world and left a power vacuum in the Far East. Because China was too weak to fill this vacuum, and because Britain was unable to resume her historic role in the area, the Soviet Union and the United States, the two rival giants of the postwar era, were drawn into—or rushed to fill—this vacuum. The fate of many of the peoples of the Far East, including those of Japan and Korea and perhaps of China as well, therefore became dependent on the relations between the two super-powers.

The Communist victory in China has been an event of tremendous significance. It further upsets the balance of power, or adds to the disequilibrium, in the Far East, and perhaps in all of Asia. With communism on the march, spearheaded by a militant and aggressive Soviet Union allied with Communist China, the pressure on all the rest of Asia is very great. This is particularly true of Southeast Asia, where the situation is peculiarly unstable anyway.

British withdrawal from India has been a major factor in upsetting the power equilibrium in South and Southwestern Asia. Today, when old political and social ills are becoming aggravated, and when such factors as the emergence of Israel as an independent state — an enclave of Judaism in a hostile Arab world — growing pressure from Russia, and fanatical nationalism have introduced new causes for alarm, increasing American interest in Southwest Asia and Britain's efforts to preserve as much as possible of her influence there are feeble restraints indeed.

The old order in Asia was based on the stability imposed by imperial powers, notably Great Britain, and by reactionary rule, such as that of the Tokugawas, the Manchus, and the Ottoman Turks. Before a new era could come to Asia, an old order had to be destroyed. The date the new era has been a revolutionary one, and no new equilibrium has yet been achieved. The major point to bear in mind is that great changes have occurred in the power structure of Asia, and that in consequence Asia today is, in Owen Lattimore's words, "out of control."¹⁹ It is casting off its external restraints, with the exception of those being imposed by the semi-Asian power of Russia, and it has not yet developed effective controls of its own. Under present conditions there can be "no peace for Asia."

¹⁹ See Owen Lattimore, *The Situation in Asia* (Little, Brown, 1949), pp. 3-13.

MAJOR ASIAN TRENDS AND ATTITUDES

Differences within Asia are almost incredibly great. Furthermore, the differences within some of its larger states or areas are almost equally notable. But the countries and the peoples of Asia have many things in common ; and they are now beginning to share an unprecedented awakening. Among the significant trends and attitudes in Asia today the following may be singled out for special emphasis :

1. *Asia is in revolt.* Asian peoples are revolting against bondage to the past, against the old feudal relationships between rulers and ruled, against social and caste distinctions, against poverty and ignorance and disease, against foreign domination in every form. The immensity of their revolution should escape no one. It is among the most powerful forces in the world today. The protest in Asia is not altogether against the West and colonialism ; equally important is the resolution to end old and wretched ways of living. Not all Asians are misled into believing that the two revolutions are one and the same thing.

2. *Nationalism is an increasingly potent force.* It has led to the rise of many new states in Asia in the postwar period, from Israel to the Republic of the Philippines, and it has stimulated independence movements in nearly all colonial areas, as in Malaya and Indo-China. It has been a significant force in occupied Japan, in war-torn China, in devastated and still-divided Korea, in somnolent Saudi Arabia, even in remote Nepal. It has been invoked with revolutionary effect by great leaders of the recent past, and it has been a source of unifying strength for present-day leaders. It is by no means peculiar to Asia. It has given enormous impetus to independence movements in Africa, and it is a power to be reckoned with in world affairs in general. Although similar in theory and effect to the nationalism of the Western state system, it also seems to be developing distinctive features of its own.

3. *While nationalism is becoming more powerful and more successful, colonialism, or imperialism, is declining — indeed dying.* This is a development of vast importance to the areas of Asia which have recently achieved or are in the process of achieving independence, to the colonial powers which, with varying degrees of realism, are adjusting themselves to the inevitable, and to the world at large. The decline of imperialism had been in progress for some decades, but it reached the proportions of a collapse after the Second World War. Before 1939 Britain, France, and the Netherlands possessed vast empires in Asia ; British imperial interests, in fact, extended from one end of the continent to the other. Today the great empires are gone, probably forever. The French still have some special ties with the "states" that have emerged in Indo-China. Britain still retains Malaya and North Borneo and strategic outposts like Hong Kong and Aden. Holland continues her rule over Western New Guinea. Portugal still has Macao, and is resisting Indian pressures to abandon Goa and other footholds in India. But these are no more than vestigial

remains of the once mighty domains of Western powers in Asia. While the colonial powers do not accept the judgment of the Bandung Conference that "colonialism in all its manifestations is an evil," they are on the defensive, and their leaders and peoples recognize that a new order is in the making.

4. *Conversely, imperialism in Asia is struggling to keep alive.* The colonial powers are loath to surrender their possessions and their prestige. This is particularly true of France and until 1949 was true of Holland as well. The British Labor Government, with considerable grace and rapidity, granted complete autonomy to India, once the brightest jewel in the British Crown, allowed Burma to opt out of the British system, and extended full Dominion status to Ceylon ; but many Englishmen deplore what Winston Churchill has often denounced as the liquidation of the British Empire. Furthermore, the British made haste to reoccupy Hong Kong after the war, and English colonial administrators and their ladies dance again in formal dress in the hotels of Singapore. Even more tenacious is what has been called the imperial frame of mind, which is reflected, consciously or unconsciously, in the policies of Western states in such situations as the Iranian crisis, the Anglo-Egyptian disputes and the struggle in Indo-China, and in the attitudes and actions of many westerners who visit or live in Asian countries.

5. *One form of imperialism, however, is definitely in the ascendant in Asia. This is Soviet imperialism.* For many decades tsarist Russia followed an imperialist policy in Asia, but this was mostly of the incorporative type, involving the absorption of peoples and territories into the expanding Russian domains. After the Revolution of 1917, the leaders of the Bolshevik regime repudiated imperialism — which Lenin described as the last gasp of a dying capitalist system — and appealed to the people of Asia as champions of anti-imperialism. It soon became apparent nonetheless that the Soviets were furthering their own ends through a subtle form of imperialism while posing as friends and liberators. In recent years their techniques of expansion and control have become more flagrant and more overt. World War II, and especially the defeat of Japan, created a situation in Asia which the Soviet leaders were not slow to exploit. Linked with a powerful ideological movement and with an acquiescent ally in Communist China, the Soviet Union is carrying on a kind of imperialism which bodes ill for all who do not welcome the Russian yoke.

There is much truth in the bitter statement of Dr. T. S. Tsiang, United Nations representative of Nationalist China : "Even at the height of the nineteenth century imperialism, no movement of imperial expansion can be compared to what Soviet Russia has achieved in Asia in recent years. Stalin has surpassed all the Ivans, Peters, Alexanders, and Nicholases of Russian history."²⁰ This view found vigorous support at the Asian-

²⁰ Address before the First Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations on Nov. 25, 1949.

African conference in Bandung, in April, 1955. Spokesmen of Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, the Philippines, and even Ceylon backed a resolution so worded as to include condemnation of the "new colonialism" of the Communists carried out by "force, infiltration and subversion," as well as of the older colonialism associated with Western powers. Naturally a conference attended by Chou-En-lai, Nehru, Nu, Sastroamidjojo, and others who sought agreement rather than division did not endorse this resolution, but the energy with which the charge was pressed was a singular revelation of the strong anti-Communist sentiment among Asians themselves.

6. *Nevertheless, the attractive power of communism in Asia today is very great.* A glance at a map will serve as a reminder that the greater part of the Asian mainland, and more than half of the people in the greatest of continents, are already under Communist control. Soviet Asia and China encompass much of the continent, forming a huge Communist intrusion and focus of power. Communist-controlled regimes hold power in North Korea and North Viet Nam, and Communist parties and fellow-travelers probe and scheme in almost every part of non-Communist Asia. The relations between communism and nationalism, and the reasons for the appeal of communism to Asians are explored at greater length later in this chapter.

7. *On certain matters most Asian spokesmen seem to be agreed.* This agreement centers on demands for economic and social justice, political independence and anti-imperialism, the end of racial discrimination, the improvement of living conditions for the masses of the people, and freedom from any kind of outside domination. Asian leaders show an extreme sensitivity to pretensions of outside powers to make decisions affecting Asia without the full participation of the Asians themselves. In a statement on foreign affairs in the Indian House of the People on September 17, 1953, Nehru declared in a typical outburst: "Somehow it is not realized by many of the great powers of the world that the countries of Asia, however weak they may be, do not propose to be ignored, do not propose to be bypassed, and certainly do not propose to be sat upon." The slogan "Asia for the Asians," even though it has been corroded by the use which the Japanese made of it, still exercises an almost irresistible appeal in Asia. The Communists use it with considerable success.

8. *Asians reject the concept of an all-inclusive bipolarity.* To be sure, one of the rival giants of our time now controls more than one-third of Asia; it is joined geographically and ideologically with Communist China, and its parties and agents reach into almost every nook and corner of Asia. To be sure, also, the other giant occupied Japan for six and one half years; it has a powerful base in Okinawa; and it has special ties with its stepchild, the Republic of the Philippines, as well as with Japan, South Korea, Formosa, Pakistan, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand, and the great colonial powers. But it is well to remember that the majority of the articulate people of Asia reject both communism and the American brand

of capitalism. They do not wish to become affiliated with either ism ; and they are convinced that their lands can become "third countries," to use Owen Lattimore's phrase, which can change the present bipolarity into a more complex balance and in many ways contribute to international cooperation.

9. *With respect to foreign policy orientation at least five different attitudes may be discerned among Asian leaders today.* These attitudes may be labeled as follows : (1) Communist China's attitude ; (2) Nationalist China-South Korea's attitude ; (3) the pro-Western attitude ; (4) the Iran-Arab attitude ; and (5) the "uncommitted world" attitude. Communist China would keep peace in Asia and save the continent from "capitalist imperialism" by bringing the entire area under Communist control. Nationalist China and the Republic of Korea would, in Syngman Rhee's words, "make Asia safe for freedom" by winning back the mainland of Asia, unifying Korea, and forcing the "inevitable" showdown with the Soviet Union before the Communist world becomes too strong. The "pro-Western" states believe that neutrality is impossible under present conditions. They prefer to seek peace through strength and through collective security, and they are willing to join Western powers in regional arrangements and security pacts. This group of states includes Turkey, Pakistan, Thailand, the Philippines, and perhaps Japan. Iran and the Arab states of the Middle East, possibly excepting Iraq, combine an awareness of the Communist threat with bitter memories of past relations with Western powers. Their recollections of the Iranian oil dispute, the Suez Canal question, and the complex of issues involved in the Arab-Israeli hostility put them in no mood for close association with their former "oppressors." The states of the "uncommitted world" seek to occupy "middle ground between America and Russia" : they speak of "neutrality," "independence," and "non-alignment." India is the leading member of this group ; others are Indonesia, Burma, Ceylon, and possibly Cambodia. Nehru has been its most eloquent spokesman. He is certainly the most important non-Communist leader in Asia, and on the relations of Asian to non-Asian states he probably speaks for more of Asia than any other living man.

10. *Asian countries are playing an increasingly important role in world affairs, one more in keeping with their potential than with their present power.* Realistically speaking, no Asian state is a major power today, although both China and India seem to be moving rapidly toward that status and although Japan, the only Asian state to win such recognition in the past, may regain some of her earlier prestige. China occupies a significant but undetermined place in the Communist orbit, and her influence extends over much of the continent. India speaks with particular authority because of her political, strategic, and ideological position. Her influence extends to the East through her role as the most important of the Colombo powers and of the "neutralist" nations, and to the West as a spokesman of the enlarged "Arab-Asian" group in the United Nations. Indian representatives have played an important mediatory or supervisory

role in many international conferences and on many international issues. Japan regained her independence only in 1952, but already her weight is felt in the markets and the councils of the world. As the most technologically advanced state in Asia, and as the major non-Communist state of the Far East and western Pacific, she has added importance and influence. Indonesia is politically unstable and economically weak, but she is also the largest and potentially most important nation in a part of the world that has great economic and strategic significance. The Arab League is one of the weakest of all regional arrangements. Its member states are neither strong nor populous, but their influence is far greater than their resources or strength, for they are in a sense the spokesmen for the Arab world and they control areas of vast strategic importance. For these and many other reasons the voices of Asian spokesmen are listened to with respect, even though these voices reflect many points of view and lack the support of formidable power.

11. *The relative positions and influence in Asia of the United States, the U.S.S.R., and Great Britain have undergone profound changes.* Briefly stated, the attractive power of the United States steadily increased until the end of World War II, but then noticeably declined in the postwar period. There are, of course, many reasons for this change, but the fact remains that for the United States the Asian "reservoir of good will" -- as Wendell Willkie put it -- reached a new low. At the same time the United States had never before been so deeply involved in Asian affairs; her influence is still great, even if her objectives and intentions are often misunderstood. Her "attractive power" rose again in late 1956.

The Red Star, on the other hand, has been steadily rising over the Asian continent. In a sense Russia has won, by design and by accident, the position formerly held by Britain in Asian affairs and to which Japan aspired. The Communist victory in China was a tremendous gain in strength for the Communist world. Soviet influence in Asia has never been greater than it is today, and it is still growing. The Communist leaders have been diabolically clever in exploiting the prestige of success, the anti-colonial and anti-imperialist feelings of Asian peoples, and the weaknesses and injustices of native regimes.

The decline in the power and influence of Great Britain in the present century has been startling. Her position has been seriously weakened by her own internal difficulties, by growing competition from other states with larger populations and greater resources, and by the rising national consciousness in her colonial possessions and elsewhere in Asia. Today the British Empire in the East has been virtually liquidated. Burma is independent; India, Pakistan, and Ceylon, as well as Australia and New Zealand, are independent members of the Commonwealth; and England's hold on Hong Kong and the Malay States is uncertain.

It would be difficult to assess the relative positions and influence of these three major world powers in Asia at the present time. Contrary to the prewar situation, British power is considerably inferior to American

and Russian power in Asia, as elsewhere, although British influence is still great in many parts of the continent. The U.S.S.R. directly controls a substantial part of the entire Asian area, is linked by many ties to Communist China and lesser Asian Communist regimes, and has an obvious, though indeterminable, influence in non-Communist Asia. Her recent moves in the Middle East are elements of her bid for Asian supremacy. The United States, as the most powerful of the non-Communist states of the world, the leading industrial nation, the chief purchaser of raw materials, and the main barrier to the further extension of Communist power, has great influence in non-Communist Asia from Japan and Korea to the shores of the Mediterranean. Whether American power and influence are greater than that of the Soviet Union is at present a matter of speculation.

12. *The recent developments in China are certain to have revolutionary effects on all of Asia.* Since the Revolution of 1911-1912, with the possible exceptions of the Nationalist Government from 1928 to 1931 and the present Communist regime, China has never had a government which exercised effective control over all her territory. Instead, she has been torn by strife between competing war lords, and particularly between the Nationalist Government and the Chinese Communists, and by nearly a decade of exhausting warfare against Japan.

Since the end of World War II, for reasons which are still being debated, the international balance of power has shifted from the Kuomintang (the party which controlled the Nationalist Government) to the Communists to such an extent that the mainland of China is now in Communist hands. The implications of this startling event are just beginning to be appreciated. China is the first colonial or semicolonial country to fall under Communist control. As emphasized in the report of a subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the United States House of Representatives, China will presumably become "for the Communists the pilot plant and proving ground for the development of Communist theory and strategy and tactics for all of the industrially backward areas of the world."²¹ "These areas," the report continued, "happen to include about three-fourths of the world's population."

13. *World War II marked the end of the phenomenal rise of Japan, of her aspirations for domination of East Asia, and — at least for the time being — of her status as a great power.* When she surrendered in 1945 Japan had been driven out of most of the vast territory she had occupied, except in China ; her navy and merchant fleet had been largely destroyed ; most of her factories and many larger cities had been reduced to heaps of rubble ; and her dreams of conquest had been shattered. From the fall of 1945 to the spring of 1952 Japan, reduced to her four home islands, was occupied under the stern paternalism of General MacArthur. The Japanese tried to re-establish a minimum basis of economic self-sufficiency and to learn

²¹ *Communism in China*, Supplement III (C) of Report of Subcommittee No. 5 of Committee on Foreign Affairs, U. S. House of Representatives, on "National and International Movements" (Government Printing Office, 1948), p. 3. Original in italics.

the difficult art of democratic government. They have continued this effort since the peace treaty went into effect, but the odds against them are very great. This abrupt reversal of fortune was a shock to the war lords and the indoctrinated masses of Japan, and it created a wholly new situation in East Asia. The successors to Japan's Fascist-militarists in this area seem to be the Communists of China.

14. *India and Pakistan are beginning to play more active roles in Asian and world affairs.* The great subcontinent, with a population of nearly 450 million people and with extensive natural resources, is potentially one of the power centers of the world. The new republics of Pakistan and India have weathered the first years of national independence, though beset with many serious problems — relations with each other and with the former princely states, refugee problems, the Kashmir dispute, economic and financial troubles, inexperienced and often corrupt political leadership, widespread famine and suffering, Communist agitation, a great variety of unsettled political issues, and, above all else, the well-nigh insuperable handicap of the depressed conditions of living that make economic and political stability virtually impossible. At best, conditions here will continue to be grave for many years to come.

Pakistan, the second most populous of the Muslim countries, looks toward Southwest Asia, and seems hopeful of becoming the leading power of the Muslim world and of exercising a stabilizing influence on the other Muslim states. Larger and better endowed with resources than Pakistan, India aspires to leadership in South and Southeast Asia, and regards herself as a champion of Asian causes. Her leaders seek not to form a coalition of the new states for any purpose, offensive or defensive, but to bring the nations of Asia together to consider common problems and to renew the old contacts with neighboring countries, which had been almost wholly suspended with the coming of the Western powers. It is significant that she took the initiative in calling the Asian Relations Conference of 1947 and the Conference on Indonesia of 1949, both of which were held in New Delhi.

15. *Politically, if not geographically, India, China, and Japan form a great Asian triangle.* At the present time these states are in a process of transition and the relations of each to the others are still in a state of evolution and flux. Culturally, and to some extent politically, relations between India and China seem to be close and cordial. India has become the chief non-Communist champion of Communist China's claims to recognition by other states and to admission to the United Nations. In the long run the two states may emerge as rivals rather than as collaborators. The present rulers of China are Communists who are attempting to remold that ancient land in the Communist image and who are proud of their position as members of "the anti-imperialist camp, headed by the U.S.S.R." The leaders of free India, on the other hand, have deliberately chosen the democratic way, and they have not hesitated to take strong measures against the Communists within their country. Nor are they

unmindful of the 2,000 miles of frontiers with Communist China, or of the nature and aims of world communism. China is trying to woo Japan, with offers of profitable trade to follow the regularization of diplomatic relations. Japan and India have not had close relations in the past, but in the postwar period both have shown a desire for closer contacts as well as concern for the effects of competition in Southeast Asia and elsewhere for markets and raw materials. Certainly the interaction of the three great states which form the Asian triangle will have an important bearing on the future of Asia and of the world.

NATIONALISM IN ASIA

In his address to a joint session of the United States Congress on May 17, 1956, President Sukarno of Indonesia declared : "Nationalism may be an out-of-date doctrine for many in this world ; for us of Asia and Africa, it is the mainspring of our efforts. Understand that, and you have the key to much of post-war history." Certainly nationalism is the most dynamic force in Asia today ; yet in many ways it is foreign to the Asian scene. It has few roots in the history of that continent, and was, indeed, essentially an importation from abroad. "The origin of nationalism in Asia was in the nature of a rebound from the European imperialism of the last century." ²² The nation-state, developed in the Western world, has for the past three hundred years provided the dominant pattern of international organization ; but as late as 1900 there was hardly a "nation" in all of Asia, unless the rising island kingdom of Japan, fast taking to Western political, military, and industrial techniques, may be regarded as an exception.

The "un-Asianness" of Asian nationalism is suggested in these penetrating observations by Paul M. A. Linebarger :

Asian nationalism involves the application to a variety of non-European cultures of political concepts not indigenous to those cultures... Though Asian nationalism functions in the modern world, it is derived from an identification on the part of Asians themselves with the image "Asian" projected to Asia by Europeans, whether in person or through mass communications, and by the further mimesis on the part of the Asians of the European concept "nationalism," for which neologisms have had to be created in most of the Asian languages concerned. The Asian nationalism which confronts the world today is, ideologically and emotionally considered, not an internal dynamic springing from the older pre-modern Asian cultures. It is instead an entirely valid response to massive Western emotional and spiritual demands. ²³

²² B. R. Sen, "Nationalism and the Asian Awakening," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, CCLXXXII (July, 1952), 110.

²³ "Asian Nationalism : Some Psychiatric Aspects of Political Mimesis," *Psychiatry*, XVII (August, 1954), 262. By permission of the William Alanson White Psychiatric Foundation, Inc.

Until the present century the obstacles to the development of nationalism in Asia were many : spiritual and cultural traditions : ignorance, poverty, and provincialism ; the rigid social and caste system in most countries ; and the strong grip of foreign imperialism. But one of the most obvious signs of Asia's renaissance is the emergence of nationalism. This has affected, and is affecting, all sections of the continent. It has already revolutionized the internal conditions in many countries, and it has led to the appearance of several new and independent states. It has made Asia a focal point in the "cold war."

Sun Yat-sen believed that China would remain a "hypo-colony" and would be open to further indignities from foreign interests as long as she remained disunited and weak. To him nationalism was the cohesive force that was needed to build a strong state. He expressed a universally-held view of leaders of Asian nationalism : that independence is a prerequisite of national development, of the solution of the economic and social problems of their countries, and of human dignity.²⁴ Hence the desire for independence was no less strong in countries which were experiencing the mellow imperialism of Great Britain and the United States than in those, like Korea, where all nationalistic tendencies were ruthlessly stamped out. An oft-repeated slogan, "Good government is no substitute for self-government," expressed this conviction. Nor were Asian nationalists impressed by the argument that their peoples were not ready for freedom and that they must therefore be patient.

In their immediate objectives the nationalist movements of Asia have been almost universally successful ; but the transition from the struggle for nation-winning to the no less arduous task of nation-building has been difficult. Many Asian leaders and peoples are still in the colonial frame of mind ; they seem still to be fighting the battle for independence rather than building sound political, economic, and social foundations for the new nations. But they are beginning to realize that independence is not an end in itself, and certainly not a panacea for all their ills. Asian nationalism must now be directed toward making independence meaningful.

Nationalism is, of course, always complex. The student must probe beneath the surface to the intangibles of the social system, the cultural pattern, national character, and many other basic factors. This basic approach is particularly important in the case of Asian nationalism, which not only has developed distinctive general characteristics but also has varied greatly from country to country. For these reasons a general commentary on Asian nationalism should be accompanied by a country-

²⁴ In an unsigned article in *The Voice of Free Indonesia* in the spring of 1946 Soetan Sjahrir, the theorist and technician of the Indonesian revolution, stated the reasons for this revolution : "So we resisted, not primarily because we were driven by hatred, resentment, or aversion to foreigners, but because we consider freedom as a *conditio sine qua non*, without which it is impossible for us to be ourselves, to form ourselves and our community. Freedom is the condition for human dignity." Quoted in Payne, p. 60.

by-country analysis of nationalist movements and by a study of the careers of the great nationalist leaders of the past and present, such as Sun Yat-sen, Mustafa Kemal Pasha, Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharalal Nehru, Aung San, Achmed Sukarno, Mohammed Hatta, and Soetan Sjahrir, Syng-man Rhee and Kim Koo, and José Rizal and Manuel Quezon.

Japan. Japan was the first of the Asian countries to be influenced by modern nationalism, strongly flavored by traditional practices and beliefs.²⁵ Beginning in the second half of the nineteenth century her leaders built up a highly centralized state, with all the trappings of militarism, authoritarianism, and nationalism. They made every effort to inculcate loyalty to the emperor, and thus to the state and its real rulers. By building up with all possible speed a strong central government, based on industrial and military power, Japan was able to guard her sovereignty and gain recognition as a major power. In this process, unhappily, "the relatively mild official type of state nationalism" of the nineteenth century turned into "virulent integral nationalism — once the government safety valve of expansionism had been opened."²⁶

The rise of Japan to the unquestioned status of a great power after her surprising defeat of Russia in the war of 1904-1905 stimulated nationalist movements elsewhere in Asia. This marked the beginning of the decline of foreign control over Asia and of the legend of the invincibility of the white man, and it heralded a new order of affairs for half the people of the world. If Japan had pursued different policies she might become the recognized leader of Oriental aspirations for individual and national independence; instead, she evinced a brutal disregard for the interests of her fellow-Orientals. The potential leader of the new Asia offered hardly more than a new yoke for the old.

As a result of World War II and seven and a half years of occupation Japan underwent a series of political, economic, and social changes which, on the surface at least, seemed to be truly revolutionary. On April 28, 1952, the Japanese peace treaty, signed in San Francisco in the previous September, went into effect, and Japan regained full sovereignty. The once-mighty Asian state re-entered the family of nations with firm promises of good intentions and peaceful aims. Japanese nationalism, it appears, is already reasserting itself. Thus far its manifestations have been of a relatively healthy kind, but some observers insist that no fundamental change in national character or national policy has occurred, and

²⁵ Yoshida Shoin and a few of his disciples who became leaders of Meiji Japan espoused views which might be described as "nationalistic" or even "ultranationalistic" in the mid-nineteenth century, but even in Japan it would be a mistake to suggest that nationalism in the modern sense had much of an impact before the last third of the century. Hilary Conroy concludes: "In spite of the island setting, the emperor system, the blatant preachings of Nichiren (1222-1282) . . . the ambitious schemes of Hideyoshi (1590's) . . . and the antforeignism of the Imperial party (1854-1867), there was at most 'national consciousness' in Japan before 1868." Moreover, "there was little nationalism in the leadership of the Restoration." "Japanese Nationalism and Expansionism," *The American Historical Review*, LX (July, 1955), 820-821.

²⁶ Conroy, p. 829.

they even fear that "what has happened under MacArthur in Japan has paved the way for the resurgence of Japanese ultranationalism."²⁷

China. The obstacles to the growth of modern nationalism in China have been very great. The concept of China as one nation among many was foreign to Chinese tradition. To the Chinese theirs was a universal empire, the center of the universe, and all other countries were satellites. Individualism and patriotism meant very little. The family system, with its emphasis on obedience to the elder members of the larger family and on ancestor worship, was the important social fact. Confucianism strongly supported this system. It was a unifying influence for centuries, but it was wholly antithetical to modern nationalism. On the one hand, it taught a kind of universal humanism ; on the other, by its famous concept of the five fundamental relationships, it emphasized filial duty and obedience. Illiteracy, desperate poverty, superstitions, isolation, and local rivalries virtually decreed that loyalty should be first of all to the family, then perhaps to the village or even to the province, but seldom to the state.

Some early evidences of a kind of negative nationalism can be found in the many protests against foreigners and against the Manchus. Positive Chinese nationalism, however, dates from the later years of Manchu rule and from the Revolution of 1911-1912. Its most active promoters have been students, intellectuals, and businessmen, and its greatest leader has been Dr. Sun Yat-sen, "the Father of the Chinese Republic."²⁸ In the famous "Three Principles of the People," which he had enunciated in tentative form as early as 1904 and which he formulated in greater detail in 1924, Dr. Sun laid down the cardinal principles which China must adopt. These principles are usually translated as nationalism, democracy, and the people's livelihood ; since Sun's death they have been subscribed to, at least in theory, by all important factions in China, including the Communists. It is particularly significant that the first of the "Three Principles" was that of nationalism.²⁹ Dr. Sun described China as "a heap of loose sand" which needed the cement of nationalism to bind it together and give it the strength without which the Chinese people could not hope to escape foreign domination or divisive internal strife. As a guide for them he evolved his doctrine of the three stages of development : military rule, political tutelage, and constitutional government. The nationalism which Sun coveted was modern in pattern but devoid of imperialism and other excesses which marked Western nationalist movements ; and it was based upon traditional Chinese virtues such as loyalty, filial piety, harmony, and peace, and was wholly compatible with internationalism.

²⁷ Hessel Tiltman, "Japan : The Strictly Democratic 'Banzai!'," *The Reporter*, March 20, 1951, p. 19.

²⁸ See two articles on Dr. Sun Yat-sen by Norman D. Palmer in *Current History*, XV (Oct. and Nov., 1948), 193-198, 279-284. See also Lyon Sharman, *Sun Yat-sen : His Life and Its Meaning* (John Day, 1934).

²⁹ Norman D. Palmer, "Sun Yat-sen : Canonized Symbol," *Current History*, XV (Nov., 1948), 282.

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, head of the Kuomintang and of the Nationalist Government and the most powerful man in China during the two decades from the death of Dr. Sun Yat-sen to the end of World War II, appealed many times for national unity to gain support for the Kuomintang in its struggle first with Communists and war lords, then with the Japanese, and finally with the Communists again. In his book, *China's Destiny*, published in 1943, Chiang declared: "In order to enable China to pass from instability to safety it is necessary that education throughout the country focus on the concept of statehood, and place the ideology of nationalism before anything else."³⁰ Unfortunately for China and for the entire world as well, in the postwar period the Nationalist Government was unable to provide a strong, efficient, and enlightened administration or to retain the support of the people. The Kuomintang had lost its revolutionary spirit and had strayed from the paths charted by its founder, Dr. Sun Yat-sen. In consequence, its leadership of the nationalist movement ebbed away.

Out of the chaos and confusion of the early postwar years, the Chinese Communists gradually emerged as the most potent force. Although in ideology and to an increasing degree in practice they were identified with the Soviet Union, which many Chinese viewed with deep suspicion, the Communists posed as champions of the nationalist aspirations of their country. By endorsing the "Three Principles of the People," by advocating and to some extent effecting needed economic and social reforms, and by emphasizing the indigenous and nationalistic character of Chinese communism, while at the same time playing down the modern radical phases of their program, the international aspects of their movement, and their ideological and other links with Moscow, the Chinese Communists won widespread support. Nominally, at least, they gave nationalism an important place among their principles. In his opening address to the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) in September, 1949, which made the final plans for launching the "People's Republic of China," Mao Tse-tung declared: "Our nation will never be an insulted nation any more." Repeatedly the Chinese Communists have successfully invoked the popular slogans of nationalism, anti-foreignism, and anti-imperialism. Thus in China today the revolution has been diverted into Communist channels, and Chinese nationalism has been perverted to the service of other ends.

Indonesia. A strong nationalist movement developed in the Netherlands East Indies in the first decade of the twentieth century. The first important native party, called the Boedi Oetomo, was formed in 1908. Its character has thus been described by Robert Payne: "The movement possessed no political credo. Essentially scholastic, it looked toward India, deriving strength not from the nascent Moslem nationalism but from Rabindranath Tagore's vision of a self-governing Asia at peace. The 'striving' was purely intellectual striving.....No one knew exactly what it was

³⁰ English translation by Philip Jaffe (Roy Publishers, 1947), p. 462.

striving for.”³¹ Boedi Oetomo never became powerful, and by 1910 it had been eclipsed by a more militant party, the Sarekat Islam, which advocated political and social reforms and a vigorous Mohammedanism. Sarekat Islam was soon claiming more than 80,000 members and demanding complete independence for the Netherlands East Indies. During World War I it adopted a socialist program.

The nationalist movement entered a more vigorous phase in 1927 with the formation of the Partai Nasional Indonesia. Its founder was a young Javanese engineer, Achmed Sukarno (or Soekarno), now the President of the new Republic of Indonesia. He may deservedly be called the father of modern Indonesian nationalism. His National Indonesian Party attempted to unite the many nationalist groups; the degree of his success may be measured by the stern measures taken by the Dutch to suppress the new party. But the suppression of even the most important nationalist organization did not end the efforts for independence. Other groups sprang up, demanding all kinds of reforms, including political freedom within or without the Dutch Empire.

The Dutch showed little understanding of the nature or strength of the native nationalist movements. To deal with them they relied largely on a policy of stern repression. Accordingly, “in the late twenties and early thirties a large section of the nationalist leadership, including Sukarno, Hatta, and Sjahrir, were transported into exile, many to the notorious Upper Digul concentration camp in New Guinea.”³² Nevertheless, the nationalist groups increased in strength and gradually began to coordinate their efforts more effectively. In late 1939, at the first All-Indonesian Congress in Batavia, the nationalist parties cooperated to press their demands for concrete steps toward independence and to promote a more widespread support for their activities.

The fall of Holland in 1940 seemed to open the way to a greater degree of independence for Indonesia; but the speedy Japanese occupation of the islands brought a bondage worse than the Dutch had ever imposed.

The new conquerors, however, were successful in securing the collaboration of native nationalist groups. Many Indonesian leaders, including Sukarno and Mohammed Hatta, accepted positions under the Japanese, although after the war they insisted that they had collaborated only to moderate the enemy's policies toward the native peoples and that they had been in constant touch with underground movements of resistance.

Six weeks elapsed between Japan's surrender in August, 1945, and the first landings of British troops in the Netherlands East Indies. These weeks saw the birth of the Indonesian Republic, with Sukarno and Hatta as the moving spirits. Proclaimed on August 17, 1945, in a declaration signed by these two men, who were still almost unknown outside of Indonesia, the Republic was so firmly entrenched in popular support in

³¹ Payne, p. 26.

³² Paul M. Kattenburg, quoted in Lawrence K. Rosinger and associates, *The State of Asia* (Knopf, 1951), p. 410.

Java and parts of Sumatra before the Dutch returned that it could not be destroyed. Sukarno became the first President of the Indonesian Republic and Dr. Hatta Vice-President. On October 7, 1945, Dr. Hatta announced that the five policies of the republic would be belief in God, nationalism, universalism, democracy, and social security. As Payne has pointed out, these policies are very similar to Dr. Sun Yat-sen's "Three Principles of the People," with belief in God and universalism added "as make-weights."

After extensive military operations the Dutch Government, in the Linggadhati Agreement of March, 1947, extended *de facto* recognition to the Republic, which presumably was to become one of the major units in a United States of Indonesia, loosely associated with the Dutch crown. Unfortunately, the pact was not implemented, and until mid-1949 relations between the Indonesian leaders and the Dutch ran the gamut from temporary periods of truce to armed hostilities or "police actions," as the Dutch described them.

The developments in Indonesia were brought to the attention of the Security Council of the United Nations, and the UN Good Offices Committee made determined efforts to effect a peaceful solution. A Round Table Conference at The Hague in the fall of 1949, after much difficulty, produced enough agreement among the Dutch, the Indonesian Republicans, and the Indonesian Federalists to proceed with plans to create a truly independent Indonesia. On December 27, 1949, in a simple ceremony Queen Juliana of the Netherlands proclaimed the Republic of the United States of Indonesia a sovereign partner in a Netherlands Indonesian Union. Under these circumstances three hundred years of Dutch rule over the rich islands of the East Indies came to a peaceful rather than a bloody end, and a new state formally came into being.

India. Although the revolt of 1857 was "the first organized expression of anti-foreign sentiment" in India,³³ the beginnings of nationalism as an effective political force date from the founding of the Indian National Congress in Bombay in 1885.³⁴ The Congress soon became "the dynamic, consolidated expression of Indian nationalism." During its first and almost pre-national period, from 1885 to 1905, Congress membership was confined largely to Hindu intellectuals and professional men in Bengal. In its second phase, which lasted from 1905 to 1917, it spread over all of India and enlisted support from all social and industrial classes and from Muslims as well as Hindus. Indian nationalism in this period assumed a mystic and spiritual quality which it has never lost.

In 1920 Gandhi launched a campaign of nonviolence and noncooperation, with which the British did not know how to cope. When violence

³³ Sen, p. 110.

³⁴ The Indian National Congress is not to be confused with the Indian Parliament. The Congress spearheaded the movement for independence, and since 1947 it has been the major political grouping within the country. It has been closely identified with the government; at present more than two-thirds of the members of Parliament are also members of the Congress. It is now often referred to as the Congress Party.

and force were resorted to by some of his own followers, Gandhi called a halt to his campaign. From 1922 to 1924 he served the first of many prison sentences, and for some six years after his release he played little part in the nationalist movement, which in these years tended to emphasize Western approaches to nationalism. Gandhi and other important leaders of the Congress Party, such as C. R. Das and Rabindranath Tagore, deplored this trend. "Both Gandhi and Tagore," writes Mary E. Townsend, "subordinated the idea of nationalism, as representing the political power and economic mastery of the state, to the less materialistic and more spiritual conception that nationalism means the well-being, development and unity of its people."³⁵

The publication of the Simon Report by an all-British Indian Statutory Commission in 1930 led to a resurgence of Indian nationalism. Gandhi, again taking active leadership of the movement, launched another campaign of civil disobedience and led a dramatic 170-mile "salt march" to the sea to make salt in defiance of British laws. In 1935 the British Government made further concessions in the Government of India Act, but these merely stimulated further nationalist feeling. Shortly before World War II, however, Gandhi and other spokesmen of an evolutionary course seemed to be regaining their influence, and the British Government eased the situation considerably by releasing thousands of political prisoners.

When the British Government declared, in September, 1939, that India was at war, Indian nationalists were split on the policies to be followed. In July, 1940, after the fall of France, the Congress Party announced that it could not "go the full length" with Gandhi in his pacifist views; but the British would not offer the concessions it demanded as the price of cooperation in the defense of India, and in October, 1940, it began a program of civil disobedience. Britain's promise of Dominion status after the war, made upon the recommendation of the Cripps mission of 1942, was rejected as inadequate; instead, in August, 1942, the All-India Congress Committee demanded that Britain "quit India" or take the consequences.

In the postwar period Indian nationalism has achieved its objective of independence, but at the price of partition and the strains and stresses of emergent nationhood. Division was made inevitable by the rise of a Muslim nationalist movement, spearheaded by Mohammed Ali Jinnah and the Muslim League. The governments of India and of the Muslim state of Pakistan now jealously guard their newly-won freedom; and, while they have not been successful in establishing satisfactory relations with each other, they seem determined to prove that their brand of nationalism is wholly consistent with the objectives of the United Nations and with all movements toward greater international cooperation.

Turkey. The evolution of the surviving fragment of the once-mighty Ottoman Empire into the vigorous Turkish Republic of today is one of the miracles of the "new nationalism." Much of the credit for this achieve-

³⁵ Mary E. Townsend, with the collaboration of C. H. Peake, *European Colonial Expansion Since 1871* (Lippincott, 1941), p. 412.

ment goes to a single man, the hero of modern Turkey, Mustapha Kemal Pasha (1881-1938) or Atatürk ("Father of the Turks"), as he came to be called by a grateful people. For fifteen years, from 1923 until his death in 1938, Atatürk ruled with a benevolent but iron hand, emphasizing nationalistic uniformity, modernization, and Westernization in all phases of the life of the people. All foreign controls were gradually eliminated, by forceful means or subtle. The type of nationalism which Atatürk championed, in Eleanor Bisbee's words, aimed at "not an empire for the Turks, not subject lands to rule, not expansionism, but nationalism inside *Turkey*."³⁶ "Turkey for the Turks," was one of Atatürk's avowed objectives; and this has also been a part of his vast bequest to his successors, İsmet İnönü and Celâl Bayar.

Distinctive Characteristics of Asian Nationalism. Asian nationalism has differed from the nationalism of the Western world in several important respects, among which the following may be cited:

1. It has had more social and cultural overtones, and has been less predominantly a political creed. A traditional, cultural type of nationalism, linked with the religious and social attitudes of the past, has existed almost universally in Asia, and is still a major force. Perhaps Asian nationalism is the result of a conscious effort to adapt Western nationalism to the Asian scene without departing too far from the traditions of the past.

2. Nationalism in Asia has had a strong negative aspect, for, as we have noted, in origin it was a reaction against foreign rule and against colonialism and all that the term implied. It is often regarded as a necessary means for the achievement of national unity in the face of all the centrifugal forces of ignorance, superstition, localism, familistic and religious customs, local warlordism, and the like, which have tended to discourage unity and make resistance to foreign encroachments all the more difficult. Because of the occasional identification of collaboration of Asian nationalists with communism in recent years, it is particularly important to remember that, as Carlos Romulo has said, nationalism in Asia has generally found expression in "a simple and straightforward freedom movement from colonial status, untainted either by the racist and regionalist appeal of Japanese anti-Western propaganda or by the ideological appeal of communism."³⁷

3. With the obvious exception of Japanese policies, and possibly of the Russian as well, nationalistic movements in Asia have sought to avoid some of the worst tendencies of Western nationalism, such as those toward imperialism, racialism, and war. On the other hand, they have given rise to some particularly alarming manifestations, notably mob violence and fanaticism. Some tendencies of Asian nationalism seem likely to lead to national suicide and widespread anarchy rather than to national unity.

³⁶ *The New Turks: Pioneers of the Republic, 1920-1950* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1951), p. 58.

³⁷ Carlos P. Romulo, "The Crucial Battle for Asia," the *New York Times Magazine*, Sept. 11, 1949, p. 13.

and independence. The rioting in Iran while Mohammed Mossadegh was premier is a case in point.

4. Asian nationalism have been linked much more closely with movements for economic and social reform. Many Asian nationalists have been radicals in their internal policies. They have worked for social reforms as ardently as for freedom from foreign rule, although they have usually insisted that the latter was a prerequisite of the former. In his presidential address to the Indian National Congress in 1936 Nehru declared : "I work for Indian independence because the nationalist in me cannot tolerate alien domination ; I work for it even more because for me it is the inevitable step to social and economic change."³⁸ Asian nationalists, therefore, are generally revolutionaries in the sense that they are proponents of drastic change and opponents of the status quo.

5. Perhaps most important of all, the Asian brand of nationalism is generally interpreted as being wholly consistent with cosmopolitanism, humanism, peace, and international cooperation. "We seek no narrow nationalism," declared Nehru at the opening session of the First Asian Relations Conference on March 23, 1947. "Nationalism has a place in each country and should be fostered, but it need not be allowed to become aggressive and come in the way of international development."³⁹ During his visit to the United States in the fall of 1949, Nehru stated in an address in Chicago on October 26 : "Internationalism can only grow effectively when nationalism has achieved its objectives in countries which are struggling for freedom." A moving statement of this same fundamental point was made by Soetan Sjahrir, one of the greatest leaders of the Indonesian Republic, in a radio broadcast on the first anniversary of the proclamation of the Republic :

Our nationalism serves only as a bridge to reach a human level that nears perfection, not to gratify ourselves, far less to do damage to human intercourse. We keep firmly to our faith in humanity in general. We are no enemies of humanity. Our nationality is only one facet of our respect for humanity.⁴⁰

Relation to Communism. To the people of the Western world communism appears to be antithetical to nationalism, for it preaches an internationalism of the proletariat of the world and the withering away of the nation-state, and in practice it leads to the subordination of national interests — except those of the Soviet Union — to allegiance to a foreign power and to a world ideology. In Asia communism has been presented in a wholly different light. In that vast continent it has been linked with nationalism and anti-imperialism, with the widespread desire for land

³⁸ Quoted in Payne, p. 85.

³⁹ *Asian Relations*. A Report of the Proceedings and Documentation of the First Asian Relations Conference, New Delhi, March-April, 1947 (New Delhi, 1948), p. 26.

⁴⁰ Quoted in Payne, pp. 50-51.

reform and social change, and with opposition to foreign rule and to native landlords, warlords, and "reactionaries." In order to understand the reasons for the tremendous gains which communism has made in Asia in the postwar period, it is vitally important to appreciate the attractive power of the U. S. S. R. and of communism, and the peculiar advantages which the Soviet Union enjoys in the clash of outside interests there.

The U. S. S. R. has several clear-cut advantages in Asia. In the first place, Russia is an Asian as well as a European power, in some respects more Asian than European. She extends over the entire northern part of the continent, with a land frontier in Asia of more than 5,000 miles. Second, she is — or recently was — herself an underdeveloped country, and she provides for the still backward lands of Asia an experience in economic development which can presumably be a pattern for them.⁴¹ Third, her ideology has always emphasized the importance of associating the Soviet Union with the aspirations of colonial peoples, and therefore has a peculiar appeal for those who identify imperialism with the capitalist states of the West. Fourth, even the Soviet brand of "democracy" seems more genuine and more desirable to the masses of Asia than people brought up in the Anglo-Saxon tradition of freedom can possibly imagine. Asians have never known freedom or political unity in the Western sense. To them bread means more than abstract political rights, and the propaganda of the Soviet Union about the economic freedom in the U.S.S.R. and about the equal treatment of all peoples, in contrast to the racial discrimination and economic stratification in capitalist states, has strong appeal.

As has been asserted so often, hunger, misery, and disease provide the feeding ground for communism, and these are the very conditions which exist everywhere in Asia. It is therefore hardly surprising that the Communist drive in Asia is making considerable headway. It has engulfed most of China, including Manchuria, and the industrial half of Korea. Outer Mongolia is virtually a Soviet puppet state. The leaders of the independent Viet Nam movement in Indo-China are Moscow-trained Communists. Native Communists are particularly active in Indonesia, Malaya, Burma, India, and Japan, and to a lesser extent in nearly every other political unit in Asia.

The Soviet Union has benefited from the decline in the power of the colonial nations in recent years, and from the apparent efforts of these nations, especially the French in Indo-China and the Dutch in Indonesia, to block or sidetrack movements for independence. She has also benefited from some of the failures and shortcomings of American policy in Asia, among which may be listed postwar policy toward China, support of the colonial powers in their efforts to restore their prewar positions, the apparent failure of Americans to understand or to sympathize with the native peoples of Asia in their struggles

⁴¹ Lattimore, *The Situation in Asia*, pp. 79-83.

for freedom and a better lot in life, the alleged interest in the preservation of the status quo in a continent which is desperately crying for change, and the evidences that the United States is trying to build up Japan as a kind of Far Eastern bastion. Such charges have been the stock in trade of Communist propagandists, and they have apparently made a considerable impression throughout Asia.

The ideological association of communism and nationalism in Asia requires further emphasis. As J. C. Campbell has stated : "Belief in dialectical materialism never blinded the Soviet leaders to the strength of nationalism in Asia. On the contrary, from the time of their coming to power they had had a carefully thought-out policy on nationalities and the colonial question." Lenin, Campbell reminds us, "set about planning a twofold attack on the citadels of capitalism through agitation for social revolution in the metropolitan countries and for national independence in their colonies. On coming to power the Bolsheviks announced themselves as champions of movements of national liberation."⁴² The "Theses on National and Colonial Questions" adopted by the Third International — the Comintern — in 1920 spelled out the doctrine in detail. "It is the duty of the Communist International," read this important document, "to support the revolutionary movement in the colonies." The reasons for this doctrine were frankly proclaimed : "The revolution in the colonies is not going to be a Communist revolution in its first stages. But if from the outset the leadership is in the hands of a Communist vanguard, the revolutionary masses will not be led astray, but may go ahead through the successive periods of the development of revolutionary experience."

This doctrine has been repeated and elaborated many times, in one form or another, in resolutions of the Comintern and in speeches of Soviet leaders and of native Communist spokesmen in various Asian countries. Nowhere has it been more clearly presented, in a manner adapted to the situation in Asia, than in Mao Tse-tung's *On the New Democracy*, a famous pamphlet published in 1940 which has been called "the most important Communist writing produced outside of the Soviet Union since before the Russian revolution." "The Chinese revolution," argued Mao, "can only be achieved in two steps : (a) new democracy ; (b) socialism." The revolution "can never be achieved without the guidance of communism," which was also, of course, the ultimate, long-range goal. To anyone at all conversant with Marxist dialectics or with the Soviet vocabulary, the term "new democracy" will have a familiar ring. It is similar to the "people's democracy" of the satellite states of Eastern and Southeastern Europe, a "democracy" which is professedly a stage in the direction of communism. Along that road lies national subservience, not freedom ; but to millions of people of Asia the "new democracy" seems to offer more than does the "capitalistic democracy" of the West, which in their minds stands for imperialism and exploitation.

⁴² *The United States in World Affairs, 1948-1949* (Council on Foreign Relations, 1949), pp. 264-265.

A Third Force? As the strong winds of social change blow over Asia, the leaders of the many nations of this greatest of continents are becoming more and more conscious of their common problems and common needs. This is a development of revolutionary implications. Doubtless Asia is too vast an area, and its inhabitants are too isolated, philosophically as well as physically, to make anything like an Asian union a real possibility. Moreover, Asia, like the rest of the world, although perhaps to a lesser degree, is inevitably divided by the global struggle for the loyalties of men. Since the end of World War II, however, leaders of many Asian countries have frequently spoken of the mission of Asia in the world and have voiced the community of interests of all Asian peoples.

Perhaps the most concrete evidence of this tendency was the First Asian Relations Conference, which was held in New Delhi in the spring of 1947. Delegates from twenty-eight Asian countries and other political entities, including some of the republics of the U.S.S.R., attended this historic conference. "When the history of our present times is written," declared Prime Minister Nehru in his address of welcome at the opening session, "this event may well stand out as a landmark which divides the past of Asia from the future." The great Indian leader thus expressed the meaning of the new era for Asia: "A change is coming over the scene now and Asia is again finding herself. We live in a tremendous age of transition and already the next stage takes shape when Asia takes her rightful place with the other continents..... The countries of Asia can no longer be used as pawns by others; they are bound to have their own policies in world affairs." While giving due credit to the Western world for its contributions to human progress, Nehru also pointed to the apparent inability of the West to prevent recurrent wars. Delegate after delegate followed the Indian Prime Minister to the rostrum to voice the identity of interests of the countries of Asia and to emphasize the importance of close collaboration among them.

Another conference in New Delhi, held in January, 1949, also had broad implications for future Asian unity, although it was convened to consider the Indonesian question. Delegates from nineteen countries, mostly from South and Southeast Asia but also including Australia, New Zealand, and Ethiopia, called for the withdrawal of Dutch troops from the areas under the control of the Indonesian Republic and for a transfer of sovereignty to a United States of Indonesia by January 1, 1950. At the same time the delegates were careful to emphasize that they were not seeking to align the East against the West. They decided not to establish a permanent organization, but agreed to consult more frequently and to cooperate more closely in the future.

History was made again in April, 1955, when representatives of twenty-nine countries of Asia and Africa met in Bandung, Indonesia, for the first Asian-African conference. The conference was sponsored by the Colombo powers — India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma and Indonesia. The countries represented were rich in history and cultural traditions, but they were

relatively weak in a power-political sense. They embraced more than half of the world's population, the vast majority of whom were colored. Their strongest bond was that for more than a century they had all experienced foreign domination or had lived in the shadow of the Western powers. They were also united in their belief that for them a new era had dawned, that henceforth they would count more heavily in the affairs of the world. In his address of welcome President Sukarno of Indonesia state : "I hope this conference..... will give evidence that Asia and Africa have been reborn, nay that a new Asia and a new Africa have been born." Other speakers echoed this theme. In spite of widespread apprehensions in the Western world, the Bandung Conference did not resolve itself into an anti-Western gathering ; nor, in spite of the presence of Chou En-lai in a most affable mood, did it take a pro-Communist position. In fact, to Chou En-lai's face several delegates denounced communism as a new form of colonialism. The conference revealed that there is no such thing as an "Afro-Asian bloc" and certainly no alignment of East versus West. On almost every issue the delegates at Bandung showed many variations of viewpoint and emphasis. The final communiqué, couched for the most part in general terms, emphasized the importance of economic and cultural cooperation among nations, respect for human rights and the right to self-determination, and the promotion of world peace and cooperation. "Social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom," the communiqué asserted, are what Asia and Africa "urgently require."⁴³

An eloquent spokesman of Asian aspirations, General Carlos P. Romulo of the Philippines, has thus analyzed the role of Asia in world affairs :

Asia today presents a baffling picture to the West. It is a study in contradictions. Amid the conflicts that divide it, we find at work a powerful impulse toward integration and unity. With no military power to speak of, it is gradually assuming the role of a Third Force interposed between the two great powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. Ruined by the war, denied many of the fruits of victory, disillusioned by its friends, menaced by new enemies, Asia has emerged from her travail as the most dynamic region in the world today.....It is an historical misfortune that the renaissance of Asia should coincide with a ruthless struggle among the great powers for the mastery of the world.⁴⁴

Unfortunately, contrary to General Romulo's assertion, Asia has not "emerged from her travail." Doubtless, too, the desire to remain aloof from the great-power struggle or to play the role of a "Third Force" is a somewhat unrealistic one. But there can be no doubt that leaders of non-Communist Asia share many of the same hopes. They believe that by removing the remaining bonds of colonialism, by raising the standards of living of the masses, by greater experience in self-government, and by

⁴³ For the text of the communiqué' see the *New York Times*, April 25, 1955.

⁴⁴ Romulo p. 13.

self-help, mutual help, and help from the Western world, they will be able to stand on their own feet. resist the tides of communism, divert the demands for social change into constructive channels, and cope more effectively with the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse — Conquest, Slaughter, Famine, and Death — which have ridden roughshod over Asia for countless centuries. They also believe, most strongly, that Asia has much to offer to the Western world and to humanity and that, as Nehru has predicted, “the emergence of Asia in world affairs will be a powerful influence for world peace.”

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Latin America: Twenty Republics. 17

in Search of a Future

More than North America, more than Europe, perhaps more than Africa, although certainly less than Asia, Latin America is a land of startling diversity. Much of it is flat and tropical, but much of it is rugged and bleak. It produces most of the world's bananas and at the same time much of the world's wool. Some of its people are rich, but most of them are desperately poor. It is the home of distinguished scholars and celebrated artists and a land of deplorable illiteracy. Some of its people know and cherish democracy, but most of them bear the scars of military dictatorship. Against "gentiles" Latin Americans present something of a common front, but at home they are highly partisan, within their states playing the great game of politics with furious words and occasional blood-letting. Yet Latin America is not all diversity. Most of the states have a common Spanish heritage and a common memory of the Wars of Independence, and they wage a common struggle against formidable natural handicaps. All have a common church, and all give lip service to the ideals of freedom. In varying measure all are aware of the overwhelming power of the "Colossus of the North," and many of them feel a heavy dependence on that power. It is difficult not to read either too much or too little into "Latin America."

The term "Latin America" refers to those states of the Western Hemisphere that possess a common background of Latin culture. It is made up of twenty republics : seven in North and Central America, three in the Caribbean, and ten in South America. The term does not include bits of land, mostly islands, controlled by outside states : among these are the Guianas, British Honduras, Jamaica, the Falkland Islands, Trinidad, Barbados, and many small islands. Nor does it usually include Puerto Rico, which, in fact, has come to regard itself as a kind of "third force" with a mission to bring the United States and Latin America into closer ideological communion.

Since Latin America reaches into the northern hemisphere and excludes areas of the southern, it is not synonymous with South America. Neither is it the same as "Hispanic America." That term is narrower in that its implications are Spanish and Portuguese ; it leaves out Haiti, whose backgrounds are French. Hubert Herring suggests that to be logical, to take proper account of the native Indians, of the Africans, and of the Spanish and Portuguese, we should speak of "Indo-Afro-Ibero-America." "But," he adds significantly, "for lack of a better term we fall back on 'Latin America.'"¹

Latin Americans everywhere feel that they are "Americans." During the warm days of the Good Neighbor Policy people in the United States learned that their propensity to monopolize the term irritated Latin Americans. Had not Dwight W. Morrow won instant popularity in Mexico when he ordered the tablet reading "American Embassy" replaced by one reading "United States Embassy"? Were not all the inhabitants of the Americas really Americans? One sensitive North American authority on Latin American history proposed that his countrymen call themselves "United States" ; and the term *estadounidenses* is not uncommon "south of the border." Ignoring possible complaints from Canadians and Mexicans, Latin Americans put the label *norte americanos* on citizens of the United States. Most of them still use it. Many others are coming to recognize the etymologic plight of the United States : "After all, each of the Latin American nations has a perfectly satisfactory name of its own. Its people are Cubans or Peruvians or Nicaraguans. If we use the name 'Americans' for ourselves, it is because we have no other name, and no slight to the other peoples on the continent is implied in its use." Thus rightly speaks one "American."²

THE LAND

Latin America comprises more than half the land surface of the Western Hemisphere. Its nearly nine million square miles make it almost three times the size of the United States. It is larger than Europe and Australia combined, about three-fourths the size of Africa, and slightly more than half the size of Asia. It is shaped like a triangle, its widest point a little below the equator. Fourteen of its twenty republics, occupying the bulk of the land mass, lie wholly within the tropics ; five extend from the tropical zone into the temperate, with two of these — Argentina and Chile — lying almost wholly in the temperate zone ; and one — Uruguay — lies wholly in the temperate zone. Its continental mass — South America — projects far to the east and south. The eastern coast of Brazil is twenty-six hundred miles east of New York City, and the southern tip of the continent is

¹ Hubert Herring, *A History of Latin America* (Knopf, 1955), p. 3.

² William L. Schurz, *Latin America* (Dutton, 1949), p. 9.


more than fifteen hundred miles nearer the Antarctic Circle than any part of Africa. This position removes South America from the main lines of east-west travel, leading it to be sometimes called the "neglected continent."

The dominant topographical feature of mainland Latin America is the mighty Andean chain, the backbone of the great cordilleran mass extending from Cape Horn to Bering Strait. In the far south the Andean ranges are compact, scarcely a hundred miles in total width, but in Bolivia and Peru they widen to four hundred miles, then narrow again toward the Isthmus of Panama. This cordilleran backbone broadens into sprawling low mountains through most of Central America, then, in Mexico, divides into two flaring chains to form the borders of the great triangular Mexican plateau. For much of their four thousand miles in South America the Andes rise sharply out of the Pacific, leaving only a thin and hot coastal strip at a low elevation. They are very high, with many peaks above twenty thousand feet, and for three thousand miles they offer only a few passes as low as twelve thousand feet. They hold many volcanoes, both dead and intermittently active. In addition to the Andes, South America has two large and rugged plateaus : the Brazilian Highlands, occupying much of southeastern Brazil and varying from two to three thousand feet in height ; and the Guiana Highlands, much smaller in area than the Brazilian but covering southern Venezuela and parts of the Guianas. In the Caribbean, Haiti and the Dominican Republic are mountainous, whereas Cuba is much less rugged.

The heart of South America is the Amazon basin of more than three million square miles, much of it almost uninhabited jungle. Far to the south lie the flat or rolling lands of southern Brazil, Uruguay, and the rich *pampas* of Argentina, the largest expanse of fertile soil in Latin America. The thousand-mile southern tip of the continent is a cold, wind-swept tableland.

Topography is always a major determinant of where people may live. In temperate climates they may live at low elevations, as they do in Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and southern Brazil. But much of Latin America lies in the tropics, where the heat may be intense at sea level. In all the Andean republics except Chile, most of the people live in mountain valleys or on plateaus : the coastal strips are too hot and the high mountains too cold. In a few instances, where trade seems to compel it, a city may rise on the hot and humid coast, as, for instance, Maracaibo, Barranquilla, and Panama. Most of the large cities in the tropics are in upland country.

A number of other significant natural features must be mentioned very briefly. The Humboldt Current, flowing northward from the Antarctic, exerts a cooling effect as far north as Peru. The trade winds blow in from the Atlantic to give heavy rainfall to the tropical interior. West winds bring adequate moisture to the western slopes of Colombia and Ecuador and to central and southern Chile, but the intervening three thousand



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Mexico and Central America: Physical and Political Map



miles get little rain. Mexico receives a heavy rainfall on its eastern slopes, but the great plateau requires irrigation on such a scale that in some years the cost absorbs almost ten per cent of the federal budget. The four most important rivers are the Amazon in Brazil ; the Orinoco in Venezuela ; the Plate system draining parts of Bolivia, Paraguay, Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina ; and the Magdalena in Colombia. For the most part the rivers of South America run in the wrong direction to be of great value to commerce. Moreover, many of them have obstructive rapids, but this condition often facilitates much-needed irrigation, and it provides a vast hydro-electric potential.

Latin American flora is infinitely varied. The lowlands of the Amazon system contain hundreds of species of plant life, including giant trees, beautiful parasites like the orchid, and a great many shrubs of commercial value. Here the growth is so luxuriant that isolated plantations and air strips are kept from suffocation only by dint of unremitting labor. In certain warm, rainless areas, as parts of Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile, the cactus flourishes, but many fiber-producing plants also are common. The *llanos* of Venezuela and the *pampas* of the Argentine are treeless. In the cooler latitudes and altitudes the trees are much the same as in comparable regions of North America.

Latin America is rather poor in mineral resources, with some notable exceptions. By way of comparison, the United States possesses an average of about 23 per cent of the world's reserves in eight basic minerals (coal, oil, iron, copper, bauxite, lead, zinc, and tin), whereas all of Latin America holds about 10 per cent. Recent discoveries in iron and bauxite would raise this figure somewhat. Latin America's greatest shortage is in good coal : its reserves appear to amount to less than 1 per cent of the world's total. It is rich in oil, with Venezuela being by far its leading producer, followed by Mexico, Colombia, Argentina, and Peru. Altogether it possesses about 21 per cent of the world's iron ore reserves. Brazil has been thought to have the largest, but Venezuela may now have taken first place. There are also deposits in Cuba, Chile, Peru, and Mexico. Argentina's known reserves are negligible. Chile is the leading copper producer, followed at some distance by Mexico and Peru, but her production is only about half that of the United States. Bauxite ore, the principal source of aluminum, is found in considerable quantity in the Guianas and Venezuela and in lesser quantity in Brazil. Mexico and Peru are important producers of lead, and Argentina is a small producer. Mexico and Peru are also sources of zinc. Bolivia is a large producer of tin, second in the world to the Malay States ; it is, in fact, an often-named example of a one-product state, although in fact it produces a number of minerals.

Other minerals and their significant Latin American sources are as follows : nitrates — Chile ; silver — Mexico, Peru, and Bolivia ; gold — Mexico, Colombia, and Brazil ; nickel — Brazil and Cuba ; manganese — Brazil and Cuba ; antimony — Bolivia and Mexico ; chromium—Cuba ; mercury

—Mexico, Peru, and Brazil ; beryllium—Brazil ; mica—Brazil ; tungsten—Bolivia, Peru, and Mexico ; platinum — Colombia and Brazil ; vanadium — Peru ; quartz crystals — Brazil ; diamonds — Brazil ; and molybdenum — Mexico, Chile, and Peru. Mexico has uranium deposits of undetermined importance.

The weakness of the Latin American mineral position is neither in lack of diversity nor in uniformly low production. It is in the smallness of the production of a number of minerals essential to a balanced industrial economy. Furthermore, it must be remembered that the resources that we have been speaking of are distributed — quite unevenly — among twenty republics. Although oil revenues have long kept the government of Venezuela in an enviable financial position — among the very best in the world — only Brazil seems to have the mineral resources to justify the hope for broad industrialization.

Thus in many respects nature has not been kind to Latin America. True, she has given it enchanting islands, some of the world's best scenery, and scattered bits of "eternal spring," but she has also given it unconquerable mountains, unendurable jungle, tropical heat and tropical diseases, too few good rivers and good harbors, too little good soil, and too little in mineral resources. She has made it hard, very hard, for peoples to become integrated, for nations to be governed, and for the common man to do well by his stomach and his mind.

THE PEOPLE

All sorts of theories have been advanced to explain the presence of human life in the Western Hemisphere when Columbus arrived in 1492. The one now accepted is that the Indians had come from Asia by way of the Bering Strait, at least ten thousand years before. Estimates put their number in the year 1500 at perhaps a million north of the Rio Grande and from 7.4 to 45 millions below it. In the course of their American development the best of these had progressed from the food-gathering stage of culture to the point where they knew something—in some cases a great deal—of agriculture, pottery making, weaving, metal working, road building, the use of stone for construction purposes, pictorial writing, mathematics, astronomy, and administrative organization. The vast majority of them, however, were in a far more primitive stage, and many of them were nomadic. None of them knew the use of the wheel. As of 1500 they were divided into a great many ethnic and linguistic groupings, the most advanced of which were the Aztecs of Mexico and the Incas of the Peruvian area. The great Mayan civilization had already declined.

When, in the wake of Columbus, "Europeans lifted the curtain and revealed the American drama, warfare and conflict were the normal order from the Arctic Circle to Tierra del Fuego. Men were killing one an-

other over hunting grounds, water-holes, river valleys, lake sites, flint beds, salt deposits, arable lands, and water for irrigation." In fact, "the dominating theme in the history of pre-Columbian America was the struggle for land and subsistence....."³ As the Indians appeared to possess vast treasure in precious metals, the invading white men soon convinced themselves that these backward red men desperately needed to be taken in hand and civilized. Speaking only of the Spanish colonies, overlooking the mestizo element that was important from the start, and disregarding what was at least lip service to Indian welfare by the Spanish government, one authority has had this to say of the white men's treatment of the Indians :


And so they proceeded to civilize them...with or without the consent of the Spanish government, the Indians were, to all intents and purposes, enslaved, and that by the time this enslavement was abolished, their debasement was, in most cases, such that it effectively prevented them from participating in the new order that arose after the Spanish yoke was overthrown. The leaders and inaugurators of the South American republics after 1821 were all creoles, and the governments they established took little cognizance of the native populations except to see to it that they remained in ignorance and poverty and that they constituted no threat to their domination. The justification for this attitude, if indeed they thought any justification necessary, was that the Indians were utterly incapable of self-government, racially and intellectually.⁴

In the over-all view the present population of Latin America, approximately 170,000,000, is made up of descendants of some 10,000,000 to 35,000,000 Indians, some 10,000,000 white immigrants (a 1950 estimate) or their descendants, and several million immigrant Negroes or their descendants. Some investigators put the number of white immigrants at closer to 15,000,000. As one writer sweetly remarks, "As a rule, Latin Americans lack a sense of numerical precision, with the result that the national statistical services are likely to suffer from a general disregard of accuracy."⁵ Miscegenation has produced a vast mestizo (white-Indian offspring) population and much-smaller mulatto (white-Negro) and zambo (Negro-Indian) populations. These mixtures have cross-married ; consequently Latin America now has an almost infinite variety of mixed strains. The largest number of immigrants of the republican period have come from Spain, Italy, and Portugal, but there has been considerable diversity in sources. Brazil has the largest Japanese group outside Asia, and the Latin American states collectively have received some 200,000 persons whom they list as "Turks" but who in fact are mostly

³ Bailey W. Diffie, *Latin-American Civilization* (Stackpole, 1945), pp. 13, 12.

⁴ From : *Indians of South America*, by Paul Radin. Copyright 1942 by Paul Radin, reprinted by permission of Doubleday & Company, Inc. P. 305.

⁵ Schurz, p. 64n.



From Preston E. James, *Latin America*, Revised Edition
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Syrians. Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, and Uruguay have been the most attractive to Europeans.

If we classify the twenty republics according to the largest single ethnic grouping, we have the following (the figure gives the percentage of the whole population in the largest group): white — Uruguay (90), Argentina (89), Costa Rica (48), and Brazil (39); mestizo — Nicaragua (77), Venezuela (68), Chile (66), Mexico (61), Colombia (59), El Salvador (52), Panama (50), and Honduras (45); Indian — Guatemala (67), Paraguay (65), Ecuador (58), Bolivia (57), and Peru (49); and Negroid — Haiti (100), Dominican Republic (81), and Cuba (49). This classification and these figures do not reveal certain significant conditions: that Brazil is 37 per cent Negroid and 20 per cent mestizo, that Costa Rica is 47 per cent mestizo, that Chile is 25 per cent white, that Mexico is 29 per cent Indian, that Colombia is 20 per cent white, that El Salvador is 40 per cent Indian, that Panama is 31 per cent Negroid, that Honduras is 40 per cent Indian, that Paraguay, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru are 30 to 40 per cent mestizo, and that Cuba is 30 per cent white.⁶ Socially — not statistically — these ethnic terms must be used with the realization that, unlike the usage of terms in the United States, any "white" blood makes a person a "white," and that race-consciousness is much less acute than among *norte americanos*.

The significance of ethnic composition lies mostly in the relationship of the various groups to the stream of national life as charted by the dominant group. Indians frequently maintain an isolation or semi-isolation in part imposed by themselves and in part imposed by the political and social order. Both Indians and mestizos have resented their subordinate status; their "demands for recognition..... [have been] repeatedly voiced; sometimes peacefully, more frequently, violently. Today these demands have become more insistent and more coherent.....No stable peace and prosperity can ever come to the republics of this great region unless these demands are granted....."⁷ But, fortunately, something is being done. Some countries have abandoned their objective of becoming "Spanish" states and have recognized that they are, and always will be, mestizo states. Led by Mexico, virtually every Latin American state has undertaken some constructive action in behalf of the suppressed elements in its population. Many Catholic orders have assumed special responsibilities in this work, and the *apristas* in Peru have sought to make Indian welfare a basic concern of an international political party. The Inter-American Congress on Indian Life held in Mexico in 1940 adopted a body of resolutions that represented "a veritable charter of Indian rights for the guidance of the American republics in formulating their Indian policies." The Andean Indian Programme, launched by the UN and its specialized agencies in 1953 at the request of Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru,

⁶ Cited in Wendell C. Gordon, *The Economy of Latin America* (Columbia University Press, 1950), p. 352. See for definitions of ethnic terms used above.

⁷ Radin, p. 306.

is "probably the most ambitious and complex technical assistance program ever attempted by international organization." ⁸ Five international agencies are "here combined in a cooperative effort to raise the living standards of ten million people [virtually all Indians] and integrate them into the lives of their countries."

THE HISTORICAL SETTING

The study of the historical background of the present-day Latin American states should include careful attention to the aboriginal culture, an analysis of the many influences of Spain and Portugal, an examination of the conflict of interests that led to independence, and a review of the struggles of the young republics for democracy and economic well-being. In this account we shall have to be very brief. Having already taken a quick look at the Indian natives, we shall now turn to the imprint of Spain, the winning of independence, and the trend of developments in the republican era.

The Imprint of Spain

At the time of the discovery of America "no part of Europe had suffered more from the shock of conquest or felt the impact of more diverse races and cultures than had the peninsula of Spain." To the extent that a "race" may be said to have evolved, it was "sober" and "robust," a people "endowed with endurance and tenacity, to whom the opportunity for wealth and adventure abroad made a peculiarly strong appeal" ; and "the national temper displayed a hardness that sometimes amounted to cruelty, as well as a certain intellectual indolence which explains in part the exaggerated attachment to tradition." Five centuries of almost constant warfare against the infidel Moors had "engendered a vigorous military spirit and love for an irregular and venturesome mode of life--together with something of a contempt for the less spectacular peacetime arts.....[and] an ideal of religious solidarity that was easily transformed into intolerance and fanaticism." ⁹ All these qualities were to be displayed in the conquest and rule of the New World.

To Spanish America went soldiers to fight, adventurers to be thrilled, ambitious men to gain wealth and power, and priests to save souls. Although some of the colonizers were farmers or artisans, few of them took their wives along. Thus the Spaniards who sailed off to America were not prepared to build a sound agrarian society or establish a commercial order. They were eminently qualified, however, to fight heroically and

⁸ See Agnese Nelms Lockwood, "Indians of the Andes," *International Conciliation*, No. 508 (May, 1956).

⁹ C. H. Haring, *The Spanish Empire in America* (Oxford University Press, 1947), p. 27.

victoriously against appalling obstacles posed by nature and the Indians, to explore a vast continent with courage and resolution unsurpassed in the history of adventure, to carry the flag and the cross into and across millions of square miles of jungle and mountain, to wrest fabulous wealth in gold and silver from almost inaccessible mines, and, in dealing with the Indians, to enslave, to exterminate, to convert, or to mate, as circumstances seemed to direct. They were qualified to build one of the most extensive empires that the world as even seen. But they created only an empire and neither free men nor sturdy nations.

For about three centuries Spain ruled an American empire of more than six million square miles, and Portugal one of some three million square miles. The only suggestion of self-government appeared in the *cabildo abierto*, or open meeting of the town council, but this had only the shadow of the substance of the New England town meeting of about the same period. "Power, however benevolently intended, came from above,"¹⁰ and there was no effort or intention to educate the people to share that power. Spanish rule remained a paternal autocracy to the end.

The economic pattern, too, was monopolistic. The colonies were to produce raw materials, particularly minerals, and they were to buy their manufactured goods in Spain. Commerce was rigidly controlled in the interest of the Crown and of privileged merchants in the home country. But foreign traders — most of all the English — were far more concerned with what was possible than with what was merely legal. Contraband trade sprang up and grew to substantial proportions — eventually far outdistancing the legal trade. Although the restrictions were relaxed in the eighteenth century and Spain's trade with her colonies soon more than doubled in volume, the colonists began to sense the possibilities in unrestricted trade. Here was a prime motivation to widespread evasion of the law and, in fact, to independence.

The pattern of social life in the colonies reflected both the Iberian mind and the American environment. The Spanish are a gregarious people, and it was natural that they should build an urban society. Some of their cities began as trading points, others as mining centers, and still others as seats of political and ecclesiastical authority. The great landholders preferred the glamour of the cities, often leaving their estates to be run by overseers, and the small landowners and the peasants lived in villages rather than on lonely farms as the English colonists so often did. The born-in-Spain Spaniards — the *peninsulares* — who held virtually all the high positions in state and church, stood at the head of the social hierarchy; next came the colonial-born full-blooded Spaniards or creoles, often enterprising and wealthy; next came the mestizos or persons of mixed blood, mostly farmers but frequently artisans or owners of small businesses; and at the bottom stood the Indians and Negroes and mixtures of the two races, almost altogether menial laborers. Since status was

¹⁰ Robin A. Humphreys, *The Evolution of Modern Latin America* (Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 30,

largely a matter of blood, tradition, and landholding, the social order tended to be a rather rigid one. More recently the emergence of a class of successful business and professional men has considerably modified the old pattern. In Brazil the color line is less distinct than in the United States, but it has by no means been erased.

Next to the monarchy the strongest institution was the Roman Catholic Church. It grew to be immensely wealthy and powerful, with bishops and archbishops at times defying governors and viceroys. It must be credited with most of the schooling and virtually all of the organized care of the sick and the destitute. It was the Church and its orders that founded and maintained the universities that so early arose in Spanish America ; and it was the Church that did most to protect and civilize the Indians. Its influence was not all good, for it sought to enforce conformity of thought, if need be by the confiscation of property and the burning of heretics. It was at times ruthlessly acquisitive. Although itself an arm of the state, it endeavored ceaselessly to exalt its own power at the expense of the secular authority. It still possesses great strength in parts of Spanish America, and, as we shall later observe, it still commands fervent loyalty while at the same time it is bitterly attacked.

Briefly, the imprint of Spain on her American empire was in part that of the Spanish mind and in part that of Spanish institutions. When these encountered a world of nature — or many worlds of nature — and a great Indian population totally outside the Spanish experience, the result was conflict, confusion, adaptation, and the emergence of a society which was neither Spanish nor Indian but Latin American. The creoles within this order were likely to be adventuresome, ambitious, too conscious of blood and position, arrogant, scornful of manual labor, and indifferent to the poverty and misery of those around them. The Indians and Negroes, resigned, plodding, and wretchedly poor, formed the mudsill of society. Between these two levels increasing millions of mestizos struggled for bread and manhood ; underprivileged, politically illiterate, and too easily led, they would later form the “masses” of most of the Latin American republics.

The imprint of Portugal on her colony of Brazil was different in a number of particulars. Neither the state nor the Church was quite so authoritarian. The mining economy was less important, the agricultural more important. As some historians have pointed out, the methods used in the colonization of Brazil more nearly approximated those of the English in North America than those of the Spanish in South America. Nevertheless Portugal gave her colonists few lessons in self-government, and only the fortunate circumstance of the long rule of a benevolent monarch gave Brazilians some preparation for governing themselves.

The Winning of Independence

The literature of the American Revolution, with its emphasis on the rights of man -- to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness -- made a stirring appeal to those Latin American thinkers who, notwithstanding discouragement from state and Church, had already begun to yearn for greater political and economic freedom. Even more profound was the impact of the French Revolution. Francisco de Miranda, Mariano Moreno, Antonio Nariño, and the great Simon Bolívar knew the philosophy upon which French revolutionaries had sought to erect a republican France. Given the repressive colonial policy of Spain, and given the taste of a broader trade through British contraband practices and the relaxation of controls incident to Spanish involvement in the Napoleonic Wars, many restive minds in Latin America were ready to break from the mother country when the opportunity came to them almost without their connivance.

Despite a few scattered, hopeless revolts and the agitation of some early advocates of Spanish-American independence, notably Francisco de Miranda and Antonio Nariño, the Spanish colonies in America were essentially loyal when Napoleon Bonaparte invaded Spain in 1808. In one important particular, however, the situation had changed from earlier days. The American-born Spaniards now outnumbered the *peninsulares*. Many of them were wealthy and educated, and since they did not have their forebears' loyalty to Spain, their first love was for the only home they had ever known and for the only land in which they might achieve personal ambitions. Consequently, when Napoleon set aside the Spanish king and put a Bonaparte in his place and Spaniards responded by organizing resistance in local councils or *juntas*, the creoles -- or *Americanos*, as they had come to call themselves -- for a time made common cause with the *juntas* in Spain and the loyal Spaniards in the New World by setting up American *juntas* to govern in the name of Ferdinand VII. They quickly sensed the fact that they had thereby put the colonies in an intermediate position between subordination to Spain and self-rule. Even before the restoration of Ferdinand in 1814 they had provided the stimulus and the leadership for isolated assertions of independence and for sporadic revolt. Within a short time the colonials had made frank resort to force, with the leadership of the forces of northern South America coming under Simon Bolívar and those of southern South America under José de San Martín and Bernardo O'Higgins.

By late 1825 the wars had been won and South America had been freed from Spain. Mexico achieved her independence in 1821 with little fighting, and in 1825 Brazil became independent of Portugal with even less fighting. Spanish control of Santo Domingo was terminated in 1821. Haiti had asserted its independence from France in 1804. The break-up of Great Colombia into Venezuela, Colombia, and Ecuador in 1830 and the fragmentation of Central America by 1840 put the number of Latin

American states at seventeen. The Dominican Republic resumed its independence in 1844 after twenty-two years of union with Haiti ; Cuba won independence from Spain in 1898 ; and Panama achieved statehood in 1903 by secession from Colombia. With these developments the roll of Latin American states was completed.

Republics without Democracy

The Latin Americans faced the problems of nation-building and state-building with far more optimism than circumstances warranted. Perhaps too much influenced by the example of the United States, they apparently believed that independence, a written constitution, and a republican form of government would at once bring them the stability and the prosperity that had been the good fortune of the English colonists in North America. But they reckoned without an awareness of many differences. Civil war soon became the norm nearly everywhere. Bolivar himself in 1830, within a few months of his death, deplored the "anarchy" in Colombia, and declared himself "ashamed to say it, but independence is the sole benefit we have gained, at the sacrifice of all others."¹¹ Bloodshed, dictatorship, and poverty fell to the lot of most of the Latin American states to the end of the nineteenth century, and they remain the lot of many of them to this day.

By the year 1900 only three of the states of Latin America had shown some promise of political stability and of progress toward democratic institutions. In Brazil, after a half-century of peace and development under Pedro II, a bloodless revolution brought the monarchy to a close in 1889 and prepared the way for a federal republic. An excellent constitution was adopted in 1891, and by 1900 Brazil had begun a period of unsteady progress toward stability and prosperity. In Chile the reign of the *caudillos* virtually ceased with the adoption of the Constitution of 1833 ; and the landed aristocracy took over the reins of power, giving Chile stability if not democracy. Argentina's early struggles between Buenos Aires and the provinces ended in 1861 with a victory for Argentine union, and under the leadership of a number of able presidents the country entered upon a long period of material progress and comparative tranquillity. These three — Brazil, Chile, and Argentina — comprise the full roll of those states of Latin America that by 1900 had moved perceptibly toward political maturity.

Four additional states entered the select list within the next few decades : Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, and Uruguay. Two of the older democracies — Argentina and Brazil — went under the heel of dictators, but by 1956 appeared to be winning the struggle to regain their constitutionalism. Chile has been so sorely beset by inflationary woes in the postwar years that her democracy has seemed to be at stake, but it has thus far survived.

¹¹ Message to the Constituent Congress of the Republic of Colombia, Jan. 20, 1830,

Colombia, which had entered upon a long period of democratic promise soon after the opening of the new century, succumbed in 1949 to bloody dissension and dictatorship. Some 150,000 persons were reported killed by late 1955.¹² With some brief interludes, Costa Rica has followed the path of constitutional government since 1902. In the years since her great revolution of 1910-1920, Mexico has settled down to stable government under the qualified democracy of a one-party system. Uruguay has in the course of the past half-century established itself as probably the most vigorous and progressive democracy in Latin America. Elsewhere, only here and there in recent years has a strong and able president momentarily brightened an otherwise dreary record of dictatorship and bad government. Some Cubans say that they have not had an honest president since Tomás Estrada Palma — their first one. Other Latin Americans may speak in much the same vein. "There is no reason for believing that political stability in the nineteen-fifties in Latin America is greater than it was a hundred years ago. Revolutions in the last thirty years have been as frequent, dictatorships as numerous, durable and oppressive as a century ago."¹³

¹² See the Latin American Edition of *Time*, Nov. 14, 1955, p. 34.

¹³ Jesús de Galindez, "Anti-American Sentiment in Latin America," *Journal of International Affairs*, IX, No. 1 (1955), 27-28.

In an attempt to get an "informed, composite reaction as to how democratic each of the Latin American states might be considered," Russell H. Fitzgibbon conducted an "experiment" in 1945 and then repeated it in 1950 and 1955. Upon the basis of evaluations made by a number of specialists he constructed a table of which the following is a part :

	Rank in 1945	Rank in 1950	Rank in 1955
Argentina	5	8	8
Bolivia	18	17	15
Brazil	11	5	5
Chile	3	2	3
Colombia	4	6	6
Costa Rica	2	3	2
Cuba	6	4	7
Dominican Republic	19	19	19
Ecuador	14	9	10
El Salvador	13	14	11
Guatemala	12	10	14
Haiti	16	18	17
Honduras	17	15	12
Mexico	7	7	4
Nicaragua	15	16	18
Panama	8	11	9
Paraguay	20	20	20
Peru	10	13	16
Uruguay	1	1	1
Venezuela	9	12	13

See "How Democratic Is Latin America?," *Inter-American Economic Affairs*, IX, No. 4 (Spring, 1956), 65-77. See also Russell H. Fitzgibbon, "A Statistical Evaluation of Latin-American Democracy," *The Western Political Quarterly*, IX, No. 3 (Sept., 1956), 607-619.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

The international relations of the Latin American states involve, first of all, their relations with each other ; second, their intra-Western Hemisphere relations, particularly those with the United States ; third, their relations with Europe, parts of which stand in a special historical and cultural position ; and, fourth, their role in the United Nations.

Intra-Latin American Relations

Most of the disputes between Latin American states have arisen from the "boundaries" inherited from the colonial period, when precision was unimportant. Although boundaries were generally defined during the early years of the republican period, some, mainly those in sparsely settled regions, remained unsettled until the appearance of some economic asset in the disputed area. Rubber led to the Acre crisis between Bolivia and Brazil ; oil, together with cattle raising and the quebracho industry, led to the Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay ; and oil figured in the long controversy over the Ecuadorian-Peruvian boundary.

Latin American states have fought three major wars among themselves. The Paraguayan War, 1865-1870, with little Paraguay aligned against Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay, was caused more by the ambitions of the Paraguayan dictator, Francisco Lopez, than by any substantial issue. The War of the Pacific, 1879-1883, with Chile fighting against Bolivia and Peru, had its origin in rivalry for the rich nitrate deposits of Tarapacá but eventually involved a complex of issues; by this war Bolivia lost her Pacific frontage. The Chaco War, 1932-1935, fought between Bolivia and Paraguay, gave Paraguay title to most of the disputed Chaco region.

Other instances of hostility or friction have arisen from the efforts of Bolivia to secure access to the Plate and Amazon systems as a means of reaching the Atlantic with its commerce, of both Peru and Colombia to reach the Amazon, and of Chile to reach the Atlantic across Patagonia. Brazil has had boundary disputes with most or perhaps all of the eight states on her borders, but she has settled them by patience and good diplomacy rather than by war. Several bits of undefined boundary remain, but this fact apparently imposes no severe strain on good relations at present.

Ideological issues have rarely disturbed the relations of Latin American states with each other. Mexico was eyed with some distrust in her early years as a consequence of the conservative nature of the revolution which gave her independence from Spain ; Argentina was something of an outcast during World War II when she persisted in collaborating with the Nazi regime in Germany ; and Guatemala's neighbors gave a helping hand to Guatemalan elements conspiring to overthrow the pro-Communist regime

of Arbenz Guzmán. Dictators have at times carried on personal feuds and at times supported their kind in other states. Commercial rivalry has more often led to eventual cooperation — as in the common front established for the marketing of coffee, sugar, cacao, henequen, and other products—than to serious friction.

The two strongest powers of South America, Argentina and Brazil, are noncompetitive in their economies ; and their political relations are proper without being cordial. Nevertheless, a sort of rivalry exists, one more keenly felt by Argentines than by Brazilians. Argentina has long aspired to Latin American leadership, and she is at times annoyed by Brazil's unwillingness to regard this ambition seriously. Some of the smaller states bear grudges against each other, as Costa Rica and Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic and Haiti. Bolivia and Ecuador are still smarting from what they regard as the rapacity of their neighbors.

On the whole, the record of the Latin American states in getting along with each other is not a bad one. With few if any exceptions, every country has spilled far more blood in domestic strife than in international wars. For the generally peaceful character of interstate relations credit must be given to a number of factors : most of the boundaries are in unsettled or sparsely settled areas, few states have a munitions industry, Brazil — almost everybody's neighbor — has demonstrated diplomacy of a high order, and international organizations, especially the League of Nations and the Organizations of American States, have often exerted a quieting influence. One writer has pertinently remarked that "Latin Americans have a strong juridical sense and international law is not a dead letter, as it largely is in the Old World."¹⁴

Latin American countries do a comparatively small amount of business with each other. In 1947 their exports within Latin America amounted to about 27 per cent of their exports to the United States ; and their imports from Latin America totalled less than 20 per cent of their imports from the United States.

Relations with the United States

Geography, common democratic ideals, and the consciousness of a common destiny, plus America's enormous economic and military strength, have made the United States the great power that matters most to Latin America. Conversely the United States, despite her interludes of indifference and bad manners, has a historic and even a sentimental interest in Latin America, and, in addition, she has an awareness of the importance to herself of the population, the goods, the markets, and the growing military potential of Latin America. In different ways the two areas of the Western Hemisphere are dependent upon each other. Trade between them amounts to about \$3.5 billion a year in each direction. Americans

¹⁴ Schurz, p. 263.

have about \$6 billion invested in Latin America, which, in turn, has about \$1.75 billion invested in American enterprises.

American friendliness to Latin American independence was largely motivated by considerations of territorial security. But two other considerations also were important. One related to trade : the confidence that the new states would open their doors to the commerce of the world. The other related to the American feeling of a basic antagonism between monarchism and republicanism : much comfort could be found in the emergence of "sister republics" dedicated to representative government and helping to hold the line against autocratic monarchism.

The same set of national interests that produced America's benevolent neutrality during the Wars of Independence and her early recognition of the new states brought about the Monroe Doctrine. President Monroe's pronouncement, made on December 2, 1823, was received with approval in Latin America, when it was noticed at all. The Doctrine languished for many years [1823-1845], during which "American influence was unimportant and even minute compared with that of Britain. . . ." ¹⁵ But during the 1850's "the principles of 1823 . . . grew steadily in popularity and . . . rose to the rank of a national dogma." ¹⁶ In the 1860's Secretary of State Seward invoked the Doctrine to frustrate Spanish occupation of the Dominican Republic and to end the French occupation of Mexico in support of Maximilian's empire. During the 1870's and 1880's, and doubtless in consequence of its new status as a "national dogma," the Doctrine was interpreted ever more liberally. President Grant declared that it denied the right of transfer of American territory from one European power to another, a principle asserted on many later occasions when such a transfer appeared imminent. Presidents Hayes and Garfield interpreted the Doctrine as denying the right of a European state to construct a trans-Isthmian canal, and as implying that the United States must have exclusive control of any such canal. In the 1890's President Cleveland went still further when in the name of the Doctrine he virtually compelled the arbitration of a boundary dispute between Great Britain and Venezuela. Cleveland's action won praise in Venezuela, Colombia, Brazil, and Peru, but it reaped suspicion and hostility in Mexico, Argentina, and Chile. ¹⁷ During the Spanish-American War the Doctrine was scarcely mentioned. Instead, to use the words of John Bassett Moore, the Americans justified their intervention as the exercise of the right to effect "the abatement of a nuisance."

The first instance in which the United States asserted a right to interfere in the affairs of a Latin American state occurred when the Platt Amendment of 1901 required Cuba to permit American intervention. The Monroe Doctrine was not invoked. But soon thereafter the United States intervened in the Dominican Republic, and on this occasion the Monroe

¹⁵ Dexter Perkins, *Hands Off: A History of the Monroe Doctrine* (Little, Brown, 1941), p. 75.

¹⁶ Dexter Perkins, "Monroe Doctrine," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* (Macmillan, 1937), X, 631. Used by permission of The Macmillan Company.

¹⁷ Perkins, *Hands Off*, p. 188.

Doctrine was advanced in justification. This use of the Doctrine had its origin in the so-called Second Venezuelan Affair. Although the affair was settled, it opened a question on the implications of the Monroe Doctrine : Since the United States was unwilling to allow European states to use force to collect lawful debts from Latin American countries, did she have an obligation to see that the defaulting countries paid their debts? With further defaulting in the unstable Caribbean area almost certain to occur, the question was by no means an academic one. The issue was taken to the Permanent Court of Arbitration, which in 1904 decided by a unanimous vote that the states which had used force to compel Venezuela to pay her debts had a right to payment before states which had not been so belligerently inclined. This, of course, put a premium upon the use of force in the collection of debts. The dilemma thus confronting the United States has been stated by Professor Bemis :

Should the United States stand by with folded arms while non-American powers, backed in principle by a Hague Court decision, intervened and perhaps ensconced themselves in strategic positions from which in the future they might cut the Panama life-line and the security of the Continental Republic : or should it intervene itself to guarantee justice and responsibility in strategically located countries whose condition invited foreign intervention, and thereby run the risk of incurring by its own intervention the misunderstanding and animosity of the neighboring republics?¹⁸

The occasion for an American decision was not long in coming. When the Dominican Republic defaulted on its foreign debts in late 1904, its president sought American intervention to forestall naval action by European powers. In February, 1905, a protocol was signed giving the United States control of Dominican customs and foreign debt payment. This began an American intervention that lasted until 1940, and included eight years of military occupation, 1916-1924.

In December, 1904, President Theodore Roosevelt declared that "in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrong-doing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power." In other words, if the Monroe Doctrine prevented European powers from chastising an American republic that deserved chastisement, then the United States herself must take the culprit in hand. This, in substance, was the Roosevelt Corollary, although it is usually dated from Roosevelt's more definitive statement of February 15, 1905.

The Roosevelt Corollary endured for twenty-five years. During that time the United States resorted to military occupation in four Latin American states : Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Nicaragua ; it is impossible to state the number of interventions, for "intervention" is

¹⁸ Samuel F. Bemis, *The Latin American Policy of the United States* (Harcourt, Brace, 1943), p. 152.

a term of diverse meanings. Included among these were certainly Roosevelt's Panama adventure, which, though antedating the Roosevelt Corollary, was in the spirit of the "Big Stick," and Woodrow Wilson's intervention in Mexico to establish constitutional government. The heyday of the Corollary was during the administrations of Theodore Roosevelt and William H. Taft. Woodrow Wilson, too, was an interventionist—really the greatest of them all—but he had the vision of a genuine Pan-Americanism that, shared by his successors, inspired the liquidation of protective American imperialism and the emergence of the Good Neighbor.

The Roosevelt Corollary was never really popular in the United States. It was clearly a justification of intervention, and, to repeat an earlier quotation from Dexter Perkins, "American rule over other peoples has always been rule with an uneasy conscience." The Latin American states grew increasingly hostile to the Corollary, and opposition sentiment at home grew increasingly vocal. Finally Frank B. Kellogg, President Coolidge's Secretary of State requested Undersecretary of State J. Reuben Clark to make a study of the implications of the Monroe Doctrine. Clark reported in a confidential memorandum submitted in December, 1928: "... it is not believed that this [the Roosevelt] corollary is justified by the terms of the Monroe Doctrine. . . ."¹⁹ President Hoover and Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson, determined to improve relations with Latin America, caused the *Clark Memorandum* to be published, and in notes sent to all Latin American governments declared that the American State Department would be guided by its principles. "In this sense, by June of 1930, the Roosevelt Corollary had been definitely and specifically repudiated. . . ."²⁰ But renunciation of the Corollary was not tantamount to a renunciation of intervention, for, as the *Clark Memorandum* suggested, intervention might be justified by the "doctrine of self-preservation." The demand of the Latin American states was for total renunciation.

During the nineteenth century the instability and insolvency of many Latin American republics had led to such frequent diplomatic interpositions that they endeavored to bind foreigners to local law. The Calvo Doctrine of 1868 asserted that proper respect for sovereignty required that the decisions of a country's courts on the rights of foreign nationals be regarded as beyond appeal to the foreign nationals' own government. The Drago Doctrine of 1902 declared that "the public debt cannot occasion armed intervention nor even the actual occupation of the territory of American nations." By one means or another, the principles of the Calvo and Drago doctrines have been largely incorporated into current practice in international relations.

At the Havana Conference of 1928 an unusually able American delegation, headed by former Secretary of State Charles E. Hughes, refused assent to a convention asserting the doctrine of unqualified noninterven-

¹⁹ J. Reuben Clark, *Memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine* (Government Printing Office, 1930), p. xxiii.

²⁰ Perkins, *Hands Off*, p. 344.

tion. The Americans argued that more attention to the *duties* of states would reduce the need for insistence on *rights*. "It was at Havana that the United States made its last defense of the interventions still unliquidated in the Caribbean."²¹ Before the Montevideo Conference met in late 1933 Franklin D. Roosevelt had become President of the United States and had already moved to terminate the last American occupation in Latin America, in Haiti. At Montevideo the American delegation, led by Secretary of State Cordell Hull, accepted the principle of nonintervention, subject to "the law of nations as generally recognized." Three years later, at the Buenos Aires Conference of 1936, the United States went all the way, agreeing with the other republics to "declare inadmissible the intervention of any one of them, directly or indirectly, and for whatever reason, in the internal or external affairs of any other of the Parties." Here was absolute nonintervention—so long and so ardently desired by Latin America. The Special Protocol Relative to Nonintervention, expanded to deny a right of collective intervention, became Article 15 of Chapter III of the Charter of the Organization of American States, drafted at Bogotá in 1948.

Meantime, Secretary Hughes had moved to bring about, in the Western Hemisphere, "the reign of justice and the diffusion of the blessings of a beneficent cooperation." He labored to bring order to distracted Central America, accepting the assistance of other states in doing so; he helped to negotiate among the Central American republics a variety of treaties relating to peace, education, social welfare, and economic improvement; he encouraged the setting up of a Central American Tribunal to hear disputes between states; he supported the Gondra Convention for the peaceful settlement of all inter-American disputes; he terminated American military occupation of the Dominican Republic; and he handled the difficult problem of Mexican relations without impatience or bluster.

Secretary Frank B. Kellogg, Hughes' successor, is best known for his co-sponsorship of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, but he deserves credit for Dwight W. Morrow's fine contribution to Mexican-United States relations, for the *Clark Memorandum* excising the Roosevelt Corollary from the Monroe Doctrine, and for American acceptance of the Washington treaties of 1929 providing for the peaceful settlement of disputes among the American states.

Herbert Hoover visited South America, promoted the settlement of the Tacna-Arica dispute, withdrew the last marines from Nicaragua, arranged for the military evacuation of Haiti, officially repudiated the Roosevelt Corollary, refused to support American bankers in El Salvador, and, outside of Central America—where America was bound by treaty—he declined to use nonrecognition as a sanction against revolutionary governments. Thus by the time of the inauguration of Franklin D. Roosevelt in March, 1933, the new Latin American policy of the United States had been well launched: "The Roosevelt Corollary had been exorcised officially,

²¹ Bemis, p. 252.

the stolen fruits of force had been placed beyond the pale of legality, and imperialism had been plausibly liquidated. . . ."²²

We cannot even list here the measures taken by the Roosevelt Administration to promote the security, prosperity, and harmony of the Western Hemisphere ; we can scarcely do more than suggest how, "determined henceforth to reconcile promises with deeds, the United States in typically Yankee fashion attacked the problem on all fronts - political, economic, and cultural."²³ Military occupation was everywhere terminated, the Platt amendment was repudiated, tariff barriers were lowered through Secretary Hull's Reciprocal Trade Agreements Program, cultural exchange was promoted, trade was encouraged and enlarged, and health and education assistance were extended. "The greatest accomplishment in the political field," says Graham H. Stuart, "was the utilization of the Pan American Conferences to serve as effective agencies for cooperation among the twenty-one republics."²⁴ When World War II began the American republics were prepared for unprecedented cooperation in the struggle against the Nazi menace ; only Argentina and, to a lesser extent, Chile dragged their feet. After the war had been won the new spirit found expression in the strengthening and revision of the inter-American system at Rio in 1947 and Bogotá in 1948.

The Truman Administration, pressed by the exigencies of the "cold war" and by frequent budgetary deficits, failed to follow through with the Good Neighbor Policy in a way to meet Latin American expectations, but its attitude was by no means one of indifference. The Eisenhower Administration, using a Good Partner label, has given increased attention to technical assistance, but most of all it has kept hands off Latin American politics and encouraged trade and private investment.

It may be possible to explain the shift from Franklin D. Roosevelt's vigorous pro-Latin America policy to the less vigorous policies of Truman and Eisenhower in terms of personalities or simply in terms of the financial capacity of the United States. Perhaps more valid than either of these is the view that FDR believed that strength and unity in the Western Hemisphere, together with isolationist neutrality laws on the part of the United States, might permit the New World to sit out the war which the European dictators seemed intent on beginning. The postwar administrations, however, have felt compelled to fight for global peace and, in doing so, to abandon the hope that the peoples of the two Americas might build a peaceful world of their own. It is this shift, and not weakness within the inter-American system, that leads Professor Arthur P. Whitaker to speak of the decline of the idea of Western Hemisphere unity.²⁵

²² Bemis, p. 224.

²³ Graham H. Stuart, *Latin America and the United States*, 5th ed. (Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955), p. 451.

²⁴ Stuart, p. 451.

²⁵ *The Western Hemisphere Idea : Its Rise and Decline* (Cornell University Press, 1954).

Much of United States- Latin American relations in recent years has been encompassed in the operation of the Organization of American States, which is discussed in Chapter 20

Relations with Europe

The Latin American states have taken almost no hand in the power politics of Europe. The only exceptions have come when European politics spilled over into world politics in the two great wars of this century. During World War I eight of the republics declared war on Germany, five broke off diplomatic relations, and seven remained neutral. During World War II all twenty republics issued declarations of war, but those of Chile and Argentina came only when the collapse of the Axis was clearly in sight. Two of the republics, Brazil and Mexico, took part in the fighting. All twenty joined the League of Nations, but most of them lost faith in it before World War II. All have joined the United Nations, and some of them have taken influential roles, as we shall presently see.

Latin America's estrangement from Spain lasted until the close of the nineteenth century. Since then, the common bond of Spanish culture has drawn them into a friendly relationship. This natural tie has been somewhat weakened by wide differences of opinion in Latin America on the virtues of the Franco regime in Spain.

The relations between Brazil and Portugal have always been cordial. Portuguese immigrants are exempted from the operation of the Brazilian quota system, and they are well received. In other ways the two countries have demonstrated their friendship by concessions to each other.

Until many of her interests were liquidated during World War II and the Perón regime, Great Britain was long the principal foreign investor in Latin America, and she remains important as both buyer and seller. The propensity of her nationals abroad to set up little Britains excludes them from close association with the local communities. The Latin Americans do not like this exclusiveness, but they do admire many of the fine qualities of the British. Argentina and Britain have a long-standing but seldom irritating difference of opinion on the ownership of the Falkland Islands.

Although Argentina and Mexico have unpleasant memories of French machinations, the political relations between Latin American states and France have been uneventful for a long time. French trade does not approach the American or British, although at times it has been sizable. But French culture has traditionally held a powerful appeal for Latin Americans, overshadowing that of any other foreign country. This influence has extended to language, literature, art, the stage, architecture, and dress styles. Although losing some ground to Spanish influence and to nativist movements, it remains strong : and as has often been remarked, Paris is the cultural capital of Latin America.

German relations with Latin America have been primarily economic.

German firms made great inroads into Latin American trade before World War I, and then sought to regain their position after losing out entirely during the war. They succeeded pretty well, only to be cut off again during World War II ; now they are making another successful effort to recover. German culture has never appealed to Latin Americans, but German military efficiency has been much admired, and German military missions were welcomed during the interwar years. German prestige suffered badly through Nazi intrigue and propaganda and the collapse of Hitler's empire.

Latin America in the United Nations ²⁶

The republics of Latin America were disappointed by the League of Nations. Many of them had entered the organization with high expectations, hoping to find in it comparative security and a counterweight to "the colossus of the North." But the League proved to have neither the universality in membership that they associated with security nor the willingness to interfere with inter-American relationships. Consequently, although all twenty republics were members at one time or another they drifted away one by one during the Great Depression and the years when the Fascist states were defying the League and getting away with it.

The American republics began preparations for post-World War II organization as early as 1942 when their foreign ministers, meeting in Rio, directed the Inter-American Juridical Committee to prepare recommendations on postwar international organization. The Committee formulated fourteen specific recommendations that emphasized universalism, the priority of "the moral law," the peaceful settlement of disputes, collective security, and the repudiation of all forms of imperialism. When the Latin Americans failed to get an invitation to the Dumbarton Oaks discussions or to be consulted by the United States State Department prior to Dumbarton Oaks, they utilized the Inter-American Conference on the Problems of War and Peace -- held at Mexico City in February and March, 1945 -- to re-formulate their views and to promote a number of actions to strengthen inter-American regionalism. The proposals adopted by the Conference to improve the announced blueprint included an enlargement of the powers of the General Assembly, an extension of the jurisdiction of the "Court of Justice," the establishment of an agency charged with promoting "intellectual and moral cooperation among nations," a grant of "more adequate" representation to Latin America on the Security Council, and recognition of inter-American regionalism. The measures taken to strengthen the American regional system consisted of an agreement to conclude a hemispheric defense treaty (accomplished at Rio in 1947), a resolution to formalize the structure of the inter-Amer-

²⁶ This discussion of Latin American participation in the UN is largely based on John A. Houston, *Latin America in the United Nations* (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1956).

ican organization (accomplished at Bogotá in 1948), a decision to coordinate existing inter-American agreements for the pacific settlement of disputes (also accomplished at Bogotá in 1948), and a determination to support the admission of Argentina to the coming San Francisco Conference (this, too, was accomplished despite an earlier decision to exclude Argentina because of her pro-Axis leanings during the war). Thus, with their ranks closed, the Latin American republics hoped to make their influence felt at the UN organizational meeting where they would constitute two-fifths of the nations represented.

Despite their solidarity, the Latin Americans were unable to accomplish as much as they had hoped at San Francisco. Again and again they ran into the stone wall of great power agreement and had to give way. In contrast to their attitude within the League of Nations, they now espoused international regionalism. Their conversion had been effected by the liquidation of American imperialism, the unfolding of the Good Neighbor Policy, and perhaps most of all by the growing power of Communist Russia. They found themselves unable to achieve an open consolidation of forces with the United States, for the North Americans feared that to appear to ask favors for their regional system would put the Soviet Union in a good position to ask favors for her satellites. But the United States representatives remained loyal to inter-American regionalism and helped to gain for it the recognition that they and the Latin Americans desired — a recognition for more forthright than that contained in the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Latin Americans were primarily responsible for the addition of Article 51 to the Charter and for Chapter IV's assertion of the Assembly's right to discuss any question not on the agenda of the Security Council. Both were important victories.

The record of Latin American participation in the UN has been one of fairly consistent but by no means complete solidarity. The twenty republics have been pursuing a deliberate policy of consultation and collaboration in support of principles common to all or most of them. They have been dedicated — more or less — to the principles of universality of membership, the juristic equality of states, anti-colonialism, the rights of dependent peoples, the social and cultural missions of the UN, the rights of women, freedom of information, the control of armaments, and financial assistance to underdeveloped areas. In many instances, however, their devotion to these principles has been subordinated to their resolution to forestall the expansion of Communist power.

The Latin Americans have allied themselves with United States spokesmen on virtually all issues related to the "cold war" and, indeed, on most political issues. Often the Latin Americans themselves have presented a solid front on underlying principles and ultimate objectives, but have broken ranks on matters of tactics or procedures. The Latin American-United States alignment has usually crumbled on issues related to assistance to underdeveloped areas. The North Americans have been unable or unwilling to commit themselves to the measure of financial as-

sistance which the Latin Americans feel that they need and that they are entitled to in view of the vastly greater United States aid programs in behalf of Europe and Asia. Most of the southern republics have also feared that the efforts toward more freedom in commercial intercourse espoused by the United States would raise serious obstacles to the progress of their infant industries.

A secondary "alliance" of the Latin American delegations to the General Assembly has been with the Arab bloc. This alignment has its roots in a common interest in economic development and anti-imperialism as well as in a common resolve to uphold the rights of small states. At times this front has broken -- as in the matter of the disposition of the former Italian colonies -- but the Latin Americans seem determined to preserve the formidable voting strength which this coalition represents. Argentina has most frequently pursued a lonely course and, among the larger states, Brazil has given the most consistent allegiance to the causes supported by the United States, but Nicaraguans declare that they have been the most sympathetic of all Uncle Sam's good neighbors.

Although the Latin American republics have failed to modify the great power concept on which the UN was founded, they have usually maintained such a solidarity among themselves, and they have commonly sent such able representatives into the various bodies of the UN, that they have at times exerted a decisive influence on the course of UN policy. Their delegates have often been eloquent spokesmen for small states, for a system of law and justice, for the underdeveloped areas, and above all, for the anti-Communist world. Unhappily, their governments, like most of those represented in the UN, have often failed to take action to implement the resolutions adopted in New York.

AN ASSESSMENT

Collectively, Latin America would seem to possess a number of conditions that tend to increase its importance in international affairs. For one thing, it has a rapidly increasing population, at present approximately equal to that of Canada and the United States combined, and it has ample space for a great many millions more. Second, it is a large producer of raw materials that are in continuous demand ; and it is at the same time an expanding market for a wide range of commodities and for foreign capital. Third, it is part -- a very large part -- of the most completely developed example of organized international regionalism, the Organization of American States, within which the members find substantial security, create new modes of international cooperation, and often achieve a common world policy. Fourth, again and again the states of Latin America, even the smallest and weakest of them, send statesmen of high talents into the councils of nations. This was true with the League of Nations, and it is now true with the United Nations. Fifth, the Latin American

countries have caught the urge to industrialize and modernize. Aided by the assistance programs of the UN, the OAS, and the United States, they are developing industries, improving agriculture, building public works, and in various other ways seeking to improve the material basis of national life.

Latin America has its problems too. We shall note these at somewhat greater length :


Geography. Among the obstacles to progress in Latin America the most obvious has been that of geography, especially topography. Indeed, all but four of the twenty republics — Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Cuba — possess terrains of such ruggedness that they have retarded national development. Mountains have done more than prevent or impede transportation and communication ; they have reduced the arable land potential and made possible a high concentration of land ownership — one of Latin America's most distressing problems. Very importantly, they have obstructed administrative efficiency, cultural homogeneity, and economic viability.

Government. Most of the states have a long record of political instability, corruption, and undemocratic practices. "Latin America," says Germán Arciniegas, "is synonymous with instability."²⁷ Nowhere in the world do the public leaders subscribe more passionately to the ideals of democracy, and nowhere else does performance lag so far behind professions. While part of the discrepancy is to be accounted for by sheer demagoguery, some of it must be charged to conditions which make an approximation to real democracy impossible. At times instability gives way to excessive stability : dictators put an iron grip on entire states and hang on until revolution or death. Usually they bleed their victims for personal profit, but in some instances they have been well-meaning and financially honest men. They have sought to give "democracy" much more the meaning of "independence," of freedom from foreign domination, than of government by the people, and they have succeeded all too well. Dictatorship commonly falls to the lot of weak and backward states, with neither a middle class with a stake in law and order nor the slightest tradition of constitutional government ; but the past few years have demonstrated that even progressive states with earlier promising records of constitutionalism may, for a time at least, be bound and gagged by a "strong man." This has happened in Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia.

The governments of most Latin American countries are "run by the generals, with the aid of the colonels and a few civilians." "Every president, whether soldier or civilian, knows that he can remain in office as long as the army supports him, but not one hour longer."²⁸ This condition, however, is hardly adequate to explain the role of the military in Latin American politics. While unarmed or poorly armed people cannot

²⁷ Germán Arciniegas, *The State of Latin America* (Knopf, 1952), p. 355.

²⁸ Austin F. Macdonald, *Latin American Politics and Government*, 2nd ed. (Crowell, 1954), p. 18.



Baldy in The Atlanta Constitution

"Volumes of Experience"

be expected to face an army, the basic question is why the army, particularly its generals and colonels, is so frequently willing to defy the government. The answer must be found somewhere in the state's traditions, in public opinion, or in the character of the leadership of both government and army.

The Economy. The postwar economic progress of Latin America is attested by a variety of statistics, as, for instance, by the increasing per capita consumption of agriculture products, by the five per cent annual increase in the output of manufactured goods, and by the fact that for nearly ten years the annual value of manufactured products has exceeded the value of the steadily expanding agricultural output. Between 1937 and 1954 the gold and foreign exchange reserve holdings of government institutions increased from \$375 million to \$3,375 million. Latin America now absorbs about 35 per cent of all United States direct private investments abroad, and it provides 32 per cent of American imports and consumes 22 per cent of American exports. In the years since the close of

World War II, wrote one competent observer in 1955, the states of Latin America have enjoyed "an increase of 33.3 per cent in the stock of capital and a commensurate advance in industrialization."²⁹ He added that between 1945 and 1953 the per capita income in Latin America rose at a rate of 3.3 per cent annually as compared with an average per capita increase of 1.9 per cent during "the period of historical growth of the United States." Some of the factors responsible for this encouraging progress were directly related to World War II, and the present outlook does not suggest the probability of such a rate of improvement for the future. Indeed, continued the 1955 observation, "Latin America's vigorous economic growth has slowed down suddenly and alarmingly within the past two years."

The future of Latin America's economy has given rise to a number of hotly debated issues. Perhaps the most basic of these relates to the so-called Prebisch thesis, which derived its name from the distinguished Argentine economist Raul Prebisch, Executive Secretary of the UN's Economic Commission for Latin America. It was contained in ECLA's *Economic Survey of Latin America, 1949*, published in 1951, and embraced in the following specific findings of the *Survey*: (1) The two-hundred-year-old industrial revolution as so far been concentrated in a few industrial centers (Great Britain, Western Europe, the United States and Japan) and has had little effect on the peripheral areas. (2) Such improvements in productivity as have taken place in the peripheral areas have been largely confined to the industries producing raw materials for the industrial centers. (3) This has led to a situation in which most of the gains in productivity in the peripheral countries have been "exported" to the industrial centers, and have done little to advance the well-being of the people of the peripheral areas. (4) Unless some kind of positive action is taken, the long-run outlook is for a continuing deterioration of the relative position of the peripheral areas.³⁰

These findings of the ECLA *Survey* say in effect that "the peoples of Latin America are caught in the inexorable workings of a process that condemns them to the role of second- or third-class citizens in the modern world economy," and they further carry the "implication.....that only strong action by the governments of Latin American countries can break through this process and bring the fuller life these people so earnestly desire." In the opinion of Benjamin A. Rogge, a vigorous critic of the Prebisch thesis, the policies recommended in the *Survey* "would bring economic nationalism and a whole host of new tensions among the countries of the world," and they run sharply counter to his conviction that "the best chance for economic development *cum* freedom will exist in a country whose government undertakes little more than the limited but

²⁹ Serge Fliegers, "The Financing of Latin America's Economic Development," *Journal of International Affairs*, IX, No. 1 (1955), 56.

³⁰ This discussion of the Prebisch thesis is largely based on Benjamin A. Rogge, "Economic Development in Latin America: The Prebisch Thesis," *Inter-American Economic Affairs*, IX, No. 4 (Spring, 1956), 24-49.

very important task of creating an environment in which all the constructive forces of private initiative and private enterprise can be released for the tasks of economic progress."³¹ Professor Rogge suggests that governments first concentrate on the traditional functions of government—"so necessary to economic development": the police force, the legal system, the monetary system, highways, education, and the like. When these have been brought to a high level of efficiency, the people should then decide what additional services they may ask of the government.

The Prebisch thesis really involves two issues: the fundamental nature of the Latin American economy of the future and the role of government in the promotion of national economies. Other important issues that have arisen relate to heavy or basic industries versus light or secondary industries, diversification versus specialization in agricultural production, the source of needed investment capital, the barriers to the investment of foreign capital, the limits of technical assistance, self-sufficiency in food production, and a new inter-American lending agency. Latin Americans themselves sharply disagree on the foreign aid policy of the United States as it relates to Latin America. Some contend that Uncle Sam is niggardly and that he helps only when he needs friends; others insist that his much greater aid to European and Asian countries is in behalf of the entire free world and that his generosity has been without parallel in history.

Social Conditions ; Budgets. With some notable exceptions, poverty and illiteracy are present to a marked degree in Latin American states. The two conditions are interrelated, and behind them lie a variety of causes: insufficient good soil; uncongenial temperature; lack of diversity in mineral resources; rugged terrain and poor communications; in many instances large Indian populations isolated by geography, traditions, or language, or all three; limited markets for local products; small national revenues for education, social welfare, and the like; a church-dominated school system that gives too little attention to liberal arts and technical education; a possible shortage of investment capital--although some observers deny this and point to the sizable investment (nearly two billion dollars) which Latin Americans hold in the United States; and the neglect of the welfare of the politically impotent masses. Whatever the causes, the consequences are national weakness and backwardness.

Critics of Latin America's achievements in education, health, and similar areas should be mindful of the fact that it is working with very little money. In 1950 the total national income of the twenty republics was about one-eighth that of the United States, and the per capita incomes were in about the same proportion. Although the average per capita income of the five highest-income countries (Venezuela, Cuba, Uruguay, Panama, and Argentina) was only about one-fifth that of the United States,

³¹ Rogge, p. 24, and Benjamin A. Rogge, "The Role of Government in Latin American Economic Development," *Inter-American Economic Affairs*, IX, No. 3 (Winter, 1955), 65-66.

it was four times that of the five lowest-income states (Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Haiti). In 1953 the total of the twenty national budgets of Latin America amounted to less than \$6 billion; the United States budget was nearly \$75 billion.³² Some of the states of Latin America have smaller annual budgets than a few of the wealthier universities in the United States. Obviously government revenues are often woefully inadequate for doing what needs to be done.

Social Stratification. Latin America has a much better record than the United States in the matter of discrimination against non-whites, "but after all of this has been said, it has to be added that Latin-American society has remained stratified, immobile, and, if a colonial expression may be used, divided into *castas*." Compared with the United States, "there is noticeably less vertical mobility," and "the barrier made by wealth, race and occupation is markedly obvious in its effect upon social mobility."³³ There is, in addition, another source of stratification — that between urban and rural societies. Whether because of an instinctive rejection of the white man's values or because discrimination and suppression have left them only the security of ancient customs and isolated living, the Indians and many of the mestizos of Latin America have never caught the liberal creoles' enthusiasm for democracy, education, and money-making. In short, they have taken very little to what we call "Westernization." With an increasing number of exceptions, they have retained primitive ways and dress, kept to large plantations or to their own scanty patches of soil in the mountain valleys and jungles, accepted a Christian veneer for their pagan religions, and eschewed urbanization, schooling, and voting. They have trodden old trails with uncomplaining fatalism, turning aside only now and then to shed their blood for an ambitious *caudillo*. "The major single issue in the political destiny of Latin America is to bridge this gap between the rural Indian and mestizo community and the nation."³⁴ An important consequence of rural isolation has been that political leadership has been regional and personal — that the *caudillo* could become the undisputed master of a tiny region or a large one. There, where his word was law, he could sustain the central government or conspire to overthrow it.

The Church. Dissension — often bitter and at times bloody — has been occasioned by differences of opinion about the proper role of the Roman Catholic Church, by its propensity to take a hand in politics, and by its failure to exert a progressive social influence. The overwhelming majority of Latin Americans are Catholics, although one figure puts the "merely nominal Catholics" at 70 per cent of the whole number.³⁵ For a long time many Latin Americans remembered that the Church had supported Spain in the South American Wars of Independence; and many Catholics,

³² These figures have been compiled from tables in Herring, p. 776.

³³ Frank Tannenbaum, "Democracy and Rural Education in Latin America," in Angel del Rio, ed., *Responsible Freedom in the Americas* (Doubleday, 1955), p. 6.

³⁴ Tannenbaum, p. 11.

³⁵ *Hispanic-American Report*, VIII (August, 1955), 337.

"nominal" and otherwise, have fought for the separation of church and state. Some state have made that separation : others have not. That church-state relations are still a subject of bitter controversy is demonstrated by the oppression of Protestants in Colombia, the circumstances attending the fall of Perón in Argentina, and Guatemala's difficulties in drafting a new constitution.

The separation of church and state does not in itself take the church out of politics. In Brazil, where separation took place more than half a century ago, the Catholic clergy openly campaigned for Eurico Dutra in 1945 ; the Catholic Electoral League openly opposed Café Filho, a Presbyterian, in the elections of 1950 ; and in August, 1953, Carlos Cardinal Vaseconcelos, Archbishop of São Paulo, issued the following statement on a move in the Brazilian Congress to enact divorce laws : "Should any Brazilian Government dare to institute divorce in Brazil, the people would have the right to oppose by armed resistance this attempt to undermine the foundation of Christian family life in this country." ³⁶ In Brazil — where Protestants are stronger than in any other Latin American state, and where Protestantism "is growing faster than in any other country on earth" ³⁷ --- Protestants complain of the barriers against Protestant missionary activity in some parts of Latin America, and they "point to Catholicism's double standard -- the demand for full freedom to convert the United States while attempting to deny freedom to Evangelicals. Protestants and maintain a monopoly in Latin America." ³⁸

One authority on Latin American institutions has declared that "it is accurate to state that the Church in Latin America is not social-minded," that "even in the moral and ethical fields, Latin American Catholicism tends more to form than to content," that "the evidence indicates that the hierarchy in Latin America are more interested in the ritual of Catholicism than in any such social policies as might permit each individual an equal opportunity to develop his potentialities," and that "in those countries in which there are fewer Catholic churches and less demonstration of faith in the form of public ceremonials, the largest amount of progress toward democracy has been realized." ³⁹ If these conclusions are correct, it is understandable that Latin American liberals should make strenuous protest and that the role of the Church should offer divisive issues.

American Influences. It seems correct to suggest that in two particulars the example of the United States may have been harmful to the newer republics of Latin America. One relates to government, the other to business.

The United States Constitution of 1787 provided Latin Americans with a pattern for republicanism, and from this document, as well as from the

³⁶ Quote in William S. Stokes, "Catholicism and Democracy in Latin America," in *del Rio*, p. 374.

³⁷ *Hispanic-American Report*, p. 337.

³⁸ *Hispanic-American Report*, p. 337.

³⁹ Stokes, pp. 368, 366.

Declaration of Independence, they have freely borrowed words and phrases. But the Constitution established a federal system and separated state and church, and the efforts to incorporate these two principles into their own political structures have given Latin Americans their most persistent internal issues. The Constitution also set up an elaborate system of checks and balances which Latin Americans have never really understood. In fact, the whole North American scheme of government assumed an experience in self-government which the Latin Americans totally lacked, and it related to a social and economic order quite unknown to them. The experience of Brazil suggests that San Martín and others may have been right in their preference for an evolutionary period under constitutional monarchs. Latin Americans had too long been steeped in the authoritarian tradition to shift smoothly into responsible democracy.

The spectacular prosperity of the United States appears to have done much to influence the economic thinking of Latin America since the Wars of Independence. For these lands the era of the "robber barons" has not yet ended. The correctives which asserted themselves in the United States -- effective representative government, powerful labor organizations, a free press and free speech, and a growing esteem for good public relations -- have not been fully operative in Latin America. Until they are operative, many Latin Americans will misunderstand the free enterprise system, and for them it will remain a qualified blessing.

Communism. Although fascism is by no means entirely a nightmare of the past in Latin America, communism probably represents a more deadly threat to the democracies of the Western world than that ever posed by fascism. Unlike fascism, it marches under the banner of democracy and, again unlike fascism, it presumes no feeling of racial superiority and no divine appointment. Furthermore, "in the Latin American republics where exploitation of the masses is a commonplace whether by the foreign capitalist or by the national politician, the glittering promises of Communism are more persuasive and alluring than the realities of a none too successful democracy."⁴⁰

Marxian communism found articulate leaders in Latin America during the decade of the 1920's but with few exceptions its spokesmen were sincerely interested in bettering the conditions of the lower classes. About 1930, however, Latin American Communists fell under the influence of the Comintern, whereupon they lost their earlier patriotic character and became the agents of international communism. The evidence suggests that they have at one time or another achieved rather formidable strength in six Latin American republics.

Measured by votes, communism has won its greatest victory in Brazil, and Latin America's best known Communist is a Brazilian, Luis Carlos Prestes. After being outlawed in 1927, the Communists supported the Vargas dictatorship briefly after its rise in 1931 and then, after an unsuccessful revolt in 1935, remained inactive until 1945. After ten years in

⁴⁰ Stuart, p. 88.

jail Prestes was released in 1945 and his party again legalized ; in return, Prestes supported the Vargas nominee for the presidency. In the elections that followed the Communist Party received more than 600,000 popular votes and won fourteen seats in the Chamber of Deputies. Prestes was elected to the Senate. The Communist vote rose to about 800,000 in 1947. Soon thereafter the party was dissolved by government action. Today some fifty Communist newspapers are tolerated, but no interference in public affairs is permitted. The government is strongly anti-Communist.

The Communists won their first Latin American cabinet posts in Chile. On instructions from Moscow the Chilean Communists infiltrated the Radical Party and gained a number of seats in the Congress in the 1937 elections and additional seats in the 1941 elections. As a reward for Communist support President Gabriel Gonzáles Videla appointed three of their number to cabinet posts in 1946. These men proved troublesome, and five months later he ousted them. When the Communists encouraged strikes in the copper mines in reprisal, Gonzáles Videla induced the Congress to outlaw the Communist Party ; and he broke off relations with the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia and gave Tito's diplomats their passports. Although President Carlos Ibáñez has permitted the Communists to operate in the open except in elections, he has in many ways demonstrated his staunch opposition to communism.

The Communist Party in Argentina was outlawed in 1930 but was legalized in 1945 when Dictator Perón saw its value in his diplomatic battle with the United States. The Stalinist wing became intermittently anti-Perón ; much of its hostility to Perón arose from the rivalry of labor unions. Perón kept the Communist Party within view as part of the window dressing for his Third Position -- neither communism nor capitalism but a third philosophy, *justicialismo* — but he never let it get out of hand. The post-Perón regimes have dealt roughly with both *peronistas* and Communists, at times charging that the two groups had joined forces.

The Communist Party in Mexico polled its largest vote in 1946 — about 40,000 — but its importance, though never great, has been out of proportion to its voting strength. The difference has been Vincente Lombardo Toledano, Latin America's Number One Communist intellectual and Number Two political leader. Toledano's influence has derived from his role in organized labor, his talents as a writer and orator, and his newspaper, *El Popular*. He organized Mexican labor into the CTM (*Confederación de Trabajadores Mexicanos*) and headed the CTAL (*Confederación de Trabajadores de la América Latina*), an inter-American labor organization which followed the Soviet lead throughout World War II. Unlike the tolerant Cárdenas (1934-1940), President Miguel Alemán (1946-1952) took a strong position against the Communists. They have lost much of their earlier strength in both labor and politics.

The Communists in Cuba established themselves during the corrupt regime of Machado (1925-1933), received nearly 200,000 votes in the elections of 1947, and then began to decline in number and influence. On

regaining power in 1952 Batista moved against all Communist-front groups, driving their leaders from the country and closing their newspapers. Like most Latin American dictators, Batista is vigorously anti-Communist and, vocally at least, pro-democratic in the clash of ideologies.

The conquest of Guatemala has been the supreme achievement of communism in Latin America. After several years of devious operations behind a variety of front organizations, the Communists elected Arbenz Guzmán to the presidency in 1950 and instituted a program of nationalization aimed primarily at the holdings of the United Fruit Company. Although the Communist regime was overthrown by Castillo Armas in 1954 and the beachhead of international communism destroyed, escaping Communists have injected a subversive influence into the politics of other Central American states.

Elsewhere in Latin America communism has won some momentary prestige here and there, but it has nowhere assumed the proportions of a serious threat. It has achieved its greatest success where labor has been best organized, but as labor unions have gained some sophistication they have spurned the Communist line. The postwar prosperity, the technical assistance programs of the United Nations and the United States, and the loyalties of Latin American dictators and democrats have substantially reduced the measure of the Communist threat. With the support of all members, the OAS has taken a resolute stand against the operations of international communism. Under the terms of a number of bilateral pacts the United States has provided arms and military missions for Latin American governments.

The Social Mind. An intangible but major problem relates to what may be called a lack of social consciousness, to what one perceptive American who has lived many years in Latin America calls "insensitivity." It is revealed in comparative indifference to the welfare of the poor and the handicapped, in the tolerance of injustice and brutality when others are the victims, in placid acceptance of corruption, and in insistence on royal roads to everything, whether democracy, wealth, or position. More concretely, it is revealed in the luxurious officers' club in Caracas, hardly a rifle-shot from the hillside shantytown; in the fondness of Pérez Jiménez for "hot-rodding" through the Venezuelan countryside at a hundred miles an hour;⁴¹ in the boast of Mexicans that graft in the United States is penny-snitching compared with operations in Mexico; in the alleged remark of Rafael Trujillo, Dominican dictator, that it was a shame that his great administrative talents — which he undoubtedly has — should have to be wasted on "such a dinky little country"; in the fabulous jewels and wardrobe of Eva Perón; in indifference to the condition of public thoroughfares as long as walls can be built; and even in the fact that dogs on the streets are afraid of pedestrians. "A policeman in the United States or London," says a distinguished Latin American, "is a human being who helps an old lady across the street, a guardian angel for the children

⁴¹ See *Time*, Feb. 28, 1955.

coming out of school, the protecting arm of the law. A policeman under a Latin American despot is a shady character not too far removed from the criminal, a man of dubious past who is handed a uniform and a revolver with orders to crush the opposition and maintain order by terror."⁴²

Whatever its cause — whether an aspect of the authoritarian traditions, a narrow view of the capitalist creed, or merely the sense of futility with which the few on top regard the prospects of really doing something for so many who need so much — there has been little devotion to the common weal, and, socially as well as politically, most Latin American states have failed to be the melting pots out of which could come true nationalities.

A NEW ROLE?


What does the future hold for the states of Latin America? For some of them the future would seem to be as gloomy as the past. It must be remembered, however, that many forms of assistance and encouragement that were unknown only a short time ago are now available. Many of the Latin American states are grasping their opportunities. Encouraged by their most perceptive leaders, by the United States, by the specialized agencies of the Organization of American States, and by the UN's Economic Commission for Latin America — ECLA is a magic term in Latin America — they have addressed themselves to their shortcomings in health, housing, education, highways, soil improvement, crop diversification, tax reform, industrialization, and a host of other areas.

Encouraging too is the fact that so many able Latin American statesmen, scholars, and journalists are speaking in behalf of a new order of affairs. Particularly hopeful are the efforts of the Inter-American Press Association, which since its organization in 1942 has taken a firm stand in defense of the freedom of the press. While United States journalists are still important in its work, it is "becoming more and more a Latin American organization." It has had the courage to decline grants from private foundations in the United States as well as to criticize the Department of State "for doing business with people like Perón" and for "unnecessarily befriending Latin American dictators who are enemies of the free press." It flatly condemned Colombian Dictator Rojas Pinella for his closing in 1955 of Eduardo Santos' great liberal newspaper *El Tiempo*, of Bogotá.⁴³

There are still other encouraging signs. One is the way in which foreign experts take to the countries in which they work : again and again the visiting North American encounters a countryman who is "sold" on this or that country and talks enthusiastically of its future. Another is the

⁴² Arciniegas, p. 387.

⁴³ For a brief account of the Inter-American Press Association, see *Hispanic-American Report*, VIII (Oct., 1955), 449-451. See also Ronald Hilton, "Responsibility and Freedom in Communications Media," in del Rio, pp. 256-262.



Department of State publication Objectives of U. S. Foreign Policy in Latin America

**Dependence on Single Exports
(Exports as Percentage of Total Exports)**

growing stream of North American tourists — something like four hundred thousand a year — who fly, sail, or drive southward to enjoy the striking beauty of Latin American lands and the hospitality of their people, and doing so both receive and transmit ideas.

Although Latin America is making unquestionable progress in its economic development, the United States Department of State speaks unrealistically when it says that Latin America is "far from being a 'backward' or 'underdeveloped' area." And it is certainly inaccurate in citing Venezuela, which is first in the value of exports in Latin America and first in per capita income, as an "example" of Latin American countries on the march.⁴⁴ Nevertheless, progress is substantial even if poorly distributed.

The bustling economies of many Latin American states,⁴⁵ perhaps especially their present fervor for industrialization, public works, and technical assistance, evidently furnish the Department of State's warrant for its rhapsodical declaration that "the big news in our days is that Latin America's time has come" — that "once again one of the great land masses of the world has caught fire and is growing and developing at a rate that is sure to change completely its relationship to the rest of the world."⁴⁶ While one may question that America's good neighbors are aflame, he can hardly doubt that some of them are making the sparks fly, and that there is sound basis for the more restrained observation of John M. Cabot,

⁴⁴ *Objectives of U. S. Foreign Policy in Latin America*, Dept. of State Pub. 6131, Inter-American Series 51 (Nov. 1955), pp. 24, 23. The figures cited in the above paragraph have been taken from this same work, p. 23.

⁴⁵ For a review of economic developments in Latin America during 1955, see the *New York Times*, Jan. 5, 1956, pp. 49-79.

⁴⁶ *Objectives of U. S. Foreign Policy in Latin America*, p. 1.

former Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, that "the development of Latin America is today so rapid that it must in a short span strongly affect the balance of world economics and military power."⁴⁷

Unhappily, most of the currently optimistic appraisals pertain only to the Latin American economies.⁴⁸ They do not say — nor could they say — that democracy is about to bloom or even to bud. While it is certainly true that power in world affairs can be exercised by states ruled by dictators, the power desired by the great liberal leaders of the Latin American republics, like that of the true liberals of every state, is power consistently to pursue the objectives of peace and justice. This power their countries cannot have while despots rule.

Despite every effort that its states may make, it seems clear that Latin America will never be a region of great powers. Only Brazil appears to have the potential for such a status, and her political and economic maturity lies many decades in the future.⁴⁹ Of the two other large states, Argentina lacks the essential mineral resources and Mexico lacks both industrial minerals and good soil. But nearly every state does have the material resources to pursue hopefully the more laudable objective of a good life for its people. Reaching this objective calls for a helping hand from the United States, as, among others, President Figueres of Costa Rica has suggested,⁵⁰ but it also calls for a dedicated leadership that has all too often been lacking in Latin America.

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⁴⁷ See *Toward Our Common American Destiny* (Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, no date), pp. 56-57. These remarks were originally made on Oct. 4, 1953.

⁴⁸ Professor Fitzgibbon's study, cited in footnote 13, undertook also to measure Latin American progress in fifteen significant areas or aspects of nation life. The specialists consulted believed that "freedom of government from ecclesiastical impact had made the greatest progress of all the criteria." They felt that "foreign domination as a retardant to democracy was also not considered serious," but that "civilian supremacy over the military, freedom of party organization, the state of local government, and the nature of elections were..... in a bad way indeed." They were impressed by the improvement in the educational level, the standard of living, and the status of social legislation; they agreed that losses had been suffered in freedom of speech and in the independence of the judiciary. "Uruguay, Costa Rica, and Chile monopolize the first three places in all three years when the specialists made their evaluations; Paraguay, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Nicaragua regularly occupied four of the last six places The statistical case for Uruguay is almost fantastically good." This provocative article — "continually granting the subjective nature of the evaluations" — is well worth reading.

⁴⁹ For an excellent brief discussion of Brazil's "Problems and Promises," see Herring, pp. 734-741.

⁵⁰ "The Problems of Democracy in Latin America," *Journal of International Affairs* IX, No. 1 (1955), 12.

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Africa: Rising World.

18

While Latin America is undertaking the modernization of its national economies with considerable energy, and while social and political developments in Asia are stirring the entire world, Africa—farther back on the path of progress—is experiencing a momentous awakening. “It is apparent,” declared the Secretary-General of the United Nations in his annual report in 1955, “that in the next ten years the peace and stability of the world will be strongly affected by the evolution in Africa, by the national awakening of its people, by the course of race relations and by the manner in which the economic and social advancement of the African peoples is assisted by the rest of the world.”

In some respects the northern part of Africa, bordering on the Mediterranean, has been a part of the European realm for many centuries ; but even here, once the traveler leaves the few cities along the seacoast, he enters a land scarcely known except to a few administrators and colonial experts. Aside from the Union of South Africa, the continent south of the Sahara has been an almost unknown land. Accurate information on most of Africa has been very spotty; and much of it is less than a century old.¹ Even today reliable data are hard to come by.

Thus Africa is still the “dark continent”—dark in two respects : the great majority of its inhabitants are Negroes and other dark-skinned peoples, and it is still largely unknown. Perhaps George H. T. Kimble was right when he wrote in 1951 : “The darkest thing about Africa has always been our ignorance of it.”²

¹ Harry R. Rudin, “Past and Present Role of Africa in World Affairs,” *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, CCXCVIII (March, 1955), 32.

² “Africa Today : The Lifting Darkness,” *The Reporter*, May 15, 1951, p. 17. Whereas news from Africa used to come — if it came at all — mostly in official state-

Fundamental changes are going on in Africa, in varying degrees and intensity, and these changes are affecting the whole picture of African life. Although the student of international relations is primarily interested in such matters as the changing patterns of colonialism and of nationalism and Africa's growing role in world affairs, he must also look for the more basic forces which are changing the face of Africa today. In the striking words and confused imagery of John Gunther: "Africa is like an exploding mass of yeast. Its fermentations are not merely political and economic but social, cultural, religious. It is springing in a step from black magic to white civilization."³

As we read disturbing news from Algeria or Kenya or South Africa, with "the spectacle of millions upon millions of people being transformed almost overnight from a primitive, trival way of life to aggressive membership in modern society,"⁴ we wonder how in this age of international tensions and great social ferment Africa can be anything but a source of trouble. There is much justification for our apprehensions. Thousands of Africans have been uprooted from their old ways, and have not found their place in the new and changing society in which their destinies are now cast. "Yet all over the continent the Africans are on the move. They are people going somewhere, without being quite sure of the direction."⁵ For all the instability, unrest, and uncertainty, the feeling of awakening is strong, "this continent seems united by a common surge of hope—just as, in the past, it must so often have seemed united by a common acceptance of despair."⁶

THE PHYSICAL AND HUMAN SETTING

Africa, second largest of continents, covers one-fifth of the land area of the globe. It is nearly four times the size of the United States. The Sahara alone, the largest desert in the world, is nearly as large as the United States; it operates in some respects as a sea—a sea of sand—dividing the African continent into two unequal parts. Geographically, historically, and to some extent culturally North Africa is much closer to

ments from colonial powers, now newspapers and magazines in all major countries are full of reports and articles about it. A mere listing of the books on Africa — many of a popular or semi-popular nature — which have appeared within the past two or three years would make a substantial bibliography. In 1952-1953 the indefatigable political reporter John Gunther travelled more than 40,000 miles in most parts of the continent, and his book *Inside Africa* was a major publishing event of 1955. Gunther tried to compress into somewhat more than 900 pages "all that the ordinary reader needs to know about Africa." His book was a Book-of-the-Month Club selection and became a best seller in the United States.

³ John Gunther, *Inside Africa* (Harper, 1955), p. 3.

⁴ Gunther, p. 3.

⁵ Peter Abrahams, review of Oden Mecker, *Report on Africa* (Scribner, 1955), in the *New York Times Book Review*, Aug. 22, 1954, p. 6.

⁶ Basil Davidson, *The African Awakening* (London, 1955), p. 233.

Europe—and, through Islam, to the Middle East—than to Africa south of the Sahara. Most of Africa is a plateau, averaging some two thousand feet in height, and much of it is still relatively inaccessible land, in spite of the fact that its major cities are linked by air and in spite of a number of mighty rivers—the Nile in the east and northeast, the Zambesi in the southeast, the Congo in equatorial Africa, and the Niger and the Senegal in West Central Africa. Few natural harbors interrupt its sixteen-thousand-mile coastline.

According to recent United Nations estimates, the population of this vast area is something like 198,000,000. The continent as a whole is rather sparsely populated, averaging perhaps 15 to 20 persons to the square mile ; but “the population map of Africa shows every variation from the remarkable densities of the irrigated Nile Valley in Egypt to the uninhabited tracts of the Sahara, with such extremes often occurring in the closest possible proximity to one another.”⁷ While the Nile Valley in Egypt is by far the most heavily populated area, densities of more than 100 persons per square mile occur in a number of other parts, including the coastal regions of Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Nigeria, the southern and eastern coasts of South Africa, and the upper Sudan along the Nile Valley. Demographically, if not yet politically, Africa certainly belongs to the Africans. Almost all of the 198,000,000 people who inhabit it are of African stock. According to most ethnologists, the three main racial groups are Hamites, Negroes, and “Bantus.” The term “Bantu,” which, properly speaking, is a linguistic and not a racial term, is applied rather generally to the great majority of the African peoples, dark-skinned but not Negroes, who live in Africa south of the Sahara. Some 600,000 persons of Indian origin live mostly in the Union of South Africa and in East Africa. According to reliable estimates, there are only 5,000,000 Europeans in all of Africa, and of this relatively small number 2,500,000 are in the Union of South Africa and another 1,600,000 in French North Africa. The 1,000,000 white people in all the rest of Africa are largely concentrated in white settler areas, mostly in East Africa. Nigeria, the largest African political unit in terms of population, has more than 30,000,000 people, but fewer than 12,000 white Europeans.

Most of Africa belongs to what is referred to as the underdeveloped world, and most of the people are poor. In many parts the standards of living are among the lowest in the world, and per capita incomes among the smallest.⁸ Millions of Africans are still hardly more than s’aves—to their tribal chiefs, to their European masters, to their own ignorance and superstitions. Forced labor still exists in Portuguese Africa, and the conditions in mining areas and in native “reserves” in South Africa are hardly better than those of slavery. Life expectancy is low in most parts of the

⁷ Robert W. Steel, “Africa : The Environmental Setting,” *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, CCXCVIII (March, 1955), 7.

⁸ Naturally per capita income varies greatly, with the figures for Europeans being much higher than for Africans, even in the same parts of the continent. In Kenya and the Rhodesias, for example, annual per capita income for Europeans ranges from \$560 to \$840, whereas for Africans the range is from \$14 to \$28.

continent. The struggle against the diseases which afflict millions of Africans is dramatized by many records of striking successes, and by the labors of selfless men, of whom Dr. Albert Schweitzer is the best known.

Africa is deficient in several important resources, including oil, and large areas lack such essentials as an adequate water supply. It does have great sources of hydroelectric power, mostly untapped as yet, and it is the chief source of many vital materials. It supplies 98 per cent of the world's industrial diamonds, 80 per cent of the cobalt, 75 per cent of the sisal, 70 per cent of the palm oil, 50 per cent or more of the gold, 25 per cent of the manganese, and 20 per cent of the copper and tin. Furthermore, it has substantial amounts of uranium, especially in the Belgian Congo and in South Africa. Without the raw materials of Africa the Western world would be in a vulnerable position indeed. Furthermore, as John Gunther notes, "Africa is not only vital for what it already has, but is incomparably the greatest potential source of wealth awaiting development in the world."⁹

The cultural and social variations among the peoples of Africa are even more pronounced than their differences in political and economic status. Some still live in primitive tribal or subtribal groups, while others are sophisticated residents of cosmopolitan cities like Alexandria and Casablanca. Africans speak some seven hundred main languages. Roughly, 60,000,000 are Muslims, 21,000,000 are Christians, and 112,000,000 are pagans. Politically, the continent is a crazy patchwork of almost very known political pattern. "There are independent states, self-governing dominions, quasi-dominions, protectorates, colonies, trusteeships, territories the status of which is ambiguous or contested, and large areas which, no matter how they are governed, are still purely tribal or feudal."¹⁰ Only Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia, Libya, the Sudan and the Union South Africa are independent states. Perhaps Morocco and Tunisia should be included on this growing list, although they retain "interdependent links" with France. Several other areas are now well along toward independence, and some of these—including the Gold Coast, Nigeria, the Central African Federation, and Somalia—will probably become independent within the next five years. Including Somalia, there are seven trust territories administered by European powers but associated with the International Trusteeship System of the United Nations. Five European powers—France, Britain, Belgium, Spain and Portugal—still control most of the continent.¹¹

⁹ Gunther, p. 5.

¹⁰ Gunther, p. 4.

¹¹ The area and population of these holdings are approximately as follows :

	Area in square miles	Population
French Africa	4,022,150	44,152,600
British Africa	2,025,719	62,433,645
Belgian Africa	924,300	12,000,000
Portuguese Africa	778,000	9,500,000
Spanish Africa	134,700	1,495,000

In this listing Morocco and Tunisia are still included in French Africa.

THE AFRICAN PAST

Very little is known of Africa's past, although it was undoubtedly the home of some of the oldest human types. In fact, "recent discoveries in Uganda, Kenya and the Transvaal support the theory that Africa, and not Asia, was the cradle of the human race."¹² The original inhabitants may have been small, yellow-skinned men, resembling the Pygmies or the Bushmen who still exist in small numbers in remote parts; but black-skinned invaders from the northeast apparently pushed them southward. The one section in contact with existing civilizations since early times has been the area north of the Sahara. The Nile Valley, of course, was the center of one of the oldest of all civilizations, dating back more than five thousand years. Centuries before Christ, Phoenician traders skirted the coast of North Africa and established colonies, the most famous of which—Carthage—became the focus of a powerful empire which flourished for several centuries until it was destroyed by the Romans. Next to Egypt, the oldest center of advanced civilization in Africa, dating back to the third century B. C., was in what is now Ethiopia. Islam was introduced into North Africa by the Arabs between the seventh and eleventh centuries A. D. Muslims from North Africa invaded southern Europe, and were not finally expelled until the late fifteenth century. Their expulsion almost coincided with the rounding of the Cape of Good Hope by Bartholomew Diaz in 1488 and Vasco da Gama's voyage to India in 1499. Thereafter, European contacts with Africa, which had been limited to settlements in North Africa and scattered landings along the northwestern coast, increased rapidly. These ventures were still largely confined to the coastal strips, although the Dutch—ancestors of the present-day Boers of Afrikaners—colonized the Cape of Good Hope in the seventeenth century.

"Slavery was the ugly dominant note in African history for at least 250 years, roughly from 1562 to the early 1800's. It is impossible to underestimate the importance of this today in psychological and other realms."¹³ Millions of Africans were seized and taken across the seas, by Arabs to the Middle East and by Europeans to the West Indies, the United States, and South America. Internal slavery continued to exist on a fairly large scale well into the nineteenth century.

Until little more than a century ago Africa south of the Sahara was "a coast, not a continent" as far as European knowledge of it was concerned.¹⁴ Thereafter the interior was frequently explored, although Africa remained a relatively unknown continent, geographically as well as politically, until recent times. In the first half of the nineteenth century the slave trade was finally ended, but in the second half the imperialist

¹² Vernon Bartlett, *Struggle for Africa* (London, 1953), p. 15.

¹³ Gunther, p. 11.

¹⁴ Margery Perham, quoted in Gunther, p. 12.

"scramble for Africa" took place. In the amazingly short space of a single generation, trickery and pressure resulted in the carving up of most of the continent among European powers. Great Britain and France got the lion's share, but substantial portions also went to Belgium, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and later to Germany. The exploitation of the indigenous peoples by the imperial powers left a bitter legacy.¹⁵ By 1912 only Egypt, Ethiopia, and Liberia were even nominally independent, and Egypt was under strong British influence, while the others were weak and backward. In spite of their defeat in the Boer War, the Boers in South Africa had attained a large measure of independence under British rule; but they too were of European stock and were already supporting the concept of "white supremacy" so strongly upheld by the rulers of the Union of South Africa today.

Until relatively recently, therefore, the vast majority of the people of Africa lived quite isolated lives centered on remote villages or regions dominated by autocratic tribal chieftains or foreign rulers. The annexation of most of the continent by European powers in the late nineteenth century had the incidental effect of bringing the continent into the modern world. It is important to bear in mind how recently this emergence has occurred.

MAJOR TRENDS AND PROBLEMS

As Africa emerges into the modern world, it is hampered by barriers of geography and of ignorance, by racial tensions and social dislocations, by the legacy of the past, by problems arising from the struggle for racial equality, economic betterment, and political independence, and by the effect of conflicts among the great powers and of the general international situation. We shall here attempt to summarize what seem to be the major trends and problems of the present time.

1. As in Asia, though to a lesser degree, nationalism is a major force in most of the continent, with the exception of the Belgian Congo and Portuguese Africa and some of the more backward parts of the British and French empires. It is particularly strong in Egypt, in French North Africa, and in British West Africa. It has often appeared in perverted forms, in association with such movements as the tribal blood cult of the Mau Mau in Kenya and the *apartheid* drive in the Union of South Africa. This aspect of the present African scene is so important for the student of world politics that it will be examined more fully in a later section of this chapter. "The plain fact of the matter is that the nationalist awakening cannot be stopped, but that large areas of Africa are not yet ready for the effective practice of nationalism, namely, full self-government. This is the central African dilemma above all other dilemmas."¹⁶

2. Africa is the last great stronghold of colonialism in the world, but

¹⁵ Davidson, p. 60.

¹⁶ Gunther, p. 887.

that stronghold is being breached at many points, and its defenders are as much concerned with coming to terms with the attackers as with putting up a stubborn defense. Whereas after World War II all but one-tenth of the area of Africa and one-fifth of its people were ruled by Europeans, at the present time some 30 per cent of the area and 45 per cent of the people are "free or almost free". Except in South Africa and occasionally in the colonial empires in times of crisis and open revolt, the European rulers of Africa seldom resort to outright oppression of the old-fashioned type, but instead respond to the growing power of the local majority groups with "a steady—if slow—process of amelioration and concession."

In their present frame of mind, few Africans will say anything good of colonialism ; but it did bring many benefits to the "dark continent," and, more important still it laid the basis for the educational, social, economic, and political advances which had to come before Africans could hope to be really free. "Colonialism has been the terrible though necessary hurricane which has swept away the old in preparation for the new."¹⁷ It provided the "revolutionary stimulus" which was essential to bring about a new order of affairs. "The supplying of this revolutionary stimulus may be the only moral and material justification for colonial conquest : but it is a real one."¹⁸

3. A by-product of the present urge to nationalism and the anti-colonial feeling is a tendency to glorify Africa's pre-European past and to paint the era of European domination in the blackest colors. This tendency is perhaps a natural consequence of the determination of Africans to find the roots of their present institutions and practices in their own soil and culture. But the picture is greatly overdrawn, and leads to a gross distortion of the conditions of the past and the needs of the present. As Basil Davidson has pointed out, African nationalism "carries with it a tendency to see the pre-European past as pure, noble and independent ; and the disintegration of tribal life as the entirely negative consequence of European presence. This romantic attitude . . . lies at the root of much of the obscurantism which is now at work within the nationalist movements of central and southern Africa."¹⁹

4. Thus far communism has not been a significant force in African nationalist movements, and it would be an inexcusable error to ascribe the African awakening to Communist instigation.²⁰ The Soviet Union main-

¹⁷ Davidson, p. 189.

¹⁸ Davidson, pp. 237-238.

¹⁹ Davidson, p. 139.

²⁰ Stuart Cloete, author of *The African Giant* (Houghton Mifflin, 1955), appears to hold a different view : "Behind all African unrest, though there is real cause for some of it, lies the sinister force of Communist propaganda and the Communist *agent provocateur*." Unless the white and black races can learn how to cooperate and unless a multi-racial society emerges in Africa, Cloete fears "a black tyranny in which Africa will be swept into the gaping mouth of the Eastern Communist Dragon." Review of Edmund Stevens, *North African Powder Keg* (Coward-McCann, 1955), in the *New York Times Book Review*, Nov. 27, 1955, p. 3.

tains diplomatic posts only in Cairo, Addis Ababa, Pretoria, and Monrovia. Only in Algeria, Tunisia, and French West Africa do local Communist parties have any real strength, but it would be folly to underestimate the potential influence of communism. Africans have not experienced Communist imperialism, but they are all too familiar with the Western brand. In their struggle for freedom from Western domination they may be willing to turn to the Communists, who claim to champion the causes which mean so much to the Africans : freedom from imperial control, racial equality, freedom from economic exploitation. Few, if any, outstanding African nationalist leaders are Communists, but some of the persons and organizations upon which they depend have been less discriminating. Communist agents and sympathizers are active in French North Africa, particularly in Tunisia and Morocco. Communist agents and sympathizers control the *Confederation Generale de Travail*, which is affiliated with the Communist-dominated International Federation of Trade Unions. The Communists go out of their way to establish contacts with African students in England and on the continent of Europe. They are, in short, always available, and they are not discouraged by the limited results which they have achieved up to the present time.

5. "By all odds the most serious problem on the continent is that of race."²¹ This usually centers on the relations between the black Africans and their white rulers or the white settlers in various parts of the continent. The experience of the indigenous peoples of Africa with white peoples over several centuries has created a basic mistrust which has often led to hatred and to extremist movements for revenge. This mistrust is strengthened by current evidences of the same old attitude of superiority, which take aggravated forms in the Union of South Africa. It poisons all efforts to establish a tolerable working basis for the "co-existence" of whites and blacks and for effective international cooperation in dealing with other African problems. "It is the color bar, above everything, that makes Africa boil with discontent. It is the root cause of African inferiority, which in turns leads to resentment and revolt ; it warps the minds of white man and black man both."²²

6. Conflicts of culture values, occasioned by rapid change, the breakdown of the old institutions and loyalties, and the existence almost side by side in some parts of Africa of communities with different cultural patterns and habits are disruptive features of the present social environment. Writing in 1949, "a distinguished intellectual of the Gold Coast" described the nature of conflicts of this sort on one West African community ; his words may be applied to much of Africa :

We have seen the conflict of cultural values in monogamy versus polygamy ; Christianity versus Tigare ; matrilineal versus patrilineal inheri-

²¹ C. L. Sulzberger, "Africa Makes a Start Toward a Better Day," *New York Times*, Feb., 8, 1953, Sec. 4, p. 3.

²² Gunther, p. 15.

tance individualism versus traditional family obligations ; elective municipal government versus tribal loyalties ; in the discourtesy governing social relations in the new economic and governmental institutions ; in the absence of a sense of social responsibility . . . in the ineffectiveness of moral and legal sanctions ; and most prominently and obviously of all in increased crime, prostitution, juvenile delinquency, unbridled acquisitiveness, bribery and corruption, which are symptoms of a maladjusted society.²³

7. One of the most obvious and fundamental results of the impact of the West and of the emergence of a new order in Africa has been what might be called the detribalization of society. African tribal life is incompatible with modern society ; its evils include "ignorance, superstition, submergence of the individual, rigid conformity, unrewarding use of natural resources, poor food, bad health, spiritual dwarfing."²⁴ But it once provided a framework within which the African people could feel fairly secure, or at least one which they understood. Now, as Emory Ross has observed, "a wholeness, a oneness in African tribal life . . . is being fractured by a force and at a speed from without which has no historical parallel in such a large and primary human society."²⁵ The reasons for this tremendous social change are summarized by Daniel F. McCall.

The super-imposition of outside authority, the intrusion of proselytizing religions which attack the ideological foundations of tribal authority, the values of the market place superseding the values of the kinship system. . . . all contributed to the decline in effectiveness of tribal organization. The necessity of meeting new situations for which there were no tribal precedents, the temporary or permanent loss of much tribal manpower to outside employment, the corruption of chiefs in their role of custodian of land, and the venality of many of them in spending such profits for personal use have further reduced the capacity of tribal organization to function.²⁶

The tribal system is still strong in many parts of Africa. Its influence is everywhere manifest, directly or indirectly. Even in the more economically advanced areas Africans still often revert to tribal practices, if only as a reaction to the foreign influences which seem to be disrupting their old ways of life. But even in rural areas the tribal system is a sick institution, and in the growing urban centers it is an anomaly. "Nothing can save it whole."²⁷

²³ Quoted in Davidson, p. 188.

²⁴ Emory Ross, "Africa's Need for Wholeness," in Harold R. Isaacs and Emory Ross, "Africa : New Crisis in the Making," *Headline Series*, No. 91 (Foreign Policy Association, Jan.—Feb., 1952), p. 58.

²⁵ Ross, p. 58.

²⁶ Daniel F. McCall, "Dynamics of Urbanization in Africa," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, CCXCVIII (March, 1955), 153.

²⁷ Ross, p. 58. The grave implications of the de-tribalization of African society and the "social disintegration of the African native" are well expressed in the following words of Apa B. Pant, former Indian High Commissioner to East Africa :

"The real problem of Africa.....is the problem of creating new societies from the

8. Urbanization and industrialization, with all their momentous consequences, are changing the face of Africa. All over Africa there is a mass movement from the rural areas to the town and cities. "It is more than a mere change in numbers ; it is a change in social relations."²⁸ According to one estimate, "by 1980 the majority of the whole African population will be town-dwellers."²⁹ In the long run the effects of this rapid urbanization should be generally beneficial. "The town is the door through which Africa is entering the modern world."³⁰ But there can be no doubt that, as in other parts of the world, the early effects of urbanization and industrialization are generally unfortunate. They are reflected in widespread social disintegration, a sense of rootlessness, and all the evils which usually exist in overcrowded new urban centers.

9. The future evolution of Africa and the relations of its various parts with each other and with the rest of the world, particularly with the Western world, are complicated by the existence in many areas of "white settler communities." The white settlers are usually opposed to far-reaching concessions to African demands. They are understandably concerned over their own future and fate if and when the Africans take over. They are a major barrier to satisfactory relations between the European colonial powers and the majority of the inhabitants of their African possessions. Only in French North Africa and in the Union of South Africa, at the extreme ends of the continent, are whites very numerous. This is a major reason why these two areas are perhaps the sorest spots in all of Africa today. Kenya is also "a white settlement state par excellence." Only some 4,000 of the 42,000 white settlers hold land, but they control 24 per cent of the arable land. Some 5,500,000 Africans have been excluded from these territories. The Mau Mau terror in Kenya was occasioned in large measure by bitterness over the conditions of white land settlement.

10. Developments in certain parts of Africa are, in various ways, of special importance in the unfolding African story. The spotlight falls most sharply on Egypt, French North Africa, Kenya, British West Africa,

ruins of the tribal, primitive societies that inhabited Africa for centuries. As long as this problem of creating new patterns of life wherein the African will find a place of honour and scope for creative living is not solved, Africa would always present a question mark to the world.....The tribal life was a life of comparative peace and tranquillity. If there was disease or tribal warfare, the heart of the man was peaceful and contented whilst he lived and obeyed the rules of tribal life. Today, there is certainly less disease and no tribal warfare. There certainly is more food available and cloth to protect man from want. But the safety and security of the tribal life has vanished and with it has also vanished the peace and tranquillity of the heart. The African today is first of all bewildered, then frustrated, and then angry to find himself a nobody in the social pattern of existence that has been built up around him, as it were, overnight.....If his society is now broken down, it is inconceivable that he should live without any privileges or securities in the new society." "Social Disintegration of the African Native," *United Asia*, VII (March, 1955), 96.

²⁸ Davidson, p. 95.

²⁹ London *Times*, April 5, 1954.

³⁰ McCall, p. 160.

and South Africa. The significance of the developments in these areas—comprising independent countries, plus British and French territories—has already been suggested, and it will be discussed at greater length in the section on “Nationalism in Africa.”

11. The Gold Coast and South Africa represent two poles of the African scene. In the one case Africans are moving steadily toward full self-government, while in the other the white minority is keeping the black majority from any effective voice in its own future. Which way will Africa go—in the direction charted by Nkrumah of the Gold Coast or in that charted by Strijdom of South Africa?

12. For more than three centuries European powers have dominated most of Africa, and their impact has been felt in a multitude of ways. It is still a major determining aspect of African life and development. Can the relations between Africans and Europeans change from those of superiority-inferiority, domination-subordination, and fear-hatred to those of understanding-cooperation?

13. For a long time Asia has exerted a powerful influence on Africa, and today Africans are looking toward Asia as never before. The Indian connection with Asia has been particularly close, for thousands of Indians have migrated to South and East Africa. The work of Mahatma Gandhi among his oppressed fellow-countrymen of South Africa is well known. It was there that he initiated and tested his technique of *satyagraha*, or non-violent resistance, which he applied so extensively and effectively in India after World War I. In Kenya, Tanganyika, and Uganda thousands of Indians live and work, chiefly in the commercial field. Their presence adds another complication to the racial problems in these areas, but it also contributes greatly to the economic and political life. African nationalists have gained hope and confidence from the successful outcome of the struggle for freedom in many parts of Asia; and in the United Nations and elsewhere leaders of the newly independent states of Asia are champions of African aspirations. Contacts between Africa and Asia are increasing year by year. The Asian-African Conference in Bandung in April, 1955, the first such gathering in history, symbolized the special ties and interests that bind together the peoples of the two largest continents.

14. In almost every part of Africa plans for economic development have been devised and initiated. In Egypt and South Africa these plans are being financed largely from domestic sources, with some assistance from abroad, chiefly in the form of long-term loans from the United States, Great Britain, or the United Nations. In Ethiopia, Liberia, and Libya internal resources are quite inadequate to support even minimal programs, and these states have therefore put greater reliance on external financing. In the colonial areas the main source of funds has been the colonial powers and foreign-owned enterprises, with considerable assistance from the United States and the OEEC.³¹

³¹ During the Marshall Plan period the Economic Cooperation Administration had a special division called the Overseas Development Fund, set up to “speed the establish-

On the whole, the development programs sponsored by the colonial powers have evoked very little enthusiasm on the part of the Africans themselves. The reasons for this attitude were frankly stated by an African scholar : "... it is abundantly clear that though it would be inaccurate to declare these schemes solely exploitative, the philosophy inherent in the overall plans, as well as in the currently active projects, is preponderantly exploitative and conforms precisely to the regular pattern of colonial imperialism. Hence, with few exceptions, the ten-year plans have come to be opposed by Africans."³² In the face of heavy odds African leaders are trying to launch their own programs of economic and educational development ; these efforts have been most successful in those parts of British Africa, notably the Gold Coast and Nigeria, which are moving rapidly toward independence.

Africans who live in areas which for a long time to come will remain under colonial rule are particularly mindful of the commitments assumed by the major colonial powers under Chapter XI of the UN Charter :

Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost . . . the well-being of the inhabitants

ment of basic services, the surveying of available resources, and providing dollar aid in the form of equipment and technical skills" in the overseas territories of the participating European governments. Some Point Four aid also has gone to Africa. As early as 1929 Great Britain launched a development plan for her African territories with the creation of the Colonial Development Fund. "Designed with the primary object of relieving unemployment in Great Britain," a fund of about \$3.2 million per year for a period of eleven years was contemplated "in order to promote commerce with or industry in the United Kingdom." Cmd. 7176, *The Colonial Empire, 1939-1947* (1947), p. 11 ; and Cmd. 6175, *Statement of Policy on Colonial Development and Welfare* (Feb., 1940), p. 5. In 1940 the plan was altered to show a greater concern for the interests of the African inhabitants of Britain's African empire and expanded in the Colonial Development and Welfare Act. By the end of World War II the whole program was going badly. It was given a new impetus with the establishment in 1945 of the Colonial Development Corporation and the Overseas Food Corporation. "Through these two government monopoly schemes, Britain is now carrying out the work of economic and welfare development in Africa." Nwanko Chukwuemeka, "International Cooperation in Africa," *Social Research*, XVIII (March, 1951), 67. More publicity has been given to certain ventures of the two corporations which were unsuccessful than to their many achievements. Among the unsuccessful ventures were the CDC's egg-production and poultry-raising scheme and the much-criticized East Africa ground-nuts scheme.

In 1946 France announced a ten-year development plan for her overseas territories. To implement this a government agency, the *Fond D'Investissement pour le Developpement Economique et Social* (FIDES), was created. "The funds are derived partly from the national government and partly from local government units, and are supplemented by loans from the *Caisse Centrale de la France D'Outer-Mer*," Chukwuemeka, p. 66. Belgium announced a ten-year plan for the Belgian Congo and the trust territory of Ruanda Urundi in 1949. The plan envisioned an expenditure of \$1.1 billion in the form of both public and private investment, the latter to be financed mainly by European enterprises and largely controlled by the huge *Union Miniere du Haut-Katanga*.

³² Chukwuemeka, p. 68.

. . . the ensure . . . their political, economic, social, and educational advancement. . . .

PATTERNS OF COLONIAL DEVELOPMENT


While certain similarities are present in the policies of the five European powers which control most of Africa, there are also striking differences in philosophy and objectives. Moreover, the territories of a single power are often themselves in various stages of economic, social, and political development ; and therefore a colonial power may follow a variety of practices in administering its territories. There can be no question that the genral trend is toward more liberal policies, and that slowly the African is being granted a voice in his own affairs. Millions of Africans are, of course, unprepared to govern themselves. If the colonial powers withdrew too abruptly, the peoples whom they had been ruling would be like a ship without a rudder. Present native incompetence is no justification for the indefinite continuation of colonial rule, although it is a standard pretext ; but it is one of the facts of Africa today that cannot be ignored.

British Africa. The official objective of British policy in Africa is "to guide the colonial territories to responsible self-government within the Commonwealth." No other colonial power has stated this objective so unequivocally, or has done so much to give it reality. The British, however, are faced with many complications and dilemmas in giving meaning to their pledge ; some of these arise in Britain herself, and others in the colonial areas. They produce a rather marked discrepancy between British theory and practice in many parts of Africa. The problems which confront Great Britain in ruling a vast empire are clearly delineated by Harold Isaacs :

The British pattern in Africa . . . embraces at once the most progressive and the most backward colonialist outlooks in African affairs. . . . (It) is a patchwork of conflicting interests and purposes involving Britain and its policies and interests, the African peoples in the various territories, the white and Asian minorities in certain of these areas, and the Union of South Africa, a sovereign member of the Commonwealth. . . . In the homogeneous colonies the slow process of reform-pressure-reform has been moving ponderously toward self-government for Africans. In the colonies with white minorities it is the whites who press for self-government for themselves so that they, like the independent white rulers of the Union of South Africa, may deny it to the Africans. This deeply rooted conflict of interests dominates the whole present course of events in British Africa.³³

It is by no means a coincidence that progress toward self-government has been greatest in British West Africa—in the Gold Coast, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Gambia—where there are no substantial white settler

³³ Isaacs and Ross, pp. 32, 33.



Adapted from The New York Times, October 26, 1952
Africa in 1952

communities. In Nigeria, the largest colony still in the British Empire, the progress is delayed not so much by British resistance as by regional and tribal division within the colony. In East Africa the picture is entirely different and more disturbing. Especially in Kenya and the two Rhodesias, white minorities stand in the way of African advances toward self-government and constitute a special problem for Great Britain. In East Africa a third element — some 100,000 people of Indian origin — forms “a distinct layer wedged in between Europeans and Africans.” The newly-created Central African Federation, a strange political entity that is not really a federation at all but a novel association of the self-governing colony of Southern Rhodesia and the protectorates of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, is dominated by white settlers who number less than 200,000 as compared with more than 4,500,000 Africans. In all of British East and Southeast Africa, from Kenya to Bechuanaland, Swaziland, and Basutoland, only one African was a member of an executive council in 1952, and only 20 sat in legislative councils.

French Africa. With the exception of the island of Madagascar and the tiny colony of French Somaliland, all of the vast French empire in Africa is located in the western and northwestern parts of the continent. The French no longer use the term "colony." Algeria is an Overseas Department, an integral part of metropolitan France, and therefore not a colony at all. Until recently Tunisia and Morocco were Associated States ; now a new relationship is being worked out, involving virtual independence for both but with some "interdependent links" with France. French West Africa, French Equatorial Africa, French Somaliland, and Madagascar are Overseas Territories. French Togoland and Cameroons, which France holds as trust territories, are known in the language of the "French Union" as Associated Territories. In *Afrique noire* — i.e., French Africa south of the Sahara — French rule is relatively moderate, and is encountering little organized opposition. In French North Africa, inhabited largely by Moors, Berbers, and other peoples of Muslim faith, and by a substantial number of French settlers or *colons*, the situation is unhappily quite different. French difficulties in Tunisia and Morocco — and even in the Algerian Department as well — have been constantly in the world's headlines in recent years, and have, in fact, been a matter of international concern. In 1954 the Mendes-France Government, in spite of bitter opposition from the *colons* in the protectorate and from their supporters in France, granted real concessions to the Tunisian nationalists, and in the following year the Government of Edgar Faure bowed to growing Moroccan pressures and restored the exiled Sultan Mohammed Ben Youssef, who had been deposed in 1953.

Traditional French policy toward colonial areas may be summed up in the word "assimilation." At a conference in Brazzaville, the capital of French Equatorial Africa, in 1944, it was decided to abandon "assimilation" in favor of "closer association" in "one and indivisible French Union," a formula clearly designed to keep sovereign power as much as possible in French hands. Until recently, at least, the French have not accepted the goal of self-government for the peoples in their colonies ; instead, they have conferred on some of them what they regarded as an even greater boon : French citizenship. Under the Constitution of 1946 all of the inhabitants of French Africa automatically became French citizens. At present 53 of the 627 members of the French National Assembly represent French Africa — excluding Algeria, which sends 30 delegates. Not all of these delegates are Africans with colored skins, but some are. The color bar is of relatively little significance, except in a social sense. The emphasis is upon culture rather than color.

As time passes the African challenge to the ideological foundation of the French Union — namely "assimilation" or "closer association" — is certain to grow more powerful. The issue has, in fact, already been joined in North Africa, where many people, chiefly Muslims, refuse to regard French citizenship as a satisfactory alternative to independence. French concessions to Tunisia in 1954 seemed to mark a new departure in colq-

nial policy, but one still well short of independence. Equally significant, perhaps, was the historic concession embodied in a joint statement of the French Foreign Minister, Antoine Pinay, and Sultan Mohammed Ben Youssef, on November 6, 1955. According to this, the Government of the restored Sultan in Morocco "will have notably for its mission to elaborate institutional reforms which will make Morocco a democratic state with a constitutional monarchy, and to conduct with France negotiations designed to lead Morocco to the status of an interdependence freely consented and defined." Apparently this was the first time that a French government had mentioned independence as a goal for any of its colonial possessions, although some of the agreements with the Associated States of Indo-China contained statements which pointed in the same direction. In the light of past French policies and attitude, one may be curious about an independence limited by "permanent links of an interdependence" with France.

Belgian Africa. The Belgian Congo, one of the richest of colonial possessions, is eighty times as large as Belgium itself. Belgian colonial policy is a strange combination of enlightened and efficient paternalism and an almost complete denial of political and social rights. A former Governor General of the Congo summed up the official policy in these words: "To dominate in order to serve." The Congo administration has probably done more to improve the health and promote the welfare of Africans than any other colonial regime, but Africans are completely excluded from participation in government above the village level, and educational opportunities for them are highly restricted. Africans of the Congo are congregating in larger and larger numbers in the urban centers, and although they are subjected to residential and social segregation and are exposed to the vices and temptation which seem to prevail generally in new industrial and commercial communities, they are probably far better off than most of their fellow-Africans. "Belgian racial policy may be said to stand halfway between that of the British and French, although officially, that is to say legally and administratively, there is no outspoken or open discrimination."³⁴

Thus far the Belgian system seems to be working rather well, in spite of the denial of political opportunities and in spite of the conditions in the urban centers. One wonders how long a policy of even "enlightened" paternalism will work. If the Belgians think at all in terms of self-government for the Congo, they obviously think in long-range terms, and they are doing little to prepare for it.³⁵

³⁴ H. A. Wieschhoff, *Colonial Policies in Africa* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1944), p. 106.

³⁵ Pierre Otis, Belgian representative on the United Nations Trusteeship Council, once stated that "the natives of Ruanda-Urundi, like those of the Congo.....had no political aspirations and that if Colonial powers withdrew the result would be a return to savagery." Quoted in George Padmore, "Comparative Patterns of Colonial Development in Africa: 3, The Belgian System," *United Asia*, VII (March, 1955), 89. In an interview published in the New York *Herald Tribune* on Nov. 25, 1951 the acting

Portuguese Africa. Conditions in the two huge Portuguese possessions of Angola and Mozambique, and in the smaller territory of Portuguese Guinea, are generally the most backward in Africa. Forced labor still exists on a large scale ; the Portuguese admit this and in fact condone it. They intend to make the Africans work, and to keep them under control indefinitely. If they ever need a safety valve for indigenous discontent or pressures, they think they have already devised one in the *assimilado* or *civilizado* system, which provides an opportunity for any inhabitant of a Portuguese territory to become assimilated or "civilized" by due process of law. "Once he becomes an *assimilado*, he assumes not only the privileges but the duties of full citizenship" ; in effect, "he becomes a white man instead of black, no matter what his color."³⁶ In 1955 *assimilados* numbered only 30,000 out of more than 4,000,000 inhabitants in Angola and 4400 out of more than 5,600,000 in Mozambique.

Technically, Angola and Mozambique are integral parts of Portugal itself, with the rank of overseas provinces. They are administered under a highly centralized system, with virtually all decisions of importance being made in Lisbon. Since Portugal is ruled by authoritarian methods, it is hardly surprising that its overseas provinces should be governed in the same way. There are some redeeming features, including a relative absence of racial feeling. As compared with that of the Belgian Congo the paternalism is less enlightened and less efficient.

Spanish Africa. Until 1956 Spain's most important possession in Africa was Spanish Morocco, across the Mediterranean from Gibraltar. Administered by the military in a way to keep it sealed off from the nationalist infection in adjoining French Morocco, it was "not only a feudal backwater, but the walled-off preserve of a grossly totalitarian dictatorship."³⁷ Thus insulated, the Moors got along with the Spaniards well enough. Dictator Franco's association with them has been close. Indeed, it was from Spanish Morocco that he led an army composed mostly of Moorish soldiers to overthrow the Spanish Republic in 1936.

In 1956 Franco opened up this "walled-off preserve" in a surprising way by offering it to the emerging state of Morocco headed by Sultan Ben Youssef. Now that arrangements have been completed, an enlarged state of Morocco has come into being and the largest Spanish possession in Africa is unimportant Spanish Sahara, just below Morocco. Divided into two zones, Rio de Oro and Sekia el Hamra, its total area is slightly more than 100,000 square miles and its population about 75,000. Spain also retains some minute holdings in the north.

British and French Colonial Policies Compared. As we have seen, the pattern of colonial development in Africa is a most varied one. The

Governor-General of the Congo predicted that some kind of electoral system providing "mixed black and white representative government" might come "in perhaps 20 to 30 years"; and that self-government for the Congo might follow "in something less than 100 years."

³⁶ Gunther, p. 590.

³⁷ Gunther, p. 117.

greatest of the colonial powers, Great Britain and France, are making more political concessions than Belgium, Portugal, or Spain. It is interesting to compare British and French colonial policy — the one based upon an increasing measure of self-government but open to serious criticism on the color issue, the other still thinking if not talking in terms of "assimilation" and "association" and having much greater tolerance of people with colored skins. Two informed but somewhat contrasting views of the relative merits of these two policies will be presented here. In a comparison of colonial attitudes on "Colour and Culture," George Padmore wrote :

The British colonial system provides the most flexible constitutional machinery for political evolution from colonial status to complete sovereign independence. Yet the racial relationship between French Europeans and the coloured colonial peoples in France and her overseas territories is easier and more tolerant than that of Britain and her colonies. The French judge a man by his culture ; the British by the colour of his skin...Politics apart, the French colonial officials are able to establish closer ties of personal friendship with the native elite than with the tribal Africans...the Englishman gets on better with the more backward and primitive Africans...Collectively, the natives in the French colonies are more repressed than those under British rule, but individually, educated Africans enjoy greater human dignity and suffer far less from colour bars and racial segregation under French rule.³⁸

After his lengthy firsthand examination of conditions in all the major colonial areas John Gunther made this judgment :

Taken all in all, British rule is the best. If I were an African I would rather live in a British territory than any other. The British do not give as much economic opportunity in some realms as the Belgians and perhaps not as much political and racial equality as the French in Black Africa, but the average African in British territory has more copious access to the two things Africans need most —education and justice. No doubt the British make blunders on occasion. But Great Britain is the only colonial power that has as its official policy the systematic training of Africans for self-government.³⁹

But George Padmore is an Englishman who has suffered at the hands of his own government for his championing of the rights of colored people in British Africa ; and John Gunther is an American who has never lived in an inferior status under colonial rule. Few self-conscious and articulate Africans today are in a mood to make comparisons ; to them, all colonial policies are fundamentally wrong. Their eyes are fixed on another goal, one declared in the final communique of the Asian-African

³⁸ "Colour and Culture : A Comparison of Colonial Attitudes," *United Asia*, VII (March, 1955), 88.

³⁹ Gunther, pp. 885-886.

conference at Bandung in April, 1955 : ".....colonialism in all its manifestations is an evil which should speedily be brought to an end."

NATIONALISM IN AFRICA

General Characteristics. Nationalism is perhaps the strongest force in Africa today, as it is in Asia, but its influence varies greatly from area to area. As in Asia, nationalism in Africa is an exotic product ; "it is the end product of the profound and complex transformation which has occurred in Africa since the European intrusion" ; it "is in one way or another a response to the challenge of alien rule, or of the intrusion of the disintegrating forces — and consequently the insecurity — of modernity." ⁴⁰ It is in large measure a reaction against outside domination, against imperialism and colonization and all that these terms imply for peoples who have experienced their consequences for many years. In the words of a leading spokesman of African nationalism, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria, the aim is to achieve a "mental emancipation" from a servile colonial mentality. ⁴¹ It is hardly surprising, but nevertheless unfortunate, that African nationalism should often vent itself in agitation against people with white skins. ⁴² Here is one of the great dangers in African nationalism. As Elspeth Huxley warns, "if it becomes a bitter flood of hatred toward the whites, with their complete expulsion as its object, a welter of strife, misery and failure lies in store for its inhabitants, and a great setback to the progress of the rest of the world." ⁴³

Many Africans believe that through the nationalist awakening they can not only achieve a greater degree of political freedom but also enhance their dignity and status as human beings. Too long, they contend, they have been second-class citizens in their own lands. A gnawing sense of inferiority and a growing resentment of European assumptions and manners of superiority — exacerbated because much of this is unconscious on both sides — account in large part for the efforts of Africans to assert their own identity in both a national and a personal sense. "The demand for 'identity' in the sense of acceptance as equals is indeed the basis of much African 'nationalism'." ⁴⁴

⁴⁰ James S. Coleman, "Nationalism in Tropical Africa," *The American Political Science Review*, XLVIII (June, 1954), 407-408, 410. This is an unusually penetrating article on the motivating forces and major aspects of African nationalism.

⁴¹ See Azikiwe's book, *Renascent Africa* (Lagos, Nigeria, 1937).

⁴² In white settler areas in particular, it still seems to the African "that there is merely a grim struggle between the African, fighting against desperate odds for justice instead of a new and universal form of slavery, and the European, fighting equally desperately to maintain white dominance." Peter Wright, "Development of Political Unrest in Africa," *United Asia*, VII (March, 1955), 105.

⁴³ Elspeth Huxley, "The Vast Challenge of Africa," the *New York Times Magazine*, July 16, 1954, p. 18.

⁴⁴ Kenneth Robinson, "Colonial Issues and Policies with Special Reference to Tropical Africa," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*. CCXCVIII (March, 1955), 92.

The contemporary emphasis on cultural nationalism is widely reflected in current writings, in speeches by nationalist leaders, and in a growing number of studies by Africans of African history and life. "It has usually been accompanied by a quest for an African history which would in general reflect glory and dignity upon the African race and in particular instill self-confidence in the Western-educated African sensitive to the prejudiced charge that he has no history or culture. In short, there has emerged a new pride in being African."⁴⁵

In Africa, as in Asia, most of the leaders of the nationalist movements are Western-educated persons, who have absorbed the revolutionary ideas of the West but have had to fight for a place in their own society and lands. James S. Coleman thus appraises the African version of this common phenomenon :

...nationalism where it is most advanced has been sparked and led by the so-called detribalized, Western-educated, middle-class intellectuals and professional Africans : by those who in terms of improved status and material standards of living have benefited most from colonialism ; in short, by those who have come closest to the Western World but have been denied entry on full terms of equality.⁴⁶

African nationalism is not only a foreign importation ; it has also been affected in many ways by external influences from the colonial powers themselves, from the United States, from the Soviet Union, and from India. Political parties, labor organizations, and other associations and groups, as well as many individuals in the metropolitan countries, particularly Great Britain and France, have given a great deal of encouragement and support, directly or indirectly, consciously or unconsciously, to the political awakening of Africa. The British and French have been almost as successful, albeit quite unintentionally, in training the leaders of nationalism as they were in Asia. Contributions of a similar kind have been made by the United States, in spite of the not-too-successful efforts of official American spokesmen to steer a course between support of the colonial powers and anticolonialism. As people of African descent, strongly conscious of the struggle for racial equality, it is not surprising that many American Negroes and Negro organizations have taken a special interest in Africa and Africans. Some of the important leaders of African nationalist movements, including Dr. Kwame Nkrumah and Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, now prime ministers of the Gold Coast and the Eastern Division of Nigeria, respectively, and Peter Koiwange of Kenya, studied at American universities.

In line with her global policy of exploiting differences between Western colonial powers and the colonial areas, the Soviet Union has posed as a champion of the nationalist movements in Africa. She has done so with

⁴⁵ Coleman, p. 409.

⁴⁶ Coleman, p. 414,

less fervor, however, than she has devoted to Asian nationalism. Her agents have established liaison with African political and labor organizations and student groups, and the message of communism is sent to Africa through many additional channels. India's successful struggle for independence has served as a stimulus for many African nationalists who now look to India for guidance and support.⁴⁷

African nationalism is compounded of many factors ; some of these are common to nationalism everywhere, and others arise from the peculiar conditions of the African environment and experience. James S. Coleman has listed the following as factors which deserve analysis :

A. Economic

1. Change from a subsistence to a money economy.
2. Growth of a wage-labor force.
3. Rise of a new middle class.

B. Sociological

1. Urbanization.
2. Social mobility.
3. Western education.

C. Religious and Psychological

1. Christian evangelization.
2. Neglect or frustration of Western-educated elements.

D. Political

1. Eclipse of traditional authorities.
2. Forging of new "national" symbols.⁴⁸

The influence of these factors is manifest in many parts of the continent, but there are also many variations in the character and intensity and results of nationalist movements. As Coleman points out, these variations are occasioned by such considerations as degrees of acculturation in different areas, the absence or presence of white settlers, the culture traits of various tribal groups and peoples, and differing colonial policies. "Nationalism is predominantly a phenomenon of British Africa, and to a lesser extent of French Africa."⁴⁹ It is relatively weak, or even non-existent except as a potential force, in the Portuguese, Belgian, and Spanish territories. It is strongly manifest in some of the independent states, notably Egypt and the Union of South Africa.

Case Studies in African Nationalism. Nationalist movements in the following areas are particularly worthy of detailed analysis : Egypt, South Africa, French North Africa, Kenya, and British West Africa (specifically, the Gold Coast and Nigeria). While it is impossible to include here any

⁴⁷ See James S. Coleman, "Current Political Movements in Africa," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, CCXCVIII (March, 1955), 96-97.

⁴⁸ Coleman, "Nationalism in Tropical Africa," pp. 411-412.

⁴⁹ Coleman, "Nationalism in Tropical Africa," p. 413.

real case studies, a few comments on the rise and characteristic features of the nationalist movements in these areas may be helpful.⁵⁰

1. *Egypt.* Egyptian nationalism dates from the rise to power of the peasant leader Ahmed Arabi, "the founder of modern Egyptian nationalism," and the British occupation of Egypt in 1882. From 1882 until the 1954 Anglo-Egyptian agreements regarding the Suez Canal area and the Sudan, the main objective of Egyptian leaders was the removal of British controls. In 1918 the "first of the great nationalist parties of modern Africa," the Wafd, was founded. Under the leadership of Zaghlul Pasha, and, after Zaghlul's death in 1927, of Nahas Pasha, the Wafd spearheaded the anti-British movement until World War II. In the post-war period the Wafd lost influence. In 1952 a coup engineered by General Naguib and Colonel Nasser forced King Farouk into exile, and laid the foundation for a modern nationalist state. Nasser, who soon dispensed with Naguib, became the spokesman for the "new Egypt." His unilateral action in nationalizing the Suez Canal in July, 1956, was regarded as motivated less by anti-British feeling or by concern for the national economy than by a desire to inflame Egyptian nationalism and to make a spectacular move to strengthen Egypt's position at the head of the Arab world. Egypt has not only taken a leading role in the Arab League and the Arab-Israeli struggle, but it also "regards itself as a kind of mother and father to African nationalist movements everywhere," especially in the Muslim lands of North Africa.

2. *South Africa.* In most parts of Africa nationalism is a movement of black or other dark-skinned peoples against colonial rule or against the colonial powers. The outstanding exception is the Union of South Africa, where "the equation is reversed. There are African nationalists, true, and they have an organization called the African National Congress. But it is *Afrikaner* (white) nationalism that counts in the Union, not African (black) nationalism." In a sense *Afrikaner* nationalism in South Africa had its origins in the settlement of this part of the continent by Boers (Dutch) and English. Even today these two white groups are often at odds. The main differences, however, are between whites and Africans, with the people of Indian origin as a further complicating factor. "The founder of South African nationalism as we know it today" was General Hertzog, who was Prime Minister of the Union from 1924 to 1939. "He believed in the 'two streams' policy," and was, "in a manner of speaking, the father of *apartheid*, even though this term was not invented until after his death." His predecessor and successor as Prime Minister, Jan Christiaan Smuts, although a fellow Boer and a believer in segregation, did not share Hertzog's hatred of the Africans. In 1948, two years before Smuts died, the Nationalists triumphed in the first election "even fought in South Africa largely on the racialist issue," and Dr. Daniel F. Malan

⁵⁰ Gunther's *Inside Africa* contains excellent accounts of the nationalist movements in Africa. The quotations in the following paragraphs are taken from this book, unless otherwise noted.

formed "the first all-Afrikaner government in history." After another election in 1953 the Malan regime moved rapidly to consolidate its racialist rule, based on *apartheid* and white supremacy, in defiance of world opinion, United Nations resolutions, and the vast majority of the people of the Union. When Malan retired in November, 1954, he was succeeded by Johannes G. Strijdom, whose racialism is even more pronounced than Dr. Malan's.⁵¹

3. *French North Africa.* Tunisian nationalism dates back many years. As long ago as 1857 reform groups were active, and before World War II two patriotic organizations had come into being. The first real nationalist party, the Destour, was formed after World War I. A decade later the Neo-Destour party was organized by nationalists who were dissatisfied with the policies of the Destour group. This party is now the spearhead of the Tunisian nationalist movement. From 1938 to 1954, along with other nationalist groups, it was officially outlawed, and many of its top leaders were imprisoned or exiled. It received powerful support from the *Union Générale des Traveillours*, a non-Communist labor organization which Gunther describes as "the best run and most powerful trade union organization anywhere in Africa above the Rhodesian Copper Belt." The leader of the *Union*, Farhat Hached, was murdered in December, 1952, allegedly by "a secret vigilante organization set up by *colons* and known as the Red Hand." The leader of the Neo-Destour is Habib Bourguiba, "an African nationalist of real stature."⁵² After many years of exile and agitation Bourguiba was allowed to return to Tunisia in 1954, as a result of the far-reaching concessions which Mendés-France made to the demands of the Tunisian nationalists. In 1956 he became prime minister of Tunisia in recognition of the country's changing status.

The main nationalist party of Morocco, the Istiqlal, was founded in 1943. After the Casablanca riots of December, 1952, which were set off by the murder of Farhat Hached in Tunisia, the Istiqlal was driven underground. It has centers in Tangier, New York, and Cairo. In 1953 the Sultan, Mohammed Ben Youssef, was deposed by certain pro-French Moroccan pashas, led by El Glaoui, the Pasha of Marrakesh, who "has been called the Metternich of Morocco." The real charge against Ben Youssef was that he was showing signs of supporting the Moroccan nationalist movement. His successor, Sultan Mohammed ben Moulay Arafat el Alaoui, became increasingly unpopular, and in 1955 the French were forced to bow to Moroccan demands for his deposition and for the return of the former Sultan. Ben Youssef returned to his throne with French promises for a larger degree of self-government for Morocco.

The nationalist agitation in the adjoining areas of Tunisia and Morocco has affected Algeria, even though this huge area is technically an Overseas Department of France. The riots in the Constantine area of Algeria

⁵¹ Gunther, p. 474.

⁵² See Lorna Hahn, "Elder Statesman of North Africa," the *New York Times Magazine*, Oct. 2, 1955.

in May, 1945, were "the kick-off of contemporary Arab nationalism, but other than purely nationalist factors were involved." At present three nationalist parties have formed an "Algerian Front" with the Communists. In November, 1954, a serious uprising occurred in the Constantine area, and since then large parts of northeastern Algeria have been unsafe for unprotected white inhabitants.

4. *Kenya.* Nationalism in Kenya has become identified with the Mau Mau excesses against the white settlers in the highlands. Actually the Mau Mau revolt is only partly a product of extreme nationalism; it is also a reversion to a more primitive tribalism, and a bloody orgy against the whites. Most of its supporters belong to the Kikuyu tribe. Long before the Mau Mau took matters into their own hands the Kikuyu had anti-British organizations. In 1922 the Kikuyu Central Association was formed, with Jomo Kenyatta, the best known nationalist leader of East Africa, as Secretary General. When it was outlawed during World War II it was succeeded by the Kenya African Union in 1944. Kenyatta was president of the KAU, and it was supported by most of the African political leaders of Kenya. This in turn was suppressed in June, 1953, because of the suspicion that it had instigated the Mau Mau terror. Kenyatta was brought to trial on the charge that instead of trying to suppress the Mau Maus, as he had agreed to do, he had really been the "manager" of the tribal terrorists. His trial, which lasted for five months, attracted worldwide attention and much sympathy for the cause of Kenyan nationalism. Kenyatta was found guilty and sentenced to seven years' imprisonment. The British seem to be making progress in dealing by forceful methods with the Mau Mau, but they are still faced with a serious dilemma in Kenya.

5. *The Gold Coast.* In the all-black British territories in West Africa nationalist efforts and British concessions have brought at least two areas, the Gold Coast and Nigeria, to the verge of independence. The situation is uncomplicated by the presence of substantial numbers of white settlers or other alien groups, but there are serious inter-tribal differences, a great deal of rivalry among native leaders, and much economic and social backwardness. In the Gold Coast, according to the present prime minister, Dr. Nkrumah, nationalism has a long history, but it had made little progress before World War II.⁵³ At the end of that war the United Gold Coast Convention, with Dr. J. B. Danquah as president, was organized. On Dr. Danquah's invitation Kwame Nkrumah returned to the Gold Coast, after an absence of twelve years. The two men, however, have been political rivals at least since 1949. In March of 1952 Nkrumah became prime minister. In July, 1953, he presented to the new Legislative Assembly an independence motion, worked out in cooperation with the British authorities. It laid down the steps which might be taken to make

⁵³ See Kwame Nkrumah, "Gold Coast's Claim to Immediate Independence," *United Asia*, VII (March, 1955), 59-64. This article is adapted from Nkrumah's famous speech on the Motion for Independence, delivered before the Legislative Assembly of the Gold Coast in July, 1953.

the Gold Coast "a Sovereign and Independent State within the Commonwealth." The indicated steps were taken, and early in 1957 the first black Commonwealth came into being. Unquestionably these developments have given encouragement to Africans everywhere to hope that their lands too may follow the path of the Gold Coast.

6. *Nigeria.* Nationalism in Nigeria is rabid and sensitive, perhaps reflecting the personalities of the two chief Nigerian nationalist leaders, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe and Obafemi Awolowe. American-educated Dr. Azikiwe, who once predicted that "by the year 2944 Black Africa will have destroyed Europe and brought the United States to the verge of extinction," heads the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons, organized in 1947. He believes that the three main tribes – the Ibo, Yoruba, and Hausa — can live together peacefully in a unitary Nigeria. Awolowe founded the Action Group in 1953. The two nationalist parties "have been flamingly antagonistic.....Nationalism has become a kind of football.....The two main parties compete in extremism to get support." In a conference in London in 1953, attended by Azikiwe, Awolowe, and a representative of the Northern part of Nigeria, an agreement was reached with the British Government providing that each of the three main regions of Nigeria, the East, West, and North, "may, if it wishes, become completely self-governing" with its own prime minister, within a central federation. As soon as certain regional differences have been resolved, an independent state of Nigeria will come into existence.

WHAT FUTURE FOR AFRICA?

Perhaps the most significant fact about contemporary Africa, as John Gunther has noted, is "its emergence with exaggerated speed into the embrace of modern times." Great social and political changes are creating all kinds of stresses and strains. Will the transition take place in a relatively peaceful manner, or will Africa be convulsed with explosions from one end of the continent to another?

Three problems seem to rise above all others. One is the problem of economic and social development. As we have seen, the change from an essentially tribal or local basis of life to a more complex pattern, embracing a growing degree of urbanization and contact with the outside world, has been an upsetting one in many respects. It has caused widespread social disintegration. There is an obvious need for improvement of standards of living, for a more sweeping approach to the problem of mass illiteracy, for training in technical skills and in political techniques, for a concerted attack on disease and unsanitary habits and conditions, for an immense improvement in the life conditions of the African peoples.

A second great need is for a change in the existing political arrangements in most of Africa. Generally speaking, Africans must be given more rapidly a greater voice in their own affairs. Statesmanship of a high order will have to be displayed if the inevitable improvements in political status are to occur without violent eruptions and near-chaos.

The third main problem, that of color and race relations, vastly complicates the whole African situation. "Race relations are at the bottom of most contemporary friction in Africa. What Africans hate and deplore even more than their submerged political status is the color bar." Here we have one of the most delicate and crucial problems in international relations, and Africa is a battleground for this issue. "If whites and blacks can learn to live together.....Africa is saved. If not, it may be lost — to chaos, to civil war, to feudalism, or the Communists."⁵⁴ The need for cooperation and partnership between white and colored peoples is patent — without this none of the basic problems can be solved; but the obstacles in the way of satisfactory race relations are formidable indeed. They are psychological as well as political; they arise from ingrained prejudices as well as from historical experience. Only superlative forbearance and mental reorientation will suffice to cope with them.

The peoples of Africa are undergoing basic changes in their own patterns of life and in their relations with each other, with the white settlers, with the colonial powers, and with the outside world. African problems are impinging more and more upon the minds of men and the councils of nations. They can no longer be ignored by serious students of international relations and of the world society.

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Economic Nationalism versus.....19

Economic Internationalism

One of David Low's cartoons shows a group of weird figures representing "a disinflationary tendency at bay," "a sterling area ready for duty," "a severe repercussion practicing disinvestment," "an unrequited export serenading an off-shore purchase," "an over-all deficit bringing itself into equilibrium," and "a category of imports chasing a dollar equivalent": and tucked away in one corner of the cartoon Low depicts his very bewildered self trying to think of some way of illustrating "an invisible import meeting an irreducible minimum output." and remarking: "Take it from me, people, making cartoons on economics these days is no joke."

Every student of international relations who is not a trained economist will share Low's trepidation in approaching the "jargon land" of international economics. Yet he must venture into this land, for today much of the subject matter of international relations is economic in character. This fact is reflected in current headlines, and in the amount of attention that is given to economic matters in every foreign office, in almost every major international organization, and in most international conferences. The student must try to see the implications of some of these economic concepts and to understand their relations to international problems, including basic issues of international cooperation and of peace and war. In the final analysis, perhaps, political considerations may outweigh the economic; political agreement may create conditions under which economic problems will fall into line. But, however strongly one may subscribe to the doctrine of the primacy of politics over economics, he must agree that it is difficult to make political sense out of economic nonsense. He must also admit that many of the tensions in today's world arise out of fundamental economic maladjustment and the "condition of deep structural change in international economic relations."¹

¹ P. T. Ellsworth, *The International Economy: Its Structure and Operation* (Macmillan, 1950), p. 675. Used by permission of The Macmillan Company.

CAUSES OF PRESENT ECONOMIC DISEQUILIBRIUM

It is important to realize that our present economic disequilibrium is not simply a temporary phenomenon resulting from the troubled state of the postwar world. The disequilibrium, as P. T. Ellsworth wrote of one of its serious manifestations -- the strong trend toward bilateralism in world trade -- reflects "the basic imbalance traceable not only to the war, but also to ten years of depression economics and to the longer-run influence of deep-seated secular change."² The halcyon days of free trade and the free market, of convertible currencies based on an international gold standard, have passed. In the twentieth century the old economic pattern has been shattered, along with the old political order of power. World War I was a major shock ; but in the 1920's, at least, it seemed that a network of trade and finance, as well as a political pattern, had developed which would meet the needs of the new state of affairs. This network, however, was seriously disrupted by the worldwide depression of the 1930's, which gave a strong impetus to programs of national self-sufficiency and to other tendencies toward economic independence.

As a result of these and many other developments the decade of the 1930's was a period of growing economic nationalism. Its effects were political as well as economic. In the totalitarian states the efforts toward national self-sufficiency -- a distinguishing characteristic of economic nationalism -- were most strongly manifest. Perhaps the outstanding example was the policy of "autarchy" followed by Nazi Germany. Through strict economic controls of many sorts the Germans succeeded in linking the states of Central and Eastern Europe to the Nazi system and in orienting the economics of other states, including some in Latin America, to serve the needs of Germany. Besides currency and exchange controls, quotas, export subsidies, and other common devices of economic nationalism, the Nazis relied heavily on a barter system by which they sought to compensate for their lack of foreign exchange and to secure the materials needed for building up their war machine by the export of nonessentials. The economic nationalism of Nazi Germany, as reflected in her policy of autarchy, was one of the bases of her foreign policies and her military power. It lowered the standard of living of the German people and disturbed relations between Germany and other nations, but it did serve the political ends of the Nazi state. Here again, this time in a baleful way, the interrelationship of economics and politics may be clearly seen.

World War II delivered the *coup de grâce* to a system already severely weakened. Among its many consequences were major shifts in production and trade, changing economic as well as political relationships, the disruption of Europe's trading and financial system, strong price and currency fluctuations, a serious attrition of Britain's economic as well as politi-

² Ellsworth, P. 688. See also dispatch of Michael L. Hoffman, dated Geneva, March 4, 1949 ; in the *New York Times*, March 5, 1949.

cal power, and a balance of payments problem. Another consequence was the frantic search for ways and means to free the channels of trade and finance, for without freedom in the movement of goods the essential expansion of world trade would be impossible in the face of the counter-vailing tendency toward bilateralism, state trading, and preferences and restrictions of all kinds.

In the present chapter we shall see how states are using nationalistic practices to defend and advance their own interests while at the same time professing to accept the ideal of economic internationalism. In examining this contradiction we shall review some of the evidences of contemporary economic nationalism and their underlying causes and implications ; and we shall note the efforts to counteract this tendency through multilateral agreements for removing some of the barriers to world trade and for establishing the interconvertibility of currency through such organizations as the United Nations and its economic agencies, and through attacks on problems of balance of payments, state trading, and other major hurdles to sound economic relations. Three areas of postwar relations are of particular importance : (1) trade and commercial policy ; (2) procedures for currency and exchange control ; and (3) international investments, both governmental and private. We shall also discuss some new patterns of economic aid and cooperation.

1. POSTWAR ECONOMIC PROBLEMS : TRADE AND COMMERCIAL POLICY

The coming of the New Deal to the United States in 1933 effected a change in America's foreign economic policy. This change rested upon the conviction that the efficiency of American industry would give it a hopeful competitive position anywhere in the world if only trade barriers could be removed or substantially lowered ; but it also sprang from the realization that states must buy if they would continue to sell — that the long-continued American export surplus must some day come to an end. Undoubtedly the new policy expressed self-interest, but it was an enlightened self-interest, one which viewed American prosperity as inseparable from a sound international economy. Since the 1930's the United States has continued to pursue this policy, although not without reservations and contradictions, as we shall see.


The United States Trade Agreements Program. The results of American efforts of the past two decades to reduce the barriers to world trade have been impressive. The going has not been easy, for the United States has faced an unfavorable international environment, the insistence of most other nations — especially underdeveloped states — that temporary restrictive trade practices are necessary, the opposition of powerful political and economic groups at home, and her own contradictory policies on such matters as agricultural and shipping subsidies. The cornerstone of the American policy has been the reciprocal trade agreements program. First en-

acted in 1934, with the vigorous sponsorship of Secretary Hull, and renewed many times since that date, the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act was a direct and deliberate challenge to economic nationalism. Under the terms of the Act, Congress authorized the President to enter into negotiations with other countries for the mutual reduction of tariff duties within certain defined limits.

By 1945 the United States had entered into bilateral agreements with some thirty states, all of them being given the most-favored-nation treatment,³ and about half of them being granted the full 50 per cent reduction in American tariffs allowed by the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act. In 1945 Congress authorized another reduction of 50 per cent, making it possible to lower the Smoot-Hawley rates by 75 per cent. In 1949 it approved a third cut of 50 per cent, thus bringing the minimum rate to 12½ per cent of Smoot-Hawley. Some of the good effects of the program, however, were nullified by other actions. One of the original purposes had been to improve the export market for American agricultural products. When a number of farm organizations felt that the program was operating too slowly for them, they succeeded in inducing Congress to subsidize agricultural exports. Thus the Department of Agriculture was soon sponsoring what amounted to "dumping" abroad, a practice hardly consistent with the Department of State's program of promoting freer trade and economic internationalism. Under the "peril-point" and "escape clause" provisions of the Trade Agreements Act, as amended in 1951, tariffs have been raised on certain imports in order to protect domestic producers. These increases have hurt major industries in other countries, and consequently have raised questions of the sincerity of American professions in foreign economic policy.

In August, 1952, President Truman rejected a recommendation of the tariff commission for an increase in the tariff on watches and watch movements, declaring that an increase would be "a heavy blow at our whole effort to increase international trade." Yet less than two years later President Eisenhower authorized the increase on the ground of national security. A correspondent of the *New York Times*, writing from Geneva, reported: "The decision is bound to have the widest repercussions. In recent months, the 'watch case' has been discussed in every Western European country and has been presented to the public as a true test of

³ As applied to tariffs, a state with a most-favored-nation status is entitled to ship goods into another country under a tariff rate as low as that granted by the importing country to the nation most favored. Therefore, when the importing country lowers the rate on a particular commodity brought in from any state, all states having a most-favored-nation agreement with the importing country are entitled to the new low rate on that commodity. When the new rate applies automatically, without the special *quid pro quo* conceded by the state which first received the new rate, the most-favored-nation clause is said to be *unconditional*; if it applies only when states receiving the new rate grant concessions equivalent to those of the first state granted that rate, then the most-favored-nation treatment is said to be *conditional*. The United States has always followed the most-favored-nation doctrine. She held to the *conditional* form until 1922; since then she has adhered to the *unconditional* form. The most-favored-nation clause is not limited to tariff agreements.



Illingworth, copyright by Punch, 1952

"... That Vile Wall Which Did These Lovers Sunder."
(A Midsummer Night's Dream, Act V, Scene 1)

United States' intentions in trade policy." Mr. Eisenhower, like Mr. Truman, has generally refused to approve recommendations by the Tariff Commission for increases, and he has shown an awareness of the international implications of American foreign economic policy.⁴ But perhaps no President can be expected completely to withstand the pressures of organized interests which are constantly demanding greater protection and are justifying their demands on the plea of national security. Yet sometimes, as Professor Clair Wilcox has pointed out, "the issue is one in which the interests of organized minorities are opposed to the prosperity of the nation and the peace of the world."⁵

⁴ See President Eisenhower's special messages on foreign economic policy, Jan. 10, 1955, and on foreign aid, April 20, 1955.

⁵ Letter to the *New York Times*, Nov. 23, 1952.

In the Atlantic Charter of August, 1941, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill asserted their determination to "endeavor... to further the enjoyment by all states of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world." This declaration was subsequently approved by a majority of the United Nations. Article VII of the Lend-Lease Agreements, which the United States entered into with Great Britain and thirteen other states, contained the pledge that the terms of settlement should "be such as not to burden commerce" and should "include provisions for agreed action.....directed to the expansion, by appropriate international and domestic measures, of production, employment, and the exchange and consumption of goods.....to the elimination of all forms of discriminatory treatment in international commerce, and to the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers." ⁶

The United States has not depended entirely upon bilateral agreements and Lend-Lease in her fight to reduce the barriers to international trade. She has taken the lead in the drafting of the two most ambitious multi-lateral agreements of this kind since the close of World War II -- the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the Charter of the International Trade Organization (ITO). But before examining these ventures we must turn our attention to a notable statement of American economic foreign policy -- the *Proposals for Expansion of World Trade and Employment*, issued in December, 1945.

The United States Proposals of 1945. The small pamphlet which contained the *Proposals* was issued by the Department of State at the time of the signing of the Anglo-American Financial Agreement of December 6, 1945, which provided for a loan of 3.75 billion dollars to Great Britain. ⁷ In form it was a listing of matters which should be considered by a proposed International Conference on Trade and Employment.

The *Proposals* may be regarded as a basic document of recent United States foreign policy. It was a clear statement of existing restrictions on international trade and of appropriate measures to release trade from some of these restrictions. World trade, it pointed out, was "kept small by four things": (1) restrictions imposed by governments; (2) restrictions imposed by private combines and cartels; (3) fear of disorder in the markets for certain primary commodities; (4) irregularity, and the fear of irregularity, in production and employment. The *Proposals* discussed all of these problems and outlined steps for dealing with them. It expressed particular concern over tariffs and preferences, quantitative restrictions, exchange control, subsidies, and state trading. It urged that whenever possible tariffs should be substantially reduced and tariff preferences eliminated by gradual steps. Except as specifically provided, states "should undertake not to maintain any quotas, embargoes, or other quan-

⁶ See text of the master Lend-Lease Agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom, signed at Washington on Feb. 23, 1942; in Ruhl Bartlett, ed., *The Record of American Diplomacy* (Knopf, 1947), pp. 646-647.

⁷ Dept. of State Pub. 2411, Commercial Policy Series 79. Hereafter cited as *Proposals*.

titative restrictions on their export or import trade with other states." Numerous exceptions to this objective were recognized, as, for instance, the possible necessity of imposing quantitative restrictions during "the early postwar transitional period" to relieve "conditions of distress in the exporting country caused by severe shortages of foodstuffs and other essential products" and, above all, "as an aid to the restoration of equilibrium in the balance of payments" - *i.e.*, to enable countries whose imports exceeded their exports to husband their resources and take special precautions in order to deal with their unfavorable balance of payments. The *Proposals* decried "the imposition of trade restrictions and discriminations through exchange techniques"; if exchange controls were necessary, they should be undertaken in accord with the requirements of the International Monetary Fund. Subsidies - *i.e.*, "any form of internal income or price support" - especially export subsidies - should be avoided if possible, and in any event should be carefully supervised.⁸

It is hard - or, more frankly, impossible - to reconcile American agricultural and shipping policies with the objective of the *Proposals*. The agricultural policies have embraced import quotas, export subsidies, and even embargoes as a part of the price support program; the shipping policies have relied heavily on operating subsidies and cargo preferences.⁹ Domestic pressures, warranted or otherwise, have forced these major exceptions in the new American program of freer trade.

The vexing problem of state trading was dealt with in very gingerly fashion in the *Proposals*: "Members engaging in state trading in any form should accord equality of treatment to all other members. To this end, members should undertake that the foreign purchases and sales of their state trading enterprises shall be influenced solely by commercial considerations." This was clearly an expression of hope rather than of realism.

With reference to cartels the *Proposals* stated that "firms have banded together to restrain competition by fixing common selling prices, by dividing the world into exclusive markets, by curtailing production, by suppressing technology and invention, by excluding their rivals from particular fields, and by boycotting outsiders."¹⁰ To remedy these conditions the *Proposals* suggested individual and cooperative action by various countries "to curb those restrictive business practices in international trade which interfere with the objectives of increased production and trade, access on equal terms to markets and raw materials, and high levels of employment and real income." It also recommended the establishment of a special agency within the proposed International Trade Organization to receive and examine complaints regarding restrictive practices and to advise the ITO on desirable remedies.

⁸ *Proposals*, pp. 12-18.

⁹ Gordon Gray, *Report to the President on Foreign Economic Policies* (Government Printing Office, 1950), pp. 84-91. Hereafter cited as Gray Report.

¹⁰ *Proposals*, p. 4. See G. W. Stocking and M. W. Watkins, *Cartels in Action* (Twentieth Century Fund, 1946), and *Cartels or Competition* (Twentieth Century Fund, 1948).

The *Proposals* reflected an awareness of both the possibilities and the limitations of commodity agreements. Such agreements, it concluded, are justified if "measures for increasing the consumption of a commodity are unlikely to operate quickly enough to prevent excess supplies of the commodity from accumulating." If they help to deal with "a burdensome surplus" or with the threat of widespread unemployment, they would seem to fill a real need. In any event, the *Proposals* insisted, such agreements should operate according to accepted international principles and should be subject to full publicity and constant review.¹¹

Full production and employment also found a place in the *Proposals*. Increased production is obviously one of the greatest needs of the world today. Full employment raises some of the most controversial issues in international economics ; it may involve increasing state control of economic life, and it may be achieved by questionable and dangerous means — as, for example, in Nazi Germany. Nations may resort to measures which may have adverse effects on other countries and in the long run on the nations which inaugurated them. "It is important," declared the *Proposals*, "that nations should not seek to obtain full employment for themselves by exporting unemployment to their neighbors."

The Drafting of GATT and the ITO Charter. The *Proposals for Expansion of World Trade and Employment* was endorsed in a joint statement on commercial policy by Great Britain and the United States and copies were sent to all governments. At the same time the United States invited fifteen countries to participate in multilateral negotiations for the purpose of reducing tariffs and other barriers to world trade. All except the U.S.S.R. accepted the invitation. In February, 1946, the newly organized Economic and Social Council of the United Nations established a Preparatory Committee to draft a charter for a proposed International Trade Organization and to lay plans for an international conference on trade and employment. This committee accepted the *Proposals* as a basis for its work. Just before the first session of the Preparatory Committee, held in London in October-November, 1946, the United States issued a *Suggested Charter for an International Trade Organization*. This document, which was an elaboration of the *Proposals* of 1945, became the principal working paper at the London meetings of the Preparatory Committee, thus supplementing the *Proposals*. After extensive revisions the *Suggested Charter* was debated at the long second session of the Committee, held in Geneva from April to September, 1947 ; and at the same time representatives of twenty-three nations engaged in negotiations to reduce trade barriers. The results of the Geneva discussions were embodied in two important documents : the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and the draft Charter for an International Trade Organization (ITO).

The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was a multilateral convention incorporating the results of more than 120 sets of bilateral negotiations

¹¹ *Proposals*, pp. 20-23.

among twenty-three nations, embracing some 43,000 separate terms.¹² The resulting agreements affected more than three-fourths of the import trade of the participating nations and about one-half of total world imports. The general provisions of GATT established "for the first time a generally accepted international code of fair treatment in commercial relations." Its three major parts related to "Tariffs and Preferences," "Non-Tariff Trade Barriers," and "Procedural and Other Matters." Many of the provisions were almost identical with those of its companion document, the draft Charter for an ITO. This duplication was, of course, intentional; the assumption was that the provisions of the ITO Charter would automatically supersede the corresponding sections of GATT when and if the Charter entered into effect, but that by being incorporated into GATT these provisions would be put into effect promptly instead of being dependent on the creation of ITO. As events were to prove, this was a wise precaution. GATT was put into effect by France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and four other nations as early as January 1, 1948, and it has since been implemented by many other states. The ITO Charter, on the other hand, has not yet been approved by the required twenty states.

The draft ITO Charter was considered at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, held at Havana from November, 1947, to March, 1948. Attended by several hundred delegates from fifty-six nations, as well as by representatives from several international agencies and nongovernmental organizations, the Havana Conference was the largest and most significant economic conference of the early postwar period. The main struggle at Havana was not between Communist and non-Communist states — Czechoslovakia and Poland were the only "iron curtain" countries to send official delegates — but between those which sought to secure acceptance of the basic principle of freeing the channels of world trade and those which were more concerned with writing into the Charter exceptions to justify restrictive practices in their own particular cases. "The difficulties that confronted this conference largely reflected the clash of economic policies and philosophies."¹³ As a result, the Charter, which already embodied numerous concessions and escape clauses, was further weakened — or mutilated.

Signed on March 24, 1948, by representatives of fifty-three nations, the Charter was a lengthy document of 106 articles, divided into nine chapters.¹⁴ Chapter I stated purposes and objectives. Chapter II dealt with "Employment and Economic Activity," and Chapter III with "Economic Development and Reconstruction." Chapter IV, the longest in the Charter (Article 16-45), began with the pledge of most-favored-nation treat-

¹² See United Nations, *General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade*, 4 vols. (United Nations, 1947); *International Conciliation*, No. 434, Oct., 1947; and *Analysis of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade*, Dept. of State Pub. 2983, Commercial Policy Series 109 (Nov., 1947).

¹³ J. B. Condliffe, *The Commerce of Nations* (Norton, 1950), p. 614.

¹⁴ *Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization*, Dept. of State Pub. 3117, Commercial Policy Series 113 (March, 1948).

ment in commercial policy, but this was hedged about with many permissible exceptions. It included a prohibition of quantitative restrictions, but acknowledged that such restrictions might be essential for a country in balance of payments difficulties and for many other reasons. It called for the abandonment of export subsidies, but stated that they might be permitted "in certain defined circumstances." It also dealt with the problem of state trading and affirmed hopefully if naively that "state trading is also brought within the Charter obligations for reduction of preferences."

Chapter V contained safeguards against restrictive business practices.¹⁵ Chapter VI attempted to lay down rules covering international commodity-control agreements, which "are to be entered into only when there is a burdensome surplus or widespread unemployment which could not be corrected by normal market forces alone." Incidentally, even before the Charter had been drawn up, the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations had established in March, 1947, an Interim Coordinating Committee for International Commodity Agreements (ICCICA), which since the drafting of the Charter has issued a number of significant reports on commodity agreements¹⁶ and has tried to keep later agreements in accord with the principles of the ITO Charter. Chapter VII outlined the structure and functions of the ITO, except for the settlement of differences, which was covered in Chapter VIII. The final chapter contained nine provisions dealing with such matters as relations with non-members, general exceptions to the Charter, and the procedures for amendment and review.

The drafting of the Havana Charter was a major feat of economic statesmanship, and represented the culmination of many months of effort. Although it was so full of reservations as to seem almost meaningless, it at least pointed the way toward international cooperation and out of the morass of trade restrictions which were already threatening to stifle international economic relations and to endanger world peace.¹⁷ It deserved a better fate than it received. To date not a single nation has ratified the Charter—not even the United States, its major creator and most vigorous champion.

Implementation and Extension of GATT. With the ITO Charter on the

¹⁵ An ECOSOC Resolution of September 13, 1951, recommended that members of the United Nations "take appropriate measures, and cooperate with each other, to prevent, on the part of private or public commercial enterprises, business practices affecting international trade which restrain competition, limit access to markets, or foster monopolistic control, whenever such practices have harmful effects on the expansion of production or trade, on the economic development of underdeveloped areas, or on standards of living." The Resolution established an Ad Hoc Committee on Restrictive Business Practices, and instructed it to submit to ECOSOC proposals for dealing with the difficult problems within its purview.

¹⁶ See *Review of International Commodity Arrangements* (Geneva, 1947) and *Review of International Commodity Problems*. 1948 (United Nations, Nov., 1948).

¹⁷ For a detailed explanation of the ITO Charter, and of the principles underlying it, by one of its champions, see Clair Wilcox, *A Charter for World Trade* (Macmillan, 1949).



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shelf, the implementation and extension of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade assumed greater importance. GATT, too, encountered serious difficulties, but these did not prevent the general lowering of customs duties to which the participating nations were pledged. By July, 1948, GATT was in effect among twenty-two of the twenty-three original signatories. Chile, the one exception, adhered to the agreement early in 1949. Ten more nations joined the list of contracting parties and participated in a second round of tariff negotiations in a conference at Annecy, France, which dragged on from April to August, 1949.

The third in the series of international tariff conferences was held at the delightful English resort of Torquay from September, 1950, to April, 1951. At Torquay the trend toward bilateralism and trade restrictions of

all sorts was more apparent than ever ; since Torquay the difficulties have been accentuated, often by nations or groups of nations seeking to provide themselves with artificial protection against outside competition, especially from the United States. Such policies have been characteristic of the countries of the British Commonwealth, of Western Europe, and of the underdeveloped areas. In extreme form they represent a departure from the spirit of GATT and the ITO Charter, and they demonstrate forcefully that many countries, even outside the Communist sphere, are adopting domestic economic and social policies which are inimical to international cooperation.¹⁸ There is considerable truth in the contention of Michael L. Hoffman that "this thesis that stable international relationships must always be sacrificed to domestic social policy is the very essence of modern economic nationalism."¹⁹

In March, 1955, delegates from forty-four nations completed an intensive review of GATT in the light of its seven years of operations. Missing from the revised agreement which followed were the controversial provisions regarding full employment, commodity agreements, and cartels. The revised GATT continued the tariff truce, which covers more than three-quarters of the free world's trade, and it prererved the most-favored-nation principle, subject to many exceptions. A separate protocol provided for an Organization for Trade Cooperation (OTC) to administer the General Agreement. In a special message to Congress in April, 1955, President Eisenhower urged American participation in the OTC, and a year later he renewed his recommendation ; but considerable opposition to OTC developed in the United States, and Congress failed to act on the President's request.

Agreement upon the terms of the new GATT and the extension of the American Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act for three years seemed to create a favorable atmosphere for another round of multilateral tariff negotiations. These negotiations were held in Geneva between January 18 and May 17, 1956, and resulted in nearly sixty bilateral agreements affecting some two billion dollars of trade at 1955 prices. The cooperative attitude of Great Britain, Western Germany, and Italy was largely responsible for the unexpectedly wide range of the final agreements, which were incorporated in protocols to GATT.

¹⁸ "Governments motivated by socialist and interventionist ideas conduct policies of 'welfare' and protection through tariffs, licenses, quotas, exchange controls, and many other welfare measures, all of which promote economic nationalism." Hans F. Sennholz, *How Can Europe Survive?* (Van Nostrand, 1955), p. 317. See also Ludwig von Mises, *Socialism* (Yale University Press, 1951), F. A. Hayek, *The Road to Serfdom* (University of Chicago Press, 1944), and Benjamin M. Anderson, *Economics and the Public Welfare* (Van Nostrand, 1949). The case for government planning and "welfare economics" is presented in John Maynard Keynes, *The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money* (Harcourt, Brace, 1936), William H. Beveridge, *Full Employment in a Free Society* (Norton, 1945), Herman Finer, *The Road to Reaction* (Little, Brown, 1945), and Alvin H. Hansen, *Economic Policy and Full Employment* (McGraw-Hill, 1947).

¹⁹ Dispatch from Geneva, dated June 10, 1951, in the *New York Times*, June 11, 1951.

State Trading and the Communist Economies. According to one authority, the emergence of state-controlled foreign trade is "undoubtedly the most important international economic phenomenon of the twentieth century."²⁰ This greatly complicates the problem of economic cooperation between states, and introduces many other disturbing factors into the international picture.

What is called state trading comes about when governments not content with the control that comes from conventional regulatory devices themselves engage in trade. Most governments do this in special circumstances and in particular commodities, and the total amount of foreign trade carried on by governments of non-Communist states is substantial. The United States is the one major wheat exporting country that does not sell abroad through a government wheat monopoly. The United States Government is a monopoly buyer of imported natural rubber and a near-monopoly producer of synthetic rubber within the country.²¹ So-called "bulk purchasing agreements" are used by many governments to obtain raw materials and other commodities important to their national economies. State trading is also a normal consequence of nationalization. Thus, when the nationalization of a particular industry takes place, a government marketing agency is usually set up to handle the selling of its products.

In Communist states trade is carried on by state-owned trading monopolies, which are usually stock companies set up to conduct foreign trade in particular commodities. These monopolies serve as both central selling agencies and central buying offices. They work within quantitative limits and on price schedules fixed by the government, and they surrender their profits to the government. All operations in a particular foreign country may be consolidated; "Amtorg" in the United States, for instance, executes the orders for all Soviet industries. In most state trading countries, however, the government itself conducts the negotiations and concludes the agreements, and then turns over to the monopoly the job of meeting the state's commitments. In the states within the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe the Russians share control with the satellite governments.²² While monopoly states may prefer to do business with each other, they are usually pleased to trade with anybody as long as the terms are "right," just as nearly everybody else is. They need certain commodities from the democratic states, and they are sensibly willing to trade for them.

The weaknesses of the state trading system are those which go with controlled economies. The system tends to dictate taste in consumer goods rather than to cater to it; it fails to provide the constant pressure which makes for lower costs, improved products, and exploratory thinking. It effects an artificial price system rather than one based on supply and

²⁰ M. Heilperin, *The Trade of Nations* (Knopf, 1947), p. 106.

²¹ John Parke Young, *The International Economy*, 3rd ed. (Ronald, 1951), p. 372. This discussion of state trading is largely based on Young.

²² Carroll and Marion Daugherty, *Principles of Political Economy*, 2 vols. (Houghton Mifflin, 1950), II, 1111.

demand. Nationalization and state trading operate on the assumption that if some regulation and supervision are necessary—as capitalist states admit—then more regulation and supervision would be even better.

Undoubtedly a regimented economy can add spectacularly to a nation's power, at least in the short run. Basic industries can be encouraged with all the resources of the state, technicians and workers assigned to the production of war goods, and luxury items prohibited forthwith. Foreign trade can be controlled to the same end. As the Daughertys say, "wherever state trading exists.....the use of economic power in furtherance of political power is a possibility."²³ In the world of today such possibilities are rarely overlooked.

In his last public statement on international affairs Wendell Willkie warned: "If after the war the industrial and commercial life of most of the countries of the world is either state-owned or controlled, then the whole problem of the survival of a free economic system, even in the United States, will be complicated."²⁴ Willkie's warning has a prophetic ring, for the very situation he feared has eventuated, and free enterprise systems are at a peculiar disadvantage in dealing with such an order of economic affairs.²⁵

2. POSTWAR ECONOMIC PROBLEMS : CURRENCY AND EXCHANGE CONTROL

It is no mere coincidence that the period of relatively free movement of goods and services in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was also the period of the international gold standard. The latter was essential to the former, for the easy movement of goods calls for the easy movement of money. But the international gold standard could not survive the economic and political explosions which began in the second decade of the twentieth century. As Michael Heilperin has pointed out, the gold standard was "the monetary system of an essentially peaceful world, where confidence reigned, trade was reasonably free, and capital movements between countries were regular."²⁶ It did not provide a mechanism for dealing with financial crises and basic disturbances in balance of payments. While it was partially revived in the 1920's, it disappeared—perhaps forever—in the economic blitz of the 1930's. Britain was forced to abandon it in October, 1931, in the midst of a major economic and political crisis. This step, together with the abandonment of free trade which soon followed, seemed to mark the end of an era. One immediate result was the

²³ Daugherty and Daugherty, II, 1112.

²⁴ *An American Program* (Simon and Schuster, 1944), p. 19.

²⁵ On this point see Jacob Viner, "International Relations between State-Controlled National Economies," *American Economic Review*, XXXIV (March, 1944). See also Report of Special Committee on Postwar Economic Policy and Planning (the Colmer Committee), issued in Nov., 1945.

²⁶ Heilperin, p. 58.

general flight from the gold standard, chiefly by those countries in the Commonwealth and the sterling area whose currencies were linked to the British pound. In April, 1933, in the early days of the Roosevelt Administration, the United States followed suit, and in 1934 the President reduced the gold content of the dollar so that it was valued at fifty-nine cents in relation to the old. It was later reduced to fifty cents. Thus the two most powerful currencies in the world, the pound and the dollar, were adversely affected by the economic troubles of the 1930's.

In recent years the general pattern has been one of growing monetary as well as economic nationalism, arrested but by no means checked by temporary improvements in the world economic picture, by the efforts of international agencies such as the International Monetary Fund, and by the strong resistance of the United States. A peaceful world needs monetary as well as economic stability ; this stability can be attained only when international payments can be made easily, when exchange rates are stable, and when currencies are freely convertible. Obviously the present trend is in the opposite direction. Most nations feel compelled to impose exchange controls and husband their currency and their reserves ; these attitudes are most prevalent in states which have accepted the principles of state planning and control of economic life and which are inclined to limit their international economic cooperation because of fear of adverse effects on their national programs. However necessary these measures may be in particular situations, it should be recognized that if pursued too intently they may seriously endanger human freedoms and world peace.

Balance of Payments Difficulties and Exchange Controls. Many of the present-day measures of monetary nationalism may be attributed to balance of payments problems. "Balance of payments" is the economist's term for the difference between what a nation receives for its exports and "invisible" items — another technical term to refer to income from shipping, investments abroad, tourist trade, etc. — and what it has to pay for its imports. "The most difficult questions of international economic relations at the present time," asserts J. B. Condliffe, "are those connected with the balancing of payments between national economies."²⁷ Many nations today are having balance of payments difficulties — particularly those which are heavily dependent upon foreign trade, such as Great Britain and Japan. Faced with the necessity of importing much of the food to keep their people alive and most of the raw materials to keep their industries going, these countries are unable to pay for such essentials through their own exports of goods and services. These difficulties are all the greater because their own productive capacities were injured by the war, because many of their former markets have disappeared, and because of the growing embarrassments to foreign trade. In an attempt to protect their own interests they add to these restrictions through import rationing, exchange controls, bilateral clearing arrangements, and other devices. Their problems are also immensely complicated by the practices of other

²⁷ Condliffe, p. 3.

states, by the complete monopoly of trade and exchange in the countries of the Soviet bloc, and by the overwhelming economic power of the United States.

Bilateral clearing arrangements, like bilateral trade agreements, have proliferated in the postwar period. They can be justified only as a temporary and necessary deviation from the multilateral way. Condliffe has explained this point very well: "All the difficulties that arise in the trade relations between free and controlled economies are inherent in the adoption of bilateral clearing practices, since such practices must utilize discriminatory trade regulation as the principal balancing mechanism..... Bilateralism is necessarily a system of discrimination."²⁸

The Dollar Shortage. In recent years we have heard a great deal about the "dollar gap" and the "dollar shortage." These conditions have arisen out of a single but significant fact: that year after year the United States has exported more than she has imported and that the nations which have received her exports have not been able to obtain the dollars to pay for the American export surplus, *i.e.*, the excess of exports over imports, which has created the "dollar gap." In not a single year since 1914 has the United States had an import surplus. From 1914 through 1948 the total American export surplus, mounting steadily and reaching staggering proportions after 1940, amounted to more than 100 billion dollars. Only a small amount of this surplus was paid for by gold or other capital movements; over two-thirds was financed by United States government grants and loans.²⁹ This process, of course, is still going on, although for a time, when the United States began to take up seriously the work of rearmament the "dollar gap" almost ceased to exist.³⁰

Since the end of World War II the United States has poured out many billions of dollars, mostly in the form of grants, for rehabilitation and recovery of other countries and to enable these countries to continue to buy essential materials from the United States. The European Recovery Program represents the greatest single venture of this sort, but funds have

²⁸ Condliffe, p. 745. See also Poul Nyboe Anderson, *Bilateral Exchange Clearing Policy* (Copenhagen, 1946).

²⁹ *The United States Balance of Payments Problem*, Dept. of State Pub. 3695, Commercial Policy Series 123 (Dec. 1949), pp. 1-6. The present huge American gold stock was acquired mostly by direct purchases of gold between 1933 and 1940, particularly from Britain, France, China, and the Soviet Union.

³⁰ "There is.....an element of illusion in the present apparent balanced position of our trade (apart from military exports), in that large 'extraordinary' dollar expenditures are still being made by the United States in other countries. As of the end of 1953 these were running at an annual rate of about \$3 billion. These extraordinary expenditures consist of disbursements by our military and civilian establishments abroad, off-shore procurement, and stockpiling. If economic aid is also included, the total of extraordinary expenditures, as of the end of 1953, was running at the rate of \$5 billion per year. Against this total should be credited the current increase of foreign gold and dollar reserves which is running at the rate of over \$2 billion per year. There is thus a concealed dollar gap of some \$2 billion to \$3 billion annually, which would be increased if there were a change in the economic situation." Commission on Foreign Economic Policy, *Report to the President and the Congress*, Jan. 23, 1954 (Government Printing Office, 1954), pp. 3-5. Hereafter cited as Randall Report.

been made available through many other channels. The British loan of 3.75 billion dollars, plus other credits to Britain, represents the largest extension of credit, as contrasted to outright grants ; but the terms of these loans, and the likelihood that most of them will be cancelled in one way or another, make the difference between grants and credits a tenuous one at best.

Faced with such a serious dollar shortage, many nations have felt compelled to discriminate against American imports at the same time that they have sought to increase their exports to the United States. These policies, undoubtedly necessary, have often created hard feelings and misunderstandings. American producers, shippers, and others complain of unfair competition from abroad, and American exporters protest at restrictions on their trade with foreign countries. Other nations, in turn, insist that the only way by which they can hope to solve their dollar problem is to restrict American imports and increase exports to the dollar area. They think that it is high time that the United States began to act more like a creditor nation ; and they point out that high tariff duties, shipping and agricultural subsidies, and other devices to restrict foreign competition will become an economic giant.

The Case for Economic Regionalism. Some economists, especially in Western Europe and in Britain, argue that the great economic weight of the United States will crush other free countries unless those countries deliberately adopt restrictive and discriminatory policies on a regional and national basis, aimed at the American colossus. A noted proponent of this point of view is the English economist Thomas Balogh, who seems to believe that England should resort to a kind of storm-cellar economics in the present emergency, zealously guarding her own economy from external tempests but joining with other countries of Western Europe to create regional economic institutions and policies and to employ all kinds of restrictive practices, such as preferential tariffs, regional trading arrangements, export subsidies, and import and exchange controls. "Western Europe's crisis," Balogh argues, "is not a temporary or short-lived departure from an 'equilibrium position' to which it is easy to return. It is a historically unique, harsh break with all that has gone before, a fundamental structural crisis which, if it can be cured at all, can be cured only by a set of carefully planned and discriminatory policies."³¹ It should be pointed out that many English economists do not subscribe to Balogh's views, and that some would have their country go very far in the other direction. G. D. A. MacDougall, for instance, declares that "we have much to lose from a regional system which would shut us off from a large part of the world's markets." "It will be hard enough," he adds, "to make both ends meet with all the markets in the world at our disposal."³²

³¹ "International Economic Equilibrium," Chap. 25 in Seymour Harris, ed., *Foreign Economic Policy for the United States* (Harvard University Press, 1948), p. 478.

³² When MacDougall presented his views in the *Economic Journal* (London), Balogh, taking exception, responded with "A Comment," whereupon MacDougall replied to

Exchange Rates and Controls. In the absence of the international gold standard, the problem of fixing exchange rates between the currencies of the various countries is a particularly difficult one. "In any circumstances—whether the exchange market is free or controlled, whether the clearing is multilateral or bilateral—this exchange rate is the most important single factor in the balancing of international payments. . . . All the international economic relations between trading countries come to focus in this ratio. . . . In theory and in practice this is the core of international economic relations."³³ Of all the exchange rates the dollar-sterling rate is the most important. The relations of these two major world currencies are as crucial as the relations between major powers, for they are the great powers of the world of international finance. When the pound was devalued, under strong American pressure, in September, 1949, it was dropped from \$4.03 to \$2.80. One immediate result was that since the dollar would buy more pounds, purchases in Britain and elsewhere in the sterling area by dollar countries were stimulated, whereas British purchases in the United States were discouraged. This was generally regarded as a desirable result, since Britain was trying to export more to the United States and to buy less from her, thereby earning more of the dollars which were desperately needed. The devaluation of the pound, followed by that of nearly all of the other currencies linked with the pound, had worldwide repercussions. It is difficult to appraise the over-all consequences of this momentous step; but certainly, as Condliffe states, after it had been taken "the balancing of payments presented a very different aspect."³⁴

The International Monetary Fund. A major purpose of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), one of the institutions which emerged from the Bretton Woods Conference of 1944 and which is now associated with the United Nations as a specialized agency, is to help to stabilize international monetary relations. By adhering to the Articles of Agreement of the IMF, each member pledged itself to avoid restrictions on payments for current international transactions as well as discriminatory currency practices, except when the Fund finds such restrictions to be necessary on a temporary basis because the currency in question is scarce or because of the exigencies of "the postwar transitional period." Under certain conditions member states may draw upon the Fund for the purpose of tiding over temporary strains on their balances of payments. Members agree to abandon exchange controls "as soon as they are satisfied that they are able,

Balogh's comment. It was an interesting debate. See *Economic Journal* LVII (March, 1947), 69-113; and LVIII (March, 1948), 74-85, 86-98. For the quotation from MacDougall, see LVIII, 92. See also Ellsworth, pp. 727-739.

³³ Condliffe, p. 746.

³⁴ Condliffe, p. 746. Writing in the American journal *Foreign Affairs* in 1951, Roy Harrod, a prominent English economist, expressed the opinion that "the devaluation of sterling in 1949 has been a disaster for Britain." See "Hands and Fists Across the Sea," XXX (Oct., 1951), 70-73.

in the absence of such restrictions, to settle their balance of payments in a manner which will not unduly encumber their access to the resources of the Fund."

Clearly, the major objectives of the Fund have not been achieved ; exchange controls and financial restrictions are still the order of the day. But to the extent of its limited capacities and resources the Fund is doing a useful work, and it is ready to be of greater service if and when the general international horizon clears. It has always been envisioned as an agency which would be really effective in dealing with long-term and not with emergency problems of currency stabilization and control. Its reports have consistently called attention to the long-run implications of the monetary policies being pursued by the nations of the world.

ERP and EPU. More limited steps to deal with matters of balance of payments and currency convertibility on a regional basis were taken in connection with the European Recovery Program and the European Payments Union, both of which were dealt with in Chapter 15. The system of having drawing rights and contributions incorporated into the Intra-European Balance of Payments Scheme, formulated by OEEC, was an effective means of stimulating intra-European trade.³⁵ The Balance of Payments Scheme was, in turn, superseded by the more substantial European Payments Union in 1950. In each program the Bank for International Settlements at Basle acted as the agent. This is only the most recent of the many services which the Bank, originally established in 1924 in connection with the Dawes Plan for German reparations, has rendered in international monetary matters. EPU has been able to provide a badly-needed multilateral clearing mechanism for member countries, its efforts, however, have been seriously hampered by the heavy deficits of some of its members and the strong surplus positions of others.

Monetary Aspects of Britain's Economic Crisis. The problems facing Great Britain in regard to the balancing of payments are particularly serious. They account in large part for British recalcitrance in implementing pledges to work for freeing the channels of world trade and finance. Britain has felt compelled to adopt a series of restrictive measures in an attempt to cope with her serious economic plight. Her position was succinctly described in a background memorandum released by the American State and Treasury Departments on August 26, 1948, on the eve of a discussion of the dollar earning problem among representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada :

During the war Britain's foreign exchange deficit totaled nearly 40 billion dollars. Half of the total was financed through lend-lease, and the remainder had to be financed by borrowing from other nations or by liquidating investments and utilizing reserves. Some 4.5 billion dollars worth of foreign investments was sold during this period while the rest

³⁵ *Agreement for Intra-European Payments and Compensations* (Organization for European Economic Co-operation, Paris, 16 October 1948), Part I. See also "European Recovery," *International Conciliation*, No. 447 (Jan., 1949), pp. 49-56.

of the deficit was met through the accumulation of sterling by other countries and by the RFC loan and dollar loans and gifts from Canada. The British still hold substantial long-term assets abroad. British investments in the United States are valued at about 2 billion dollars and the value of investments in other areas is several times that figure.³⁶

By the end of the war the blocked sterling balances amounted to approximately 14 billion dollars. Shipping and investment losses had been very heavy. The abrupt ending of Lend-Lease by President Truman on August 21, 1945, was an additional shock. To cope with the immediate emergency Britain turned to the United States for aid. An agreement of December 6, 1945, approved by the American Congress on July 15, 1946, after long and bitter debate, provided for a loan of 3.75 billion dollars.³⁷ The announced purpose of this "loan that was more than a loan" was "to facilitate purchases by the United Kingdom of goods and services from the United States, to assist the United Kingdom to meet transitional post-war deficits in its current balance of payments, to help the United Kingdom to maintain adequate reserves of gold and dollars, and to assist the United Kingdom to assume the obligations of multilateral trade." In the agreement the United Kingdom promised to make currency freely convertible and to abandon exchange controls. "This credit," stated an accompanying announcement, "would make it possible for the United Kingdom to relax import and exchange controls, including exchange arrangements affecting the sterling area, and generally to move forward with the United States and other countries toward the common objective of expanded multilateral trade."³⁸

Whatever Britain's intentions in making such commitments, in practice she has been unable to fulfil them; instead, she has tended to cling to exchange controls and restrictive trade practices for reasons which she believes to be compelling. In July, 1947, Britain, in accordance with her pledge, made sterling convertible under certain specified conditions; but the drain on her supply of gold and dollars was so severe that she abandoned the experiment in the following month, with the consent of the United States. It has not been repeated. Memories of the convertibility crisis of 1947 still haunt British statesmen and financiers, and the British economic position has not been strong enough to risk another venture in

³⁶ The text of this memorandum was printed in the *Department of State Bulletin*, XXI (Sept. 5., 1949), 353-355. See also *Anglo-American Economic Relations*, a problem paper prepared by the International Studies Group of the Brookings Institution, 1951.

³⁷ For a good brief treatment of the negotiations leading to the Anglo-American Financial Agreement of December, 1945, and of the Congressional debate which preceded its approval, see J. C. Campbell, *The United States in World Affairs, 1945-1947* (Council on Foreign Relations, 1947), pp. 358-369.

³⁸ The text of the statement by President Truman and Prime Minister Attlee which was released at the time of the signing of the Anglo-American Financial Agreement of December, 1945, was printed in Dept. of State Pub. 2439, Commercial Policy Series 80 (Dec., 1945). The text of the Agreement itself may be found in Dept. of State Pub. 2676, *Treaties and Other International Acts Series* 1545 (1946).

multilateralism. The results of the British loan also were disappointing. Because of a sharp rise in American prices with the virtual end of price controls, the value of the loan declined by at least 25 per cent. The line of credit was exhausted long before it was expected to be, and more of it had to be devoted to transitional emergency purposes, as contrasted with long-term recovery, than had been contemplated. The hard winter of 1946-1947 imposed severe additional strains upon the British; consequently, 1947 was a dark year, economically as well as politically.³⁹ Balance of payments difficulties accounted in large part for the epoch-making decision in February, 1947, to reduce Britain's overseas commitments, notably by withdrawing economic and military aid from Greece and Turkey. In 1947, because of a variety of adverse factors, Britain's gold and dollar reserves dwindled alarmingly; and the convertibility crisis forcefully brought home the precarious position of the national economy. Redoubled efforts were made to increase production, expand exports, especially to the United States and other dollar countries, and to limit dollar imports.

Britain's Continuing Crisis. These measures, plus substantial American aid under the Marshall Plan after April, 1948, proved to be no more than temporary stimulants. In an attempt to counteract another dollar crisis in 1949, all the members of the sterling area agreed in July to reduce dollar imports by 25 per cent—this led to an embargo on imports of American petroleum for a few weeks in the spring of 1950—and in September, 1949, Britain underwent a major surgical operation by devaluing the pound by more than 30 per cent, as we have already mentioned.

For some months after September, 1949, Britain's balance of payments position improved markedly. Additional reasons for this encouraging development were better economic conditions in the United States, which led to a larger amount of purchases from the sterling area, and the increased demand for goods and services resulting from the Korean War and from the consequent rearmament programs of the United States and other countries. The improvement in Britain's position, however, was again only temporary; and in 1951-1952 she was faced with perhaps the gravest

³⁹ The economic crisis of 1947 in Britain was largely a dollar crisis. The reasons for this situation were clearly stated in a British White Paper entitled *Economic Survey: 1947*: "We are now drawing some 42 per cent of our imports from the Western Hemisphere, which is now the main source of the food and raw materials that we must have. But we are selling there only 14 per cent of our exports. We are thus running large deficits with these countries. These must be settled in dollars or their equivalent. To much of the Eastern Hemisphere, on the other hand, we tend to sell more than we buy. In a world fully recovered from war, this would provide us with the means to settle our deficits with the West. But now many of the Eastern Hemisphere countries have no gold or dollars or essential goods with which to pay; to others we owe large debts which we shall have to repay gradually, and the surplus in our trade with such countries is used up in this way. We, therefore, shall not be able wholly to use our surpluses with Eastern Hemisphere countries against our deficits with Western Hemisphere countries This dollar problem within our total balance of payments can be wholly solved only by the economic recovery of Europe and the Far East and the establishment of equilibrium in all the major trading countries' balance of payments." Quoted in Condliffe, pp. 547-548.

economic crisis in her history. The general election of October 25, 1951, resulted in the overthrow of the Labor Government, and Mr. Churchill's return to power at the head of a Conservative Ministry occurred in the midst of the crisis. The magnitude of the new emergency was clearly outlined by Prime Minister Churchill in a radio speech to the British people on December 22. After pointing out that in 1951 Britain fell far short of paying for her purchases from other countries, and that in October the gold reserve had fallen by more than 300 million pounds—leaving the total reserve at the alarmingly low figure of about 1.1 billion pounds—he declared: “Unless this rate of loss could be reduced, we were within a few months of national bankruptcy and having to choose between charity, if we could get it, and starvation.” Somehow, he told the British people, Britain must develop the means to pay her own way, for there was no assurance “that anyone else is going to keep the British lion as a pet.”

While Mr. Churchill was inclined to place some of the blame for England's predicament upon the Labor Government—he referred disparagingly to the “six years of socialism and two years of class warfare”—he realized that the underlying causes of the crisis were far deeper than this and that the immediate causes lay primarily in a series of unfavorable external factors. These included the worsening of the terms of trade, the expanded defense program, and the heavy costs of the dispute with Iran over oil. “The only ultimate solution,” in the opinion of R. A. Butler, Chancellor of the Exchequer, “was one of expansion”; but as immediate measures he announced the Conservative Government's intention to cut imports drastically, to place added restrictions on new building (except housing), to effect more government economies, to emphasize restraint in personal spending, to introduce a new excess profits tax, to institute additional measures of credit control, and to consult at all times with the countries of the Commonwealth, the sterling area, NATO, and OEEC.

Since 1952 Britain's economic position has improved considerably. Gold and dollar reserves of the sterling area have steadily climbed, although they have not reached the mid-1951 level; industrial output has continued to rise; investments abroad have mounted; and the balance of payments picture has brightened. The main reasons for the surplus in overseas payments have been larger export earnings and a larger surplus on “invisible” items—i.e., earnings from shipping, overseas investments, etc. On paper, at least, the “dollar gap” has been more than closed; but this result has been achieved, as Sir Roger Makins remarked in October, 1954, “by means which are not of a permanent character, and which are at the mercy of events and of politics.”⁴⁰

⁴⁰ “The Sinews of Peace,” address in Portland, Oregon, Oct. 8, 1954.

3. POSTWAR ECONOMIC PROBLEMS : INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT

Foreign investment has been one of the chief factors in the tremendous economic and industrial advances of modern times.⁴¹ Until World War I Britain had made the greatest contribution in this field, and her overseas investments were sources of great economic and political strength. Even for some years after 1914-1918 the serious deterioration in her economic position was not generally apparent. This was due in part to the fact that she was living on the accumulated resources of many decades of economic and financial supremacy. Only when a great percentage of British overseas investments was liquidated during World War II, and when Britain, once a great creditor nation, had become saddled with heavy foreign indebtedness and a staggering balance of payments deficit, did the full magnitude of the change become apparent.

The lessons of the British experience in the nineteenth century may still be studied with profit, but those successes can hardly be repeated under the more difficult conditions of the twentieth century. "What the private capitalism of the London money market achieved in the half-century preceding the first World War," declares J. B. Condliffe, "was an impressive demonstration of economic development resulting from well-directed investment and skillfully-managed monetary policies. Any attempt to repeat that demonstration must now reckon with heightened economic nationalism and must therefore proceed by international agreement. This involves a larger measure of intergovernmental control so that foreign investment and trade must in the future proceed in a different political climate."⁴²

Obstacles to International Investment. The political climate to which Professor Condliffe refers is generally unhealthful ; and the problem of creating a healthful one for foreign investment is one of the gravest problems in international economic relations today. The obstacles are many. They are to be found in the conditions in countries which need foreign capital and in countries which could supply funds for capital investment ; they are also to be found in the general international environment. In his *Report to the President on Foreign Economic Policies*, submitted in November, 1950, Gordon Gray listed the major obstacles as "present international tensions," "actions, or expressed unfriendly attitudes of other governments toward foreign capital, political instability, fear of government control, or expropriation," and "economic difficulties, particularly those resulting in exchange restrictions."⁴³ The Woodrow Wilson Founda-

⁴¹ For an excellent discussion of this development see the chapter on "Investment and Enterprise" in Condliffe, pp. 320-359.

⁴² Condliffe, p. 349. See also *The Political Economy of American Foreign Policy : Its Concepts, Strategy, and Limits*, Report of a Study Group sponsored by the Woodrow Wilson Foundation and the National Planning Association under the chairmanship of William Y. Elliott (Holt, 1955), pp. 10-11, 19-54.

⁴³ Gray Report, pp. 61-63, 72,

tion-National Planning Association Study Group reported in 1955, with reference to private foreign investment, that "an expansion in its volume and scope is not likely to occur automatically," for these reasons :

The major economic and political obstacles to such expansion include the poor economic health of many national economies, the incalculability of the international economy, the cold war, and the profound social transformation of the underdeveloped countries. . . . The immediately apparent obstacles . . . are broadly of two kinds—those arising from competitive uses of capital and those unduly enhancing risks. The most important competition with which private American investment abroad has had to contend has been the alternative opportunities for investment at home. . . . The greatest obstacles . . . have been the high risks—over and above those traditionally considered to be normal business risks—which the private investor . . . recognizes as entailed in the commitment of capital funds in most parts of the world today . . . three kinds of deterrents have tended to impress themselves increasingly upon potential private investors—political risks, the risks of war and civil disorder, and the risks arising from the incalculability and restrictiveness of the contemporary international economy.⁴⁴

Private International Investment. International investment may be either private or public. In the United States, the chief source of funds, the former is regarded as "the most desirable method of development," in the words of the Gray Report ; whereas in the countries which most need development funds the latter is preferred, for private investment is viewed with suspicion by governments which are still sensitive to any trace or hint of foreign interests—"imperialism!"—and which believe in the necessity of state planning of development projects. Because of unsettled conditions abroad and the plentiful opportunities for capital investment in the United States, American private foreign investment has averaged less than a billion dollars a year in the postwar period.⁴⁵ Of the net direct investment nearly three-fourths has been in the petroleum industry and of the nonpetroleum investments more than 70 per cent has been invested in Latin America. Clearly, private capital is not attracted

⁴⁴ *The Political Economy of American Foreign Policy*, pp. 332-333.

⁴⁵ "During the period 1948-1952, United States private long-term investment abroad increased at an average annual rate of \$1.5 billion. Of this total, additions to holdings of foreign securities by private individuals and financial institutions accounted for only \$200 million per year, mostly in investments in Canada or in securities of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The remaining \$1.3 billion per year was about equally divided between net new direct investments abroad of American corporations and reinvestment of earnings from their foreign operations." Randall Report, p. 16. The Study Group sponsored by the Woodrow Wilson Foundation and the National Planning Association called attention to another important aspect of the American private foreign investment picture : "Indeed, the United States has been for the past quarter of a century a 'mature creditor' in the sense that annual earnings from private long-term foreign investments have exceeded the annual net outflow of American private long-term capital. With new petroleum investments now declining and income from existing investments rising, the difference . . . is certain to grow substantially in the decade ahead." *The Political Economy of American Foreign Policy*, p. 330, n. 4.

by many types of badly-needed development projects or to those countries whose political regimes and too-shaky economies make them a poor risk for private enterprise. Gordon Gray estimated that private capital could be expected to provide between 500 and 800 million dollars a year for development programs.⁴⁶

A great many suggestions have been made for encouraging the flow of private capital abroad. The most common are investment treaties with countries in need of such capital, government guarantees of private investment against such grave risks as inconvertibility of currency and foreign expropriation, and a combination of investment treaties and government guarantees. In the former, the main commitments are made by potential recipient governments ; in the latter, the governments of the capital-exporting countries make the commitments. In both instances private investors are the beneficiaries. The Gray, Rockefeller, and Randall reports all recommended these steps.⁴⁷

Public International Investment. In the financing of economic development it is obvious that, as Mr. Gray pointed out, "public funds will have to play a substantial role." At the present time, the two main public lending institutions providing loans to underdeveloped countries are the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Export-Import Bank. The International Bank was created, along with the International Monetary Fund, by the Bretton Woods Agreement of 1944 ; its purpose is to help to finance postwar reconstruction and develop the resources and productive capacities of the countries which need outside aid. Gray argued that it should be "the primary public institution for extending development loans." Thus far, however, its operations in this sphere have been very limited ; but this is due to the difficult conditions which must be satisfied before it will make loans and not to a limited borrowing capacity on its own part. The Export-Import Bank, an agency of the United States Government, is the main channel by which American public funds are loaned to foreign governments. Gray proposed that its lending authority be increased to five billion dollars, and that it extend foreign loans of between 200 and 400 million dollars a year.⁴⁸

Estimates regarding the total amount of foreign capital needed annually for economic development vary widely. Some authorities insist that the capacity of underdeveloped countries to utilize outside capital is extremely limited⁴⁹ while others think that many billions a year can be used. Gray seemed to be thinking in terms of approximately two billions a year, mostly from American sources. The Rockefeller Board recommended an

⁴⁶ Gray Report, p. 72.

⁴⁷ Gray Report, pp. 61-63 ; *Partners in Progress : Report of the International Development Advisory Board* (Government Printing Office, 1951) ; and Randall Report, pp. 16-23.

⁴⁸ Gray Report, pp. 14, 64-66.

⁴⁹ For an excellent summary of this point of view see Harlan Cleveland, "Problems of Economic Development in the Far East," Chapter II in John K. Fairbank, Harlan Cleveland Edwin O. Reischauer, and William L. Holland, *Next Step in Asia* (Harvard University Press, 1949), pp. 25-47.

annual rate of two billion dollars in private foreign investments, plus a two-billion-dollar raw materials program. A United Nations memorandum on *Measures for Economic Development of Underdeveloped Countries*, published in May, 1951, estimated capital requirements for underdeveloped areas at 19 billion dollars a year; even assuming an increase in domestic savings, this would mean annual deficits of "well in excess of \$10 billion."⁵⁰ One economist computed that if the UN figures were scaled downward to take account of some neglected considerations, and if China were excluded, "the excess over current savings would then be within the range of \$4.7 to \$7.1 billion" per year.⁵¹ FOA estimates of capital requirements ran in the neighborhood of four billion dollars a year for an initial period of four years. The United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East reported that Southeast Asia alone needed thirteen billion dollars over a five-year period. The Colombo Plan of Britain and the Commonwealth countries in South and Southeast Asia called for five billion dollars over the same period. Professor Seymour Harris, a well known American economist, suggested some seven billion a year of overseas investment for an undesignated number of years.⁵² Many other estimates of this sort could be given; nearly all of them emphasize the continuing need for sizable funds for economic development.

New Proposals for Development Financing. Many types of organizations and funds have been proposed to supplement the existing international agencies for the financing of reconstruction and development projects. The two which seem to have the greatest support are a Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED) and an International Finance Corporation (IFC). SUNFED "would make low interest loans and outright grants for non-self-liquidating and non-revenue-producing projects."⁵³ It is strongly favored by the underdeveloped countries but thus far has been opposed by the United States and other UN members which would be expected to provide the bulk of the financing. The United States long delayed its support of an IFC, which has been previewed as "a kind of investment bank, using public and private funds to finance private international projects"⁵⁴ The establishment of an International Development Corporation (IDC) has been suggested. Presumably this would be an international counterpart of similar corporations which have been created in several underdeveloped countries. The Study Group sponsored by the Woodrow Wilson Foundation and the

⁵⁰ U. N. Doc. E/1986, 3 May 1951, p. 79.

⁵¹ Benjamin Higgins, "Development Financing," *International Conciliation*, No. 502 (March, 1955), p. 292.

⁵² Cited in Ellsworth, p. 842.

⁵³ *The Political Economy of American Foreign Policy*, p. 344. See also Wilfred Malenbaum, "International Public Financing," *International Conciliation*, No. 502 (March, 1955), pp. 337-338.

⁵⁴ *The Political Economy of American Foreign Policy*, p. 337. See also "Statement of His Excellency Ambassador G. L. Mehta.....at the Discussion of the Bank's Annual Report," *International Monetary Fund and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Press Release No. 35*, Sept. 27, 1952.

National Planning Association expressed the opinion that an IDC would be even more desirable than an IFC : "Instead of an International *Finance* Corporation—or perhaps as an addition to it—we believe there should be established an International *Development* Corporation, empowered not only to provide venture capital to private enterprise but also to investigate investment opportunities, set up projects on its own account, and manage them during their initial stages until they could be sold to private investors."⁵⁵ On July 25, 1956, the International Bank announced the formation of the International Finance Corporation.

PATTERNS OF ECONOMIC AID AND COOPERATION

A discussion of current trends in the world economy would be incomplete without emphasizing that efforts toward economic internationalism involve doing as well as undoing. We have been speaking mostly of barriers, restraints, and impediments of many kinds, implying that the well-being and cooperation of states is largely a matter of removing more or less arbitrary obstructions, whereupon trade would find its natural "flow" and everybody would be better off. While that argument is not to be lightly dismissed, it must be pointed out that it has its limitations. Trade involves productivity, which in turn calls for the intelligent use of natural resources and manpower. It is the attention which states are giving to the stimulation of production that is the most positive and the most encouraging feature of present-day endeavors to improve the world economy. Here the economic programs of states have an international flavor that is often lacking in their policies toward the problems of trade and finance.

We cannot here examine the many projects in economic and financial cooperation, mutual aid, and technical assistance. Some relate to relief and rehabilitation, some to foreign private and public investment, some to national and international loans or grants, some to monetary and exchange stabilization, some to regional schemes of self-help, some to multilateral or unilateral technical assistance and advisory aid. It would be difficult to classify these projects and programs, or even to give them a common label. They differ greatly in sponsorship, mechanism, and immediate objectives. Many countries now have national programs of economic development. Most of these call for expenditures which can be realized only with outside assistance. Technical assistance under various UN agencies calls for the use of limited funds subscribed by member states and spent under the guidance of experts of many nationalities. The World Bank is essentially an underwriting concern, arranging for foreign investment but itself providing only small amounts of capital. The Monetary Fund is in no sense an investment agency ; its function is the stabilization of international exchange and the making of short-term loans to states with unfavorable trade balances. The Caribbean Com-

⁵⁵ *The Political Economy of American Foreign Policy*, p. 338.

mission is a consultative body interested in the promotion of economic conditions, health, tourism, and other concerns of the Caribbean community ; it utilizes both UN and United States assistance facilities. The South Pacific Commission is a multilateral body which conducts a program of health improvement, economic development, and social welfare. Various proposals for economic cooperation under the leadership of the Organization of American States have not yet been put into execution. The Colombo Plan is an ambitious proposal of cooperative self-help in South and Southeast Asia which seeks to enlist substantial outside capital.

The sterling area, "the largest multilateral trading area in the world," is a group of countries, in the Commonwealth and outside, which are bound together by the British pound and which cooperate with relatively few economic and financial restrictions within the area. The British Colonial Development Corporation makes capital and technical assistance available for projects of a productive or commercial nature in British dependencies. The European Coal and Steel Community involves essentially joint control over the coal and steel resources of the major industrial nations of Western Europe, notably Germany and France. The European Payments Union was designed to provide a system of currency convertibility among the countries of Western Europe and thereby to stimulate intra-European trade. The Marshall Plan, one of the most ambitious programs of economic cooperation in history, provided for unilateral subsidies on a large scale, contingent upon certain demonstrations of self-help. The American Mutual Security Program is primarily military in character, but it is a comprehensive program that embraces the major foreign aid programs which the United States is now undertaking, including the Point Four Program.

The final results of the host of aid programs are, of course, still speculative. These programs must be viewed with a number of sobering thoughts in mind. In the first place, most of them are little beyond the blueprint stage, or in any event they are still far short of completion. Even those which have been officially "completed," like the Marshall Plan, have left many problems and succeeding plans in their wake, and it is still too early to attempt to measure their long-range achievements. Second, these plans assume a continuing political cooperation that may or may not be forthcoming, and an international climate that will permit concentration of extensive efforts and resources on basic problems of development and finance. Third, it remains to be seen how much they have been occasioned by the rise of the Communist threat, and how well they will fare if and when relations between the Communist and the non-Communist worlds become less ominous. Fourth, there is the very real question of the limits of the assistance which may be obtained from outside sources. Finally, we must not be too quick to take for granted a correlation between decent living standards and a passion for peace. To some extent we have been misled into such an assumption by the victories of Communist propaganda in underdeveloped areas, forgetting that literacy, industrialization, and

improving — but still far from adequate — living standards are very likely to bring increased unrest and an insistence upon all the theoretical rights of sovereignty, including the right to wanton nationalism.

There are also grounds for a more hopeful outlook. We seem to have in the making workable plans for economic development without the penalties of imperialism. The enlivened nationalism which may accompany the rise of economic levels may very well express itself in laudable social and cultural enterprises, and may prove to be wholly compatible with economic and political internationalism. The more general utilization of natural resources should prevent or delay the early exhaustion of the resources of some states. Increased productivity in certain areas will help to relieve the present disastrous imbalance of world trade, and will make possible higher standards of life for countless millions of people. Finally, new patterns of sympathetic cooperation may even become something of a norm for future generations.

CURRENT TRENDS : A SUMMING UP

The dominant pattern today is one of economic nationalism rather than internationalism. It is apparent in trade restrictions, exchange controls, and obstacles to private foreign investment. It is most conspicuous in countries where state trading is the normal pattern. But there are some hopeful signs of better days to come. Many nations have subscribed to the principles of multilateral trade, currency convertibility, removal of exchange controls and the stimulation of foreign investment. Although her own economic internationalism is somewhat qualified — even uncertain — the United States, perhaps largely because of her fortunate economic position, has taken the lead in urging concrete steps toward applying these principles. Her trade agreements program, her leadership in the negotiations leading to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, her strong support of the economic agencies of the United Nations, her Point Four Program, and her numerous other programs of economic aid, involving many billions of dollars — these are but some of the more notable evidences of her sponsorship of economic internationalism. The United Nations, especially through the Economic and Social Council, the regional and functional commissions, and the specialized agencies, is also exerting strong pressure for international economic sanity.

It is difficult to say how much of present-day economic nationalism is due to the general disequilibrium and to the serious problems confronting most countries, with the omnipresent necessity of imposing restrictions to cope with emergency situations, and how much is due to the trend toward state planning and control of economic life and the acceptance of philosophies which gravely jeopardize the hopes for economic cooperation. If the restrictive measures which most states now impose are not caused by temporary emergencies, but instead are to be a permanent feature of

national economic policy, the prospects for a peaceful world are dim indeed. In a recent book entitled *The International Economy* an American economist forcefully states the case for economic internationalism :

Much has been granted, in the argument of this book, to the case for protection to stimulate economic development, for exchange controls as a weapon against capital flight, and for the use of import licensing as a device in times of emergency. Much scope is also given for the use of these measures in the provisions of the International Monetary Fund and of the proposed International Trade Organization. But if restrictive practices are required to deal with the pressures of exceptional severity, it is vitally important that their use be safeguarded, their necessity constantly reviewed, and their use abandoned when conditions permit in favor of arrangements which invoke comparisons of efficiency. To establish a pattern of trade restrictions as the probable permanent framework of future international economic relations would be to turn our backs on the hope of growing international cooperation, expanding world trade, and steadily improving standards of living and to guarantee the return of nationalism, intense trade rivalry, and the collapse of western unity.⁵⁶

Aside from the Soviet Union and the states of the Soviet bloc, the strongest tendencies toward economic nationalism are apparent in the policies of the underdeveloped nations and in those of states which are experiencing serious difficulties in rehabilitation. The problem varies with the position and resources of the particular states. In underdeveloped countries the main need is for basic economic development ; it is not for recovery, for that would imply a return to what never existed. In war-dislocated countries which once possessed considerable industrial development, the problem is recovery and rehabilitation, although this is complicated by what are apparently permanent shifts in the basic factors of economic power and in the channels of trade and finance. The nature of the need also varies according to regions ; it is one thing in Western Europe, another in Asia. As Harlan Cleveland states, "whereas the European economic problem is now to a considerable extent a trade and payments problem, the fundamental economic problem in the Far East is development."⁵⁷ Again we are faced with a familiar dilemma : nations that are trying to raise their economies above the present intolerably low levels and those that are trying to rebuild economies shattered by war and postwar disequilibrium feel compelled to resort to devices of economic nationalism, whereas their only hope of ultimate success lies in the creation of a world in which economic internationalism prevails.

In the building of such a world the responsibility of the United States is particularly great. As President Truman declared in a famous address suggestive of Wilson's First Inaugural : "We are the giants of the economic world. Whether we like it or not, the future pattern of economic relations

⁵⁶ Ellsworth, p. 885.

⁵⁷ Fairbank, Cleveland, Reischauer, and Holland, p. 32.

depends upon us. The world is watching and waiting to see what we shall do." Mr. Truman also underscored the interrelationship of political and economic policies: "Our foreign relations, political and economic, are indivisible. We cannot say that we are willing to cooperate in one field and unwilling to cooperate in the other."⁵⁸ In the wisdom of these words the question of the primacy of politics over economics, or of economics over politics, may be resolved; in reality the two are "indivisible" and inseparable, simply different aspects of the enduring problem of finding ways by which nations and peoples may live together in an interdependent world.

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The trend toward regionalism and regional arrangements is one of the most interesting developments in recent international relations. The Charter of the United Nations specifically recognized it ; and the Vandenberg Resolution, adopted by the United States Senate on June 11, 1948, gave it strong endorsement.¹ It has reached its fullest development in the Western Hemisphere and in Western Europe, but it has also appeared elsewhere.

The trend is in part an outcome of the necessity of pooling national resources for protection in a divided and war-threatened world: but it is also an outgrowth of other pressures which are driving nations together in the present era. Indeed, it may indicate that the nation-state system which has been the dominant pattern of international relations for some four centuries, is evolving toward a system in which regional groupings of states will be more important than the independent sovereign units. Perhaps, as Walter Lippmann has said, "the true constituent members of the international order of the future are communities of states."²

In this chapter we shall examine the nature and implications of international regionalism and analyze the most important regional arrangements which are now in being or which are seriously contemplated. To gain some understanding of the limitations and possibilities of regional arrangements, we must also consider their relations to the United Nations.

¹ Of the six objectives listed in this Resolution, two (2 and 3) concerned regional arrangements. They recommended : (2) "progressive development of regional and other collective arrangements for individual and collective self-defense in accordance with the purposes, principles, and provisions of the Charter," and (3) "association of the United States, by constitutional process, with such regional and other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, and as affect its national security."

² Unpublished address on "The Atlantic Community," at a conference on "Regionalism and Political Pacts," Philadelphia, May 6, 1949. E. H. Carr shares this view. See *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939*, 2nd ed. (London, 1946), p. 231.

THE USE OF TERMS

At the outset a number of terms should be defined. Although these are defined today in a wide variety of ways, it will be necessary to indicate rather definitely how they will be used in the present chapter.

Because of the frequent use of "regions" to mean areas smaller than states, it is important to emphasize that in international relations a region is invariably an area embracing the territories of three or more states. These states are bound together by ties of common interests as well as of geography. They are not necessarily contiguous, or even in the same continent. The outstanding example of far-flung regionalism is the association of fifteen nations, on both sides of the Atlantic and in the Scandinavian and Mediterranean areas, in the North Atlantic Treaty. For the purposes set forth in the treaty these states, geographically so scattered, may be regarded as forming a real community of states. In other words, the countries of the North Atlantic Pact now form an international region.³

At the San Francisco Conference in 1945 the Egyptian delegation introduced an amendment to the draft text of the United Nations Charter to limit the term "regional arrangements" by definition to "organizations of a permanent nature [...] grouping in a given geographical area several countries which, by reason of their proximity, community of interests or cultural, linguistic, historical, or spiritual affinities, make themselves jointly responsible for the peaceful settlement of any disputes which may arise between them and for the maintenance of peace and security in their region, as well as for the safeguarding of their interests and the development of their economic and cultural relations."⁴ B. V. Boutros-Ghali, a distinguished Egyptian scholar who has written one of the best studies of regional agreements, in general approved of this definition but proposed to revise it in several particulars, notably to attribute to a regional arrangement "the final aim of forming a distinct political entity."⁵ Dr. F. N. van Kleffens, former Dutch Ambassador to the United States, has formu-

³ Admittedly this is stretching the concept of "region" well beyond its usual limits. One can understand the bewilderment expressed in the following lines, quoted in the *New York Times*, May 22, 1949. They were sung at the spring dinner of the Gridiron Club in Washington, D.C., on May 21, 1949, to the tune of "Far Away Places":

The old North Atlantic has spread quite a lot
To Italy from Maine.
There'll soon be no country that touches it not
With the single exception of Spain.
They call me a schemer, well may be I am
But today I can follow the shore
Of our North Atlantic, all the way to Siam
There's no other ocean no more!

⁴ *Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, 1945* (United Nations, 1945), XII, 850; Document 533 (English), III/4/A/9, May 23, 1945.

⁵ B. V. Boutros-Ghali, *Contribution à l'étude des ententes regionales* (Paris, 1949), p. 101.

lated this definition : “. . . a regional arrangement or pact is a voluntary association of sovereign states within a certain area or having common interests in that area for a joint purpose, which should not be of an offensive nature, in relation to that area.”⁶ This definition requires one qualification. The terms “arrangement” and “pact” should not be used synonymously. Although a “pact” is the usual means of bringing an “arrangement” into being, “pact” is a looser and more general term ; it may relate to an understanding on a single, comparatively simple matter, requiring no administrative machinery of any kind. A real regional arrangement, on the other hand, cannot exist without fairly elaborate organization.

To point out that writers do not agree on a definition would simply be saying that “regional arrangement” has not yet become a technical term.⁷ Such an arrangement must involve sovereign states, certainly more than two, and they must be engaged in a substantial common enterprise. Agreement is lacking on the geographical implications — if any — of “regional” and on the question whether states joined for offensive action may properly be regarded as constituting a regional arrangement. Also uncertain is the degree of collaboration necessary to qualify as a regional arrangement. This inexactness in definition means that students of international relations may disagree on whether a true regional arrangement exists in a particular instance.

Several regional arrangements may exist within a given area, as is the case in Western Europe today. Such arrangements do not have to include all the states within the area immediately affected. A state may be excluded for political or ideological reasons (for instance, Franco Spain) or it may choose to stay out because of fear of international entanglement and possible violation of neutral status (Switzerland, in most instances).

A regional arrangement may be primarily a military alliance, if it is a truly defensive alliance, but it must be more than that. It must provide for collaboration in other respects, and it need not be a military alliance at all. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, for example, is primarily a military alliance, but it is also an organized association of fifteen states formed for many other purposes.

A “regional understanding” is quite different from a regional arrangement, for it may be entirely without machinery for the implementation of

⁶ E. N. van Kleffens, “Regionalism and Political Pacts,” *The American Journal of International Law*, XLIII (Oct., 1949), 669.

⁷ Writers who would lay down special qualifications, such as Boutros-Ghali and van Kleffens, believe that these are necessary if the term is to be used in any meaningful way. They feel that there is need of terminology to distinguish peaceful, voluntary, and effective multilateral collaboration from ventures that may be aggressive in purpose, wholly involuntary, without real means of implementation, bilateral in nature, or superficial in interests.

Those writers who prefer a looser use of the term point out that the Charter makers carefully avoided a definition, and they insist that the proposed definitions make nothing illegal and change nothing, and that they are arbitrary, unrealistic, conflicting, and futile.

common policies. It suggests more of a common attitude than integrated or even concerted action. Neither should a regional arrangement be confused with "such vague, all-inclusive, and not too candid terms as 'orbit,' 'bloc,' or 'zone' -- euphemisms for domination plain and simple."⁸ Hence, as we shall point out later, the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the East European "bloc" within the Soviet "orbit" are not genuine regional arrangements.

REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS BEFORE WORLD WAR II

Many examples of regional arrangements prior to World War II have been cited by various commentators, but one may doubt that most of them would satisfy the tests now commonly imposed. Dr. van Kleffens, for example, specifically mentions the leagues and confederacies of ancient Greece ; the treaty of 1856 giving neutral status to the Aaland Islands ; the treaty of 1863 regarding the Ionian Islands ; and the Congo Act of 1885. But it seems highly doubtful that any of these examples meets the requirements of Dr. van Kleffens' own definition of a regional arrangement.

Before World War I. Possible examples of regional arrangements in the century between Waterloo and World War I would be the Germanic Confederation and the limited regionalism in the inter-American, the Balkan, and the Baltic areas. "The great political unifications in Europe," noted Adolf B. Drucker, "were preceded by economic 'regions,' just as such 'regions' survived the great dissolutions of political units." As examples of the former process he cited the German Zollverein, which prepared the way for the political unification of Germany, and economic arrangements in Switzerland, Italy, Austria-Hungary, the Scandinavian area, and the Iberian Peninsula, all of which preceded the coming of political unity. His second point is illustrated in the survival of "regional preferences in the economic intercourse of the Balkan States" after the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire.⁹ Moreover, to continue Drucker's analysis, "before 1914, world integration was proceeding steadily by means of regional policies expressed in customs unions, preferential relationships, 'open door' arrangements, long term commercial treaties inter-related through the most-favored-nation clause, monetary unions, and worldwide acceptance of the gold standard." In some cases these trends toward economic regionalism resulted in the formation of true regional arrangements ; most of them, however, were of a relatively minor and ill-defined character and led nowhere.

Between World Wars. A number of regional arrangements came into being in the interwar period (1918-1939), although some were in embryonic form and were never fully organized. One of the most obvious

⁸ Robert Strausz-Hupé, *The Balance of Tomorrow* (Putnam, 1945), p. 273.

⁹ "Regional Economic Principles and Problems," in *Regionalism and World Organization* (Public Affairs Press, 1944), pp. 102, 104.

examples was the Little Entente. "Composed of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania and created shortly after the conclusion of the war, it grew out of a series of bilateral mutual assistance treaties among the three countries. It gradually developed into a broader political organization and, after 1933, came to approximate a close diplomatic confederation with definite organizational structure."¹⁰

There were many other attempts through agreements to form groupings of states in Eastern Europe and the Balkan area, but with the possible exception of the Balkan Entente of 1934 these attempts did not lead to any real regional arrangements. The Five-Power Treaty signed by Belgium, England, France, Germany, and Italy in 1925 regarding the western frontiers of Germany — the most important of the seven Locarno pacts — seemed to lay the foundation for regional collaboration for a specific purpose; but it was not implemented to the extent necessary to bring a regional arrangement into effective operation. The most hopeful instance of developing regionalism was that embracing the republics of the New World.

The British Commonwealth. Should the British Commonwealth of Nations — in many respects the most effective of all international associations — be regarded as a regional arrangement? The answer must certainly be in the negative. The Commonwealth is too scattered, and its driving force is at times less practical than sentimental. The ties that bind its members are at once too loose and informal and too deep-rooted and traditional. While its members consult with each other regularly on many matters, they have deliberately avoided setting up elaborate machinery for Commonwealth cooperation.

Nor should the British Empire or the sterling area, both of which center in Britain, be classed as regional arrangements. The Empire is not an association of sovereign states, and the pound sterling, for all its mighty power in world affairs, is not a sufficiently cohesive force to bring a regional arrangement into being in the absence of formal organization and integrating purpose.

The Inter-American System. From its formal beginnings in 1889 the so-called Inter-American System had expanded rather steadily in both purpose and machinery until World War II, but it had not explicitly accepted the principles of common defense or close economic cooperation. Before 1939 inter-American collaboration had been present in many areas of interest: sanitation, public health, highways, international law, trade, agriculture, conservation, education, radio, child welfare, and others. As machinery existed for the promotion of these common interests, one may properly regard the Inter-American System as a regional arrangement, even before World War II. But since Pearl Harbor far-reaching changes have been made by way of formalizing the organization, expanding its interests, and elaborating its machinery. The Inter-American System is

¹⁰ Ward P. Allen, "Regional Arrangements and the United Nations," *Organizing the United Nations*, Dept. of State Pub. 2573 (1946), pp. 5-6.

now international regionalism in its most advanced form. For that reason we shall examine it first among the present instances of international regional arrangements.

REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

World War II brought unprecedented cooperation among the American republics. They made provision for common defense, the exchange of essential materials, and financial and cultural collaboration. The Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace, held in Mexico City in 1945, laid the groundwork for the Rio Treaty of 1947 as well as for the Charter of the Organization of American States and other important agreements approved at the Bogotá Conference of 1948.

The Rio Treaty. A special Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security, held at Rio de Janeiro in August-September, 1947, drafted the famous Rio Treaty — the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. This agreement not only provided for collective security in the Western Hemisphere but also furnished a pattern which was closely studied, if not actually copied, in the drafting of the Brussels Treaty of 1948 and the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949.


The heart of the Rio Treaty is Article 3, which closely resembles Article 4 of the Brussels Treaty and Article 5 of the North Atlantic Pact :

The High Contracting Parties agree that an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all American States and, consequently, each one of the said Contracting Parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.

The Rio Treaty is regarded as a collective security arrangement within the meaning of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. That it was to fit into a larger community of interests is clearly stated in Article 26 : "The principles and fundamental provisions of this Treaty shall be incorporated in the Organic Pact of the Inter-American System."

The Organization of American States. The Organic Pact or Charter of the Organization of American States, adopted at the Ninth International Conference of American States (the Bogotá Conference), provides the framework for a comprehensive regional organization. "It systematizes and integrates what was formerly a loose, informal and disorganized arrangement..... into a unified form of hemispheric organization."¹¹ The

¹¹ Georgine L. Ogden, "The Organization of American States," *Columbia Journal of International Affairs*, III (Spring, 1949), 48. The Bogotá reorganization also involved a change in name. The Union of American Republics (until 1910 the International Union of American Republics) became the Organization of American States. Also in 1910, the Bureau of American Republics (formerly the Commercial Bureau of American Republics) became the Pan American Union. The name "Pan American Union" has never applied to the larger organization, but always to the central secretarial office.



Americas, Pan American Union

Organization of American States

Charter is a lengthy document of 18 chapters and 112 articles. Article I states specifically: "The Organization of American States is a regional agency with the United Nations."

The Organization of American States — or, briefly, the OAS — is similar in structure to the United Nations in some ways and dissimilar in others. The Inter-American Conference, for example, resembles the General Assembly of the UN, although it meets much less frequently (a regular session is to be held every five years) and, unlike the General Assembly, it is formally designated as "the supreme organ." The Council is similar to

the United Nations Security Council, but its powers in the field of security action and enforcement are more limited. It has twenty-one members, one from each state in the OAS ; it is the central administrative and coordinating agency for the Organization ; it supervises the work of the Pan American Union, and has under its direct control the following organs : (1) the Inter-American Economic and Social Council ; (2) the Inter-American Council of Jurists ; and (3) the Inter-American Cultural Council.

The Inter-American Economic and Social Council, then, is not one of the major organs of the OAS, as is its counterpart in the United Nations. Moreover, it meets less regularly, its organization is less formal, and its program is less ambitious. The Inter-American Council of Jurists is to be compared to the International Law Commission of the UN ; the OAS has no judicial body comparable to the International Court of Justice. The permanent working committee of the Council of Jurists is the Inter-American Juridical Committee, with headquarters in Rio de Janeiro.

The creation of a separate Inter-American Cultural Council reflected the importance of cultural activities in the promotion of "friendly relations and mutual understanding among the American peoples." The Committee for Cultural Action is the permanent committee of the Cultural Council.

The Pan American Union is given new importance in the reorganized Inter-American System. It has become "the central permanent organ of the Organization of American States and the General Secretariat of the Organization." In its new form it is a true international secretariat, resembling the Secretariat of the United Nations. The Secretary General of the OAS is the Director of the PAU ; he is chosen by the Inter-American Conference for a ten-year term and is not eligible for reelection. The present Secretary General is José Mora of Uruguay.

As in the case of the United Nations, a number of specialized organizations are integrated into the OAS. These include the Pan American Sanitary Bureau, the Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences, the Pan American Institute of Geography and History, and the Inter-American Telecommunications Office.

The specialized conferences provided for in the Charter of the OAS are convened "to deal with special technical matters or to develop specific aspects of inter-American cooperation." Many conferences of this type have been held in the past, as, for example, the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace at Buenos Aires in 1936, the Mexico City Conference of 1945, the Rio Conference of 1947, and various conferences to deal with more technical problems.

At the request of any member of the OAS the Council may call a Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs "to consider problems of an urgent nature and of common interest.....and to serve as the Organ of Consultation." During World War II three important meetings were held — in Panama in September-October, 1939, in Havana in July, 1940,

and in Rio de Janeiro in January, 1942. A meeting in Washington in March-April, 1951, was concerned with the threat of international communism.

As a result of the many agreements, especially the Charter of the OAS and the Rio Treaty, a comprehensive and coordinated pattern of regional agencies and arrangements has come into existence and is actively functioning in the Western Hemisphere.¹² A great deal of defense planning has been done, as was contemplated in the Rio Treaty, and the prompt and efficient action of the Council of the OAS in a number of instances has shown that it is capable of dealing with threatened breaches of the peace. Its timely and vigorous action in early 1955 when Costa Rica was invaded from Nicaragua was a model of effectiveness. Nevertheless, the most notable achievements of the OAS have been in the promotion of trade, public health, education, cultural exchange, and other pursuits of peace.

REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS IN WESTERN EUROPE

Even the most casual view of the existing regional organizations among the states of Western Europe would reveal a complex and confusing pattern. There are at least seven economic coordinating bodies which are wholly or substantially concerned with Western Europe. These are (1) the Benelux Union ; (2) the economic committees established by the Brussels Pact powers ; (3) the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) ; (4) the economic committees of the Council of Europe ; (5) the economic and finance committees of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ; (6) the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe ; and (7) the European Coal and Steel Community. In addition to the major coordinating groups there are many other important organizations which are regional in character, such as the inter-Scandinavian economic bodies, and Franco-Italian and French-British economic groups. On the military side, the organs, agencies, and committees created in implemen-

¹² The OAS began to function shortly after the Bogota Conference, although the Charter did not officially enter into effect until Dec. 3, 1951, when Colombia became the fourteenth state to ratify. All of the twenty Latin American states and the United States participate in the work of the OAS. Canada is not a member, but may join if she chooses ; in fact, the substitution of "States" for "Republics" in the name was made to permit her inclusion.

Perhaps it should be added that other ventures in regionalism have been projected in the Western Hemisphere. None of these aimed at general membership and none has ever had much prospect of success. The best known was Bolivar's scheme for a confederation to preserve freedom, harmonize the laws, and maintain peace. The most persistent effort has been made in Central America ; indeed, the five "states" constituted a single federal republic from 1823 to 1839. Federative proposals were advanced in 1845, 1847, 1849, 1862, 1876, 1885, 1886, 1895, 1907, and 1921. An Organization of Central American States was set up in 1951, with headquarters in San Salvador. Dictator Peron of Argentina sought to embrace his neighbors in an economic union, but with varying degrees of coolness they repelled his overtures.

Member States of Important European Institutions*
(As of January 1, 1955)

MEMBER STATES	OEEC,					Brussels		North Atlantic	
	Benelux Customs Union 9-5-1944	ECE. Eco. Commission for Europe March, 1947 ¹	Org. for European Eco. Coop 4-16-1948	Council of Europe 5-5-1949	European Union of Payments 9-19-1950	European Coal & Steel Community 4-18-1951	Treaty Organization 3-17-1948	Western European Union 5-5-1955	Treaty Organization 4-4-1949
Austria			✓					×	✓
Belgium	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓				✓
Denmark		✓	✓						
France			✓					✓	
W. Germany			✓						
Greece		✓							✓
Iceland		✓							
Ireland									✓
Italy									✓
Luxembourg		✓				×	✓	✓	✓
Netherlands	✓					×	✓		✓
Norway									✓
Portugal					×				✓
Sweden	✓			×	×				✓
Switzerland					✓				✓
Turkey	✓		×		×		✓	✓	✓
United Kingdom					✓ ²			✓	
Yugoslavia									✓
Canada									✓
U. S. A.									✓

* Adapted from Hans F. Sennholz, *How Can Europe Survive?* (Van Nostrand, 1955), p. 141, by permission of the publisher.
¹ Also the USSR, Ukraine, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Byelorussia are members.
² The entire sterling area is a member.

tation of the Dunkirk Treaty, the Brussels Treaty, the North Atlantic Pact, and the Western European Union, to mention only the major defense arrangements, already overlap so seriously as to create many new problems in coordination of resources and effort.

Without making an arbitrary classification, we shall here first discuss the regional arrangements of a primarily economic character, then those whose functions are largely political or military. As we examined the background, evolution, and potentialities of these various arrangements in Chapter 15, our attention will now be given mostly to structure and inter-agency relationships.

The Benelux Union. "Benelux" is a term derived from the names of the three countries — Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg — which have combined to form a single customs union and now operate as a unit on many international issues. Benelux represented the first official action of West European countries toward integration, and it has pointed the way to more extensive moves in the same direction. The customs union has been created, but the economic union which was to follow is still in the planning stage.

The permanent organization provided for by the Benelux Customs Union Convention of 1944, as supplemented by later decisions, consists of (1) the Conference of Cabinet Ministers ; (2) the Council for Economic Union ; (3) the Administrative Council on Customs Duties ; (4) the Commercial Agreements Council, which "has the function of insuring the coordination of measures in respect of relationships established with third countries" ; and (5) the General Secretariat, which has headquarters in Brussels. In May, 1955, the Conference of Cabinet Ministers approved a draft agreement for the establishment of an Inter-Parliamentary Benelux Council.

The organs and committees of the Benelux customs union have been operating successfully for several years. While the union is primarily an arrangement for economic cooperation among its members, political and cultural collaboration has led the representatives of the Benelux countries to take a common stand at many international conferences.

Organization for European Economic Cooperation. In many respects the Organization for European Economic Cooperation is the most elaborate regional arrangement in Western Europe. It was created by the Convention for European Economic Cooperation, signed in Paris on April 16, 1948 — less than two weeks after the United States Congress had passed the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948, which established the Economic Cooperation Administration. Representatives of sixteen nations, plus the Anglo-American and French zones of Germany and the Free Territory of Trieste, drafted the Convention.

The functions of the OEEC were listed in some detail. Broadly speaking, it was instructed "to promote consultation between the countries concerned, to consider measures and create the machinery necessary for European economic cooperation, especially in matters of trade, interna-

tional payments and movement^t of labour.”¹³ The Organization was, in a sense, the European counterpart of the Economic Cooperation Administration (April, 1948 to December, 1951); it worked closely with ECA, and was the main coordinating agency of the countries receiving Marshall Plan aid. It also cooperated with many organs and agencies of the United Nations.

The OEEC, with headquarters in Paris, works through an intricate organization. The central organ, the Council, is “the body from which all decisions derive.” It is composed of high-level representatives of all member states, normally cabinet members or their deputies. Responsible to the OEEC Council are the Managing Board of the European Payments Union and the European Productivity Agency, a separate operating unit. An Executive Committee is charged with carrying on the work of the Council and with supervising the activities of the secretariat and the technical committees. The Secretary-General is assisted by two Deputy Secretaries-General.

Several general and specific committees study economic and financial problems such as balance of payments, trade, manpower, and colonial matters. There are special committees for food and agriculture, coal, electricity, oil, iron and steel, raw materials and basic products, nonferrous metals, chemical products and fertilizers, timber, pulp and paper, textiles, inland transport, maritime transport, and machinery. OEEC has also set up a special Customs Union Study Group. The secretariat is a true international civil service of about 600 members recruited from the member nations.

European Payments Union. All European countries which participated in the Marshall Plan are members of the European Payments Union. Created in 1950 to facilitate the operations of OEEC, it is, in effect, a clearing house of which all the central banks of the participating countries are members and through which the countries are able to settle their accounts with one another. The Bank for International Settlements (Basel, Switzerland), as agent for the Union, determines the payments position of the members at the end of each month and the manner in which surpluses and deficits should be settled in accordance with the EPU agreement.

EPU was originally established for a two-year period; but the Council of OEEC has extended its life with the understanding that if convertibility is adopted by nations having fifty per cent of the Union's payment quotas EPU will be replaced by a new and looser system of fund and limited clearing under a European Monetary Agreement. Whatever its future, EPU has already contributed greatly to the recovery of Europe and to closer cooperation in other respects as well.

European Coal and Steel Community. The draft treaty for a “European

¹³ Resolution 1 on the Functions of the Organization for European Cooperation. The text of this resolution is given in *Documents Relating to the North Atlantic Treaty*, Senate Document No. 48, 81st Cong., 1st Session, April 12, 1949, pp. 76-82.

Coal and Steel Community," signed on April 18, 1951, provided for a federal type of organization, with four main organs : (1) a High Authority, advised by a Consultative Committee ; (2) a Common Assembly ; (3) a Council of Ministers ; and (4) a Court of Justice.¹⁴ The High Authority, set up in August, 1952, is a kind of board of directors of nine members, who are expected to act "in complete independence in the general interest of the community" and neither report to nor accept "instructions" from any Government or organization. They may issue binding decisions and recommendations as well as advisory opinions. Among the extensive powers conferred on the High Authority are the right to tax private coal and steel producers, to levy fines for violations of its orders, and to borrow and lend. Member states pledge to use their police powers, if necessary, to enforce the directives of the High Authority.¹⁵ A Consultative Committee of from 30 to 51 representatives of producers, workers, and consumers, appointed by the Council of Ministers for two-year terms, advises the Authority.

An organ not originally contemplated by the initiators of the Schuman Plan is the Council of Ministers, composed of one minister from each of the six member nations, which serves as a direct link between the High Authority and the member states. "In all situations not expressly provided for in the treaty, decisions or recommendations of the High Authority are to be made subject to the unanimous concurrence of the Council."¹⁶ Another check upon the High Authority is the Common Assembly, which meets once a year to consider the Authority's report and to question its members. By a two-thirds vote the Assembly may compel the members of the Authority to resign. This body is composed of 78 members, 24 from Benelux and 18 each from France, Italy, and West Germany, chosen either by the national parliaments or by direct popular election. The Court of Justice has jurisdiction over appeals from decisions or recommendations of the High Authority by the Council of Ministers, a member state, or private coal or steel enterprises or associations. It also has the power to annul acts of the Assembly and of the Council of Ministers.

Several nonmember states of continental Europe maintain delegations at the seat of the High Authority, and the United States appoints a representative to the Community. Britain, which was the first country to accredit a mission to the High Authority, established a closer liaison in late 1954. On December 21 of that year Britain and the Community signed a treaty establishing a permanent Council of Association composed of four members of the High Authority and four British members, with a joint

¹⁴ The texts of the draft treaty and accompanying documents were printed in *The Schuman Plan Constituting a European Coal and Steel Community*, Dept. of State Pub. 4173, European and British Commonwealth Series 22 (April, 1951). For excellent brief descriptions of the organs established to implement the Schuman Plan see *Understanding the Schuman Plan*, Dept. of State Pub. 4281, European and British Commonwealth Series 26 (July, 1951), and Frank H. Blumenthal, "Schuman Plan Treaty Signed," *Freedom & Union*, June, 1951, pp. 26-28.

¹⁵ *Understanding the Schuman Plan*, p. 3.

¹⁶ See John Goormaghtigh, "European Coal and Steel Community," *International Conciliation*, No. 503 (May, 1955).

secretariat. The Council may meet with government ministers from the member countries of the Community or with the High Authority when it wishes to discuss matters of common interest.

One may raise the question whether the Schuman Plan has in fact retained its original character. The activities of the High Authority are severely limited by the controls which the Common Assembly, the Committee of Ministers, the Court of Justice, and even in some respects the Consultative Committee exercise over it : and at least the first two of these supervisory bodies seem to be subject to the governments of the member states to such a degree that the supranational character of the new European Coal and Steel Community may have been modified. Nevertheless, the Schuman Plan represents a deliberate attempt to delegate sovereign powers for a carefully prescribed purpose.

The Brussels Pact and Western European Union. The Brussels Pact, signed in March, 1948, by the Benelux states, Britain, and France, has been called "the most significant, and the first legal move toward the European unity which so many have talked about for so long." It was the first concrete expression of "Western Union," a term which has been used to label any and all proposals and steps looking toward the closer economic, military, and political integration of the countries of Western Europe. The Pact is primarily, of course, a military arrangement. Its core is Article 4, which declares : "If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power." The Pact, however, also provides for economic, financial, social, and cultural cooperation among the member states and for the coordination of all activities, including joint defense planning and operations, by a political agency—the Consultative Council. A brief review of the organizational framework of the Pact will suggest the range of its interests.

1. *The Consultative Council and the Permanent Commission.* The Consultative Council, the supreme authority in the Brussels Treaty Organization, is composed of the foreign ministers of the five participating states and is so organized as to be able to exercise its functions continuously. In its early meetings the Council set up a Permanent Commission as a coordinating and consultative organ. Later meetings of the Council have been devoted mostly to coordinating its work with that of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. A small but efficient secretariat assists both the Consultative Council and the Permanent Commission.

2. *The Defense Organization.* Since the Brussels Treaty is primarily a defense arrangement, it is not surprising that the organization for defense is particularly elaborate.¹⁷ It consists of two main parts, the Higher

¹⁷ For a detailed chart of the Brussels Treaty Defense Organization, See *Western Cooperation for Defence*, a publication (I. D. 998) of the Reference Division of British Information Services, issued in June, 1950. p. 17.

Direction and the Command Organization. The Higher Direction is conducted through several committees whose activities are coordinated by the secretariat. During the summer of 1948 the Military Committee drew up plans for a Permanent Defense Organization, popularly known as Uni-Force. The Commanders-in-Chief Committee prepared a series of defense plans for Western Europe, and it effected an exchange of men and equipment, endeavored to standardize arms and equipment, and conducted several joint maneuvers and exercises.

Despite their progress in collaboration, it was obvious that the Brussels Pact powers could not by themselves defend Western Europe. The North Atlantic Pact provided the broader framework within which the defense organization under the Brussels Pact could be fitted to achieve its major objectives. With the organization of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE), Uni-Force was virtually fused into the larger framework.

3. *The Economic and Social Organization.* At the Hague in July, 1948, the Consultative Council decided that the finance ministers of the five countries should meet frequently to work for closer economic and financial cooperation. The finance ministers, in turn, recommended the establishment of a Finance and Economic Committee. This Committee works closely with the Military Supply Board and the Chiefs of Staff Committee of the Brussels Pact, and with OEEC, Benelux, and the United Nations.

Among the social and cultural committees which have been set up by the Consultative Council are the following : (1) a Committee of Cultural Experts, to promote closer cultural relations among the five countries ; (2) a Committee of Social Experts, to study the problem of harmonizing the social legislation, especially that regarding social security ; (3) a Committee of Experts on Public Health ; (4) a Committee of Experts on War Pensions ; and (5) a Sub-Committee on Migration.

By 1954 the Brussels Treaty Organization's economic functions had been assumed by OEEC, and its military functions had been for the most part yielded to NATO. Shortly afterward the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe recommended that the social and cultural functions of the Union be transferred to the Council, and it seemed that the Brussels Treaty Organization had served its purpose and would soon pass into history. Instead, before the end of the year it had been given a new lease on life.

When the foreign ministers of nine nations met in London in late September and early October, 1954, in an attempt to devise some alternative for the European Defense Community, which had just been killed by the French National Assembly, they decided to deal with the problem of German rearmament and Germany's place in Western Europe through NATO and an enlarged and strengthened Brussels Treaty Organization. They agreed that West Germany and Italy should be invited to accede to the Brussels Treaty. The expanded organization soon came to be known as the Western European Union (WEU). According to the blueprint, the

Consultative Council would become "a council with powers of decision." The maximum defense contribution of each WEU member to NATO would be determined by a special agreement, and "the strength and armaments of the internal defense forces and the police on the continent" would be determined by other agreements for members of the WEU. The Council of the WEU would report once a year to member governments and to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe. WEU would work closely with other European organizations, and its military organization would be virtually integrated with that of NATO. Thus the once almost defunct Brussels Treaty Organization, enlarged, invigorated, and renamed, would continue to function as an important regional organization in the vital area of Western Europe.

The Council of Europe. The Council of Europe held its first session in Strasbourg, France, in August-September, 1949. Since then it has been an operating entity of limited powers but of great potential significance. At present it has fourteen regular members --- the Brussels Pact countries, Denmark, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Turkey, and Western Germany --- and one associate member, the Saar. Its main organs are the Committee of Ministers and the Consultative Assembly.

The Committee of Ministers, composed of the foreign ministers of the participating countries, has far greater powers than the Consultative Assembly in both substantive affairs and internal organization. The Committee meets in private before the beginning of each session of the Consultative Assembly and "at such other times as it may decide." Its recommendations to member states are not now required to be unanimous, but they are not binding until ratified by the respective governments.

The Consultative Assembly is "the deliberative organ of the Council of Europe." It consists of "representatives of each Member appointed in such a manner as the Government shall decide" ; membership is now fixed at 132, with representation ranging from three (Iceland, Luxembourg, and the Saar) to eighteen (France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom). It conducts its deliberations in public, but there is no vote in these discussions. A two-thirds vote is required on most important matters. The Assembly has a Standing Committee of 28 members and committees on general affairs, economic questions, and legal and administrative matters. A secretariat, headed by a Secretary-General and a Deputy Secretary-General, with headquarters at the seat of the Council in Strasbourg, assists the Committee of Ministers and the Consultative Assembly.

The Statute of the Council of Europe expressly stated that the Consultative Assembly could discuss only those questions which were approved by the Committee of Ministers.¹⁸ At its first session the Assembly rebelled against the "pale agenda" prepared for it and demanded the right to discuss some of Europe's fundamental problems. It proceeded to

¹⁸ For the text of the Statute of the Council of Europe, see the *New York Times*, May 6, 1949.

do exactly that. Furthermore, with the approval of the Committee of Ministers, it appointed a General Affairs (Political) Committee to consider ways and means of acquiring greater independence and thereby greater power and prestige.

Although the Council of Europe embodies only a limited form of European cooperation, it has served as a stimulus to many other movements. It maintains permanent liaison committees with OEEC and receives an annual report from OEEC. The European Coal and Steel Community also submits regular reports to the Council, and usually the Assemblies of the two organizations hold a joint annual meeting. A protocol to the treaty establishing the Community even recommended that the delegates to the Common Assembly of the Community be chosen from among the representatives to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe.

THE NORTH ATLANTIC COMMUNITY

Experience with regional arrangements in Western Europe, from Benelux to the Council of Europe, convinced many realists that the existing arrangements were too narrow in scope, geographically as well as politically. In other words, the basic problems of Western Europe seemed to be unsolvable within the geographical area between the Atlantic Ocean and the "iron curtain." More and more it came to be realized that the destinies of Western Europe are inextricably linked with those of a larger area, now commonly termed the North Atlantic Community.

The North Atlantic Pact, signed in Washington on April 4, 1949, by representatives of twelve states, gave formal recognition to this broader community. These states had long been bound together by many ties. They shared the heritage of Western civilization. In a sense the Atlantic Ocean had become a broad highway which joined the states bordering on it, rather than a barrier which separated them. Walter Lippmann, who had been mindful of the Atlantic Community since World War I, declared in 1949 :

The Atlantic Ocean has never been a military frontier between Europe and the Americas ; it has always been the inland sea of a neighborhood of nations closely connected with one another by geography, history and vital necessity...The concept of the Atlantic Community is not an upstart idea...The Atlantic Community has in fact existed for more than thirty years. It has fought two great wars for its survival and its freedom... April 4, 1949 is an important date in the history of the world, not because it creates new obligations but chiefly, in my view, because it marks the formal recognition of a new political entity which will play a great part in the history of the world...the common interest which has existed *de facto* is recognized *de jure*.¹⁹

¹⁹ Address in Philadelphia, May 6, 1949. Lippmann himself was one of the first to emphasize this concept. In an editorial in *The New Republic* of Feb. 17, 1917, on "The Defense of the Atlantic World," he wrote : ".....on the two shores of the Atlantic ocean

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The North Atlantic Treaty now binds together the major states of the Atlantic Community—the United States, Great Britain, and France—and Canada, Italy, Western Germany, Portugal, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, the Benelux countries, Greece, and Turkey.²⁰ These nations comprise a regional organization of great significance in world affairs—one which has already taken concrete form. In considering the structure of NATO, as shown in the accompanying chart, it should be remembered that this structure is constantly being changed and expanded to meet new international developments.


1. *The North Atlantic Council, the Council of Deputies, and the Permanent Council.* The North Atlantic Treaty provides for a Council to head the Treaty Organization and to be “so organized as to be able to meet promptly at any time.” Originally the Council was composed of the foreign ministers of the member states, or their representatives; but in 1951 the participating states agreed to add the defense, economic, and finance ministers to the Council whenever problems of direct interest to them were considered. Even earlier, in May, 1950, the foreign ministers had decided to create a permanent body of deputies with the following assignments: (1) to coordinate the work of the defense agencies of the North Atlantic Treaty; (2) to recommend steps necessary to implement the coordinated defense plans; (3) to “exchange views on political matters of common interest”; (4) to “promote and coordinate public information in furtherance of the objectives of the Treaty”; and (5) to “consider what further action should be taken under Article 2 of the Treaty” for closer political and economic cooperation.²¹

The creation of the Council of Deputies gave NATO a high-level coordinating agency of a permanent character. The deputies immediately undertook the task of planning for the military defense of Western Europe, an undertaking soon made more urgent than ever by the attack on South Korea, with its clear warning of the possibility of aggression elsewhere. But, as the activities of NATO expanded, the need for an agency


there has grown up a profound web of interest which joins together the western world. Britain, France, Italy, even Spain, Belgium, Holland, the Scandinavian nations, and Pan-America are in the main one community in their deepest needs and their deepest purposes. They have a common interest in the ocean which unites them. They are today more inextricably bound together than most even as yet realize.” Thirty-two years later Lippmann listed as members of the Atlantic Community, in addition to those countries which he mentioned in his editorial of 1917 (which, be it noted, included all of the Latin American states), Canada, Ireland, Iceland, Portugal, and even Australia and New Zealand. See also Lippmann, *U. S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic* (Little, Brown, 1943), Chapter VII, “The Atlantic Community.” Theodore White called NATO “the biggest political fact in the Western world.” *Fire in the Ashes: Europe in Mid-Century* (William Sloane, 1953), p. 285.

²⁰ Greece and Turkey were invited to join NATO in Sept., 1951. Western Germany became a member in May, 1955.

²¹ See North Atlantic Council Resolution on Central Machinery, May 19, 1950; in *Department of State Bulletin*, XXII (May 29, 1950), 831.



ORGANIZATIONAL SET-UP



Organization of American States

The Set-up of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

The Military Committee shown on the chart at left consists of the Chiefs of Staff of member countries; the Standing Group is composed of representatives from the United States, France, and the United Kingdom

The New York Times, March 9, 1954

with greater authority than the Council of Deputies became apparent. Accordingly, at its Lisbon meeting in February, 1952, the North Atlantic Council decided to establish a Permanent Council which would sit continuously at the new headquarters in Paris, and which would replace the Council of Deputies and certain other agencies which had been functioning in a semi-independent manner. The Permanent Council, composed of representatives of all the member states at the ministerial level, is now "the focal point of NATO. Everything else depends on it and is linked to it."²²

2. *NATO Military Organisation.* Supervising the work of the NATO military organization, under the Permanent Council, is the Military Committee, assisted by a Military Representative Committee and a Standing Group, consisting of the Chiefs of Staff, or their representatives, of Britain, France, and the United States, who together form "the key military unit of the whole North Atlantic edifice." The Standing Group must integrate the plans of the component areas and develop an over-all strategic concept and plan. As its name suggests, it meets continuously; its headquarters are in Washington.

The two major commands under NATO cover the European area (SHAPE) and the Atlantic Ocean area (SACLANT). There is also a regional planning group for Canada and the United States, with headquarters in Washington, and a Channel and Southern North Sea Command at Portsmouth, England, with a Channel Committee (CHANCOM) in London. The headquarters of SACLANT are in Norfolk, Virginia.

Of crucial importance in the planning of NATO's military efforts is the defense of Western Europe. This is the direct responsibility of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE), which directs the NATO forces in Europe under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR). One might say that the efforts of the nations of the free world to defend themselves by combined action are centered in SHAPE's headquarters at Rocquencourt, near Paris. In the SHAPE area there are four subordinate commands: Northern Europe (Oslo), Central Europe (Fontainebleau), Southern Europe (Naples), and Mediterranean (Malta).

3. *Other Committees and Agencies of NATO.* Responsible to the North Atlantic Council and the Permanent Council, and on the same level as the Military Committee, are three other important organs: (1) the Financial and Economic Board, (2) the Defense Production Board, and (3) the Planning Board for Ocean Shipping. Other boards and committees have been established as the need has appeared.

4. *The Secretariat.* Like its UN counterpart, the NATO Secretariat is an international staff headed by a Secretary-General. It has important

²² Michael L. Hoffman, dispatch from Geneva, dated March 8, 1952; in the *New York Times*, March 9, 1952. "A series of jolts propelled NATO from its early madness of irresponsible committees into an organization which now, however primitive, points to the way ahead." White, p. 308.



Gilchick in Time and Tide, London

The Soviet View of Western Rearmament

military, defense production, and financial and economic departments, the latter working closely with the Organization for European Economic Co-operation as well as with NATO's Financial and Economic Board.

The ramifications of NATO are no more than suggested by a discussion of its major organs. To do full justice to the subject one should examine the organization and functions of the many subordinate agencies and commands and study the activities of the hundreds of individuals, military and civilian, drawn from all the member states, who are, after all, the moving force of NATO.²³

NATO and the Atlantic Community. With the progress of plans for the coordination of the resources of the North Atlantic area for defense and other purposes, the outlines of a true regional arrangement in the Atlantic Community are beginning to take form. Whether they can be filled in remains to be seen. As the states which participate in NATO are discovering, it is difficult to reconcile conflicting interests and to establish common policies even when there is agreement on objectives and an awareness of the necessity for collaboration. According to one observer, "NATO possesses body, limbs, organs—but no soul. It keeps books but raises no fresh flags or banners."²⁴

The Soviet Union has bitterly denounced NATO as an aggressive coali-

²³ For the real nature and meaning of NATO see White. Chap. XIII, "The Basin of Freedom," especially pp. 285-286, 316-317.

²⁴ White, p. 315.

tion "to establish by force Anglo-American domination over the world" and has charged that it "is a factor undermining the United Nations organization."²⁵ The first accusation seems palpably absurd, while the validity of the second remains to be seen. Spokesmen for the North Atlantic Treaty powers reply that the Soviet Union herself, by her persistent aggressions, has forced NATO into being, and they justify it as a measure of collective self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. But, as Prime Minister St. Laurent of Canada emphasized in a radio broadcast before the signing of the Pact, "a Security Treaty will not be fully effective if it is nothing more than a military alliance." NATO was clearly intended to be more than an anti-Soviet alliance; its founders were motivated by the desire to establish more satisfactory machinery for collaboration among the states of the Atlantic Community. In its larger context, to repeat Walter Lippmann's trenchant observation, NATO's chief significance is that "it marks the formal recognition of a new political entity" in a community of nations which "has in fact existed for more than thirty years."²⁶ It is the most ambitious experiment in international regionalism yet launched.

REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE

Tendencies toward regionalism have also appeared in Eastern and South-eastern Europe. The Little Entente of the 1920's and 1930's, though primarily a military defense agreement, led to organized cooperation in many fields. The Pan-Slav idea, frequently distorted and invariably vague, was often a stimulus to closer regional ties. Proposals for a Danubian federation, or for a Balkan federation, were advanced many times in the nineteenth century, and they have also been voiced in recent years. Even native Balkan Communist leaders, notably Dimitrov in Bulgaria and Tito in Yugoslavia, have openly advocated some kind of Balkan federation.

Communist Groupings. The East European Bloc, consisting of the

²⁵ "Official Text of U.S.S.R. Statement on North Atlantic Pact," *USSR Information Bulletin*, IX (Feb. 11, 1949), 86, 87.

²⁶ It is understandable, of course — especially in view of the ambiguities of the wording of Chapter VIII of the Charter, and the disagreements among learned authorities about the relationship of Chapter VIII to Article 51 — that the framers of the Pact should call it simply a collective self-defense arrangement under Article 51, although sometimes they too speak of the Pact in a much broader sense. It is also understandable why the Soviet Union should insist that the Pact has no justification under Chapter VIII or any other section of the United Nations Charter. But unless the North Atlantic Pact is set in this broader framework, it will lose much of its justification and significance. One of the statesmen of the North Atlantic Community who has consistently emphasized this point is Lester B. Pearson, Foreign Minister of Canada. In 1955 he wrote: "This is no time for NATO to weaken or limit itself.....It has already proved to be an effective agency for organizing defense cooperation to meet a military threat. It must now develop greater cohesion and cooperation among its members in the pursuit of common political, social and economic objectives." "After Geneva: A Greater Task for NATO," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXIV (Oct., 1955), 23.

U.S.S.R., Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Albania, and in some respects Finland as well, bound together by a network of nearly twenty bilateral treaties of mutual assistance,²⁷ cannot be considered a true regional arrangement as we use the term here. It is clearly not a voluntary association; perhaps it should not be regarded as an association of states at all—certainly not one of free states. Moreover, the countries associated in it have never even claimed to belong to a regional arrangement as recognized by the United Nations Charter.²⁸

Still less could the Cominform—the Communist Information Bureau—be classified as a regional arrangement. This organization came into existence in September, 1947, under the sponsorship of the Soviet Union, for the announced purpose of defeating the Marshall Plan. It was basically a coordinating body for the Communist parties of Eastern Europe and therefore for the governments of the Soviet satellite states. It played a major role in the campaign against Tito after June, 1948, but after 1955, when the new leaders of the Soviet Union began to woo Tito instead of fulminate against him, it lost its *raison d'être*. It was dissolved in 1956.

The widely heralded "Molotov Plan," announced as a substitute for the Marshall Plan in East Europe and directed by a Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, took form in January, 1949. This is another involuntary association, intended as a vehicle for Soviet efforts to link the countries of Eastern Europe ever more closely with the U.S.S.R. economically as well as politically.

The Warsaw Treaty Organization. The Soviet response to the ratification of the Paris agreements of October, 1954, which provided the framework for associating a re-armed West Germany with the new Western European Union and with NATO, was to take the initiative in the establishment of a kind of East European rival to NATO. On May 11-14, 1955, leading Soviet and satellite figures, with an observer from Communist China, met in Warsaw for a "Conference of European Countries on Safeguarding Peace and Security in Europe." On May 14 they agreed to establish a unified command of their armed forces and signed a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance.²⁹ According to its text, the treaty was "open to other states, irrespective of their social or Government regime," and would lapse "from the day . . . a collective security

²⁷ For a convenient listing of these treaties of mutual assistance and cooperation, from the Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty of Dec. 12, 1943, to the Polish-Rumanian Treaty of Jan. 26, 1949, and the texts of some of them, see *Documents Relating to the North Atlantic Treaty*, Senate Document No. 48, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (Government Printing Office, 1949), pp. 102-115. For a detailed analysis of these East European treaties, see W. W. Kulski, "The Soviet System of Collective Security Compared with the Western System," *The American Journal of International Law*, XLIV (July, 1950), pp. 453-476.

²⁸ Leon Govre, "The Eastern European Bloc and the United Nations Charter," *Columbia Journal of International Affairs*, III (Spring, 1949), 38-39, 46. See also Van Kleffens, p. 672, n. 10.

²⁹ For the texts of the communiqué and the treaty see the *New York Times*, May 15, 1955. See also Press Releases No. 45 and 46 (May 15 and 17 1955), of the Polish Embassy, Washington, D. C., and Hanson W. Baldwin, "Communist 'NATO' Tightens Soviet Grip," *New York Times*, May 15, 1955.

treaty comes into force." Article 4 contained the usual an-attack-on-one-shall-be-regarded-as-an-attack-on-all provision, and Article 5 provided for a unified command. The main organ of what may be called the Warsaw Treaty Organisation was to be a political consultative committee, which might set up "any auxiliary organs it considers necessary." Headquarters of the unified command were to be in Moscow, where each member state would maintain permanent representatives of its general staff. The parallelisms between the organization of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO are obvious; but in view of the relationship between the Soviet Union and the "states" of Eastern Europe it must be concluded that the WTO belongs rather to the story of the Soviet bloc and the satellite system, which is examined in another chapter.

REGIONALISM AND REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS IN ASIA


The obstacles to Asian regionalism are enormous. They include ideological differences, illiteracy, profusion or confusion of tongues, object poverty, population differentials, localism, and mountain barriers, to mention only the more obvious. On the other hand, cooperation among the countries of Asia is facilitated by certain common features. Particularly noteworthy among these are the peculiarly supranational—almost nonnational—character of nationalist movements, the imperative of common action to obtain necessary outside assistance, something approaching a common standard of living, and the absence of a single dominant power.

The net result of the tendencies toward regionalism in Asia is not yet impressive, but the trend is unmistakable. Asian regionalism seems wholly compatible with nationalism; in fact, it would hardly be possible without the long steps toward political independence, economic improvement, and educational advance which nationalism has championed. It also seems equally compatible with international cooperation, for the leaders of the free countries of Asia are particularly insistent that nationalism and regionalism must not conflict with each other or with the fundamental interests of the world community.

The Arab League. One of the clearest examples of regionalism in Asia today is the Arab League. The League is a regional association among Arab states of the Near East: Egypt, Libya, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, and Yemen. It was formed in 1945 with the benediction and indeed the active assistance of the British;³⁰ its primary objectives as stated in the Pact of the League of Arab States are "the strengthening of the relations between the member states, the co-ordination of their policies in order to achieve cooperation among them and to safeguard their independence and sovereignty."³¹ The League pledged

³⁰ See Judith Laikin, "British Influence on the Arab League," *Columbia Journal of International Affairs*, III (Spring, 1949), 102-104.

³¹ The text of the Pact is given in B.V. Boutros-Ghali, "The Arab League, 1945-1955," *International Conciliation*, No. 498 (May, 1954), Appendix A.



The Arab League

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

support to Arab peoples who had not yet gained independence, and asserted Arab claims to Palestine and its determination to defend that area against Jewish encroachments.

The chief organ of the Arab League is a Council—called the Majlis—composed of the prime ministers, or their representatives, of all member states. The secretariat is in Cairo. Its major divisions are the Political, Economic, Legal, Social, Cultural, Press and Publicity, Administrative and Financial, and Palestine departments. The League has set up committees paralleling most of these departments. The Secretary-General of the League until late 1952, Abdul Rahman Azzam Pasha, was more responsible than any other person for keeping the organization intact and functioning. His successor is Mohammed Abdel Khalek Hassouna, a former Egyptian foreign minister who has tried to reverse Azzam's policy of making the secretariat a propaganda center. Opposition to him from within has been led by Ahmed Shukeiri, an Assistant Secretary-General.²³

In security matters the League's powers are severely limited. Decisions of the Council are not binding unless unanimous, and the League cannot enforce decisions which involve the "independence, sovereignty, or territorial integrity" of a member state. A state which in the opinion of the Council "is not fulfilling its obligations under the Pact" may be "excluded from the League" by the unanimous vote of all other member states.

Since its formation the Arab League has concentrated largely on political matters, and especially on questions relating to Palestine. A number of proposals and plans for economic, social, and cultural cooperation have been submitted to it, but the League thus far has been "long on resolutions, short on implementation." It failed to prevent the creation of Israel or to subdue the Israelis in the hostilities of 1948-1949. It passed many bold resolutions but proved to be far weaker, both militarily and politically, than had been imagined. While it did present a united front against the Jews in Palestine, it revealed deep-seated rifts and conflicting ambitions among the rulers of the Arab states—notably among King Farouk of Egypt, King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia, and King Abdullah of Jordan. Farouk and Ibn Saud bitterly objected to Abdullah's annexation of Arab Palestine, and they denounced the negotiations for a union of Syria and Iraq in 1949.

As a counter-proposal to various divisive schemes the Egyptian Prime Minister, Hussein Sirry Pasha, suggested a collective security pact among the states of the Arab world. When this was approved by representatives of all member states except Jordan and Iraq the success was hailed as "a triumph for a group of men who believe firmly that time is working for the emergence of some type of commonwealth of Arab-speaking states under the leadership of Egypt."²⁴

²³ Ray Alan, "The Arab League : Happy Band of Schemers," *The Reporter*, March 24, 1955, p. 35.

²⁴ Albion Ross, dispatch from Alexandria, dated June 18, 1950 ; in the *New York Times*, June 19, 1950.

After the assassination of King Abdullah of Jordan in July, 1951, his son and successor, King Talal, abandoned his father's ambition for a Greater Syria under Jordan's crown. A new military regime in Syria ended the long quarrels with Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq. The Iranian oil crisis and the Anglo-Egyptian dispute over the Suez Canal and other issues caused the Arab nations to present at least the appearance of a united front in support of national "emancipation" and against Western "imperialism." With Iraq's ratification of the Arab collective security pact, announced on March 16, 1952, the guarantees of the pact entered into force. Officially labeled a Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic Co-operation, the pact contemplated a Joint Defense Council composed of the foreign ministers and defense ministers of the participating states, under the control of the Arab League Council, assisted by a Permanent Military Commission of representatives of the General Staffs of the member states. It also provided for an Economic Council of Ministers of Economic Affairs or their representatives. The agencies created under this Treaty have met infrequently since 1952, and "there has been as yet no real implementation of the Treaty, largely because of difficulties inherent in creating and equipping an army under the command of the Permanent Military Commission."³⁴ A complicating factor has been the willingness of one of the members of the League, Iraq, to enter into security commitments with non-League states. In 1954 the League successfully opposed Iraq's adherence to the Agreement for Friendly Cooperation between Pakistan and Turkey. In spite of bitter opposition by Egypt and Saudi Arabia, Iraq did join with Turkey in a Treaty of Joint Defense in February, 1955, and with Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, and the United Kingdom in the Baghdad Pact in November of the same year. These agreements did not prevent solid Arab support of Egypt when Israel, then Britain and France, resorted to forcible measures in October, 1956, but, perhaps due to the promptness of UN action, that support did not extend to military intervention.

Although the League has repeatedly appeared to be on the point of disintegration, it has continued to serve as an agency for calling worldwide attention to the growth of Arab nationalism. By such means as bloc voting and active participation in the United Nations it has emphasized the determination of the Arab states to remain free from foreign control and to consider certain regional problems on a regional basis. Thus far it has not been an effective regional arrangement—certainly not as contemplated in Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter. Too loose in organization, too sharply divided by political and personal rivalries, and too much of a hostile coalition against Israel, it has failed to become a positive force for peace and stability in the Near East. Nevertheless, it is a symbol of national revival in the Arab world, and it may herald a trend toward a larger political grouping in a strategically critical area. "As a self-contained and effective unity," wrote David Courtney about the Arab League in

³⁴ Boutros-Ghali, "The Arab League, 1945-1955," p. 392. The text of the treaty is given in Appendix B.

the *Jerusalem Post* of June 19, 1950, "it has never existed ; but it has existed, and still exists, as a formal attempt to create a common external policy out of a natural kinship among the Arab States." This statement is as valid today as it was in 1950.³⁵

Pacific Union. The term "Pacific Union," like its better-known European counterpart, "Western Union," has many meanings. It has been used to refer to associations, most of them imaginary in nature, of Asian countries on a continental, regional, or localized basis, ranging from real federations to the loosest possible kind of cooperative action.³⁶

At the present time the most specific and geographically the most limited proposal for Pacific Union is for a Southeast Asia Union to promote the common political, economic, and cultural interests of the states of that area. Presumably such a union would eschew military commitments. It would attempt to assist the peoples of Southeast Asia to better their conditions of life and to prepare themselves for greater freedom and greater responsibilities, thereby, it is hoped, bolstering the region alike against persistent colonialism and against the threat of mounting Communist pressures. In 1950 the chief sponsor of a Southeast Asia Union, President Elpidio Quirino of the Philippines, invited countries of Asia interested in forming a union to a conference at Baguio to take the necessary first steps.

The results of the Baguio Conferences held in late May, 1950, were limited and disappointing. Delegates from seven scattered countries—Australia, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand—agreed on a series of resolutions for regional cooperation in economic, social, and cultural programs, and exchanged views on matters of common interest ; but, largely on the insistence of India and Indonesia, the Conference avoided public declarations or commitments of a political nature altogether.³⁷ For political reasons, no official representatives from Indo-China, China, or Korea had been invited. The Conference failed to accept a Philippine proposal for a permanent organization.

The Colombo Powers and Asian Regionalism. Leaders of the Colombo Powers (India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, and Indonesia) have met frequently to confer on matters of interest to all of them. While they have

³⁵ "Even if the League becomes weaker, its prestige for the Arabs remains intact, not only because it is the first *non-Western* international organization, but because it symbolizes Arab unity to the people from Agadir to Aden." Boutros-Ghali, "The Arab League, 1945-1955," p. 443. See also J. S. Raleigh, "Ten Years of the Arab League," *Middle Eastern Affairs*, VI (March, 1955), 65-77.

³⁶ S. R. Chow's *Winning the Peace in the Pacific* (Macmillan, 1944) is a comprehensive treatment of the possibilities of regionalism in the Pacific area and in Asia in general.

³⁷ Although this position may be criticized as further evidence of current Asian ostrichism, it was the only possible one to take in view of the basic lack of agreement and of enthusiasm regarding any and all proposals for regional association in Southeast Asia. The aim of the states of this area, as Werner Levi has stated charitably, "has been to demonstrate the degree of Asian solidarity rather than to point up the many difficulties still confronting the establishment of an Asian union." "Union in Asia?," *Far Eastern Survey*, XIX (Aug. 16, 1950), 148.

often differed—this is especially true of India and Pakistan—they are all concerned with economic development and other forms of cooperation. They are the chief recipients of aid under the so-called Colombo Plan as well as the sponsors of the Asian-African Conference at Bandung, Indonesia, in April, 1955. In general they favor various forms of regional cooperation, but they have not favored elaborate organizational forms for the implementation of cooperative plans and common objectives.

The Asian Relations Conference of March, 1947, described as “the first outward expression of the new awakening in Asia,” was attended by representatives of most of the Asian states. Both Gandhi and Nehru were there. While intended primarily to effect an exchange of views on economic and cultural matters, it had some political significance. It set up a Provisional Council with Nehru as President, and approved the creation of an Asian Relations Organization, with headquarters in New Delhi. The Organization has never expanded beyond its skeleton status, although it has issued some publications and participated in a few conferences.

A resolution adopted unanimously by the nineteen states represented at the Asian Conference on Indonesia, held in New Delhi in January, 1949, recommended that the participating nations explore the possibilities of regional arrangements within their areas. Since Australia, New Zealand, China, and the states of the Arab League, as well as the countries of South and Southeast Asia, were represented, the meaning of “regional arrangements within their areas” was none too clear.

In many respects the Asian-African conference at Bandung in 1955 was one of the most remarkable international gatherings in history, and seemed to mark the new role of Asia and Africa in world affairs. Its final communiqué expressed a desire to cooperate in economic, cultural, and other ways, agreement to establish liaison officers in the participating countries, and a hope for “prior consultation of participating countries in international forums.” But it also affirmed specifically: “It is . . . not intended to form a regional bloc.”³⁸

The Colombo Plan. In spite of its name, the Colombo Plan for Co-operative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia is not an integrated plan at all. Rather, it is “a name given to the whole sum of the effort which the countries of South and South-East Asia, helped by countries outside the region, are making to develop their economics and raise the living standards of their peoples.”³⁹ It has some machinery, and it represents what is probably Asia’s most advanced effort at regional cooperation, but it is not a true regional arrangement. Its main agency of cooperation is the Consultative Committee, which was set up at a meeting of the Commonwealth foreign ministers in Colombo in January, 1950. The original members were the United Kingdom and the other Commonwealth countries, plus Malaya and British Borneo. Several coun-

³⁸ The text of the communiqué is given in the *New York Times*, April 25, 1955.

³⁹ “The Colombo Plan,” ID 1210 (April, 1944), British Information Services, New York.

tries within and outside the area of South and Southeast Asia have joined the Committee since 1950 : Viet Nam, Laos, Cambodia, and the United States in 1951 ; Burma and Nepal in 1952 ; Indonesia in 1953 ; Japan, the Philippines, and Thailand in 1954. In October, 1955, the Committee met for the first time outside Asia, in Ottawa.

After hasty preparation of development programs by the Asian members of the Consultative Committee, the Colombo Plan was formally inaugurated on July 1, 1951. Calling for an estimated expenditure of more than five and a quarter billion dollars over a six-year period, it sought to coordinate a comprehensive effort for economic development in the heart of the underdeveloped areas of the world with a minimum of machinery and staff. Assistance is provided by the Technical Cooperation Scheme, and coordination by a Council and by the Bureau for Technical Cooperation, located in Colombo. The Colombo Plan is a major effort at regional cooperation, and it has already stimulated many other cooperative efforts within and among the states of the area and between these states and non-Asian countries and various organs and agencies of the United Nations.

Pacific Pacts. Users of the term "Pacific Union" frequently mean a Pacific Pact, similar to the North Atlantic Pact. Supporters of such proposals are prompted by the desire to present a stronger front to the growing menace of communism in Asia, to establish a common defense plan and organization, and to associate the United States in such an undertaking. Two outstanding advocates of Pacific Union, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and President Syngman Rhee, have for obvious reasons emphasized the importance of "organizing the Pacific peoples in their fight against communism," to use Dr. Rhee's words. Official spokesmen of Australia, New-Zealand, Thailand, and Japan have also favored some kind of Pacific defense pact.

In July, 1950, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the United States House of Representatives unanimously endorsed proposals for a mutual defense pact for the Pacific area, patterned after the North Atlantic Treaty, in which the United States would participate.⁴⁰ In the following year, 1951, the Truman Administration took the initiative in launching "an overall system of Pacific Ocean collective security pacts." Three such pacts were concluded in 1951, with the Philippines, with Australia and New Zealand, and with Japan, one in 1953, with the Republic of Korea, and one in 1954, with Nationalist China. Presumably these pacts were envisioned as the first steps in a widening network of Pacific security arrangements in which, it was hoped, other Asian nations, as well as Britain and France, would join. Until such time, however, as India, Indonesia, and other Asian states participate, and until the pacts bring about cooperation on a broader front, these agreements belong to the pattern of mutual defense arrangements of the states of the free world, with the United States as the main link, rather than to the pattern of true Asian regionalism.

⁴⁰ See the *New York Times*, July 12, 1950.

SEATO. In 1954 a collective security treaty for Southeast Asia was finally achieved. After the Geneva truce agreements—which, from the American point of view at least, seemed to contain alarming concessions to the Communists—the United States, Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, and Pakistan agreed to meet in Manila in early September to consider measures for concerted resistance to possible aggression or subversion in Southeast Asia. Out of this conference emerged the so-called Pacific Charter and the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty.⁴¹ Although the Treaty provided for a minimum of machinery, and although only two states of Southeast Asia adhered to it, it was immediately dubbed the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). The only agency established by the Treaty was a Council “so organized as to be able to meet at any time.” In addition to expressing concern with mutual aid in resisting armed attack or in preventing and countering internal subversion, the Treaty also contained provisions for cooperation in strengthening “free institutions” and the promotion of “economic progress and social well-being”; but no agencies were established to work toward these ends.

The first meeting of the Council of SEATO was held in Bangkok in late February, 1955. In their final communiqué the foreign ministers present announced plans for giving some organizational form to their collective efforts. The Council would meet at least once each year. When not in session its work would be carried on by “Council representatives who will have their seat in Bangkok,” and who would be assisted by a secretariat and by working groups as needed. Each member government would designate a military adviser to its Council members. Economic experts would meet periodically, and would advise the members of the Council on matters within their sphere of interest. In April the Council representatives, at the urgent request of Thailand, voted to establish a “watchdog committee” of experts on subversion. They took steps to organize a secretariat and to create certain special committees. In May its Committee on Information, Cultural, Education and Labor Activities held an initial meeting in Bangkok. Thus by mid-1955 SEATO had a structure as well as a name.

It was inevitable but unfortunate that SEATO should frequently be compared with NATO. The contrasts between the two organizations are striking :

NATO is a strong association of natural allies . . . bound together by firm commitments and by an elaborate organization. It has substantial forces at its command, and has evolved elaborate plans for united military and other action in the event of an attack on any of the member states. It has vigor and teeth. . . . SEATO, on the other hand, is a loose association which calls for little organization, for no unified command and for almost no unified military measures at all, and which has none of the

⁴¹ For the texts of the Charter and the Treaty see the *New York Times*, Sept. 9, 1954.

automatic action provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty. . . . [Nevertheless,] the stumbling block is not in the treaty but in the capabilities and will of the member states, and even more in the attitudes of those who determine the policies of other Asian states.⁴²

THE UNITED NATIONS AND REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

Regional arrangements were given more positive and detailed endorsement in the Charter of the United Nations than in the Covenant of the League of Nations. Woodrow Wilson viewed with suspicion the idea of regional arrangements and alliances; and the founders of the League feared that they would open the way for alliances and a return to the balance of power system which would, in the long run, be in substantial opposition to the League concept of collective security on a global basis.

At the San Francisco Conference the question of regional versus international organizations was debated at great length; indeed, it was "one of the knottiest questions"⁴³ with which the Conference wrestled. According to an American expert who served on the Committee on Regional Arrangements of the Third Commission at the San Francisco Conference :

. . . the approach of the various countries to the problem of regional arrangements may be said to have been conditioned in part by one or another of five points of view, all of which operated in favor of varying degrees of autonomy for regional or other limited arrangements within the general framework of the United Nations :

1. The desire of the American republics to safeguard the inter-American system ;
2. The similar feeling on the part of the states of the Arab League . . . that the status of that League be preserved ;
3. The wish of the U.S.S.R. to except from any restrictive control under the Charter the system of bilateral mutual assistance pacts ;
4. France's concern over possible renewal of German aggression, leading her to seek freedom of action against ex-enemy states without the necessity of awaiting prior action by the Security Council ;
5. The general uneasiness of the small states over the power granted the Security Council in the light of the Yalta voting formula.⁴⁴

There was also strong objection, especially on the part of the United States and the Latin American republics, to the stipulation in the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals that a regional arrangement or agency could not take enforcement action without the express authorization of the Security

⁴² Norman D. Palmer, "Organizing for Peace in Asia," *The Western Political Quarterly*, VIII (March, 1955), 26.

⁴³ For a detailed report on this subject see *The United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, April 25—June 26, 1945. Report on the Action of the Conference on Regional Arrangements*. Submitted to the Governing Board of the Pan American Union by the Director General. Congress and Conference Series No. 48. Pan American Union (Washington, D. C., 1945.).

⁴⁴ Allen, "Regional Arrangements and the United Nations," p. 7. See also Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., ed., *The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg* (Houghton Mifflin, 1952), pp. 186-198.

Council of the new international organization. In view of the Yalta voting formula, this requirement seemed to imply that a single permanent member of the Council could block action under any regional arrangement.

In its final form the United Nations Charter devoted an entire chapter (Chapter VIII, Articles 52-54) to the subject of regional arrangements. In addition, Article 33 provided for "resort to regional agencies and arrangements" among the recommended procedures for the pacific settlement of disputes. As stated in Article 53, the authorization of the Security Council is not required before action is taken against an enemy state of World War II. An even more important exception is provided for in Article 51, which opens the way for a great variety of regional security arrangements outside the effective control of the United Nations.

The Charter does not attempt to define "regional arrangements or agencies"; it leaves the whole question of their character and purposes, and of their exact relations with the United Nations, very much up in the air. What it does have to say on regional arrangements is confined to the field of security. It is silent on the possible economic, social, and other potentialities of such groupings. Yet within the UN itself, as well as outside, the regional principle has been applied in these broader fields, as for instance, in the regional commissions of the United Nations. The Caribbean Commission and the South Pacific Commission, which are not agencies of the United Nations, cooperate with the larger organization.

Proponents of regional security arrangements naturally insist that these devices are wholly consistent with the United Nations Charter and are necessary steps in regional or collective self-defense. The Charter specifically recognizes the right of nations to take action of this sort until and unless the United Nations is able to assert itself effectively in the maintenance of peace. But while these arrangements can be readily defended, there is real danger that they will deteriorate into military alliances *against* some country or countries, that they will provoke counter-measures—that they will, in short, increase international tensions and thereby accentuate the very evils they are presumably designed to prevent. There is much truth in this frank comment by Professor Leland M. Goodrich :

It must be clearly recognized, however, that the world organization is not being strengthened by the multiplication and tightening of these regional security arrangements. On the most optimistic view they are to be regarded as temporary expedients and as possible aids in creating conditions which permit the rehabilitation of the global system. If the United Nations as an organization to maintain international peace and security becomes effective, such regional arrangements should decline in importance and be subordinated in operation to the responsible organs of the United Nations.⁴⁵

⁴⁵ "Regionalism and the United Nations." *Columbia Journal of International Affairs*, III (Spring, 1949), 19-20. See also Grayson Kirk, "The Atlantic Pact and International Security," *International Organization*, III (May, 1949), 239-251.

Because of the limitations of the United Nations, the major non-Communist states have increasingly tended to rely more on regional security arrangements than on the international organization. This trend has alarmed many supporters of the UN. Writing in a popular American magazine in 1954, Carlos Romulo of the Philippines contended that "the United Nations is dying" because member states are "more and more taking the great political issues outside the framework of the organization."⁴⁶ "In the name of regional arrangements," added another observer, "the United Nations has been placed in a position of inferiority, so that now the links between the regional arrangements and the world organization exist at the practical pleasure of the former."⁴⁷ This bypassing of the UN on vital issues greatly troubled Secretary-General Trygve Lie, and he frequently warned of the danger of the attrition of the UN and urged a reversal of the regional trend. His successor, Dag Hammarskjöld, has taken the same position. In his annual report in 1955 he wrote: "In recent years, the main attention has been concentrated on arrangements designed to give a measure of security on a regional basis, in the absence of a more universal system of security. If there is now to be a serious and sustained exploration of the possibilities for cooperation on a wider basis, the role of the world organization must necessarily gain a new dimension."

Secretary-General Trygve Lie stated on February 11, 1948, that regional arrangements could be "a very useful element in building a United Nations system of collective security provided they recognize the supremacy of the Charter."⁴⁸ This is an important point. Article 103 of the Charter states it clearly: "In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the Charter shall prevail." Moreover, as Lie insisted in his memorandum of June 6, 1950: "Measures for collective self-defense and regional remedies of other kinds are at best interim measures, and cannot bring any reliable security from the prospect of war." Regional arrangements, in other words, have constructive possibilities only if they are truly a part of a larger pattern, centering on the United Nations—"the one common undertaking and universal instrument of the great majority of the human race."

⁴⁶ "The UN Is Dying," *Collier's*, July 23, 1954, p. 30.

⁴⁷ Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., "A Re-examination of Regional Arrangements," *Journal of International Affairs*, IX (1955), 84. For a concrete example of the problems that may arise in the relations between the UN and a regional arrangement, see A. M. Rosenthal, "Guatemala Case Raises Issue of U.N.'s Future," *New York Times*, July 4, 1954, E4.

⁴⁸ The question may be raised whether this very cautious endorsement is really an endorsement at all. Mr. Lie showed a conspicuous lack of enthusiasm for regional security arrangements (including the North Atlantic Treaty), and many other UN officials and delegates have shared his restraint. Even if one approves of an arrangement like the North Atlantic Pact, it may be more realistic to confess that it came into being because of the obvious weakness of the United Nations as a security arrangement, and as a necessary substitute for a more desirable, but apparently unobtainable, protective system on the international plane.

THE BALANCE SHEET OF INTERNATIONAL REGIONALISM

In the period following World War II the trend toward international regionalism has been so pronounced that it is now an acknowledged feature of the international scene. It has achieved a new meaning and a new significance. While it has not in any real sense breached the barrier of the sovereign state system, it has provided the impetus and the machinery for much closer cooperation of states on the regional level.

In spite of the growing importance of international regionalism, as evidenced by the appearance of many new regional arrangements, very little attention has been given to this development by students of international relations. The exact nature of international regionalism is by no means clear. The same comment could be made of its significance and place in the international society of the present, and even more particularly of the future. As Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., has pointed out, there is a great need "to rethink the concept of regionalism." It is important to explore its relations to the prevailing nation-state pattern ; to looser arrangements between states through treaties, trade relations, alliances etc. ; to proposed unions and federations, on a regional or broader level ; to larger associations of states such as the British Commonwealth of Nations ; and to universal organizations, notably the United Nations at the present time, but embracing also any other nearly universal associations which are now in existence or which may come into being in the future.

Professor Furniss has itemized six "perplexing difficulties" to which "the development of so many 'arrangements' since 1945 has given rise." The first is "the continuing confusion arising from the lack of precision in definition." A second difficulty arises from the "overlapping networks of agreements." A third difficulty is caused by the exclusion of certain states from regional arrangements in their areas or the refusal of other states to adhere to such arrangements. The fourth and fifth difficulties are that some so-called regional arrangements are preoccupied "with conditions inside the area as a means of attaining objectives outside the area," and, conversely, "that too much internal organization may lead to difficulties in linking the arrangements one with another and each with the United Nations." The sixth difficulty "concerns the relevance of such arrangements to the maintenance of peace and security in the light of the series of revolutions which have taken place in military technology since 1945."⁴⁹ The difficulties are indeed perplexing ; they justify Furniss' insistence on the need for a fundamental re-thinking of the meaning of regionalism and of the nature and place of regional arrangements in the world of the mid-twentieth century.

If international regionalism is properly developed and is closely integrated into a more universal framework such as is provided by the United Nations, it can fill a real gap in the existing pattern of international

⁴⁹ Furniss, pp. 81-85.

society. Wrongly used, it will become nothing more than a camouflage, and a poor one at that, for military alliances, "blocs," and "orbits," and therefore will exercise a disturbing and destructive influence on international relations.

The multiplication of regional arrangements, especially in Western Europe, is already giving rise to problems of coordination and to apprehensions about the possibility of conflicting obligations. Hamilton Fish Armstrong has warned that "the overlappings in a security system based on regions are evidently as troublesome as the gaps."⁵⁰ But while problems of coordination are obviously great, such obligations should be complementary and not conflicting. Indeed, the thesis may be hazarded that the more regional arrangements a given state enters, the more secure is that state and the brighter are the prospects for peaceful international collaboration. Georges Scelle believes that "there is in this interlocking or interweaving of groupings a guarantee of peace. . . . If a state belongs to many different systems, it will be by that very fact restrained in its warlike inclinations by the very weight of each of the groups to which it belongs, and on the other hand will help neutralize the warlike inclinations of its partners by the care which it will take to safeguard its own associations."⁵¹ Moreover, the experience and perspective gained in many cooperative endeavors on the regional level should contribute greatly not only to the successful functioning of regional arrangements but also to the development of that international climate of opinion without which all efforts at supranational cooperation are doomed to failure.⁵²

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⁵⁰ "Regional Pacts : Strong Points or Storm Cellars?," *Foreign Affairs*, XXVII (April, 1949), 360.

⁵¹ *Une crise de la Société des Nations* (Paris, 1926), p. 216.

⁵² In a remarkable statement in the House of Commons on March 28, 1950, with reference to the progress achieved through the organizations for West European cooperation, Mr. Younger, British Minister of State, testified to the beneficial effects of cooperation through many regional arrangements : "As a result of the interlocking of all these organizations, there is already growing up a very large body of experts, officials, Ministers, and latterly also Parliamentarians, who are becoming accustomed from day to day, and from week to week, to think beyond their own frontiers ; who are getting to know their colleagues of other countries, to deal with them with the same problems but seeing them dealt with in a different perspective ; who are exchanging opinions and, what is probably more important, exchanging information with a frankness and intimacy which would certainly have been unthinkable only a few years ago."

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Part Five

FORMULATIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST

The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union

21

"In its distant objectives," asserts Edward Crankshaw, "the foreign policy of the Soviet Union is less obscure and more coherent than that of any other country in the world. The objectives embrace the ultimate victory of the world proletariat under the leadership of Moscow."¹ The goals of communism have been proclaimed, with some variations of emphasis, ever since Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels declared in the *Communist Manifesto* : "The Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims. They openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrowing of all existing social conditions." This program of world revolution distinguishes the Soviet Union from every other modern state—Soviet leaders and dialecticians never weary of expounding the unique character of their political order—and, understandably, it creates deep hostility between the "two worlds" and introduces a peculiarly dynamic and menacing element into all tendencies toward Soviet expansionism and imperialism.

Conditioning Factors. Soviet foreign policy, however, can hardly be summed up as the fanatical pursuit of a single goal, although this interpretation is popular in many circles. Instead, like the foreign policy of any state, it is inevitably shaped by a variety of factors : geographic and

¹ Review of Max Beloff, *The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia*, Vol. II : 1936-1941 (Oxford University Press, 1949) ; in the *New York Times Book Review*, July 3, 1949, p. 4.

strategic considerations ; historical and traditional policies ; the general international situation ; internal political problems ; the elements of economic strength and weakness within the state ; the morale of the people and the character of the leadership ; and other equally basic conditions. At various stages in their brief tenure of power the Communist leaders of Russia have appeared to regard world revolution as an imminent and then as a remote expectation, as a goal to be placed in the forefront of their policies and then as one which can be relegated at least temporarily to the ideological closet. Moreover, as Barrington Moore, Jr., believes, there is some indication that world revolution has been transformed "from a goal into a technique." "If there is any central goal behind the policy of the Soviet leaders," he argues, "it is the preservation and extension of their own power, by any means whatever, rather than the spread of a specific social system or the realization of a doctrinal blueprint." ²

Special Problems in Analysis. In any analysis of Soviet foreign policy two limitations should be borne constantly in mind. The first is that reliable information is very difficult to obtain and is indeed generally lacking. Even a casual perusal of some of the literature on the Soviet Union will reveal that on the whole the sources are scanty and unreliable, and that supporting evidence for many of the statements is quite unsatisfactory. Few important original documents are available ; the press is government-controlled ; public debate on foreign policy is practically nonexistent ; the value of the reports of the foreign correspondents tolerated in the Soviet Union is necessarily lessened by the fact that these correspondents have little access to essential documents, are subject to strict censorship, and are not free to move about at will.

A second limitation is that the Russians and in fact all Communists use familiar words and concepts in very unfamiliar ways. The Communists have posed a semantic problem which did not arise during the years of Fascist aggression. Mussolini boasted that he spat on the corpse of liberty, and Hitler sneered at democracy ; but the Communists, who are equally contemptuous of liberty and democracy as understood in the non-Communist world, use these and other words in a wholly novel sense. Failure to understand this practice, as John Foster Dulles has said, "explains why we so often agree with what Soviet leaders say and then find it difficult to reconcile their acts with what we thought they meant." ³ "Upside-down language" to use Sir Gladwyn Jebb's phrase, is the usual fare offered by Communist propagandists. It suggests that the slogans which George Orwell foresaw in his book *1984* are not so fantastic after all : "War is Peace," "Freedom is Slavery," and "Ignorance is Strength."

² Barrington Moore, Jr., *Soviet Politics — The Dilemma of Power : The Role of Ideas in Social Change* (Harvard University Press, 1950), p. 394.

³ "Thoughts on Soviet Foreign Policy," *Life*, June 3, 1946, p. 113.

BASES AND INSTRUMENTS

To what extent is Soviet foreign policy a continuation of tsarist policy, conditioned by the same geographic and strategic, historical and traditional factors? To what extent is it a product of Communist ideology, particularly of the Communist view of world revolution and inevitable conflict and of the Marxist-Leninist theory of international relations? To what extent is it shaped by international developments? by domestic events? by personalities? Who formulates it and how is it implemented?

A Continuation of Traditional Policies? To Communists this question seems meaningless. According to their doctrine the interests of Russian national policy and of world communism are identical. To non-Communists this is a hotly debated question on which all kinds of opinions have been expressed. Thus many historically-minded observers point out that nearly all of the policies now followed by the Soviet Union are a natural and logical continuation of historic Russian policies.

From the time of Peter the Great, perhaps from an even earlier period, the leaders of Russia have sought to consolidate and develop the resources, human and natural, of their vast land mass, to acquire windows to the West, and to gain access to the oceans without abandoning their self-imposed isolation. Communist Russia shows the same tendencies to expansion, the same overzealous solicitude for her "fellow-Slavs," the same concern for Asia, although the motives may be different. Russian interest in the Balkans, in Poland, in Manchuria and Outer Mongolia, in the entire borderland area, is nothing new. It has often been pointed out that since 1939 the Soviet Union has expanded almost to the fullest extent of tsarist aspirations, with the one outstanding exception of the Turkish Straits.

There are also plenty of precedents for the present suspiciousness and aloofness of the Russian leaders, for their calculated obscurantism, for their isolationism and messianism, for their intolerance and autocratic tendencies, for strict control from above, and for persecution, purges, and slave labor camps. George F. Kennan once remarked that he could piece together lengthy excerpts from the observations in De Custine's *La Russie en 1839* and submit them, with only slight changes, to the State Department as a report on present conditions in the Soviet Union.⁴

We may conclude, therefore, that the foreign policy of the Soviet Union is in many respects a continuation of the policies of tsarist Russia, but that the Communist leaders of Russia, like the tsars, have had to make adjustments to the existing structure of international relationships. There are some observers who would take sharp issue with this analysis. Writing in the American journal *Foreign Affairs* two decades ago, Karl Radek, then one of the most prominent of Russian spokesmen, stated that "to

⁴ An interesting summary of the observations of the Marquis de Custine was printed in the *Christian Science Monitor*, Oct. 18, 1949.

attempt to represent the foreign policy of the Soviet Union as a continuation of Tsarist policy is ridiculous. Bourgeois writers who do so have not grasped even the purely external manifestations of this policy.”⁵ To support his position Radek pointed out that the Soviet Union had not tried to seize the Dardanelles, or Port Arthur, or Dairen, and had maintained a uniformly friendly attitude toward Poland and the Baltic states. In view of the course that Soviet policy has taken since he wrote, his examples were singularly ill-chosen to support his thesis, and his own fate is a reminder that many old Bolsheviks could not themselves master the inner workings of the party machinery. In July, 1951, a group of Russian émigrés in the United States, including Alexander Kerensky, wrote in a letter to the *New York Times* that “to confuse Kremlin policies with historic Russia is to miss the heart of the threat confronting the world today.” They argued that this confusion identified Stalin with the Russian people, and that this identification might be a fatal error; besides, the Bolsheviks had “created an entirely new species of state, unknown in the annals of human history” — “a party state” in which the people were and are “a powerless instrument.”⁶

The Influence of Marxism-Leninism. The statement of the Russian émigrés tended to underestimate the continuing influence of basic factors and to exaggerate the unique qualities of the Soviet experiment; but it did call attention to another determining element. Something new has been added. The new element, of course, is communism. The leaders of the Soviet Union believe that communism represents the wave of the future, that capitalism will be destroyed by inner collapse and by external pressures, and that surely — though probably only after revolutions and other upheavals while capitalism is in its death throes — the dictatorship of the proletariat and the classless state will be established, leading, in turn, to the withering away of the state. The Marxist-Leninist theory of international relations assumes inevitable conflict between the Communist and non-Communist worlds; it regards imperialism as the last stage, the dying gasp, of capitalism (Lenin wrote a famous book on *Imperialism*); it emphasizes finality of ends and flexibility of means, astute timing of strategy and tactics, and the duality of morality and of standards between Communists and non-Communists; it stresses the either-or philosophy and the absolute impossibility of neutrality.

Stalin never wearied of repeating Lenin’s dictum that “without revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement.” Many of the most widely circulated Communist writings, including most of the works of Marx and Lenin, are essentially theoretical treatises. They seem heavy and almost meaningless to the uninitiated, but they are carefully studied in Communist-dominated countries and accepted as gospel by the faithful. In a society in which theory and practice are so intertwined such works are of basic significance.

⁵ “The Bases of Soviet Foreign Policy,” *Foreign Affairs*, XII (Jan., 1934), 194

⁶ The *New York Times*, July 8, 1951. Sec. 4, p. 8.

1. *A Scientific Doctrine?* The allegedly scientific character of Marxism-Leninism, the proclaimed infallibility of its Soviet interpreters, the doctrines of world revolution and inevitable conflict, and in fact its whole approach to international relations make communism, when based on a strong state led by able and ruthless men, a constantly threatening force in the world. "Soviet diplomacy," insists Eugene Tarlé, a noted Soviet historian, "is fortified with the scientific theory of Marxism-Leninism. This doctrine lays down the unshakable laws of social development." This doctrine, observes Gerhart Niemeyer, "is at the very core of the regime. It is the cement that holds its adherents together.....Marxist doctrine.....motivates communists chiefly through the certainty of a communist destination of history and the dogma of party infallibility." Actually, as Niemeyer demonstrates, Marxism itself is "torn by an inner contradiction between social analysis and revolutionary will, scholarship and prophesy, rational and irrational elements." Moreover, "in Soviet policy making, one finds that the scientific-analytical elements of Marxism are indeed constantly present but are subjected to continuous re-interpretation, juggling of concepts and distortions of meaning in accordance with changing political intentions of the Party leadership.....The scientific part of the doctrine has been abandoned by continuous adaptation to changing political needs." There is no point, however, in trying to convince the Soviets of the irrationality of their doctrine. As Niemeyer says :

Communist doctrine renders communist minds somewhat impervious to the results of empirical observation and scientific analysis. It makes it possible for them to overlook the inadequacies of the theories on which Soviet policies officially operate, and to ignore the evidence these theories fail to explain and coordinate.....The fear of inconsistency does not bother them. They can ride two horses at the same time and confidently await for a kind of dialectic Pegasus that will take off with them in a third direction.....Hence communist doctrine, with all its attendant features of semi-rationality, must be expected to continue as the political basis of the Russian regime. ⁷

2. *Inevitable Conflict or Peaceful Co-existence?* The Communist doc-

⁷ "An Inquiry into Soviet Mentality," paper prepared for the Foreign Policy Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania. Published in revised and expanded form with the same title, as Foreign Policy Research Institute Series No. 2 (Praeger, 1956). See especially Chapter 2, "Soviet Doctrine," See also Czeslaw Milosz, *The Captive Mind* (Knopf, 1953) ; and Richard Crossman, *The God That Failed* (Harper, 1949). "What must be realized is the continued psychological advantage which the belief in inevitable victory — in working with the inexorable laws of history and not against them — has conferred upon the Communist faithful, and above all the extreme flexibility in daily action which they have derived from the conviction of their own absolute righteousness." Max Beloff, *The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, 1929—1941*, 2 vols. (Oxford University Press, 1947, 1949), II, 392-393. In a lecture at the University of Pennsylvania on April 19, 1948, Professor Hans Kohn declared : "The Russians do not wish to conquer the world. They wish to save the world, in spite of itself. They must learn to understand that unfortunately, from their point of view, the world is beyond salvation by them."

trine of world revolution has been a major source of misunderstanding and apprehension. As Max Beloff has written :

The basic and inescapable relation of the Soviet State to other States, is one of conflict. And for a full understanding of the Soviet attitude, it is necessary to realize that the conflict is one in which the outcome is a foreordained victory for the Soviet State and, with it, the international proletariat. To try to comprehend the Soviet outlook and to dismiss the inevitability of the world proletarian revolution is as idle as to try to comprehend the outlook of medieval man and to dismiss the reality of the Last Judgment. ⁸

But does the doctrine of world revolution mean then that war is inevitable between the Communist and non-Communist worlds? Or is peaceful co-existence possible? The behavior of the Soviet Union and the pronouncements of her leaders provide no clear answer to this question. At certain periods, especially when the Soviet Union was interested in collective security and popular fronts to meet the menace of fascism, and during the years of wartime collaboration, the goal of world revolution seemingly faded into the background ; at other times the Soviet leaders have appeared to be determined to press forward at all costs. It is little wonder that people who are not skilled in Marxist dialectics cannot fathom the intentions of the men in the Kremlin. Those men speak with many tongues.

Lenin once said : "We are living not merely in a State, but in a system of States, and the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with imperialistic States for a long time is unthinkable. One or the other must triumph in the end. And before that end supervenes a series of frightful collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois States will be inevitable." Stalin himself later quoted this statement of Lenin with approval, and then added : "A peaceful victory over capitalism is not to be expected. In present circumstances, capitalism can only be overthrown by means of revolution which will take the form of protracted and violent struggle to the death." Yet Stalin at times took a wholly different tack. As early as 1921 he declared : "The basis of our relations with capitalist countries consists in admitting the co-existence of two opposed systems." In almost every one of the rare interviews which he granted to Westerners he reiterated this theme. ⁹ In his essay *Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.*, first published in 1952, Stalin expressed the belief that the capitalist countries were not likely to make war upon the Soviet Union because they realized that this would mean the destruction of capitalism. He also affirmed that "the Soviet Union itself would not attack capitalist countries." But, he added, the inevitability of wars between capitalist countries for markets and their desire to drive out their competitors were "stronger than the contradictions between the camp of capitalism and the

⁸ Beloff, II, 392.

⁹ "Historicus," "Stalin on Revolution," *Foreign Affairs*, XXVII (Jan., 1949), 175--214.

camp of socialism." Stalin's self-proclaimed grand strategy was to prepare the way for the coming victory of the proletariat everywhere by exploiting and aggravating the "three major contradictions which are already undermining the strength of the capitalistic system." These are : the contradictions between proletariat and bourgeoisie, between the imperialist powers themselves, and between the capitalist-imperialist powers and the colonial areas.

The issue of inevitable conflict versus peaceful co-existence may be somewhat clarified if we bear in mind the meaning of conflict in the Communist vocabulary and the difference between strategy and tactics. The Communists believe that conflict is the normal relationship between the two orders ; but to them this does not necessarily mean an all-out global war. They pretend to see a wide no man's land between war and peace in which they can maneuver openly and clandestinely in preparing for the final collapse of the capitalist order. Furthermore, as Lenin interpreted history, it "does not have a 'victory or death' quality — there is no urge to seek a final dramatic showdown and a *Götterdämmerung* finale." ¹⁰

3. *Strategy and Tactics.* Communist literature is replete with references to the importance of strategy and tactics, and to the possibility of frequently shifting policy without abandoning the ultimate goal. Stalin's conception of Communist strategy and tactics was "highly flexible" and rested on "a continual assessment of the status of forces in both the capitalist and the Socialist systems." ¹¹ It is often difficult for a person schooled in neither military concepts nor Communist dialectics to decide when the Soviet Union is undertaking a tactical maneuver and when it is pursuing a strategic aim. It seems probable, however, that the frequent references to the possibility of peaceful co-existence fall within the realm of tactics rather than that of long-term strategy. Certainly in the Soviet view such statements do not negate or even conflict with the ultimate revolutionary goals. "One of the chief conditions to which tactics must be adjusted," according to Stalin, "is the ebb and flow of the forces favoring revolution. Aggressive tactics should be timed with a rising tide ; tactics of defense, the assemblage of forces, and even retreat go with an ebbing tide." ¹² It was highly important to gauge the direction of the tide.

4. *"Socialism in One Country" and World Revolution.* In the struggle between Stalin and Trotsky which followed Lenin's death the major issue was Stalin's view that primary emphasis should be on building "socialism in one country" against Trotsky's view that the goal of world revolution

¹⁰ Moore, p. 399. See also "X," "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs*, XXV (July, 1947), 566-582 ; and Waldemar Gurian, "Permanent Features of Soviet Foreign Policy," *The Year Book of World Affairs*, 1947 (London, 1947), I, 1-39.

¹¹ "Historicus," p. 205.

¹² "Historicus," p. 206. It was this point, among others, which George F. Kennan, the intellectual father of the "containment" policy, had in mind when he proposed a policy for meeting Soviet pressures in his famous article in *Foreign Affairs* on the "Sources of Soviet Conduct." Similar assumptions lay behind the frequent references of Secretary of State Acheson and other prominent American spokesmen to the necessity of creating "situations of strength."

should neither be subordinated nor shelved. With Stalin's victory the theory was reconstructed to fit the facts. Henceforth the Soviet Union would be regarded as the base for world revolution ; there could be no conflict between the goal of building socialism in one country and that of world revolution. This dual objective was proclaimed by Stalin on innumerable occasions. The following statement is typical : "The goal is to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat in one country, using it as a base for the overthrow of imperialism in all countries. Revolution spreads beyond the limits of one country ; the epoch of world revolution has begun." ¹³

5. *Consequences of Marxist-Leninist Theory.* Soviet foreign policy may not differ fundamentally from that of tsarist Russia ; but certainly, as Max Beloff stated, "an explanation of Soviet policy which dismisses the Revolution would seem to be an explanation which neither the facts nor Soviet writings warrant." ¹⁴ It would seem that Soviet activities about the borderlands of Russia since 1939, which have resulted in the annexation of some 400,000 square miles of territory, the establishment of satellite states in the Balkans and in Central Europe, and the extension of Soviet influence in Asia, could all be explained, on the one hand, as being motivated by a desire for security and for the prevention of encirclement by a hostile capitalist world or, on the other hand, as nothing more dangerous than an unusually successful application of the traditional expansionist policies of the tsars. Unfortunately, neither explanation seems quite adequate. It would be folly to overlook the treatment meted out to the satellite states and the many evidences that the Soviet appetite, sharpened by a revolutionary dynamism, is by no means satiated. This brings us again to the disturbing consequences of the Marxist-Leninist view of the world. These consequences are well stated by Barrington Moore, Jr. :

Russian expansion can be explained very largely without references to Marxist ideological factors. For the most part, each step in Soviet expansion can be considered a logical move to counter a specific actual or potential enemy...What, then, is there left for the Marxist ideological factor to explain? This much at least : the Marxist-Leninist tradition has made it very difficult to reach a *modus vivendi* with the Soviets...A belief in the inherently aggressive tendencies of modern capitalism obviously excludes any agreement except an armed truce of undetermined duration¹⁵.

Additional Influences. A study of Soviet foreign policy must take note of a number of additional influences. Here we can mention and briefly comment on only four of these : "the existing structure of international relationships" ; domestic conditions ; personalities ; and the structure of the government.

¹³ Quoted in "Historicus," p. 198.

¹⁴ Beloff, II, 390.

¹⁵ Moore, p. 392.

The Bolshevik regime in its early months seemed determined not to conform to the rules of the international game as laid down by capitalist powers. It gave abundant evidence of this feeling: repudiation of the national debt, publication of the secret treaties, and appeals to peoples of foreign states over the heads of their governments. But the Soviet Union has had to have many dealings with other nations and with international organizations. "On the whole," Barrington Moore states, "Soviet policy has been characterized by a series of adjustments to the existing structure of international relationships, which the U.S.S.R. has been unable to overthrow and replace by a new world community of toilers' states."¹⁶ Thus the Soviet leaders, though suspicious, reluctant, and inexperienced participants in world politics, have resorted to alliances, measures of collective security, intervention, balance of power practices, and other standard techniques of Western diplomacy.

Although the Soviet leaders seem to exercise complete and unquestioned control over the Soviet sphere, they are nevertheless very sensitive to domestic happenings. The attention and effort they devote to internal propaganda offer ample evidence of this. They are determined that the Soviet Union shall have the powerful economic base which a modern great power must possess, and that public discipline and morale shall be equal to any demands. No careful interpretation of the sources of Soviet behavior in foreign affairs can neglect the implications of such internal developments as the New Economic Policy of 1921-1928, the Stalin-Trotsky feud, the Five Year Plans,¹⁷ the liquidation of *kulaks*, the collectivization of agriculture, the political purges of 1936-1938, the "cultural purges" in the postwar period, the agricultural crisis in recent years, and the "downgrading" of Stalin by the present leaders of the U.S.S.R.

Although communism holds that the individual is important only as a member of a group, the role of personalities in shaping Soviet foreign policy has been very important. The leadership — including the revamped Presidium — now consists of a minority of "Old Bolsheviks" and a majority of new men whom Stalin gathered around himself. The "Old Bolsheviks" were trained in the school of bitter experience, whereas most of the younger group, says Bertram Wolfe, "never knew the wide dreams and humane ideals of the nineteenth century intelligentsia, the feverish disputation, hope and wretchedness of the Tsarist underground, prison and exile, nor the 'heroic days' of the storming of the Winter Palace and the Kremlin." Instead, continues Wolfe, "they were wholly formed in the Stalinist fight for a monopoly of power under the new régime of bureaucratic totalitarianism."¹⁸ The growing importance of younger men may account for the "new look" in Soviet diplomacy, but the roles of

¹⁶ Moore, p. 405.

¹⁷ For example, as Max Beloff states, "the great internal readjustment known as the First Five-Year Plan provides the master-key to every aspect of Russian policy in the years immediately following 1929." I, 27.

¹⁸ Bertram D. Wolfe, "A New Look at the Soviet 'New Look'," *Foreign Affairs*, XXIII (Jan., 1955), 184-185.

individuals cannot be determined, at least now, as Theodore White makes clear in a forceful simile :

Of all those areas which Russian secrecy guards, none is more jealously sheltered than the inner area of decision-making where personalities, ambitions, rivalries and emotions clash....Like subterranean monsters, Russia's masters grapple with each other in the deep, beyond the range of sight and only an occasional stinking bubble breaking to the surface tells us that a struggle is going on at all.¹⁹

When Stalin said that "the Politburo is the highest organ not of the state but of the Party and the Party is the highest directing force of the state," he was saying what outside observers have also said : that the Politburo was "the seat of Communist authority and the core of Soviet power." The same may now be said of the Presidium, which in October, 1952, replaced both the Politburo and the Orgburo, the control body on internal party matters. When it is remembered that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is one of highly restricted membership, the power of the Party, working through the Presidium, becomes apparent. Not only is that power unchallenged, but the decisions are made in secret party meetings where "Russia's masters grapple with each other in the deep." Thus the Russian Communists have contrived a monopoly of power in a monolithic state.

SOVIET DIPLOMACY FROM BREST-LITOVSK TO SAN FRANCISCO

The General Course. The Bolsheviks had no sooner seized power in 1917 than they faced the issue of survival. The making of a separate peace with Germany posed the first major test. The choice lay between a betrayal of revolutionary principles by making peace with an imperialist power and the continuation of a war that might well end in Russian defeat and the extinction of the Bolshevik regime. Lenin spoke for peace, and by a narrow margin he carried the day. Presumably he believed that some of the harshest features of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk could be evaded ; and he may have foreseen the defeat of Germany, with the consequent nullification of the entire treaty. The second test involved the Bolsheviks' capacity to maintain their regime against revolting anti-Bolsheviks, notably White Russians, supported by small Allied forces at several points. Even before succeeding in this effort they had in 1919 organized the Comintern and started it on its career of promoting communism outside Russia.

Many states, including the United States and most of the countries of Latin America, refused to recognize the new regime. Gradually, however, some states began to relent, and in 1922 the Soviet Republic was invited

¹⁹ *Fire in the Ashes : Europe in Mid-Century* (William Sloane, 1953), pp. 324-325.

to the Genoa Conference. In the same year Russia and Germany, both outcasts in the family of nations, reached an agreement of friendship and trade in the Treaty of Rapallo, followed by a nonaggression pact in 1926 that foreshadowed a more famous agreement of the same kind in 1939. Meantime, in 1923 the Soviet Republic had joined other Socialist Republics to become the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The new state was quite willing to make agreements with other countries: "It has been calculated that between 1920 and 1937 the Soviets entered into 234 bilateral and 57 multilateral international agreements of all sorts."²⁰ Many of these were nonaggression pacts. The Communist government had been recognized by most states by 1927, but American recognition did not come until 1933.

The victory of Stalin over Trotsky in intraparty politics inaugurated a long period of building a strong Russia at the cost of a program for immediate world revolution. Consequently, while concentrating on the first objective with a series of Five Year Plans, the Soviet Union sought peace with other states through repeated proposals for disarmament, through support of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, through encouraging an anti-Fascist front, through the Comintern's temporary shelving of its anti-democracy campaign in 1935, and, after a dozen years of hostility, through joining the League of Nations in 1934 and for five years leading the movement for peace, disarmament, and collective security. As the aggressive intent of the Fascist states became clear, she proposed a multilateral Eastern Pact of mutual assistance, she signed mutual assistance agreements with France and Czechoslovakia, and she urged strong action by the League to defeat aggression in Ethiopia and Spain. Whatever their motives, from 1934 until 1939 the Russians were the only powerful friends of collective security to be found in the world. But they were not powerful enough. Appeasement at Munich in 1938 destroyed whatever remaining confidence the Russians had in the British and the French, and thereby sowed the seeds of the Nazi-Soviet Pact of August, 1939. For almost a year Soviet leaders drew back into diplomatic seclusion, played a wait-and-see game, and, as later revelations showed, lent an ear to the simultaneous wooing of Germany and of Britain and France.

Soviet Policies in the Middle East. In the early days of their power the Communists showed some signs of abandoning traditional Russian aspirations in the Middle East, but they soon responded to the attraction of geographical and strategic considerations. The new dream, like the old, was control of the Turkish Straits and access to the Mediterranean, a port in the warm waters of the Persian Gulf, and a safe and easy route to India.

The new Russia and the new Turkey remained on friendly terms for twenty years after World War I. Then, in 1939, the Soviet Union reverted

²⁰ Warren B. Walsh, "Soviet Foreign Policy from Petrograd to Yalta," in Stuart Gerry Brown, ed., *Great Issues* (Harper, 1951), p. 262. See also T. A. Taracouzio, *War and Peace in Soviet Diplomacy* (Macmillan, 1940), pp. 315-342; and Michael T. Florinsky, "The Soviet Union and International Agreements," *The Political Science Quarterly*, LXI (March, 1946), 61-89.

sharply to the policy of the tsars. In 1945, after several years of deteriorating relations, she announced her intention of terminating the twenty-year-old treaty of friendship ; and at the Potsdam Conference later in the same year she persuaded Britain and the United States to agree to seek a revision of the Montreux Convention of 1936, which had fixed the status of the Straits in a way pleasing to Turkey. Farther east, Persia had effected a withdrawal of Bolshevik penetration in 1921 by agreeing to permit Russian troops to move in if a third power tried "to use Persian territory as a base of operations against Russia." Later the Russians vainly sought an oil concession in northern Persia, but after the signing of a nonaggression pact in 1933 relations remained unchanged until World War II. Russian and British troops moved into Iran (the name was changed in 1935) to frustrate Nazi designs ; and at the conclusion of the Teheran Conference in 1943 Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin issued a statement thanking Iran for its cooperation during the war and pledging economic assistance and affirming their desire for the continuance of the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Soviet-Afghan relations have generally been peaceful. The two states signed a treaty of alliance and friendship in 1921, a treaty of neutrality and nonaggression in 1926, and a commercial agreement in 1936. No Anglo-Russian frictions developed in Afghanistan during World War II, as they did in Iran.

In their early days the Soviets made a strong bid to win the support of the Muslims of the Near East for communism, but their propaganda was poorly suited to peoples still living under semi-feudal conditions. Soviet tactics thereupon shifted from preaching the class struggle to the incitement of discontented minorities. Again the failure was almost total.

Soviet Policies in the Far East. By the Treaty of Peking of 1860 Russia picked up some 350,000 square miles of Chinese land in the Amur region which, added to her own northern areas, gave her a dominating position in northeastern Asia. She founded Vladivostok, also in 1860 ; she built the Trans-Siberian Railroad in the 1890's ; she obtained concessions for the Chinese Eastern Railway in 1896 ; and she won control of Port Arthur and Dairen in two agreements of 1898. But by these thrusts she put herself at odds with the rising state of Japan as well as with Great Britain and other European powers with spheres of interest in China. The clash of the expansionist policies of Russia and Japan culminated in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, which cost Russia heavily in prestige and territory. For some two decades thereafter her influence and activity in the Far East were at a low ebb. Japan even achieved a temporary foothold in eastern Siberia from 1918 to 1922 while the new Russian regime was weak, after which the Russians began to regain their strength in the area. When Japan sought to expand her influence from her bases in Korea and Manchuria in the early 1930's, the two states engaged in "semi-war" from 1933 until 1941, when a neutrality pact gave them a four-year truce. When the Soviet Union declared war on Japan in August, 1945, her troops occupied Manchuria with little opposition, placing her in a strong position

to fill the power vacuum resulting from the complete defeat of Japan less than a week later. Moreover, she was now ready and willing to lend a hand to the Communists of China.

During the period of Soviet weakness, 1917-1924, China tried to reduce the Russian pressure on her border areas, but she too was weak. Her great revolutionary leader, Sun Yat-sen, was in fact so disturbed over the steady deterioration of the Chinese Republic and the ineffectiveness of his own party, the Kuomintang, that he sought help from the outside. Rebuffed by the Western powers, he turned to Russia, which sent advisers and organizers. But Sun Yat-sen died in 1925, and two years later his successor, Chiang Kai-shek, broke the "First United Front," driving the Communists not only out of the Kuomintang but out of the country as well. For the next decade Russian interference in China was slight and was largely confined to border areas. In 1935 the Chinese Communists offered to join with the Kuomintang in resisting Japanese encroachments, and for ten years — 1935-1945—relations between the Soviet Union and Chiang Kai-shek's government were outwardly placid, embracing a non-aggression pact and considerable material aid by Russia to China. Apprehensions raised by the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 were relieved by the Nazi attack on Russia, but the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact of 1941 left China alone in the war against Japan on the mainland of Asia. In one of the most controversial incidents of World War II, Roosevelt at the Yalta Conference acceded to Stalin's demand for an enhanced status for Russia in the Far East at the expense of China, and he later pressured Chiang Kai-shek into acquiescence. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union promised to respect Chinese sovereignty and to give moral and material support to the National Government of China.

Relations with Germany, 1939-1941. The German occupation of Czechoslovakia in March, 1939, left few doubts regarding Hitler's intentions or the imminence of war. At this critical stage the Soviet leaders appear to have appraised their position something like this :

We cannot count on the British and the French. We have left three possible courses : (1) Resist Germany and enter a war in which we may have no powerful allies and for which we are unprepared. (2) Do nothing, but let Hitler add Polish resources and manpower to his own and station his great war machine on hundreds of miles of the Russian border, poised for the long-advertised *Drang nach Osten*. (3) Collaborate with Hitler for the time being, thus avoiding immediate war, allowing us time for greater rearmament, giving us a buffer zone, and diverting to us some of the Polish potentials that would otherwise go to Hitler ; this course will at the same time let the Axis states and the democratic states exhaust their strength against each other, which is precisely what each of those groups of states would be willing to have us do with the other group.

On August 24, 1939, a joint communiqué announcing the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact stunned most of the world.

From August, 1939, to June, 1941, the Soviet Union appeared to collaborate with Nazi Germany, but in fact relations soon became strained. Never trusting or complacent, the Russians continued the speed-up of military and industrial preparations. Warnings poured into Moscow from many sources, including Britain, France, and the United States, that the Germans might be planning a surprise attack. The blow fell on Sunday, June 22.²¹

"The Strange Alliance." In a single day Hitler and the Communist propagandists transformed "the imperialist war" into "the great patriotic war." Summoned by their leaders to rise in defense of "Mother Russia" — not, be it noted, to defend communism or promote world revolution—the soldiers and plain people of Russia responded magnificently to the challenge of the Nazi invaders. Churchill and Roosevelt instantly proclaimed support of Russia, and Stalin assured his countrymen of "loyal allies in the peoples of Europe and America." The United States alone sent more than eleven billion dollars in Lend-Lease aid to the U.S.S.R.

On the surface "the strange alliance" worked well ; but we now know that relations were never easy or truly cordial. The Soviet Government gave little credit to its Western allies for the materials which it received, treated their representatives with coolness and restricted their movements, was almost pathologically secretive about its military needs, and refused to allow the Americans and British to use Russian airfields and other facilities freely. We also know now that the Soviets made a number of peace overtures to Germany in 1943 and 1944,²² and that they were continually and consciously making plans for exploiting the postwar situation.

During the war several conferences of top-ranking leaders of Britain, Russia, and the United States were held, notably the meeting of the foreign ministers in Moscow in October, 1943, and the two conferences of Churchill and Roosevelt with Stalin, at Teheran in November-December, 1943, and at Yalta in February, 1945.²³ The avowed purpose of all these

²¹ For a penetrating analysis of the background and causes of the German attack on Russia in June, 1941, see John A. Lukacs, "The Story Behind Hitler's 'Biggest Blunder,'" *New York Times Magazine*, June 17, 1951.

²² Walsh, p. 275. In the captured files of the German Foreign Office were secret documents relating to Nazi-Soviet peace overtures in 1943. These documents have not yet been published. In his syndicated column of Feb. 25, 1948, Drew Pearson stated that the U. S. State Department had planned to publish them, but reversed its decision because of protests from the French and British Governments. The reason for the protests, according to Pearson, is that "the Russians have a series of documents which, if published, will make the British look just about as sick as the Russians. What the Russians have is the records of secret conversations.....in which the British tried to persuade Hitler to go to war against Russia." The Russians themselves have repeatedly charged that the British and Americans secretly negotiated with the Germans between 1941 and 1943. In the fourth reply to the published documents on *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941*, the Russians listed specific instances when, they alleged, British or American representatives met with German agents for the purpose of "betraying their Russian Ally." See "Falsifiers of History and Historical Notes," Feb. 16, 1948 ; summarized in the *New York Times*, Feb. 17, 1948.

²³ The texts of the official statements issued at the Moscow, Teheran, and Yalta Conferences, and the secret agreements made at Yalta, are printed in Ruhl J. Bartlett, ed., *The Record of American Diplomacy* (Knopf, 1947), pp. 658-671.


conferences was to agree on concerted measures for winning the war and for preparing for the peace that would follow. At Moscow Russia joined with Britain and the United States in announcing a determination to establish "a general international organization.....for the maintenance of peace and security" after the war. At Teheran, Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin announced their "complete agreement" on plans for the defeat of Germany. At Yalta the three leaders agreed on common policies for the occupation and control of Germany, for establishing order in Europe and assisting peoples formerly under Nazi domination to regain their freedom, for Russia's entry into the war against Japan in return for major concessions in the Far East, and for convening a United Nations Conference to draft a charter for the proposed world organization.

Within two weeks after the Yalta Conference the Soviet Union began to violate the Declaration on Liberated Europe. In direct defiance of the spirit and letter of the Yalta Agreements, Vyshinsky undertook a mission to Southeastern Europe for the purpose of imposing Soviet-controlled regimes on the countries of that area. Shortly afterwards the Soviet Union showed an equally flagrant disregard of her commitments in the agreements on Poland and Germany. Instead of encouraging the formation of a "Polish Provisional Government of National Unity," she gave her full support to the Lublin regime which she had sponsored, and concluded with this regime a treaty confirming Poland's new western boundary, which the United States and Britain had refused to recognize. She also began to give every indication of ignoring her agreements regarding four-power control of Germany. Toward the end of his life President Roosevelt, who had gambled so heavily on continued Russian cooperation in the post-war period, made several strong protests, including direct appeals to Stalin. They were ignored.

THE POST-YALTA SHIFT

For at least eight years — until 1953 — postwar Soviet foreign policy was characterized by growing hostility to the West, by increasing tendencies toward noncooperation and isolation, by consolidation of the Soviet orbit, and by general intransigence. These tendencies were encouraged by Soviet reinterpretation of national interests, especially the means to security, and by the strong reaction of the leading states of the non-Communist world to Russian moves and techniques. They were undoubtedly also influenced by the re-emphasis on Marxist-Leninist doctrinairism and the subordination of all cultural and intellectual activity to the interests of the Party.

Until 1947 or 1948 the general orientation of Soviet policy was somewhat obscured by the subtle and indirect means with which it was being forged, and by the tendency of non-Communist statesmen to confuse tactics with strategy. From 1948, when the Communists became more



Kukrinikst in Pravda

"Welcome for 'General Plague' in Europe."



Gurov in Komsomolskaya Pravda

"A foreign-born person has no place in America."



Kukrinikst in Pravda

"American gestapo in Korea."



Dolgorukov in Komsomolskaya Pravda

"Right hand knows what the left is doing."

FOUR RUSSIAN VIEWS OF AMERICA

overt in their propaganda and policies both at home and abroad, until the death of Stalin in March, 1953, the emphasis was clearly on conflict. During this period the "cold war" became "hot war" on a limited scale in Korea, and it threatened to erupt into total war at almost any moment. It is apparent now that the Soviet leaders were undertaking, as a conscious and deliberate policy, what Philip Mosely has called a "post-Yalta shift from limited co-operation to an attitude of sharp rivalry."

Stalin's death was followed by evidences of a struggle for leadership and by the emergence of internal economic problems and of more flexible and cooperative policies within the Soviet orbit and toward non-Communist states. The repeated Soviet emphasis on the theme of "peaceful co-existence," and the Soviet concessions which made possible truces for Korea and Indo-China, a state treaty for Austria, the renewal of discussions on disarmament and on the future of Germany, and the "summit" meeting in the summer of 1955, encouraged many observers to hope that the "new look" in Soviet policy presaged a happier era in international relations. But most seasoned observers warned that the "new look" was not so new after all, and that there was little evidence that the new leaders of the Soviet Union were following different objectives from those which were laid down by Lenin and Stalin and which had been pursued relentlessly with only an occasional shift in tactics.

The Renewed Emphasis on Marxist-Leninist Doctrinairism. The general intransigence of postwar Soviet foreign policy, its tendencies toward isolation, suspicion, and aloofness, and its strong anti-Western and particularly anti-American bias, may be explained as a reflection of the basic Marxist-Leninist interpretation of international relations — including inevitable conflict and "capitalist encirclement" — and of the determined efforts of the Soviet leaders to purify the Party, to strengthen its discipline, to sharpen its doctrinal attitude after the period of "loose deviationism" resulting either from too close association of Russian troops with the outside world or from the lack of proper indoctrination, and in general to gain control over all aspects of national life and thought.

Statements of Soviet leaders support this interpretation. One of the earliest of these was Kalinin's address in Moscow early in 1945, in which he warned of the danger of "capitalist encirclement" after the war. Perhaps the most significant statement was Stalin's election speech of February 9, 1946, in which he rejected the idea of whole-hearted cooperation with other countries and forcefully restated the Marxist-Leninist thesis that conflict was inevitable as long as capitalism survived.

In September, 1947, Zhdanov called upon Communists in all countries to lead the fight against the "imperialist aggressors," and proclaimed the now familiar thesis of the two camps, the "imperialist" camp headed by the United States and the "anti-imperialist" camp led by the Soviet Union. Early in 1949 the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared in an official statement that the North Atlantic Treaty was convincing proof "that the ruling circles of the United States and Great Britain have adopted an

openly aggressive political course, the final aim of which is to establish by force Anglo-American domination over the world, a course which is fully in accord with the policy of aggression, the policy of unleashing a new war pursued by them."²⁴ Pronouncements of this same tenor were particularly virulent in 1952.

The New Pan-Slavism. Another postwar development — as yet of undetermined significance — relates to the Soviet leaders' manipulation of the concept of Pan-Slavism. The older Communist view, designed to reduce the rivalries of the many national groups which composed the Soviet Union, was that the separate nationalisms had been buried in the Revolution of 1917. This Pan-Slavism disappeared during the period of Nazi-Soviet "understanding" of August, 1939, to June, 1941, for real Pan-Slavism could not have acquiesced in the treatment accorded the Czechs and the Poles. With the German attack on Russia it emerged to serve as a rallying cry in the war against Hitler. By 1945 it had gained considerable vigor; Soviet leaders hoped that it would become "the vehicle of a common civilization — the civilization of communist Russia, of the Soviet Union, and of its leading people, the great Russian people."²⁵

Tito's defection in 1948 necessitated some ideological revisions. Not only was the Pan-Slav front obviously broken, but also it appeared that the equality of peoples implied in the Pan-Slav concept might suggest a certain freedom to follow the Yugoslav precedent. The new version was Pan-Russianism. It was used to make Great Russia and the Soviet Union almost identical. Slav equality gave way to Russian dominance. "There are signs," says Hans Kohn, "that the non-Russian peoples, Slavs as well as non-Slavs, do not sufficiently appreciate being constantly reminded of the deep gratitude which they owe to the 'great' Russian people and of their immutable dependence upon the leadership of the Russian people. It is not impossible that an enforced conformity and loyalty may prove a weakening factor in the vast Moscow empire....."²⁶

The "Iron Curtain." The effects of the renewed emphasis on Marxist-Leninist doctrinairism were even more marked on the domestic scene than in international relations. Apparently the Soviet leaders concluded that drastic measures were necessary to purify and strengthen the party, to rehabilitate the country, and to steel the Russian people to new endeavors and new sacrifices. "Stalin, it would seem, made an even greater mistake in allowing the Red Army to see Europe than in allowing Europe to see his Army."²⁷ The "iron curtain" was lowered from Stettin to Trieste

²⁴ The full text of this statement was printed in the *USSR Information Bulletin*, IX (Feb. 11, 1949), 79-87.

²⁵ Hans Kohn, "Pan-Slavism and World War II," *The American Political Science Review*, XLVI (Sept., 1952), 708. The above discussion of Pan-Slavism is largely based on Kohn's article. See also his *Pan-Slavism: Its History and Ideology* (University of Notre Dame Press, 1953).

²⁶ Kohn, "Pan-Slavism and World War II," p. 722.

²⁷ Sergius Yakobson, "Postwar Historical Research in the Soviet Union," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, CCLXIII (May, 1949), 126,

and soon divided the Communist from the non-Communist areas in more than a territorial sense.

Contacts with the West were reduced to a minimum, and were in fact confined almost exclusively to a few officials. Western diplomats in the Soviet Union were restricted in their movements and allowed to see only certain Russian officials. A few newspaper correspondents led a lonely existence in Moscow and some of the satellite states, but they were subject to expulsion at any moment or to arbitrary arrest and imprisonment. The arrest and trial of Robert Vogeler, an American businessman, in Hungary in 1950²⁸ and of William Oatis, a correspondent of the Associated Press, in Czechoslovakia in 1951 showed to what extent the Communists were prepared to go to seal off their world.

Control of Cultural and Intellectual Activity. The same considerations led to cultural purges. Soviet leaders undertook to determine what was correct economics, correct mathematics, correct history, correct international law, correct biology, correct music and correct art. By their decisions the greatest authorities in these and other fields were silenced or forced to recant. Among the victims of the Jovian displeasure of the Party hierarchy were persons world-famous in their special fields — Varga the economist,²⁹ Shostakovich the composer, Marr the linguistics expert, Alexandrov the historian-philosopher, and Orbeli the biologist. Other victims of the hierarchy's wrath were the Mendelian theory of heredity and, indeed, objectivity in every field. "Soviet scholars, the party insisted, were to be trusted, active Marxists, militant, partisan, and intolerant." A certain kind of "objectivity," however, was encouraged. "Partisanship in the proletarian world view," stated an official mouthpiece, "did not exclude objectivity in the study of facts, but on the contrary presupposed it, since the class interests of the proletariat do not contradict but coincide with the objective course of historical development."³⁰ The exact meaning of this "upside-down language" became even more elusive when, in 1948, "objectivism" was condemned as "an exaggerated attachment to facts."

In his capacity as "Politburo arbiter of intellectual production," Andrei Zhdanov frequently laid down the correct line for Soviet intellectuals. In the fall of 1946 he launched an attack on the popular literary magazines *Zvezda* and *Leningrad*, which resulted in the thorough revamping of the one and the suspension of the other. In the following summer he denounced Alexandrov's *History of Western European Philosophy* and severely castigated ninety of the leading philosophers of the Soviet Union

²⁸ For official U. S. protests and other action in the Vogeler case, see issues of the *Department of State Bulletin* of Jan.-March, 1950. Vogeler was released in 1951. For Vogeler's own story, see *I Was Stalin's Prisoner*, with Leigh White (Harcourt, Brace, 1952).

²⁹ Varga made the mistake of concluding, on the basis of his research, that the capitalist economic system, especially in the United States, had shown unexpected vitality and strength during the war, and that its collapse was less imminent than had been supposed. See Frederick C. Barghoorn, "The Varga Discussion and Its Significance," *American Slavic and East European Review*, VII (Oct., 1948), 214-236.

³⁰ Yakobson, p. 127.

"for their lack of courage, originality, and energy." On many other occasions he demanded that Soviet intellectuals beware of foreign influences and form an ideological front in support of the Communist Party and Marxist-Leninist doctrine.⁸¹

Scholars who worked in particularly dangerous fields tried to lessen the occupational hazards by adulation of the party leaders and by avoiding as far as possible any subject which might be remotely controversial. Some of the major works in history and allied fields were hardly more than propaganda tracts, useful only as proof of the mental straitjacket which even the greatest of Soviet thinkers had to wear. This stricture could be laid on such potentially important works as the three-volume *History of Soviet Diplomacy*, edited by V. P. Potiemkine.

The writing of "correct" history in Soviet Russia today is not the comparatively simple matter of exalting earlier heroes of the Communist Party and all their works; indeed, such a course leads almost certainly to disaster. The historian must banish from his mind such bourgeois confessions of futility as that the past cannot be adjusted to serve the present. He must write from the conviction that "history is politics projected into the past." He quotes or fails to quote, mentions or fails to mention, at his peril, for yesterday's words or yesterday's heroes may be today's anathema.⁸² The difficulties of laying down the official party line are illustrated by the fate of the great multi-volume *Soviet Encyclopedia*, which was supposed to sum up all Communist knowledge and wisdom. The first edition took something like a quarter of a century to compile, and it is now proscribed because of its doctrinal "errors."

The Strategy of Peace. Ever since the Communists came into power in Russia they have insisted that they are the true friends of peace and that the leaders of capitalist states are "warmongers." They have used peace appeals as instruments of foreign policy to gain recruits for the Communist cause and to divert attention from acts which belie their profession of peaceful intentions.⁸³


Four Soviet "offensives" of the postwar years deserve attention: (1) the "World Peace Movement" of 1949-1950, (2) the Stockholm Peace Appeal of 1950, (3) the mid-1951 offensive, and (4) the post-Stalin offensive.

The World Peace Movement grew out of a series of "peace congresses" held in 1949-1950 in many cities of the world, including Paris, London, New York, and Mexico City. The sponsoring organization, called "Partisans of Peace," established an executive bureau in Paris, and through it succeeded in encompassing "virtually all important front organizations" through which the Communists were then "appealing for support to labor.

⁸¹ Yakobson, p. 126; see also Percy Corbett, "Postwar Soviet Ideology," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, CCLXIII (May, 1949), 45.

⁸² See Bertram D. Wolfe, "Operation Rewrite: The Agony of Soviet Historians," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXI (Oct., 1952), 39-57.

⁸³ See Leon Dennen, *The Soviet Peace Myth*, a pamphlet issued by the National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc., n. d.



Cummings in The London Daily Express

"But We're Peaceful — The Russian Army Hasn't Fired a Shot"

women, youth, and other 'peace loving' people." The World Congress of the Partisans of Peace became "the leading over-all Communist-front organization in the world."³⁴ Its World Peace Movement promoted three noteworthy enterprises. The first was an unsuccessful effort to incite strike to close European ports to American shipments of arms under the Mutual Security Program. The second was an attempt to mobilize worldwide support for peace proposals similar to those introduced by the Soviet Union in the UN. The third enterprise became the second of the four postwar peace offensives that we have noted.

The Stockholm Peace Appeal was initiated by the World Congress of the Partisans of Peace at a meeting in Stockholm in March, 1950. The objective was to collect millions of signatures to a simple declaration against the use of atomic weapons. By August the Congress claimed that nearly 275,000,000 persons had signed, including 1,350,000 Americans. Obviously, many haters of war signed the Appeal in good faith, too easily forgetful of Russia's atomic backwardness, her massing of terrible non-atomic weapons, and the Communist aggression then getting under way in Korea.

³⁴ "Delegates from World Congress of Partisans of Peace Refused Entry to U.S.," *Department of State Bulletin*, XXII (March 13, 1950), 400-401.

The peace offensive of mid-1951 consisted of friendly declarations and peaceful-coexistence sentiments diffused throughout the Western world through radio, the press, and even the United Nations. It carried with it some relaxation of censorship, even to the extent of accepting a half-joking proposal for the publication in both Britain and the Soviet Union of an exchange of statements by spokesmen of the two countries. The Russian press also was permitted — or directed — to give full publicity to a not unfriendly exchange of letters between President Truman and “President” Shvernik of the U.S.S.R. As no deeds accompanied Soviet words and as the propaganda blasts were quickly resumed, the peace offensive was credited by most of the West to an attempt to slow down Western rearmament and to enervate the Atlantic Community.

The post-Stalin peace offensive was certainly the most extensive, the most subtle, and the most successful of all. In this offensive, deeds were added to words, and some discernible progress was made in the improvement of relations with the West. We shall return to this phase of Soviet conduct in our later discussion of the “new look.”

SOVIET DIPLOMACY SINCE YALTA

The areas in which the Soviet Union is most interested and in which she can most effectively bring her diplomacy to bear are naturally those contiguous to her. Here she must erect her defense barriers or launch her threatened conquests, as the case may be. There are three or possibly four such areas. One is the Middle East, another the Far East, and another Germany. A fourth area, comprising the satellite states of Eastern Europe, is in a somewhat anomalous position, being neither in the Soviet Union nor apart from her. Consequently we shall reserve the satellite area for separate discussion.

Middle East Perspective. The misery, chaos, social and economic injustices, and nationalistic fanaticism which are marked characteristics of the Middle East today offer the Communists a fertile field for propaganda and subversion. Their shadow falls athwart an immense area, and their influence may be detected in nearly all of the troubled spots, whether Cairo, Jerusalem, or Teheran. For the first decade after World War II they gained no major victories in the Middle East and in fact suffered some serious rebuffs; but they established contacts with various discontented groups and established the basis for the exploitation of grievances and frictions. In recent years they have scored some obvious successes in the Arab world, through arms deals, economic assistance, and propaganda campaigns.

No sizable Communist parties exist anywhere in the Middle East — Mohammedanism seems to be an effective barrier against them — but as was demonstrated by the vandalism of the Tudeh Party in Iran during the flare-up over the nationalization of the oil properties, even small Com-

munist groups can stir up a lot of trouble when conditions are favorable. As Sir Olaf Caroe has remarked, apropos of Communist activities in the Middle East, "while the waters are troubled, they will be fished." In the Middle East the waters are very troubled, and Communists are forever fishing.

The Turkish Straits. In 1946 the Soviet Union demanded a "new regime" for the Straits, one to be controlled by "Turkey and other Black Sea Powers." Turkey and the Soviet Union, she proposed, should "organize joint means of defense of the Straits." Well aware of the implications of the demands, the Turkish Government, with the strong encouragement of Great Britain and the United States, rejected them. Instead, it joined the two Western powers in proposing a conference to revise the Montreux Convention. The Russians did not respond favorably to this suggestion. Soviet intentions since then have been reflected mostly in Russian newspaper demands for the cession of Turkish territory along the Caucasian frontier.

The Turks have shown a sturdy independence and a determination to resist Soviet pressures, and they are well aware of the seriousness of the Soviet threat. They have the strongest government in the Middle East, and since 1947 it has been further strengthened by military aid and other substantial evidences of support from the United States. Turkey is quite willing to associate with Western and other states in measures for collective self-defense, and she is proud of the role that her troops played in resisting Communist aggression in Korea. At the Bandung Conference her foreign minister was outspoken in his criticism of "Communist imperialism."

Iran. As the end of the war approached, the Soviet Union revealed her aims in Iran by three major moves. First, she revived the demand for an oil concession. In 1944 an Assistant Commissar went to Teheran to negotiate such a concession, but he returned to Moscow empty-handed. Second, she tried to stir up a revolt in the Iranian province of Azerbaijan and to set up a puppet regime there. Late in 1945, when the province proclaimed itself an autonomous state, Russian forces prevented the Iranian Government from sending troops to suppress the revolt. Iran appealed to the Security Council of the United Nations. In April, 1945, the Soviet Union promised to withdraw her troops from all of Iran in return for the formation of a joint Soviet-Iranian oil company. With the departure of the Soviet troops the puppet regime in Azerbaijan collapsed, and the Iranian Government re-established its authority. To Russia's deep chagrin the Majlis, after a delay of nearly a year and a half, refused to ratify the oil agreement.³⁵

With the assassination of Premier Ali Razmara in March, 1951, and the

³⁵ Sir Olaf Caroe, *Wells of Power* (London, 1951), pp. 72-76; Harry N. Howard, "The Soviet Union and the Middle East," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, CCLXIII (May, 1949), 184-186; George E. Kirk, *A Short History of the Middle East from the Rise of Islam to Modern Times* (London, 1948), pp. 262 ff.

formation of a government headed by Mohammed Mossadegh, Iranian nationalism reached new heights of fanaticism. The chief object of attack was the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, whose vast properties in Iran were expropriated. This situation gave the Russian Communists an excellent opportunity for their third move : to pose as champions of Iranian independence from Western imperialism. The Soviet Union officially remained aloof from the imbroglio, but her propaganda agencies gave full attention to the events in Iran.

Since the fall of Mossadegh in 1953 and the settlement of the oil dispute, the political and economic situation in Iran had greatly improved. The strong anti-Western feeling has subsided, and the Tudeh (Communist) Party has been outlawed. Iran has associated herself with Britain, Iraq, Pakistan, and Turkey in the Bagdad Pact. She is no longer a gaping hole in the "northern tier" of states that forms the Middle Eastern frontier of the Soviet Union.

Israel. The Soviet Union, at least until World War II, had posed as a friend and protector of the Arab world. She showed little sympathy for Zionism, holding that it was "a theocratic bourgeois doctrine, unworthy of support." With the emergence of the new Jewish state of Israel and its successful resistance to the Arab armies, however, the Soviet Union showed a willingness to abandon the Arabs and to embrace the cause of Israel. But Russian solicitude for Israel was short-lived. Soviet purges of early 1953 seemed to have a definite anti-Jewish cast ; and in February the Kremlin severed diplomatic relations after the bombing of the Soviet Legation in Jerusalem. In more recent years Soviet anti-Semitism has led to attacks on Jews in "iron curtain" countries and to denunciations of Israel and Zionism as instruments of Anglo-American imperialism. The Soviet Union has extended military and economic assistance to Egypt and other Arab states. This aid accentuated the Near Eastern crisis of 1956.

Communist China. The Soviet Union, with almost no effort or cost, scored tremendous gains in East Asia in 1945. These came chiefly as a result of the Yalta Agreement, the occupation of Manchuria by Russian troops, the Sino-Soviet Treaty of August 14, 1945, and the power vacuum created by Japan's defeat, China's weakness and division, Britain's inability to resume her former position, and the speedy withdrawal and demobilization of the United States. Russia was not slow to profit from the virtual removal of the once formidable counterweights to her ambitions in East Asia. She obtained the concessions in the Far East which had been promised to her at Yalta and in the Sino-Soviet Treaty, but she soon violated many of the pledges she had made in return. In Manchuria she stripped the industrial plants, and withdrew her forces in such a way as to aid the Chinese Communists and frustrate the efforts of the Nationalists to occupy this vital area. Although she remained officially aloof from the civil war which began in China in 1946, at no time did she give aid and support solely and "entirely" to the Nationalist Government, as she had promised. When the People's Republic of China was proclaimed

on October 1, 1949, Russia abandoned all pretense at impartiality and recognized the new regime with great fanfare on the following day.

To what extent the Russians influence their ideological brothers in China can of course only be guessed, although it is obvious that the influence is great. The leaders of Chinese Communism came to power through their own efforts; they have a large army and the resources of a vast country at their disposal, and China is so situated geographically and strategically that a more independent course than the Kremlin usually tolerates is quite possible. The Soviet leaders seem to have taken to heart some of the lessons of the Yugoslav defection, and they appear to be treating Communist China with more deference and leniency than they show to the European satellite states.

In December, 1949, Mao Tse-tung visited Moscow, presumably for the first time. At the end of his visit, in February, 1950, the Soviet Union and China announced the signing of a Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Aid, with two supplementary agreements, one confirming Russian rights in Manchurian railways and in Port Arthur and Dairen, with a pledge by the U.S.S.R. to abandon these areas by 1952, the other promising a Soviet credit of \$300,000,000 to China.³⁶ As later modified, these agreements provided for Soviet withdrawal from the Changchun Railway in Manchuria, in accordance with the pledge of 1950, but they also stipulated that Soviet troops could remain in Port Arthur, contrary to the 1950 commitment, "until such time as peace treaties between the Chinese People's Republic and Japan and between the Soviet Union and Japan are concluded."³⁷

In late September and early October, 1954, a Soviet delegation headed by Khrushchev, Bulganin, Mikoyan, and Shvernik visited Peiping, supposedly to attend ceremonies commemorating the fifth anniversary of Communist China. One result was the signing of a series of "seven accords" dealing with Chinese-Soviet relations, the international situation, relations with Japan, Port Arthur, mixed Soviet-Chinese companies, technical assistance, and railroads.³⁸ Russia agreed to evacuate Port Arthur by May, 1955, to extend another long-term loan of \$130 million, to sell her share in four joint Soviet-Chinese companies, to help China undertake fifteen heavy industry projects, and to build two railroads from Central China to the Russian border. She gave Red China her moral support but not a specific commitment regarding Formosa. The two countries expressed their "deep sympathy for Japan and the Japanese people" and urged Japan to "take the path of liberation from foreign dependence."

³⁶ The texts of the Sino-Soviet treaty of Feb. 14, 1950, and of the supplementary agreements were printed in the *USSR Information Bulletin*, X (Feb. 24, 1950), 108-110. An official summary of the agreements of March 27 appears in the issue of April 14, 1950.

³⁷ The text of the Sino-Soviet communiqué of Sept. 16, 1952, was printed in the *New York Times* of the same date.

³⁸ For the text of the Soviet-Chinese Communist communiqué on the seven accords, see the *New York Times*, Oct. 12, 1954.

The precise roles of the Soviet Union and Communist China in Korea, and their relations with the Communist government of North Korea, cannot be determined. Presumably the Communist leaders of both countries participated in planning the attack of June, 1950, the Chinese intervention in November, and the general direction of the campaign against the United Nations forces. In Korea itself the Russians kept in the background.

Japan. The conclusion of a peace treaty for Japan was delayed until 1951 because of the inability of the Soviet Union and the United States to agree on either methods of procedure or treaty terms. The American position was generally supported by most of the non-Communist nations directly concerned. After the problem of Chinese representation had been "resolved" by deciding to invite no delegation from China, the United States issued invitations to no less than fifty nations still theoretically at war with Japan to attend a conference at San Francisco on September 4, 1951, for the purpose of concluding a peace treaty with Japan. Russia caused a mild diplomatic surprise by accepting the invitation and sending a delegation headed by Deputy Foreign Minister Gromyko ; but her delegates refused to sign the treaty. Technically, the U.S.S.R. is still at war with Japan.

When the Japanese peace treaty officially became effective, on April 28, 1952, the Soviet Government repeated its strong protests against the whole proceeding. It also objected to the security treaty between the United States and Japan, to the abolition of the Far Eastern Commission, and to all other logical corollaries of the new status of Japan. Russia and the Soviet bloc long refused to acquiesce in Japan's re-entry into the family of nations ; in September, 1952, Malik cast the Soviet Union's fifty-first veto to keep Japan out of the UN.

Since the Japanese are faced with the necessity of expanding foreign trade as a matter of national survival, it is natural that they should look to the potential markets and sources of supply in areas close to their shores, even in Communist lands. They seem to be willing to risk the political pressures and complications that may attend closer economic ties. The new orientation of Japan's foreign policy has coincided with the "new look" in Russia ; and both these developments have changed the pattern of Soviet-Japanese relations. Months of negotiations finally — in October, 1956 — resulted in a joint declaration ending the eleven-year state of war. The settlement of territorial claims was deferred until the meeting of a peace conference, the date for which was not set.

The Soviet Position in Germany. The leaders of the Soviet Union are well aware of the crucial importance of Germany. Their zone in Eastern Germany gives them a salient thrust far into the heart of Europe, and hence either a bridgehead for further expansion or an anchor for their defensive moves. They seem to be following a consistent pattern of integrating Eastern Germany as rapidly as possible with the Soviet orbit, while at the same time they hold out the attractive bait of German unification. If Russia could gain the support of a Communist-dominated Ger-

many, or even of an independent Germany oriented in her direction, she would gain an immense advantage in the power struggle.

In this curious endeavor to treat Germany as a defeated nation and yet to pursue her as a potential ally, to achieve security against a future German threat and to win the loyalty and allegiance of the German people, the Soviet Union possesses both advantages and disadvantages. Among her advantages are her position as the dominant power in all of Eurasia ; the strength of the Red Army and heavy military concentrations in Eastern Germany and nearby areas ; her firm control over nearly 20,000,000 Germans in her occupation zone — who become in a sense hostages to fortune ; her propaganda which harps on the beauty of life in Eastern Germany and on the ugliness of life and politics in Western Germany, and which presents the Soviet Union as the true champion of peace and of German freedom and unity and the West German state as a puppet in the hands of the war-minded powers, particularly the United States. Her disadvantages include the strong anti-Russian and anti-Communist feelings of most Germans ; resentment of the Russian and Polish annexations of former German territory and the eviction of millions of Germans from this territory, of the heavy reparations exactions and the stripping of German factories, of the retention of many thousands of German prisoners somewhere in the U.S.S.R. ; and the oppressive tactics which the Russians have followed in their zone of occupation.

Wartime Decisions Regarding Germany. During the period of "the strange alliance" representatives of Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States held several discussions on questions relating to Germany. Many important decisions were made at Yalta, and a comprehensive agreement on Germany was negotiated at Potsdam. The decisions at Yalta included the procedure for reparations payments, arrangements for the occupation of Germany, with each state to control a particular zone — with a French zone to be created out of the areas assigned to Britain and the United States — and an agreement in principle that Poland should get territories in East Prussia and Upper Silesia. Both Churchill and Roosevelt made it very clear at Yalta that in their opinion the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should be made at the peace conference, and the Potsdam Agreement contains a clear statement to this same effect. Yet the Russians have insisted that Britain and the United States did accept the present western boundary of Poland.

The Potsdam Agreement covered the political and economic principles which were to govern the treatment of Germany, reparations claims and procedures, the disposal of the German merchant marine, territorial changes in Eastern Germany, the trial of war criminals, and the orderly transfer of German populations (which actually became the forced uprooting and transportation of some eight million people). Disputes over the interpretation of the Potsdam Agreement began almost at once, and so did violations. The procedure for joint occupation and four-power collaboration in Germany, with the Allied Control Council as the coordinat-

ing body for the four zones and with the Kommandatura serving a similar function in the government of Berlin, proved to be unsatisfactory from the outset. No solution except the division of the defeated country, and of its capital, into separate zones seemed possible, and the occupying powers were faced from the beginning with the necessity of trying to make the best of a bad situation.

Soviet Reparations Claims. Basing their claim upon the secret understanding reached at the Yalta Conference by Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin that the figure of twenty billion dollars in reparations should be taken "as a basis for discussion," Soviet representatives insisted on this figure, particularly the amount of ten billions which they demanded for the U.S.S.R. In the absence of agreement the Soviet Union went ahead with heavy exactions, nominally at least for reparations, in the eastern part of Germany. The experiment with wholesale dismantling of plants and their removal to the Soviet Union proved to be so unsatisfactory and caused such hostile repercussions that after the summer of 1946 the Russians transferred to themselves the title to many German plants and operated them in Germany "as Soviet properties for the reparations account." Most other industries in Eastern Germany have been nationalized and are operated as municipal, state, or zonal industries.³⁹

East-West Competition in Germany. Efforts of the occupying powers to agree on unified policies toward Germany in implementation of the Potsdam Agreement proved generally futile almost from the beginning. By the summer or fall of 1946 further attempts at coordinated action had been largely abandoned, and each side began to concentrate on consolidation and development of its area and on attempts to win the support of the German people against the other. Since 1947 the differences between the Soviet Union and the Western powers over Germany have been so great and so fundamental that no appreciable progress has been made in one of the most crucial sectors of the "cold war." In Chapter 15 we described Allied policies in Western Germany, notably the steps to bring into existence a West German state and to associate it with Western Europe. Russia protested bitterly against every one of them and denounced the Western powers for the open violations of the Potsdam Agreement. Two of the Soviet measures of retaliation, or of unilateral action, were particularly significant. These were the Berlin blockade and the establishment of the "German Democratic Republic" in the Soviet zone, also described in Chapter 15.

East Germany. In October, 1949, the Soviet Union sponsored the establishment of the "German Democratic Republic" in her occupation zone. This new government became the main vehicle for Soviet control in East Germany. Apparently this "democratic" republic has been integrated rather closely into the Soviet economic and political system. The Russians still depend primarily on the army of occupation, the militarized zonal

³⁹ Franz L. Neumann, "Soviet Policy in Germany," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, CCLXIII (May, 1949), 174-178.

police, the secret police and other agents, and the SED party. Konrad Adenauer declared in early 1953 that "the Soviet Zone is becoming a Soviet-Russian satellite state with increasing speed."⁴⁰

But integration into the Soviet system is apparently not to the liking of the East Germans. On June 17, 1953, hundreds of people in East Berlin staged an impromptu uprising which was crushed only when Russian tanks and troops were brought into action. The much-publicized photographs of Germans tearing up bricks in the streets to hurl at Russian tanks symbolized great courage, but these qualities were not enough to change the situation in the Soviet zone, and conditions remained basically unchanged. "If anything has changed," read an informed report of March, 1954, "it is that the anti-Communist leadership has been so seriously weakened by arrests and executions that the population will be incapable of organized resistance for some time to come."⁴¹

The East German Republic has a status somewhat different from that of the Soviet satellite states of Eastern Europe, but it is just as much under Russian control and is being integrated into the East European complex. While not a participant in the Mutual Security Treaty signed in Warsaw in May, 1955, it will undoubtedly fit into the evolving pattern of coordination in the Communist world until the Soviets show a real willingness to implement their pledges of German unification.

Communist propaganda for German unity makes a powerful appeal to many Germans, and poses a recurring dilemma for the Western powers. There is good reason for believing that in actuality the Russians would agree to the unification of Germany only under conditions which would make that nation readily susceptible to Soviet control ; but realists will not completely rule out the possibility that the Soviet Union may be willing to make real concessions in order to prevent a rearmed Western Germany from joining the Western powers. "If the Soviet proposals are serious," stated the *New York Times* on March 23, 1952, "it means that the Kremlin is ready to gamble on the risk of creating an independent, armed and 'neutral' Germany as an alternative to allowing West Germany to join the Allied camp." This prospect seemed even more likely in 1956 than in 1952, as the four-power meeting at the "summit" in the summer of 1955 and the subsequent negotiations on German issues made abundantly clear.

EASTERN EUROPE AND THE SATELLITE SYSTEM

An account of Russian policies in Eastern Europe may not belong in a chapter on Soviet foreign policy ; for, except for Yugoslavia and since

⁴⁰ "Germany and Europe," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXI (April, 1953), 363. For an excellent earlier discussion see Richard P. Stebbins, *The United States in World Affairs*, 1949 (Council on Foreign Relations, 1950), pp. 185-196.

⁴¹ "East Germany After Berlin," *Current Germany*, I (March, 1954).

October, 1956, possibly Poland as well, the "states" in that area are within the Soviet orbit, and all their policies are controlled from Moscow. "From the Soviet point of view there should be no 'international relations,' in the traditional meaning of the words between the U.S.S.R. and the satellite countries. They are to be replaced by relations of a 'new' or 'special' or 'higher' type."⁴² Nevertheless, much useful information bearing on Soviet policies and objectives in foreign affairs may be obtained from a study of the evolving pattern of control in Eastern Europe.

The Declaration on Liberated Europe. In the Declaration on Liberated Europe, agreed upon at the Yalta Conference in February, 1945, Stalin joined with Roosevelt and Churchill in the following pledge :

...the three Governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite state in Europe where in their judgment conditions require (A) to establish conditions of internal peace ; (B) to carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed peoples ; (C) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsible to the will of the people ; and (D) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.

A special Declaration on Poland promised that "the Provisional Government.....should.....be reorganized on a broader democratic basis."

Within a few weeks after the Yalta Conference, the Soviet Union had violated the pledges regarding the "liberated" former Axis satellite states in Eastern Europe and had begun the process of creating a Soviet orbit virtually sealed off from the outside world. There were obvious geographic, historic, and security reasons for the Soviet interest in this part of the world. Moreover, by their wartime policies the Allies had inadvertently facilitated Soviet designs there through the decision to launch a second front from Western Europe and through acquiescence in Russian demands that Soviet troops should occupy such key centers as Berlin and Prague. The "iron curtain" soon divided Eastern from Western Europe. Behind that curtain Soviet political influence was supreme. West of it, where the Red Army did not penetrate, communism was a disturbing but not a controlling force.

In the peace treaties of 1947 Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania were bound to "secure to all persons the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms" ; but these promises have been flagrantly violated. Britain and the United States have repeatedly protested against this disregard of treaty obligations, and the International Court of Justice has handed down a sharply critical opinion. Soviet Russia and her henchmen in Eastern Europe have violated the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe and the agreements regarding Poland and Yugoslavia, the United

⁴² Samuel L. Sharp, "Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe," *Foreign Policy Reports*, XXVI (Jan. 1, 1951), 182.

Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the armistice agreements, and the peace treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania.

Soviet Objectives in Eastern Europe. Among the many reasons for Soviet efforts to bring the states of Eastern Europe under complete domination, the following, at least, should be emphasized : (1) to dominate the buffer zone between the Soviet Union and the West, to establish "friendly" governments in the states in that area, and to indoctrinate and regiment the people so that they will be faithful satellites and dependable allies of the Soviet Union in the event of war ; (2) to orient the countries of Eastern Europe toward the Soviet Union, instead of toward the Western world, politically, economically, culturally, and in every other respect, and to eliminate Western influences and ties ; and (3) to make use of the economic resources of the area for rebuilding the Soviet economy and developing the economic strength which would be essential for the successful prosecution of another war.⁴⁸

It should be noted that the policies followed by Russia in Eastern Europe could be interpreted either as security measures or as vital first steps for further Soviet expansion. Certainly the Soviet leaders did not regard this area as a bridge between East and West ; they did everything in their power to destroy the bridge that already existed. The unanswered question was whether they regarded Eastern Europe as a security buffer zone or as a bridgehead.

The Pattern of Control. Soviet policies in Eastern Europe, with the exception of Yugoslavia and, more recently, Poland, have been very effective. It appears that the major objectives have been achieved although there are constant rumors and occasional appalling evidences of unrest behind the "iron curtain." Between 1945 and 1948 local Communist organizations, with the direct and indirect assistance of the U.S.S.R. — and especially with the visible presence and occasionally the active intervention of the Red Army — gained complete control in Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. In all of Eastern and Southern Europe only Finland, Greece, and Turkey escaped the Communist shackles.

The pattern of control was strikingly uniform, varying only with local conditions such as the strength of opposing parties and of democratic institutions, the extent of popular resistance, and the popularity or unpopularity of native Communist leaders. It made little difference whether a state had been associated with the Axis or had fought on the side of the United Nations, or whether the political parties and their leaders had collaborated with or had opposed the Russians. In the end their fate was the same.

At first the Communists participated in "Popular Front" governments, but they joined with the "bourgeois" parties only to destroy them. With

⁴⁸ John C. Campbell, *The United States in World Affairs, 1947-1948* (Council on Foreign Relations, 1948), pp. 450-451.

the assistance of the Red Army and Soviet political "advisers," native Communist leaders who had usually been trained in Moscow came into power through clever propaganda, economic and social reforms, and terrorism and intimidation. They secured key ministries, such as the ministry of interior and the ministry of information or propaganda. They saw to it that persons loyal to them occupied most of the important posts in the armed forces and in the police. With these two instruments in hand they moved swiftly to take over the press, the radio and other organs of information, industry, and the labor unions. Thus firmly entrenched, they were in a position to undermine other parties and to take over the machinery of the state.⁴⁴

In the establishment of the "people's democracies" the Communists, Russian and native, won considerable popular support. They were adroit in their propaganda appeals, especially in exploiting the weaknesses of other parties and institutions, in disguising their own real motives, and in posing as champions of needed economic and political reforms and as enemies of exploitation, whether by favored groups within the countries or by foreign nations. They ended all surviving monarchies in that area, and identified their most formidable political rivals, the peasant or Social Democratic parties, with collaboration with the Axis, with corrupt and conservative groups, and with faithless leadership. They attempted to woo the peasants of Eastern Europe by sponsoring land reforms, the nationalization of industries, and agricultural cooperatives.

Along with persuasion went ruthless terrorism. The opposition was intimidated and gradually liquidated, and opposition leaders were imprisoned or executed unless they had fled for their lives. War-crime and treason trials became vehicles for public "confessions," extracted by methods which combined medieval tortures with the diabolical application of modern techniques for breaking the human mind and spirit.

Even Communist parties in the satellite states were frequently "purged," especially after the Yugoslav defection in the summer of 1948. The peasant parties were greatly weakened by the arrest, exile, or defection of their leaders, and by their inability to resist those who controlled all the effective organs of power. After the Communists had been defeated in

⁴⁴ An examination of the steps leading to the taking over of any one of the states of Eastern Europe would provide a case study in the pattern of control. For the general picture see Hugh Seton-Watson, *The East European Revolution* (Praeger, 1951); David J. Dallin, *The New Soviet Empire* (Yale University Press, 1951); J. C. Harsch, *The Curtain Isn't Iron* (Doubleday, 1950); Campbell, pp. 444-452 ("Consolidation of the Soviet Bloc"); Dinko Tomasic, "The Structure of Soviet Power and Expansion," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, CCLXXI (Sept., 1950), 32-42; Bogdan Raditsa, "The Sovietization of the Satellites," *The Annals*, CCLXXI (Sept., 1950), 122-134 (see especially the blueprint for the sovietization of Yugoslavia which Tito received from the Comintern on May 9, 1941, quoted on pp. 124-126). Ferenc Nagy, *The Struggle Behind the Iron Curtain* (Macmillan, 1948) is an account of Soviet and Communist machinations in Hungary by a former Prime Minister. The sovietization of Poland is described in Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, *The Rape of Poland: Pattern of Soviet Aggression* (Whittlesey, 1948), and Arthur Bliss Lane, *I Saw Poland Betrayed* (Bobbs-Merrill, 1948).

relatively free elections in Hungary in 1945, they saw to it that no more elections were held until the campaign of indoctrination and intimidation had made deeper inroads and until the peasant parties had been weakened or destroyed.

The War against Religion. After the destruction or corruption of the peasant and "bourgeois" parties, the most formidable organized opposition to Communist rule in the satellite states came from religious groups, especially from those with ties with the West. "The Orthodox churches, by tradition and organization linked to the state authorities, were brought under control without great difficulty in Rumania and Bulgaria through the appointment of subservient church officials."⁴⁵ Protestant and Jewish church leaders were outspoken opponents of communism, but they were numerically few and relatively uninfluential. The most powerful resistance came from the Roman Catholic Church, which has been far more consistent in its opposition to communism than to fascism. In nearly every country of the Soviet bloc it had a large membership, and in Poland it was the dominant church. In every one of these countries the Communists in control have sought to dissolve Catholic organizations, to take over Catholic schools, and to destroy the influence of Catholicism.

Hungary was the great test case. There the Communists struck at Jozsef Cardinal Mindszenty, the Roman Catholic Primate of Hungary. In December, 1948, Mindszenty was arrested on charges of treason against the state and of espionage and lesser crimes. As the Communists defined treason, the Cardinal was undoubtedly guilty, for he had spoken out fearlessly against the developments in his native country. Although noted for his mental powers and physical courage, he acted at his trial as though he had been tortured or drugged, and he pleaded guilty to all charges.⁴⁶ Sentenced to life imprisonment, he was released during the uprising of October-November, 1956; a few days later, when Soviet forces surged back into Budapest, he took refuge in the American Legation.

Shortly after Mindszenty's trial an even more fantastic exhibition of Communist justice was staged in Bulgaria, where fifteen leading Protestant ministers, accused of treason and the other usual offenses, "competed with each other in tearful self-incrimination, expressions of contrition, and professions of loyalty and gratitude to the Bulgarian authorities who had enabled them to see the error of their ways. The defendants joined with the prosecution in turning the trial into a vast indictment of the pernicious influence of the United States and Great Britain."⁴⁷

Czechoslovakia. By 1948 the only state in Eastern Europe which had managed to escape Soviet domination was Czechoslovakia, democracy's

⁴⁵ John C. Campbell, *The United States in World Affairs, 1948-1949* (Council on Foreign Relations, 1949), p. 108.

⁴⁶ Campbell, 1948-1949, pp. 108-109; Stebbins, pp. 244-245; R. H. Markham, ed., *Communists Crush Churches in Eastern Europe* (Meador, 1945); Clarence A. Manning, "Religion Within the Iron Curtain," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, CCLXXI (Sept., 1950), 112-121.

⁴⁷ Stebbins, p. 246.

"slow window" to the East, whose economic and political ties bound her closely with the West. She had made a treaty with the Soviet Union in 1943, and in the postwar period had followed a conciliatory policy toward her powerful neighbor, hoping and apparently believing that cooperation might be an alternative to Communist domination. Her hopes were in vain, and in February, 1948, in a coup which reverberated throughout the world, Czechoslovakia too passed into the Communist camp.⁴⁸ For a few months the "iron curtain" revealed no rifts from Stettin on the Baltic to Trieste on the Adriatic.

The Tito Split. Not long afterward, however, a major rift did appear in the apparently monolithic structure of communism. It was caused by the Kremlin's denunciation of the policies -- or "heresies" --- of the Communist leaders of Yugoslavia, first announced to a startled world by the Cominform on June 28, 1948. As shown in documents issued by both sides shortly after the Cominform announcement, the break had been in the making for some time. Instead of recanting abjectly, as erring Communists were expected to do, Tito and his associates complained of Soviet attempts to interfere in Yugoslav affairs and denied the "unjust fabrications" of the Russian Communist Party; at the same time they declared their loyalty to Stalin and the Soviet Union, and defended their policies as completely in accord with Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Furthermore, their position was endorsed by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, although it was denounced without exception elsewhere in the Communist world.

Although the economic situation in their country became increasingly serious, the Yugoslav leaders showed no signs of weakening. Under these conditions they took a more conciliatory attitude toward the non-Communist states, but they continued to proclaim their allegiance to Communist principles. Yugoslavia entered into a number of agreements with Western powers. At first these related almost exclusively to trade and economic assistance; but as the emphasis in Western Europe shifted from recovery to defense Yugoslavia was given a limited amount of military assistance, and began to cooperate in a peripheral way in the joint defense efforts.

The "New Look" and Yugoslavia. Shortly after the death of Stalin the bitter Soviet attacks and organized pressures on Yugoslavia gave way to conciliatory gestures. Formal diplomatic relations were resumed, and trade between the two countries greatly increased. Russia supported a settlement of the Trieste question favorable to Yugoslavia. The climax of

⁴⁸ For the background and details of the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia in 1948, see *The Coup d'Etat in Prague*, Supplement III (A) to Report of Subcommittee No. 5 of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the United States House of Representatives on "The Strategy and Tactics of World Communism"; House Document No. 154, Part I, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (Government Printing Office, 1949). Also helpful: Dana Adams Schmidt, *Anatomy of a Satellite* (Little, Brown, 1952); Albion Ross, "The Communist Way: How Czechoslovakia Was Taken Over," and Drew Middleton, "Soviet Push Westward Long in the Making," *New York Times*, Feb. 29, 1948; and Dana Adams Schmidt, "'Coexistence' -- A lesson from History," *the New York Times Magazine*, Aug. 12, 1951.

the Russian campaign to establish a new relationship with Tito came in May, 1955, when top Soviet leaders, headed by Khrushchev, Bulganin, and Mikoyan, made an official visit to Yugoslavia. On his arrival in Belgrade, Khrushchev declared :

We sincerely regret what happened and resolutely reject the things that occurred, one after another, during that period. We...ascribe without hesitation the aggravations to the provocative role that Lavrenti P. Beria...and others—recently exposed enemies of the people—played ... For our part we are ready to do everything necessary to eliminate all obstacles standing in the way of complete normalization of relations between our states...The strongest ties are created among...those countries ...that base their activities on the teachings of Marxism-Leninism.

Apparently this open admission of error and equally open bid to Tito to return to the fold surprised and somewhat irritated the Yugoslavs, who seemed willing to discuss political and economic problems but showed no eagerness to return to the old state of affairs. A meeting of minds on ideological issues will be difficult, for, as C. L. Sulzberger has pointed out, if all the essential doctrines that established Titoism as a heretical form of communism were accepted by the Soviet Union, the "basis for its satellite empire and international Communist activities would be destroyed."⁴⁹ Nevertheless the abolition of the Cominform, the more flexible tactical and ideological position of the present leaders of the Soviet Union, and the deliberate wooing of Tito seem to have effected at least a partial reconciliation. Indeed, in the summer of 1956 leaders in the United States Congress began to urge a reconsideration of American aid programs as they affected Yugoslavia. In July, 1956, Edvard Kardelj, Vice-Premier of Yugoslavia since 1948, analyzed the bases of Yugoslav foreign policy in some detail in an article in *Foreign Affairs*.⁵⁰ He observed that relations with the Soviet Union had improved "greatly" and that they had become "stable and friendly." While expressing gratitude for American assistance, he declared that "Yugoslav-American relations cannot be based on the prospect of Yugoslavia joining the Western bloc." The true national interests of his country, added Kardelj, require for her "an active policy designed to support all trends toward peace and the peaceful elimination or blunting of antagonisms between blocs."

Possibly the Russians actually hope to lure Tito back to the international Communist camp ; but they certainly also have other and more immediate objectives in mind. In all probability they aim to create a better situation in the satellite states, to encourage Yugoslavia to maintain a neutralist position, to weaken her ties with the West, and to undermine her alliance with Greece and Turkey. Like the almost simultaneous concessions on Austria, Germany, and disarmament, the Russian pilgrimage to Belgrade was hailed in the non-Communist countries as a major reversal of Soviet

⁴⁹ Dispatch from Belgrade, May 31, 1955 ; in the *New York Times*, June 1, 1955.

⁵⁰ "Evolution in Yugoslavia," XXXIV (July, 1956), 580-602.

policy ; but it remains to be seen whether there moves actually did not put the Soviet Union in a stronger position to achieve even broader objectives.

The Coordination of Policies. Tito's defection in 1948, and the increasingly effective measures of the nations of the North Atlantic Community to counteract Soviet threats and pressures, caused the leaders of Soviet Russia to renew their efforts to strengthen their holds over the satellite states. These efforts have been pressed as vigorously during the period of the "new look" as they were from 1947 or 1948 to 1953. In fact, in some respects they have been intensified. If the Soviet leaders had any thought of relaxing their hold, they must have abandoned it as a result of the great uprising in Berlin in June, 1953. The Soviet reaction to the Paris agreements of 1954 regarding Germany was the Warsaw Conference, which established a more elaborate kind of regional organization east of the "iron curtain."

Four main agencies or instruments for strengthening the ties between the Soviet Union and the satellite states of Eastern Europe, in addition to the national Communist parties and Soviet representatives and "advisers," have been utilized : (1) a network of treaties of mutual assistance and cooperation ; (2) the Cominform ; (3) the so-called "Molotov Plan" and its Council for Mutual Economic Assistance ; and (4) the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

1. *The Soviet Treaty System.* On December 12, 1943, a "Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance, and Post-War Cooperation" between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia was signed in Moscow. This pact inaugurated a series of treaties between Russia and the states of Eastern Europe — with Yugoslavia (April 11, 1945), Poland (April 21, 1945), Rumania (February 4, 1948), Hungary (February 18, 1948), Bulgaria (March 18, 1948), and Finland (April 6, 1948). The treaty system was further extended by nearly twenty similar treaties among the Soviet-dominated European states themselves, beginning with the Yugoslav-Polish Treaty of March 18, 1946.⁵¹

2. *The Cominform.* In September, 1947, Communist leaders from nine European countries held an important meeting in Warsaw. Among them were two influential members of the Russian Politburo, Zhdanov and Malenkov. Zhdanov proclaimed the Soviet position on the Marshall Plan by declaring flatly that the Soviet Union would "bend every effort in order that this plan be doomed to failure." The principal decision of the conference was to establish a Communist Information Bureau, with headquarters in Belgrade, Yugoslavia. After the Tito "heresy," in July, 1948, these were hastily removed to Bucharest, Rumania.

The Cominform was nominally an organization of the Communist parties in the Soviet Union, in the Soviet satellite states of Eastern Europe, in France, and in Italy ; but it seemed to be in many ways a revived Comintern, a kind of coordinating agency for the worldwide Communist movement. Its official organ, which bore the intriguing title *For a Lasting*

⁵¹ Campbell, 1947-1948, p. 449 ; Campbell, 1948-1949, p. 115.



Peace, For a People's Democracy, was full of news of Communist activities all over the world. Many major pronouncements of Communist policy first appeared in its pages.

After 1948 the Cominform spearheaded the attacks on Tito as well as other campaigns of opposition to the heretic state. Its efforts were for the most part singularly ineffective, and it soon fell into disuse. As far as is known, it held no meetings after 1949. When the new leaders of the Soviet Union decided to court Tito instead of casting him into the outer darkness, the Cominform was deprived of its chief propaganda objective. In April, 1956, it was officially dissolved on the ground that it had "exhausted its uses" owing to the emergence of socialism from the confines of one country and to the "strengthening of many Communist parties in the capitalist, dependent and colonial countries."

3. *East-West Trade and the "Molotov Plan."* Historically, the chief markets of the states of Eastern Europe, particularly of Czechoslovakia and Poland, have been in Germany and to a lesser extent in Western Europe. Among the most significant postwar agreements which have been negotiated by countries on either side of the "iron curtain" were the trade agreements which Poland signed with France in December, 1948, and with Great Britain in January, 1949. Leaders of Western Germany also have looked hopefully to the revival of East-West trade as a partial solution for their economic problems. The United Nations, especially through the Economic Commission for Europe — the one surviving major link between East and West Europe — has assiduously explored and emphasized the opportunities for the expansion of this trade. The United States is officially on record as favoring this development, but in actuality her reluctance to do anything which might strengthen the Soviet system and the strong pressures from Congress and influential domestic groups have imposed formidable barriers.

The chief obstacle to the revival of East-West trade is undoubtedly the policy and outlook of the Soviet Union, which has been attempting — and with considerable success — to isolate the East European states from the West and to make them economic as well as political satellites of the U.S.S.R. By her trade pacts, her priority system, and her general policies the Soviet Union has been seeking "to expand the trade of East European countries with one another and with the U.S.S.R. at the expense of trade with the West."⁵² Apparently she hopes to integrate the economic systems of the orbit states and to develop a balanced regional economic unit under the leadership of an industrialized Czechoslovakia and Poland.

The term "Molotov Plan" came into general use after the countries of Eastern Europe had been directed not to participate in the Marshall Plan. Heralded as the Soviet answer to the Marshall Plan, it was designed to tighten the economic ties of the East European states with each other and with the Soviet Union. Actually it was hardly a plan at all ; and since all

⁵² Laurie Sharp, "The Molotov Plan Rolls over Eastern Europe," *United Nations World*, IV (Feb., 1950), 57.

of the states had adopted generally similar economic plans in the postwar period and had become oriented toward the Russian economy, a kind of "Molotov Plan" had been in existence for some time. The plan was given more definite form in January, 1949, by the creation of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. Little information is available on the Council's specific nature or activities.

4. *The Warsaw Treaty Organization.* A better coordination of Communist policies, especially in Eastern Europe, seems to have been agreed upon at the Warsaw Conference of May 11-14, 1955. Seven European satellite state and the Soviet Union approved a twenty-year mutual security treaty and a protocol placing their military forces under a supreme commander with headquarters in Moscow. According to Bulganin, the treaty was "not a closed one. All other states irrespective of their social and state regime can join it." East Germany, however, was temporarily excluded. Rumors that agreement had also been reached at Warsaw to establish a new type of political association, which might possibly supplant the Cominform, and to effect a greater degree of economic coordination seemed to be confirmed on June 4, when the *Neue Deutschland*, official organ of the Socialist Unity Party in Eastern Germany -- the governing Communist Party in that area -- published an important announcement by Walter Ulbricht, East German Communist leader. According to Ulbricht, at Warsaw the eight signatory nations to the mutual security treaty also agreed to establish "a joint body -- a Political Consultative Conference" which would "make it possible to coordinate policies and acts of all the signatory powers for the purpose of solving major problems." Moreover, announced Ulbricht, an even more ambitious plan for economic coordination had been adopted.⁵³ These developments suggested that a new type of association was being established and that a significant change was occurring in the Communist world.

THE "NEW LOOK"

On the eve of the August, 1952, meeting of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union -- the first since 1939 -- Stalin issued a 25,000-word statement of views on basic economic and political questions. This statement, now known as *Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.*, was "Stalin's last and most significant theoretical work."⁵⁴ It was described by *Pravda* as "the greatest event in the ideological life of the Party and the Soviet people." It provides some clues to the ideological orientation of the present Soviet leaders, for, as Bertram D. Wolfe has pointed out, the men "who now form the post-Stalinist 'collective leadership,' are the men Stalin

⁵³ For a summary of Ulbricht's significant announcement, see dispatch by M. S. Handler, dated Bonn, June 4, 1955, in the *New York Times*, June 5, 1955.

⁵⁴ Wolfe, "A New Look at the Soviet 'New Look'," p. 195. Quotations in this section not otherwise credited were taken from Wolfe's article.

gathered around him in his rise to personal dictatorship." Stalin's "Last Statement" heralded what is now commonly spoken of as the "new look" in Soviet Russia.

Stalin's Last Statement. Stalin in his statement laid down some propositions on the prerequisites for the transformation of the Soviet Union from the existing "Socialist" system to one of "complete communism," and others on the nature of international conflicts. While he reaffirmed many basic Communist theories, he did not hesitate to repudiate or to revise many concepts and propositions enunciated by Marx, Engels, Lenin, and himself. Rejecting the familiar interpretation of the inevitability of conflict between the "capitalist" and "socialist" worlds, he argued that in the existing situation, with the capitalist states virtually cut off from trade with Russia, China, and the Communist states, conflict among capitalist countries over markets was a stronger force than the "contradictions between the camp of capitalism and the camp of socialism." He reaffirmed the Socialist theory of international relations: "In order to destroy the inevitability of wars, it is necessary to destroy imperialism." Later, while reasserting his belief that war between "capitalist" and "socialist" countries was not imminent, Stalin discussed ways to promote wars between "capitalist" states and to encourage "struggles for liberation" and for the "overthrow of capitalism."

Change in Leadership. Developments and rumors in the fall of 1952 and the spring of 1953 convinced observers that the stage was being set for momentous changes in the Soviet Union. In the weeks following the Party Congress, reports of scandals, exposures, arrests, and purges filled the newspapers and created an air of tense expectancy in Moscow and elsewhere in Russia. "It was apparent to all in Moscow in February," reported Harrison Salisbury, "that great and sinister events were in the making"; there were "increasingly plain signs that something akin to dementia was taking hold of Stalin and that the country stood on the brink of a reign of terror....."⁵⁵ But on March 5, 1953, the death of Stalin was announced. Whatever plot had been hatched for his removal — if any at all — now evaporated, and the transfer of power was made in an outwardly peaceful way.

Immediately after the announcement of Stalin's death the new leaders of the Soviet Union took their posts. Malenkov became Chairman of the Council of Ministers (*i.e.*, Premier); Beria, Molotov, Bulganin, and Kaganovich became First Deputy Chairmen; Beria became Minister of Internal Affairs; Vyshinsky became Permanent Representative at the United Nations; Molotov replaced Vyshinsky as Foreign Minister; Bulganin resumed his former post as War Minister; and Voroshilov succeeded Shvernik as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R. — "President" of the U.S.S.R. A new Presidium of ten members and four alternates replaced the old one of twenty-five members and eleven candi-

⁵⁵ Harrison Salisbury, "Russia Re-Viewed," in the *New York Times*, Sept. 20, 1954.

date members. Its members were Malenkov, Beria, Molotov, Voroshilov, Khrushchev,⁵⁶ Bulganin, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Saburov, and Pervukhin.

Without exception all these men had been prominently identified with Soviet and Party politics. They were either old associates of Stalin, like Beria, Molotov, Bulganin, and Voroshilov, or protégés of Stalin and products of the new Russian bureaucracy, like Malenkov and Khrushchev. Many observers concluded that Malenkov and Beria were the two top leaders. Some believed that the new leaders would inevitably be drawn into a power struggle from which would again emerge a single leader.

The two men whom the "experts" generally rated as the strong men in the new regime soon lost out. Beria was the first to fall. There had been rumors that he had been in effect demoted in the Soviet hierarchy by orders of Stalin himself; but he remained in charge of the secret police and was clearly a formidable figure on the Russian scene. On July 10, 1953, *Pravda*, the CPSU organ, announced that he had been dismissed from all of his posts. He had become "a bourgeois renegade and an agent of international imperialism." Nearly six months later, on December 23, *Izvestia*, official organ of the Soviet Government, announced that Beria had "confessed" to all the charges against him, and that he and six accomplices had been shot. Beria's fall seemed to consolidate Malenkov's position, but less than two years after Stalin's death the new Premier was made the scapegoat for certain failures in Soviet policy, particularly on the domestic front. On February 10, 1955, he submitted his "request" to step down, saying that "lack of sufficient experience in local work" had led to his failure "to effect direct guidance of individual branches of national economy." In less than ten minutes the Supreme Soviet approved Malenkov's "request," and a short while later Bulganin was appointed Premier. Malenkov retained his membership in the Presidium of the CPSU and was assigned the posts of Deputy Premier and Minister of Electric Power Stations.

After Malenkov's demotion most observers believed that Khrushchev was the new Big in the Soviet Union and Bulganin hardly more than a figurehead.⁵⁶ This appraisal has been strengthened by developments since 1955, which have brought Khrushchev more and more to the front. The great question mark seems to be Khrushchev's relations with the Army, particularly with Marshals Zhukov and Konev.⁵⁷

The Downgrading of Stalin. "The Stalin myth was dead as soon as his

⁵⁶ See articles by Harry Schwartz and Harrison E. Salisbury in the *New York Times*, Feb. 9, 1955; also Philip E. Mosely, "Russia After Stalin," *Headline Series* No. 111 (Foreign Policy Association, May-June, 1955), pp. 9-22. According to a dispatch from Vienna in the *U.S. News & World Report* (May 13, 1955), the Austrian officials who went to Moscow to negotiate terms of the state treaty for Austria reached a somewhat different rating. They considered that the top three in Russia were Bulganin, Molotov, and Mikoyan, the middle four Kaganovich, Pervukhin, Khrushchev, and Saburov, and the bottom three Malenkov, Voroshilov, and Zhukov.

⁵⁷ Mosely, *Russia After Stalin*, pp. 19-22; Hanson W. Baldwin, "Soviet Power Struggle," *New York Times*, June 5, 1955; Franz Borkenau, "Battle of the Marshals," *The New Leader*, May 30, 1955.


body was cold," and his successors "began immediately a fresh rewriting of history to cut him down to size — not to actual size, but to their own size, so that there could be some sense in their claim to individual or collective succession." For one-man dictatorship was substituted the "Leninist" practice of "collective leadership" and the revival of the Party as an active political organism. At the Twentieth Party Congress, held in Moscow in February, 1956, the attacks on Stalin were openly pressed. In his opening report Khrushchev condemned the leader cult, and he mentioned Stalin's name only once in the course of a 50,000-word address. A few days later Mikoyan questioned the correctness of Stalin's *Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.* — a work which at the Nineteenth Party Congress in 1952 he had hailed as a masterpiece of Communist thought. He also praised a number of old Bolsheviks who had been purged during the Stalin era, referred sarcastically to Stalin's famous "Oath to Lenin," and called attention to Lenin's last testament, which contained some highly critical comments on Stalin. The Twentieth Congress closed with an address by Khrushchev in which, in the words of Philip E. Mosely, he depicted Stalin as a "bullheaded and uninformed meddler in military strategy" who was wrong in his nationality policy, stubborn in his Yugoslav policy, and addicted to fancying himself "an infallible genius."⁵⁸ After the Congress the anti-Stalin campaign was openly prosecuted, and most leaders in other Communist countries as well as in the Soviet Union soon joined in the chorus.

How can the downgrading of the Great God Stalin be explained? Possibly it represents a belated day of reckoning on the part of the present leaders of the Soviet Union, for they had been subjected to untold humiliations and perils while Stalin was alive. Or it may be an attempt to prevent the re-emergence of one-man dictatorship at a time when no likely candidate meets the specifications for the job. Or it may be a trimming of the pattern to fit the new men available. Or it may be the creation of a scapegoat for earlier Communist crimes and blunders, or a preliminary clearing of the way for new policies and maneuvers. "One can only infer," as Merle Fainsod has said, "that on balance the new rulers were persuaded that the Stalinist legacy was an incubus, which cast a shadow of distrust around the new regime and limited its freedom to strike out in new directions."⁵⁹

Change in Policies? The changes in Russia which followed the death of Stalin not only included changes in leadership but also seemed to involve changes in policies. The new leaders went out of their way to introduce a more flexible and relaxed note into their behavior and policies. In both domestic and foreign affairs so many concessions and changes

⁵⁸ "Soviet Foreign Policy : New Goals or New Manners?" *Foreign Affairs*, XXXIV (July, 1956), 541. For purported text of Khrushchev's address see *New York Times*, June 5, 1956.

⁵⁹ Merle Fainsod, "Russia's 20th Party Congress," *Foreign Policy Bulletin*, XXXV (May 1, 1956), 126.



Orr in The Chicago Tribune

The Red Napoleon — and His War Horse

were made that they gave a "new look" to Soviet policy. All over the world troubled people wondered what these changes meant. How "new" was the "new look"? Was it simply a shift in tactics, such as had occurred on several earlier occasions, or did it portend a fundamental reorientation of Soviet policy?

The domestic changes have included a new emphasis on consumer goods, a relaxation of many restrictions and controls, greater freedom of movement within the country, and deep concern with the general agricultural situation. Perhaps the greatest of all has been a willingness to admit mistakes of policy and to reverse courses of action which have not proved to be successful.

In foreign policy the new regime relaxed in many respects: visas for the U.S.S.R. became easier to obtain; many restrictions on travel within the country were modified; hundreds of foreign nationals were released from arbitrary imprisonment; some Soviet-born wives of foreigners were

allowed to leave the country ; many of the annoying restrictions on foreign diplomats and correspondents were ended ; official and unofficial delegations and visits by individual foreigners were encouraged, and those who came to Russia found a comparative affability. The Soviet Union agreed to a truce in Korea in 1953 and in Indo-China in 1954. After an originally negative reaction, she agreed to consider President Eisenhower's atom-for-peace proposals, and in May, 1955, she herself advanced some significant new proposals on disarmament and the international control of atomic energy. In March, 1954, Molotov proposed a European security pact open to the United States, and he declared his country ready to consider adherence to the North Atlantic Treaty, which Communist propagandists had consistently damned as an association of "warmongers." Reversing her traditional policy, the Soviet Union contributed to the United Nations Technical Assistance Program and insisted that her technicians and resources should be drawn upon. She also embarked on a kind of Point Four program of her own, and entered into technical assistance agreements with a number of countries, including India, Iran, and Afghanistan.⁶⁰ Relaxing elsewhere, in 1956 she issued a stamp in honor of Benjamin Franklin, "Great American Public Figure and Scientist."

The overtures which the new Soviet leaders, at the risk of considerable humiliation, made to Tito in 1955 led to a basic reorientation of policy toward the former Communist "heretic." After many years of stalling, Russia suddenly invited Austrian leaders to Moscow to discuss the terms of the Austrian state treaty, and made concessions which in a short time cleared away the last remaining obstacles. Although she had consistently denounced the West German Government as an illegal regime, and had bitterly resisted any and all moves to rearm Western Germany and to associate her with Western Europe, in the early summer of 1955 the Soviet Union offered to recognize the West German Government and invited Konrad Adenauer to Moscow. In June she agreed to a meeting at the "summit" with Britain, France, and the United States to consider crucial issues between the Soviet Union and the West. The meeting of Eden, Faure, Eisenhower, and Bulganin was held in Geneva in July, 1955 ; and while no agreement on details resulted it did lead to a frank exchange of views and helped to pave the way for more fruitful negotiations on several fronts. Several top Russian leaders have visited non-Communist countries, and have made every effort to be affable and persuasive. In November and December, 1955, Khrushchev and Bulganin received enthusiastic receptions in India, Burma, and Afghanistan, and in April, 1956, they were somewhat coolly greeted in Great Britain. Leading figures of non-Communist states have been invited to the Soviet Union ; the list of such visits is already a long one.

The Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was "a significant landmark in the history of Soviet Communism." At this

⁶⁰ Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "Russia, Southeast Asia and Point Four," *Current History*, Feb., 1955, pp. 103-108.

Congress Khrushchev and other Soviet spokesmen "revealed an ideological flexibility and capacity for fresh maneuver in striking contrast with the rigidity of latter-day Stalinism." They reformulated Communist doctrine in such a way as to facilitate cooperation with other countries, Communist and non-Communist alike, and with Socialist parties in Europe and Asia ; they declared that "war is not fatalistically inevitable" ; and they reaffirmed the thesis of peaceful co-existence as "a fundamental principle of Soviet foreign policy."⁶¹

In these and many other ways the post-Stalin "new look" seemed to be much more appealing and hopeful than the forbidding Soviet visage of the last years of the Stalin era. But the concessions in doctrine and in foreign policy have doubtless been occasioned less by purity of heart than by such factors as the crisis in Soviet leadership, the serious economic problems, especially in agriculture, the difficulties in the satellite countries, and the success of the policies of non-Communist states. They may somehow pertain to the establishment of closer relationships with Communist China and the Communist states of Eastern Europe. The very real concessions regarding Austria — almost the only example of this kind to date — may have been prompted by the changed situation in the satellite area, by a desire to prevent the rearming of Western Germany and her association with Western Europe, and by a hope of forcing American troops out of Europe and their air bases with them. The Soviets certainly also connived to render meaningless the Paris agreements of October, 1954, regarding Germany.⁶²

All the Soviet Union's proposals may seem at first glance to be sensible and desirable ; but a closer analysis would reveal that they could not be achieved without undermining the programs for security which the non-Communist nations of the Western world have been building for many years.⁶³ Most seasoned observers were agreed that the "new look" was in basic respects not so new after all. The new Soviet leaders are Stalin's men, and while they have publicly downgraded their old master they have not deviated fundamentally from the principles which he laid down in his last significant statement.⁶⁴ In non-Communist countries there were many who shared the belief of Merle Fainsod that "the Khrushchev-Bulganin arsenal of intensive industrialization, diplomacy, trade, technical assistance, cultural penetration, and subversion is no less formidable than the cruder threats, pressure and bluster which Stalin employed in the period of the Berlin blockade and the Korean adventure."⁶⁵ On the other hand, the many evidences of changes in Soviet tactics in the post-Stalin

⁶¹ Fainsod, p. 127.

⁶² "Izvestia alone printed forty articles, reviews, and commentaries on the Paris agreements between Jan. 1 and 16, 1955." — *Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the History and Culture of the USSR*, II (Feb., 1955), 20.

⁶³ Wolfe, "A New Look at the Soviet 'New Look,'" pp. 194, 195.

⁶⁴ Thomas P. Whitney, "What We Can Expect of the Russians," *New York Times Magazine*, May 22, 1955, p. 9.

⁶⁵ Fainsod, p. 127.

era were welcomed as opportunities to deal with some acute problems, to reduce international tensions, and to lay the foundations for the kind of "peaceful co existence" which would give new hope for mankind in the atomic age. It was generally considered that the "new look" represented a change of manners rather than of heart. Nevertheless, when Bulganin and Khrushchev, as the traveling salesmen of the Soviet Union, sought to peddle their wares of peaceful co-existence, no responsible non-Communist statesman slammed the door.

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The Foreign Policy of the United States

22

Americans like to think of their country as the goddess of liberty, holding high the torch of freedom as a beacon light to all the peoples of the world. Communist propagandists point to that same America as a ruthless imperialist power trying to prop up her rotten system by exporting her troubles to the rest of the world and by forcing all other nations to accept her dictates. Some friendlier critics speak of her as a reluctant dragon with brute strength but with little mind or imagination. All these images are stereotypes. The interesting thing about them is not that they misrepresent or obscure the real United States but that they all appraise her in terms of foreign policy.

By history and by experience, by temperament and by inclination, Americans are ill-prepared to accept the heavy responsibilities and commitments in world affairs which their country has assumed in recent years. The transition has been made too suddenly, and the tempo of events has accelerated too rapidly, for the evolution of a satisfactory policy for the "long pull." Moreover, the state of the world has been such that a really satisfactory foreign policy is probably impossible.

After some preliminary observations, we shall center our discussion on the postwar period. But first something must be said about the factors conditioning American foreign policy, the basic principles of that policy, and the nature of the national interest.

FACTORS CONDITIONING AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

The foreign policy of the United States, like that of any state, is shaped largely by geographical and historical considerations, by her political and social system, by her economic strength and military power, by her relative power position, by the policies of other states, and by the world

environment. The following observations on American foreign policy, made in 1949 by an anonymous but "important United States statesman who has much to do with shaping this policy," point to its basic setting and nature :

United States foreign policy is the sum total of the aspirations and reactions of the American people, with relation to world affairs, as they are channelled up through the executive branch of the Government and through Congress.

This policy is necessarily fluid. It is by its essential quality neither static nor the conscious decision of one man or of one group of men. As public sentiment changes, the color of American policy changes.....

In foreign affairs nations cannot pursue static objectives. The whole subject is dynamic. Diplomacy must operate in a fluid medium. Some objectives cannot ever be attained — like perfection. Some problems cannot ever be permanently "solved." We must learn to live with them. The important thing is motion toward given objectives. ¹

National Characteristics. American national characteristics have always had a decided bearing on foreign policy. In foreign as in domestic affairs "some clue as to how the American people *will behave and should behave* must be sought in the total complex of conditions and factors which make American society what it is or what it is becoming." ²

Many of the strengths and weaknesses of the American character can be traced to the intermingling of many races and peoples in the vast "melting-pot" that is America, and to the expansion across a great continent with little opposition. These experiences have given strength and vitality to the American experiment : they have made it possible to develop a society possessing great economic and political strength based on the principles of democracy and liberty. On the negative side, these same characteristics may account for the qualities which Thomas Bailey and others have noted in their analyses of the attitudes of the American people toward foreign affairs — their "spirit of spread-eagleism" ; their bumptiousness and exaggerated confidence in themselves ; their "blind optimism," which together with their idealism tends to give them a false picture of the world and to lure them into moral crusades ; their inability to grasp the intimate relationship between foreign policy and military power and between foreign and domestic affairs ; their selfishness and shortsightedness ; their immaturity and inexperience ; their caprices and fluctuations in mood, which create uncertainties abroad regarding American intentions and determination ; their apathy and ignorance with respect to foreign affairs ; their xenophobia and xenophilia ; their provincialism and isolationism, or at best their very tentative internationalism. ³

¹ Quoted by C. L. Sulzberger, in the *New York Times*, Oct. 20, 1949.

² Robert K. Carr, Donald H. Morrison, Marver H. Bernstein, and Richard C. Snyder, *American Democracy in Theory and Practice : The National Government* (Rinehart, 1951), p. 951.

³ See Thomas Bailey, *The Man in the Street : The Impact of American Public Opinion on Foreign Policy* (Macmillan, 1948) ; Gabriel Almond, *The American People and*

Many close observers of American foreign policy, especially those who are familiar with the experience of other nations, are highly critical of the alleged American "intoxication with moral principles" and the tendency to regard power politics as something which can and should be avoided. These points are stressed — perhaps overstressed — in Hans Morgenthau's *In Defense of the National Interest* and to a lesser extent in George F. Kennan's *American Diplomacy, 1900-1950*. Morgenthau holds that these attitudes have continued into the postwar period and account for the "stultification of mind" and "paralysis of will" which he believes have characterized recent American foreign policy. The "four intellectual errors of American postwar policy," in his opinion, are Utopianism, legalism, sentimentalism, and neo-isolationism.⁴ Kennan decries "our [American] general ignorance of the historical processes of our age and particularlyour lack of attention to the power realities involved in given situations." According to him, "the most serious fault of our past policy formulation" lies "in something that I might call the legalistic-moralistic approach to international problems. This approach runs like a red skein through our foreign policy of the last fifty years."⁵

There is unfortunately much truth in these strictures ; but they are by no means the whole or even the major part of the story, and they reflect a misunderstanding of American history and American character, and of the role of moral concepts and legal principles in international affairs. While it may be well to be reminded by devotees of *realpolitik* that American tendencies to go off on moral crusades and to expect to avoid the "contamination" of power politics are dangerous, these same critics do a great disservice by underestimating the strong and healthy influence of idealism in foreign policy and by overlooking one of the major forces which has actuated the United States in her dealings with other nations.

Domestic Policies and Pressures. The Task Force on Foreign Affairs of the Hoover Commission referred to "the disappearance of the line of demarcation which hitherto has existed between domestic and foreign problems."⁶ Many Americans are becoming more conscious of the interconnection between domestic and foreign affairs, and of the effect of the one upon the other ; but "for the present," as a study of the Brookings Institution pointed out, "the people of the United States frequently show an unwillingness to support wholeheartedly specific foreign policies advocated by their government when this requires a substantial modification of domestic policies, sometimes to the detriment of local or personal interests.

Foreign Policy (Harcourt, Brace, 1950) ; Lester Markel, ed., *Public Opinion and Foreign Policy* (Harper, 1949).

⁴ Hans J. Morgenthau, *In Defense of the National Interest* (Knopf, 1951). See especially pp. 28-33, 91-138, 229-242. Morgenthau describes three forms of Utopianism : Wilsonianism, isolationism, and internationalism.

⁵ George F. Kennan, *American Diplomacy, 1900-1950* (University of Chicago Press, 1951), pp. 83, 95.

⁶ *Task Force Report on Foreign Affairs*. Appendix H. Prepared for the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government. January, 1949. p. 38.

The result is that the government often adopts domestic policies that are incompatible with its stated foreign policies." ⁷ The heavy burdens which the military budget and the foreign aid programs now impose upon the American economy would seem to indicate that this is an age when foreign policies are of primary importance. On the other hand, the influence of the country abroad depends primarily upon the strength of the internal political, economic, and social structure. Moreover, the position of the United States on many international issues is often shaped by domestic pressures, even to the detriment of the national interest. ⁸ This is probably true of many aspects of postwar China policy. On a lesser issue, one can sympathize with the attitude of a British statesman who, when asked for his views on the partition of Ireland, replied that he never interfered in American domestic politics !

Among the strongest internal pressures whose effects are not always conducive to the formation of rational foreign policies are those from organized minority groups, especially from what Thomas Bailey calls the "hyphenate organizations." ⁹ These groups form powerful voting blocs, as members of Congress are well aware. One can argue that so great is the Jewish-American influence in this country that the entire American position on the Palestine issue was framed largely to conform to the demands of this minority group. Religious and other organizations are sometimes equally effective. The position of the United States toward the civil war in Spain was certainly influenced by the strong Catholic support of General Franco ; in this case, however, there were other organized pressures, perhaps equally potent, which took an opposite view. While America cannot play her proper role in the world if her policies are determined by pressure groups within, it is certainly true that most of the hyphenate organizations are sincerely concerned with national interests, and that the successful intermingling of peoples of many nationalities has given the United States one of her greatest sources of strength.

Pressure tactics are by no means confined to ethnic and religious groups. Probably the best financed and most persistent of all pressure groups are those which speak for bankers, farmers, manufacturers, organized labor, and veterans' organizations. Lesser groups — professional, educational, economic, cultural, and others — also raise their strident voices to demand foreign policies to conform to their convictions or their interests. These policies may relate to immigration, armament or disarmament, Marshall Plan purchases, aid to India, the exchange of professors, the duty on tuna, the exclusion of Argentine beef, or any of a thousand other matters.

Constitutional Handicaps. Under the best of conditions a democratic

⁷ *Major Problems of United States Foreign Policy*, 1947 (The Brookings Institution, 1947), p. 28.

⁸ "History does not forgive us our national mistakes because they are explicable in terms of our domestic policies.....A nation which excuses its own failures by the sacred untouchableness of its own habits can excuse itself into complete disaster." Kennan, p. 73.

⁹ See Bailey, Chapters II and III.

state, especially one of the federal type, labors under rather severe handicaps in the conduct of its foreign relations. Today's conditions impose particular strains on the United States. The Constitution itself and Supreme Court decisions, such as *Missouri v. Holland*,¹⁰ have centered authority over foreign affairs in the central government and have restricted state action which might contravene foreign commitments, and they have given the President primary responsibility for the conduct of foreign relations. Nevertheless, the federal-state dichotomy can still produce embarrassments, and in actual practice the principle of the separation of powers and the deliberate vagueness of the Constitution have led to serious friction between the executive and the legislative branches.¹¹

Party Cooperation and Administrative Coordination. Differences between the President and Congress are, of course, most likely to occur when the President's party is not in control of Congress. On these occasions the President may find his treaties and his appointments obstructed by the Senate and his requests for appropriations blocked by one or both Houses. This political handicap has been only partially overcome by an attempt to bring the two major parties to an informal agreement that partisan politics end "at the water's edge," or, in other words, that they strive for "bipartisanship" in foreign policy. Begun during World War II when Roosevelt took two Republicans into his cabinet, and repeatedly urged by the late Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, bipartisanship in foreign policy has an off-and-on record. President Eisenhower early appealed for it, but, with a narrow Republican majority in the Eighty-third Congress, an actual minority in the Eighty-fourth, and at times the opposition of Senate Republican leader William F. Knowland, he had little choice. Indeed, without it hardly one of the major items of his legislative program would have been approved. At present bipartisanship is a vague term, with many possible interpretations ;¹² and back of it lies the warning of Senator Vandenberg that it must not become "an iron curtain behind which specious unity would stifle traditional American debate."¹³

Moreover, the President, elected by a different constituency from the Congress, has no assurance that the members of his own party will follow his lead or will even abide by the party platform. Only when he has a large majority in the Congress can he count upon the members of his own party for support. Even when his special duties and powers in the field of foreign policy are acknowledged, the President may run afoul of Congressional insistence that the proposals he is making relate primarily to domestic rather than to foreign affairs. This difficulty is common at

¹⁰ 252 U. S. 416 (1920).

¹¹ See Edward S. Corwin, *The President's Control of Foreign Relations* (Princeton University Press, 1917), *The President : Office and Powers* (Oxford University Press, 1940), and *Total War and the Constitution* (Knopf, 1947) ; *Task Force Report on Foreign Affairs*, pp. 46-48, 125-134 ; and Daniel S. Cheever and H. Field Haviland, *American Foreign Policy and the Separation of Powers* (Harvard University Press, 1952).

¹² Richard C. Snyder and Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., *American Foreign Policy : Formulation, Principles and Programs* (Rinehart, 1954), pp. 497-500.

¹³ Radio broadcast of Oct. 4, 1948 ; in *New York Times*, Oct. 5, 1948.

times when the line between internal and foreign policies is hard to draw and when powerful domestic interests have to be considered in almost every issue of foreign affairs. Agricultural, shipping, and trade policies may be cited as examples.

Another problem is to achieve the effective cooperation of the multitude of offices having functions related to foreign policy. When it is realized that the Task Force on Foreign Affairs of the Hoover Commission found within the Executive Branch alone "59 departments, agencies, commissions, boards, and interdepartmental councils under the President, of which the work of at least 46" involved "some aspects of the conduct of foreign affairs," it is obvious that American foreign policy is conditioned by the efficiency of each of these agencies and particularly by the degree of coordination with which they operate. While we cannot here discuss the structure and operation of these forty-six bodies — even of the Department of State and the Foreign Service¹⁴ — we must give a word to the most common device for coordination, the interdepartmental committee. The Foreign Affairs Task Force found that "in the foreign affairs field 33 such committees were sufficiently important to warrant special study. Over 20 or two-thirds of these were created since the end of World War II." Of the "high-level interdepartmental committees" the Task Force singled out three as especially significant: the National Security Council, the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems, and the National Security Resources Board. The NSC is charged with the coordination of military and foreign policies, and since this is a major problem of American foreign relations under present world conditions the NSC, in membership and in operations, is probably the most important single coordinating agency in the government today. The NAC, almost equally important in membership and duties, has the difficult task of supervising monetary and financial problems and of relating these policies to the over-all objectives of the United States. The NSRB was concerned with the location, husbanding, procurement,

¹⁴ On the Department of State and the Foreign Service, see: *The Administration of Foreign Affairs and Overseas Operations*, A Report Prepared for the Bureau of the Budget, Executive Office of the President, by the Brookings Institution (Government Printing Office, 1951); J. R. Childs, *American Foreign Service* (Holt, 1948); Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, *Foreign Affairs, A Report to the Congress* (Government Printing Office, Feb., 1949), and *Task Force Report on Foreign Affairs* (Appendix H), (Government Printing Office, Jan., 1949); *The Department of State, 1930-1955: Expanding Functions and Responsibilities*, Dept. of State Pub. 5832 (Government Printing Office, 1955); William Y. Elliott and others, *United States Foreign Policy: Its Organization and Control* (Columbia University Press, 1952); Arthur W. Macmahon, *Administration in Foreign Affairs* (University of Alabama Press, 1955); James L. McCamy, *The Administration of American Foreign Affairs* (Knopf, 1950); Elmer Plischke, *Conduct of American Diplomacy* (Van Nostrand, 1950); Richard C. Snyder and Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., *American Foreign Policy: Formulation, Principles, and Programs* (Rinehart, 1954); Graham H. Stuart, *The Department of State: A History of Its Organization, Procedure and Personnel* (Macmillan, 1949); *Toward a Stronger Foreign Service*, Report of the Secretary of State's Public Committee on Personnel, Dept. of State Pub. 5458, Department and Foreign Service Series 36 (Government Printing Office, June, 1954).

and development of vital strategic and critical materials, inside the country and abroad. Its functions have been taken over by the Office of Defense Mobilization and several other agencies.

PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

It is often asserted that the United States has no foreign policy ; but such an analysis is at best a superficial one, as any student of American diplomacy, not to mention any member of the much-abused State Department, should know. Broadly speaking, the United States, like any other state, has to have a foreign policy, or foreign policies. This was a matter of supreme importance in the early days of the republic, and it has become so again. Even in the period of American history when foreign affairs were regarded as relatively unimportant — indeed, as something of a luxury — there were certain basic policies to which the United States adhered. In fact, some of these have become traditional.

The fundamental principles of American foreign policy have been stated in general terms on innumerable occasions ; notable examples have been Cordell Hull's address in Washington on March 17, 1938, and President Truman's Navy Day speech of October 27, 1945. Such statements are so general as to be virtually meaningless, hardly more than pious platitudes. A more profitable approach is to study the history of American diplomacy. No one can read any of the standard texts in the field, such as those by Bailey, Bemis, Latané and Wainhouse, Pratt, and Van Alstyne, without reaching the conviction that there are certain underlying concepts and principles which have played an important part in America's foreign policy throughout all, or most, of her history. The most basic of these, according to Van Alstyne, are those of security, expansion, and neutrality. Nathaniel Peffer believes that "the fixed points" in American foreign relations are isolationism, the Monroe Doctrine, freedom of the seas, and the Open Door.¹⁵ Bemis holds that the following principles are "foundations of American foreign policy" : (1) sovereign independence ; (2) continental expansion ; (3) avoidance of the ordinary vicissitudes and ordinary combinations and collisions of European politics ; (4) the noncolonization principle ; (5) the no-transfer principle (no transfer by one European power to another of any possession in the Western Hemisphere) ; (6) freedom of international trade ; (7) self-determination of peoples ; (8) freedom of the seas for neutral ships in time of war, and freedom of navigation of international rivers ; (9) the right of expatriation and the wrong of imprisonment ; (10) nonintervention ; and (11) a feeling of anti-imperialism.¹⁶ In addition to a number of 'broad objectives,' Professor Pratt notes "one more general and pervasive — a humanitarian desire to

¹⁵ *America's Place in the World* (Viking, 1945), p. 32.

¹⁶ Samuel Flagg Bemis, "The Shifting Strategy of American Defense and Diplomacy," *The Virginia Quarterly Review*, XXIV (Summer, 1948), 321-335.

do good in the world, to spread Christianity and democracy.”¹⁷ However much one may question these statements of fundamentals, they are useful guides for a study of the record of American diplomacy and for an understanding of current American policies.

Before World War II. The Monroe Doctrine and other important foreign policies during the period when John Quincy Adams served his country so ably as Secretary of State (1817-1825) were largely reformulations of policies which had already been put into practice with reasonable consistency. The founding fathers believed that the United States should and must remain aloof from the power struggle in Europe, but they were deeply concerned with any threats to the European balance. They wanted to steer clear of “entangling alliances” — the phrase is Jefferson’s, not Washington’s — and of “the ordinary vicissitudes of her [Europe’s] politics” — the phrase is Washington’s. But from Washington to Wilson American Presidents were insistent upon all the rights of neutrals. “About the historic problem of neutral rights,” as Professor Bemis has observed, “has been gathered a major part of the history of American diplomacy.”¹⁸ Since the earliest days of the Republic, moreover, the promotion and protection of trade — and therefore an active participation in at least some aspects of world affairs — have been paramount interests of the United States.

Beginning in 1898 the United States embarked on a bolder course in international affairs and assumed more sweeping commitments beyond her borders, especially in the Far East and Latin America. This was the springtime of the Open Door and the Indian summer of Manifest Destiny. Admiral Mahan succinctly described American foreign policy in the first decade of the twentieth century as “participation in Asia, a sphere of influence in the Caribbean, and continued nonparticipation in Europe.”¹⁹ At about the same time the political system of the nineteenth century, based upon a Europe with an apparently stable balance of power with Britain as the continuous holder of the balance, began to reveal those serious rifts which led to its almost complete collapse in two world wars. With the coming of the First World War the United States was faced with the full implications of her new position in a changing political order. Probably the “world structure of power” was such that she could not have escaped eventual involvement in the struggle ; in any event, she did participate, and her President, Woodrow Wilson, tried to turn the bitter lessons of the war into constructive ventures in international cooperation and into higher standards of international conduct. His famous “Fourteen Points” and his many other public utterances reflected that idealism, that

¹⁷ Julius W. Pratt, *A History of United States Foreign Policy* (Prentice-Hall, 1955), p. 4.

¹⁸ Samuel Flagg Bemis, *A Diplomatic History of the United States*, 3rd ed. (Holt, 1950), p. 99.

¹⁹ William G. Carleton, *The Revolution in American Foreign Policy, 1945-1954* (Doubleday, 1954), p. 5.

"intoxication with moral abstractions" or "pernicious abstractions," which many students of American policy deplore.

In the years following 1920 American foreign policy became more and more divorced from reality. The United States was in the 'ambiguous position of being a major power, unwilling to act as such, yet inevitably exerting on international relations the influence of a major power.....The policy line consequently fluctuated between an avoidance of commitments, an insistence on freedom of action, and an effort to establish universal principles of international conduct." ²⁰ Bemis has called this "the Fool's Paradise of American history," during which "American foreign policy degenerated into five postulates: isolationism, anti-imperialism, disarmament, neutrality, pacifism." ²¹ Above all, it was the period of isolationism, which reached its peak — or its nadir — in the neutrality legislation of the 1930's. Although the exponents of this policy, or lack of policy, tried to defend it by asserting that it represented a return to the first principles of American diplomacy, in reality it was very different in character from early American "isolationism." Hans Morgenthau has made this point very effectively: "For the realists of the first period, isolation was an objective of policy, and had to be striven for to be attained. For the isolationists of the interwar period, isolation was a natural state, and only needed to be left undisturbed in order to continue forever. Conceived in such terms, it was the very negation of foreign policy." ²²

The Roosevelt Administration and After. The first reactions in the United States to the march of aggression in the 1930's came in efforts to withdraw into a storm cellar that did not exist. The cool reception of Roosevelt's "quarantine speech" in 1937 was an indication of the state of the American mind. In the two years or so prior to Pearl Harbor, however, Roosevelt took one bold step after another in support of Britain and against the Axis powers, while America was supposedly neutral. He believed that such steps were essential to the national interest, and he tried to educate the American people to the imperatives of the situation; but he did not — perhaps could not — take the people into his full confidence in justifying his actions. In a sense, therefore, as both his defenders and his critics, for different reasons, have pointed out, he "deceived" the American people.²³

²⁰ *Major Problems of United States Foreign Policy, 1950-51* (The Brookings Institution, 1950), p. 30.

²¹ Bemis, "Shifting Strategy," pp. 330-331.

²² Morgenthau, p. 29.

²³ For bitter attacks on Roosevelt's pre-Pearl Harbor policies, see H. E. Barnes, ed., *Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace* (Caxton Printers, 1953); Charles A. Beard, *President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War* (Yale University Press, 1948); George Morgenstern, *Pearl Harbor, the Story of the Secret War* (Devin-Adair, 1947); F. R. Sanborn, *Design for War: A Study of Secret Power Politics, 1937-1941* (Devin-Adair, 1951); Charles C. Tansill, *Back Door to War: The Roosevelt Foreign Policy, 1933-1941* (Regnery, 1952); and R. A. Theobald, *The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor: The Washington Contribution to the Japanese Attack* (Devin-Adair, 1954). Thomas A. Bailey, who is generally sympathetic with Roosevelt, speaks of the President's deception in a different sense: "Franklin Roosevelt repeatedly deceived the American people during the period before Pearl Harbor.....He was faced with a terrible dilemma. If he let the people slumber in a fog of isolation, they might well fall prey to Hitler. If he came out unequivocally for intervention, he would be defeated in 1940.....If he was going

On the whole, the isolationism of the interwar years finds only a feeble echo today, and one of the outstanding characteristics of the American reaction to the postwar world is the general acceptance of full American participation. While the trend of events was the great educator in the realities of world affairs, Franklin D. Roosevelt contributed much by his ability to dramatize and popularize the principles of American political action. "Prior to World War II," wrote Senator Arthur Vandenberg in 1951, "the oceans were virtual moats around our continental bastions. All this changed progressively at Pearl Harbor and thereafter. It became very obvious to me that this was a different world in which we had to sustain our own freedoms."²⁴

Before undertaking a somewhat more detailed examination of American foreign policy since World War II, we shall first observe the nature of that paramount consideration, "the national interest," after which we shall note the general course of postwar policy and the conditions under which it has been pursued. Then we shall be ready to review the significant decisions and measures in America's recent foreign policy.

WHAT IS THE NATIONAL INTEREST?

The foreign policy of every country is at all times presumably designed to promote the national interest. But what is the national interest?²⁵ And by what standards and by whom is it to be determined? Hamilton and Jefferson at times differed sharply on these questions. Franklin D. Roosevelt believed that he was acting in the national interest in the months prior to Pearl Harbor, but Charles A. Beard and other critics have charged that he was not. According to Morgenthau, Hamilton correctly foresaw and Wilson did not that the interest was the maintenance of the European balance of power. Today, to continue Morgenthau's analysis, the "vital objective" — that is, the national interest "sharpened to meet particular international situations" — of American foreign policy in Europe and Asia is "the restoration of the balance of power by means short of war."²⁶

to induce the people to move at all, he would have to trick them into acting for their best interests, or what he conceived to be their best interests.....This is clearly what Roosevelt had to do, and who shall say that posterity will not thank him for it?" *The Man in the Street*, pp. 11-13.

²⁴ Arthur W. Vandenberg, Jr., ed., *The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg* (Houghton Mifflin, 1952), p. 577.

²⁵ A volume published by the Brookings Institution makes a helpful distinction among national interests, objectives, policies, and comments: "Stated broadly, *interests* are what a nation feels to be necessary to its security and well-being; *objectives* are interests sharpened to meet particular international situations; *policies* are thought-out ways of attaining *objectives*; and *commitments* are specific undertakings in support of *policy*." Again: "*National Interests* reflect the general and continuing ends for which a nation acts." *Major Problems, 1950-1951*, pp. 24 n., 383.

²⁶ Morgenthau, p. 201; see also pp. 14-18, 23-28. Morgenthau's book is a particularly provocative recent study of the concept of national interest. For different points of view in recent years see "The Idea of National Interest in 1950," a series of articles

This kind of analysis by no means clearly defines national interest ; in fact, it illustrates rather the temptation to define it in terms of particular theories and of generalities. The warning of George F. Kennan is quite apposite : "The national interest does *not* consist in abstractions." Yet the concept of national interest is a very useful one which policy-makers should never forget. It helps to place foreign as well as domestic policy in the framework of national policy, and it is a much-needed antidote to political shortsightedness and partisanship. Fred H. Harrington has said that "the concept of American national interest in the diplomatic field centers around economic forces, strategic patterns, and moral judgments with reference to the proper role of the United States in world affairs."²⁷ While it may be true that "despite changed meanings, *national interests* are the constants rather than the variables of international relations,"²⁸ it is likewise true that developments at home or abroad require a continual reassessment of these interests. Instances of such developments are the transition from an agricultural to a predominantly industrial economy in the United States, and the repercussions of World War II and of postwar Soviet foreign policies.

The most searching investigation of the concept of national interest is still Charles A. Beard's *The Idea of National Interest*, first published in 1934. Beard summarized many views of the national interest, but concluded that there were two major concepts — which he called the Jeffersonian and the Hamiltonian — and that each was based upon a sound conception of the national interest. Throughout most of American history these concepts have provided a useful guide in the formulation of foreign policy, but by the third decade of the twentieth century they had become outmoded. In the concluding paragraph of his important study Beard says :

Evidently, then, the two inherited conceptions of national interest are in the process of fusion and dissolution. A new conception, with a positive core and nebulous implications, is rising out of the past and is awaiting formulation at the hands of a statesman as competent and powerful as Hamilton or Jefferson.²⁹

No such statesman has yet appeared, and no such clear formulation of the national interest as that provided by Hamilton and Jefferson has been

by Fred H. Harrington, William Carleton, George A. Lundberg, Ruhl J. Bartlett, Harry Elmer Barnes, and Allan B. Cole, in *American Perspective*, IV (Fall, 1950), 335-401 ; the address by George F. Kennan on "The National Interest of the United States," delivered at the Centennial Conference on International Understanding at Northwestern University, Jan. 30, 1951 (reprinted in the *Illinois Law Review*, March-April, 1951) ; and Norman D. Palmer, ed., "The National Interest — Alone or with Others?," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, CCLXXXII (July, 1952).

²⁷ Fred H. Harrington, "Beard's Idea of National Interest and New Interpretations," *American Perspective*, IV (Fall, 1950), 345.

²⁸ *Major Problems*, 1950-1951, p. 383.

²⁹ *The Idea of National Interest* (Macmillan, 1934), pp. 552-553. Used by permission of The Macmillan Company.

made for modern America. In view of the heavy international commitments of the United States and of the growing importance of foreign policy, the need for a correct appraisal of the national interest is a matter of particular urgency. Doubtless it will have to be related to a broader framework and it will be subject to more variables than ever before. Moreover, it will have little meaning unless it represents a widespread consensus and unless it is applied to specific policies. It is also well to remember that the national interest "involves, not only military security and the American economy, but also a defense of American values."³⁰

THE SETTING AND COURSE OF POSTWAR POLICY

Postwar American foreign policy may be divided into four main periods. The first lasted for about a year and a half after V-J Day. This was the "honeymoon" period, when the United States was still under the influence of a series of illusions about the nature of the postwar world and the possibilities of great power cooperation. But in late 1946 and early 1947 she faced the fact of a divided world and took the leadership in formulating policies which conformed more closely to existing realities. These have been termed the New Departure. Communist aggression in late June, 1950, ushered in the third period, that of the Korean War. Economic recovery was subordinated to military preparedness; and American policies in Western Europe and in the Far East were subjected to searching criticism and re-examination. A fourth period began when the long era of Democratic occupancy of the White House and the even longer rule of Joseph Stalin in Russia came to an end. The new Soviet leaders gave hints of a desire to follow more flexible and conciliatory policies, and hope rose for the reduction of international tensions and a reversal of the drift toward war.

America's foreign policy since World War II has thus been dominated by the Communist threat. This has meant that her attention has been given first to Europe, second to Asia. But defense has called for far-reaching efforts in the Western Hemisphere. Canada and the United States have made permanent their wartime Joint Board of Defense; and their military establishments collaborate in many respects, including building a triple screen of radar stations from ocean to ocean. The American defense conception also embraces Latin America, as it has done for more than a century. Nevertheless, the crucial areas of the moment are elsewhere; and we must here center our attention on American policy as it sought to energize and consolidate the defenses of the free world on the periphery of the Communist bloc of states and satellites — that is, in Europe and Asia.

In our brief analysis of postwar American foreign policy we shall discuss some of the major aspects of the four periods we have outlined.

³⁰ Harrington, p. 344.

Later we shall select for somewhat more thorough examination two broad areas of policy : the emerging patterns of security, and United States foreign assistance programs.

Postwar Illusions and Frustrations. "As autumn, 1944, approached," wrote Cordell Hull in his *Memoirs*, "my associates and I began to wonder whether Marshal Stalin and his Government were commencing to veer away from the policy of cooperation to which they had agreed at the Moscow Conference." Hull asked the American Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Averell Harriman, to "estimate the present trend of Soviet policy so that we might decide how to meet this possible change in Russian attitude," Harriman made a somewhat gloomy reply. The reason for the change, he believed, was "that when the Russians saw victory in sight they began to put into practice the policies they intended to follow in peace."³¹

In his State of the Union message of January, 1945, President Roosevelt said : "The nearer we come to vanquishing our enemies the more we inevitably become conscious of differences among the victors." The President and his top associates were fully informed of the limited nature of Russian cooperation during the period of "the strange alliance,"³² and long before the end of the war they began to have mounting doubts about the behavior and the intentions of the spokesmen of the Soviet Union. But despite these and many other evidences that Roosevelt and other top American leaders foresaw difficulties with the Soviet Union, there can be little doubt that they allowed their optimism to triumph over their growing doubts. They confused what they believed had to be with what was actually possible, and thus they based their policies upon a number of false assumptions.³³ Perhaps the most serious of these was that the Soviet Union would not revert to her earlier suspicion and noncooperation based on the concept of "inevitable conflict." Great power unity was patently vital to the postwar world, for without it the United Nations could never live up to the great expectations placed in it, satisfactory peace treaties could not be agreed upon, and the great powers would engage in a costly and dangerous rivalry which would retard economic rehabilitation and recovery, put peace in constant jeopardy, and imperil the whole political and social order.

In the months following V-J Day the United States was primarily concerned with such matters as peacemaking, occupation policies, economic rehabilitation and recovery, and cooperation with the United Nations. In short, she had to face grave problems arising from the war and from the legacy of war, and she sought to help lay the foundations for a peaceful world order. In the fall of 1946 she reached agreement with other Allied powers on the terms of peace treaties for Italy, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Finland, but not on treaties for the major defeated powers,

³¹ *Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, 2 vols. (Macmillan, 1948), II, 1459-1460.

³² The difficulties of Anglo-American cooperation with the Soviets are recounted by the head of the U. S. Military Mission in Moscow, 1943-1945, in John R. Deane, *The Strange Alliance* (Viking, 1947).

³³ Sumner Welles, *Where Are We Heading?* (Harper, 1946), pp. 100-106.

Germany and Japan, or on an Austrian state treaty. She accepted new burdens in the occupation of Germany and Japan as well as of Korea and Austria. By participating in UNRRA, and through direct loans, grants, and other forms of assistance, she accepted a major responsibility for the economic rehabilitation of the world ; but not until the evolution of the European Recovery Program in 1947-1948 did she develop a coordinated program of foreign assistance.

The United States took an active part in the United Nations from the beginning ; she played a major role in setting up the various organs and agencies of the UN and in launching the world organization as a going concern. She exerted a moderating influence in a long series of political disputes, beginning with the Iranian crisis in the early part of 1946 ; and she assumed the leadership in working out a plan for the international control of atomic energy.

In the occupation of Germany the United States shared responsibility with Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and France. Against the background of the Casablanca declaration for "unconditional surrender," the heritage of the Morgenthau Plan for the pastoralization of Germany, the dissensions within the American Government and among the wartime allies on the proper policies to be followed, the Yalta Declaration regarding Germany, and the Potsdam Agreement, the formulation of satisfactory policies was an almost impossible task. It was made even more difficult by the many erroneous assumptions which handicapped American policymakers in the early postwar period, the reluctance of the American people and the Congress to undertake consistent and long-term commitments in Germany or elsewhere, the confused and chaotic situation in Germany herself, and the uncooperative and in fact antagonistic policies of the Russians.

In many areas of policy the United States made substantial progress ; but she was unable to formulate satisfactory policies for dealing with perhaps the two gravest developments of the postwar period : Soviet aggressive tactics, especially in Europe, and the revolution in Asia. On almost every issue and in almost every part of the world, relations between the Soviet Union and the Western powers were characterized by basic disagreements and frequent deadlocks — in Eastern Europe, in Germany, in the United Nations, in most sessions of the Council of Foreign Ministers.³⁴ Soviet intransigence and noncooperation came as a particular shock to the American people, who were not aware of the wartime friction until the real story was released with the lifting of censorship. They clung to the belief that all the major powers would cooperate for the common good ; and they also clung to their illusions about the nature of communism, even though Soviet words and deeds had made it clear that the leaders

³⁴ For a series of illuminating case studies in the difficulties of negotiating with the Soviet Union, see Raymond Dennett and Joseph E. Johnson, eds., *Negotiating with the Russians* (World Peace Foundation, 1951). This book contains ten chapters by Americans who took a leading part in the negotiations which they describe.

of Communist Russia had deliberately reverted to doctrinaire Marxism-Leninism.³⁵

During the early postwar years American policy-makers showed little understanding of the nature of the Asian revolution, whereas the Communists were clever in capitalizing on anti-Western, anti-colonial, and anti-imperialist feelings, and in linking communism with native nationalist movements. For many reasons the United States became identified in Asian eyes with reaction and imperialism. In China she backed the losing side in the civil war which broke out soon after V-J Day and which ended only with the complete victory of the Chinese Communists in 1949. In Korea, American aspirations for the unification of the entire country were frustrated, in spite of repeated attempts to reach agreement with the Soviet Union on the basis of the Cairo Declaration. The United States could take credit for implementing her promise of independence for the Philippines, although the alarming political and economic deterioration of this "showcase of democracy in Asia" raised grave new problems. The one area in Asia where United States policy was truly impressive in the immediate postwar period was occupied Japan, but there General MacArthur, as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, ran virtually a one-man show, and the United States in effect assumed chief responsibility for the peaceful evolution of a nation with a record anything but peaceful and democratic.

The New Departure. In the latter part of 1946 the United States began to show signs of awakening to the nature of the Soviet threat and of heading toward a firmer policy. The New Departure in foreign policy was dramatized on March 12, 1947, when the President delivered his "Truman Doctrine" speech. In this speech Mr. Truman called for a program of aid to Greece and Turkey, and he emphasized "the broad implications involved." "I believe that it must be the policy of the United States," he declared, "to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." Thereafter a prime object of American foreign policy was to be the "containment of Soviet power," to use an expression first popularized by George F. Kennan, then Director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff. More and more it became recognized that the United States was involved in a "cold war" which might at any time shift into a "hot war." Even the European Recovery Program, first suggested in Secretary of State Marshall's Harvard speech less than three months after the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine, was regarded by many as primarily designed to build up Western Europe against Russia, although it had strong and obvious economic motivations. There were other major landmarks in the evolution of an American policy designed to protect the United States by building up "situa-

³⁵ This was made particularly apparent by Stalin's speech of Feb. 9, 1946, in which, as General Deane stated, he "reaffirmed the doctrine of Marx and Lenin and exhorted his people to extraordinary efforts in preparation for the inevitable wars which must be expected so long as the capitalist system exists." *The Strange Alliance*, p. 320.

tions of strength" throughout the non-Communist world. They included : the Rio Treaty of 1947 ; strong approval of the Brussels Pact in early 1948 ; the Vandenberg Resolution in mid-1948 ; the Berlin airlift in 1948-1949 ; the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 ; encouragement of efforts toward economic, military, and political integration in Western Europe ; cooperative endeavors with Britain and France to coordinate occupation policies in Germany, to bring into existence a West German state, and to associate that new state with Western Europe ; the North Atlantic Treaty ; and contributions to the rearming of the nations of Western Europe and the North Atlantic Community and to coordinated defense planning through the Mutual Defense Assistance Program and central planning in SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe).

In the Far East the situation was far less satisfactory. In 1949 American forces were withdrawn from Korea, but the country remained weak and divided, at the mercy of great power rivalries and Communist encroachment. The American occupation of Japan had passed its point of maximum effectiveness, and there was strong pressure to terminate it, even though many of the long-range objectives had not been achieved. In Indo-China the French were engaged in protracted warfare with Communist-led Vietnamese nationalists. Here the United States was faced with the double dilemma of maintaining satisfactory relationships with an indispensable ally of the Atlantic Community whom she did not wish to weaken in any way but whose colonial policies she could not approve, and of identifying herself with independence movements without undermining her European ally and without playing into the hands of the Communists.

The greatest dilemma of all stemmed from the developments in China. America's China policy satisfied no one. Against the wishes of the Administration and particularly of the State Department, Congress insisted on continuing aid to the Nationalists, although that aid was inadequate and was made even less effective by the confusion into which the Nationalists had fallen. The fact was that the situation in China had deteriorated beyond hope of salvage and that it was a serious reverse for American policy. On October 1, 1949, the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China was proclaimed, and before the end of the year the remnants of the Nationalist forces had taken refuge on Formosa. Confronted by bitter attacks from critics at home and abroad, the recognition of the new regime in China by several non-Communist states, including India and Great Britain, the Angus Ward case, and other evidences of the anti-American orientation of the leaders of the New China, the United States attempted to reassess her entire Far Eastern policy. Little progress had been made before the Communist attack on South Korea changed the whole picture.

The Korean War and the Great Debates. With the attack on the Republic of Korea in late June, 1950, the "cold war" gave way to open aggression and direct military action by a Russian satellite. It was widely feared that the Korean War marked the beginning of a new and more

dangerous phase of Communist imperialism, which might lead to similar attacks in other parts of the world and eventually to World War III. The intervention of the Chinese Communists in late October and early November added to these fears. The response of the United States was to take the leadership in United Nations action to deal with the aggression, to commit the bulk of her regular armed forces to the operation, to undertake a major defense effort which called for substantial increases in her armed forces and the production of more and better weapons, to coordinate her many programs of foreign aid and military assistance into a single Mutual Security Program in which the accent was heavily on military aid, to enter into security pacts with Japan, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand, to take the initiative in the preparation of a Japanese peace treaty (signed on September 8, 1951, by representatives of 48 nations), and in many other ways to strengthen herself and to assume the leadership of the growing alliance of free nations against Communist imperialism.

Most Americans agreed with their leaders that there was no other path which they could take without gravely endangering national security. Nevertheless, the new American steps and the basic decision which prompted them were not taken without grave misgivings about their possible effects, both upon the American economy and upon the prospects for peace. Vigorous debates were staged on the correct policy to be followed vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and on such issues as the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic Pact, Chinese relations, American commitments in Western Europe, the Korean War, and the Mutual Security Program. Two of the "great debates" were particularly significant and aroused widespread interest. One centered on policies toward Western Europe, the other on policies in the Far East.

The first debate was touched off in December, 1950, at a time when the military situation in Korea was most alarming, by a radio address by former President Herbert Hoover. Mr. Hoover's convictions were well summarized in his declaration that "the foundation of our national policies must be to preserve for the world this Western Hemisphere Gibraltar of Western Civilization."³⁶ His criticisms came at a time when the Administration was preparing to cooperate with the other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in plans for the defense of Western Europe and to station more American troops in that area.

The debate which Mr. Hoover initiated seemed to probe to the fundamentals of American foreign policy and America's proper role in the world. Did American frontiers extend only to the Western Hemisphere and the defensive shield from Britain to Formosa, or were they also in Europe and on the mainland of Asia? Could the United States depend on her allies, particularly on the countries of Western Europe? Could Western Europe be defended anyway? Could the American economy stand the

³⁶ For the text of Mr. Hoover's speech of Dec. 20, 1950, see the *New York Times*, Dec. 21, 1950. The *Times* gave an excellent "blow-by-blow" account of the entire course of the "great debate" from December, 1950, to April, 1951.



March in The New York Times

"Its Real Purpose"

strain of a staggering military budget and global aid programs? On these and similar questions Mr. Hoover and Senator Robert A. Taft differed fundamentally from the supporters of the Administration.

On January 5, 1951, in a 10,000-word address to the Senate of the new Eighty-Second Congress, Senator Taft attacked the Administration's foreign policies, especially the plans to send more armed forces to Europe. He charged that the President had already exceeded his constitutional authority by ordering American troops into action in Korea without the approval of Congress, and that "the President has no power to agree to send troops to fight in Europe." Taft's view received considerable support in the Senate, but the pendulum began to swing in the other direction after General Eisenhower's address to a special session of Congress and his radio report to the nation in early February. On April 4, the second anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Pact, the Senate approved

a resolution pledging that the United States would station in Europe "such units of our armed forces as may be necessary and appropriate to contribute our fair share." with an amendment providing that no ground troops should be added to the four divisions in Western Europe except with Congressional approval. The result of this phase of the foreign policy controversy was a clear-cut victory for neither the Truman Administration nor its critics, although popular and Congressional opinion sided heavily with the Administration.

Hardly had the echoes of "the great debate" begun to fade away before they were succeeded by an even greater debate. A week after the Senate's passage of the troops-for-Europe resolution President Truman removed General of the Army Douglas MacArthur from all his Far Eastern commands. This action provoked a political and emotional explosion in the United States, "in an atmosphere that was already heavy with bitterness over foreign policy."³⁷ When MacArthur returned to the United States, for the first time in fourteen years, he was greeted as a hero rather than as a repudiated and deposed commander. He received the signal honor of being invited to state his views before a joint session of Congress, and on April 19, before a packed chamber and crowded galleries, with most of the American people gathered around radio or television sets, he made one of the most memorable and dramatic addresses in American history. Denouncing the Administration's policy in the Korean War as "appeasement," MacArthur urged that the United Nations forces in Korea should be "permitted to destroy the enemy build-up bases north of the Yalu" (i.e., in Manchuria); he also urged "the removal of restrictions on the forces . . . on Formosa, with logistical support to contribute to their effective operations against the Chinese mainland," a tighter economic blockade, and a naval blockade of the China coast "to prevent the Chinese Reds from getting succor from without."

Two major issues soon emerged in the early stages of the second great debate: (1) the reasons and the circumstances of General MacArthur's dismissal and (2) the fundamental bases and assumptions of the Far Eastern policy of the United States, especially with respect to China and to the Korean War. The Second issue—Far Eastern policy—had broad ramifications, affecting as it did the most criticized and the least successful phase of American foreign policy in the postwar years. Allied with this were questions of the relations of the United States with other countries and of the relative importance of Europe and Asia in American policy and strategy.

The exhaustive hearings which followed clarified a number of important points, added to the confusion about others, and led to certain announced modifications in the Administration's Far Eastern policy, especially with regard to the admission of Red China into the UN and to the question of Formosa. Quite understandably, the reaction in the free world to *l'affaire MacArthur* was one of bewilderment and alarm. Among the

³⁷ The New York Times, April 15, 1951, p. E 1.

nations that looked to the United States for leadership and assistance there were many that were concerned lest the policies MacArthur advocated, which to them seemed much too provocative and too likely to increase the danger of global war, should in the end be forced upon the Administration by a critical and insistent public opinion. They must have wondered whether the United States was not too irresponsible and too disunited to be relied upon in the long, tough struggle with Communist imperialism.

The Eisenhower Administration. The future course of American foreign policy was determined more in the national party conventions in June and July of 1952 than by the presidential election of November 4. The nomination by the Republicans of General Dwight D. Eisenhower instead of Senator Robert A. Taft was in effect a vote of confidence in the basic principles of President Truman's foreign policy. The same was true of the nomination of Governor Adlai E. Stevenson by the Democratic convention.

On January 20, 1953, for the first time in twenty-four years, a Republican President entered the White House. Many people in Western Europe and in Asia were apprehensive. Somehow they seemed to think that the Republicans were more "warlike" than the Democrats: they had grave doubts about the policies of the General become President, and they were rather suspicious of his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles. But the President's Inaugural Address seemed reassuring. He really spoke on the state of the world—on its problems, its trials, its changes. He outlined no specific foreign policies, but he asserted "certain fixed principles" that would guide his Administration. These included an abhorrence of war, the development of American strength, a willingness to cooperate with other states, no appeasement, no abuse or misuse of American power, support for the security of other states, the encouragement of productivity and profitable trade for the world, loyalty to the United Nations, collaboration with states of the Western Hemisphere, the encouragement of European unity, the equality of all races and peoples, and making the United States an effective force for peace.

The first evidence of the "positive" foreign policy promised by the Republicans came with President Eisenhower's Message on the State of the Union, February 2. Two pronouncements in particular suggested that the Administration had in mind some drastic tactical changes within the framework of the older policies. The Seventh Fleet would no longer prevent the Chinese Nationalists on Formosa from attacking the Chinese Communists on the mainland; and Mutual Security aid to Western Europe would be conditioned upon the earnestness of the efforts of the European states to effect a closer integration. These decisions did not abate the considerable anxiety among the allies of the United States in both the Far East and Europe; for a time all of them continued to fear an enlargement of the Korean War into World War III. As the early weeks of the Eisenhower Administration came to a close, however, it became

clear that American foreign policy would remain essentially unchanged. Here and there a little "positive" had been added, but the soldier-President had shown no disposition toward recklessness in word or deed.

A number of events in the course of 1953 appeared to offer new hope for the lessening of international tensions. On March 3 Stalin died, and the new leaders of the Soviet Union began to follow more flexible and conciliatory policies. On April 16 President Eisenhower made a strong plea for peace, which helped to calm those who feared that he was too much concerned with the military approach. On May 11 Sir Winston Churchill called for an early meeting of the top leaders of Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and the United States. On July 27, after more than three years of fighting, the Korean War was brought to an end by the signing of a truce agreement. In September a sweeping victory for Adenauer in the elections in West Germany promised well for the defense of Western Europe; but in August the Russians announced that they had exploded a hydrogen bomb. In December, in an address before the General Assembly of the United Nations : Eisenhower proposed a world pool of atomic materials for peaceful purposes. Negotiations for the implementation of this atoms-for-peace plan have been underway since that time.

The year 1954 was one of conferences, with Mr. Dulles setting new records as a traveling Secretary of State. At the Berlin Conference in February the foreign ministers of the Big Four made another effort to consider a peace settlement for Germany ; but even in the relaxed atmosphere of the "new look" they were unable to reach agreement. Instead, they agreed to sponsor a conference at Geneva to consider problems relating to Korea and Indo-China, with Communist China invited to attend. The United States was cool to the whole idea, and Mr. Dulles went to Geneva for only a few days. No progress at all was made on the Korean issue, but after weeks of negotiation agreements for a truce in Indo-China were signed. The United States refused to be a party to the Geneva settlement, for she feared that the terms compromised Indochinese independence and gave the Communists an entering wedge in Southeast Asia.

After Geneva the United States took the initiative in calling a conference in Manila, where in September representatives of eight nations signed the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty. Later, military officials of these states conferred on measures for concerted defense and set up a small organization in Bangkok. The Manila Treaty was bitterly denounced by Russia and Communist China and disapproved by India and other nations of the "neutralist" world.

In Western Europe a fundamental objective of American policy was imperiled when the European Defense Community Treaty was rejected by the French National Assembly on August 30. But here, too, the loss was at least partially recouped. With Mr. Dulles taking a back seat, and with Sir Anthony Eden making an explicit declaration of the willingness of Great Britain to maintain troops on the continent, the delegates of nine nations signed an accord in London to integrate West Germany politically

and militarily with Western Europe, to expand the Brussels Treaty to include West Germany and Italy in a Western European Union, and to assure the West German Government of full sovereignty in the near future. The decisions at the London conference were incorporated into a series of thirty separate treaties and agreements signed in Paris on October 23 by representatives of fifteen nations. When these entered into effect in 1955, in spite of Soviet efforts to prevent their ratification, they created a broad framework for West European cooperation. President Eisenhower felt that in general the hopeful aspects of the "new look" warranted his going to Geneva to participate in the "summit" conference of July, 1955.

The Eisenhower Administration vigorously defended its foreign policy record in the presidential campaign of 1956. While Governor Stevenson's attack was forthright and telling, the issues were scarcely ones of broad policy. Both candidates accepted an active American role in world affairs and both favored support of freedom-loving nations everywhere. In the elections and during the weeks that followed the American people expressed confidence in Mr. Eisenhower's course in the Near East crisis. He was critical of Israel, Britain, and France, but he sought no drastic "reappraisal" of relations with those states ; he supported UN measures to resolve the crisis ; and he remained on guard against hostile Soviet moves.

THE PATTERN OF SECURITY

Many critics at home and abroad have complained that in the postwar years the United States has departed from her nonmilitaristic traditions and become almost obsessed with the military approach. They argue that this may be a disastrous form of national myopia, since the problems arising from the revolutionary movements of our time cannot be solved by military means : "You can't fight ideas with bullets." Even communism, backed by the growing power of the Soviet Union and Communist China, so the Argument runs, is not primarily a military threat, but rather a challenge to the principles which free men hold most dear.

Emphasis on Military Security. There can be no doubt that in recent years the United States has harped incessantly on the military defense of the free world. This indicates no desirable order of priority, but a recognition of real and present dangers. Behind the shield of deterrent power the free world may grow in strength and confidence, and the forces which threaten freedom may be held in check and may eventually wither away. The United States would like to devote less of her resources and energies to military defense, but as the strongest of the non-Communist powers she has a colossal responsibility and must accept the risks that a heavy burden on the national budget imposes on the economic, social, and political structure of the country.

At the close of World War II American military forces were demobilized at a rapid rate under pressure to "bring the boys home" and to give


tangible evidence of confidence in the good faith and good intentions of other states. By the end of 1946 the American armed forces had been reduced from nearly 12,000,000 men to hardly more than 1,500,000. "We didn't demobilize," said Bernard Baruch, "we scuttled and ran." As the dimensions of this error became apparent, and as the hopes for a peaceful and cooperative world faded, the United States felt impelled to strengthen her defense establishment, to encourage and assist other free nations to rearm, and to enter into bilateral and multilateral security agreements with many other states.

The annual budget figures reflected America's reaction to the trend of world events, especially the vast rearmament effort after the outbreak of the war in Korea in June, 1950. As given in President Eisenhower's Budget Message of January 16, 1956, expenditures for national security for the fiscal years 1946-1955 were as follows (in billions of dollars) :

1946	\$43.5	1951	\$22.3
1947	14.4	1952	43.8
1948	11.7	1953	50.3
1949	13.0	1954	46.5
1950	13.0	1955	40.6

Military Assistance. National security, conceived in military terms alone, involves more than the maintenance of a strong defense establishment ; it also includes military assistance to other free nations. According to the Seventh Semiannual Report on the Mutual Security Program, "the total value of military grant aid shipments to all parts of the world, from the beginning of the military assistance program in October, 1949, through December 31, 1954, amounted to \$10.5 billion." Percentagewise, 71 per cent went to Europe, 18 per cent to Asia and the Pacific area, 10 per cent to the Near East and Africa, and 1 per cent to Latin America. Until 1949 this assistance was extended through a series of relatively uncoordinated programs ; but since October, 1949, it has been administered in a more coordinated way, first through the Mutual Defense Assistance Program and then through the Mutual Security Program. The Defense Department has had the major responsibility for the actual implementation of these programs, although from January 1, 1952, to August 1, 1953, they came under the general supervision of the Mutual Security Agency and from August 1, 1953, to June 30, 1955, of the Foreign Operations Administration.

Mutual Security Treaties. In his address to the representatives of sixty nations who had assembled in San Francisco on June 24, 1955, Secretary of State Dulles stated that "the United States is today a party to mutual security treaties which bind us collectively to the defense of no less than forty-four countries." Through these treaties the pattern of collective security has taken tangible and impressive form. Regional security arrangements of a comprehensive nature are in effect in the Western Hemisphere and in the North Atlantic area. In another vital part of the world,



United States Collective Defense Arrangements

Mutual Security Agency

the Far East and Southeast Asia, no similar arrangement has been possible ; but the United States is associated with seven other nations — Great Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines — in the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (the Manila Treaty) ; she has joined with Australia and New Zealand in the so-called ANZUS Pact ; and she has entered into bilateral security agreements with Japan, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, and the Nationalist Government of China.

The Rio Treaty. The pattern for the regional security arrangements which were authorized by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and which have proliferated in the postwar period was suggested in the Act of Chapultepec, drawn up at the Inter-American Conference on Problems of Peace and War, held at Mexico City in February-March, 1945. In language employed later in the Brussels Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty, the Act declared "that every attack of a State against the integrity or the inviolability of the territory, or against the sovereignty or political independence of an American State, shall... be considered as an act of aggression against the other States which sign this Act." No provision was included to make the agreement effective, but in September, 1947, the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance was signed by representatives of nineteen American republics at Rio de Janeiro. It entered into effect on December 3, 1948, upon ratification by two-thirds of the signatory states. All twenty-one members of the Organization of American States had ratified by early 1951. The region covered by the "Rio Pact" includes the entire Western Hemisphere and extends well out into the Atlantic and the Pacific ; and the machinery for its implementation is now a part of the OAS.

The North Atlantic Treaty. In his Truman Doctrine speech in March, 1947, the President had declared : "I believe that it must be the foreign policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." This was clearly a statement of principle, not a specific program of action ; but it was applied immediately to justify aid to Greece and Turkey, and it has since been invoked in support of many other programs of military and economic aid. It was this principle that underlay American participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the passage of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act.

The signing of the North Atlantic Treaty by the United States was an epochal event. Article 5 declared that each of the parties to the Treaty, in the event of an armed attack against one or more of them, "will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area." Except for the French alliance of 1778, this marked the first major long-term commitment into which the United States had ever entered with any state of Western Europe. But in another sense it was

simply the formal recognition of a commitment which had in effect already existed for many years and which had been generally recognized by the American people in the postwar period. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is now one of the cornerstones of American foreign policy.

The Manila Treaty. The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty is a much weaker instrument than the Rio Treaty or the North Atlantic Treaty, not so much because of the provisions of the treaty itself as because of the difficulties in developing a satisfactory plan of defense in a weak and dangerously exposed part of the free world. Only two states of Southeast Asia — Thailand and the Philippines — are parties to the treaty; Communist China, India, Indonesia, and Burma are opposed to the concept on which the treaty rests; the Western signatories—France, Great Britain, and the United States — are far away and are handicapped by the continuing suspicion of colonialism and imperialism; and the remaining states—Australia, New Zealand, and Pakistan — have only peripheral interests in Southeast Asia.

In structure, too, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization is weaker in its military aspects than either the OAS or NATO. The treaty itself “followed the pattern of the Australia, New Zealand, and Philippines treaties rather than the NATO model. That is to say, instead of declaring an attack upon one to be an attack upon all, it stated that an attack upon one would be recognized as dangerous to the peace and safety of the others.”⁸⁸

Mr. Dulles was quite right in opposing the initials SEATO to designate the new security arrangement, for they would suggest comparison with NATO, and by no stretch of the imagination is SEATO an Asian NATO. Nevertheless, it represented the maximum amount of cooperative planning for defense of Southeast Asia that was possible under existing circumstances.

AMERICAN FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

World War II cost the United States about 41 billion dollars in the form of lend-lease expenditures. Since then she has spent more than 51 billion dollars on foreign aid programs. There seems to be little prospect that these will be discontinued in the foreseeable future; in fact, they seem to have become, as President Eisenhower stated in his message to Congress on April 20, 1955, “an integral part of our foreign policy.”

The American foreign aid programs developed as emergency measures to deal with emergency situations. Only with the growth of the Marshall Plan did they lose their unsystematic and emergency character, and only more recently have they become part of a continuing and long-range policy. This evolution has occurred in the face of determined efforts to

⁸⁸ Pratt, p. 750.

shelve the whole program of foreign aid. Although Congress had in the fall of 1954 voted in favor of ending development assistance as soon as possible, it approved vast sums for foreign aid in the summer of 1955.


The Five Phases. The period of large-scale American foreign assistance since 1941 may be divided into five phases. The first covered the years from the passage of the Lend-Lease Act in March, 1941, to the abrupt termination of this "weapon of victory" upon the cessation of hostilities in August, 1945. The second, lasting until the effective launching of the European Recovery Program in 1948, embraced American relief to war-torn areas and special credits to individual countries for reconstruction. The third began with the passage of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948, "the first systematic attempt to deal with the problems of postwar reconstruction on a wider geographical basis." The Communist attack on South Korea in late June, 1950, marked the beginning of the fourth phase, one in which the emphasis was shifted from recovery to rearmament. This emphasis was apparent in the Mutual Security Act of October, 1951, "which combined the various types of assistance programs into a single scheme, world-wide in scope and based primarily on security considerations." The first appropriations for Point Four were made during this phase. Certain events in 1953, notably the death of Stalin and the "new look" in Russia and the truce in Korea, seemed to promote a healthier international atmosphere ; these naturally had an effect upon the American foreign aid program. In this fifth phase emphasis has shifted from Europe to Asia, and to a considerable degree from military to economic assistance.⁸⁹

1. *Lend-Lease.* The passage of the Lend-Lease Act was certainly one of the most unneutral steps ever taken during time of war by a so-called neutral. It made available to countries resisting Nazi aggression the resources of the United States. Of the total of 49.1 billion dollars of gross assistance under lend-lease (there was about 7.8 billion dollars in reverse lend-lease) Great Britain received 29 billions and the U.S.S.R. 10.8 billions. Only two other countries received more than a billion dollars of aid under the program : France (2.6 billions) and China (1.3 billions).


2. *Early Postwar Assistance.* Apparently the United States hoped to wind up her aid program after the war and to transfer the problems of financing postwar reconstruction to new international agencies and to private enterprises. Instead, the conditions resulting from the war and the deterioration of relations between the Soviet Union and the Western powers forced her to embark on a series of uncoordinated emergency measures on a variety of fronts. Large grants were made for the termination of lend-lease operations, for postwar relief through UNRRA and international refugee organizations, to areas occupied by American forces, to China (directly and through the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation

⁸⁹ The quotations in this paragraph are from William Adams Brown, Jr., and Redvers Opie, *American Foreign Assistance* (The Brookings Institution, 1953), p. 543.


AID SINCE 1945 BY REGION



BREAKDOWN OF MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID




CHANGES IN REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION



The Trend of the U.S. Aid Program

The New York Times, December 4, 1955


THE YEARLY TREND




Total U.S. Aid Since World War II

The New York Times, May 6, 1956

SHIFT TO ASIA



SHIFT TO MILITARY



Administration),⁴⁰ and to the Philippines. The largest single item was a loan to Britain of 3.75 billion dollars, but substantial credits were also made available for post-lend-lease operations, for surplus property disposal, and for loans by the Export-Import Bank. During this phase gross foreign assistance amounted to 14.5 billion dollars, exclusive of nearly 500 million dollars for interim aid to certain European countries while the Marshall Plan was taking shape and for aid to Greece and Turkey, which continued beyond this phase.

3. *The European Recovery Program.* The ERP was the most ambitious peacetime undertaking that the United States has ever assumed in foreign affairs. No other venture in American foreign policy has been more carefully planned, more actively debated, or more strongly implemented. The nature of the Program and its contribution to European recovery are described in Chapter 15. Here we shall consider it as the major undertaking during the third phase of American foreign assistance programs, when economic rehabilitation was the dominant theme.

In a commencement address at Harvard University, on June 5, 1947, Secretary of State George C. Marshall proposed the idea that developed into the European Recovery Program. The Communist coup in Czechoslovakia in February, 1948, helped to persuade many Congressmen that the United States must strengthen the free countries of Europe, and the signing of the Brussels Treaty in March, 1948, afforded evidence that the leading nations of Western Europe were determined to defend themselves and to deserve American aid. On April 3, 1948, President Truman signed the Foreign Assistance Act, which authorized an expenditure of 5.3 billion dollars for the European Recovery Program, 463 millions for China, 275 millions for Greece and Turkey, and 60 millions for the International Children's Emergency Fund. It also provided for the establishment of an Economic Cooperation Administration, separate from but with close relations with the State Department. ECA special missions were soon established in each of the participating countries, which, in turn, signed bilateral aid agreements with the United States (except for Switzerland) and established the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), with headquarters in Paris, to coordinate their own recovery efforts and to work closely with ECA.

In this manner the European Recovery Program was launched. It was conceived as a four-year program, with gradually decreasing appropriations; the total expenditure was estimated to be in the neighborhood of 17 billion dollars. When the program came formally to an end, on December 31, 1951, the actual expenditures — made or committed — amounted to about 11 billions; but additional commitments had in the meantime been made for the rearmament of Western Europe and for the coordination of defense efforts in the North Atlantic Community. These called for many billions more. The shift in emphasis was reflected in the scale of the President's recommendations for fiscal 1952, when he asked for 1.65 bil-

⁴⁰ For a comment on UNRRA see p. 357n.

lion dollars for economic aid to Europe and for 5.24 billions for military assistance. For fiscal 1953 the amounts requested were 1.8 billions and 4.145 billions, respectively.

With respect to its immediate objectives the Marshall Plan was generally a decided success. There were ample grounds, however, for believing that even this gigantic effort might prove to be far short of what was needed. Quite possibly it helped to save Western Europe from economic collapse and from Communist conquest from within and from without. Moreover, it helped to restore hope and confidence in a crucial part of the free world. But when it was over Western Europe could hardly be regarded as a viable economic or political unit or as in a position to defend itself. The economies of most of the countries could not sustain a major defense effort, and the political situation in many was still unstable. The strength of the Communists in France had declined only slightly, and in Italy they had actually increased in numbers ; and "neutralism" and apathy and defeatism were still widespread.

Before it was fused into the Mutual Security Program, the Marshall Plan had become largely a program of economic mobilization for defense. In its early stages the economic aspects were paramount, but the critical international situation, especially after the attack on the Republic of Korea in June, 1950, made these attempts rather unrealistic ; and the focus of the Marshall Plan was shifted from recovery to rearmament. There is considerable basis for Theodore White's conclusion : "Though the Marshall Plan continued in name down to 1952, historically it came to its end the week the Communists attacked in Asia."⁴¹

4. *The Mutual Defense Assistance Program.* On July 25, 1949, the day on which he signed the instrument of ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty, President Truman sent to Congress a request for legislation authorizing a program of "military aid to free nations." The Mutual Defense Assistance Program which followed was largely a program of military aid to the countries which participated in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, with some economic aspects, and with some peripheral military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey (which are now affiliated with NATO) and to countries of the Far East and other parts of Asia.

According to the provisions of the act, the appropriation for military aid to NATO countries could be made available only when each country requesting assistance had signed a bilateral agreement with the United States and when the President had approved "recommendations for an integrated defense of the North Atlantic area." These formalities were not completed until January 27, 1950, when eight bilateral agreements were signed and the President announced his approval of the "strategic concept" worked out by the foreign and defense ministers of the North Atlantic countries.⁴² In March the first assignment of airplanes and other military equipment under the MDAP left the United States.

⁴¹ *Fire in the Ashes : Europe in Mid-Century* (William Sloane, 1953), p. 70.

⁴² For the President's statement and the texts of the Mutual Defense Assistance

In June, 1950, the President asked Congress for another billion dollars for the second year of MDAP. This time very little serious opposition was encountered in Congress. "The alternative to military assistance," declared a report of the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services committees, "is the abandonment of freedom and the confession of weakness which the Soviet Union would not be slow to interpret as an invitation to aggression."⁴³ The attack on South Korea in late June seemed to prove that these were not idle words. Appropriations for MDAP were vastly expanded before the end of 1950, and when this program was made a part of the Mutual Security Program in the following year, the appropriations for military aid to Western Europe were more than five times as great as the previous annual figures under MDAP. For other areas the sums for military assistance were stepped up proportionately.

The Point Four Program. The first announcement of the Point Four Program was made in President Truman's Inaugural Address of January 20, 1949. It soon became clear, however, that, as James Reston once said, "the speech preceded the policy." The Administration took several months to work out the details of a program of a very modest sort, *after* the President's address. Hence, although it had its inception during what we have called the third phase of postwar foreign assistance, the implementation of Point Four began early in the fourth phase.

The Act for International Development (Title II of the Economic Assistance Act of 1950) was the first legislative step to implement the Point Four Program. Despite the fact that the United States was by that time spending some 400 million dollars a year on various forms of assistance to underdeveloped areas,⁴⁴ the Act was "a significant milestone in the evolution of American world policy."⁴⁵ For the first time, "technical assistance" had become a major foreign policy. The Act declared the purpose was to "aid the efforts of the peoples of economically underdeveloped areas to develop their resources and improve their working and living conditions by encouraging the exchange of technical knowledge and skills and the flow of investment capital to countries which provide conditions under which such technical assistance and capital can effectively and constructively contribute to raising standards of living, creating new sources of wealth, increasing productivity and expanding purchasing power." It authorized participation in both bilateral and multilateral "technical co-

Agreements with Belgium, Denmark, France, and Italy, see *Department of State Bulletin*, XXII (Feb. 6, 1950), 198-211. The agreements with Luxembourg, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands were printed in the two subsequent issues of the *Bulletin*.

⁴³ *Mutual Defense Assistance Act Extension*, Senate Report 1853, 81st Congress, 2nd Session, June 21, 1950, p. 26.

⁴⁴ See address of Samuel P. Hayes, Jr., on "Point 4 Program after Korea," made in Baltimore, Md., Jan. 23, 1951; printed in *Department of State Bulletin*, XXIV (Feb. 5, 1951), 225-226.

⁴⁵ Richard P. Stebbins, *The United States in World Affairs*, 1950 (Council on Foreign Relations, 1951), p. 96.

operation" programs, and directed the President to set up machinery for administration and coordination, including an advisory board with representatives of private industry.

The Administration continued to tailor its requests for Point Four to the dimensions which Congress would tolerate ; but both within and without the Government there was a strong feeling that the United States should raise her sights in this area of foreign policy, both because the needs of the underdeveloped countries were great and because American national interests would best be served by a truly bold program of aid.⁴⁶ Yet, despite the Gray Report of November, 1950, which declared that the new and "promising" economic measures "have not been pressed with the vigor that the situation requires, and they have not been fused into a sufficiently effective program," and the International Development Advisory Board's insistence in March, 1951, that a program of aid to underdeveloped areas was an essential part of the American defense effort as well as a necessary contribution to the promotion of more stable economic conditions in the world, Congress preferred to give priority to defense measures and military assistance, and to regard Point Four as an impractical, long-range scheme which had small relation to the existing emergency.

The Act for International Development provided that the administration of the Point Four Program should be entrusted to the Technical Cooperation Administration, which was created within the Department of State. In August, 1953, TCA was transferred to the newly-established Foreign Operations Administration, and for nearly two years Point Four was a part of the Mutual Security Program. This step gave substance to charges that Point Four was regarded in the United States as a weapon in the "cold war" — that it was a method of buying support and of obtaining important strategic materials rather than a long-term policy of aiding underdeveloped countries to improve their basic economic strength so that they might stand on their own feet as equal partners of other free nations. But the reasons for the inclusion of Point Four in the Mutual Security Program were more practical, based on the obvious need to coordinate the operation of the various foreign aid programs and to present these programs to Congress in the form most acceptable to that sometimes other-wise-minded body.

The Mutual Security Program. In the spring of 1951 President Truman proposed the consolidation of the foreign aid programs. He asked for 8.5 billion dollars for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1952, with nearly 7 billion dollars allocated to Europe. The Mutual Security Act of October

⁴⁶ See, for example, Dewey Anderson and Stephen Raushenbush, *A Policy and Program for Success*, No. 1 in the Bold New Program Series of the Public Affairs Institute (Washington, D. C., 1951) ; James P. Warburg, *"Point Four" : Our Chance to Achieve Freedom Without Fear* (Author's Publ., 1949) ; and *United States Policy for Foreign Economic Development*, a report by a seminar on "Economic Policies for Underdeveloped Areas" of the World Affairs Council of Philadelphia, supplement to *World Affairs Councilor*, II (May, 1951).




*Herblock; Copyright, 1952
The Washington Post*

"You mean these aren't enough?"

10, 1951, enabled the President to make the integration he had recommended. He appointed W. Averell Harriman as Director for Mutual Security, and Harriman, on January 15, 1952, announced the organization of the new Mutual Security Agency (MSA). This Agency, located in the Executive Office of the President, exercised general supervision over all the foreign aid programs and absorbed many of the activities formerly carried on by ECA. The responsibility for the actual operation of the Technical Assistance Program devolved largely upon the State Department and that of the military aid programs upon the Department of Defense.


The objectives of the Mutual Security Program included those of the later phases of the ERP, with their emphasis on economic aspects of rearmament, the military objectives of the MDAP, and the technical assistance objectives of the Point Four Program. While it cannot be said that new objectives were included — except perhaps that of coordination —

MUTUAL SECURITY PROGRAM FISCAL YEAR 1956




The United States Congress appropriated \$2,703 million in new funds for the Mutual Security Program for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1956. Of this total, \$1,022 million will be administered by the Department of Defense and \$1,681 million by the International Cooperation Administration of the Department of State. In addition, \$63 million of unobligated funds from prior fiscal years were authorized to be used in fiscal year 1956. Again, the bulk of the money will be used in Asia, the focus of communist pressure on the Free World.

The total of FY 1956 MSP appropriations is about the same as the amount for FY 1955 and a little more than one-third of the amount for FY 1952.



Foreign Policy Briefs, Vol. V, No. 12, December 30, 1955



The New York Times, May 6, 1956

the new program made possible a broader and more intensified approach, as, for instance, greatly expanded economic aid and technical assistance in the Far East and an enlarged program in Latin America.

5. *The Foreign Operations Administration.* The integration of foreign assistance programs which had been promoted by the Mutual Security Act of 1951 was carried still further by Reorganization Plan No. 7 of August, 1953, which consolidated the Mutual Security Agency, the Technical Cooperation Administration, the Institute of Inter-American Affairs, and certain other agencies into the Foreign Operations Administration. The change was essentially an administrative one, with the projects directed by FOA still labeled the Mutual Security Program. Harold E. Stassen was Director of FOA until it was terminated on June 30, 1955; during those twenty-two months he directed the expenditure of approximately 8.7 billion dollars of which 6.3 billion went to military assistance and direct forces support.

On June 30, 1955, on the conclusion of his service as Director, Mr.

Stassen submitted to the President a brief over-all report on some of the major aspects of the Mutual Security Program under FOA.⁴⁷ Of particular interest was the change "from preoccupation mainly with building of military defenses to the aim of creating an economic base capable of both supporting necessary defense efforts and also of yielding a growing measure of economic progress and advance in human dignity and well-being." Of almost equal significance was "the shift in program emphasis from Europe to the less developed areas of the world." Mr. Stassen pointed out that "the arc of free Asia" was "the area offering the most urgent challenge and the greatest opportunity for constructive action," but he noted that increased attention was also being given to Latin America, the Near East, and Africa. Other major developments listed by Mr. Stassen were : the suspension of all economic aid to the Marshall Plan countries ; building "additional strength" in Spain, Yugoslavia, and Berlin ; the development of the technical cooperation program into "a powerful instrument for meeting forthrightly a broad range of problems involved in achieving economic progress by democratic means" ; and the realization that the Program "has become in fact an integral part of our total foreign policy and national security system."⁴⁸

When FOA came to an end, on June 30, 1955, the foreign economic assistance and technical assistance programs were returned to the State Department, with somewhat enhanced status. They were put under the International Cooperation Administration, with a director directly responsible to the Secretary of State.

⁴⁷ *Report to the President on the Foreign Operations Administration*, June 30, 1955.

⁴⁸ The dimensions of the Mutual Security Program and the significant areas of program emphasis are suggested in the following breakdown for the fiscal year 1956 :

military aid	\$1,133,000,000
Direct forces support	317,000,000
Defense support	
Europe	92,000,000
Near East and Africa	102,500,000
Asia	837,800,000
Development assistance	
Near East and Africa	73,000,000
Asia	71,000,000
Latin America	38,000,000
Technical assistance	
Near East and Africa	41,000,000
Asia	66,500,000
Latin America	31,500,000
U.N. technical assistance	24,000,000
Organization of American States	1,500,000
President's Fund for Asian Economic Development	200,000,000
Special emergency fund	100,000,000
Others (United Refugee Program, Children's Welfare, Palestine Refugees, etc.)	159,300,000

THE NEW PARTNERSHIP

We have examined some of the factors conditioning American foreign policy and some of the principles which have governed it. We have seen that most of these principles were formulated early in the American experience, and that they have stood the test of time and of changing conditions much better than is generally realized. Since the turn of the century, however, some have had to be abandoned and others reformulated and re-examined. In this period vast changes have occurred in the world political pattern, and the United States has moved, somewhat haltingly and reluctantly, into a position of great power and responsibility. There is ample evidence for concluding that she has not yet learned how to act like a great power or how to wield such tremendous responsibility ; that she has not yet adjusted herself to her new world position ; that she is still handicapped by illusions and concepts which were acquired in a far different era. Perhaps it is not surprising that her motives and intentions are not always understood abroad ; she does not fully understand them herself. She still is trying to formulate policies which will be truly in the national interest, and she is beginning to realize that good intentions and lofty statements of principle are no substitute for concrete policies closely geared to determined objectives.

A friendly English critic, J. B. Priestley, expressed the anxiety of many observers when he wrote in 1947 :

America now bestrides the world ; she is the colossus of our time. Whatever is said and done in the United States may easily change the lives of unnumbered millions thousands of miles away...It is clearly a terrible responsibility. But where except in occasional speeches, is America's sense of responsibility? ... Congressmen who have never given a morning's serious thought to world problems hurry to register votes that may ruin half a continent. Columnists in search of a scoop casually blast the plans of half a dozen countries. Private feuds that we in Europe know nothing about shape our lives.

The most powerful government on earth seems to have no continuing policy, no tradition to guide it, and is clearly swayed by what is largely an irresponsible sensation-loving press and an electorate that can be stampeded like cattle. Imagine our feelings. It is like being locked in a house with a whimsical drunken giant.⁴⁹

So startling is this image that most Americans might have difficulty in recognizing themselves in it ; but they must admit that Priestley's misgivings have some basis in fact. They should realize that apprehensions of this sort have been frequently voiced in unofficial circles in almost every

⁴⁹ "You Worry the World," in *Magazine of the Year*, Oct., 1947 ; quoted in Harold and Margaret Sprout, *Foundations of National Power*, 2nd ed. (Van Nostrand, 1951), p. 415.

other country of the non-Communist world. Even in official quarters the same doubts and fears have been expressed, although in more restrained and diplomatic language. One may suspect that the real source of perturbation lies in the unwelcome realization by the peoples of other free nations that they are heavily dependent on the United States for economic recovery, political stability, and military protection. Quite understandably, they do not care to feel like poor relations of a "whimsical drunken giant" or even of a sober, reliable giant. The United States, for her part, still seems to expect gratitude and appreciation for the tremendous outlays she has made to assist other countries, when she should realize that gratitude is a rare commodity on the international market and that the real justification for her aid programs must be sought in the realm of national self-interest, with humanitarian considerations an important but nevertheless subordinate motivation.

The Hoover Commission's Task Force on Foreign Affairs called attention to two characteristics of the present international position of the United States which call for recognition and implementation. The first is that "the objectives and policies of the United States are today by necessity fundamentally positive in nature rather than negative or declaratory as in the past" and that even a policy with so many negative aspects as the Truman Doctrine "requires positive commitments in terms of dollars and personnel." The second prime characteristic is "the cooperative nature of our foreign relations"; even the major issues between the two giants of the modern world, the Soviet Union and the United States, "are not bilateral but involve many countries."⁵⁰ Many Americans are still unwilling to face the full implications of these observations, but the majority are apparently beginning to accept them as among the unavoidable conditions of international life.

More than a generation ago Woodrow Wilson declared: "We are participants, whether we would or not, in the life of the world. The interests of all nations are our own also. We are partners with the rest." Many years of disillusionment and another world war were required before the American people realized and accepted the import of Wilson's words. Now, "for the first time in its history," says one historian of American diplomacy, "the United States has been striving to live up to the responsibilities of world leadership"; and he adds: "This is the single most important fact in the world today."⁵¹

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⁵⁰ *Task Force Report on Foreign Affairs*, p. 37.

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The Foreign Policies of Great..... 23

Britain, France, and Other States

The Soviet Union and the United States — the order is alphabetical— are the two super-powers in the world today. Perhaps Great Britain may properly be regarded as the only other great power, although France and Italy have a traditional claim to that distinction. It is more difficult to indicate the position of other states. India's potential, for instance, is far greater than her power in being, and the same is true of Communist China ; Yugoslavia's military strength is out of proportion to her technological development ; and Argentina and Spain seem to have military establishments unwarranted by their economic resources. The same might be said of Turkey. The power of Germany and Japan, not long ago the most powerful states of Europe and of Asia, is now, of course, very low, for until recently they were restricted under the terms of Allied occupation. Germany is still divided, with neutralist sentiment strong among those living in the territory of the Federal Republic. Japan is forbidden to rearm on any substantial scale by the constitution drawn up during the period of occupation.

Military power, however, is not always an index to a state's influence in world affairs. France, Communist China, and India are notable examples today : France because of her geographical position, her worldwide commitments, and the quality of her diplomacy ; Communist China because of her aggressive impulses, her enormous potential, and her affiliation with Soviet Russia ; and India because of her unlimited manpower, her strategic position, and her leadership of non-Communist Asia.

In the present chapter we shall review the foreign policies of Great Britain and France, and more briefly those of Communist China and of India. We shall then discuss the policies being pursued by the "re-emergent powers," Germany and Japan ; and finally we shall consider the general nature of the foreign policies of the lesser powers.

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF GREAT BRITAIN

"The general character of England's foreign policy," wrote Sir Eyre Crowe in his famous Memorandum of 1907, "is determined by the immutable conditions of her geographical situation on the ocean flank of Europe as an island State with vast overseas colonies and dependencies, whose existence and survival as an independent community are inseparably bound up with the possession of preponderant sea power." Because of these underlying factors, as well as her historical traditions, he argued, Britain "has a direct and positive interest in the maintenance of the independence of nations, and therefore must be the natural enemy of any country threatening the independence of others, and the natural protector of the weaker communities."¹ In particular, Britain sought to maintain a balance of power on the continent of Europe — a policy which had become so well established as to be "an historical truism." Sir Eyre could then also declare that England "champions the principle of the largest measure of general freedom of commerce," a policy dictated alike by enlightened self-interest and by the desire to be on friendly terms with other nations.

Traditional Bases of British Policy

Geography, sea power, trade, balance of power, imperial interests—these have been the traditional bases of British foreign policy, and every British statesman of the past few centuries has been conscious of them. On the whole British diplomacy has sought with considerable skill and finesse to promote the interests of Britain in the light of these underlying realities, and it has done so with a continuity that is one of the outstanding characteristics of British foreign policy.

Geography, Sea Power, and Trade

This fortress built by Nature for herself
Against infection and the hand of war,
This happy breed of men, this little world,
This precious stone set in the silver sea,
Which serves it in the office of a wall,
Or as a moat defensive to a house,
Against the envy of less happier lands.

—*King Richard II*

One may feel on reading these famous lines from Shakespeare that times have changed. Admittedly, the weapons of our day have modified Brit-

¹ "Memorandum on the Present State of British Relations with France and Germany," dated Jan. 1, 1907. For text see G. P. Gooch and H. Temperley, *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1919*, 12 vols. (London, 1926-1938), III, 402-407, 419-420.

ain's geographical advantage of earlier years, but they have by no means obliterated it. It is still a factor of prime importance. But England's insularity did more than provide her with "a moat defensive" behind which she could develop the sturdy institutions of freedom ; it also drove her people into their historic alliance with the sea — to naval supremacy, to foreign trade, and to empire.

One of the principal roles of British sea power has been to keep the sea lanes open, so that the island people could carry on their vital trade, especially the export of finished goods and the importation of raw materials and foodstuffs without which survival would have been impossible. Before World War II Britain normally imported about half of her food and exported about twice the percentage of domestic production that the United States did. The attempts of the Germans in two world wars to blockade the British Isles were almost fatal reminders of the degree of Britain's dependence on outside sources of supply. Trade is indeed the lifeblood of Britain, and it is no mere coincidence that its promotion and protection have always been major concerns of British policy.

Balance of Power. A central aim of British foreign policy from the time of Henry VIII and Cardinal Wolsey to the present has been to prevent the domination of Europe by a single power. Of all the foreign policies of Britain, this has generally been regarded as one of the most basic and most enduring. For this purpose England intervened in continental affairs again and again, usually in support of the state or coalition of states which was prepared to resist the dominant power of the day. Occasionally shortsighted leaders, or those with special axes to grind, gave support to the stronger European states rather than to the weaker, and thus contributed to an upsetting of the balance of power.

Despite these apparent lapses at times, the main outlines of this historic policy are clear. England has viewed with ever-watchful suspicion any state which threatened to upset the balance of power ; at crucial moments she has intervened on the continent with all her might — against France under Louis XIV and under Napoleon, and against Germany under William II and under Adolf Hitler. For centuries Britain and France had been the best of enemies, but under the altered conditions of the nineteenth century they began a cautious friendship and collaboration in many ways ; and in the twentieth century the blood of Englishmen and of Frenchmen has flowed in a common cause on many a battlefield. During this period Germany and not France threatened to upset the balance in Europe.

In the heyday of the balance of power policy England regarded herself as the holder of the balance in Europe rather than as an active participant in European power politics. This was wholly in keeping with her long-standing dualism of approach to continental affairs — that is, her concern in the affairs of Europe and at the same time her desire to remain aloof from them. But as we have pointed out in the chapter on the balance of power, Britain is no longer in a position to act as balancer, and indeed the present state of world politics offers little hope for those who would

restore the old system. Two factors, in particular, in addition to the attrition of British power and prestige, prevent such a restoration. In the first place, as we have noted, Europe is no longer the only major theater where balance of power considerations are predominant. *World politics* are now really all that the term implies. A policy of balance of power is especially difficult to follow on a worldwide scale. Second, the balance of power in Europe has been so completely destroyed that there is no state, or effective coalition of states, with which Britain could ally herself in order to restore it. In earlier times one of the conditions of Britain's balance of power policy on the continent was the existence of such a state or of such a power grouping.

Imperial Interests. Great Britain has long been the greatest of imperial powers. As the center of an empire "on which the sun never sets," the little island off the northwest coast of Europe has played a role in world affairs which would have been inconceivable in the absence of colonies and dependencies far from home. The preservation of a vast empire, with the maintenance of lines of communication to all its parts and to the countries of the Commonwealth has been a cardinal aim of British foreign policy. Britain's statesmen have perforce thought in imperial terms, and many of her finest sons have served her well in far-off corners of the earth.

The Decline of British Power

As we look back upon the last quarter of the nineteenth century we can see that in spite of the pomp and glory Britain's power in world affairs was already beginning to decline. The main causes for this decline, which has reached such serious proportions in the present century, are to be found in developments over which Britain had little control. Technological advances, for instance, operated to modify her insularity, reduce her naval pre-eminence, and diminish her industrial advantages. The rise of the United States and Japan signified that new and powerful non-European rivals had appeared to challenge Britain's political, commercial, and naval supremacy. The unification of Germany under Bismarck and her ambitious ventures under William II not only revived the old threat to the European balance of power but also introduced another economic and naval competitor for Britain. England still followed a balance of power policy, Sir Edward Grey's protestations to the contrary notwithstanding, but after the "splendid isolation" of the 1890's had lost its splendor, England vigorously sought allies — first Japan and next France and Russia. It should be noted, however, that England then became involved in the balance of power system in a less desirable role, for she ceased to be a balancer and instead consistently threw her weight onto one scale of the balance.

The world of the *Pax Britannica* was on the whole a stable and peaceful one, and the major stabilizing factor was British power, both visible and invisible. The decline of that power was gradual, and its full implications were not clearly perceived until after the Second World War. But since

1945 there have been numerous indications that British statesmen have become conscious of it and that, while they have sought to capitalize as much as possible on Britain's past influence and prestige, they have also faced the need of retrenchment and readjustment in foreign as well as in domestic affairs.

Even the fundamental bases of British foreign policy have been greatly weakened, and almost every one of the traditional British policies is gravely challenged today. Facts of geography — presumably the most immutable of all the factors conditioning a nation's power — have changed in significance. England's position as an island kingdom in a strategic location with respect to Europe and the trade routes of the world, and blessed by a favorable climate and valuable natural resources, is still of vital importance ; but in the age of air power the Channel is an inadequate moat, and the development of atomic and hydrogen bombs makes England a peculiarly vulnerable base instead of an impregnable fortress. She still possesses great sea power, but she has lost command of the sea. Furthermore, for three-quarters of a century she has been at a growing disadvantage in competing for the markets of the world. In the postwar period she has increased her exports to a record level, but she has achieved this at the greatest sacrifice and under the most adverse conditions. Her income from investments overseas, one of her main sources of economic strength in the nineteenth century, has seriously declined as a result of the forced liquidation of a substantial part of her foreign holdings. Her basic industries — notably coal, steel, and textiles, which made her "the workshop of the world" — have lost their primacy. Many of the former elements of overseas strength have been seriously weakened, with a consequent deterioration of Britain's total position in world affairs. Even the value of the vital bases and strategic points still under British control—including Hong Kong, Singapore, Aden, and Gibraltar — is far less than formerly.

Britain and Postwar Europe

The British Labor Government, which was in power from 1945 to 1951, was severely criticized for its apparent reluctance to cooperate with the nations of Western Europe. The Conservative Government, which has been in power since 1951, while it may have been less doctrinaire and somewhat more sympathetic in its approach to European affairs, has cooperated with the nations of Western Europe only to a limited degree and has avoided association with all plans for real integration. Nevertheless, in the postwar period Britain has worked with unusual intimacy with European states economically, militarily, and, to a lesser extent, politically. In general, in her recent relations with Western Europe she has been the proponent of functionalism or inter-governmentalism, rather than of federalism. This position explains her whole-hearted cooperation in arrangements such as the Brussels Pact and the Organization for European

Economic Cooperation in contrast to her cautious attitude toward the Council of Europe and her early refusal even to discuss the Schuman Plan.

Western Union. In January, 1948, Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin delivered his famous "Western Union" speech, which seemed to herald a new British orientation toward Europe. He made the most solemn pledge of cooperation with the countries of Western Europe that any responsible British statesman had ever uttered. But while Britain's words were bold, her acts were cast in the old orthodox mold. Western Union, at least in British eyes, took the form of machinery for defense and for the social, economic, and cultural collaboration set up in implementation of the Brussels Treaty. This important agreement, signed on March 17, 1948, by representatives of the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, was essentially a military alliance.

The European Recovery Program. In the evolution and administration of the European Recovery Program (ERP), Britain showed leadership as well as a willing spirit in working with the other European countries which shared the aid. She has cooperated fully in the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), which was set up in April, 1948, to implement the Marshall Plan. As the largest trading country in the Program and the chief recipient of aid, Britain deserves particular credit for her part in drafting the Intra-European Payments Scheme in 1948, which set up Europe's own "Little Marshall Plan" to promote intra-European trade.

The Schuman Plan. The British reaction to the Schuman Plan for pooling the coal and steel production of France, Germany, and perhaps other countries, proposed by the French foreign minister on May 9, 1950, disclosed the limits of the Labor Government's willingness to cooperate in real European integration. In spite of British aloofness, a blueprint for the European Coal and Steel Community was worked out in 1950 and 1951 by representatives of the Benelux countries, France, Italy, and West Germany; and in August, 1952, the Joint High Authority, the central directing agency of the new Community, began to function. The British Government immediately appointed a permanent delegation to the new Authority, and since 1952 it has maintained close liaison with the Community. On December 21, 1954, it signed an "Agreement of Association between the United Kingdom and the European Coal and Steel Community." This provided for a "permanent council of association," composed of four representatives of the High Authority and four British representatives, with a joint secretariat. The agreement called for mutual consultation where necessary, exchange of information, and the examination of "restrictions and other factors affecting mutual trade in coal and steel between the two areas." It was clearly designed to "help to promote a growing association between the United Kingdom and the Community" without in any way limiting Britain's freedom of action.

The Council of Europe. British representatives participated throughout in the drafting of the Statute for the Council of Europe under the super-

vision of the Consultative Council of the Brussels Pact and in all the meetings of the various organs of the Council. From the outset they favored a council of governments, with limited power, whereas the French wanted an assembly of prominent persons who could vote as they chose and envisaged the Council as a body which might eventually pave the way for real political union in Western Europe. In general, the British attitude prevailed. British pressure was partially responsible for the defeat on November 23, 1950, of a proposal before the Consultative Assembly for a federal Europe. As Churchill later said in so many words, Britain had no intention "to be merged in a Federal European system" — "we are *with* them, not *of* them."

EDC and the Paris Agreements. After some preliminary hesitation Britain gave support to the concept of a European Defense Community. In April, 1954, she signed an agreement with the states to be associated in EDC, pledging "all possible support" and "close cooperation." Arrangements were announced for political and military liaison between the United Kingdom and the Defense Community. "Her Majesty's Government," an accompanying British declaration asserted, "have no intention of withdrawing from the Continent of Europe so long as the threat exists to the security of Western Europe and of the European Defense Community." This significant pledge was a strong one, but it was in line with Britain's policy of liaison but not participation.

In spite of the British pledge of April, 1954, and a similar commitment by President Eisenhower, the French Assembly killed the EDC Treaty. Britain thereupon took the lead in devising an alternative formula for European security and for dealing with the France-Germany problem. The result was the London-Paris agreements of October, 1954. On September 29 British Foreign Minister Eden made the following pledge :

The United Kingdom will continue to maintain on the mainland of Europe, including Germany, the effective strength of the United Kingdom forces now assigned to SACEUR, four divisions and tactical air force, or whatever SACEUR regards as equivalent fighting capacity.

The United Kingdom undertakes not to withdraw these forces against the wishes of the majority of the Brussels Treaty powers.....

This understanding would be subject to the understanding that an acute overseas emergency might oblige Her Majesty's Government to omit this procedure.

Some British and American commentators hailed the pledge as a reversal of historic British policy toward the European continent. This interpretation may well be questioned ; in fact, no less than nine times in the postwar period Britain has entered into formal engagements or made official declarations of policy which suggested a willingness to make the same type of commitment. "What is different about this pledge," Eden said, "is that it is given to prevent a war and not to win a war." "There is no 'supranationality' about the arrangements," observed Woodrow

Wyatt, a Labor Member of Parliament who has written much on foreign affairs, "but there is a great increase in 'internationality'." ²

Liaison — Not Participation. "The policy of the British Government," wrote Sir Oliver Franks, British Ambassador to the United States, to Paul G. Hoffman on June 21, 1950, "is to cooperate with other Western European countries and work with them for unity in Europe." The British record is certainly a worthy one; but it also suggests that on all future measures for real political or economic unity the British position will be either an acceptance of a proposal in principle, while obstructing it in practice, or an attitude of "cordial caution" which will amount to complete rejection. Unofficial British opinion is at times much more candid than official utterances. Referring to the proposal for a political union of Western Europe, including Britain, Lionel Robbins, a well-known British economist, declared that "it is necessary to say with the utmost frankness that that is not our goal, that from our point of view there are weighty considerations which render it not merely difficult but positively undesirable." ³

Britain and the Atlantic Community

The strengthening of ties among the nations of the North Atlantic Community, appearing to escape some of the limitations and embarrassments of Western Union, has appealed strongly to many Englishmen. Professor Robbins, for one, sees great possibilities in this larger association :

.....on the basis of the Atlantic Pact, there has been achieved a grouping which, if developed and suitably consolidated, may yet arrest the tide of advancing barbarismIt is a grouping which can be sufficiently strong.It is a grouping within which we ourselves can whole-heartedly co-operate without fear of destroying existing connections.....It is a grouping within which it is possible to solve the age-long problem of Germany.It is a grouping, moreover, which corresponds to the main area of our spiritual solidarity.....Any attempt at supra-national organization on a lesser basis than this must necessarily be backward-looking.⁴

Perhaps, as Ernest Bevin once said, in British eyes "the Atlantic Community offers a reasonable and workable alternative" to European unity. One wonders whether the idea does not appeal to Britain because it gives her an excuse for her lukewarm support of all movements for real European unity, because the larger Community is such a loosely organized one that it does not force Britain into binding commitments, and because it enlists the military power of the United States and Canada and perhaps of Latin America. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization provides the

² "Geography Closes in on the British," *New York Times Magazine*, Oct. 17, 1954.

³ Lionel Robbins, "Towards the Atlantic Community," *Lloyds Bank Review*, New Series, No. 17 (July, 1950), p. 8.

⁴ Robbins, pp. 13-14.

kind of collaboration in which the British believe they can participate without major reservations. It is extensive and calls for a large degree of cooperation without requiring any surrender of sovereignty or any commitments that might be interpreted by the British as conflicting with their existing obligations to the Commonwealth.

Britain's Relations with Other Great Powers

France. Franco-British relations were embittered early in World War II when the French collapse left the British army in the desperate position from which it was rescued only by the miracle of Dunkirk. Later French collaboration with the Nazis created a widespread feeling in Britain that the French had betrayed the cause of freedom. There were additional clashes during the war, and since 1945 there have been others. Many Frenchmen viewed with suspicion the doctrinaire nationalism and dogmatism of the British Labor Government. They were apprehensive about British policy in Germany, fearing that Britain would again fail to appreciate the danger of a revived German state. Britain adopted an "austerity" program, an example which France, for political and perhaps for temperamental reasons, could not emulate. The French, deprived of British markets for wine and other so-called "luxury" items charged that Britain was preserving her "austerity" at the expense of other countries; and the British countered with the declaration that France was not deserving of extensive outside aid until she had shown a willingness to try some "austerity" herself and a greater ability to manage her own affairs. British financial policies often affected France adversely. A prime example of this was the devaluation of the British pound in September, 1949, an action which the French resented on the ground that Britain had not given other countries enough time or aid to cushion the shock.

The most recurrent source of French distrust of Britain has been the official British attitude toward the closer integration of Western Europe. To the French the British give the impression of holding aloof instead of working as a partner in an area where cooperation is most vital. Because of this attitude French negotiators have often preferred to work out the details of any far-reaching proposals without British representatives, and to hope that when the blueprints were ready the British would cooperate. This policy has at times paid dividends. Generally speaking, however, the French are confronted by the dilemma in which they find that effective Western Union is impossible without the British and yet is almost impossible with them. Nevertheless, Britain's increasing collaboration with the European Coal and Steel Community and Eden's pledge of September, 1954, suggest that these two countries which have so much in common in their devotion to the institutions of freedom may move together in the future as they have done so often in the past half-century.

Germany. As one of the four occupying powers in Germany, Britain was compelled to give a great deal of attention to German affairs. On the

whole, she cooperated closely with the United States and France in the administration of Western Germany, in the Allied Control Council and the Berlin Kommandatura, in the establishment of an International Authority for the Ruhr, and in the steps leading to the formation of the West German state. With respect to such matters as reparations, punitive measures of control, the level of industry, and German disarmament, she usually took a position less intransigent than that of the French, with their long memories of German aggression, and less indulgent than that of the Americans, who seemed to be more concerned with getting Germany off the backs of the American taxpayers than with the danger of renewed German aggression. Faced with heavy overseas commitments, and with limited manpower and financial resources, the British were reluctant to maintain strong occupation forces in Germany and to bear the costs of occupation. Nevertheless, in general the basic decisions regarding Western Germany were worked out amicably on a three-power basis ; but the attitude of the Soviet Union has made four-power agreement on the whole of Germany impossible. Britain cooperated in the steps which made the Federal Republic a sovereign state, and she would like to see a reunited Germany.

The Soviet Union. British policy toward the Soviet Union in the postwar period has been based upon realism, modified somewhat by wishful thinking about the possibilities of Soviet cooperation with the West. Even in responsible circles in Britain the United States was for a time criticized about as much as the Soviet Union, and many Englishmen became apologists for Russia's behavior and policies. As the "honeymoon period" gave way to the "cold war," most Englishmen, including the majority of Laborites, took a more realistic and less hopeful view of the character and intentions of the Russian leaders ; but the Socialist doctrinairism and anti-American proclivities of the left wing of the Labor Party, epitomized by Aneurin Bevan, are still strongly manifest. The Conservative position toward Russia was always more reserved, but Conservatives and Laborites alike are agreed that every effort should be made to cooperate with the Soviet Union and with other Communist regimes. While they seem to have recognized that their destinies are inseparably linked with those of their sister nations of the Western world, the British people still believe that they can exert a salutary modifying influence on the two rival giants of the postwar era. British governments, whether Laborite or Conservative, have continued to promote a fairly extensive trade with Russia and the other countries of the Soviet bloc. Nevertheless, Britain of course remains one of the great bulwarks of the free world.

The United States. Bismarck once said that the supreme fact of the nineteenth century was that Britain and the United States spoke the same language. At the Conservative Party Conference in Blackpool, in October, 1954, Churchill said that he had always thought that "the growth of ever-closer ties with the United States.....is the supreme factor in our future" ; and in the following month, speaking at the Lord Mayor's banquet in

London, he declared : "The whole foundation of our existence stands on the alliance and friendship, and, if I may say so, an increasing sense of brotherhood, with the United States."

The British are fully aware of the contributions of the United States to Britain's survival before, during, and after World War II. Conversely, fair-minded Americans will never forget the magnificent spirit of the British when they stood alone in 1940 and 1941, their long years of austerity, and their tremendous contributions to the cause of freedom everywhere. The ties of a common heritage and tradition, a common language (or a reasonable facsimile thereof), common foes, and common interests are very strong.⁵ Americans as well as Englishmen respond to Wordsworth's vow that

We must be free or die, who speak the tongue
That Shakespeare spake.....

1. *Sources of Friction.* For all "the ties that bind," Britain and the United States have often been poles apart in point of view, however much they have agreed on fundamentals. Criticism of one by the other at times approaches the dimensions of a favorite indoor sport ; generally speaking, it is without particular malice and is apparently based upon the assumption that one has a special right to criticize his friends. This "antagonism" has, of course, a long historical background ; but it has been accentuated by differences and misunderstandings in the postwar period. Among the many recent sources of friction the following may be noted :

(a) The abrupt suspension of Lend-Lease immediately after hostilities ceased in August, 1945. This unexpected move, coming before Britain could begin her postwar readjustment, put her in a difficult financial position and aroused a great deal of resentment.

(b) The suspicion in the United States of socialist programs in Britain, especially when the Labor Government was in power, and the reciprocal distrust in England of allegedly conservative or even reactionary tendencies in the United States.

(c) It has been difficult for the British to reconcile themselves to their new and lesser position in world affairs. It is natural that a people who formerly occupied such an enviable position among nations, and who have sacrificed much more than have Americans in what is really a common cause, should chafe under the realization that they must accept favors from others, especially from the United States.

(d) Some Americans have criticized the British for their apparent reluctance to cooperate in steps toward the real political and economic integration of Western Europe. The British think, even though they

⁵ When Churchill stepped down as Prime Minister in April, 1955, an American radio network honored him in a special program. On this, an American newscaster with several years of service in Britain declared that it was his observation that Englishmen in general regarded Roosevelt as a greater man than Churchill, but that Americans commonly regarded Churchill as the greater.

usually keep their sentiments to themselves, that criticism of this sort ill becomes a nation across the Atlantic whose political and economic policies have often hindered effective European cooperation.

(e) Opposing foreign policies, especially vis-à-vis the Communist states. The British have repeatedly expressed alarm about America's Russian policy. They favor an increase in East-West trade and a more conciliatory policy toward the Soviet Union as well as toward Communist China. Britain and the United States have been at odds on many issues of China policy. Britain announced her willingness to recognize the new regime in China as early as January, 1950, whereas the American Government, strongly influenced by American public opinion, has thus far refused to extend recognition or to support Red China's admission into the UN.

(f) Differing viewpoints on issues relating to colonialism. Although the United States has frequently been accused by anti-colonialists of supporting the colonial powers in such areas as Indo-China and North Africa, the British still criticize American policy as being essentially unsympathetic to their aims and dilemmas in colonial areas.

(g) When Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company in July, 1956, Britain and the United States differed strongly on the proper course to follow. The differences led to a major break when the United States publicly disapproved of the intervention of the British and French in Egypt, following Israel's invasion of the Sinai Peninsula. The whole complex of Middle East issues placed a severe strain on the unity of the Western alliance.

(h) The disruptions of World War II have accentuated differences in economic philosophy and in trade and financial policies. Indeed, as a study prepared by the Brookings Institution has emphasized, "almost all aspects of Anglo-American economic relations have been characterized by persistent differences of opinions."⁶

2. *The Clash of Economic Policies.* To illustrate some of the main points of the conflict between the two democracies in economic philosophy and policies we shall refer briefly (1) to the sterling area and the special restrictions which are placed on trade and financial transactions between it and outside countries and (2) to some effects of Britain's economic position on her foreign policy.

The British pound has long been a formidable figure in the world arena. It is, in fact, the unifying force in a group of nations which since the beginning of the Second World War has been termed "the sterling area." Within the area, sterling (that is, British pounds) may be transferred with relative freedom, but the transfer of sterling and financial transactions in general between sterling and nonsterling countries are governed by rather stringent British exchange-control regulations. Under these regulations the nonsterling world is divided into four groups of

⁶ *Anglo-American Economic Relations*, a Problem Paper prepared by the International Studies Group of the Brookings Institution for a Seminar on Problems of United States Foreign Policy held at the University of Pittsburgh, April 5-10, 1951 (The Brookings Institution, 1951), p. 38.

nations. We need not discuss here the precise machinery by which accounts are paid between the sterling bloc and each of the four nonsterling areas. The important point is that the lack of ready transferability obstructs international trade, the encouragement of which is a major objective of American foreign policy.

Great Britain, seeking to protect her limited sterling reserves, considers that she is at present unable to support the American program for the reduction of tariffs and the modification or elimination of the many trade control devices that are now in use. The United States, on the other hand, confident that the efficiency of her industries would enable them to invade every free market in the world, is urging a policy of relaxation. The Americans would implement their policy by multilateral agreements, whereas the British would and do use multilateral agreements within the sterling area but protect their interests against other states through the use of bilateral treaties, exchange and trade controls, and other restrictive practices. While Britain is on record in favor of the principle of multilateral trade on a worldwide basis, her concern for her own resources and for her pre-eminent position in the sterling area makes her shy away from any measures which seem to threaten these sources of strength. Consequently, the United States feels that while the British pay lip service to the principles of multilateral trade and currency convertibility, their policies are designed to perpetuate the present restrictions and controls; whereas the British view is that they must move slowly to avoid serious effects on their gold reserves and their already overburdened economy. Differences in economic philosophy tend to widen the gap of misunderstanding.

Britain and the Middle East

For many decades the Middle East has been an area of special concern to Great Britain. The primary consideration, historically speaking, has been the safeguarding of the route to India and the Far East. This became especially crucial after the completion of the Suez Canal in 1869. It also accounts in large part for the traditional British objective of preventing Russian domination of the Turkish Straits, which would place the Russian bear in the path of the British lion in the eastern Mediterranean. Until World War I Britain sought to preserve the Ottoman Empire as a stabilizing factor in the Middle East. But internal decay and revolt, the alliance with Germany and active participation in the First World War, and the changing world situation proved fatal to the tottering empire of the sultans.

The Arab States and Israel. During World War I, in the McMahon correspondence and other pledges, Britain entered into special relations with the new Arab states, while in the Balfour Declaration she encouraged Zionist aspirations for a Palestine homeland. No amount of finesse could convince Arabs and Jews, long-time enemies, that Britain's commitments to them could be reconciled. Undoubtedly British policy made possible

the eventual creation of an independent Jewish state, but in the period immediately preceding Britain had been generally regarded as strongly pro-Arab in sympathies. Toward the end of the Second World War she actively encouraged the formation of the Arab League.⁷

From the early 1880's until 1923 Egypt was virtually a British protectorate. After 1923 the British hold was progressively weakened as a result of both British consent and Egyptian nationalist agitation, and the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 officially ended the protectorate. During World War II British forces occupied Egypt against the wish of the Egyptian Government, and much bitterness developed. In the postwar years relations deteriorated still further. The main issues in dispute concerned the treaty rights of Britain with respect to the Suez Canal, the status of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, and the settlement of claims arising from the stationing of British troops in Egypt during the war. In February, 1953, Britain and Egypt reached an agreement which provided for the right of the Sudanese to determine their future status — some form of federation with Egypt or complete independence — after a transition period not to exceed three years.⁸ Twenty months later, in October, 1954, an agreement provided for the complete evacuation of British forces from the Suez Canal base by June 18, 1956, for the efficient maintenance of the base by Britain and Egypt, and for the right of Britain to return to the base in the event of an armed attack by an outside power upon any country that was a party to the Treaty of Joint Defense between the Arab League States or upon Turkey.⁹

British withdrawal from Egypt has not improved Anglo-Egyptian relations. On the contrary, many policies of the Nasser regime have disturbed the British: leadership of the Arab campaign against Israel, encouragement of anti-British moves in Jordan, acceptance of arms shipments from Communist countries, assistance to the anti-French agitation in North Africa, broadcasts over Radio Cairo attacking Western imperialism and urging the people of Africa to revolt, and the Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal. Anglo-Egyptian relations have of course been particularly tense since the British and French invasion of Egypt in the latter part of 1956.

With other Arab states Britain's relations have varied from very close, as in the case of Jordan and Iraq — former British mandates — to relatively distant, as in the case of Saudi Arabia. Iraq, over the strong opposition of the other states of the Arab League, joined the Bagdad Pact, with which Britain is also associated. British pressure upon Jordan to follow

⁷ See Judith Laikin, "British Influence on the Arab League," *Columbia Journal of International Affairs*, III (Spring, 1949), 102-104.

⁸ The text of the Sudan agreement is contained in Appendix C of *The Sudan, 1899-1953* (ID.1179), published by the British Information Services.

⁹ For the main articles of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of Oct. 19, 1954, and for an excellent factual summary of the whole course of Anglo-Egyptian relations, see *The Background of Anglo-Egyptian Relations* (ID 735, Revised), published by the British Information Services in Nov., 1954.

Iraq's example boomeranged, and along with many other factors led to anti-British demonstrations in Jordan and to the dismissal, in early March, 1956, of the long-time British leader of the Arab Legion, General John Bagot Glubb — "Glubb Pasha." Some British officers, however, still serve with the Arab Legion, and the British Government is continuing its subsidy to the Legion. Britain was involved with Saudi Arabia in the Buraimi Oasis dispute, centering on rival claims by British-supported sheikhs and Saudi Arabia to some oases of oil-bearing promise in the southeastern part of the Arabian Peninsula.

The main source of Arab dissatisfaction with Great Britain, as with the United States, is her support of the Jewish state of Israel. Britain joined with the United States and France in May, 1950, in a pledge of assistance to either Israel or the Arab states in the event of aggression. Nevertheless, when Israel sent troops into the Sinai Peninsula in late October, 1956, Britain and France invaded the Suez Canal area and fought Egyptians, not Israelis. To be sure, the British did bring pressure upon Israel to withdraw Israeli forces from Egyptian soil; but this did little to lessen the intense resentment against Britain in the Arab world. Britain, like the United States, has not been able to resolve the dilemmas occasioned by the tragic state of Arab-Israeli relations.

The Cyprus Question. On her forced withdrawal from the Suez Canal area and the weakening of her position elsewhere in the Middle East, Britain's power in the area centered on the island of Cyprus. In 1955 and 1956 this crown colony became a major problem for the British. The vast majority of the Cypriotes were of Greek descent, and with the open encouragement of the Greek Government they initiated a vigorous propaganda movement for *enios* — union with Greece. The Turkish minority on Cyprus was strongly opposed to *enios*. In the face of growing agitation and terrorism the British imposed martial rule on the island, while at the same time they promised the Cypriotes eventual freedom to decide their own destiny.

Iran and the Persian Gulf Area. The main considerations of present British policy in the Middle East are, of course, those of oil and strategy. Britain is heavily dependent on the oil supplies of Iraq and the Persian Gulf area (Iran, Kuwait, etc.), and the British financial stake in Iranian and Iraqi oil is tremendous. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company represented the largest single overseas enterprise in which the British Government was directly involved. The crisis over the nationalization of the Iranian oil fields in 1951 was one which called for the greatest tact and diplomacy. The collapse or even the pro-Soviet orientation of the Iranian Government might result in the loss of a major source of oil, and furthermore might endanger the relation of Western countries with the Muslim world and leave a Russian satellite on the Empire lifeline.

Britain's blockade of Iran after the seizure of the Anglo-Iranian's holdings led to the virtual collapse of the oil industry in Iran. Within Iran the political and economic situation deteriorated rapidly. At length, after the

unbalanced Mossadegh had been ousted by groups loyal to the Shah, and with the assistance of American mediators, notably Herbert Hoover, Jr., a settlement of the oil dispute was reached in August, 1954.¹⁰

The closing of the rift between Britain and Iran, following closely upon Britain's agreement with Egypt on the Suez Canal base, vastly improved the atmosphere in the Middle East. These developments, however, could not obscure the decline of British prestige in that area or the many sources of friction that remained. Britain is still vitally concerned with bases, treaty arrangements, and other measures for the preservation of her stake in the Middle East. Prompted by these considerations, and by a concern for the defense of the "northern tier" of states bordering the Soviet Union, Britain joined Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan in November, 1955, in signing the Bagdad Pact.

Britain, the Commonwealth, and the Empire

Mr. Churchill once stated in a classic phrase that he had not become His Majesty's First Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire ; and he often criticized Mr. Attlee and the Labor Government for their alleged willingness to hasten the loosening of imperial and Commonwealth bonds. The "liquidation" of empire has been a phenomenon of the postwar years. In 1948 Burma formally seceded from the British system, and in the following year the British Parliament recognized the independence of Ireland, except for the six counties of Northern Ireland. In 1947, with British aid, a compromise solution was reached whereby India was divided into the Union of India and Pakistan, both of which became Dominions in the Commonwealth.¹¹ In February, 1948, Ceylon also was given Dominion status. In the spring of 1949 the prime ministers of the Commonwealth countries agreed on a formula under which India could become a republic and still remain within the Commonwealth. In March, 1955, Pakistan also became a republic.

The British Commonwealth and Empire now consists of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland ; five Dominions and two republics and their dependencies ; the self-governing Colony of Southern Rhodesia, which is associated with two protectorates, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, in the so-called Central African Federation ; three territories in Africa administered through the Commonwealth Relations Office ;

¹⁰ The texts of the statements issued in Teheran and in London on Aug. 5, 1954, are given in the *New York Times*, Aug. 6, 1954.

¹¹ "The word 'Commonwealth' has been used in British official documents to refer to the dependent overseas territories as well as to the independent nations. The word 'Empire' is avoided by nearly everyone save Conservatives ; the official phrase is 'Dependent Overseas Territories.' Even the word 'dominion' is now sparingly employed, perhaps because it still carries a slight connotation of dependent status. Finally, even the designation 'British' in connection with the Commonwealth is now officially avoided." *Major Problems of United States Foreign Policy, 1950-1951* (The Brookings Institution, 1950), pp. 202n.-203n.

many dependent territories administered through the Colonial Office ; and two condominiums (that is, areas governed jointly by Britain and some other country), namely the New Hebrides and Canton and Enderbury islands in the southern Pacific. Until 1955 the Sudan also was a condominium, under joint Anglo-Egyptian rule. The population of the United Kingdom is about 50,500,000. The population of the Commonwealth and Empire is approximately 610,000,000, more than two-thirds of whom live in India and Pakistan. The Empire itself has a population of nearly 75,000,000.

The area long known as the Gold Coast is scheduled to achieve the status of a Dominion in March, 1957. It will then resume its ancient name of Ghana.


Since the new and enlarged Commonwealth has taken shape, the Commonwealth foreign ministers have met frequently to discuss common problems. At the first meeting, held in Colombo in January, 1950, Percy Spender, then Foreign Minister of Australia, outlined a cooperative program for economic assistance to South and Southeast Asia which later became the Colombo Plan.¹² Commonwealth prime ministers also meet occasionally ; in a sense their meetings are the successors to the old Imperial Conference of the pre-World War II period: All the Commonwealth members maintain large missions in London, and there is constant communication and consultation between London and Ottawa, Canberra, Wellington, Pretoria, New Delhi, Karachi, and Colombo.

Of the concentric circles linking Britain to various other states, that embracing the members of the Commonwealth is of first importance. On this point both major parties and most of the British people are agreed.

In spite of continued collaboration, however, all is not well within the Commonwealth. Its bonds have definitely weakened, and its future is uncertain. Its focus — at least demographically — has shifted to Asia. The vast majority of the people of Commonwealth countries now live in newly-independent lands where the memories of British imperial rule are fresh and where suspicion of Western imperialism in any and every form is still pronounced. Relations between certain members of the association, notably between India and South Africa and between India and Pakistan, are gravely strained, and the centrifugal tendencies within the Commonwealth have grown stronger.

Britain herself, beset with mounting internal problems and faced with the necessity of husbanding her resources, is no longer able to act as effectively as in former years as the regulator of Commonwealth affairs, or as,

¹² The Governments which participated in the preparation of the Colombo Plan issued the full text of the report of November, 1950, a 22-page summary of its contents, with extracts from the report, and an interesting 40-page illustrated booklet, entitled *New Horizons in the East*, prepared by the Economic Information Unit of the United Kingdom Treasury. See also John R. E. Carr-Gregg, "The Colombo Plan : A Commonwealth Program for Southeast Asia," *International Conciliation*, No. 467 (Jan., 1951) ; and *The Colombo Plan* (ID 1210), published by the British Information Services in April, 1955.



The British Commonwealth as Elizabeth Become Queen

the guardian and protector of the Dominions. More and more these countries are looking outside the Commonwealth, or to their own resources, rather than toward London. Canada has many interests in common with the United States, and these are growing in strength. Relations between Britain and the Union of South Africa have become distant, and at times even strained. Australia and New Zealand are identifying themselves more closely with India and other non-Communist countries of Asia and with the United States, which presumably could give them greater protection than Britain in the event of war. Pakistan is a weak country, divided and unstable, and it is disgruntled about Britain's position in the Kashmir dispute. She seems to aspire to closer association with the Muslim world. In many respects, as has been pointed out, India is *in* but not *of* the Commonwealth. She is trying to follow an independent course in world affairs, and she does not hesitate to follow a similar course in Commonwealth matters as well. South Africa takes a dim view of the membership of Ghana (the Gold Coast) in the Commonwealth, and these unfriendly sentiments are cordially reciprocated. Ghana's Nkrumah and South Africa's Strijdom may be said to represent opposite ends of the African spectrum.

Although vast changes are occurring within it and its future is uncertain, the British Commonwealth of Nations has been probably the most successful of all international groupings. It will undoubtedly continue to exert a major influence in world affairs.

Britain Today and Tomorrow

Whatever may be the opinion of others, the British at least are by no means convinced that their future is behind them, that henceforth they must reconcile themselves to the status of a third-rate insular power and to the loss of their exalted position. Britain remains a world power, if not a super-power, and must think in world terms.¹³ She cannot exist without allies, without markets abroad, without substantial imports of foodstuffs and raw materials. Her position, if not her survival, is likewise dependent on her relations with the Empire, the Commonwealth, the sterling area, the Arab world, the North Atlantic Community, especially the United States, Western Europe, and, in a very special and vital sense, the Soviet Union and the Communist world. Her general objective is to retain as much of her former prestige and power as possible, to husband her limited resources and apply them where they will carry the greatest weight. Her worldwide interests are sometimes conflicting and contradictory, but they inevitably bend her efforts in the direction of international collaboration. British capacity to appraise the realities of international politics and to distinguish permanent bases of policy was reflected in an observation

¹³ "Britain is going to continue to be what she has been, a Great Power," Sir Oliver Franks confidently predicted in 1954. See *Britain and the Tide of World Affairs* (Oxford University Press, 1955), p. 1.

made by Harold Macmillan on June 15, 1955, in his first address in the House of Commons after his appointment as Foreign Minister : "After a long Russian winter of ice and snow the sun is beginning to come out, but I say that it is a good rule in setting out upon an expedition, if I may change the metaphor, to keep one's base secure. We have a sound base, and it is based upon a triple partnership of the British Commonwealth and Empire, the United States and the peoples of Free Europe."

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF FRANCE

Geographically, culturally, and politically France has occupied a central position throughout the history of Western civilization. For some decades before World War II, however, the French position was being steadily weakened, although this fact was often obscured by astute diplomacy and by the prestige of former greatness. Perhaps not until the collapse of 1940 were the flaws in French politics and society, and the basic weakness in France's power position, exposed mercilessly for all the world to see. Since the war, with major outside assistance, especially through the Marshall Plan, the French have made a rather impressive economic recovery and have repaired many of the visible wounds of war. But the invisible wounds remain, and the French find themselves called upon for new and greater sacrifices and exertions at a time when their physical and spiritual reserves are low. "France is still a weary nation, still bruised by the war and dazed by the occupation, and still rent by the great divisions in her history — the French Revolution and the Vichy conflict."¹⁴

Quite understandably, it is difficult for Frenchmen, realists though they are, to face present realities and to reconcile themselves to their changed position in the world. Even within the older European political system France was being outstripped in industrial and military power, as well as in population, by a unified and militaristic Germany, with Britain and Russia often exercising a decisive influence on European affairs. Now the very system of which France was a part has collapsed, perhaps forever, and to an unprecedented degree the destinies of France rest in the hands of other powers, which are either non-European, like the United States, or European in only a peripheral sense, like Britain and the Soviet Union.

Foreign and native historians have often called attention to the existence of at least two Frances : (1) authoritarian France, the France of the *ancien régime*, the France which looks to the "man on horseback," the France of the Church, the Army, and big business ; and (2) republican France, the France of the Revolution, a liberal, democratic France, strongly entrenched in the middle class and the "common people." Perhaps one should add a third France, namely socialist France ; but Left-Center parties have lost heavily to the Communists, now the largest party in the

¹⁴ Lester Markel, "The Challenge to France — And to Us," *New York Times Magazine*, June 17, 1951, p. 24.

National Assembly.¹⁵ Added to France's divided tradition has been her demographic decline : second among European states in population in 1850, she was fourth in 1900 and she is fifth today. Moreover, she has failed to keep pace industrially and to achieve a sound political or social structure. In consequence, her foreign policy has at crucial times been cautious and vacillating or bold in statement but ineffective in action.


In retrospect it is clear that France never fully recovered from the "victory" of World War I. This struggle sapped her resources and destroyed many of her finest sons, whose leadership and services have been sadly missed. In the interwar period she realized quite clearly that she would be unable to find security by herself ; therefore she sought it in alliances and collective security. But she failed to revive the prewar alliances with Britain and Russia, and when the aggressors began to march she sacrificed security to "peace." Her failure to act when German troops moved into the Rhineland in 1936 may be regarded as a turning point, and the capitulation at Munich two years later exposed her physical and psychological weakness and unpreparedness. A weak and distracted France entered the Second World War, and the mood of appeasement created the atmosphere for the collaborationism of the Vichy regime. For five bitter years, while the fate of the free world hung in the balance, France in effect was blotted out as an independent state. But the voice of France was not wholly stilled. The French of the Resistance and the Free French showed that the spirit of France had not been entirely crushed or corrupted ; they established the basis for France's attempts to recover from the crushing blow to her pride and to her position in world affairs. But the wartime experience was a shattering one. Psychologically as well as materially, and it still haunts the French as a nightmare that cannot be forgotten.

Conditioning Factors of Postwar Policy

It has not been easy for the French to recover from the effects of the Vichy experience and to readjust themselves to a new and difficult world. Four new factors, in particular, as Saul K. and Irina Padover have pointed out, had to be taken into account : "The primary factor was France's own reduced importance. The second was the decline of Europe in general and of Germany in particular. The third was the emergence of the Soviet colossus as the foremost continental power. The fourth was the appearance of the United States as the prime force in Western Europe."¹⁶ Today, more than a decade after liberation, in addition to the relative weakness occasioned by German industrial and demographic resurgence, France is suffering from prolonged instability, from persistent neutralism, and from widespread discontent within the French Union.

¹⁵ Saul K. Padover and Irina Padover, "France : Setting or Rising Star?," *Headline Series*, No. 81 (Foreign Policy Association, May-June, 1950), pp. 25-26. See also General de Monsabert, "North Africa in Atlantic Strategy," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXI (April, 1953).

¹⁶ Padover and Padover, p. 55.



The Short Life of French Cabinets

In June, 1954, "seven years of centre government and ten years of M.R.P. [*Mouvement Républicain Populaire*] control of foreign and imperial affairs" came to an end. "The 'continuity of French policy' had tied itself into a Gordian knot which it had become necessary to cut."¹⁷ The man who assumed control at this critical juncture was Pierre Mendès-France, who apparently believed that he had a mission to reduce France's commitments overseas, to rescue the country from the dilemmas centering on the EDC Treaty, and to try to do something about the serious economic and political impasse at home. Dynamism succeeded "immobilism," and after many months of indecision France had a government which seemed to be able and willing to act. Mendès-France fulfilled his pledge of a truce in Indo-China within a month; he extended a pledge of "internal sovereignty" to Tunisia; he acted as gravedigger for EDC; he won French approval of the London and Paris agreements of October, 1954, including the Saar compromise; he steered a constitutional reform through the As-

sembly ; and he tackled a host of internal problems. In foreign affairs, at least, it may be that his acts raised France's prestige at the price of a weakening of her position within the French Union and in Europe. Mendès-France appealed to the people as no other premier in the postwar period, but he could not long carry the Assembly with him. In February, 1955, he gave way to a middle-of-the-road government headed by Edgar Faure. Dynamism, at least temporarily, came to an end.

In addition to political ills France has spiritual afflictions. In the face of past humiliation and present weakness it is little wonder that "neutrality" has prevailed among many non-Communist Frenchmen, especially among journalists and intellectuals in general. The official position of the French Government is that "neutrality" is based on illusions, that it has little political support, and that it is declining steadily as hope and confidence revive. The Government insists that the French people realize that France can never be neutral in world affairs. In his address to a Joint Session of the Congress of the United States, in April, 1951, President Vincent Auriol of France characterized neutrality as "a moral absurdity" and as "geographical and historical nonsense." Nevertheless, it suggests a way of thinking that is important in French life today.

French foreign policy-makers must be ever-mindful of the fact that France is still the center of the second largest "empire," involving commitments in all parts of the world. Some 72,000,000 people live in the overseas possessions, 30,000,000 more than in continental France herself. In an age of declining colonialism great changes are occurring in France's old empire. It is now organized as the "French Union." "The Union is a democratic attempt to solve the complex imperialist problem, and it is based upon the declared principle that France's overseas territories are a part of the French Republic, to which they are joined in more or less equal membership."¹⁸

French imperialism is growing more mellow, but not fast enough to satisfy many of the native peoples in the overseas possessions. Until 1954 the most disturbed area was Indo-China, where the French had a full-scale civil war on their hands soon after they returned after World War II. The situation was complicated by the Communist victory in China and the external as well as internal pressures of the Communists, aided by many sincere native nationalists. After the reverse at Dienbienphu in May, 1954, the French accepted a truce agreement which brought the protracted struggle to an end. Viet Nam was divided along approximately the 17th parallel, with the Communist Viet Minh in control of the northern part and elections called for in 1956 to determine the future status of all of Viet Nam. The provisions of the truce agreement regarding elections, however, could not be implemented. French influence in Indo-China today, especially in Viet Nam, is at a very low ebb indeed.

France also has her problems in her huge African possessions, with their

¹⁸ Padover and Padover, p. 10.

total of fifty million people. French policy has been more successful in French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa, particularly in Senegal, than in North Africa.

Algeria is a Metropolitan Department of France, with 30 seats in the National Assembly in Paris, but its population has not identified itself with France as completely as the French had hoped. The European settlers, mostly French, who have enjoyed a favored economic and political status,¹⁹ are far outnumbered by the indigenous population, mostly Muslims. Hundreds of people have been killed in Algeria in recent months, and parts of the area are virtually under the control of guerrilla bands. The French still hope to pacify Algeria and satisfy the aspirations of the majority of the inhabitants short of granting it independence. On the other hand, Morocco and Tunisia, formerly "Associated States" within the French Union, were willing to settle for nothing but independence. French deposition of Sultan Sidi Mohammed Ben Youssef in Morocco in August, 1953, stirred up a hornet's nest, and not until the French gave in and restored Ben Youssef more than two years later did the situation come under control. In November, 1955, the restored Sultan announced the end of the French protectorate in Morocco, although this was not to take effect until a treaty had been made with France, and although the new state was to be bound to France by "interdependent links." Tunisia had been promised virtual freedom by the Mendès-France Government in 1954. On March 20, 1956, France announced her willingness to recognize the independence of Tunisia, although, as in Morocco, even after "independence" Tunisia was to maintain "interdependent links" with France. In spite of this peculiar arrangement, Morocco and Tunisia can no longer be regarded as parts of the French Union. Both "states" were admitted into the United Nations in November, 1956.

Major Aspects of Recent Policy

A fair analysis of the role of France in world affairs today must be made with an understanding of the conditioning factors that we have mentioned: the decline of Europe, the rise of Russia, the new role of the United States, French political instability, French neutralism, and discontent within the French Union. Behind these, of course, lie other factors, historical, economic, and demographic. While it may seem that all of them are resolved in the futile search for security, it must not be forgotten that great positive values remain. Among these are the French grasp of the fundamentals of political life, the essential stability and permanence of French institutions, and a very real desire to join in the defense of West-

¹⁹ "All the present crises in North Africa spring, not from the relations between France and her North Africa possessions, but from.....the co-existence of a European minority, far superior in standard of living, economic power, and political development, and an indigenous population which outnumbers it by ten to one and is increasing rapidly." Luethy, pp. 235, 236.



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"P'raps I'd Better Hold It, Dear"

ern Europe. It is probably more accurate to think of France as "the Resistance" than as "Vichy," but both were stubborn historical facts.

With this background in mind, we shall discuss a number of phases of recent French foreign policy : relations with Germany, Great Britain, and the United States, and France's interest in European unity.

France and Germany. One might respond to the mention of Germany by exclaiming, "Aye, there's the rub !" "The majority of Frenchmen still consider Germany as Enemy Number One..... French opinion is almost morbid on the subject of Germany, and not without reason."²⁰ Anxious at all costs to avoid a fourth invasion from across the Rhine in less than a century, the French are acutely conscious of the fact that a united Germany is potentially far more powerful than France, especially in industrial capacity and population. The thought of 45,000,000 or fewer Frenchmen facing 70,000,000 or more Germans is a perpetual nightmare to the French.

²⁰ Padover and Padover, p. 57.

It makes their policy toward Germany relatively simple and consistent, although the pattern and the emphasis have changed with world conditions. On the negative side the French have persistently demanded the political decentralization of Germany and economic controls over German industries, especially in the Ruhr. In these respects French policy has been more severe than that of Britain or the United States, and understandably so. On the more positive side, the French favor a Franco-German rapprochement as the necessary condition for peace. In recent months the positive goals have been more frequently emphasized than the negative — meaning that to many Frenchmen the Russian threat is now greater than the German.

Within a logical pattern, then, French policy toward Germany has evolved from an essentially negative one to a positive one — to the acceptance, however reluctant, of the inescapable fact that Germany must be kept out of the Soviet orbit and must be associated in some major way in the defense and economy of Western Europe. The French have viewed with grave misgivings, however, the efforts of the United States to rebuild and to rearm Germany. French political parties are in fundamental agreement in regard to Germany, even though they differ on methods and details.

France and Britain. A sense of common destiny binds France and Britain together.²¹ It is hardly surprising, therefore, that despite all the differences between them they have usually found ways to compromise their differences and to unite in a number of common undertakings. On the whole, cooperation has been least effective in political matters and most effective in military matters. The two countries cannot agree on the power to be given to the Council of Europe, but they can agree on plans for joint defense. The Brussels Treaty of 1948—creating a defensive alliance of the Benelux states, Britain, and France—represented a compromise between British and French views on strategy, organization, and personnel. French and British statesmen and military officials have cooperated in NATO with admirable camaraderie. Presumably a common goal—or a common desperation—prompted France and Britain to co-operate in the ill-fated invasion of Egypt in the latter part of 1956.

France and the United States. To the members of the National Press Club in Washington, in January, 1951, Premier René Plevén declared: "France is your ally and not just a fair-weather friend. We are Allies and we will remain Allies—and we will not let anything—I say anything—weaken the alliance that binds us together." On the unofficial level the feeling is not always so cordial. Many Frenchmen view the United States with antipathy and distrust. This view is undoubtedly based in part on ignorance, cultural snobbishness, national temperament, and a natural reluctance to be so dependent on American aid. "There is," as Fred W. Riggs has stated, "a deep-seated aversion to the American way of life—

²¹ The relations of the two states were discussed earlier in this chapter under the foreign policy of Great Britain.

as seen by the French it is crudely materialistic, 'capitalistic,' culturally shallow, perhaps only slightly less repugnant than the Russian way."²² Even the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Pact have been looked upon with indifference and antagonism. Naturally the French Communists pour out a never-ending barrage of propaganda ; this carries home to French workers and peasants in a way which the United States has not been able to match.

Much of the anti-American feeling is probably in essence a reflection of the concern of the French people over their own weaknesses and their precarious international position. Indeed, it is likely that those Frenchmen who look to the United States for leadership in the present crisis, and who realize the importance of good relations between the countries of the North Atlantic Community, vastly outnumber those who distrust and dislike the United States and who believe that America is almost as great a threat as Russia.

France and European Unity. Despite her demoralized condition, her internal weaknesses, and her limited resources, France has aspired to play a great role in postwar affairs, to retain and consolidate her overseas possessions, and to regain her high position on the continent of Europe. French diplomacy has shone at its brightest in European affairs. Statesmen like Robert Schuman, Georges Bidault, and Jean Monnet have disclosed an imaginative approach to Europe's problems, even though they have not always carried their country with them. Two of the boldest steps, originally spoken of as the Schuman Plan and the Pleven Plan, led to the actual creation of the European Coal and Steel Community and to the abortive plan for a European Defense Community.²³

Retrospect and Prospect

Postwar French foreign policy, conditioned by the necessity of reconciling historic policies with present realities and carried on by weak "caretaker" governments, has been more consistent and successful than France's internal and external weaknesses would seem to permit. For one thing, the French have not lost their old diplomatic skill; for another, their country is so much the keystone of the European arch that they cannot be shoved aside. Then, again, whereas cabinets have changed with alarming rapidity, foreign policies have not. As a matter of fact, from the end of the war to mid-1954 two able statesmen, Robert Schuman and Georges Bidault, both of one party, alternated in the Foreign Office.

It may be said that French foreign policy since 1945 has gone through two main phases. The first was characterized by the effort to act as a mediator rather than as a participant in the growing East-West conflict. This course was followed for about two years, while the Communists were

²² *Foreign Policy Bulletin*, XXX (Jan. 12., 1951), 4.

²³ The European Coal and Steel Community and the European Defense Community are discussed in chapters 15 and 20.

in the French Government ; but it was abandoned in 1947 when the Communists were expelled and France's real position in the power struggle was perceived more clearly. In the second period, from 1947 to the present—with occasional lapses, notably during the early months of “the Mendès-France experiment” in 1954—she has been willing to join with the rest of the free world, especially Britain and the United States, in formulating an effective program for defense against the Communist threat.

No one who knows the French and is familiar with their history can ever really despair of their future. Even after a decade and a half of defeat and disillusionment the essential vitality and resourcefulness of this great nation make it one of the pillars of the free world.

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF COMMUNIST CHINA

Like Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek, the leaders of Communist China play upon the ancient themes and national aspirations and anti-foreign feelings of the Chinese people ; but their basic policies, particularly in foreign affairs, are conditioned by “the immutable premises and assumptions of Marxism-Leninism.” They believe that the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of international relations is the correct one, and they loudly proclaim their identification with “the anti-imperialist front, headed by the U.S.S.R.” The major aspects of the foreign policy of Communist China, based on this fundamental orientation, were summarized by Henry R. Lieberman, able Far Eastern correspondent of the *New York Times*, in a single sentence : “The Chinese Communists appear on the whole to be guided by their basic alliance with the Soviet Union, a deep suspicion of the West, a special sensitivity about ‘imperialist encroachment’ on their borders and a desire to extend the Communist revolution whenever and wherever they can.”²⁴

Major Aspects of Foreign Policy

Through a variety of techniques and approaches the rulers of Communist China are trying to consolidate their internal position and to gain a more favorable position abroad. Most of all they are concerned with assuming a leading role in Asian affairs. They appeal to their fellow-Asians as leaders of the “anti-imperialist bloc” and of “liberation” movements, as models for dealing with the serious political, economic, and social problems of Asia, as champions of Asia's new role in the world, and as leaders of the “peace movement.” “Peking's pretensions to power in Asia,” states W. W. Rostow, “and its claim as a model of theory and practice for Asia are unlimited.”²⁵

²⁴ Dispatch from Hong Kong, dated Nov. 4, 1950 ; in the *New York Times*, Nov. 5, 1950.

²⁵ *The Prospects for Communist China* (Wiley, 1954), p. viii.

Upon the proclamation of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, on October 1, 1949, the new regime invited recognition by other governments. By February, 1955, it had established diplomatic relations with 24 countries, including 12 non-Communist states. The United States steadfastly refused to recognize the regime. Not until 1954 did Communist China begin to play a role in world diplomacy, although her spokesman appeared before the Security Council in November, 1950, and her representatives negotiated from 1951 to 1953 on a truce in Korea. She achieved a new status, however, with representation at the Geneva Conference in early 1954 and full participation in the Asian-African Conference at Bandung in April, 1955. In both meetings, and particularly at Bandung, Chou En-Lai, the Foreign Minister of Communist China, took a leading part. In June, 1954, Chou joined with Prime Minister Nehru of India in a joint declaration of the "five principles" of peace.

To gain support abroad, as at home, the Chinese Communists have resorted to the "carrot and stick" technique. They have used strong-arm methods and vituperation along with conciliatory gestures and honeyed words. Prominent among their devices have been international conferences, cultural delegations and guided tours, mass movements and drives, peace appeals and campaigns, threats and blackmail, campaigns to coerce the Chinese people and to stir up hatred for America, friendship associations, mass liquidations and purges, and an unending barrage of propaganda on many fronts. They sent troops into Korea and Tibet in 1950. They have been preparing to launch an assault on Formosa, and they insist that they will never rest until that island, the refuge of "the Chiang Kai-shek bandit gang," is under their control. They have made special efforts to develop close contacts with overseas Chinese and with other Asian countries.

Relations with Soviet Russia

Perhaps the chief basis of collaboration between the Chinese and Russian Communists has been the fact that they are bound together by a common body of doctrines and beliefs, stemming from the same sources and directed toward the same general ends. During two periods in the past thirty years the Soviet Union appeared to be making a major effort to give firsthand direction to the Chinese revolution. The first period was from 1923 to 1927, when Russian advisers came to China at the invitation of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. One of these, Michael Borodin, was probably the most influential man in China during these years, with the exception of Dr. Sun himself. The second period is, of course, the postwar years. The leaders of Communist China have loudly proclaimed their devotion to the Soviet Union, and all the organs of propaganda have sounded the love-Russia line.

Mao Tse-tung went to Moscow in December, 1949, probably for the first time, for the alleged purpose of participating in the celebration of Joseph Stalin's seventy-first birthday. He remained about two months. One

major result of his visit was the signing, on February 14, 1950, of a "Treaty Regarding Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Aid Between the Soviet Socialist Republics and the Chinese People's Republic." The two countries pledged to "undertake jointly all necessary measures at their disposal to prevent any repetition of aggression and violation of peace on the part of Japan or any other state which directly or indirectly could unite with Japan in acts of aggression." The powerful Communist states agreed to "co-operate with each other in all important international questions" and "to develop and strengthen economic and cultural ties between the Soviet Union and China." In other agreements Russia made a number of concessions to China in the Far East and promised a loan over a five-year period "to the amount of 300 million American dollars."²⁶ There has been much speculation about the possibility of secret agreements between the two countries, or secret codicils to the treaty of February 14. In all probability the costly gamble in Korea increased Communist China's dependence on the Soviet Union. It was significant that the willingness of the Chinese Communists, as well as the North Koreans, to discuss a cease-fire in Korea was first suggested not by a Chinese spokesman but by Mr. Malik in a broadcast sponsored by the United Nations.

In the fall of 1954 a delegation of Soviet leaders, headed by Bulganin and Khrushchev, visited China. On October 11 a joint communiqué announced that "seven accords" had been reached.²⁷ In these the two Governments proclaimed a "complete unity of views both in the sphere of the growing multilateral cooperation between the two states and in questions relating to the international situation." They seemed to embody real Soviet concessions to China, and they undoubtedly helped to raise the prestige of "New China" in Asia.

Many Chinese "experts" insist that no foreign country can dominate China, directly or indirectly, for long — least of all the Soviet Union, which is disliked and distrusted by the Chinese people — and that the possibilities of a "Titoist" deviation in China are very good. But it would be foolhardy indeed to conduct a foreign policy toward China on the assumption that she can be weaned away from Russia. This may happen, but there have been few if any concrete evidences of rifts between the two Communist-controlled regimes.

It seems quite certain that the Chinese Communists believe the gospel they preach, that they are convinced they are riding "the wave of the future," and that they will resort to any techniques to further their aims. By open propaganda, by direct military action, by clandestine infiltration, by open and disguised support of Communist parties and rebellious groups in other Asian countries, and by constant preaching of their "either-or" doctrine, they will continue to exploit every weakness in the

²⁶ For the text of the Sino-Russian Treaty and the two supplementary agreements, see the *New York Times*, Feb. 15, 1950. The italics above have been added.

²⁷ The text of the communiqué announcing the "seven accords" is given in the *New York Times*, Oct. 12, 1954.

armor of their opponents, particularly in the vulnerable countries of Southeast Asia. Hand in hand with the Soviet Union they wage "the holy struggle of world revolution."

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF INDIA

Measured in power-political terms India is far from being a power of the first rank. To be sure, she is the second most populous state in the world and the most populous of the non-Communist states ; but one may question whether her huge population, in its present state of economic and social backwardness, constitutes a real element of strength. The literacy rate is less than 20 per cent, the per capita income not much more than \$50 a year, and the life expectancy only 32 years. Although rising, the average daily food consumption is about 1700 calories. India has some important natural resources and is now the second most industrialized state in Asia, but she is nonetheless in an early stage of industrial development ; about 80 per cent of her people live in villages and depend upon agriculture for a livelihood. She occupies an area of considerable strategic significance, and the Indian subcontinent as a whole enjoys the protection of some formidable natural barriers, notably the Himalayas and the sea.

India's present influence in Asian and world affairs is greater than a brief analysis of factors of weakness and of strength would indicate. This is due in part to the quality of her leaders and the prestige they gained during the struggle for independence, to her strategic position, to her membership in the Commonwealth, and to the distinctive traditions and characteristics of her foreign policy ; but it is due primarily to the nature of the present world struggle, and to India's role as spokesman of the so-called "uncommitted" world, which centers on non-Communist Asia.

The roots of India's foreign policy are to be found in the civilizations which developed there over many centuries, particularly in the Hindu, Buddhist, and Muslim views of life and patterns of thought, the heritage of British policies, the independence movement and the position taken by the Indian National Congress on foreign affairs, and the influence of Gandhian philosophy and the Gandhian tradition of nonviolence and the importance of ends as well as means.

More recently India's policies have been shaped by the circumstances under which she achieved her independence, including the voluntary abdication of the British and the bloodshed and dislocation which accompanied partition, by internal weaknesses and divisions, by difficulties with her nearest neighbor, Pakistan, by the postwar developments in Asia—notably the emergence of many new independent nations and the Communist victory in China — and by the world environment in which she has had to carry on her domestic and foreign policies.

Until August, 1947, India was under British rule, and the major decisions of her foreign policy, officially speaking, were made in Whitehall or

in the Governor General's palace in New Delhi. But long before 1947 spokesmen of the Indian independence movement were taking an active interest in foreign policy. India was a member of the League of Nations, and prominent Indians participated in many international and Commonwealth conferences. From its inception in 1885 the Indian National Congress evinced an interest in foreign affairs. In the 1930's resolutions of the Congress on foreign affairs showed an acute concern with developments in China, the struggle against imperialism, the Spanish civil war, Japan's aggression in China, the rise of fascism, and the cause of world peace. At its Madras session in 1927 it passed resolutions which are still referred to as reflecting basic foreign policies of independent India. Another strong element of continuity in policy has been provided by Jawaharlal Nehru himself ; for a longer period than any other world statesman he has been the voice of a nation's foreign policy.

Among the major facets of Indian foreign policy have been a strong opposition to racial discrimination and to imperialism ; an emphasis on the basic economic, social, and political development of nations rather than upon communism or upon power politics ; an insistence that, to use Nehru's words, "the countries of Asia, however weak they might be, do not propose to be ignored, do not propose to be by-passed, and certainly do not propose to be sat upon" ; an emphasis on a policy of independence or nonalignment ; an interest in the United Nations and in other efforts at international cooperation ; a desire to avoid being involved in the "cold war" and a particular aversion to regional security pacts (witness the Indian reaction to the Manila Treaty of 1954) ; and a deep concern for all efforts which tend to reduce international tensions and to work for "peaceful co-existence." Some observers, at home and abroad, have criticized these professions as being naive or annoyingly moralistic in tone, with little relation to India's actual policies. Some have even charged that Nehru's India has actually followed pro-Communist policies in foreign affairs, and they point to the rather favorable Indian climate of opinion regarding the Soviet Union, the strong Indian denunciation of security measures by the United States and other non-Communist nations, the apparent unwillingness in India even to admit the reality of the Soviet-Communist threat, and the policies of India toward Communist China, which have at times amounted almost to courtship and which have emphasized reliance on such professions of peaceful intentions as peace pledges and the "five principles" of the Nehru-Chou declaration of June, 1954. Whatever its failings, however, the foreign policy of the Nehru Government has won widespread support in India, and almost certainly is a reflection of the prevailing Indian assessment of present needs and capabilities.

That "neutralist" India is not unaware of security considerations is indicated by the attention given to maintaining an adequate military establishment and to guarding her frontiers. From a security point of view, her first concern is with her relations with her immediate neighbors.

Next is her concern for relations with her Communist neighbors across the Himalayan frontier, and notably with Communist China. The Nehru Government was profoundly disturbed when Chinese troops were sent to Tibet in 1950. India's relations with Pakistan are a matter of deepest concern, and unfortunately there is little prospect that the many issues in dispute can be resolved in the foreseeable future. As the most influential member of the so-called "neutralist" group of nations, India is especially interested in developing the closest possible ties with other Asian nations which share her point of view. India disclaims any desire to act as a leader in Asia, but she is a leading champion of Asia's claims to a greater place in world affairs, and her actions suggest that she is not always averse to taking the initiative. India was the main organizer and is now the accepted leader of the powerful Asian-African bloc in the United Nations. She has repeatedly taken a hand in conferences of Asian states, including the one at Bandung in April, 1955, certainly the most significant international conference ever held in Asia and the first conference of its kind in history.

GERMANY AND JAPAN : RENASCENT POWERS

The foreign policies of the Federal Republic of Germany and of Japan, which we have called powers of uncertain status, are not yet really fixed, because only since 1952 have they been permitted to make basic decisions on foreign policy without approval by the occupying powers.


Since 1952 the West German State (the Federal Republic of Germany) has been nominally independent in the eyes of the non-Communist world. Even before 1952 it was permitted to establish diplomatic relations of a limited nature with non-Communist states, to participate in the European Recovery Program, to become a member of the Council of Europe, to join in the defense of Western Europe (with certain restrictions), and in other ways to exercise more and more control over its own destinies.

In the Soviet zone of Germany a "German Democratic Republic" was proclaimed in 1948. From its inception it has been under Communist domination, and the voice of East Germany is the voice of Moscow. Its actions can be understood only in relation to Soviet policies in the East European area and to the over-all gyrations of the world Communist movement.

West Germany has made a remarkable recovery from defeat and devastation. With its large population, its industrial resources and know-how, and the energy of its people, it is potentially the most powerful state in Europe west of the Soviet Union. In fact, it may already have achieved that status. It now has the major voice in its own affairs, and it is playing a greater role in European politics. Since the London and Paris agreements of October, 1954, went into effect, it has been affiliated both with NATO and the newly-created Western European Union.

Its spokesmen have been quite vocal in expressing their views on such questions as German rearmament, the Schuman Plan, German unification, and their desire for a greater hand in the affairs of Western Europe. To achieve their ends they have not been above playing off the Western powers against the U.S.S.R. Neutralist sentiment is still strong in Western Germany. Nevertheless, as long as the West German regime is headed by Konrad Adenauer, one of the great statesmen of postwar Europe, it may be expected to persevere in its policies of cooperation with the other states of Western Europe. But no one can predict the course of Western Germany after the aged Adenauer has passed from the scene.

In many respects Germany is the focal point of the "cold war." While her own future depends in large measure on the nature of the relations between Russia and the West, it may also be said that the outcome of the misnamed East-West conflict depends to a considerable degree on the future of Germany. Whether Germany remains divided or is reunited, whether she leans toward the East or toward the West or retains a fairly independent position, whether she emerges again as a menace to world peace and freedom or moves in the opposite direction, whether she be-



The Frankfurter Rundschau

West Germany: "But don't forget my poor sister."

comes "bridge or battleground" -- on these issues much of the world's future depends.

Japan too, now once again an independent nation, can become a powerful force for peace or for conflict. In spite of the bursting of her dreams of Asian conquests, and in spite of the dislocation and shock caused by many years of war and occupation, she is still potentially one of the great nations of the world. She is by far the most highly industrialized state of Asia. In September, 1951, most of the nations which participated in the war against her, except India and the countries of the Soviet bloc, signed the Japanese Peace Treaty, which went into effect in the following April. Japan has not yet made a peace settlement with the Communist states, and the future of her relations with the Soviet Union and Communist China is uncertain. The great unanswered questions seem to be : (1) Have her people and her leaders really abandoned the dreams of a Greater East Asia under Japanese rule and the ideas of military fascism, and are they sincerely desirous of establishing a peaceful, democratic — or at least constitutional — state? (2) Can Japan, now reduced to her four home islands, find the necessary markets abroad and develop a sufficiently high

level of productivity to sustain her rapidly growing population at a reasonable standard of existence? If the answers to either or both of these serious questions is in the negative, then Japan may out of ambition or desperation turn to Fascist or Communist "saviors" and thus precipitate a major crisis, as she did in 1931.

THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF LESSER POWERS

As the "realists" like to emphasize, this is a great power world, and the major decisions in world affairs, including the ultimate decisions on war or peace, are being and will continue to be made by the most powerful states. This is not to imply, however, that all of the other states, in which the majority of the world's people live, are nothing but pawns or satellites of the few great powers. Some may indeed be in this unhappy situation, but on the whole the lesser powers — a term which embraces both middle and small powers — have a far from negligible influence. With some exceptions, they have not been markedly successful in maintaining neutrality or even real independence ; but they have been able to force major powers to consider their interests by developing common patterns of actions in regional and universal groupings, notably in the United Nations, and they have been a positive and sometimes decisive force.

Great-Power-Small-Power Relations. As the negotiations which preceded the drafting of the United Nations Charter revealed, there are considerable differences in the attitude of the great powers towards the lesser ones. Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States were in agreement on the necessity for the "veto" in order to protect their interests, but they had varying concepts of the role of the lesser powers in the new international organization. In general, the Soviet Union wanted the UN to be definitely and almost exclusively a great power show, whereas Britain and the United States favored more consideration of the rights and interests of the lesser powers. The policies which these countries have since followed reflect this difference in view.

Few states, whatever their size or power, can hope to follow a policy of neutrality under present world conditions. Those which have been most successful have been Switzerland, Sweden, Ireland, and perhaps Afghanistan. But in each case it may be demonstrated that neutrality was a policy that was made possible by peculiar and probably temporary conditions. However zealous a state may be in refraining from making any international commitments which are likely to compromise its neutrality, the danger of involvement because of circumstances beyond its control is ever present. As a general rule, it may be said that neutrality in today's world is an illusion.

This does not mean, of course, that a state must choose sides in every power struggle, or that it cannot preserve a measure of independence of action. It may be true, as E. H. Carr insists, that "the small country can

survive only by seeking permanent association with a Great Power";²⁸ but many of the lesser powers will not admit this and are seeking other roads to survival. In many respects these states are right in believing that to analyze the present international situation in terms of a conflict between "two worlds" is shortsighted and dangerous. Surely not all of international relations revolve around the exigencies of the "cold war." India, Indonesia, and other Asian countries, for example, are consciously trying to follow a policy of remaining aloof, a policy which they call "non-alignment."


States in a buffer zone are faced with a limited number of choices. They can ally themselves with a major power, they can become satellites of a major power, they can attempt to maintain a tenuous neutrality, or they can try to play one major power off against another as a means of preserving as much freedom of action as possible. Norway, Greece, and Turkey have cast their lot with the Western powers; the East European states have become satellites of the Soviet Union; Sweden is trying to follow a neutral course; Iran seems to be interested in exploiting her bargaining position.

To overcome individual weakness some of the lesser powers have joined in cooperative efforts for defense, economic development, and other purposes, sometimes in concert with one or more great powers and sometimes by themselves. Through such groupings they are able to exert a greater influence on major powers and on world affairs in general. The Arab states of the Middle East, weak and torn by internal dissensions and dynastic feuds, have tried to present a united front through the Arab League and through bloc voting and other concerted action in the United Nations, especially on the Palestine question. A Muslim bloc could have considerable influence, since it would speak for states which occupy a strategically important position and possess the chief oil reserves of the world. There is much talk, but so far little action, regarding an Asian bloc headed by India. The Latin American states exert a powerful influence on the foreign policy of the United States, especially through the OAS and other agencies for inter-American cooperation. Most of the smaller states of Western Europe play an active part in the many organizations for economic, political, and military cooperation which have come into existence in that area. The British Commonwealth is not, strictly speaking, a regional grouping, but undoubtedly its members speak with greater authority in world affairs because of their participation in it.

Lesser-Power Influence. Lesser powers are natural champions of all forms of international cooperation, for it is clearly in their interest to preserve the peace and to exert a moderating influence on the great powers.²⁹ They find their greatest opportunities in the United Nations.

²⁸ *Conditions of Peace* (Macmillan, 1942), p. 58. Carr argues here that modern warfare and changing world conditions have destroyed the effective independence of small states. See especially pp. 52-58.

²⁹ In the words of Martin Wight, "not burdened with particular concrete interests, small Powers are able to be conscious of a universal interest." *Power Politics* (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1949), p. 50.



The New York Times, August 17, 1952.

Why the Middle East Is Important to the Rest of the World

In spite of the dominating position of the great powers, the lesser states are represented on all organs of the UN, their spokesmen are listened to with respect, and often they are able to act as intermediaries between major powers. In this way they make a truly great contribution to the peaceful settlement of disputes, as well as to the smoothing of ruffled tempers. Nor should the influence of individual statesmen from lesser states be minimized. Anyone who followed the activities of the UN must be impressed by the leadership of Evatt of Australia, Spaak of Belgium, Pearson of Canada, Rau, Madame Pandit, and Krishna Menon of India, Entezam of Iran, Padilla Nervo of Mexico, Belaúnde of Peru, Fraser of New Zealand, Romulo of the Philippines, and other spokesmen of the lesser powers.

The middle powers are in a position to exercise a great influence on the major powers and on the course of world affairs, and they are becoming more aware of their potentialities. Usually they possess a regional superiority which gives them effectiveness in a wider area. India's position in South and Southeast Asia has already been mentioned. Australia is especially concerned with security arrangements in the Western and southwestern Pacific, with collaboration with the states of South and Southeast Asia, and with the future position of Japan. She took the lead in the development of the Colombo Plan, and an Australian represented the entire Commonwealth on the Allied Council for Japan. Argentina and Brazil are none-too-friendly competitors for primacy in South America; and Argentina, in particular, often appears inclined to resent and to challenge the policies of the United States in Latin America.

At least two other states which should be classed as middle powers do not possess regional superiority, for they are too close to great powers, but they do have an influence out of proportion to their independent power. These states are Canada and Italy. Canada has close ties with both the United Kingdom and the United States; politically she is associated with the Commonwealth, but geographically and economically she is linked more closely with her North American neighbor. She is an important member of NATO, and although she had not affiliated with OAS she participates wholeheartedly in measures for hemispheric defense and cooperation. Italy is a vital bastion of the free world. She occupies a central position with regard to both Western Europe and the Mediterranean area. Her policies and indeed her destinies are tied to those of the other states of Western Europe.

Those peculiar hybrids, Spain and Yugoslavia — the one a Fascist state which survived a world war for the extinction of fascism, the other a Communist state outside the "iron curtain" — may perhaps also be considered as middle powers. Possibly Turkey should be added, too. Spain occupies such a strategic position with respect to Atlantic, Mediterranean, and West European defense that she can hardly be ignored, in spite of her internal weaknesses, her serious economic plight, and the bad odor of the Franco regime. Yugoslavia is willing to exploit her unnatural position and

is finding her very vulnerability a source of strength. Turkey maintains a sizable and efficient army, and seeks defense against Russia through cooperation with the West in NATO.

One other observation should be made about the role of the lesser powers in world affairs. This is the real contribution that they are making in "sweetening" international relations and in calling attention to first principles. One shudders to think what the level of international life would be if the world were partitioned among a few super-powers. Smaller states have no monopoly on morality and justice and spiritual values, and often they cloak selfish and short-sighted ends in the mantle of principle, as do great powers ; but because their possibilities of survival are so dependent on the avoidance of conflict between great powers, and because they are more likely to be pawns rather than victors in a power struggle, they often appeal to higher principles of conduct and action.

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Part Six

THE FUTURE OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY

The Atom: Power Without.....**24** Limit

Early on the morning of August 6, 1945, an American B-29 dropped a single bomb on the Japanese city of Hiroshima. The blinding flash of the explosion a few seconds later was followed by the appearance of a mushroom-shaped cloud which soon towered for miles over the doomed city. Some 150,000 people were killed or wounded — and many of the latter were to die in agony from radiation effects — and 75 per cent of the buildings of the city were destroyed or badly damaged. A short time later the President of the United States, in a broadcast heard around the world, announced that “the basic power of the universe” had been unleashed against Japan.

In this dramatic and apocalyptic way the people of the world learned that the atomic age had begun. In a single moment, it seemed, problems of international conflict and cooperation, of war and peace, had become questions of the future of mankind, even of its survival. Since Hiroshima, the hydrogen bomb and experiments with bacteriological and chemical weapons have improved the techniques of mass destruction to the point where the atom bomb itself is hardly more than a conventional weapon. Since Hiroshima, too, many efforts have been made to adjust man’s thinking and institutions to the imperatives of the atomic age, but these efforts have fallen far short of the dimensions of the crisis. “Truly,” wrote Paul-

Henri Spaak, one of the world's wisest statesmen, in 1955, "our imagination is not in step with our era." ¹

Shortly after the atom bombs were first used against Japanese cities an American physicist wrote :

We find ourselves with an explosion which is far from completely perfected.....It is conceivable that totally different methods may be discovered for converting matter into energy since it is to be remembered that the energy released in uranium fission corresponds to the utilization of only about one-tenth of one per cent of its mass. Should a scheme be devised for converting to energy even as much as a few per cent of the matter of some common material, civilization would have the means to commit suicide at will...Here is a new tool for mankind, a tool of unimaginable destructive power. Its development raises many questions that must be answered in the near future...These questions are not technical questions; they are political and social questions, and the answers given to them may affect all mankind for generations. ²

Since these words were written great progress has been made in harnessing new sources of nuclear energy, but almost no progress has been made in dealing with the political and social questions which the new discoveries raise. As Albert Schweitzer stated in his address in Oslo on November 4, 1954, on his receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize : "Man has become a superman.....because he is in command.....of latent forces in nature," but he "is not elevated to that level of superhuman reason which must correspond to the possession of superhuman force."


No competent analysis of international relations in the second half of the twentieth century can ignore the consequences of the availability, for the first time in history, of "power without limit" — power for the benefit or for the destruction of mankind. The unseen atom has become perhaps the greatest force in the world.

THE ADVENT OF THE ATOMIC AGE

Hiroshima's day of doom, August 6, 1945, marked the world debut of the atomic bomb, but it was not the birthday of the atomic age. That birthday was December 2, 1942, when, "amid the greatest wartime secrecy," a small group of scientists, gathered on a squash court underneath the west stands of the University of Chicago's abandoned football stadium, watched the lighting of "the first atomic fire on earth." Dr. Arthur H. Compton directed the project, and Dr. Enrico Fermi captained the scientific team which designed and built the atomic furnace (which Fermi

¹ Paul-Henri Spaak, "The Atom Bomb and NATO," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXIII (April, 1955), 359.

² Henry De Wolf Smyth, *Atomic Energy for Military Purposes* (Princeton University Press, 1945), pp. 224, 226.



Diario las Américas

— "Si siguen así, vamos a tener
que empezar de nuevo . . . !"

called a "pile" but which has since become known as a nuclear reactor). The experiment proved that splitting the atom could start a self-sustaining chain reaction, and it demonstrated practically that an atom bomb could be made.

For some years scientists had been conducting experiments which suggested that a controlled chain reaction was possible. Einstein, in his famous formula $E=MC^2$, had advanced the startling theory that energy could be converted into matter. The splitting of the atom, however, with the consequent release of atomic energy, was the work of many scientists. Fermi's epoch-making experiments at the University of Rome in 1934 led directly to the discovery of uranium fission, apparently first produced by O. F. Hahn and Fritz Strassman in Germany about 1938. Lise Meitner and O. R. Fritsch learned of this discovery before they were exiled from Germany in 1938, and Niels Bohr received the news from them. In January, 1939, both Fermi and Bohr came to the United States, and Bohr communicated word of the achievement to physicists in Princeton and else-

where. Fermi had accepted a post at Columbia University, where, on January 29, 1939, he and some of his new colleagues directed the first splitting of the uranium atom in the United States.

Fermi, Bohr, and other exiled physicists learned that a special institute had been created in Berlin for work on an atom bomb. They understood the grave consequences if the Nazis should perfect such a weapon ahead of the free world. They induced the most famous of the scientist-exiles in America, Albert Einstein, to write a now-historic letter to President Roosevelt, stressing the urgency of investigating the possibilities of developing an atomic bomb. It was perhaps ironic that one of the great champions of peace, and even of pacifism, should have been the man to urge the American President to undertake "probably the greatest calculated risk in history" in order to develop a weapon of unprecedented capabilities for human destruction. The risk was taken, and the atomic age was the result.

On August 13, 1942, the "Manhattan District" was officially established in the Army Corps of Engineers to carry on the special project, with Major General Leslie R. Groves in charge. Canadian and British scientists were enlisted to aid the American and exiled European scientists. At Chicago, as we have noted, the first nuclear chain reaction was achieved in December, 1942. At Los Alamos, New Mexico, Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer directed a group of scientists, including Fermi and Bohr, in designing and building the first bomb. Other research centers were established at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and elsewhere. The first atom bomb ever to be tested was exploded not over Hiroshima but at Alamogordo, New Mexico, on July 16, 1945. It was remarkable that a project of such dimensions, eventually involving an expenditure of more than two billion dollars and the labor of some 300,000 workers, could be undertaken and completed in full secrecy during a major war.

Nearly three months before the Alamogordo test proved that the atom bomb would actually work, and on the day that the United Nations Conference on International Organization met in San Francisco, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, one of the few top political officials aware of the nature and significance of the Manhattan Project, and Major General Groves went to the White House to deliver a memorandum to President Truman. Apparently Mr. Truman had known nothing about the bomb plans before the death of Roosevelt called him to the highest office in the land. Now, on April 25, 1945, nine days after he had become President, he learned from Mr. Stimson's memorandum that within four months the United States would in all probability possess "the most terrible weapon ever known in human history," one with which "modern civilization might be completely destroyed."

From the day of Stimson's "enlightening presentation of this awesome subject" until he left the White House nearly eight years later, President Truman was involved in a series of decisions regarding the development and control of the atom bomb and even more fearful weapons of mass

destruction. The decision to drop the bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was his to make, and he made it upon the advice of his most trusted advisers. Disagreement over the military and moral justification of that decision continues to this day.

Congress, at President Truman's request, established an Atomic Energy Commission to supervise all work relating to experimentation in the use of atomic energy for military and peaceful purposes. Although most of this work has been carried on in secret, the Commission's chairmen, particularly David E. Lilienthal and Lewis L. Strauss, along with many outstanding atomic scientists, have been involved in a series of controversies, public as well as private, over the decisions and acts of the AEC. The division of opinion on the desirability of proceeding with experiments on the hydrogen bomb — a division reflecting the opposing positions taken by J. Robert Oppenheimer and Edward Teller — and the decision of the AEC to bar Dr. Oppenheimer from access to certain classified information added dramatic highlights to the postwar atomic story.

In the spring of 1946 a committee headed by Dean Acheson produced the so-called Acheson-Lilienthal Plan for an international atomic development authority, and at the first meeting of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission the American representative, Bernard Baruch, submitted a proposal modeled on the Acheson-Lilienthal Plan. In spite of vigorous Soviet opposition the American plan, in revised form, was accepted by the majority of the members of the Commission and later approved by the General Assembly. Nearly eight years later, in December, 1953, in an address to the General Assembly, President Eisenhower advanced a proposal for the pooling of atomic resources for peaceful uses. After considerable hesitation the Soviet Union agreed to discuss this atoms-for-peace plan, and a subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission studied it in some detail. Late in the summer of 1955 an international conference on the peaceful uses of atomic energy, attended largely by scientists, was held in Geneva. Hopes rose that the nations which had made the greatest progress in the development of nuclear weapons — the United States, Great Britain, Canada, and the Soviet Union — would cooperate in searching for some means of international control, in sharing their atomic resources with other nations, and in utilizing atomic energy for peace rather than war. At the same time, however, the atomic powers were adding to their stockpiles of atomic and perhaps also of hydrogen bombs, and they were pressing forward with experiments in the development of even more powerful instruments of destruction.

In the postwar period the United States has exploded a number of atomic bombs at the Nevada proving grounds and in the western Pacific. Some of these were apparently five or six times more powerful than those used against Japan in 1945. Tactical atom bombs have also been manufactured, and atomic artillery shells and atomic warheads for guided missiles have been proved to be practicable.

The United States enjoyed a monopoly of atomic bombs until 1949, a

condition which many Western statesmen — including Winston Churchill — regarded as the chief deterrent to Soviet aggression and the chief shield for Western Europe. On September 23, 1949, all complacency arising from the American monopoly was shattered by President Truman's announcement that Russia had recently exploded her first atomic bomb. Although this development had been expected, calculations had fixed the likely date much later.

THE HYDROGEN BOMB

Even before they knew that the Soviet Union had made a successful atomic bomb, a number of American scientists led by Edward Teller, some high military officials, and a few key members of Congress, notably Senator Brien McMahon, had begun to agitate for initiating work on a new bomb — a “super-bomb” much more powerful than the atom bomb. Instead of being produced by the *fission* of the nuclei of atoms of heavy elements — uranium and plutonium — the explosion of the hydrogen bomb, or H-bomb, as the contemplated new weapon soon came to be erroneously called, would be produced by a *fusion* of extremely light elements — tritium and deuterium seemed to be the most hopeful ones — under intense heat (20,000,000°C. or more). The suggestions of Teller, McMahon, and others who shared their views were strongly opposed by Chairman Lilienthal of the Atomic Energy Commission and by many outstanding American scientists, notably J. Robert Oppenheimer and James B. Conant. For a long time the proposals were coolly viewed by the white House. The explosion of an atomic bomb by the Soviet Union changed the attitude of many American policy-makers. Since the Russians had made the atomic bomb so quickly, there was no reason to doubt that they were already at work on the H-bomb, or that they could make it if it could be made at all. It became apparent at once that if the United States and the Western world were to keep the strategic initiative, they would have to do more than outmanufacture the Soviet Union in atomic bombs. On January 31, 1950, four months after he had revealed the Russian atomic explosion, President Truman announced that he had “directed the Atomic Energy Commission to continue its work on all forms of atomic weapons, including the so-called hydrogen or super-bomb.”

The President's momentous decision met with “somber, overwhelming approval” in the United States. Almost all of the top atomic scientists, however, whether they approved of the President's decision or not, agreed that the development of the super-bomb would raise new threats to civilization and human survival.⁸ Soon after the President's announcement Albert Einstein, in a sense the father of the atomic bomb, declared :

⁸ Appalled by the potential destructive power of the H-bomb, a group of American physicists, led by Hans A. Bethe and Samuel K. Allison, issued a statement on February 4, 1950, which took the rather enigmatic position that “there can be only one justification for our development of the hydrogen bomb, and that is to prevent its use.” The

The hydrogen bomb appears on the public horizon as a probably attainable goal.....If successful, radioactive poisoning of the atmosphere and hence annihilation of any life on earth, has been brought within the range of technical possibilities.

Thus with mixed emotions the United States entered the fateful race to develop the H-bomb. Encouraged by the Administration and utilizing a combination of government resources and private scientific skills, the directors of the project achieved concrete results in an amazingly short time. On November 1, 1952, tests at Eniwetok in the western Pacific included what were described as "experiments contributing to thermonuclear reactions." It was later announced that the prototype of the H-bomb exploded at this time was in the megaton range (a megaton is the equivalent of 1,000,000 tons of TNT). The 1952 tests demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt that the dreaded H-bomb could be made.

Less than a year later, on August 8, 1953, Premier Malenkov revealed that Russia too had the H-bomb secret. Shortly before his announcement scientific instruments outside Russia had indicated that the Soviets had indeed "tested a weapon or device of a yield well beyond the range of regular fission weapons and which derived a part of its force from the fusion of light elements." This development was even more momentous than the news of Soviet success in making an atom bomb in 1949.

The first explosion of an actual hydrogen bomb occurred in March, 1954, during tests sponsored by the United States Atomic Energy Commission in the vicinity of Bikini atoll in the Pacific. On March 1 "a very large thermonuclear device" was exploded. It was "the most devastating explosion man has ever produced," and apparently generated an unexpectedly powerful force of 15 to 20 megatons, which would make it a blast 750 to 1,000 times more powerful than that of the atomic bomb that had been dropped on Hiroshima. Even more ominous than the immediate effects—"blast, heat, immediate nuclear radioaction"—were those of "residual radioactivity," popularly known as the "fall-out." In 1955 the Atomic Energy Commission reported that as a result of the H-bomb explosion of March 1, 1954, "about 7,000 square miles of territory downwind from the point of burst was so contaminated that survival might have depended upon prompt evacuation of the area or upon taking shelter and other protective measures." ⁴ American newspapers were prompt to point out

statement continued : ".....the thermonuclear reaction on which the H-bomb is based, is limited in its power only by the amount of hydrogen which can be carried in the bomb. Even if the power were limited to 1,000 times that of a present atomic bomb, the step from an A-bomb to an H-bomb would be as great as that from an ordinary TNT bomb to the atom bomb.....New York, or any other of the greatest cities of the world, could be destroyed by a single hydrogen bomb.

"We believe that no nation has the right to use such a bomb, no matter how righteous its cause. This bomb is no longer a weapon of war, but a means of extermination of whole populations. Its use would be a betrayal of all standards of morality and of Christian civilization itself."

⁴ The report of the AEC on the effects of hydrogen bomb explosive was printed in the *New York Times*, Feb. 16, 1955.

that 7,000 square miles covered an area almost as large as the state of New Jersey, or of Connecticut and Delaware combined. Thus with a relatively few H-bombs it appeared that the major centers of population and industry in any country could be destroyed. A British physicist calculated that ten or twenty well-directed bombs could make "organized life impossible" in Britain; and most scientists apparently considered that if he erred at all it was in overestimating the number of bombs that would be required to produce this fearful result.

In 1954, therefore, the hydrogen bomb age actually arrived. Twenty months after the Bikini explosion the Soviet Union exploded a bomb which the Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission described as "in the range of megatons," meaning that it was a true hydrogen bomb.⁵

Already it seems that even more destructive weapons than the H-bomb exploded on Bikini are within the range of possibility. A widely publicized book, *The Hydrogen Bomb*,⁶ published in September, 1954, reported that the United States already had an H-bomb too powerful to test. Its power was said to be so great that it approached "the practicable limit of thermonuclear weapons," namely 45 megatons or almost 2,400 times the force of an atom bomb of the Hiroshima type.

The hydrogen bomb is often referred to as a three-stage weapon — a fission-fusion-fission bomb. The initial explosion comes from a powerful fission bomb, made of either uranium 235 or plutonium. This explosion provides a temperature of several hundred million degrees, which causes the fusion of a mixture of the heavy varieties of hydrogen, namely deuterium or tritium. The fusion process releases neutrons of such energies that they are capable of splitting the nuclei of the normally nonfissionable uranium 238. "Thus the main explosive force of the hydrogen bomb comes not from fusion of hydrogen but from the fission of the cheap and abundant uranium 238."⁷

The hydrogen bomb, therefore, is not just a more powerful atomic bomb. "Thermonuclear weapons," declared a member of the United States Atomic Energy Commission in November, 1955, "represent an entirely new kind of power. Their potential destructiveness is so different from the destructiveness of 'A' bombs that these new weapons do not belong to the same category — not by any stretch of the imagination..... the atmospheric contamination that results from large thermonuclear explosions is serious. In fact, it is so serious that it could be catastrophic. A sufficiently large number of such explosions would render the earth un-

⁵ The announcement of "the largest explosion thus far in the U.S.S.R." was first made on November 23, 1955, by Chairman Lewis L. Strauss of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, and was confirmed three days later in an official Soviet statement. See the *New York Times*, Nov. 24 and 27, 1955.

⁶ James R. Shepley and Clair Blair, Jr., *The Hydrogen Bomb* (David McKay, 1954).

⁷ William L. Laurence, in the *New York Times*, Nov. 18, 1955.

inhabitable to man. That is a plain fact.”⁸ The Soviet announcement less than a week later gave added significance to these gloomy words.

Scientists appear to be doubtful whether there are in fact any foreseeable limits to the potential power of thermonuclear weapons. Some even argue that for better or for worse the hydrogen bomb age holds out the prospect of “power without limit.” The production of the hydrogen bomb, they point out, “now makes it certain that the most dreaded weapon of all — the cobalt bomb — can also be successfully built.” The cobalt bomb would consist of a hydrogen bomb encased in a shell of cobalt instead of steel ; when vaporized in the explosion, the cobalt would be “transformed into a deadly radioactive cloud 320 times more powerful than radium.”⁹

In addition to the frightening possibilities resulting from the development of thermonuclear weapons and from experiments with radioactive poisons, equally unpleasant prospects are present in the field of chemical and bacteriological warfare. Although poison gas was not used during World War II, new and more deadly types were developed during war-time and in the postwar period. Biological weapons are apparently of great variety and potency. “Fungi, bacteria, rickettsiae, viruses and toxic agents” may be used with devastating effect against human beings and other living organisms.¹⁰ Over thirty diseases are considered to have significant military potentialities ; these include anthrax, botulism, tularemia, psittacosis, and pneumonic plague.¹¹ Bacteriological agents can be introduced into the water supply, sprayed from the air, or directed against enemy populations in many other ways difficult to guard against. Moreover, unlike the atomic and H-bombs, they can be produced easily and inexpensively in small laboratories and by small states. As early as 1947 Rear Admiral Zacharias summed up the significance of chemical and bacteriological warfare : “.....there are today in the arsenals of several of the great powers other absolute weapons, chemical, biological, and climatological, more devastating than the atom. They are capable of exterminating the last vestige of human, animal and even vegetable life from the face of the earth. They are being manufactured at this moment.”¹²

DEALING WITH “THE BASIC POWER OF THE UNIVERSE”

The problems of world politics which occupy the attention of statesmen and nations today are not basically different from those of a somewhat earlier time, but the background against which they have to be considered

⁸ Address by Thomas E. Murray at Fordham Law School dinner, New York, Nov. 17, 1955 ; in the *New York Times*, Nov. 18, 1955.

⁹ William L. Laurence, in the *New York Times*, April 7, 1954.

¹⁰ Ansley J. Coale, *The Problem of Reducing Vulnerability to Atomic Bombs* (Princeton University Press, 1947), p. 97.

¹¹ Hanson W. Baldwin, *The Price of Power* (Harper, 1948), p. 73.

¹² Ellis M. Zacharias, “Absolute Weapons More Deadly Than the Atom,” *United Nations World* (Nov., 1947), p. 13.



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The Washington Post

"Pardon Me, Mister"

has changed fundamentally. Since the end of World War II, a change far more basic than the deteriorating state of great power relations has occurred. "In 1945," wrote C. L. Sulzberger a decade later, "it was a question of peace. Now it is a matter of humanity's survival."¹³ In Toynbee's terms, "Man's acquisition of this degree of command over non-human forces had made it impossible for him any longer to evade the challenge of two evils [war and class conflict] which Man himself had brought into the World in the act of providing himself with a new species of society."¹⁴ Thus mankind, in Toynbee's view, confronted "an unprecedented human situation."

In the light of all available evidence it seems apparent that the atomic age has indeed uncovered ample grounds for the most optimistic hopes and for the darkest despair. At the moment the prophets of despair are in the ascendant. Both scientists and students of politics and society are

¹³ *New York Times*, June 20, 1955.

¹⁴ Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History*, 10 vols. (Oxford University Press, 1954), IX, 467-468.

appalled by the appearance of frightful instruments of destruction at a time when man is still patently incapable of developing social institutions commensurate with the needs of the new age. "We have found that the men who know most are the most gloomy," declared eight world-famous scientists in 1955. Hanson W. Baldwin, after a careful appraisal of the world political-strategic situation, had earlier come up with this melancholy observation :

The face of tomorrow is a bleak visage ; we are embarked upon a 'time of troubles' ... We have opened for all time the lid of Pandora's box of evils. We cannot push the genii back into the box. We may not like it, but we must face it.¹⁵

In general, the atomic age has thus far accentuated the negative. Men are more deeply concerned with the dangers of atomic warfare than they are entranced by the prospects of atomic plenty. They are making some efforts to adjust to the new era, but as yet their political and social orientation, like their policies, has not crossed the threshold of the new age. Their words suggest that they are aware of the dilemmas which face them, but their acts suggest that they are either unwilling or unable to take the stern measures which the new era demands. The policies which seem practicable are inadequate, and those which seem adequate are impracticable. It is imperative that we think realistically and soberly of the policies which are both adequate and possible, and of the political and social implications of the great technological advances of the age that we have just entered.

In this chapter we shall examine existing trends and possible developments in those areas most relevant to our study of international politics : (1) problems of strategy ; (2) problems of national policy and international action ; (3) the peaceful uses of atomic energy ; and (4) the dilemma occasioned by the incompatibility of atomic science and pre-atomic concepts of interstate relations.

STRATEGY FOR THE ATOMIC AGE

While the fundamental principles of war have changed but little through the centuries, tactics and strategy have been altered as a result of new weapons and new threats to the balance of power. Each of the major technological developments in the art of warfare has given at least temporary advantage to the offensive. In the past, techniques of defense gradually caught up with those of offense although wars became deadlier and costlier as a result of improved weapons. Today those who are responsible for the protection of nations and of peoples seek desperately to provide that protection in an age of weapons of mass destruction. If war comes,

¹⁵ Baldwin, p. 317.

how can they find adequate defense when even a few planes — or perhaps guided missiles — can drop enough super-bombs to paralyze vast areas and kill millions of people? Short of the abolition of war or effective control of weapons of mass destruction, what defense is possible? Even minimal armed forces and armaments, an extensive warning system, and preparations for national mobilization and civil defense impose staggering burdens and threaten to turn free nations into garrison states.

The Strategy of Defense

Nations have maintained conventional types of armed forces, partially, no doubt, owing to inertia and to bondage to outmoded methods and concepts of warfare ; hence the familiar observation that states seem always to be preparing for the last war rather than for the next. But the need for conventional types of forces is still great. Even in an atomic war, not all action would be carried out by technicians engaged in directing super-bombs to predetermined targets. Furthermore, some men hope that the wars of the future will be limited ones, if wars there must be. American monopoly of the atom bomb may have averted a military showdown in the early postwar years, but it was of no use to the United Nations forces in Korea, where combined units of the army, navy, and air force, armed with nonatomic weapons, had to fight an old-fashioned type of war under unfavorable conditions. In addition to their regular functions, in fact, regular units of the armed forces are now expected to undertake certain special tasks, so that, while the need for certain types of units and weapons has decreased, new assignments have been added.

Great offensive emphasis is now placed on the development of unconventional weapons and effective methods of delivery by piloted planes or guided missiles ; defensive emphasis is on early warning systems, interception devices and techniques, target dispersion, duplication of key equipment, and variety of armaments. In general, relatively greater attention is being given to the air force, which has vital functions in both offense and defense. Effective integration of the armed services has become imperative. "The true meaning, tactically, of the technological revolution and of total war," wrote the distinguished military analyst of the *New York Times* in 1948, "is just this ; it has forced a 'shotgun marriage' or rather an atomic-bomb marriage, of all the fighting services, and a grudging but growing recognition that military force is indivisible and that all forms of it are interdependent, not independent." "Functional definitions of service responsibilities are not easily established in the atomic age," he continued, "and will tend to become more and more blurred as weapons develop."¹⁶

National safety and national survival may well depend upon the ability to withstand a sudden, devastating surprise attack with atomic weapons, to launch an immediate and effective counterattack, to mobilize military

¹⁶ Baldwin, p. 179.

and national resources so that the entire nation becomes a giant war machine, to sustain severe losses on the home front as well as among the military forces for an indefinite period of time, and to undertake operations from overseas bases and to coordinate these with actions of allies. While much depends on the development of strong military forces in being, even more depends upon the ability of the entire nation to gear itself for war. As General Eisenhower stated in 1948 in his final report as Army Chief of Staff, "the military establishment is only the cutting edge of the national machine through which destructive force would be applied against an enemy." Supremely important, as General Eisenhower recognized, are the intangibles of national morale and the moral and spiritual reserves of a people :

Security cannot be measured by the size of the munitions stockpiles or the number of men under arms or the monopoly of an invincible weapon.....Even in time of peace the index of material strength is unreliable.....But adequate spiritual reserves, coupled with understanding of each day's requirements, will meet every issue of our time.

While nations should work for peace in every possible way, they must at the same time give prime attention to problems of immediate national security. Even in peace time this necessity now imposes acute strains on national budgets. Most expenditures are devoted to the maintenance of military forces and equipment in being, to research and development of new weapons, and to facilities and techniques of military defense. Less attention is being given to reducing vulnerability to atomic attack. This is in part due to the nature of the problem, for no real protection seems possible. All that can be hoped for is that precautionary measures will help to reduce the number of casualties and the extent of the destruction, especially to vital military and industrial installations. In general these relate to dispersal, decentralization, the preparation of underground shelters, the construction of buildings which incorporate heat-, blast-, and radiation-resisting features, civil defense, and disaster relief. Thus far, however, no nation has really done much to prepare itself against the hazards of atomic warfare, aside from emphasizing military preparedness.

In the United States, for example, federal, state, and local authorities appear to be working at cross purposes in the vital field of civil defense, and efforts to rally strong public support have been largely futile. In truth, the measures which are called for may impose impossible demands on the people, and may even be antithetical to the objectives of a free society. "Any major measures to minimize casualties — such as relocation of population.....or deep underground construction of all urban buildings— would require a revolutionary interference by the government in individual choices, a revolution for which public support can hardly be envisaged."¹⁷ Crowded cities would be prime targets for atomic bombs, especially if

¹⁷ Coale, p. 62-63.

they are also vital industrial centers ; but while there has been much talk about the need for de-urbanization in the United States — perhaps for esthetic and moral as well as for military reasons — very little has been done in this direction.

"The political, economic and psychological problems are so major," states Hanson W. Baldwin, "that compulsory de-urbanization can safely be termed 'impossible' ; least in peacetime." But Baldwin does believe that gradual decentralization should be encouraged. Specifically, he suggests decentralization through city planning, slum clearance, zoning laws, suburban "green belts," the dispersion of military installations to nonurban areas, and the decentralization of city administrations and of hospital, police, and fire-fighting facilities. He stresses the need for a restudy of power and communications systems, the breaking of transportation and communications bottlenecks, emergency radio communications systems, new water supply and purification systems, more buildings above ground of steel girders and concrete and at least "pilot underground plants" and stockpiles, a "coordinated and integrated civilian defense home front defense scheme," and evacuation plans for every major city. As for the nation's capital, the general nature of his recommendations is indicated in this terse statement : "Washington must both disperse and dig."¹⁸ While these measures are less drastic than compulsory de-urbanization, they raise some of the same difficulties and problems, and very little progress is being made in implementing them. Apparently the United States is prepared militarily to wage atomic war and to act immediately in the event of attack ; but, short of a miracle, if an atomic war comes, it will find Americans psychologically and physically unprepared.

The Limits of Deterrents

The major non-Communist states have pursued security through policies of "containment," "building situations of strength," "mutual security," "defense through deterrents," or "stalemate through deterrent strength." These interrelated policies carry no guarantee of even minimal security, but they are the best that statesmen can devise when the policies which they would like to follow seem to be out of the question. Present measures are based on the assumption that the best hope for security in a divided world is to be strong enough to resist by force threats to the peace and to make aggression and war unprofitable for the would-be aggressor.

The present deterrent-strength point of view has been voiced again and again by statesmen of the Western world and by writers on military strategy. A major exponent has been Churchill himself. As early as March 31, 1949, in an address at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, he pointed to the deterrent effect of the American monopoly of the atomic bomb. "I must not conceal from you..... the truth as I see it," he said.

¹⁸ Baldwin, p. 263. For his discussion of "Dispersion and Centralization," see pp. 252-265.

"It is certain that Europe would have been communized like Czechoslovakia and London under bombardment some time ago but for the deterrent of the atomic bomb in the hands of the United States." After the Soviet Union was known to possess both the atomic and the hydrogen bomb, Churchill continued to place his faith in deterrent power. In a debate on defense policy in the House of Commons on March 1, 1955, he declared :

Unless a trustworthy and universal agreement upon disarmament, conventional and unclear alike, can be reached and an effective system of inspection is established and is actually working, there is only one sane policy for the free world in the next few years. That is what we call defense through deterrents.....All deterrents will improve and gain authority during the next ten years. By that time, the deterrent may well reach its acme and reap its final reward.

A year earlier Churchill had sought to reassure those who were concerned about the contradiction of a peace-loving state following a policy of this sort. "Peace is our aim," he asserted, "and strength is the only way of getting it.....We need not be deterred by the thought that we are trying to have it both ways at once. Indeed, it is only by having it both ways at once that we shall get a chance of getting anything of it at all."

American spokesmen have been less eloquent but no less forceful in championing the policy of "defense through deterrents." For example, speaking in Washington on October 12, 1955, the Secretary of the Air Force, Donald A. Quarles, said : "The road to peace is long and tortuous, and meanwhile we must maintain our strength at the ready." Although a potential aggressor may have the capacity to launch an atomic attack, continued Mr. Quarles, "we would be no less secure so long as we maintain the power to retaliate decisively. This proposition creates a stalemate through deterrent strength, which I believe is, paradoxically, our best hope of peace."

The student of international politics may wonder how long a "stalemate through deterrent strength" may be expected to last, and whether deterrents really deter. The strategy of deterrents has many disadvantages ; it seems to run counter to the lessons of the past and the hopes for the future. Certainly, as Quincy Wright argues, "while the fear of retaliation is an important deterrent, it may not suffice to prevent war if power is an important deterrent, it may not suffice to prevent war if power political rivalries continue with mounting tensions." Fear of retaliation, he thinks, is "a slender reed to lean upon."¹⁹ Even if it helps to prevent war in the immediate future, "a world in which two or more states were sitting on powder kegs powerful enough to destroy every major city on earth will be a world of half peace at best."²⁰ Indeed, as Wright warns,

¹⁹ Quincy Wright, *Problems of Stability and Progress in International Relations* (University of California Press, 1954), pp. 330, 312.

²⁰ William T. R. Fox, in Bernard Brodie, ed., *The Absolute Weapon : Atomic Power and the World Order* (Harcourt, Brace, 1946), p. 196.

"efforts to achieve national security by exclusive reliance on either military superiority or a military balance are likely to achieve ruin for all."²¹

It may well be, as Winston Churchill has said, "that we shall, by a process of sublime irony, have reached a stage where safety will be the sturdy child of terror, and survival the twin brother of annihilation." If so, it is indeed a gloomy prospect, but one far less gloomy than that of atomic catastrophe, and one which at least holds out the hope that "somehow, something good will come of ill." The American authors of *The Hydrogen Bomb* summed up the situation in these words :

Possession of the thermonuclear bomb holds no answers in itself and shows no way to a decent future. It simply prevents an immediate end to the future. The United States, certainly along with its allies, was caught in the unhappy stalemate President Eisenhower described in his memorable speech to the U.N. on benign uses of atomic energy. Yet it is inescapable that two atomic colossi are doomed for the time being "to eye each other malevolently across a trembling world." It can only be said that better this than a single atomic colossus—the Soviet Union—eyeing a trembling world.²²

A strategy for the atomic age must deal with more than deterrents and "massive retaliation." Even if a major atomic war is averted, it by no means follows that there will not be localized wars or that the nations of the free world will not be faced with threats to their security by limited wars and "creeping aggression." A secondary strategy for dealing with less-than-atomic threats by less-than-massive retaliation must therefore be formulated. An atomic stalemate, if it now exists or if it develops and lasts for some time, will not prevent such contingencies. One writer asserts that "the struggle between the free and Communist worlds will go on..... The era of strategic deadlock is less likely to see a peaceful world than a busily vicious one, boiling with limited wars. These will not necessarily be little wars. The only limitation is on the use of the ultimate strategic weapons against the Russian and American homelands." It would be dangerous for the United States to concentrate all her efforts on deterrents and retaliation against atomic attack. She must be prepared to deal with more limited threats. "In the long run, the erosion of repeated U.S. failures of the Indo-China type could be nearly as disastrous as all-out thermonuclear war." This situation has given rise to what has been called "the strategy of the double deterrent," which calls for a "tactical deterrent" as well as a "strategic deterrent." The United States "must be able to punish local aggressions with such speed and force that the Communists will finally call a halt."²³

²¹ Wright, p. 330.

²² Shepley and Blair, p. 228.

²³ "The Pistol and the Claw : A New Military Policy for the Age of Atom Deadlock," *Time*, Jan. 10, 1955, pp. 16-17. Copyright, *Time*, Inc., 1955.

POLICY FOR THE ATOMIC AGE : GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

In a memorandum for President Truman on "Proposed Action for Control of Atomic Bomb," dated 11 September, 1945, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson wrote :

I think the bomb ... constitutes merely a first step in a new control of man over the forces of nature too revolutionary and dangerous to fit into the old concepts. I think it really caps the climax of the race between man's growing technical power for destructiveness and his psychological power of self-control and group control—his moral power.

The advent of the H-bomb and other major advances in instruments of mass destruction have given added weight to Mr. Stimson's appraisal of more than a decade ago. As we have noted, the eminent physicist Professor Henry De Wolf Smyth observed in his report, entitled *Atomic Energy for Military Purposes*, that the development of the atom bomb "raises many questions that must be answered in the near future." "These questions," he pointed out, "are not technical questions ; they are political and social questions, and the answers given to them many affect all mankind for generations." Perhaps the questions are even more truly moral and religious. Not long after the appearance of the Smyth Report the wise elder statesman Bernard M. Baruch, first American representative on the Atomic Energy Commission of the United Nations, declared : "Science has taught us how to put the atom to work. But to make it work for good instead of for evil lies in the domain dealing with the principles of human duty. We are now facing a problem more of ethics than of physics."

Speculations of this kind suggest that while man's political and social behavior has not yet changed fundamentally in response to the great technological changes, thinking people everywhere are very much concerned with survival and human betterment in the atomic age. This fact has given rise to a mental conditioning which has produced an even greater flowering than before of individual and social neuroses and gloomy prophecies. In the twentieth century the belief in the doctrine of inevitable progress, which was strongly held in many places in the nineteenth century — especially in the United States of America, with her expanding frontiers and her growing wealth — has received many shocks. From Oswald Spengler to T. S. Eliot, philosophers and literary men have been making nasty remarks about "progress." Several years before the atomic age opened, Eliot wrote in *The Rock* :

The endless cycle of idea and action
Endless invention, endless experiment,
Brings knowledge of motion, but not of stillness ;

Knowledge of speech, but not of silence.....
 All our knowledge brings us nearer to our ignorance,
 All our ignorance brings us nearer to death.....
 Where is the wisdom we have lost in knowledge?
 Where is the knowledge we have lost in information? ²⁴

One does not have to share Eliot's pessimism to raise the same basic queries. In the atomic age these may become questions of survival. What evidence can be adduced to suggest that new approaches are being developed or even sought in a serious and realistic fashion? Has the pattern of international relations responded to the new imperatives?

There is now, as there was yesterday, an abundance of "solutions" for the world's problems. What distinguishes today's proposals from those of yesterday is not their substance; it is in the circumstances under which they are made. In short, the difference is the atom. Statesmen, scientists, and students of international relations now often write and speak with oppressive anxiety, with the conviction that, after many false alarms, mankind is now really, unequivocally, and positively "at the crossroads." Consider the statement drawn up by seven atomic scientists in July, 1955: "Here, then, is the problem which we present to you, stark and dreadful, and inescapable: shall we put an end to the human race; or shall mankind renounce war?" Or President Eisenhower's milder but equally meaningful words: "It seems clear that there is no longer any alternative to peace." Or the implications in the title of a little book of a few years ago — *One World or None*. Or the pages of the *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, which are filled with prophecies of the doom that will be ours if we fail to accept world government. Expressions of sentiments of this kind could be added almost without end.

One notable product of the despair resulting from a sober analysis of present trends and perils, and particularly of the demands for the abolition of war and for the establishment of world government, is the emphasis on the role of faith and of religion in the present crisis. In many respects this "return to religion" is wholesome and desirable, but it is dangerous and escapist if it is nothing more than a gesture of despair and if it is used as a substitute for constructive action. "The horror of this monstrous balance of potential annihilation led many of the U.S. atomic scientists who knew its implications from the beginning to seek some spiritual, almost mystical remedy. Unhappily they sought something that did not yet exist and in their frantic search almost destroyed the balance." ²⁵

Many political reporters, presumably among the most sophisticated and realistic observers of the contemporary scene, are so disturbed by the magnitude of the problems facing mankind, and by the limited imagination and wisdom displayed in attempting to deal with them, that they too fall back despairingly upon religion. They do so seemingly without

²⁴ T. S. Eliot, choruses from *The Rock*, in *The Complete Poems and Plays 1909-1950* (Harcourt, Brace and Faber and Faber, 1952), p. 96.

²⁵ Shepley and Blair, p. 231.

understanding just what they mean by religion or how it can lead us through the present crisis. A recent example of this type of thinking may be found in a thought-provoking book by Marquis Childs, one of the ablest and most experienced of American columnists and reporters.²⁶ Appalled by "the awful complexity of the times in which we live," and observing "how tossed and troubled, how clutched at random from the burning, are the straws that decide our destiny," Mr. Childs, as a sympathetic fellow-correspondent wrote in a review of the book, "shifts the burdens from the conference table to the altar."²⁷

POLICY FOR THE ATOMIC AGE : SPECIFIC PROPOSALS

Many proposals have been advanced in support of a particular approach to a general policy for the atomic age. Seven of these have achieved some popularity. They may be listed as follows : (1) the abolition of war ; (2) the establishment of some form of world government ; (3) general disarmament ; (4) the establishment of effective controls for atomic energy ; (5) an agreement of major powers not to use atomic weapons ; (6) an agreement of states possessing atomic energy production facilities to terminate all experiments with weapons of mass destruction ; and (7) an agreement by the United States and the Soviet Union to scrap all existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons.

The first three of these proposals are general in nature, whereas the remaining four relate specifically to atomic weapons. Proposals for the abolition of war, for world government, and for general disarmament have been made again and again. Since 1946 the United Nations, chiefly through its Atomic Energy Commission and later its Disarmament Commission, has been trying to secure agreement on plans for the international control of atomic energy — the fourth of the proposals. These efforts are analyzed in some detail elsewhere in this volume.²⁸ The last three proposals, more limited in nature, call for some attention.

Proponents of an agreement to ban the H-bomb argue that, as a result of formal agreement and informal understandings, poison gas, though it was manufactured in quantity and in more and more deadly forms, was not used to any extent during World War II, and that there seems to be a good prospect that bacteriological warfare can be averted in the same way. Why, then, cannot nuclear weapons be so regarded or rather disregarded?

The answer to this question is painfully obvious. There may be some arguments in favor of obtaining a clear pledge by the atomic powers that they will never use the fearful weapons in their possessions, but this pledge may be of little value in the event of a global war. It may, in fact,

²⁶ *The Ragged Edge : The Diary of a Crisis* (Doubleday, 1955).

²⁷ Herbert L. Matthews in the *New York Times Book Review*, Oct. 23, 1955, p. 41.

²⁸ See Chapter 13.

embarrass and handicap peace-loving nations that wish to live up to their commitment at a time when their survival is threatened by an enemy who has already violated a similar commitment. The Einstein-Russell statement of July, 1955, emphasized the illusory nature of this "solution." "Whatever agreements not to use H-bombs had been reached in time of peace," the statement read, "they would no longer be considered binding in time of war, and both sides would set to work to manufacture H-bombs as soon as war broke out, for, if one side manufactured the bombs and the other did not, the side that manufactured them would inevitably be victorious."²⁹ In time of war all promises, vows, and commitments give way to the urge to national survival.

During the H-bomb tests at Bikini in March, 1954, some Japanese fishermen within the range of the fall-out following the explosion suffered grave injury. This misadventure led to an outburst of anti-American feeling in Japan and became an international incident. It also led to renewed demands from many parts of the world, and most strongly from India, that further experiments of the kind be suspended pending an international agreement on disarmament. Support for this demand came from those concerned with the moral and political issues involved, and from those who feared that the experimental explosion of increasingly powerful atomic weapons would result in huge casualties. Speculation about the radiation and other effects of bigger and better blasts ran the gamut from confidence in scientific controls to science-fiction pictorial representations of the earth in fragments. A combination of risks too great to take and growing pressure from many quarters may curtail future tests, but it seems certain that, in the absence of an effective system of international control of nuclear weapons, research and experimentation will go on.

A variation of these two approaches calls not only for agreements to refrain from using nuclear weapons and from making further tests but also for the destruction of all existing stockpiles. Some of its supporters urge the United States to take the initiative in this gesture of faith, regardless of the action of the Soviet Union. A leading spokesman for this point of view, C. Rajagopalachari, veteran leader in India's struggle for independence and a former Governor General of independent India, has taken this position. In a letter to the *New York Times*, dated December 4, 1954,³⁰ he argued that "it is possible yet to save mankind.....through tremendous courage — courage against one's own fear.....Salvation consists in unilateral action, in courage and in the fundamental faith that the good ultimately triumphs." Having laid down this philosophical premise, Rajagopalachari issued a call: "Let each not wait for the other but unilaterally let us throw all atom bombs in the deep Antarctic and begin a new world free from fear." The United States — "she who committed the mistake first" — should lead the way. "She is morally big enough to do it..... If America does it, the whole world will rally round her as men

²⁹ For the text of this statement, see the *New York Times*, July 10, 1955.

³⁰ Published in the *Times* on Dec. 26, 1954.

rally round a hero or a god." And what would the Soviet Union do if the United States by this act of faith gave her virtual monopoly of nuclear weapons? Rajagopalachari was ready with his answer : "It would be impossible for the party that lags to use this dreadful weapon thereafter." Apparently this would be impossible because of "the secret power of the good."

Some of the proposals for meeting the present crisis would require profound changes in international relationships, while others would deal more specifically with vital areas of danger. While some appear to hold no promise of effectiveness, others, however plausible they may be, seem unattainable in anything like the foreseeable future. Where, then, does this leave us? Surely, short of efforts to attain the unattainable, or of reliance on faith and religion and the power of good, something can be done to deal with the conditions which underlie present anxieties and to enable nations to live together without atomic war while on the "plateau of suspense." This will have to be more than a "new look" in Soviet foreign policy and more than bold proposals by the friends of peace. In part men must learn to live with their problems, even with those created by the advent of the nuclear era. But new measures will have to reinforce the more conventional approaches, and in fact are already doing so. These may be less dramatic than the proposals we have been examining, but some of them are even now being tested and implemented as they prove to be feasible. In the opinion of Quincy Wright, "relative security must be sought in political processes for changing opinions and conciliating differences." With regard to the relations between the two giants of the present age, a better perspective can be achieved. Wright sees grounds for hope in "peaceful means of education, discussion, and negotiation for modifying the opinions and intentions of both Russians and Americans so that they will better relate their needs to the changing conditions of the world."³¹ We shall return in the following chapter to the subject of a path to the future.

PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY

On August 6, 1955, ten years to the day after the bombing of Hiroshima, a United Nations-sponsored International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy opened in Geneva. For two weeks delegates and observers from seventy-two nations, including the Soviet Union and other Communist states, exchanged views on the implications and possibilities of atomic power. For a decade the emphasis had been upon using that power to develop more powerful weapons of destruction, but at Geneva it was upon using the new source of energy for human betterment. There could be no question of the potential significance of the conference, especially since scientists from the "iron curtain" countries were also there. It

³¹ Wright, pp. 330-331.

"could be history's most portentous gathering," declared C. L. Sulzberger of the *New York Times*. "We are on the verge of unmapped revolutions. Over unending centuries, sources of power have been limited and costly Now energy is about to become almost limitless and free."³² His colleague William L. Laurence, science editor of the *Times*, agreed with this interpretation :


If the hopes of the world on the outcome of this conference are realized, it will herald the opening of what is potentially the greatest era in the striving of man to create a better world for himself and his descendants ... Nuclear energy promises to restore the balance between the "have" and "have not" nations of the world by providing an abundant, virtually limitless source of energy, enough to raise the standard of living of every nation in the world to heights undreamed of. In addition, nuclear energy also offers the greatest promise in history to increase greatly the world's food supply, to prolong life, to conquer disease, and, in general, to create a better life for the world's millions everywhere. All this is not a mere dream of a present-day Jules Verne. The atomic revolution is here, scientifically and technologically... Unlike coal and oil, which are expected to be exhausted in less than a century, nuclear fuels, uranium and thorium, are expected to last thousands of years. And scientists are confident that within a decade or so they will learn how to use the lighter elements, such as "heavy hydrogen" and lithium, now used in the hydrogen bomb, as vast sources of controlled power. When this secret has been mastered—and progress in this direction is already being made—man will have fuels enough to last him for as long as the sun itself will keep life going on this planet.³³

The first International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy had been made possible not only by great advances in atomic research but also by certain developments in the political realm. The Geneva Conference could not have been held on the same scale and with the same frankness if the "new look" had not produced a greater degree of cooperation on the part of the Soviet Union, and if the earlier "summit" conference had not helped to clear the atmosphere for meetings on the nonpolitical and scientific level. Another conference of the same magnitude was planned within three years, and meetings on special aspects of the general subject of atomic power for peaceful uses are being held with increasing frequency.

In the meantime, research continues and significant discoveries are being made. Some of these pertain to fundamental research — for example, the discovery in October, 1955, of a new atomic particle, the antiproton, created from energy generated in the world's most powerful atom-smasher, the bevatron, in Berkeley, California. Other discoveries relate to applications of basic knowledge — for example, nuclear reactors which produce

³² Dispatch from Geneva, dated Aug. 7, 1955 ; in the *New York Times*, Aug. 8, 1955.

³³ Dispatch from Geneva, dated Aug. 6, 1955 ; in the *New York Times*, Aug. 7, 1955.



Diario las Americas

¡ Parece Mentira Que Sean Hermanos!

great quantities of heat, electricity, and radioactive substances, and atomic-powered submarines. "Man-made radioactive elements.....open virtually limitless vistas as the most powerful agents for the treatment of disease, and a 'searchlight' into the living labyrinth of many of nature's most vital processes."³⁴

In December, 1953, in an address to the General Assembly of the United Nations, President Eisenhower had advanced a proposal for the pooling of atomic resources, under the aegis of the UN, for peaceful purposes. This atoms-for-peace proposal has been widely discussed in the United Nations and throughout the world. In addition to the Geneva meeting, its fruits to date have been the encouragement of research in many countries and the sharing of the results; and the establishment of an international atomic agency. Although it has less authority and scope than the United States proposed for it, the new agency is playing a central role in serving as an international clearinghouse for nuclear materials for peaceful uses and for information on significant trends and developments in the field of atomic

³⁴ William L. Laurence, dispatch from Geneva, dated Aug. 6, 1955 ; in the *New York Times*, Aug. 7, 1955.



Alexander in *The Philadelphia Bulletin*

"Pleas for Adoption"

research and on their possible applications in such fields as agriculture, industry, and medicine. Eighty-four countries are associated with the agency. The leading atomic powers and the leading uranium producers have semipermanent membership on the board of governors.

The emphasis on the use of atomic energy for constructive purposes is helping to right the imbalance that existed during the first decade of the atomic age, which, born in wartime, tended to give priority to the development of nuclear weapons. Even the research in peace time uses for atomic energy opens up new dangers, for the nuclear materials which are made available for human welfare can rather easily be used for nonpeaceful purposes as well. In discussing the progress of the atoms-for-peace program in the United Nations, Thomas J. Hamilton noted :

Ironically, the very success of the atoms-for-peace program will make it next to impossible to prohibit atomic bombs. Apart from the fact that

no system of inspection could detect the large existing stockpiles of nuclear material, there is a further complication : plutonium, which makes just as destructive a bomb as U-235, is a by-product of the atomic reactors that will be scattered around the world.³⁵

Exciting as are the prospects of harnessing the atom for peaceful purposes, an even more limitless source of energy may soon be available. This is solar energy, "our most potent natural resource." "On a single day the land areas of the temperate and tropical zones are flooded with more energy from the sun than the human race has utilized in the form of fuel, falling water and muscle since it came out of the trees over a million years ago. The whole amount of coal, petroleum and natural gas left in the earth is the energy-equivalent of only 100 days of sunshine. In fact there is more energy in the small fraction of radiation received from the sun than in all the uranium in the world."³⁶ Obviously the solar age is far in the future. Very little attention is being given to research in solar energy, and thus far attempts to utilize this potentially tremendous source of energy have not produced notable results. "But the basic conceptions are in our grasp and without much doubt can be brought to realization."³⁷

WISDOM OUT OF EXTREMITY ?

Within one post-Hiroshima decade, wrote C. L. Sulzberger in 1955, "the entire world power relationship has altered."³⁸ The failure to achieve satisfactory peace settlements with the major defeated nations, the growing split between the Communist and non-Communist worlds, the rise of sensitive new nations afflicted with bitter memories and unstable economies and governments, the rise of the pressures of nationalism and of "the revolution of rising expectations," and other developments created more than enough crucial issues and problems to test the capacities of statesmen and institutions. The advent of the nuclear age made the era of transition infinitely more trying, for unprecedented power had emerged at a time of unprecedented political, moral, and spiritual crisis. It seemed to be difficult, as Bertrand Russell wrote a few years ago, "to persuade mankind to acquiesce in its own survival."

The atomic age has burst suddenly upon the world, and its implications cannot be fully assessed for many decades. Sir Winston Churchill stated in March, 1955, that with the appearance of the hydrogen bomb "the entire foundation of human affairs was revolutionized and mankind placed in a situation both measureless and laden with doom." Two months later Aneurin Bevan, not Churchill's greatest admirer, flatly declared : "The

³⁵ "U. N. Debates Atom's Growing Role," *New York Times*, Oct. 23, 1955, p. E3.

³⁶ Waldemar Kaempffert in the *New York Times*, Nov. 6, 1955, p. E9.

³⁷ Farrington Daniels, "A Limitless Resource : Solar Energy," *New York Times Magazine*, March 18, 1956, p. 47.

³⁸ Dispatch from Paris, June 19, 1955 ; in the *New York Times*, June 20, 1955.

hydrogen bomb has completely revolutionized international relationships." It would be more accurate to say that the hydrogen bomb has revolutionized the conditions under which international relations must henceforth be carried on, but that it has not yet revolutionized international relationships. In due time — unless disaster wins the race — the fundamental changes in technology will lead to equally fundamental changes in political and social institutions and in international relations. But so far in the atomic age the state system, which has been around for a long time, is still the dominant pattern of international relations, and many pre-atomic problems are being dealt with — or are not being dealt with — in the old pre-atomic ways. Political leaders, foreign ministers, and diplomats carry on pretty much as usual. They may move around more rapidly, and they may pay more attention to popular pressures and to scientific developments, but their methods and, in many cases, their mental orientation, have not changed a great deal.

In our study of international relations we must pay particular attention to existing practices and approaches, but we must never forget the vast changes in the world scene and in the "human situation" resulting from the startling developments in the nuclear field. In the words of the late Senator Brien McMahon, who labored mightily to make his fellow-Americans aware of the full implications of the atomic age : "It is our solemn obligation, I think, to lift our eyes above the lesser problems that seem to monopolize our time and to discuss and act upon what, by any standard, is the supreme problem before our country and the world."

Despite the persistence of traditional procedures and attitudes in high places, one of the encouraging notes of the present day is the growing awareness of the significance of the changes that are occurring, and a growing earnestness in the search for policies and outlooks which will be practical and adequate in the atomic age. On the other hand, the magnitude of present dangers has encouraged pessimism and cynicism ; it has induced in some a state of resignation and in others a feeling of panic ; it has led nations to give priority to measures of national security and defense at the expense of positive contributions to the improvement of living standards throughout the world and to human relations ; it has aggravated ideological and other basic differences between nations, and has made real accommodation and real improvement in the international atmosphere difficult. And the uninvited guest present at all deliberations is the unseen but powerful atom. It may yet, indeed, "revolutionize international relationships." Perhaps the growing recognition of both the promise and the danger will light the way out of the present darkness. In the same article in which he voiced the lament that "truly our imagination is not in step with our era," Paul-Henri Spaak wrote in a more hopeful vein :

' Around the atomic bomb is being built a whole strategy, a whole policy; perhaps even, in outline, a philosophy. Out of our very extremity may come wisdom, out of the frightening means of destruction may come

the means of assuring peace. What men in the past have sought to make prevail by persuasion, by appealing to humane feelings, may in the end be achieved because the insensate machine inexorably imposes it. Technical progress may indirectly produce moral and social progress. If so, what an extraordinarily crooked road it would have been that led toward the good !³⁹

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³⁹ Spaak, p. 358.

Tomorrow : The Same.....25

World Still ?

"Mankind at the Crossroads." "Can Civilization Survive?" "One World or None?" These are some of the ominous phrases now used to shock men into a consciousness of tremendous stakes in the issues of international politics. Other generations too have felt the same delicate balance of destiny and doom. Tom Paine wrote with such a feeling in the dark hours of the American Revolution ; Washington spoke of self-government as an experiment "perhaps finally entrusted to the hands of the American people" ; English journals were filled with rim-of-the-abyss sentiments when only the Royal Navy stood between Napoleon and conquest of Britain ; and Lincoln declared at Gettysburg that the Civil War was being fought that "government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth."

But because the peoples of the earth — or some of them — have had the same desperate sense of urgency before does not establish that they were always mistaken, that they were always the deluded victims of alarmist propaganda. Generally the worst catastrophes have been averted ; but survival has been costly, and the price of freedom has gone over higher. What we are engaged in today is no less than a war for freedom — freedom from oppression and bloodshed, freedom from fear and want, freedom for the mind and the spirit of man. It is a never-ending struggle, calling for "eternal vigilance," and the odds against success continue to be heavy.

"The majority of men," observed Henry David Thoreau, "Lead lives of quiet desperation." At the present time the unhappy conditions of the world in which we live add to the usual frustrations and failures that complicate and test the life of every person. Socially and politically, we are haunted by a sense of fear, of failure, and of inadequacy. "What we are afraid of," says Walter Lippmann, "is that we may not be up to it all." Our failure has been particularly marked and serious in dealing with the

problem of war. As Lippmann states : "In this century one war has led to another. We have never been unable to prevent the war that was coming. Never were we properly prepared for war when we had to fight. And never have we known how to settle the war when we were winning."¹ In the atomic age the consequences of continued failure are so appalling that a new sense of peril and foreboding has gripped mankind. The forces of unreason and of destruction seem to be winning out over the rational and constructive forces. One can understand, and perhaps share, the following gloomy reflections of a veteran observer of the world scene, Harold Isaacs :

To try to think reasonably about the present state of the world is to assume that reason has something to do with the case. But every "reasonable" approach soon halts before a stone wall of unreasonable fact. We are caught in a tangle of cause and circumstance that is sweeping us toward everything that nobody wants. For ours is the time of the triumph of the irrational. It is difficult to wander anywhere on the face of the earth without being assailed by a sense of being in a madhouse where delusions govern amid hopeless and needless suffering, where myopia and fear have obscured the most elementary demands of true self-interest.....everything that is done or that happens, including our own acts, conspires against us. Such is the gross contradiction, the demantia of our time, a mighty un-hinging of our social faculties. It results from our inability to use our knowledge and resources to create a society that will work. ²

Technological developments, which have opened up new vistas of human progress, have also added to "the world-wide insecurity which is the fate of modern man." The consequences of this dilemma are well summarized by Reinhold Niebuhr :

Our problem is that technics have established a rudimentary world community but have not integrated it organically, morally or politically. They have created a community of mutual dependence, but not one of mutual trust and respect. Without this higher integration, advancing technics tend to sharpen economic rivalries within a general framework of economic interdependence ; they change the ocean barriers of yesterday into the battle-grounds of today ; and they increase the deadly efficacy of the instruments of war so that vicious circles of mutual fear may end in atomic conflicts and mutual destruction. To these perplexities an ideological conflict has been added, which divides the world into hostile camps.³

Just why is mankind again at the old familiar crossroads? What is the enemy that must be defeated before man can regain hope for that "better world"? Is the answer in political or politico-economic terms, such as Ag-

¹ From Mr. Lippmann's column in the *Philadelphia Inquirer*, Dec. 18, 1951.

² *No Peace for Asia* (Macmillan, 1947), p. 266. Used by permission of The Macmillan Company.

³ "The Illusion of World Government," *Foreign Affairs*, XXVII (April, 1949), 379.

gression, Capitalism, Communism, the National State, or Sovereignty? Or is it in social terms, as Illiteracy, Overpopulation, Poverty, or Racial Discrimination? Or is it in more personal terms, as Corruption, Greed, Immorality, Irreligion, or just plain Human Nature? Or is it a composite of many or all of these?

While all the woes that afflict men everywhere may affect the relations of states, we must here confine ourselves to a brief examination of the major obstacles to international harmony and to an appraisal of the prospects for a larger measure of international good-will and cooperation.

It is often said that the transcendent fact in world politics today is bipolarity — the hostility between the mighty Soviet Union with its satellite and allied states and the non-Communist states, led by the United States and comprising most of the world's democracies, plus a few states hardly entitled to that distinction. Yet the vital issue is the capacity of men to devise a regime of peace that also carries with it some assurance of security and well-being. Each generation poses the issue anew — each in its own set of concrete terms. If we may believe the lessons of history, once the present impasse has been resolved we shall pass on to new names and new threats of aggression. It is more sensible to ask if the repetition will ever cease than to ask if the present threat will be the last. We know that there is seldom finality in history.

In this concluding chapter we shall essay five very broad and very difficult tasks. First, we shall review some of the problems that beset the international community and impair or destroy good relations among states ; second, we shall see if we can find some of the reasons why these problems arise and persist ; third, we shall evaluate three general approaches to peace ; fourth, we shall look for possible changes that could affect the pattern of future international relations ; and, finally, we shall attempt a realistic preview of the years immediately ahead.

PROBLEMS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

For purposes of the present discussion, we shall list these problems under seven heads : (1) war ; (2) nationalism ; (3) sovereignty ; (4) overpopulation ; (5) economic nationalism ; (6) racial discrimination ; and (7) ideological universalism. Admittedly this listing is selective and more or less arbitrary ; the problems are so numerous and so interrelated that they might be presented in almost any number and in many different ways.

1. War. As we have already analyzed war in some detail in the chapter entitled "War as an Instrument of National Policy," we need only to make certain observations here to put war in its proper relationship to other international problems. First, war is a manifestation of some underlying disorder ; it is a symptom rather than the disease itself. This is more particularly true of recent times than of earlier days. Mechanization has made war too horrible and too costly to be undertaken for light and transient

reasons, and the development of weapons of mass destruction has made it almost as suicidal for the "victors" as for the vanquished. Other factors, too, have influenced the change : for example, the growth of representative government, the development of something akin to world public opinion, and the increasing economic interdependence of states. Second, it must be understood that war is not the worst of all tragedies. Even states that fight defensive wars always do so out of choice ; they choose war because the alternatives appear worse—because war with all its horrors is normally preferred to enslavement or extermination. The significance of this is that the abolition of war might in some instances amount to the solemn pronouncement and affirmation of an even more ghastly sentence.

Third, under present circumstances the outlawry of war is neither politically feasible nor ethically sound. To date our state system has viewed the state as the guardian of the security and welfare of its people-- the state and nothing else. The discharge of its enormous responsibilities has required that the state possess authority to utilize power-- all of its power, if need be. To do what is expected and demanded of it, it must be allowed the means. Otherwise, it would itself disappear in an orgy of anarchy and violence. The survival of states has been possible only because their authority and power have measured up to their responsibilities. Perhaps the time has passed when the individual state *should* carry the ultimate burden of the guardianship of its people ; perhaps the state system itself should long since have given way to something better. But the point made here is that as long as this system exists the separate states must have the authority to do the job required of them. International law recognizes the right of self-defense ; it has never presumed to deny the legality of defensive war. Nor can ethics condemn recourse to war when the alternative would amount to total capitulation to the rule that "might makes right."

The outlawry of aggressive war is, of course, another matter. Such efforts may be ethically sound, but it does not follow that they are politically feasible. As far as words and resolutions can make them so, this has already been done. The Covenant of the League of Nations, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and the Charter of the United Nations are but the most notable and general of efforts to that end. The realization appears to be dawning that aggressive war cannot be prevented by making it dishonorable—that this can be done only by making it manifestly unprofitable. The growing consciousness of that truth may be the salvation of our world.

2. Nationalism. Without repeating the more detailed analysis of nationalism in our first chapter, we may venture a number of observations to emphasize the importance of nationalism in the problems of the international community. First, nationalism has positive values of great importance. In addition to its familiar role in the liberation of nations, it has often provided the motivation for unified action by the people of a state toward praiseworthy objectives. It has been a significant force in promoting representative government. In brief, one might say that, by supplementing compulsion, self-interest, moral obligation, religious duty, and

other forces, nationalism has added enormously to the constructive potentialities of modern states.

Second, it must be admitted that nationalism has often gone berserk, producing excesses in both domestic and foreign policies. On the home front, excessive nationalism may lead to ill-advised economic practices, militarism, intolerance, repression, censorship, and oppressive taxation. Civil liberties and cultural freedom may be straitjacketed in the name of national unity. On the international front, nationalism that has run riot has repeatedly eventuated in hatreds, economic strife, expansionism, imperialism, aggression, and long and bloody wars. A too-exuberant nationalism, laying claim to an exalted destiny, clashes head-on with other too-exuberant nationalisms or with the security considerations of peace-minded states. Not without reason, it has often been damned as the foremost war-maker of the past few centuries.

Third, one must recognize and accept the indisputable fact that nationalism, whatever its virtues and its viciousness, is so deeply implanted in the minds of men that it is a major force to be reckoned with in all our hopes and blueprints for a more perfect world. It is a living, emphatic reality, whether in ancient Britain or newborn Israel, in democratic France or Fascist Spain, in the wealthy United States or impoverished Haiti, in huge Canada or tiny El Salvador, in progressive Uruguay or primitive Paraguay, in populous China or unpopulous Australia, in Protestant Germany, Catholic Italy, Hindu India, or Islamic Egypt. Good or bad, it will not quietly dissolve before the mutterings of theorists or the pontifical resolutions of international conferences. On the contrary, it will persist through the foreseeable future; sentiment and tradition will try to sustain it even should it cease to be the priceless tool that it now is for the implementation of national policy.

Finally, nationalism has heretofore performed vital functions, and it neither can nor should be obliterated until the functions are no longer needed, or until some better mechanism has been devised to carry out the functions that are still deemed essential. Nationalism gives the state unity and effectiveness; it contributes the spiritual quality which makes the state a going concern. Without it the state becomes weak and decadent, a potential victim to more vigorous states. But whereas a sensible nationalism is indispensable to the state system — and at present we have no other system — an aggressive nationalism may be madness loose in the world. The immediate task is to make aggressive nationalism patently disastrous to the states which are likely to indulge in it, not to attempt to extirpate nationalism root and branch. In the fullness of time some more powerful force may arise to assume its functions. Pending that day, nationalism must figure in all our calculations.

3. Sovereignty. Sovereignty sets up barriers to international action and cooperation. Pleading their sovereignty or taking refuge behind it without using the term, states are technically justified in refusing assent to common action. The United Nations Charter, like conventional international

law, presupposes that states may be expected to assume responsibilities without their express assent but that they cannot be compelled to undertake any positive act of collaboration with other states. Consequently, sovereignty is often pointed to as the great impediment to helpful international action.

Another important disservice of sovereignty is its tendency to freeze the status quo. Called into play by nationalism, it provides the legal justification for the refusal to right obvious wrongs. In the world of sovereign states there is always the danger that only by force can states be brought to effect the adjustments which ever-changing conditions of life seem to make desirable for the greater good. In short, the nation-state system, based on the principle of sovereignty, tends to develop a rigidity that often leads to tensions, at times to violence, and too frequently to full-scale war.

In all fairness, however, sovereignty must be appraised with the realism that we applied to nationalism. Despite all the obstructionism that provincial minds can squeeze from it, sovereignty, like nationalism, will and should remain a bulwark of the state until such time as the protective functions of the state are in fact as well as in theory assumed by a supranational organization or organizations.

4. Overpopulation. What we here call the problem of overpopulation is regarded by some persons in another light. They may say that the difficulty is not too many people but too little food ; or that the world's food-producing capacity is adequate to sustain several times its present population, and therefore that the problem is not the social one of overpopulation but the technical one of production and transportation, the political one of restraints on trade and migration, and the economic one of distribution and land tenure.

Overpopulation may affect international relations in a number of ways. Its most direct and obvious effect is to provide a semblance of validity for expansionism, as it did with Germany and Japan in the 1930's. But it may also suggest a condition of dependence on other states, and it usually carries with it low standards of health and sanitation, high illiteracy, and absence of effective democracy. The assumption that the standards of living of undernourished peoples must be raised substantially if people anywhere are to eat well in peace underlies the Technical Assistance Program of the United Nations and the Point Four Program of the United States.

Overpopulation is, of course, most pressing in Asia. There the phenomenal rate of increase threatens permanently to outrun the increase in the production of food or exchangeable equivalents. Emigration offers no hopeful solution. These people cannot go anywhere in large numbers, and they could be assimilated only very slowly even if the utmost effort were made. Even physically the job would be forbidding : a dozen *Queen Elizabeths*, plying constantly between India and Australia, could no more than dent the annual absolute increase in India's population.

The problem of overpopulation is one of the most serious and most alarming of all the many problems that beset the world today. Moreover, it seems to be getting worse instead of better. In considering it there are ample grounds for the deepest pessimism, but there are also grounds for a tempered optimism. A prominent sociologist has suggested this possibility :

Statistical indices of nearly all sorts indicate that today throughout most of the world cultural development is going ahead faster than population growth. This suggests that the Asiatic peoples, and others as well, will acquire modern civilization in time to check their fertility and thus achieve an efficient demographic balance, instead of multiplying to the point where such acquisition would be impossible and a stationary but wasteful situation would be made permanent.⁴

An equally prominent economist has stated :

We may conclude with respect to densely populated underdeveloped areas that if workers can be released from agricultural production by measures which raise their productivity, and if suitable new occupations for their employment can be provided, there is at least a strong possibility that the gains of increased productivity and higher incomes will not be nullified by an explosive growth of population.⁵

Since overpopulation is a relative condition, not to be determined by a count of mouths to feed or even by a comparison of local food requirements, the conclusion seems warranted that many underdeveloped areas can be tutored or developed into self-support on a respectable level. If they cannot meet their food needs with home production, perhaps they can produce the economic equivalents in copper, nitrates, coffee, tin, oil, or something else. Perhaps, too, outside assistance can substantially increase domestic food production and at the same time promote industrialization, which seems always to reduce the birth rate in the long run. One authority who has studied the population problems of all continents has reached the following conclusion regarding birth control for the densely populated areas of Asia :

It is the solution ; but to attempt to introduce it first would be to reverse the whole course of development through which the rest of the world has gone in its movement toward fertility control. Birth-control techniques are simply means to the end of family limitation ; the desire to limit families depends upon revolutionary changes in cultures as they shift from an agrarian to an industrial way of life. The entire set of life conditions which contribute to high mortality and high fertility must alter before the vital

⁴ Kingsley Davis, "The World Demographic Transition," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, CCXXXVII (Jan., 1945), 10.

⁵ P. T. Ellsworth, *The International Economy : Its Structure and Operation* (Macmillan, 1950), p. 804. Used by permission of The Macmillan Company.

revolution can come. For most of the world this means that ways must be found to increase agricultural production, to introduce and develop industries, to promote trade, to broaden horizons through wider education and the promotion of literacy, to improve health facilities and individual welfare services, to insure political stability and leadership. In short, through balanced modernization of all the world's backward areas a solution to problems of overpopulation may be reached.⁶

These sober judgments offer grounds for hope, but they also suggest the magnitude of the task of dealing with the problem of overpopulation. One of the remedies commonly proposed is that of birth control ; but this is far easier to prescribe than to promote, for it meets the formidable obstacles of religious and moral injunctions, illiteracy, and poverty. Yet some areas cannot continue forever to engage in random procreation while unable to provide a decent or even a minimal living for their present populations. Nor can their people be sacrificed to Malthusian economics and left to tender their surplus to starvation, disease, and war. How can the long period which must elapse before tolerable conditions of life exist in most of the world be bridged over without some gigantic explosion, such as war or anarchy or both ? It is a far cry from the modest beginnings that are represented by the technical assistance programs of the United States, the Commonwealth countries, and the United Nations to the "balanced modernization of all the world's backward areas."

Another aspect of the problem of overpopulation must be mentioned. In countries of the greatest density of population, even when the population has been large, the presence of a backward economy has often prevented the development of significant national power. This suggests the conclusion that a country too poor to build factories, railroads, and the like cannot mount a major military operation. Certainly the great offenders of recent times have not been the nations of starving masses. It does not necessarily follow that underdeveloped countries have not caused and cannot cause great wars. Historically, they have often furnished the prizes — land, trade concessions, mineral rights, etc. — for which the powerful states have fought each other. Today, especially in Asia, they offer fertile areas where communism may move in to gain manpower and natural resources, perhaps to promote the economic potential and enlist it in the cause of world revolution. Overpopulation and wretched standards of living everywhere have become linked to the national interest of every state, Communist or non-Communist.

5. Economic Nationalism. We have already discussed economic nationalism in some detail in Chapter 19. It is one manifestation or expression of nationalism, for it pertains to a state's policies when they are designed to promote the economic well-being of that state without concern for the welfare of other states. From the over-all point of view, such a policy

⁶ Stephen W. Reed in Ralph Linton, ed., *Most of the World* (Columbia University Press, 1949), pp. 152-153.

has four main weaknesses. In the first place, it often means waste and higher prices, for artificial trade barriers may nullify the economies of more efficient production elsewhere. Second, if it calls for a favorable balance of trade it probably weakens other states and injures the welfare of their nationals. Third, through the discriminations that it imposes it engenders resentment and all sorts of international tensions. Fourth, it probably means the development of the war-making potential of the state pursuing such a policy.

For the practicing state, economic nationalism offers two principal gains : it brings more profit to protected industries and higher wages to workers in those industries, and it may add to the state's military capacity through the promotion of self-sufficiency. On the other hand, the curtailment of imports may mean an inadequate stockpiling of essential commodities that have to be imported. Devotion to the idea of a favorable balance of trade may also mean the early depletion or exhaustion of natural resources.

Much has been written in behalf of economic internationalism, and, indeed, it seems to be a prerequisite of a peaceful world. It must be recognized, however, that the road to such a state of affairs is strewn with formidable obstacles. These will not disappear before the sound reasoning of internationally-minded economists. Even when it is granted that a free or relatively free world economy would operate to the advantage of all states, it does not follow that it would profit all groups within every state. Furthermore, it may be difficult to convince the people of a state that a favorable balance of trade is undesirable, even when the balance is written off the books. As long as the present American prosperity endures, it is doubtful if the American taxpayers will protest very strongly against gifts to foreign states of five billion dollars a year — actually only a trifle more than one per cent of the national income. In other words, it may not be demonstrable to the average person that American tariffs do not pay. Finally, the defenders of economic nationalism can argue with some justice that trying to export a high standard of living is a kind of "operation rat hole"— that more food for some countries would simply mean a still larger number of people on the same old starvation diet — that population controls are necessary before the standard of living can rise.

Economic nationalism is by no means the whole of the world's economic problem. Some states are poor in resources, and no amount of economic internationalism can offer substantial relief. Other states desperately need technical assistance and investment capital. Now that peoples everywhere have become more articulate and more assertive, no one can sensibly expect peace in the future as long as poverty — and disease and illiteracy— afflict hundreds of millions of human beings. If it seems unduly optimistic to assume that people who are decently fed and cared for are lovers of peace, we can at least have the assurance that constructive action toward the alleviation of poverty is progress toward the solution of one of the world's most harassing problems.

6. Racial Discrimination. We have repeatedly pointed out that a great

deal of the resentment of the peoples of the East against the peoples of the West is to be explained by what is called "racial discrimination". Many observers have insisted that what galls Asians most is not that Westerners have full stomachs, bathtubs, and skyscrapers, but that they retard themselves as superior kinds of beings. Asians have become acutely aware of the "superiority" of Western man through many practices which have marked them as social inferiors and their countries as "backward states" : trade restrictions, immigration controls, quota systems, imperialism, treaty ports, extraterritoriality, colonialism, military intimidation, naturalization, discriminations, segregation, compulsory labor and even foreign slavery, and many others. Africans have had the same unhappy experience.

Indictments of "racial discrimination" have been made too uncritically by nonwhite peoples, and they have been received too credulously by many sympathetic white people. They are in part conscious or unconscious propaganda designed to arouse and consolidate resistance to imperialism and colonialism. Rather than white versus yellow or white versus black, the alignment has actually been strong versus weak. For a time Hitler enslaved most of a white Europe and Japan a large part of yellow Asia ; and black nations have been known to hold white nations in subjection, as the story of Haitian-Dominican relations discloses. Generally speaking, the powerful states have been the white states and the weak states the colored ones. Inevitably white people came to feel "superior." Inevitably, too, yellow and black people came to explain their exploitation in terms of color rather than of weakness. The coincidence of white with strength and of yellow or black with weakness gives an undeniable plausibility and even some validity to charges of racial discrimination.

7. Ideological Universalism. By this term we mean the urge or drive to extend a given body of related beliefs throughout the world. It is motivated by the desire to make a particular ideology secure by making it universal. The impulse toward universalism has probably been felt by everyone whose brain has been disturbed by an idea, but we are here concerned only with those beliefs that are supported by instruments of national policy. Not every venture in widespread conquest, of course, has been prompted by the effort to implant or compel a way of thinking worthy of the name of ideology. Thus one may well doubt that Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, Genghis Khan, or even Kaiser William II aspired to anything like ideological universalism. They may be written off as seekers after power and glory. On the other hand, it seems hardly correct to restrict the term to modern times, as some writers prefer. The spreading of Mohammedanism by the sword, the Thirty Years War, and the early Napoleonic Wars appear to have brought rather fundamental values into conflict, with much of the world at stake. However one may feel about the newness of basic ideological issues, he will doubtless concede that not all modern wars have involved an antagonism of ideologies.

It is significant that ideologies have become more important in war at

the same time that war has tended to become total war. What is the relationship? Which is cause and which is effect? Lest we assume that total war is the monopoly of the twentieth century, we might recall the Punic Wars and the Paraguayan War, which were total to the point of the exhaustion or extinction of at least one of the participants. We must conclude that the stakes need not be deeply ideological to produce total war. But in modern times a combination of pressures has operated to discourage recourse to war for slight and flimsy reasons. Among these pressures we must include the technological developments that have made war so completely devastating and military inequality so starkly apparent, the staggering cost of war, the economic interdependence of states, the development of responsive and responsible government, a better-informed citizenry, the passing of monarchies with their dynastic rivalries, the fixing of boundaries, the growth of international law, and the emergence of institutionalized peace-keeping procedures. In the face of all these restraints, small states find it almost impossible to engage in private wars and powerful states resorts to war only when the issues evoke a national fervor which produces the unity essential to total war. Of course, well-directed propaganda will contribute mightily to that end. In other words, conditions in the modern world tend to prevent war between small powers for any stakes and between great powers for picayunish or middling stakes. They do not prevent wars between great powers or groups of powers capable of the mechanization that is essential for total war when the issues are deeply ideological. This has been the history of the past half-century, and it is the appalling threat of the future.

Total war, therefore, has been a factor -- but only one of many -- in making war increasingly ideological in nature. But it is also true that the presence of ideological issues has tended to promote total war, and this fact is of far greater moment to our generation. To say that one's ideology is at stake is to say that his way of life hangs in the balance. All the institutions and traditions that he cherishes may be torn from him and hateful ones may be put in their place. Add to this total stake the fact that mechanized warfare requires vast manpower and woman power in the production line, and the result is the entire adult population committed both emotionally and vocationally to war -- that is, to total effort.

Ideological universalism is in itself no threat to the proponents of any particular ideology, for it may remain an unimplemented aspiration ; but it becomes a threat when it is supported by aggressive designs and great military power. With certain qualifications, democracy is an unaggressive ideology, although those who urge preventive war would make it aggressive. Fascism, on the other hand, whether of the German, the Italian, or the Japanese variety, was patently aggressive, and its suppression required the all-out combined efforts of the supporters of two irreconcilable ideologies. And the central issue in world politics today is whether the survivors can get along together -- whether, in particular, the rulers of Communist Russia will be content with an ideology without universalism.

Finally, let us venture a few observations : 1. In theory, ideologies are rarely susceptible to compromise, although it does not follow that co-existence is impossible. That depends on the depth of the urge to universalism as well as upon the price tag of realization — whether the opposing military power makes the cost prohibitory. Something like a balance of power may effect a standoff or a spatial compromise. This is the assumption behind the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 2. If the Western community of states denies to communism the right to universalism, it must be willing to accept less than universalism for its own ideology. 3. An aggressive ideology, powerfully supported, must be guarded against on a thousand fronts, for its devices may be both completely ruthless and incredibly ingenious. 4. Democratic states must be on constant guard lest they sacrifice their distinctive liberties in the effort to combat repugnant ideologies. The loss may come through the laws themselves, as some conservative Americans believed to be the case in Socialist Britain, or it may come through the growing intolerance of public opinion, as evidenced by McCarthyism and witch-hunts in the United States. 5. Since ideological war between powerful states would almost certainly mean total wars, they should be avoided until the last honorable alternative has been exhausted ; they should be prepared against with the knowledge that they will be total wars and that, if they come, they must be fought with an awareness of total stakes.

THE PERSISTENT "WHY ?"

The world *is* in a mess. It has always been in a mess to the people of any given time, often only to have the next generation look back longingly at "auld lang syne." Regretfully, the candid historian must declare his judgment that "the good old days" never were and that "the bright new tomorrow" will never be.

But to say that our problems, like our poor, will always be with us, is not to say that they will always be the same problems. Again like our poor, we shall shed some of the old ones and gain — if gain is the word — some new ones. All of man's better impulses drive him toward "solving" the "problems" of his own day ; often he fails, rarely does he succeed ; frequently he is able to reduce their severity, to cut them down to manageable proportions. He then must learn to live with what remains. Perhaps time will remove or modify them ; perhaps a later generation will wage the fight more successfully, winning an inch here and an inch there.

The problems of international relations which we have listed and reviewed are only some of the major and obvious ones. To continue our analysis, we shall raise questions about the responsibility of man himself and some of his works for the inability of states to live together in peace and with a greater measure of cooperation. Here again the list is selective, not exhaustive.

Man Himself ? Let us begin by noting certain assumptions in religion and law. All ethical religions assume that man has freedom of choice in his conduct ; otherwise they would offer no more than sterile ritualism. Freedom of choice was implicit in the teachings of Jesus ; it is today often belligerently explicit in the sermons of evangelical ministers. It was long a basic assumption in criminal law. Most modern law, however, assumes that the criminal is a sick man, without capacity for socially correct judgments ; and punishment has to some extent given way to therapeutics.

If we take our bearings from science rather than from religion and law, the story is different. The works of Charles Darwin, particularly *The Origin of Species*, published in 1859, advanced a theory that with modifications has been generally accepted by modern scientists. Some theologians have been able to reconcile it with the Bible, while others have not. Darwin argued that man was not the product of instantaneous creation but had "evolved" through countless ages of time from a microscopic one-celled organism. Later writers, particularly Herbert Spencer and John Fiske, added to Darwin's thesis until they had formulated a theory of moral evolution. According to this, at some unknown point in man's ancestral lineage a rudimentary mind took form — a mind totally without capacity for moral judgment but devoted to survival, which had theretofore been a matter of chance. Moral sense appeared only with *homo sapiens*, but even then at first it only glimmered. As man's physical adaptation improved, his mind did likewise. He became able to understand better his own interests, and he slowly acquired that expanded consciousness of self-interest which is group interest or morality.⁷

When a society believes that certain values are to be cherished above certain other values or all other values, then the defense of the cherished values becomes the mandate of morality. This can mean that war becomes a moral obligation and peace a confession of moral delinquency. Or it is another way of saying that if men have a right to life they have a right to defend life — or a way of life — by whatever means may be necessary. But men go beyond the defense of true fundamental values, and, in the name of security or honor, they wage aggressive war. The urge to security is inseparable from the will to live, but security is always imperfect and relative. It may mean anything from a bag of corn to vast power and prestige. The ego, like the body, has caloric requirements.

It is doubtless the relativity of security that underlies the tendency of men and nations to magnify the matter of greatest annoyance into an intolerable wrong. Today, appalled by the stakes involved in the struggle of the Communist states against the free states, certain wars of the past century appear totally incredible. But would anyone dare to say that when the present great crisis has passed the allies of today will not become the enemies of tomorrow? Anglo-American cooperation with Russia faded away with the defeat of Nazi Germany. Should the Communist

⁷ See James H. Breasted, *The Dawn of Conscience* (Scribner, 1934).

menace disappear, what will happen to the British-American *entente*? To British-French collaboration? To British Commonwealth and Empire solidarity? To inter-American unity? Who can say that the present high resolves of these states to cooperate forever for peace and justice will not give way before new and increasing differences, once the shadow of Communist aggression has passed away? One might even contend that the hope of the Western world is the persistence of the Soviet threat.

We must conclude that men and states have a moral right to defend their basic interests, by war if necessary, but that psychological factors lead both men and states to a confused and changeable set of values.

Is It These? The search for causes of the world's ills might be further extended. Let us note a few more of these very briefly, if only to show that they cannot be regarded as getting down to basic causes.

The real culprit cannot be any particular country, for the same country may have been aggressive at some periods in its history and pacific in others. It cannot be the nation-state and its corollaries of nationalism and sovereignty, for conflicts among political and social groups were frequent before the evolution of the peculiar forms of political organization and behavior that have prevailed for the last few centuries. It cannot be any particular form of government, for governments of every kind have at times been aggressive. To be sure, modern totalitarianisms, notably fascism, have been especially prone to stir up trouble. Communism, linked to the power of the Soviet Union, raises new and perhaps greater dangers. If these modern totalitarian systems and ideologies are now basic causes of international friction, something new and alarming has been added to the world's problems.

Nor can the real offender be armaments, for these are more of a product of international suspicions and rivalries than a cause of war, and unilateral disarmament may actually increase the danger of conflict. It cannot be diplomacy, for that is only an instrument of policies, good and bad. It cannot be international law, for this law now operates in only a limited area, and it is singularly ineffective — or even inapplicable — in the most serious kinds of international disputes, namely those of a political character. It cannot be illiteracy, for the great wars have been among the most literate states. It cannot be industrialism, for wars are by no means peculiar to the industrial era or to industrialized countries. It cannot be capitalism, for this system has been associated with unprecedented progress and freedom and internationalism as well as with economic rivalries among nations and human exploitation. It cannot be imperialism, for instead of proving to be the final desperate stages of capitalism, as Lenin predicted, imperialism has given way to concepts of trusteeship and national freedom; and today, when imperialism, except perhaps in certain forms, is dying, and is everywhere on the defensive, the threat of war remains. It cannot be race, for wars have rarely had an interracial character. It cannot be religion, for no great war of the past three centuries has been provoked by primarily religious factors. It cannot be

poverty, for the wealthy states are precisely those which have done the bloodiest fighting.

If we have not yet found the common denominator in all the instances of conflict among states, it seems that we must accept one or the other of two conclusions : either that the common denominator is something we have not yet listed, or that there is none and that even basic causes differ from conflict to conflict. Let us answer the question in a conclusion embracing some positive views.

Pointing the Finger. The nature of very early man prescribed for him a line of conduct that would enable him to survive. He was concerned with the protection of his "interests" ; ethics and morality had nothing to do with what he did. Then, as society developed, he came to share his interests — or many of them — with his family, his tribe, his neighbors, his community, his sect, his nation, and his state. Coincidentally with this development systems of ethics and morality took form, even in very primitive societies. Men still believed that survival was a highly competitive business ; and, indeed, in many respects it was and still is. for the prerequisites of satisfactory living have never been present in a measure to meet the desires of all men. While the impulses of normal men do not drive them to kill and destroy wantonly, men have always been quick to resist threats to their interests, whether actual or traditional, material or ideological. Conflicts of interests within separate states are commonly resolved through the judicial and political devices set up within the states, but a significant restraining influence is reluctance to weaken the state as against other states. Certain historical developments have made states increasingly sensitive to threats to their national interests or "national security." More recently the complexity of international life has enlarged the area of national interests, and the mechanization of warfare has added to the penalty for insecurity. With, as yet, no substitute for the ultimate responsibility of the state for the welfare of its people, we are at a stage when the authority and power of the state are jealously guarded and sometimes precipitately invoked.

This is putting in briefest form the contention that international strife is due neither to the natural viciousness of man nor to any of the institutions that he has developed to serve his needs. Assuming that man was meant to live, it is hard to believe that his pattern of conduct could have been different. He has always defended his interests, and he always will. To insist that war has never done precisely that would seem to be a wholly indefensible argument. One schoolboy is quoted as saying, "A lie is an abomination unto the Lord and an ever present help in time of need." Nor does it make much sense to argue, as some modern writers are doing, that man's fundamental urge to cooperation has somehow been perverted into one of competition. The job ahead is not to deny conflicts of interests, still less to suppress them ; it is to achieve the maximum of adjustment and to tolerate the residue.

Our conclusion on the basic causes for the constant strife among states

is in some respects most unsatisfactory. It would be so much simpler if we could point the finger at communism, monarchy, poverty, or the like, and then get down to the business of eradicating it ; it would be even simpler to say that man is inherently and unchangeably vicious, for then we could give up. Instead, we are dealing with a complex of human nature and external realities. To encourage us, however, we have the solid facts that within the past two generations moral judgments have extended to war itself, and that today we are tackling the problem with more earnestness and experience than ever before. To that extent we have already progressed beyond our forefathers.

APPROACHES TO PEACE

The archives and libraries of the world contain many thousands of proposals of alternatives to war and of approaches to peace.⁸ A few of these have been tested by time and experience ; most of them are no more than paper plans. Some emphasize an attack on the underlying causes of war ; others stress methods of peaceful settlement of international disputes ; still others concentrate on the development of various types of security systems, with the object of making aggression unprofitable through the concerted action of peace-loving states. Some are based on relatively simple formulas or panaceas ; others call for a many-sided approach. Some seek to improve the existing state system ; others seek to replace this system with some form of world government or other supra-national institution. Some represent a unilateral, others a regional, and still others a nearly universal approach. Some call for the creation of new institutions or the strengthening of existing ones ; others stress the need for changes in the minds or hearts of men, especially of those in the seats of power. Some give priority to disarmament, others to security. Some place heavy reliance on methods of moral suasion, others on the organization of force. Some are based on the development of international law, others on laying the foundations of a true international community, still others on upholding concepts of international morality. Some place faith in treaties for the outlawry of war, for nonaggression, for neutralization, for cooling-off periods, for conciliation, or for arbitration ; others place no trust in such treaties, unless they are of the self-executing variety, and emphasize performance rather than promise.

Three of the many general approaches to peace may be called (1) the institutional, (2) the functional, and (3) the curative. These are not exclusive of each other, but the terms suggest the line of greatest emphasis. We shall note here some of the merits and the limitations of each.

The Institutional Approach. The number of international organizations in existence at the present time is truly staggering. We have already observed some of the deficiencies of many of them, as well as the difficulties

⁸ For an analysis of hundreds of peace plans, see Edith Wynner and Georgia Lloyd, *Searchlight on Peace Plans* (Dutton, 1944).

of coordination that have arisen. There is probably excessive confidence in the efficacy and potentialities of institutions in dealing with problems of war and peace. On the slightest provocation, whether on the national, regional, or universal level, a new institution or organization is created. The most outstanding and comprehensive of these today is, of course, the United Nations. Others of especial importance, which are basically political but are also comprehensive in character, are the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Organization of American States. There are no truly supranational institutions in existence at the present time ; those which have been created under the Schuman Plan are probably the closest approximations.

Institutions of many types are obviously needed, and they serve a highly useful purpose. Without them the world's work could not be done. They also provide invaluable experience in international cooperation. They supplement the normal channels of diplomacy and of contact between nations in an important way. But for all their merits, they are, after all, merely instruments, and their value depends upon the way in which they are used. Something more than instruments is needed if peace is to be preserved. If a multiplicity of organizations could achieve this goal, war would be as dead as the dodo.

Most of the plans for world government, whether limited or universal in scope, call for the creation of institutions of a supranational character.⁹ In fact, the institutional approach to peace relies mostly on structure and form, on the establishment of a wide variety of political institutions, some of a far-reaching character, to deal with the problems that beset the world. Some "institutionalists" would revise the United Nations Charter in such a way as to transform that organization into a United States of the World. Others would leave the UN more or less as it is, but would have as many of its members as possible join in establishing a separate federal structure with real power. The Atlantic Union Committee would form a federal union of the democracies of the Atlantic Community ; conceivably this might be a first big step toward a larger federation, but the Atlantic Union itself would be the nucleus of the Western world. Federal Union, Inc. —the organization headed by one of the true pioneers in the world government movement, Clarence Streit — is at present devoting most of its efforts to supporting the Atlantic Union proposal, although it advocates a larger and larger union as conditions permit. The United World Federalists take a more universal approach ; they would include even Russia and her satellites in their original union. One organization centered at the University of Chicago has already drafted a proposed constitution for a world federal union, and another, with offices in Washington and elsewhere, is making plans for a convention to draft a world constitution and

⁹ See *Revision of the United Nations Charter*. Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations on Resolutions Relative to Revision of the United Nations Charter, Atlantic Union, World Federation and Similar Proposals. Senate Report No. 2501, 81st Congress, 2nd Sess, Sept. 1, 1950 (Government Printing Office, 1950).

is doing a great deal of spadework in preparation for this convention, when and if it meets. World government associations of a similar sort exist in Britain, the Commonwealth countries, Western Europe, and many other places.

Proponents of world government render a genuine service by calling attention to distant objectives and by acting as gadflies to those who have the responsibility for the relations of states. They are, of course, vulnerable to charges of impracticality and of oversimplification of international issues. They tend to place too much hope in new institutions and constitutions, and to overlook the fact that before these instruments can be effective "there are foundations to be fortified and sturdier foundations to be laid." Professor Edwin D. Dickinson, who is a charitable critic of plans for world government, has thus commented on their limitations and their usefulness :

When presented as alternatives to what we have, they become positively harmful. Surely we cannot think seriously of loosening the hold on what we have in pursuit of the will-o'-the-wisp of a supreme parliament ! Surely we may not hope to raise the ideal superstructure until foundations have been more securely laid ! Peace and the good order must be built on experience. Order can never spring full panoplied from even the most inventive minds in conference or convention. These truths must be obvious. The way of experience may be hard but there is no other. If world government enthusiasts may become reconciled to these truths without too much impairment of their crusading zeal, there is no reason why they should not march helpfully in the vanguard of constructive effort.¹⁰

The Functional Approach. The so-called functional approach also gives considerable emphasis to institutions and organizations, but, as the term suggests, it is concerned more with the encouragement of international functional agencies, particularly those having primary economic or social objectives, or both, rather than political ones. The premise on which this approach seems to rest may be stated as follows : cooperation between nations is extremely difficult to achieve on the political level, for on this level matters of national pride and prestige, of balance of power and power politics in general, are of first importance ; on the other hand, nations are willing to work together in the wide area of economic, social, and technical activities, and such cooperation is not only valuable in itself but also helps to create the atmosphere and to forge the ties that bind nations and peoples together. The argument here is that it is more important to create common interests and interdependence than it is to establish security organizations or federal parliaments. As one exponent of this point of view puts it, "The only means through which political cooperation can ultimately be achieved is through gradual expansion of the existing areas of cooperation until the circles overlap and common national interests render closer political cooperation essential."¹¹

¹⁰ *Law and Peace* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1950), p. 134.

¹¹ See Philip E. Jacob, "The United Nations and the Struggle for World Welfare,"

Like proponents of world government, though in a different sense, the "functionalists" are open to charges of ostrichism. The political field is the main area of international conflicts, and precisely for this reason it is the vineyard in which the serious student of international politics must labor. He cannot eliminate political problems by trying to ignore them. It is all very well to promote health and sanitary measures, better agricultural methods, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the like ; but these steps by themselves will not resolve serious international disputes or build a peaceful world order. DDT and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are fine and worthwhile, but they are not substitutes for security.

The institutional and functional approaches are not incompatible. Both would operate to a great extent through organizations. One stresses political, the other economic, social, cultural, humanitarian and other non-political aspects. Organizations like the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the Organization of American States have agencies that are concerned with all phases of international life. The European Coal and Steel Community seems to represent an attempt to fuse the political and the functional ; or perhaps it would be more accurate to say that it seeks to achieve political ends through agencies which are essentially functional but which provide a base for further political development in the form of federation. The Plevin Plan for a European Defense Community was apparently designed to work toward the same objective in the same manner.

The Curative Approach. Nor is the so-called curative approach wholly divorced from the institutional and functional approaches. It, too, usually envisions the creation of organizations to fulfill its objectives. Many of these objectives are political, but more are nonpolitical and seem particularly adapted to a functional treatment. This approach is essentially a long-term one. It calls for the eradication of — or at least a frontal attack upon — basic economic and social and political evils or handicaps, such as poverty, hunger, famine, disease, illiteracy, racial and caste discrimination, and human oppression and misery, wherever they may be found. This is the purpose of many of the activities of the United Nations and of technical assistance and economic development programs of a bilateral and multilateral nature.

In the long run the curative approach should be the most fruitful of all, but in more immediate terms it cannot be concentrated upon to the exclusion of the others. It is one of the anomalies of our age that a great coun-

Pennsylvania School Journal, Oct., 1950, p. 60. A functional program in international relations has been strongly championed by David Mitrany, especially in his book *A Working Peace System* (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1944). This study is indispensable for anyone who wishes to explore the possibilities of the functional approach. E. H. Carr also sees more hope in the growth of international functional agencies than in those of a basically political nature. His views on this subject are developed in *The Conditions of Peace* (London, 1942) and in *Nationalism and After* (London, 1942).

try like the United States spends many billions on military preparedness and on military assistance programs and only a few millions on technical assistance and economic development projects ; that a great but under-developed country like India, faced with the vast problem of making her newly-won independence meaningful for the mass of her people, devotes between one-third and one-half of her total budget to military purposes, chiefly because of strained relations with her neighbor, Pakistan ; that the total costs of the economic and social activities of the United Nations to date have been less than the cost of one battleship. Yet these anomalies exist because every state feels compelled to give first priority to national security and to other immediate problems. Perhaps this is as it should be ; for peace must be safeguarded in order to allow time and opportunity for the curative approach to make itself felt. The waiting time is bound to be a long and dangerous one.

The Many-Fronts Approach. Obviously the approaches to peace are many. There is no single key, and possibly all of them together cannot unlock the door to a peaceful world. Reinhold Niebuhr has said that "the trustful acceptance of false solutions for our perplexing problems adds a touch of pathos to the tragedy of our age" ; yet Professor W. Friedmann holds that "one of the few fortunate developments of recent international politics is a healthy distrust of panaceas."¹² In approaching the problem of war and peace there is much to be said for concentrating on a few of the major issues and approaches, but without losing sight of the others. Even some of those who seem to put all their eggs in one basket are by no means unmindful that other baskets may be useful too. Thus a conference on world government in 1951 went on record in support of this view : "The approach to peace must, therefore, consist of two major parallel actions : the cooperative planning and building of a structure in which mankind could live at peace ; and the cooperative planning and carrying out of an effective war upon those social and economic evils which arouse men to a sense of injustice and move them to violence."¹³ The foremost living historian of civilizations past and present has raised two great issues for question and comment :

Can we find a middle way in international affairs between the old anarchy of independent states jostling against each other—an anarchy which, I believe, cannot go on much longer in its old form—and the extreme opposite regime of a world peace imposed by some single Power on all the rest? ...And can we find some middle course not only in the arena of international politics, but also in the social field, between the old inequality of classes, leading to subterranean class warfare, and a social revolution leading to the forcible abolition of class, which is the programme for which Communism stands?...I believe that the discovery of middle ways

¹² *An Introduction to World Politics* (Toronto, 1951), p. 56.

¹³ From the preamble of report of the Economic and Social Commission of the Fourth Annual Congress of the World Movement for World Federal Government, held in Rome in April, 1951 ; quoted in *Freedom and Union*, VI (June, 1951), 28.

of negotiating these two great questions of war and class is the supreme need of the world at present.¹⁴

CHANGES IN THE FACTORS OF POWER

We shall attempt here to suggest some possible changes that may significantly influence the world politics of years ahead. Much of what we have to say will be little more than speculation, but we shall rule out the whole realm of the improvable: the collision of worlds, interplanetary visitations, and the like. With less assurance, we shall also omit as unlikely—or at least as unforeseeable—the appearance of a new, powerful, and militant ideology and the rise of another evil genius with the abilities of Napoleon or Hitler. With at least these exceptions, let us try to list a few possible changes, say of the half-century to come.

Population Changes. Experts in the field of population tell us that Western Europe is about to level off in the number of its people, that it may before long even begin a slow decline. Eastern Europe will continue to grow. The situation in Asia is highly speculative, with uncertain factors being the improvement made in land use and the measure of industrialization. The population of China now appears headed for a greater slackening than that of India, with Japan somewhere between the two. On the whole, the rate of increase in Asia will continue to surpass that of the Western world. The center of gravity of the world's population will thus continue to move ever eastward. This is a fact of great political as well as economic significance. Statistics on Africa are obviously unreliable. That continent's population is thought to have remained fixed at about one hundred million between 1650 and 1850, but in the past century to have doubled. A continued increase may be expected, subject to many variables.

Latin America is expected to continue its population boom. One authority, cited earlier, declares that its population "is growing faster than that of any other major region in the world,"¹⁵ with a more than 40 per cent increase between 1920 and 1940, and with an expectancy in 1970 of between 200,000,000 and 225,000,000. Within fifty years it may be more than double that of the United States, whereas in 1900 it was about one half. The rate of increase in the United States will probably slow down, with an absolute decline a possibility by 2000; but in this connection it must be noted that today's population is substantially greater than that predicted ten years ago. Joseph S. Davis is more biologically optimistic than most writers; he predicts 50,000,000 more Americans by the end of the century.¹⁶ For the world as a whole, population is increasing at the highest rate in human history. We must remember, too, that shifting age

¹⁴ Arnold Toynbee, "The Study of History in the Light of Current Developments," *International Affairs*, XXIV (Oct., 1948), 564.

¹⁵ Kingsley Davis, "Latin America's Multiplying Peoples," *Foreign Affairs*, XXV (July, 1947), pp. 645-646.

¹⁶ "Fifty Million More Americans," *Foreign Affairs*, XXVIII (April, 1950), 412.

groups within the population may decisively affect a population's productive capacity and its military power. The import of these projections is that areas of higher living standards and more democratic institutions must face the prospect of an increasing disadvantage in one of the important elements of national power.

Natural Resources. Judgments on natural resources are necessarily tentative, partly because later discoveries may completely change the picture, partly because present calculations of reserves may be in error, and partly because scientific advances may well reduce the worth of some currently known resources and enhance the utility of others. In respect to the foremost of all natural resources — fertile soil — it may be assumed that progressive states will make its preservation one of the prime objectives of national policy. Less developed states will in many instances add immensely to their agricultural production through their own energies and through technical assistance programs. Indeed, discoveries recently announced may eventually bring into profitable use vast areas of land now completely unproductive. Perhaps the same general analysis will apply to forestry and animal husbandry. But the diligence of governments and the skill of scientists are unlikely to alter the specialization of areas in a wide range of agricultural products ; thus the United States will probably continue to depend on foreign sources for natural rubber, cordage fibers, silk, cork, certain vegetable oils, many foods and condiments, a great many medicinals, including quinine and opium, and innumerable other items. All states will doubtless continue to rely importantly on foreign sources, nearly all of them even much more than the United States.

The extent and distribution of the world's mineral resources have been discussed in an early chapter on the elements of national power. In the present stage of international politics, perhaps the most significant observation to be made is that the states of the Western world now possess a substantial margin of superiority in the production of most of the essential minerals, but that Eastern Europe and Asia contain resources of such magnitude that they already sustain enormous military power and that the differential in productivity may be expected to decrease and perhaps disappear altogether. The conclusions to be derived from this observation, however, must be tempered by the consciousness of a great many unknown factors. The accuracy of present calculations of reserves and the discovery of additional reserves are perhaps not the most important of these, even if, as we are told, Africa possesses "mountains of coal and uranium, vast deposits of copper and iron, and outcroppings of diamonds and precious metals,"¹⁷ and the polar regions have unmeasured riches. Technological factors may prove to be of decisive importance, involving the use of substitutes, the development of synthetics and alloys, the utilization of inferior ores, the harnessing of water power, the exploitation of the energy-producing potentialities of the atom, and the use of solar and tidal energy. These may alter the import of present resources.

¹⁷ Theodore H. White, "Africa Is Next," *Harper's Magazine*, Feb., 1952. p. 38.

Natural resources are so vital to the conduct of modern warfare that they may readily prove to be the crucial factor between any contending states or groups of states. In the present Soviet-Western antagonism, the advantage of the West is considerable, more so in industrial productivity than in reserves of essential resources.

Technological Advances. We may confidently and fearfully expect increased efficiency in the science of killing — atomic devices, hydrogen bombs, guided missiles, faster planes, super-schnorkels, lethal gasses, bacteriological weapons, and so on. Whether or not we reach push-button warfare, we can be sure that as long as states believe that their security is at stake they will give high priority to the means of defense. But there may be other areas of technological advance somewhat less directly but just as surely playing their roles in international relations.

What, for instance, would happen to "oil politics" if atomic energy supplants oil as motive power? What would be the political consequences if medical advances remove the population restraints in presently congested areas? Or if they extend life expectancy to eighty or a hundred years? What if revolutionary agricultural techniques provide the Indians and the Chinese with all the food they want? What if rain-making, the de-salting of ocean water, and the use of rumored new fertilizers add enormously to the arable surface of the earth? What if synthetic rubber drives natural rubber from the market and so afflicts great areas with poverty? What if other synthetics create like havoc among the growers of wool, flax, silk, and hides? What happens if our scientists present us with the long-threatened capsule diet? What are the political implications of a universal language? of a far more general distribution of newspapers, magazines, radios? indeed, of improved standards of living everywhere? What may come of more efficient techniques of propaganda? of the recently-developed satanic techniques or chemicals for extorting confessions from innocent persons? What may be the effect of giant international cartels? of more powerful weapons of economic warfare?

Perhaps the only certainty is that the future will bring many changes in our present techniques. In particular, "the potential 30 billion horsepower-hours in one ton of atomic fuel, which men are devising ways of unlocking for good or evil, raises another specter over the world."¹⁸ While one may view with apprehension an increase in man's ability to destroy, he should also bear in mind the probability that the science of the future will also enlarge man's capacity for good. The purposes to which he puts the tools of tomorrow will be determined not by the tools themselves but by the objectives he has in mind.

Other Possible Changes. We have just discussed population, natural resources, and technology — three of the elements of national power. Little need be said of possible changes in other elements, such as geography, morale, and leadership. Geography can be altered by the efforts of men,

¹⁸ Russell W. Davenport and the editors of *Fortune*, U. S. A. : *The Permanent Revolution* (Prentice-Hall, 1951), p. 186.

as in the building of canals and tunnels, the dredging of harbors, the straightening of rivers, the draining of swamps, the filling of shallows, etc., as well as by the actions of nature. Far more significant in recent centuries, however, have been the technological achievements which have in effect changed geography. The triumphs in transportation and communications engineering need no recounting here. Morale is now receiving a great deal of attention. Governments realize its importance, and they are coming to promote it by increased concern with the problems of all segments of the population, by extensive propaganda enterprises, and by mass education. Training for leadership is less difficult for dictatorial states than for democratic states : they can promise offices to men and women in training, and if they stay in power they can make good their promises, whereas no democratic government can assure high political office to anybody. Nevertheless, democracies can insist upon high standards for appointments to many technical and administrative posts. The choice of better elective officials can be encouraged, but not much can be done through legislative or executive action.

In addition to changes in the elements of national power, we must contemplate the virtual certainty of political changes of a fundamental character. Just what they will be is anybody's guess. Actually, of course, the attainment of something like a harmonious world order implies basic changes in political relationships, but in working toward that end we shall eventually have to cope with conditions quite different from those of today. For instance, what would be the effect if Great Britain should lose her status as a great power? Or if Pakistan, or the countries of the Arab League, or an independent North Africa should give effective leadership to the 230 million people of the Muslim world? Or if the Middle East should go Communist? Or if India should abandon her policy of nonalignment and take a vigorous stand one way or the other? Or if the Chinese and the Russians should together undertake large-scale aggression? Or if Japan should disappoint the hope of the West in her nascent democracy? What possibilities are there for dynamic nationalism in various parts of the world? What complications lie ahead if the alleged resources of the polar regions materialize? Suppose Argentina realizes her ambition of South American leadership? Is Nazism really dead? Can Germany be peacefully reunited? How long will Eastern Europe passively submit to Russian oppression? Indeed, how long will the Russians themselves submit? Is it conceivable that the counsels of madness might lead a jittery America into a preventive war? Will American foreign aid continue? If so, will it bring returns of progress and harmony or of parasitism and acrimonious charges of favoritism? Can the American economy stand the strain? Is it possible that Americans may lose at home at least some of the freedoms they now feel are imperiled from abroad?

The political pattern of the world is clearly in a state of transition, and fundamental changes must occur if it is to meet the imperatives of the atomic age. The inadequacies of the present pattern have been obvious for

a long time. H. N. Brailsford, for example, stated them a generation ago, in a book bearing the arresting title, *Olives of Endless Age : Being a Study of This Distracted World and Its Need of Unity* :

It seems, then, that our post-war political world is riddled with contradictions. It professes principles which it does not and dare not apply. Its equal, sovereign, national states are neither national nor sovereign nor equal. They enjoy the most varied degrees of effective independence. It is hardly too much to say that only the Great Powers possess that actual ability to move and act of their free choice, which truly constitutes independence.....

The political form of the world is a contradiction of economic good sense. The titanic power of our machines is fettered and lamed by our political folly... The political form of the world has ceased to correspond to its economic needs. The problem of our generation is to find this form.¹⁹

All this seems very much like saying that the future is uncertain. And so it is, but something may be gained by extending our view to much that now seems doubtful, for some of the possible will surely come to pass, Yet we do have a body of "knowns," and upon these the people of today must build their programs for the future. Working with these, let us observe the avenues of approach to the world of tomorrow.

THE SAME WORLD STILL !

It seems hardly necessary to emphasize the role of idealism in the lives of men. It is "the light on the horizon," "the dream of tomorrow," "the promises men live by." It is faith and hope and courage. It supplies the drive in the efforts toward a better world. But by itself it is not nearly enough. Fifty centuries of recorded history have shown the limits within which idealism must operate ; "experience," marking the possible as against the impossible, the practicable as against the impracticable, provides an equally necessary realism. He who has read history cannot avoid the conclusion that the rule of slow but uneven change will prevail in international relations as it has done for so long in all concerns of political life. "Peace by mechanism" is impossible. The answer is not that simple. The Bok Peace Award contest of 1923 drew out 22,165 plans. There must be quite a gap between making plans and making peace.

If a better world is not to be reached by some ingenious scheme of international organization, what then? Are we never to reach it, or are we to await some super-ingenuous scheme? The answer, as we have given it before, is that the world will always be in a mess but that through its own persistent efforts it may materially reduce the measure of its harassment. It may eventually eradicate war and other conflicts, but it will never give every man his own self-determined justice. As for a magic formula, we

¹⁹ Harper, 1928, pp. 58, 60, 61.

shall here at least avoid the inconsistency of offering one. Instead, we shall simply offer some speculations about the probable course of international relations for the foreseeable future.

1. All states will continue to regard their ultimate defense as their own strength and that of their trusted allies. Only there can they find full loyalty to their own special interests. And there, protected by sovereignty, they will cultivate their strength until and unless a new order of affairs makes it abundantly clear that their destinies are secure in other hands. No such assurance has yet appeared.

2. States will continue to pursue security through defensive alliances and collective security arrangements. Many such power alignments will be ad hoc in nature. Others, based upon a fundamental community of interests, will achieve a relatively permanent character.

3. For a long time to come states will aspire to a position where they can mobilize more power than their prospective enemies. In other words, they will remain conscious of the balance of power and seek to tip the balance in their own favor. They will do this in spite of international organizations and the elaboration of techniques for the peaceful settlement of disputes.

4. States will continue for a long time to place chief reliance for the settlement of their differences upon conventional diplomacy. Through this means they will foster trade, protect their nationals, and, as in the past, in many ways bring a degree of cooperation among states. They will privately and quietly resolve most disputes before these reach a serious stage.

5. Ideological conflict will persist as a characteristic of international relations. As total war has brought the possibility of total defeat and total penalties, all national ideologies will tend to acquire an urge to defensive universalism. Ideologies will long serve as tools as well as drives, for they have demonstrated their effectiveness as weapons of the state.

6. The United Nations will continue to provide a forum for the oratory and debates of the spokesmen of national states. It will pursue its vast program of international cooperation, making some gains that states will be loath to forego. It will do particularly good work in social, cultural, and humanitarian fields, and it will achieve some successes in its economic work. It will be less effective in dealing with political problems. Through judicious operation it may establish norms for the relations of states and so enlist a supporting world opinion. It will have to earn respect and authority ; it cannot legislate them.

7. Functional organizations will continue to gravitate toward the United Nations. Whether affiliated with the UN or not, they will direct international cooperation in many activities, drawing states closer together, often preventing differences from becoming conflicts, and do much to make cooperation a habit.

8. International law will be expanded and made more systematic. In-

dividuals may be made clear subjects in theory, but states will continue to be the chief "persons" in international law. Some gains may be made in improving the legislative, judicial, and executive functions of international organizations, but powerful states will retain a nullifying power in fact.

9. Regional groupings of states will continue, and the number may increase. With the right kind of leadership, these groupings can be made to serve local and regional interests and at the same time buttress the United Nations. A more powerful United Nations would not necessarily make them useless.

10. Technical assistance and economic development programs, however sponsored, will do much to elevate standards of living and rates of literacy. They will contribute to economic interdependence and to the removal of psychological barriers between states. They will help to end colonialism and imperialism. They may modify the problem of overpopulation. At the same time they will doubtless continue to be too limited in scope to deal with the vast needs of the underdeveloped countries and areas of the world. States will use good works as an instrument of national policy.

11. Individuals and groups will continue the use of pressure devices of all kinds to achieve their own objectives. Some men will persist in subordinating the common good to the selfish ends of profit, power, or personal obsession; we shall always be plagued with warmongers, profiteers, militarists, race-haters, monarchists, anarchists, Communists, robber barons, would-be messiahs, appeasers, peace-at-any-pricers, and a host of other vultures and crackpots. Some men will always be willing to join forces to sacrifice a larger society to achieve the "self-expression" of a smaller group, with the integrating denominator being race, language, geography, political or economic ideology, or something else. Some of these will be "good" men, others "bad" men, but who is to judge?

12. Other individuals will carry the fight for the ostensible ends of peace and good-will. They will give their time and money for the things they believe in, some giving a lifetime of service to a single cause, others giving momentary ecstasy to a succession of causes *du jour*. They will continue to band themselves together into innumerable societies to promote every conceivable and many inconceivable aspects of international relations. Some will act selfishly, others unselfishly; together they will do some harm, but they will do much good. Often they will act with too little information, too little realism, too much theory, too much optimism. Collectively, they will add much to the world's awareness of its great problems and to the resolution of people everywhere to support programs of constructive action.

If this preview of the world of tomorrow seems to mean that we and our descendants will still confront grave problems in the relationships of peoples, that we shall have little more to blame than the nature of man and his physical world, that new factors will certainly enter to modify or accentuate our difficulties, and that the road to peace is tortuous and altogether

uncertain, then we must recognize that we have been given the lot of man in all ages. The history of mankind is a story of trial and error, and the most inspiring part of it is the persistence of good men in good causes. The outlook is gloomy, but by no means hopeless.

For the present "top priority must.....be given to the transitional problem of keeping the future open until men can make the fundamental adaptation necessary to civilized life in the atomic era."²⁰ The problem is one that will tax the abilities of men and the vitality of political institutions. It means that the future holds in store challenges and anxieties, opportunities and perils, such as men have seldom if ever experienced in other "times of trouble."

In his *Civilization on Trial*, Arnold Toynbee has written a paragraph with which we may appropriately close this book :

There is nothing to prevent our Western civilization from following historical precedent, if it chooses, by committing...suicide. But we are not doomed to make history repeat itself ; it is open to us, through our own efforts, to give history, in our case, some new and unprecedented turn. As human beings, we are endowed with this freedom of choice, and we cannot shuffle off our responsibility upon the shoulders of God or nature. We must shoulder it ourselves. It is up to us.²¹

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APPENDIX

Countries of the World

NAME	SQUARE MILES	POPULATION	MEMBERSHIP							
			LEAGUE OF NATIONS	UNITED NATIONS	ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES	NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION	COUNCIL OF EUROPE	ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE	ORGANIZATION FOR EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COOPERATION	ARAB LEAGUE
			1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. Afghanistan	250,000	12,000,000	·	·						
2. Albania	11,000	1,175,000	·	·						
3. Andorra	190	5,000								
4. Argentina	1,080,000	18,564,000	·	·	·					
5. Australia	2,975,000	9,201,000								
6. Austria	32,000	6,954,000	·	·					·	
7. Belgium	12,000	8,841,000		·			·	×	×	
8. Bhutan	18,000	300,000								
9. Bolivia	419,000	3,125,000	·	·						
10. Brazil	3,285,000	57,098,000		·	·					
11. Bulgaria	43,000	7,600,000		·						
12. Burma	262,000	19,242,000		·						
13. Cambodia	67,000	4,500,000		·						
14. Canada	3,846,000	15,601,000	·	·		·				
15. Ceylon	25,000	8,385,000		·						
16. Chile	297,000	6,072,000	·	·	×					
17. China (Communist)	4,278,000	463,493,000	}	·						
18. China (Nationalist)	14,000	7,618,000		·						
19. Colombia	448,000	12,657,000	×	·	×					
20. Costa Rica	32,000	933,000	×	·	×					
21. Cuba	44,000	5,926,000	×	·	×					
22. Czechoslovakia	49,000	13,100,000	×	·				×		
23. Denmark	17,000	4,405,000	×	·		×	·	×	·	
24. Dominican Republic	19,000	2,347,000	×	·	·					
25. Ecuador	287,000	3,500,000	·	·	×					
26. Egypt	383,000	22,000,000	·	·						×

NAME	SQUARE MILLS	POPULATION	MEMBERSHIP							
			LEAGUE OF NATIONS	UNITED NATIONS	ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES	NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION	COUNCIL OF EUROPE	ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE	ORGANIZATION FOR EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COOPERATION	ARAB LEAGUE
			1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
27. Ethiopia	400,000	19,260,000	×	×						
28. Finland	130,000	4,216,000	×	×						
29. France	213,000	42,774,000	×	×			×	×	×	
30. Germany (East)	42,000	17,830,000	}	×					×	
31. Germany (West)	95,000	51,955,000								
32. Ghana (Gold Coast)	92,000	4,500,000								
33. Greece	52,000	7,819,000	×	×					×	
34. Guatemala	42,000	3,202,000	×	×						
35. Haiti	11,000	3,112,000	×	×						
36. Honduras	45,000	1,565,000								
37. Hungary	36,000	9,600,000	×	×						
38. Iceland	40,000	156,000								
39. India	1,270,000	374,469,000	×	×						
40. Indonesia	736,000	81,100,000								
41. Iran	628,000	19,000,000	×	×						
42. Iraq	168,000	4,871,000	×	×						
43. Ireland	27,000	2,933,000	×	×						
44. Israel	8,000	1,750,000								
45. Italy	116,000	48,000,000	×	×						
46. Japan	143,000	89,269,000	×	×						
47. Jordan	37,000	1,400,000			×					×
48. Korea (North)	48,000	9,000,000								
49. Korea (South)	37,000	21,000,000								
50. Laos	89,000	2,800,000			×					×
51. Lebanon	4,000	1,416,000			×					
52. Liberia	43,000	2,750,000		×	×					×
53. Libya	425,000	1,092,000			×					
54. Liechtenstein	61	14,800								
55. Luxembourg	1,000	307,000	×	×			×	×	×	
56. Mexico	764,000	30,000,000	×	×		×				
57. Monaco	370 acres	19,000								
58. Mongolia	626,000	2,078,000			×					
59. Morocco	172,000	9,650,000			×					

NAME	SQUARE MILES	POPULATION	MEMBERSHIP							
			LEAGUE OF NATIONS	UNITED NATIONS	ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES	NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION	COUNCIL OF EUROPE	ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE	ORGANIZATION FOR EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COOPERATION	ARAB LEAGUE
			1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
60. Nepal	54,000	6 to 7 million								
61. The Netherlands	13,000	10,747,000	✓					✓	✓	
62. New Zealand	104,000	2,170,000	✓							
63. Nicaragua	57,000	1,202,000								
64. Norway	125,000	3,440,000						✓		
65. Pakistan	365,000	75,842,000		✓						
66. Panama	29,000	863,000			✓					
67. Paraguay	157,000	1,530,000	✓	✓	✓					
68. Peru	482,000	9,200,000	✓	✓						
69. Philippines	116,000	21,940,000								
70. Poland	120,000	26,500,000						✓		
71. Portugal	35,000	8,693,000				✓			✓	
72. Rumania	92,000	16,800,000		✓						
73. El Salvador	13,000	2,122,000		✓	✓					
74. San Marino	23	14,000								
75. Saudi Arabia	927,000	7,000,000								✓
76. Spain	190,000	28,863,000	✓	✓						
77. Sudan	967,000	8,764,000		✓						✓
78. Sweden	173,347	7,235,000	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓	
79. Switzerland	16,000	4,904,000	✓						✓	
80. Syria	66,000	3,820,000		✓						✓
81. Thailand	200,000	19,925,000	✓	✓						
82. Tunisia	48,000	3,600,000								
83. Turkey	296,000	24,110,000	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	
84. Union of South Africa	472,000	13,393,000	✓	✓						
85. Union of Soviet So- cialist Republic	8,590,000	213,000,000	✓	✓				✓		
Armenian S.S.R.	12,000	1,282,000								
Azerbaijan S.S.R.	41,000	2,735,000								
Byelorussian S.S.R.	81,000	239,000		✓				✓		
Estonian S.S.R.	17,000	1,000,000	✓							
Georgian S.S.R.	29,400	3,555,000								
Karelo Finnish S.S.R.	69,000	600,000								

NAME	SQUARE MILES	POPULATION	MEMBERSHIP							
			LEAGUE OF NATIONS	UNITED NATIONS	ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES	NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION	COUNCIL OF EUROPE	ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE	ORGANIZATION FOR EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COOPERATION	ARAB LEAGUE
			1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Kazakh S.S.R.	1,073,000	6,146,000								
Kirghiz S.S.R.	76,000	1,490,000								
Latvian S.S.R.	25,000	1,800,000	×							
Lithuanian S.S.R.	25,000	2,700,000	×							
Moldavian S.S.R.	13,000	2,660,000								
Russian S.S.R.	6,502,000	111,000,000								
Tadzhikistan S.S.R.	55,000	1,455,000								
Turkmen S.S.R.	187,000	1,170,000								
Ukrainian S.S.R.	233,000	40,500,000		×				×		
Uzbek S.S.R.	157,000	6,000,000								
86. United Kingdom	94,000	50,887,000	×			×	×	×	×	
87. United States	3,027,000	165,248,000		×	×	×	×	×		
88. Uruguay	72,000	2,650,000		×	×					
89. Vatican City	109 acres	1,000								
90. Venezuela	352,000	5,758,000		×	×					
91. Viet Nam (North)	77,000	13,000,000								
92. Viet Nam (South)	50,000	10,000,000								
93. Yemen	74,000	5,000,000		×						×
94. Yugoslavia	99,000	16,927,000	×	×				×		

Statistics on area and population have been taken from Walter H. Mallory, ed., *Political Handbook of the World* (Harper for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1956). When figures were not available in this work other sources have been used — notably *The Columbia Lippincott Gazetteer* (Columbia University Press, 1952). Except for very small countries the figures have been rounded out to the nearest thousand.

Since sovereignty is a matter of degree, there is little agreement on the number of states now in existence. The above list is substantially complete; in fact, it contains some political units whose sovereignty may well be questioned. The inclusion of Morocco and Tunisia as sovereign states may be somewhat premature, in view of their "interdependent" links with France and the uncertainty of their present political status. The effective date of the formal independence of the Gold Coast was set for March, 1957. The new state has adopted the ancient name of Ghana.

Materials

FOR THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

(A Supplement to "Suggestions for Further Reading")

The Study of International Relations

- AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION, *Goals for Political Science*. William Sloane. 1951.
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- FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS PROJECT, Princeton University, *The Interdisciplinary Study of International Politics*. Foreign Policy Analysis Series No. 7.
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- UNESCO, *Contemporary Political Science : A Survey of Methods, Research and Teaching*. Pub. No. 426 of UNESCO. 1950. See especially Chapter 3.
- UNESCO, *A Handbook for the Improvement of Textbooks and Teaching Material as an Aid to International Understanding*. Paris. 1949.
- WARE, EDITH E., ed., *A Study of International Relations in the United States : A Survey for 1937*. Columbia University Press. 1938.

- WEBSTER, SIR CHARLES, *The Study of International Politics*. Cardiff. 1923.
- WILSON, HOWARD E., *Universities and World Affairs*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 1951.
- WOODWARD, F. L., *The Study of International Relations at a University*. Oxford University Press. 1945.
- World Politics*. A quarterly published by the Center of International Studies, Princeton University. Something of a professional journal for teachers of international relations. Contains many pertinent articles.
- WRIGHT, QUINCY, *The Study of International Relations*. Appleton-Century-Crofts. 1955. Required reading for teachers and advanced students.
- ZIMMERN, SIR ALFRED, *The Study of International Relations*. Oxford University Press. 1931.
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Textbooks, Selected Readings, and Bibliographies

- ALLEN, STEPHEN H., *International Relations*. Princeton University Press. 1920
- ARMSTRONG, HAMILTON F., ed., *The Foreign Affairs Reader*. Harper. 1947.
- BALL, M. MARGARET, and KILLOUGH, HUGH B., *International Relations*. Ronald. 1956.
- BARNES, HARRY ELMER, *World Politics in Modern Civilization*. Knopf. 1930.
- BARTLETT, RUTH J., ed., *The Record of American Diplomacy*. Knopf. 1947.
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- BOWMAN, I., *International Relations*. American Library Association. 1930.
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- HAAS, ERNEST B., and WHITING, ALLEN S., *Dynamics of International Relations*. McGraw-Hill. 1956.
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- LERCHE, CHARLES O., JR., *Principles of International Politics*. Oxford University Press. 1956.
- MANDER, LINDEN A., *Foundations of Modern World Society*. Stanford University Press. 1947. Second Edition.
- MAXWELL, BERTRAM W., *International Relations*. Crowell. 1939.
- MIDDLEBUSH, F. A., and HILL, N. C., *Elements of International Relations*. McGraw-Hill. 1940.
- MILLS, LENNOX A., and McLAUGHLIN, CHARLES H., *World Politics in Transition*. Holt. 1956.
- MOON, PARKER T., *Imperialism and World Politics*. Macmillan. 1926. Reprinted in 1942.
- MOON, PARKER T., *Syllabus on International Relations*. Macmillan. 1925.
- MORGENTHAU, HANS J., *Politics Among Nations : The Struggle for Power and Peace*. Knopf. 1954. Second Edition.
- MORGENTHAU, HANS J., and THOMPSON, KENNETH W., *Principles and Problems of International Relations : Selected Readings*. Knopf. 1950.
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- PADELFORD, NORMAN J., and LINCOLN, GEORGE A., *International Politics: Foundations of International Relations*. Macmillan. 1954.
- PLISCHKE, ELMER, *International Relations, Basic Documents*. Van Nostrand. 1953.
- REINSCH, P., *World Politics*. Macmillan. 1900.
- SAVORD, RUTH, compiler, *American Agencies Interested in International Affairs* Council on Foreign Relations. 1948. Revised Edition. A useful guide to purposes, addresses, publications, and other helpful data.
- SCHLEICHER, CHARLES, *Introduction to International Relations*. Prentice-Hall. 1954.
- SCHUMAN, FREDERICK L., *International Politics : The Western State System in Mid-Century*. McGraw-Hill. 1953. Fifth Edition.
- SCHWARZENBERGER, GEORG, *Power Politics : A Study of International Society*. Praeger. 1951. A text by an eminent English scholar. Contains two extensive bibliographies.
- SHARP, WILTER, and KIRK, GRAYSON, *Contemporary International Politics*. Rinehart. 1944.
- SIMONDS, FRANK H., and EMENY, BROOKS, *The Great Powers in World Politics*. American Book Company. 1939. New Edition.
- SPROUT, HAROLD, and SPROUT, MARGARET, eds., *Foundations of National Power*. Van Nostrand. 1951. Second Edition.
- STEINER, H. ARTHUR, *Principles and Problems of International Relations*. Harper. 1940.
- STRAUSZ-HUPEL, ROBERT, and POSSONY, STEFAN, *International Relations : In the Age of the Conflict between Democracy and Dictatorship*. McGraw-Hill. 1954. Second Edition.
- UNESCO, *International Repertory of Social Science Documentation Centres*. Paris. 1952. Despite the intimidating title, this pamphlet is a useful guide to institutions and journals relating to the social sciences, including international relations.
- WALSH, E. A., ed., *The History and Nature of International Relations*. Macmillan. 1922.

Periodicals

Completeness and accuracy in the listing of periodicals devoted to international affairs appear to be impossible. The following is a selected list of major periodicals in the field. Many other periodicals are devoted to specific aspects of international affairs, such as arbitration, demography, statistics, etc. For three excellent guides to general and some special periodicals, see the following entries under "Textbooks, Selected Readings, and Bibliographies" in this Appendix : Edward P. Davis, Ruth Savord, and UNESCO. Particularly valuable as a guide is the World List of International Relations Periodicals, prepared for the International Studies Conference (Paris, 1951).

- African Affairs*, London
American Journal of International Law, Washington
American Political Science Review, Columbus, Ohio
American Slavic and East European Review, New York
Americas, Washington
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia
Annals of the Organization of American States, Washington
Asian Review, London
Aussenpolitik, Stuttgart
Australian Outlook, Melbourne and Sydney
Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, Toronto
China Review, London
Chronique de politique etrangere, Brussels
Contemporary Review, London
Cuadernos de estudios Africanos, Madrid
Current Digest of the Soviet Press, New York
Current History, Philadelphia
Department of State Bulletin, Washington
Eastern World, London
Europa-Archiv, Frankfurt am Main
European Digest, London
Facts on File : A Weekly Digest of World Events, New York
Far Eastern Quarterly, Ann Arbor
Far Eastern Survey, New York
Foreign Affairs, New York
Foreign Policy Reports, New York
Foreign Service Journal, Washington
Headline Series of the Foreign Policy Association, New York
Hispanic-American Report, Stanford, California
India Quarterly, New Delhi
Inter-American Economic Affairs, Washington
International Affairs, London
International Conciliation, Boston
International Journal, Toronto
International Organization, Boston
Internationale Spectator, The Hague
Journal of Central European Affairs, Boulder, Colorado
Journal of International Affairs, New York (earlier, *Columbia Journal of International Affairs*)
Journal of Politics, Gainesville, Florida
Journal of the Royal Asian Society, London
Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Bristol, England
La comunita internazionale, Rome
La revue des deux mondes, Paris
Latin American Report, New Orleans
Middle East Journal, Washington
Middle Eastern Affairs, New York
New Times, Moscow
Pacific Affairs, New York
Pakistan Horizon, Karachi
Political Science Quarterly, New York
Politique etrangere, Paris
Politique internationale, Paris
Relazioni internazionali, Milan
Review of International Affairs, Belgrade
Review of Politics, Notre Dame, Indiana
Revue internationale d'histoire politique et constitutionnelle, Paris
Revue politiques et parlementaire, Paris
Round Table, London
Russian Review, New York
Slavonic and East European Review, London
Soviet Press Translations, Seattle, Washington
Soviet Studies, Glasgow

<i>Swiss Review of World Affairs</i> , Zurich	<i>World Affairs</i> , Toronto
<i>United Asia</i> , Bombay	<i>World Affairs</i> , Washington
<i>United Empire</i> , London	<i>World Affairs</i> , Wellington
<i>United Nations Review</i> . See also section on "United Nations Publications"	<i>World Affairs Interpreter</i> , Los Angeles
	<i>World Politics</i> , Princeton
	<i>World Today</i> , London
<i>Western Political Quarterly</i> , Salt Lake City, Utah	<i>Zeitschrift fur Geopolitik</i> Hamburg

Headline Series and International Conciliation

Two series of booklets deserve special mention in a listing of materials for the study of international relations. These are the Foreign Policy Association's *Headline Series* and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace's *International Conciliation*. The numbers of the *Headline Series*, six a year, are priced at thirty-five cents each; the issues of *International Conciliation*, five (formerly ten) a year, are priced at twenty-five cents each. Both are cheaper on an annual (or longer) subscription basis or in quantity lots. Orders should be addressed as follows: Foreign Policy Association, 345 E. 46th Street, New York 17, N.Y.; and Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N.Y., respectively. Many earlier numbers of both series are still available and useful. Following is a list of titles published in 1953-1956:

Headline Series

- | | |
|--|---|
| #95 <i>The Economy of Spain</i> | #108 <i>Yugoslavia between East and West</i> |
| #96 <i>What the Arabs Think</i> | #109 <i>South Africa</i> |
| #97 <i>Europe's Quest for Unity</i> | #110 <i>New Nations of Southeast Asia</i> |
| #98 <i>The Emergence of Modern Egypt</i> | #111 <i>Russia After Stalin</i> |
| #99 <i>China and the World</i> | #112 <i>The Future of Austria</i> |
| #100 <i>The U.S. and Latin America</i> | #113 <i>Disarmament: Atoms into Plowshares?</i> |
| #101 <i>Problems of East-West Settlement</i> | #114 <i>The New Britain</i> |
| #102 <i>The New Japan</i> | #115 <i>Great Decisions: The U.S. Looks Ahead</i> |
| #103 <i>Canada: A Great Small Power</i> | #116 <i>U.S. Foreign Policy: 1945-1955</i> |
| #104 <i>Burma: Land of Golden Pagodas</i> | #117 <i>The Many Uses of the Atom</i> |
| #105 <i>India Since Independence</i> | #118 <i>Mainsprings of World Politics</i> |
| #106 <i>Our Stake in World Trade</i> | #119 <i>Underdeveloped Lands: "Revolution of Rising Expectations"</i> |
| #107 <i>The U.S. and the UN</i> | #120 <i>The Population Explosion</i> |

International Conciliation

- | | |
|--|---|
| #485 <i>Narcotic Drug Control</i> | #488 <i>European Integration</i> |
| #486 <i>Food and Population</i> | #489 <i>The United Nations and Human Rights</i> |
| #487 <i>The British Commonwealth: Pattern of Cooperation</i> | #490 <i>Soviet Peace Offensives</i> |

- | | |
|---|---|
| #491 <i>World Health Problems; Barriers to World Health</i> | #501 <i>Self-Determination and Dependent Arcus</i> |
| #492 <i>The Refugee and the United Nations</i> | #502 <i>Financing Economic Development</i> |
| #493 <i>Issues before the Eighth General Assembly</i> | #503 <i>European Coal and Steel Community</i> |
| #494 <i>Korea: Collective Measures against Aggression</i> | #504 <i>Issues before the Tenth General Assembly</i> |
| #495 <i>The French Union</i> | #505 <i>Organizing for World Trade</i> |
| #496 <i>The World's Civil Service</i> | #506 <i>The Jordan River Valley</i> |
| #497 <i>UNESCO in Perspective</i> | #507 <i>The Quest for Equality</i> |
| #498 <i>The Arab League: 1945-1955</i> | #508 <i>Indians of the Andes</i> |
| #499 <i>Issues before the Ninth General Assembly</i> | #509 <i>Togoland</i> |
| #500 <i>South Asia: Unity and Disunity</i> | #510 <i>Issues before the Eleventh General Assembly</i> |

League of Nations Publications

The most comprehensive listing of League publications is Hans Aufricht, *Guide to League of Nations Publications* (Columbia University Press, 1951). Also highly useful is Marie J. Carroll, *Key to League of Nations Documents Placed on Public Sale 1920-1929* (World Peace Foundation, 1930). Four supplements by Miss Carroll bring the key through 1933.

Some League publications are now available through the United Nations. A selected number of these are contained in the catalogue, *Ten Years of United Nations Publications, 1945 to 1955: A Complete Catalogue*. Catalogues of League publications are no longer in print. Inquiries regarding these publications may be addressed to Sales and Circulation Section, United Nations, New York.

United Nations Publications

Next to the United States Government, the UN is the largest publisher in the world. Not only is its range of operations incredibly broad but it also has five official languages—Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish—and some of its publications are issued in all of these. In order to facilitate the identification of published materials, two sets of symbols have been worked out. One is the Document Symbol, which indicates the organ involved, the date, and possibly other relevant information. The other is the Sales Number. Every UN publication except the United Nations Treaty Series, the Official Records, and the various periodicals carries this number. It is usually placed on the inside front cover or on the reverse of the title page. It is given with title entries in UN catalogues, and it should be used in ordering.

Some knowledge of the Document Symbol is indispensable to readers who need to find their way around among UN publications, and it should be used in giving citations. To assist librarians, the UN issues a Documents Index Note Series. Number 43 of this series (ST/LIB/SER.D/43), dated September,

1952, and entitled *Consolidated List of United Nations Documents Index Series*, contains 31 pages of symbols. Useful guides are Carol C. Moor and Waldo Chamberlin, *How to Use United Nations Documents* (New York University Press, 1952), and *United Nations Documents Series Symbols* (as of November 15, 1955), published by the United Nations in 1956 (1956. I. 4).

In 1955 the United Nations Secretariat published a very comprehensive and well-indexed catalogue under the title, *Ten Years of United Nations Publications, 1945 to 1955 : A Complete Catalogue*. A supplementary *United Nations Publications, 1955* was issued in 1956. These catalogues do not list the publications of the International Court of Justice and the specialized agencies, which have separate publication programs. Inquiries about these should be addressed to the agency concerned. Certain descriptive publications dealing with the activities and achievements of the specialized agencies are included in the United Nations publications program.

The majority of the publications of the United Nations fall under two main categories ; (1) Secretariat Studies and Reports. This group is itself divided into seventeen categories, some of which are in turn divided. (2) Official Records. These comprise the proceedings of the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Disarmament Commission.

Special mention should also be made of the following : (1) The United Nations Treaty Series. Treaties and agreements entered into by member states of the UN are published in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter. This series is, in effect, a continuation of the League of Nations Treaty Series of 205 volumes. By May, 1956, it had reached 138 volumes. (2) Annual reports and year books. The most valuable of these for general purposes is the huge *Yearbook of the United Nations*, a comprehensive and authoritative survey of all UN activities. (3) United Nations mimeographed documents. Certain classes of mimeographed documents may be purchased by annual subscription. These include documents of the General Assembly and its committees, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council and its committees and commissions, the Trusteeship Council, the International Law Commission, and the Disarmament Commission. (4) Periodicals. The United Nations issues a large number of periodicals, mostly of a specialized nature. A comprehensive and attractive general periodical is the *United Nations Review*, the most valuable single general source of current information about the UN and its activities. The *Review*, a monthly, was preceded by the *United Nations Weekly Bulletin*, August, 1946 through December, 1947, and the *United Nations Bulletin*, a semi-monthly, January, 1948 through June, 1954. Among the more specialized periodicals are economic bulletins for Europe, for Latin America, and for Asia and the Far East, several statistical journals, and the *United Nations Documents Index*. (5) *A Bibliography of the Charter of the United Nations* (1955. I. 7), a comprehensive worldwide bibliography citing more than 2900 books, pamphlets, periodicals, articles and government reports which cover the history of the Charter, comparisons made between the Charter and the Covenant of the League, and specific chapters and articles of

the Charter. (6) *Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs* (1955. V. 2), a summary in five volumes of the decisions of the UN organs from the beginning of their functioning to September 1, 1954, together with related material, organized by Charter articles. (7) *Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, 25 April to 26 June 1945*. Volumes I-XV were published in 1945-1946 by the UN Information Organizations (London and New York) in cooperation with the Library of Congress. Volumes XVI-XXII were published by the UN in 1954-1956.

In the United States orders for UN publications (except the *United Nations Reporter*, the titles of the International Court of Justice and the Specialized Agencies, and the mimeographed documents) should be addressed to International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, and Canadian orders should be addressed to Ryerson Press, 299 Queen Street West, Toronto, or to Periodica, Inc., 5112 Ave. Papineau, Montreal.

Pan American Union Publications

The Pan American Union, central secretariat of the Organization of American States, maintains a broad publication program. Its books, pamphlets, and serials are commonly issued in English, Spanish, Portuguese, and French. They relate to a wide range of national and international interests in the Western Hemisphere. Some are elementary and impressionistic, others technical and highly specialized. Many are beautifully illustrated, and all are priced as low as possible. A complete catalogue may be obtained upon request to Publications Division, Pan American Union, Washington 6, D.C.

In addition to many separate works dealing with the sessions and actions of the several organs of the OAS, commerce and industry, agriculture, health, education, geography, history, travel, national and international law, housing and planning, statistics, and the social sciences, the PAU issues four serials of interest to students of international relations : *Americas*, an illustrated monthly magazine devoted mostly to nonpolitical aspects of life in the Americas ; *Annals of the Organization of American States*, a quarterly containing official documents of the OAS ; *Inter-American Review of Bibliography*, a quarterly containing articles, book reviews, bibliography of recent books and pamphlets, news, and other notes ; and the not-quite-annual *American Juridical Yearbook*, a survey of developments in inter-American regional law. The PAU offers an attractive "Depository Subscription" to all publications — books, booklets, reports, and periodicals—for twenty-five dollars a year.

United States Government Publications

The Government Printing Office in Washington issues a vast amount of material concerned with international relations. This includes a great many annual reports of Government agencies as well as specialized papers and

reports on the work of various committees and commissions and on the international conferences in which the United States has participated. The Government Printing Office issues many special subject catalogues of its publications. These are being constantly revised and reissued with a continuance of the same catalogue number. The *Monthly Catalog of United States Government Publications* is a guide to current publications. For a helpful list of representative publications of the Government Printing Office, see the appendix to the annual *United States Government Organization Manual* and Everett S. Brown, *Manual of Government Publications, United States and Foreign* (Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1950). Elmer Plischke, *American Foreign Relations: A Bibliography of Official Sources* (Bureau of Governmental Research, University of Maryland, 1955) is particularly useful. A list of unofficial bibliographies, collections of documents, and periodicals is given in the appendices.


The Department of State issues various guides to publications, bibliographies and lists of materials (including selections for basic reference collections in international affairs and foreign relations), chronologies, diplomatic papers (including the *Foreign Relations of the United States series*), treaties and agreements and information concerning treaties, materials on international conferences and organizations (including an annual report by the President to the Congress on *United States Participation in the United Nations*), digests of international law, information on diplomatic and consular missions and officials, various "series" of publications (the bulk of State Department publications), periodicals, press releases, and certain special publications. Two serials, in particular, are indispensable for the student of international relations. The *Foreign Relations of the United States* is a documentary collection which began in 1861 under a somewhat different name and which has now reached more than 170 volumes. Except for a few special issues the materials included are now fifteen years behind publication date, a condition which is due to inadequacy of editorial assistance and shortage of funds rather than to a kind of statute of limitations, as many persons assume. Special volumes include several supplements on World War I, thirteen volumes on *The Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, two volumes on *Japan, 1931-1941*, and collections of documents on *The Soviet Union, 1933-1939* and *The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945*. For an enlightening discussion of this series and of the screening involved, see E. R. Perkins, "Foreign Relations of the United States," *Department of State Bulletin*, XXVII (Dec. 22, 1952). The other essential serial is the *Department of State Bulletin* itself, begun in 1939 and issued weekly on a subscription basis. It is a useful source for news, official statements on policy, and current documentary materials.

Among the more substantial publications of the Department of State during the past decade are *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945* (four volumes) ; *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression* (eight volumes and two supplements) ; *Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg* (thirty-seven volumes) ; *Germany, 1947-1949 : The Story in Documents* ; *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1929-1941* ; *Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation : 1939-1945* ; *United States Relations with China, with*

Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949 (the China White Paper) ; and The United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, California, April 25—June 26, 1945 ; Selected Documents.

Much pertinent material is also published by other departments and agencies of the United States Government. Particular attention is called to the publications of the Defense and Commerce Departments, the Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, the International Cooperation Administration (which is technically a part of the Department of State) and its predecessors, the Foreign Operations Administration, the Mutual Security Agency, and the Economic Cooperation Administration.

Congressional publications are an increasingly valuable source of information on foreign affairs. These include the proceedings of the Senate and the House of Representatives (published in the *Congressional Record*), hearings, reports of committees, staff studies, materials printed as public documents, and the texts of bills and treaties. Two useful compilations of documents on foreign policy are *A Decade of American Foreign Policy : Basic Documents, 1941-1949*, Sen. Doc. No. 123. (Government Printing Office, 1950) ; and *Review of the United Nations Charter : A Collection of Documents* Sen. Doc. No. 87, 83rd. Cong. 2nd. Sess. (Government Printing Office, 1954).



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